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***THE CHANGES OF SPAIN TOWARD THE WESTERN
SECURITY POLICY***

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An abstract cannot provide in-depth analysis of the Francoist Spain foreign policy. Nor can it cover all the dimension of the internal circumstances. Instead, the aim of this work is providing a conceptual framework to explain the evolution of the relationship between the Spain of Franco and the United States.

This work focuses its attention on three key moments of the relationship between the western security policy toward Spain: the exclusion of Spain from the economic aid provided by the European Recovery Program; the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the consequent exclusion of Spain; the exigency of the bilateral relationship between the Francoist Spain and the United States of America symbolized by the Pact of Madrid signed in 1953 and its renewals until the inclusion of the newly democratic Spain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (from now on referred as NATO).

Generally speaking, the role of the economic aid of the European Recovery Program was very important for the reconstruction of the Western Europe and the exclusion of the Francoist Spain determined a serious drawback for the economy of the Spanish regime. The criticism toward Spain, in the second post-war period, was a direct consequence of the 1943 movie “Inside Fascist Spain”, in which the Spanish regime was pictured as a fascist state under the help of the Nazi Germany. This given state was also represented by Truman’s behavior, he was concerned about the religious discrimination pursued by Franco’s regime. Furthermore, the denigration toward Spain became evident in the last two Inter-Allied Conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, as well as in the conclusions of the San Francisco Conference. Firstly, the *Yalta Conference* made it clear the failure of the Spanish approach to the western States; this project was managed by the Duke of Alba – the Spanish ambassador in the United Kingdom – and consisted in an agreement between Spain and the United Kingdom, aiming to prevent an alliance among the western countries and Spanish most infamous enemy: “*la Rusia comunista*”¹. However, Churchill’s response was very clear: the government of His

¹ Espadas Burgos, Manuel, *Franquismo y Política Exterior*, Madrid, Ediciones Rialp, 1988, p. 169.

Majesty could not sign an agreement against the Soviet Russia, that was considered – at the time – an ally. At the *San Francisco Conference*, Spain was not invited and during the session, held 19th June 1945, the Mexican delegate, Luis Quintilla, intervened focusing his attention to the conditions of the future art.4 of the UN Charter², and proposed that the article should not be applied to those State created with the support of the military forces defeated by the United Nations during the second world war. This suggestion – a clear reference to the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War – was approved and it provided Spanish exclusion from the UN organization. The *Potsdam Conference* – important for the consequence of the change among the main characters of US politics, as well as the UK politics – was significant for the different position toward Spain expressed by Stalin and Churchill; the secretary-general of the PCUS prepared a document in which he articulated the immediate sanctions to apply against the Francoist Spain, based on a triple accusation: firstly, the idea that the regime of Franco was imposed by the Nazi Germany and the Fascist Italy; secondly, the idea that Spain represented a peril for both European and South-American countries; thirdly, the imposition of terror against Spanish population. Churchill was against any idea of sanction, he thought that those sanctions could draw a different path from the one pictured by Stalin and his position prevented from taking any decision on the theme. But this little opening to the regime was interrupted by the victory of the Labour party at the UK'S election and as one might expect, this implied a new conduct of the UK's foreign policy towards Spain. The communiqué of the Potsdam Conference, hold on August 2nd, affirmed that – in the case of the admission of Spain in the UN – USA, UK, URSS would express their oppositions in the Council of Security. As a consequence, and as a result for the pressures made by the delegates of Panamá and Poland, 12th December 1946 the General Assemble emitted an international condemnation against the regime of Franco, excluding Spain as a member of the various international organizations. That was the maximum juridical expression of Spanish isolation. In the meantime, the French government, held by Félix Gouin, provided the closure of the border with Spain. Despite these events, the beginning of the Cold War represented a turning point for Spain. In the summer of 1946 there were three stress

² The article 4 of the UN Charter refers to the procedures of admission for the new members of the United Nation

areas, under British control, in which Russian actions caused some problems. Those zones were the Middle East, namely for what concerned the situation in Iran; the Eastern Mediterranean, regarding Turkey and Greece; and lastly the administrations of the Allied-Occupied Germany areas. In front of this scenario, the British ambassador in Moscow – Frank Roberts – started to construe the Soviet actions as part of an expansionist plan, driven to defeat the British influence in those territories not directly subjected to US interests. The analysis of the UK ambassador implied also the conclusion that UK was alone and in a difficult economic situation that could also prejudice the possibility to finance the troops outside the national territory. Because of this, John Maynard Keynes was named by UK government to negotiate the allocations of new funds for the reconstruction, but the new economic aid did not help the British economy³ and the continue aggression of the Soviet Union made USA to rethink their intervention in the foreign policy. On 12th March 1947, the President Truman announced, in front of the Congress of the United States, the widely known “Truman doctrine” replacing UK in Turkey and Greece. Despite this economic intervention, the USA understood that the expansionist action held by the Soviets was not limited to those stress points, but it was starting to be more incisive especially regarding the occupied area of Germany under Soviet control and among the European States under the “Soviet umbrella”. It was necessary for the USA to create a bigger aid program for all those countries that wanted to build stable and durable relationships with the USA. This idea came from the US analysis of the two world conflicts: for USA the origins of the two world wars were the establishment of autarchy and protectionism among European countries. However, Spain was excluded by the two Foreign Ministers of France and UK, respectively Bidault and Bevin, appointed to deliver the list of the European receiver countries to the US. In a communiqué of 29th June 1947, Bidault and Bevin excluded Spain from the Paris Conference. Consequently, the Francoist regime started to activate its diplomacy in order to find some allies that could support the Spanish candidature for the ERP program. Fundamental was the support of Portugal. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Martín Artajo, ordered his ambassador in Lisbon, Nicolás Franco, to pressure Oliveira Salazar with the intention of letting him sustain Spanish candidature. In spite of this, the Portuguese mission was not successful. The

³ In fact, one of the conditions of this new economic agreement was the decision to make the pound convertible.

problem was not convincing the USA politics, but the European politics. Even the US decision to give the final word at the Paris Conference to decide which country should participate and which not, did not help the fate of Francoist regime.

The birth of the NATO was a long process, that since its beginning excluded the possibility of a Spanish participation. To understand the exigency of a military defense alliance in the late 40's we should recall the events in Czechoslovakia. The 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état made clear to the Foreign Ministers reunited at a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers that it was necessary to provide a security pact in order to guarantee the signatory Countries a protection from an eventual Soviet attack. Hence, 22nd January 1948 British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin addressed a speech at the House of Lords. In his intervention, viewing the critical moment in post-war world, he proposed the creation of an organism in the West, calling it as a "*spiritual union*". Consequently he worked in order to build this union and the 17th march 1948 – one month after the coup d'état of Prague – the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg signed the Pact of Bruxelles, that defended the five Countries from a German attack, clearly a reference to the URSS. Despite this important first step, the USA's absence made this alliance not so credible as to represent a real threat for enemies. Accordingly to this inadequate association, that same day, Truman promised US military support to the European Countries participating in the Pact of Brussels. However, the promise made by Truman without a constitutional support of the US Senate was vain word. The President was fortunate enough to find in the chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, an ally. Undoubtedly the Vandenberg resolution⁴ was very important because, reaffirming the purposes of the US foreign policy that is the peace building and the security through the United Nations, it gave the President the power to make alliances and other collective agreements for self-defense in accordance with the UN Charter. After only one month since the approval of the *239 Senate Resolution*, on 6th July 1949 the negotiations started. Negotiations that, the 4th April 1949 would lead to the *North Atlantic Treaty*. The discussions showed mainly two positions: one supported by the French and one supported by the US. France proposed to integrate USA and Canada to the former Pact of Brussels, without signing a new Pact. In spite of this

⁴ S. Res. 239

position, USA knew that the *casus foederis* of the Pact of Brussels was too tight and would cause serious problems at the time of the ratification in the Senate. For this reason, the model used was the Pact of Rio, which provided – after the request of the State/s directly attacked – to the the Contracting Parties may determine the measure to take as response. In other words, the fifth article of the NATO do not provide a direct response, but it provides the examination of the attack by the contracting Parties. At the end of the negotiating work five other States were invited: Italy, Norway, Denmark, Island and Portugal. It is very important to recall that the North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are not the same thing.

In order to understand the difference between these two, it is important to analyze the effects of the Conflict in Korea. On 25th June 1950 the North Korea of Kim Il Sung attacked South Korea governed by the President Sygman Rhee. This conflict was very important, regarding to the effects on the international relations, in consequence of the recent division of Germany⁵. The war in Korea represented a strong incentive because it seemed to confirm the NSA hypothesis of the “Fundamental Design of the Kremlin”. The events in Korea affected the exigency to build a security organization in the field of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the 1950 North Atlantic Council held in New York, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, proposed an implementation of the US presence in Europe under the condition of building an European united army in which there were also German troops. This proposal was rejected by France worried about the re-militarization of Germany and Jean Monnet elaborated the unfortunate CED⁶ project. Consequently, on 18th December 1950 the Parties involved in the North Atlantic Treaty gathered together in Brussels, in this occasion the US delegation reiterated the necessity of a German participation in the Alliance. Nevertheless, the solution was found only in 1955, in that meeting was established the Military Committee (MC), a permanent organ which reunited the highest representatives of all the armies of the contracting Parties. In addition, in the North Atlantic Council of London was created the Standing Group (SG), composed of the Chief of defense Force from France, Great Britain and USA. Even so,

⁵ Federal Republic of Germany (FRD) established the 23rd May of 1949. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) established the 7th October of 1949.

⁶ An European project that provided the integration of small unity of the different European armies, even the inclusion of Germans battalions, the creation of an European Defense Minister, Parliamentary Assemble and a common budget. This project was rejected at the ratification process by the French Parliament the 30th august 1954, marking its ending.

the most important decision was the creation of the “Supreme Allied Commander” charge given to the General Dwight Eisenhower.

The aggravation of the international contest, caused by the Korea War, was important in the re-definition of the US security policy toward Spain. On 18th January 1950 Dean Acheson, in a letter to Senator Tom Connally – at the time chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – expressed the position the Department of Spain faced to the “*cuestion española*”. He affirmed that there were no alternatives, in Spain respect to the Francoist regime and that an economic aid should be addressed to help the development of a democratic political, economical and military system. In spite of this, the opinion of the Secretary of State would change in a couple of months. With the incoming Conferences regarding the construction of the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, Acheson started to speculate on the possibility of incorporating Spain – in a direct or indirect way – within the North Atlantic Alliance. If the Secretary of State invited to wait until better times, Omar N. Bradley – the President of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – thought that the USA should ascertain Spanish cooperation in the hypothesis of a war, for this reason he suggested to normalize the diplomatic relations with Spain in order to provide economic and military aids. However, on 16th June 1950 Truman rejected The Pentagon’s proposal, defining that suggestion as militaristic and non-realistic on account of the circumstances of the moment. In the meantime, at the Senate started a debate about an amendment to the Foreign aid program. Namely, the Senators McCarran and Brewster promoted a revision of the allocation of funds directed to the foreign countries, providing an endowment of 100 million to Spain, to be delivered through the Export Import Bank. But, the intervention of the President stopped McCarran and Brewster’s proposition. Even so, the Congress men pro-Francoist regime prepared a “*jugada bien pensada*”⁷. On 31st July 1950 Truman arrived in the Senate with a view to press for the allocation of 4,000 million for the program for the foreign economic aid. In this situation the Senator McCarran presented a new amendment concerning a 100 million grant to Spain. After Joseph C. O’Mahoney proposed that the concession should be administrated by the Export Import Bank, excluding the interference of the Department of State, the Senate approved with 65 votes in favor and

⁷ Viñas, A., *En las Garras del Águila*, Barcelona, Crítica, 203, p. 78.

15 votes against. The 62,5 million⁸ made Spain to be the only European Country that had not signed any prior agreement or submitted to US analysts the state of health of Spanish economy.

The pact of Madrid represented for Spain the end of international isolation and the start of a bilateral relationship with the United States. In the NSC 72/6 the National Security Council stated that Spanish inclusion in the NATO was a priority. However, at the time there was a difference between the Department of state and the Department of Defense. The Department of the State reiterated the existence of clear limits for the cooperation between the two States. On the contrary, the Department of Defense considered unnecessary any further agreement between the two administrative branches and suggested the beginning of the negotiations. After some months of inactivity, by the middle of February 1953 the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, solicited the reaching of an understanding between the two Departments. After the National Security Council reunion of 13th May 1953 a settlement was made, now US could speak with only one voice. After few months of negotiation at the Palacio de Santa Cruz, on 26th September 1953, the Pact of Madrid was signed. It was composed by three “*convenios*”: one regarding the mutual defense, the second regarding the economic aid, and the last one regarding the explanation of the defensive nature of the Pact. Even if Franco started to declare that “Spain now makes the international politic”⁹, one of the most important fact of this Pact was the amount of the concessions made by the secret clauses. Those clauses corrode the sovereignty of the Spanish government, contradicting what was said in the public acts.

The renewals:

1963

The event that facilitated the renewal of the 1953 Pact of Madrid was surely the Cuban missile crisis. The Francoist regime was not pleased with the resolution of the crisis: the peril of the expansionism of the Castrism was not neutralized and the US decision to impose economic embargo toward Cuba had the effect to increase the Anti-American faction. Even so, the US decision to install Polaris missiles in the Rota base added to the

⁸ The sum was reduced in order to reach an overall consensus on the matter.

⁹ Espadas Burgos, Manuel, *Franquismo y Política Exterior*, Madrid, Ediciones Rialp, 1988, p.198.

Spanish bases more value in the terms of geo-strategic importance. At the end, the only result obtained by Franco regime was the signing of a joint statement, in which the USA admitted the importance of Spain in the terms of security policy as well as the development of the Atlantic and Mediterranean zones.

1970

The negotiation that preceded the signing of the 1970 *Convenio de Amistad y Cooperación* was influenced by the Palomares accident of 17th January 1966¹⁰. This event made the Spanish diplomacy more exigent requesting the entrance in the NATO and the USA support in the process of association at the CEE. In the *Convenio de Amistad y Cooperación*, the will to transform the Pact into a Treaty was not reached. In spite of this, the newly Spanish Foreign Minister reached the result of eliminating all the secret clauses.

1976

The international contest helped the Reign of Spain to negotiate with the USA a Treaty and no longer a *Convenio*. After Franco's disappearance, the Ford Administration accelerated its efforts to reach a new agreement on the basis. For the Spanish delegation – now represented by the King Juan Carlos and the Foreign Minister José María de Areilza – it was important to equalize the *Convenio* to a Treaty. In other words, Spain wanted to receive from the US Congress an approval as to the democratic transition held by the monarchy. The “*Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación*” was signed on 24th January 1976, and Areilza qualified it as an “*excelente regalo a la monarquía*”.

To conclude, the impediments to the entry of Spain in the NATO ceased only after the demise of Franco. The negotiate signed on 30th May 1982 provided Spain its membership both to the North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO. Even the consequent referendum of 1986 did not cause a problem for the membership of State and after the victory Spain started to be a real actor in its approaches to the NATO, joining the

¹⁰ In that day, there was a there was a clash between a Spanish tanker KC135 and a USA bomber B52. Thus , 3 thermonuclear bombs carried by bombardier were dropped, two of them caused – once on the ground – caused a detonation of low intensity, sparking fears of radioactive contamination.

mission of 1991 in the Gulf War, supporting the US-British-French intervention in Iraq and choosing of Madrid as the venue of the Peace Conference in the Middle East.