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**Hua-Yi Identity and Chinese Non-Expansion Commitment: A  
Study on Wars During the Early Period of Tang Dynasty**

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## Summary

Long peace is not an unbelievable but a common situation in ancient East Asia. Compared to modern long peace in the relative terms, such as the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana, *Sinic Pax* is different in a sense that the underlying logic and operational principle is different from modern international system. Regarding to long peace in ancient East Asia, there are several theories and explanations. However, these theories and explanations tend to take Chinese non-expansion commitment as granted or set it as premise. Without deep research on why China was willing to constrain itself from invasion or expansion, blind acceptance of stipulation of Chinese non-expansion commitment is irrational and self-deceptive. Because it hard to image that a hegemony will not try to transform its formidable power and incomparable wealth into territorial expansion in an anarchic world, which might help to survive in the sense of defensive realism, or which might reflects its success of pursuit of power in the sense of offensive realism. All theories and explanations reduce Chinese non-expansion to premise are doomed to fall into the utopian pitfall, which idealizes and then beautifies China as benign and kind hegemony without 'evil' ambitions according to Chinese pacifist and inclusive rhetoric written down by proficient Confucian officials of Chinese Dynasties. In contrast with scholarship believing China's non-expansion commitment, some scholarship focuses on Chinese expansion and then put forwards that China seldom invaded its neighbors because China was absent of capacity to do it or China could get less or even lose to do it. In the sight of this sect, Chinese non-expansion commitment is more like consolation deceiving itself of maintenance of predominance and superiority and swindle diluting its neighbors' vigilance than reality. Therefore, there is a crucial need to find out whether such commitment existed in ancient East Asia and to what extent that it was accepted by Chinese tributaries. In order to explain it, identity will be applied here. According to logic of determinant influence of identity to interest and indirectly to activities, this commitment existed as a result of China's effort to conserve Hua identity, which required observation binding obligation originated from Hua-Yi identity, and this commitment would be accepted by its neighbors in different levels varying with the level of their acceptance of Yi identity. Then quantitative examination of these two hypotheses focuses on wars during early period of Tang Dynasty.

### **1. Long Peace in Ancient East Asia and China's Gravitational Role**

Since entrance of 21<sup>st</sup> century, East Asia has been rising in the world as an economic and political pivotal region. However, unlike recent disintegration of East Asia, it was an integrative regional

system of self-fulfillment and self-maintenance in the pre-modern time, within which China had played a gravitational role. Not only in the economic field, East Asia as a system had its shadow in the cultural and political field as well. However, East Asia as a geographic and academic concept remains indistinct and controversial varying from different scholarship concerning ancient East Asia, despite it functioning as an integrated international system. Partially, it can be ascribed to the concept of East Asia *per se*, which was an exogenous concept envisioned by the West for the sake of differentiating and marking their global colonies. Although whether it's reasonable to claim that this concept is "the product of self-centered division of World by the West ideologically" cannot be answered without any bias, (Wang and He 2014: 161) East Asia as an operational term is prevailing in the scholarship and daily life as well. Furthermore, East Asia and China are so entangled that it's difficult to separate one from another in analysis of inter-state relations.

### ***1.1 Cultural Ancient East Asia and its Chinese Origins***

Ambiguity of ancient East Asia as a scholar term is embodied in its constitutive states or political units. Owing to attention to different aspects of ancient East Asia of scholars, its constituents varies from only 3 states or political units to more than 30. However, within numerous delineation of scope of ancient East Asia, two main criteria can be concluded, according to which ancient East Asia is defined and distinct from other international systems.

The most applicable criterion for definition of ancient East Asia is the common culture shared by the alleged "Confucian states"<sup>1</sup>. Ancient East Asia defined by this criterion is also called "East Asian cultural cycle" (Gao 2008: 227~236), "the Confucian space" (Kelly 2011: 414), "the inner core of the Chinese-dominated regional system" (Kang 2007: 25~29; Kang 2012: 25~53). Regarding to the members of East Asia, numbers of Confucian states are fluctuant chronologically. However, three states, apart from China, can be seen as Confucian states constantly: Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Additionally, several historically existent states can also be seen as Confucian states, such as Balhae, Ryukyu Kingdom. However, unlike the classic and existing to date Confucian states, they were annihilated and then incorporated into other states.

Within these states, several aspects can be concluded as embodiment and expression of this cultural criterion, based on which the Confucian states can share a sense of "we-ness". These aspects

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding to relations between sinic culture and Japanese one, Huntington thinks they are different, but both of them are the offspring of Chinese civilization but Japanese civilization went on a way of self-construction. However, Huntington doesn't explain what is the most different or what is similar between them. He makes Japanese civilization as an independent catalogue, in my view, partly because he tries to conciliate with "most" scholars who insist "Japanese as distinct civilization". Furthermore, he doesn't negate Japan's incorporation of Confucianism. (Huntington 1996: 40~55)

include Chinese characters, Confucianism, statutes system, (Sinicized) Buddhism, technology, customs and conventions, suzerain-vassal relationship, emperor institution, bureaucratic system, educational system and so on. (Fairbank 1968a: 1; Feng 2004: 1~3; Gao 2008: 227~235; Kang 2012: 33~49; Nishijima 2000: 5~7; Wang 2008a; Wang 2008b) Four fundamental characteristics, *inter alia*, can be extracted from the above lists as the most distinctness from other cultural cycles or other international systems. They are Chinese characters, Confucianism, political institutions, and Sinicized Buddhism.

### ***1.2 Political Ancient East Asia and its Chinese Centricity***

Another criterion for defining East Asia is political interaction between states of East Asia. That is, if there exists substantial interaction politically and such interaction influences each state's, both internal and foreign, policy-making, these states constitute East Asia. According to it, East Asia is a regional space comprised of China Proper, Confucian states, Inner Asia, and, sometimes, Southeast Asia. As a result of this criterion's focus on interaction with China, its members was in flux.

Compared to the cultural criterion, this criterion has its own advantages in analyzing ancient East Asia. First, if the Chinese cultural cycle were taken into consideration, it will be easy to discern, however, that Chinese foreign policy is not as reasonable and coherent as it should be. Second, although steppe nomadic polities seldom adopted Chinese institutions and culture and maintained their own customs and conventions, mutual learning and, even, convergence did happen, especial in the frontier area between China Proper and Inner Asia, let alone the alien Chinese Dynasties that got themselves sinicized as a result of admiration for the splendor and superiority of Chinese culture and in order to rule the Han nationality who outnumbered them.

### ***1.3 Ancient East Asia as an international system under Chinese Superiority***

Ancient East Asia, as an international system of self-fulfillment and self-maintenance as discussed above, should be defined as operational as possible. Therefore, ancient East Asia is an area as international system of hierarchy comprised by political units interacting with each other around China as center so deep that their internal and foreign policy-decisions are influenced by other states and sharing a common cultural recognition despite the extent varying from realization and pragmatic utilization to adoption into state-building and institution-design and sinicization. That is, first, ancient East Asia included not only Confucian states but also the nomadic states. Second, in ancient East Asia, interaction between states was connected with China directly and indirectly. On one hand, Confucian states maintained their connection and political relationship, always formally

suzerain-vassal relationship, with China through tributary trip to and investiture from Chinese Dynasties. Last, these pre-national entities should shared knowledge about common culture, Confucianism, to some extent like “constitutional structures<sup>2</sup> of international societies” coined by Reus-Smit, regardless of whether or not they accepted it and adopted into their policy-decision and to what extent.

#### ***1.4 Long peace in ancient East Asian and Chinese Security Commitment***

There was a long peace in ancient East Asia defined above, especially in Chinese Cultural Cycle. Peace means, in its relative terms, means absence of wars of large scale and acquiesce in military clashes of small scale. Although it is called long peace, or the *Pax Sinica*, it doesn't mean that peace in ancient East Asia is continuous and without any interrupt. Looking back through history, it can be discerned that peace in ancient East Asia was intermittent, despite that duration of peace in Chinese Cultural Cycle was longer than it between China Proper and Inner Asia. However, if taking nearly 2000-year history of East Asia as a whole, long peace did exist and sporadic conflicts and confrontations within it, just like military clashes during the Cold War, didn't change its nature.

Additionally, peace is always intermingled with or subordinate to stability and security in political analysis. And they have their distinctive expression respectively. Regarding to peace, there were few wars between pre-national entities, especially between Confucian states. Regarding to stability, China, more precisely Chinese Dynasties irrelevant to who established, maintained its gravitational status, or hegemony in modern term, and, on the other hand, other states, regardless of the Confucian states or the nomadic states, maintained their contact through China directly or indirectly and legitimated their authority through Chinese recognition in the form of reception of investiture from China, which was more apparent in the Confucian states. With respect to security, as Chinese commitment that this “dominant state will not exploit the subordinate states,” (Kang 2010: 611; Kang 2012: 62) security dilemma was a rare case in ancient East Asia. Although peace, stability and security have their own expression and manifestation respectively, they cannot be analyzed separately for strong ties bonding them together. On one hand, peace was the result of maintenance of stability and security, which diluted and even removed motives to wage a war. On the other hand, peace provided clear evidence to persuade China's neighbors to believe that security dilemma could be resolved by then norms and institutions with Chinese origins and characteristics. In sum, peace,

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<sup>2</sup> “Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of inter-subjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action.” (Reus-Smit 1999:30)

stability and security are overlapped and fused when discussing long peace in ancient East Asia.

## **2. Explanations for Chinese commitment of Non-Expansion**

In order to preserve such a long peace in a so vast area, given the basis nature of ancient East Asia being hierarchy under anarchy, China, as a hegemon, not only need to restrain itself from exploiting the lesser states, but also should bear its responsibility to mediate conflicts between the lesser states. The latter is well discussed under the title of “tribute system”, which functions not only in political and economic ways but also in cultural, intelligent, technological and educative ways. However, key to unravel *Pax Sinic* is the former requirement of long peace, that is, Chinese commitment of non-expansion. Once this commitment is proved efficient and perpetual, long peace will be explained from the basis. However, such commitment of non-expansion is taken for granted by some scholars. From Kang’s rhetoric, for example, it can be concluded that once China receives its neighboring states’ recognition and enthrone it as the common leader in the *Tianxia*, which is mainly reflected by sending tribute, China will feel so satisfactory that it has no desire to expand its influence and even to enlarge its territory. However, it’s without ample evidence to prove whether this psychological satisfaction really matters in dealing with foreign relations. And if so, it is at odds with Chinese military practice. For example, although Koguryo had paid its submission to Sui and Tang, it could not escape from these two dynasties’ punitive expedition, if not expansive war. Similar cases are beyond count and will not listed here. The importance of these counter-examples reminds us not to postulate that China was so benign that it only needs formal and ritual achievement but abandons material and substantial benefit.

According to above consideration of Chinese non-expansion commitment, several questions listed below remain unsolved, and to some extent are neglected intentionally by international relations scholars. First, what factors led China to make and observe this commitment? Second, how creditable was this commitment? Third, did creditability of this commitment vary with some elements, such as types of pre-national entities? Fourth, how did this commitment function in dealing with foreign affairs and, more importantly, military conflicts? Fifth, whether or not did this commitment experience evolution during era of imperial China? If so, what was this evolution and what influence and consequence did this evolution bring about? Sixth, how did this commitment disappear in the pre-modern time? Last, whether or not does this commitment still has an impact on contemporary China? Given the length of this thesis and capacity of author, only the first four questions will be discussed and the last three, unfortunately, will be omitted, however, with hope that all these questions will be studied detailedly and systematically some day.

Although there exist numerous evidences that can be extracted from “the historical field of data”, some still stresses China indeed wanted to invade its weaker neighbors but it cannot do that as a result of capacity, or if it do that, cost will outvalue benefit. As Acharya notes, “The Chinese did acknowledge the status of overseas rulers whom they could not subjugate by force. ... Against lesser states, the Chinese did not refrain from threatening or using force (Acharya 2003: 154).” With resort to cost-benefit calculation, Cohen holds, “With lesser power, when they perceived force to be effective, as with the Zungaris and Nepalese, they did not refrain from applying it as ruthlessly as circumstances required. When their estimates were wrong, as in Burma and Vietnam, they did not hesitate to accept face-saving solutions and cut their losses (Cohen 2000: 243~244).” All these explanations and similar ones will be termed as “rational explanation” for its emphasis on material power and ration of benefit to cost.

### ***2.1 Rational Explanation***

First, China was destitute of Capacity. Although China withhold so great power and might that it can maintain its superiority and dominance for nearly 2 millennia, it doesn't mean that China can defeat any disobedient states, overturn their government, enslave their subjects and even incorporate them into Chinese territory. Even though China can march westwards and northwards and sail eastwards and southwards, it doesn't mean China is sufficient to expand its influence to and even annex these areas, because the following two factors bottle up its capacity of expansion: supply of horses and insufficiency of logistics. Although shortage of hoses and incapacity of logistics indeed existed in China historically and periodically, it cannot be exaggerated so much that China is treated as lack of capacity for expansion. In reality, when China was in its powerful and prosperous times, mainly during the first several decades after the establishment of dynasties, China possessed so formidably and availably military might and prowess that it could unify all China, defense against nomadic assaults and plunders, and even put them back or incorporate them.

Except for destitute of capacity of expansion, tribute was treated as alternative reason for Chinese non-expansion commitment, although it, to some extent, was a result of Chinese lack of expansive might and calculation of cost and benefit. Fairbank, *inter alia*, offers a classic model of tribute system. According to Fairbank, “China's foreign relations were suzerain-vassal relations conducted through the ancient forms of tributary system. ... All types of international intercourse, if they occurred at all in the experience of China, were fitted into the tributary system --- spying out the enemy, seeking allies and all manner of negotiations (Fairbank: 1942: 129, 137).” And this tribute system extended its influence as long as the first several decades after China was forced to “join”

and “accept” the treaty system as a result of Chinese defeat in the first Opium War (Fairbank 1968b), and even influenced the modernization of East Asia which is thought by most scholars as a result of East Asian reaction to European challenge (Hamashita 1986; Hamashita 1999: 1~28). Regarding to tributary system, China and its counterparts, the tributaries, had different interests, based on which tribute system operated successfully so that East Asia System remained rather stability. On one hand, China needed to get legitimacy required necessarily to prove its ruler’s status as the son of heaven. On the other hand, what matters in the view of tributary states was sanction of trade by China through which they could get necessities and make profit.

Third, cost-benefit calculation can be referred to analyze it. As a sedentary state, cost of waging a war was expensive for ancient China in practice, not only given costs related to mobilization, projection, logistics and supply, but also given how to assemble nationwide resources and to utilize them. Furthermore, according to same logic, Zhou Fangyin applies game theory to explain how stability was maintained as a result of strategic interaction between China and peripheral states, although his theory is based on Chinese advantageous power and Chinese defensive nature. Once cost of conciliation was higher than punitive expedition, the later would replace the former and then China’s neighbors would constrain themselves from raid and plunder. However, once nomadic states changed its strategy into submission would China change its strategy into conciliation consequently. Therefore, a new turn of this cycle will happen.

## ***2.2 Cultural Explanation***

Although rational explanation offers plausible interpretations about Chinese non-expansion commitment seemingly scientifically and falsifiably, it only opens a window of this antique mansion of ancient East Asia, which is more featured by culture instead of mere material. Unlike rational explanation, cultural explanation pays more attention to Chinese culture, philosophy and traditions in order to find out the internal factors that determine China’s strategic view.

First, although it’s difficult to elucidate whether Confucianism’s prudence on war is the product of summary and calculation about costs and profits of war between China and its counterparts, such prudence indeed existed in the form of just war in ancient China. Theoretically, Confucian insists that great power should concentrate on moral and ethical power in dealing with foreign states so that they can pay submission to China voluntarily and gradually be acculturation. In Confucian world, there is no boundary between China and foreign states because all states should be submitted to emperor, the son of Heaven, who bears responsibility appointed from the Heaven to govern the world. However, this is the ultimate phase, before which China should spread its morality and ethics



so that foreign states can get to know Chinese cultural superiority and thus submit to China. However, before the world was incorporated by Chinese culture, there existed wars and confrontations. In order to justify wars, Confucianism believes just war can be utilized as a legitimate instrument.

Second, unlike mere concentration on China, Robert E. Kelly focuses cultural community, that is Confucian states including China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam, in ancient East Asia and proposes a Confucian long peace theory. In Kelly's understanding, "although states are distinct polities, the underlying citizenries of a cultural peace space do not feel themselves culturally distinct (Kelly 2011: 410)." And the shared culture functions to incur member states of the cultural community to hold a sense of "we-ness" which limits and constrains the choice of war. Kelly holds that "Confucianism was ethically opposed to the use of force, both at the individual level and as a tool of statecraft, especially between Confucianized people," and that "Confucianism created a unique diplomatic language for Confucian states ... that smoothed communication and provided distinct in-group cultural artefacts (Kelly 2011: 411~413)." As a result, whether peace exists varies with the types of states. As Kelly specifies, "the shared Confucian ethic strongly discouraged the use of force against those who had adopted the enlightenment ... lesser Confucian states recognized China's formal superiority, but were *de facto* independent and unmolested ... non-Confucians would not fall into these categories (Kelly 2011: 413)." After examining wars between China and its Confucian counterparts during Ming Dynasty and comparing it with control group, that is classic Greece, Western Christendom and modern Arab state system, Kelly finds that "the proposed Confucian Long Peace is real (Kelly 2011: 422)".

Apart from the above two approaches applying culture merely to explain China's non-expansion commitment directly or indirectly, David C. Kang suggests a third way that combines structural features of ancient East Asia and Confucian culture. Kang defines hierarchy as "a rank order based on a particular attribute (Kang 2012: 17)," and he insists hierarchy is a result of consensus of its members. Therefore, within this hierarchic system, balance of power is a rare case and, instead, China's neighbors are more willingly prefer to bandwagoning, accommodation and submission (Kang 2003a; Kang 2003b; Kang 2005; Kang 2010a). The reason for subordinate states agree on Chinese hegemony and pay their submissions to China is ascribed to China's cultural superiority and their reverence for China's culture is reinforced by their learning, adoption, acculturation and internalization of Confucianism, despite China being disinteresting in propagating its ideas and values (Kang 2010b: 602~611; Kang 2012: 25~53). On the other hand, as Kang adds, "hegemony is a form of hierarchy that involves more than material power. It also involves a set of norms –social

order- that secondary states find legitimate (Kang 2012: 23~24).” That is, hierarchic system in ancient East Asia functions as international society where “a group of states ... have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements (Bull and Watson 1984: 1).” Just like Kang’s specification, “the tribute system had evolved into a set of rules, norms, and institutions with China clearly the hegemon, resulting in a clear hierarchy and very long peace (Kang 2010b: 602).” As a result, within this hierarchic international society, China had no desire to exploit or invade its subordinates as long as they respect Chinese superiority and pay their submission to China in the form of tribute, investiture, adoption of Chinese calendar, etc.

### **3. Hua-Yi Identity and Non-expansion Commitment**

Apart from the above explanation, identity, a basic term to analyze international relations since Constructivism first applied it as a variable in the end of last century, can pave for the road to understand why China voluntarily made such commitment and why foreign states trusted this commitment to the degree that, though, varies with their acceptance of subordinate identity, Yi, compared to the permanent superior identity, Hua, held by China. Unlike historical approach focusing description of origin, evolution and content of Hua-Yi distinction, manifestation of Hua-Yi distinction in specific foreign policies, significance and disadvantages of Hua-Yi distinction, etc., Hua-Yi distinction will be applied theoretically for explanation of correlation between Hua-Yi identity and Chinese non-expansion. Hua-Yi identity will be treated as an independent variable and Chinese non-expansion commitment will be treated as a dependent variable. Furthermore, Hua-Yi identity will be treated as three levels according to state’s acceptance of it. Generally speaking, as a null hypothesis, the higher level of acceptance of Hua-Yi identity the state is, the more credibility the non-commitment of China is and the more likeness peace or peaceful settlement between China and foreign states is.

#### ***3.1 Identity and Self-Constraint***

Since identity was introduced into analysis of international relations, it played an increasingly role in security issue. According to Wendt identity is “a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an intersubjective or systemic quality (Wendt 1999: 224).” Furthermore, Wendt

classifies identity into four catalogues: personal or corporate identity, type identity, role identity, and collective identity. Among four types, role identity can be applied to analyze state's preference of foreign policy, where the extent of role identity's influence is determined by intimacy or interdependence. As Wendt notes, "when intimacy is high, ... even if a state wants to abandon a role it may be unable to do so because the Other resists out of a desire to maintain its identity (Wendt 1999: 228)." Interest bridges identity and action. As Wendt points out, "states are actors whose behavior is motivated by a variety of interests rooted in corporate, type, role, and collective identities (Wendt 1999: 233)." Identity cannot determine state's action but it can influence state's interest. In Wendt's understanding, interest of state includes autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem, other than physical survival, the only interest of state suggested by realism. Certain identity will influence state's perception of ranking of interests, thereby influencing state's certain activities.

Briefly, identity is what I am as a mixture of what I suppose I am and what I find I am from other's view. Therefore, before enduring social structure is constructed, identity is not static but in a dynamic process, within which my expectation of myself is always suffered from other's interpretation of me in the form of certain interactive mode. Therefore, state not only faces physical security but also confronts with ontological security, which means consistency and stability of identity. Construction of identity implies certain mode of behavior of ego that can be perceived by other as ego and other have common ideas or culture presuppose identity. However, once identity cannot persist or is in change all the time, certain role identity cannot be constructed, let alone enduring social structure.

However, physical security and ontological security is not always the same. Rather, they may confront with each other. It resembles Wendt's point about relations between intimacy of role identity and foreign policy. That is, if a state accepts an identity so deep that it believes change of identity will risk uncertain disadvantages despite with hope of better physical security. Furthermore, how to maintain a stable identity is the key of ontological security. Regarding it, biographical narrative and corresponding mode of action is two keys in maintenance of identity. Biographical narrative is how state records, recounts, and interprets its past, present and future. Through it, state can fuse its past identity to with current identity and extend it to its future one. However, discursive method to maintain identity play a more efficient role in self-identification of identity than in other's perception of identity of ego. As social identity is production of interaction, biographical narrative does little to maintain it despite its great contribution for intrinsic identity. In order to keep social identity intact, states should perform like what their biographical narrative proclaim. In simple terms,

state should make itself of what it suppose and this artifactual effort should be admitted by other states. Therefore, if state wants to maintain its identity, it should restrain itself from breaching it. In the same token, if the identity is so important for a state, especially a hegemony, that it is willing to conserve it by self-constraint, commitment originated from identity is creditable. Precisely, a state need to constrain itself from obedient movement that obviously contrast with what it proclaim it is. Therefore, once states constructed certain identity and the identity persist rather long, commitment, as discursive expression of identity in biographical narrative, is creditable and even can be utilized to achieve physical security by the subordinate states.

In this thesis, I apply ontological security into analysis of Chinese non-commitment. As China tried its best to maintain Hua-Yi identity as the underlying principle for foreign affairs, it would constrain itself from infringing the requirements and obligations implied by Hua-Yi identity. Originally, Hua-Yi identity implied co-existence of China and its tributaries and absent interest of China to annex or sinicize<sup>3</sup> its tributaries actively. In order to maintain itself as Hua and therefore superior status in ancient East Asian system, China needed to fulfill its commitment. Although it sounds ideally rather than realistically, Chinese effort to observe its commitment had lasted for nearly two thousand years, except for alien Chinese Dynasties' expansive activities. Furthermore, this commitment was well trusted by states, especially Confucian states, in ancient East Asia as a result of their acceptance of Hua-Yi identity. In order to perform like a state with identity of Yi, Chinese tributaries needed to observe certain requirement and obligations derived from their identity, Yi identity. In turn, they could feel secure or free of threat from the monster China with formidably material power and gloriously cultural edge. However, creditability of the commitment varies with the level of their acceptance, like Wendt's degree of intimacy of role identity. The deeper they accept Hua-Yi identity, the creditable the commitment will be.

### ***3.2 Hua-Yi Identity***

Distinction between Hua and Yi can be traced back to as early as Shang Dynasty, whose oracle bone script recorded related information. In Shang Dynasty, Hua-Yi identity was of little relation with culture and thus had no contemptuous implications. However, with Chinese achievement of high productivity partly because of application of iron, mixed with development of Chinese cultural complication, Hua-Yi distinction started to possess implications of superiority of China and

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<sup>3</sup> Although Chinese rhetoric or biographical narrative emphasizes Chinese kindness for educating and moralizing its tributaries, China seldom realized it actively (Kang 2012: 25). Rather, China tended to maintain its tributaries backwardness in terms of culture. For example, embargo is imposed on historical books (Wang and He 2014: 134), which can be seen as a main resource for education.

contempt towards Yi as early as the Spring and Autumn period, which were reflected in Chinese classic texts. As Hua-Yi distinction was gradually accepted by China and alien states, Hua identity and Yi identity gradually became two kinds of roles in ancient East Asia for intercourse and interaction between China and its alien states. Since Qin unified China, China became a single term referring to Chinese Dynasty, although there were still plural Chinese Dynasties during divided period, such as the Three Kingdoms period. However, from Han Dynasty on, Hua-Yi distinction functioned as a basic principle directing Chinese foreign policy in practice. After Tang declined and eventually ceased to exist, “Hua-Yi” identity experienced several variations. The first subversion of Hua-Yi distinction was brought up by Liao Dynasty but Yuan Dynasty led to the most significant variation of Hua-Yi identity. After establishing Ming Dynasty, Zhu and his successors tried their best to recover Hua-Yi distinction. At last, as an alien Chinese Dynasty, Qing Dynasty was acculturated more deeply and intensively than Yuan Dynasty and adopted traditional Chinese foreign policy in dealing with foreign states so that there was unperceivable difference from Han Chinese Dynasty. In the same token, Qing Dynasty inherited Hua identity as the gravitational state of ancient East Asia. In the last five hundreds years before China was completely incorporated into modern international system and consequently Hua-Yi identity was replaced by nation-states of equality, Hua-Yi distinction still functioned as fundamental principle upholding Chinese hierarchic foreign policy. However, with two times of significant Hua-Yi conversion, so-called Confucian states developed some kinds of replacement of China as the state with Hua identity, such as Korea and Japan.

Although China was the only state that can be called Hua, there are several criteria to judge who is qualified as Hua. As there is possibility that “China will be the new barbarian (*Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan Zhushu* 2000: 595),” though which is more like caveat than fact, fixed and concrete criteria are required to justify China as Hua and all other states as Yi. According to traditional political thoughts and Confucianism, there are three main types of criteria. First, utilization of mode of life and production as criterion to divide Yi apart from Hua was the earliest one, which can be traced back to Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties. The second criterion is ethnic. Although Confucianism doesn’t emphasize ethnical factor in judging Hua from Yi, ethnic played a more important role in China’s self-identification as Hua in Han Chinese Dynasties, which was accepted by the Confucian states as a criterion to judge which one was China. The last but most referred criterion is culture, precisely ritual. If cultural criterion is true and well-accepted by the Chinese, in nature, Hua identity and Yi identity are transformable, in one-way transformation from Yi to Hua or two-way transformation from Yi to Hua or from Hua to Yi. However, cultural criterion has been

more referred by alien states or alien Chinese states for justify their regime since China entered into imperial time. Whether such cultural conversion was a fact rather than a myth remains controversial. If China is taken as a political unit and identity of China as Hua as a symbol differentiating China and its neighbors, there will be not room for conversion from Yi to Hua or from Hua to Yi. Instead, Hua was an inherent identity, despite self-orientation of China, which had been identified and then reinforced by an extremely time-consuming process since ancient times within which China interacted with its neighbors who was viewed by China as barbarian first for their different mode of life and production and their ethnicity and, after achievement of China in material and cultural terms, for their subordination of culture and absence of ritual of China. On the other hand, state as Yi, which had not capacity to join the competition of unification or invasion of Central Plains, had little ambition to transform into Hua, a typical sign of which was their persistent conservation of their own traditions, conventions and culture.

### ***3.3 Hypothesis on Relations between Hua-Yi identity and Non-expansion Commitment***

As Hua-Yi distinction is rather fixed and unchangeable, if alien Chinese Dynasties is treated as anomalies, Hua and Yi can be a pair of corresponding identities, which point to China and non-Chinese states respectively. If so, as identity inherently influences state's preference and thus imposes self-constraint of binding-force on state's foreign policy, Hua-Yi identity instinctively imposes certain constraints and prerogatives on both state of huahip and state of Yi identity. That is what will set up as null hypothesis here that Chinese non-expansion commitment is a result of self-constraint imposed by identity of Hua and there is a positive correlation between this commitment's creditability and the level of acceptance of foreign states in ancient East Asia.

Additionally, hypothesis of relations between Hua-Yi identity and non-expansion commitment is built up on the basis of two assumptions, which will be taken as granted here. The first assumption is that Hua-Yi distinction is the underlying principle of Chinese foreign policy. Hua-Yi distinction means China and alien states should act according to fixed rules, norms and conventions, that is, accordance with ritual. Generally speaking, as Hua means superiority, China should take the role of centrality and lead the world into right direction, while, as Yi means subordination, alien states should submit to China and long for Chinese civilization and moralization. Practically, it means all international institutions, tribute institutions, investiture institutions and expeditionary institutions, set up by China is based on responsibilities and prerogatives originated from Hua-Yi identity. The second assumption is Chinese maintenance of distance from Yi. While China concentrated on construction of ancient East Asian hierarchic system where China as centrality was surrounding by

alien states, China tried its best to escape too frequent interaction with alien states not only for self-consciousness of superiority but only for maintenance of security from its immoderate neighbors. And this type of inclusiveness of Chinese foreign policy is termed here as 'limited inclusiveness'.

According to above two assumptions, I put forward the null hypothesis here that Chinese non-expansion commitment was determined by its idea about Hua-Yi identity. As long as China preserved its self-identification as Hua, China will seldom progressively and ambitiously extend its direct control over domain of Yi. Regarding to creditability of this non-expansion commitment, there is positive correlation between it and level of acceptance of Hua-Yi identity. That is, the higher level foreign states' acceptance of Yi identity is, the higher creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment is as a result of less threat that they perceive from China. The first level states that observed tribute and investiture institutions and acculturated themselves to Chinese culture internalizing Hua-Yi identity, the second level states that obeyed both institutions acknowledging Hua-Yi identity, and the third level states that only observed tribute institutions utilizing Hua-Yi identity.

#### **4. Methodology**

According to two criteria, absolute advantage of material power and capable projection of power, completeness of Hua-Yi identity, I choose early period of Tang Dynasty as my case. Furthermore, according to initiators of wars, wars in examination will be classified into two groups: unintentional wars and intentional wars. Although it seems more possible that intentional wars will lead to expansion of China, here, both kinds wars are possible for territorial annexation.

In order to verify my two hypotheses, clear and operational approach will be designed as follow. As I propose that if Hua-Yi identity functions in theory, China will constrain itself from annexation of alien states. Therefore, I will set up a loose criterion for verification of my first hypothesis: if percentage of wars, both intentional and unintentional, including territorial expansion is low, hypothesis that Chinese non-expansion commitment is determined by Hua-Yi identity is efficient. Regarding to second hypothesis, I suppose different levels of acceptance of Yi identity will influence state's perception of creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment. As direct equation between creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment and level of acceptance of Yi identity cannot be found, an indirect way will be applied here that creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment will be reflected by alien states' absence of challenge or attack against China. Therefore, if the second hypothesis is efficient, percentage of unintentional wars between China and

the first level states should be very low, despite the ideal situation being absence of unintentional wars; unintentional wars between China and the second level states will increase with material growth of these states; and there will be a bit of wars between China and the third level states.

## **5. Wars During Early Period of Tang Dynasty**

According to two criteria, observation of fundamental institutions and acculturation of Chinese culture and Confucianism, 88 states interacting with Tang Dynasty will be classified into three types in Table 5-1. Furthermore, according to two criteria, intentional or unintentional, with expansion or not, 72 wars are analyzed in Table 5-2.

According to examination of wars during the early period of Tang Dynasty in Table 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5, both two hypotheses can be proven to large extent. On one hand, as a result of low percentage of expansive war of China, despite 24% that is not as ideal as I propose, that China constrain itself from expansion or annexation as a result of its intrinsic identity, Hua identity. On the other hand, the second hypothesis is verified more efficiently than the first hypothesis. Regarding to the first level states, there was absent of unintentional wars, which means that the first level states internalized their Yi identity and possessed no ambitions to raid to China for economic profit or to challenge China for political rising. Regarding to second level states, as they held instrumental view of Hua-Yi identity as a result of their material disadvantage and observation of requirement and obligation originated from Yi identity bringing more profits than disobedience or detachment from Chinese world order, they tend to tactically possess Yi identity to appease China but their perception of Chinese non-expansion commitment is lower than the first level states. However, when they get improvement in material, especially military, terms, they will try to disobey and even to challenge China as a result of their cost-benefit calculation, in which they tend to believe they can get more and lose less in raid, plunder, attack and challenge than observation. Data on wars reflect this disposition efficiently. Before 670, the second level states were under shadow of Chinese formidable might and tried not to provoke China, for example, Tibet, the later main rival of Tang Dynasty, trying to appease China in traditional Chinese form, owing to which China successfully realized its ambition of punishing Koguryo that had disobeyed ritual requirement since Sui Dynasty. After 670, with material growth, Tibet and then Easter Turks started to challenge China in their own region. Regarding to third level states, low rate of emergence of war support hypothesis that they accept Yi identity as a way to get intercourse with China for economic benefits instead of incorporation into Chinese world order and they have no need to worry Chinese potential invasion as a result of their remote distance from China.



In sum, as China tried to maintain its identity of Hua, it would constrain itself from expansion. On the other hand, as alien states accepted their Yi identity, intrinsic connotation of Hua-Yi identity would led them to trust Chinese non-expansion commitment, although the level varied with how deep they accepted their Yi identity. The higher level their acceptance of Yi identity, the higher level their perception of creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment.

Table 5-1: States interacting with China

Names of States	Levels of States	Reference
Baiji (Paekche)	1	JTS Vol. 199(I)
Bohai Mohe	1	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Gaoli (Koguryo)	1	JTS Vol. 199(I)
Silla	1	JTS Vol. 199(I)
Jiankun	2	XTS Vol. 217(II)
Bahanna (Ferghana)	2	XTS Vol. 215(II)&221(II)
Bolv Guo (Bruzha)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Boshi (Persia)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Cao Guo (Khebud)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Dangxiang Qiang (Tangut)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Dongnv Guo	2	JTS Vol. 197
Dongxie Man	2	JTS Vol. 197
Eastern Turks	2	JTS Vol. 194(I)
Gaochang	2	JTS Vol. 198
Huihe (Uyghur)	2	JTS Vol. 195&199(II)
Humi Guo	2	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Jibin Guo (Kophen)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Kang Guo (Samarqand)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Liangcuan Man	2	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Liugui	2	XTS Vol. 220
Mi Guo (Maimargh)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Nanping Liao	2	JTS Vol. 197
Nanping Liao	2	XTS Vol. 222 (III)

Pugu	2	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Qidan	2	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Qiuci Guo (Kucha)	2	JTS Vol. 198
Shaxia Turks	2	JTS Vol. 194(I)
Shi Guo (Chach)	2	XTS Vol.221(II)
Shi Guo (Kesh)	2	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Shilifoshi Guo	2	XTS Vol. 222 (III) & THY Vol. 100
Shiwei	2	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Suduseni Guo	2	XTS Vol. 221(II) & THY Vol. 100
Tongluo	2	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Tufan (Tibet)	2	JTS Vol. 196(I)&196(II)
Tuhuoluo (Tokharistan)	2	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Tuqishi (Turgesh)	2	JTS Vol. 194 (II) & XTS Vol. 215
Tuyuhun	2	JTS Vol. 198
Western Turks	2	JTS Vol. 194(I)
Wuchang Guo (Oddiyana)	2	THY Vol. 99 & XTS Vol. 221 (I)
Xi	2	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Xieyu Guo	2	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Xiyuan Man	2	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Xizhao Man	2	JTS Vol. 197
Xue Yantuo	2	JTS Vol. 199 (II)
Yuanfan Mohe	2	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Zumo Guo	2	XTS Vol. 221(II)
An Guo (Boukhara)	3	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Bei Tianzhu (Northern India)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Biao Guo (Pyu Kingdom)	3	JTS Vol. 197
Dandan	3	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Dashi (Arab)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Daweilou	3	XTS Vol. 200
Dong Tianzhu (Eastern India)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Duopodeng	3	JTS Vol. 197
Fulin Guo (Byzantine Empire)	3	JTS Vol. 198 & XTS Vol. 221 (II)

Funan	3	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Geshimi	3	XTS Vol. 222(II)
Guduo Guo (Khuttal)	3	XTS Vol. 221(I)&221(II)
Heling (Kalinga)	3	JTS Vol. 197
Hepishi Guo	3	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Huoxun Guo (Khwarezm)	3	JTS Vol. 194(II) & XTS Vol. 221 (II)
Japan	3	JTS Vol. 199(I)
Jumi Guo	3	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Juwei Guo	3	XTS Vol. 221 (I)&221(II)
Linyi Guo	3	JTS Vol. 197
Mingmie	3	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Mojietuo (Magadha)	3	XTS Vol. 221(I)
Nan Tianzhu (Shouthern India)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Nanzhao Man	3	JTS Vol. 197
Nipoluo (Bal-po)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Panpan	3	JTS Vol. 197
Poli Guo	3	XTS Vol. 197 & TD Vol. 188 & THY Vol. 99
Shizi Guo (Simhalauipa)	3	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Shule Guo (Kashgar)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Suiheluo	3	JTS Vol. 197
Touhe	3	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Tuohuan	3	JTS Vol. 197
Wuluohun	3	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Xi	3	JTS Vol. 199(II)
Xi Tianzhu (Western India)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Xiasaban Guo	3	XTS Vol. 221
Yanqi Guo (Karasahr)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Yizu Guo	3	XTS Vol. 221(II)
Yutian Guo (Kotan)	3	JTS Vol. 198
Zangke Man	3	JTS Vol. 197
Zhanbo	3	XTS Vol. 222 (III)
Zhenla Guo (Kmir)	3	JTS Vol. 197 & THY Vol. 100

Table 5-2: Wars between China and Alien States During Early Period of Tang Dynasty

Year	States Warring against China	Level of States	Types of Wars	Expansion of Territory	Comment
630	Eastern Turks	2	I	Y	
635	Tuyuhun	2	U	N	
638	Tibet	2	U	N	
640	Gaochang	2	I	Y	
641	Xue Yantuo	2	I	Y	military assistance for Western Turks who suffered invasion of Xuey Yantuo
642	Western Turks	2	U	N	
644	Karasahr	3	I	N	
645	Koguryo	1	I	N	military assistance for Silla who suffered invasion of Koguryo allying with Paekche
646	Xue Yantuo	2	I	Y	
647	Koguryo	1	I	N	
648	Kucha	2	I	Y	
648	Songwai Man	3	I	Y	
648	Koguryo	1	I	N	
648	Middle India	3	U	N	
651	Western Turks	2	U	N	
652	Baishui Man	3	U	N	
655	Koguryo	1	I	N	military assistance for Silla who suffered invasion of Koguryo allying with Paekche and Mojie

657	Western Turks	2	I	Y	
658	Koguryo	1	I	Y	
	Kashgar,				
659	Zhujubo,	3	U	N	
	Bantuo				
					military assistance for Silla who suffered
660	Paekche	1	I	Y	invasion of Paekche supported by
					Koguryo
661	Koguryo	1	I	N	
662	Uyghur	2	U	N	
663	Paekche	1	I	Y	Japanese military assistance for Paekche
668	Koguryo	1	I	Y	
670	Tibet	2	U	N	
674	Silla	1	I	N	
678	Tibet	2	U	N	
679	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
680	Tibet	2	U	N	
680	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
682	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
682	Tibet	2	U	N	
683	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
684	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
687	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
687	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
689	Tibet	2	I	N	
692	Tibet	2	I	Y	
694	Tibet	2	I	N	
696	Tibet	2	U	N	
696	Khitan	2	U	N	
697	Khitan	2	U	N	
698	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
700	Tibet	2	U	N	

702	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
706	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
708	Turgesh	2	U	N	
712	Xi	2	I	N	
714	Western Turks	2	U	N	
714	Khitan	2	I	N	
714	Tibet	2	U	N	
716	Tibet	2	U	N	
716	Eastern Turks	2	U	N	
721	Western Turks	2	U	N	
722	Tibet	2	I	N	military assistance for Bruzha who suffered invasion of Tibet
727	Tibet	2	U	N	
728	Tibet	2	U	N	
728	Tibet	2	I	N	
729	Xinan Man	3	I	Y	
729	Tibet	2	I	Y	
732	Khitan, Xi	2	I	N	
733	Khitan	2	I	N	
737	Tibet	2	I	N	military assistance for Bruzha who suffered invasion of Tibet
738	Tibet	2	I	Y	
739	Turgesh	2	I	N	
741	Tibet	2	U	N	
745	Tibet	2	U	N	
746	Tibet	2	I	Y	
746	Tuyuhun	2	I	N	
747	Bruzha	2	I	Y	

Table 5-3: Types of Wars and Result of Expansion or not

Type of Wars	Number	Number (Per Year)	Percentage (of all wars)
All	71	0.6121	100%
Unintentional Wars	36	0.3103	51%
With Expansion	0	0	0%
1 <sup>st</sup> level states	0	0	0%
2 <sup>nd</sup> level states	0	0	0%
3 <sup>rd</sup> level states	0	0	0%
Without Expansion	36	0.3103	51%
Intentional Wars	35	0.3017	49%
With Expansion	17	0.1466	24%
1 <sup>st</sup> level states	4	0.0345	6%
2 <sup>nd</sup> level states	11	0.0948	15%
3 <sup>rd</sup> level states	2	0.0172	3%
Without Expansion	18	0.1552	25%

Table 5-4: Wars with Different Types of States

Type Of States	Number	Number (Per Year)	Percentage	
Warring with China			Of Corresponding Type of Wars	Of All Wars
All	71	0.6121		100%
The First level states	10	0.0862		14%
Intentional	10	0.0862	100%	14%
Unintentional	0	0	0%	0%
The Second level states	55	0.4741		77%
Intentional	22	0.1897	40%	31%
Unintentional	33	0.2845	60%	46%
The Third level states	6	0.052		8%
Intentional	3	0.026	50%	4%
Unintentional	3	0.026	50%	4%

Table 5-5: Number of States Warring against China

Types of States	Number of States	Percentage of this type of states
All	71	100%
States that warred against China	24	34%
States that didn't war against China	47	66%
The First Level States	4	100%
States that warred against China	3	75%
States that didn't war against China	1	25%
The Second Level States	42	100%
States that warred against China	13	31%
States that didn't war against China	29	69%
The Third Level States	42	100%
States that warred against China	8	19%
States that didn't war against China	34	81%



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