ASSESSING EUROPEAN ACTORNESS IN THE 2011 LIBYAN CRISIS
Acknowledgments

How long has been the path, how short has been this year. The tasks to undertake seemed almost insurmountable, and yet one by one the obstacles have been surpassed. If I have cycled upon every hill and if I have grown so much in this year of study, it is thanks to those who have supported me.

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Thanks to my colleagues that have accompanied me in this journey,
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Thanks to my family who has almost presumed I would have succeeded,
Thanks to the one who listened to me when I was on a verge, and who knew how to cheer me up simply sharing a comic book,
Thanks to my mother who helped me make my homework as I wished when I was child, but in a better way than the one I expected,
And thanks to my father who, before my departure, could just smile at me and tell me *tu ne cede malis sed contra audentior ito*... and I just knew it was the best advice I could ever carry with me.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign Security Policy</td>
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<td>CJEF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>CRT</td>
<td>Civilian Response Team</td>
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<td>CSCM</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security Defence Policy</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>CR&amp;OC</td>
<td>Crisis Response &amp; Operational Coordination Department</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department</td>
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<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representatives</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GMP</td>
<td>Global Mediterranean Policy</td>
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<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>MEFTA</td>
<td>Middle East Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>PPEWU</td>
<td>Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>République Centrafricaine</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITCEN</td>
<td>Joint Situation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFM</td>
<td>Union For the Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Union du Maghreb Arabe</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UPM</td>
<td>Union Pour la Méditerranée</td>
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Introduction

Since its beginnings in the fifties, the European Union (EU) has been intensely engaged in the goal of constructing security. Indeed initial economic integration had the effect of consolidating peace among States that had been facing violent conflicts until the previous decade. Such peace project eventually led to a further integration of institutions, policies and common instruments to achieve stability also with neighbouring States. Hence it is possible to state that the ambition to achieve security was nested already in the early beginnings. Developing peaceful neighbourhood relations, like those with the Mediterranean, has been one of the tools utilized for such purpose. Nevertheless the outburst of the so-called Arab Spring has requested a redefinition of the policies oriented towards that area. In parallel to this tendency to achieve peace and stability, the EU has progressively developed the capabilities to become a security actor, able to deploy military and civilian missions. The path towards this evolution has been long and resulting from compromises between different visions: between NATO members and non-NATO members, between NATO oriented countries (like the CEECs) and those more in favour of a strong CSDP, between countries more prone to promote human rights (like the Nordics) and hence more UN oriented to countries that accept the eventuality of casualties¹. All these divergences have shown a difference in the role conception of Europe as such and have been considered in the formation of Treaties.

The Lisbon Treaty constitutes the most recent reform of the European Institutions and has modified the Foreign Policy mechanism inside the Union, prescribing an intergovernmental arrangement of decision-making, as well as an attempt to improve the crisis management and response capabilities. Indeed it has provided the EU with an accountable policy-making structure with the aim of equipping the Union with a coherent voice and a clearer decision making process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU has thus undergone a process of reform aimed at improving the coherence of its external action and at becoming an actor able to deploy missions autonomous from other IOs. Has it, though, managed to become a coherent security actor? The first test for the renewed EU has occurred with the 2011 Libyan crisis, outburst nearly six weeks after the establishment of the EEAS, and has thus been the litmus test for the processes underwent by the Union in its reform. Indeed crisis in Libya constituted a first test for European Union’s ability to respond to a crisis in its

neighbourhood and for the instruments to employ. Hence our research question will be as follows: Has the European Union displayed the features of a coherent security actor in the 2011 Libyan crisis? The hypothesis will be that the EU has only partially displayed the features of a coherent security actor, as a Union not yet united in its role conception has lacked coherence in its approach and has not managed to institutionalize binding authority able to take final decisions in Foreign Policy.

To answer our research question we will preliminarily define the concept of Actorness and what are the criteria that must be considered to assess over actorness. As it will be maintained in the first chapter, actorness can be defined as composed by both material and ideational aspects, matching the agency-structure division that will be bridged. The issues related to agency would be the ideational aspects like strategic culture, role perception, and external expectation whereas among the material there would be capabilities, authority and autonomy and legitimacy. After having provided a definition we will proceed in testing whether the EU has met the criteria individuated through the methodology presented in the ad-hoc paragraph. To test the hypothesis the research will be composed as follows. As a preamble it is necessary to provide some background information over the evolution of the EU role conception and this will also show how the EU, though its policies, has built external expectations from relevant others. Secondly it will be outlined the relationship among the EU and the Mediterranean and how it evolved with the outburst of the crisis. In fact this will provide information on legitimacy, as for a non-Sate actor being recognized by others through the stipulation of legal treaties denotes that the entity is recognized as legitimate. Autonomy and Authority will be discussed together since the two are interrelated: indeed an actor is autonomous (independent form its member states\(^2\)) when it is legally entitled to take a specific decision. The more authoritative an actor is the more it can act autonomously. However when studying authority one must study how decisions are taken, through which processes and to what extent are those binding. Hence authority will be studied in detail and, attaining to Hermann’s methodology we will try to understand what kind of authority the EU possesses.

Even though Hermann is mostly well known for analysing the extent to which leader’s personality influences Foreign Policy, in this work we will rely on her research for different aspects. Since her work is mostly focussed on States instead of on Europe as such, it will not be possible to apply all the parts of her theory to the study of actorness. Nevertheless her study of the decision units involved in a decision making process can be useful in our research a well. In fact her method is

constituted in such a way that allows identifying which entities are entitled to take decisions and whether there exists an ultimate decision unit able to impose final decisions on others and to commit resources in the name of the others. These questions are applicable to the European level as they are limited to one specific aspect, which is to understand who is entitled to take final decisions. To provide an answer the method utilized will be the analysis of the pertinent articles of the Lisbon Treaty. Hence, studying how such Treaty has reformed the EU Foreign Policy we will be able to assess whether or not there is a ultimate decision unit and whether or not there is one binding authority that can commit the resources of all in a specific policy.

On the autonomy criterion, several explanations can be given and those depend on the definition we provide of autonomy. If the latter relies legal capabilities to act and on the existence of separate institutions then the analysis can be held together with the study of authority. Instead considering autonomy in terms of economic and operational autonomy, a paragraph on capabilities will be needed. The research, being aimed at understanding if capabilities were adequate to perpetrate missions autonomous from other IOs, will be limited in assessing whether some resources was lacking and what hindered the pooling of resources able to sustain an autonomous CSDP mission in Libya. Hence briefings, official meetings and reports will be studied to understand whether there was a scarcity of resources. What will be maintained is that the Lisbon Treaty has formalized a dual constitution regime: a supranational one that deals with the single market policies and inter-governmental one for the foreign and defence policies3. The part that has been put under analysis due to the crisis is precisely the latter. A system unable to produce a strongly binding decision, combined with the presence of deep cultural and strategic cleavages among member States has facilitated States with stronger executives to pursue their own foreign policies. Indeed the Treaty has not allowed the formation of a supranational authority able to take final decisions in the domain of the CFSP and to commit resources. Such lack of a strong executive is coherent with a parallel lack of common visions and interests among the member States. The Libyan crisis has highlighted that an incomplete integration in the field of security matters has led to a decisional impasse at the EU level, leaving to France and Great Britain the leading role. After having examined the process through which decisions are taken we will proceed in assessing over their coherence. The latter, following the work of Missioli, will differentiate four levels of coherence (horizontal, vertical, institutional and multilateral). The Horizontal level, dealing with coherence

3FABBRENI S. “The Dilemmas of an Intergovernmental Foreign Policy: Learning from the European Union’s Answer to the Libyan Crisis” International Politics, Vol. 51, 2, 2014
between the EU policies, will be studied through an assessment of the decisions taken during official meetings and summits at the EU level and see if the goals pursued are at least consistent with each other. In this work effectiveness of the policies will not be at stake, but rather whether or not contradictions can be found in the objectives defined by the EU institutions. Vertical coherence instead, focusing on the approaches of different member states, requires a different method. In fact for this purpose declarations of political leaders of the most involved countries will be examined. To be more systematic we will choose speeches and declaration released in relevant periods, like in the aftermath or before meetings, as well as information on how bargaining inside the institutions has occurred. Also institutional coherence will be assessed by focusing on declaration from the European Institutions and whether battles for turf have hampered cooperation. Finally multilateral coherence will be assessed by analysing the relations between the EU and other relevant actors like the UN, NATO and the AU, with which coordination was necessary to establish mutually reinforcing relations aimed at producing coherent policies. To do so, it will be studied whether meetings have been held and whether the goals to accomplish shared between the EU and the IOs. The inability to pursue a coherent policy and reach a joint position towards Libya has represented an old paradigm: the Franco-British directory in Foreign Policy, even if under the aegis of the US and NATO. The above-mentioned deadlocks have weakened and divided the EU and reconfirmed that to become a successful actor integration must proceed one step further.
CHAPTER 1
Theoretical framework

1.1 Defining Actorness

Central to the answering of our research question is the definition of the concept of Actorness. In order to give a definition it will be useful to analyse the literature on the concept, since such concept has been defined in many different ways by several influential scholars. In spite of the differences present in the variety of approaches used, it can be maintained that the most important elements of the definition are commonly shared. Actorness has been widely discussed in academic debates based on legal, behavioural and structural criteria. Indeed the legal criterion is needed to assess who has the right to act; the behavioural refers to the capacity and finally the structural one to the opportunity. The approach, utilized in the field of International Relations (IR), was based on the realist assumption that States were the sole actors. As a consequence authors like Hedley Bull (1983), Christopher Hill (1993) and Jan Zielonka (1998) have concluded that the EU, not being a State, is not a complete actor. Only after the second half of the 20th century was this State-centric idea challenged and the idea of Actorness has been applied to explain the nature of the European Union. Moreover it is important to specify the field in which our analysis is oriented: in our case we will analyse the external activity of the EU. Nevertheless we still need to find a comprehensive way to describe the European Actorness, considering its *sui generis* nature.

Traditionally, inside a legal framework, international actorness has been fused with the concept of legal personality. In fact International Public Law has always had the sovereign state as a main object of analysis. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 sentenced the birth of the modern State, linked to territorial sovereignty and only actor entitled to sign treaties and to participate in International Organizations (IOs). Even though some, like Meszaros, maintain that choosing the peace of Westphalia as the funding point of the modern State is more a myth than a reality, what is certain is less controversial is that the modern State was the one regarded to by legalistic approaches.

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not only traditional territorial states, but also IOs like the United Nations have been recognized a legal status by the ICJ, status that confers it independence from its member states. After the second half of the 20th century in fact, the correspondence between the legal framework and the reality of political events started to fade. Later on the European Community (EC) was granted this legal status and, following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was established as a legal person in lieu of the EC7. Even adopting such prospective though, the actorness of the EU has been a controversial issue with the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht. Due to the nature of the II and III Pillars (CFSP and JHA) the TEU did not confer the Union a legal personality, prescribing it from concluding agreements until 20048. However, owning the legal status of international actor is not sufficient to provide a comprehensive assessment of actorness. Due to internal features (e.g. ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ states), some legally recognized states are not treated as such, while particular non-recognized states like Taiwan or entities like the EU are perceived to be important international players. Furthermore recognition is not always automatic, as in the case of Kosovo or Palestine. In case of the EU itself, not being a proper sovereign means that its diplomatic recognition remains at the discretion of third parties. This is why in the 70s the realist assumptions have been challenged by pluralist approaches which underline the presence of significant units other than the States that are significant in the analysis. In the realm of IR disciplines, the issue is closely connected to the agent–structure debate.

It is ontologically relevant to distinguish the source founding the social collective. If individuals constitute the latters we are operating in the domain of Individualism, represented by rationalist theories like neo-realism and liberal theory. In both cases rational behaviour is a key feature for actorness and leads to maximization of utility in accordance with security and economic interests. When assuming that such social collective is an independent entity that gathers a greater value than the sum of its components, then the relevant theories are structuralism and holism. Examples of Structuralism are postmodernism and neo-Marxism, in which shared social structures are seen as enabling and constraining individual interests and behaviour. Some contemporary IR theories, like the one elaborated by Wendt’s constructivism, that utilizes role theory tools, try to combine the two opposed poles by assessing the ontological importance of both9. However the controversy continues to be methodological, since choosing one (or the two) approaches influences the judgment over the

7 Ojanen H. “The EU as a security actor: In and with the UN and NATO” in Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, The EU presence in international organizations, Routledge, 2011
actorness of the EU and its specificity. Hence, on the side of individualism, internal factors become crucial to assess actorness, precisely what Bretherton and Vogler would call “behavioural” criteria: autonomy and capability. On the opposite pole instead, structuralism emphasizes structural criteria like opportunity and presence. To overcome the impasse we will try to give a definition of actorness that considers and builds a relation between both sides of the problem: agency and structure. Only in this way will it be possible to define actorness by analysing the reciprocally constitutive relation between internal factors and structural constraints.10

Authors like Keohane and Nye stress the existence of differentiated kinds of actors: governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental, inserting Europe among the intergovernmental ones. The limit of such approach is that, as we shall see, the European Union cannot be simply described as an intergovernmental actor since it also has supranational powers. The debate over its actorness is entwined with the issue of its nature: academic debates have been comparing the EU to the State, to IOs, regional actors, and multilevel polity. Nevertheless such comparisons are seldom exhaustive, since Europe is more than a mere union of States but less than a federation. In fact as Mario Telò has shown, the story of Europe has been, between the XVI and XX centuries, entrenched with the formation of the modern State, influenced by the thoughts of Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. But such entanglement of absolutism, constitutionalism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism is linked to the formation of a European order. Even though the projects for a Federal Europe, as theorized by Altiero Spinelli, have not become a reality, the European Union has challenged the Westphalian State evolving towards something more complex. Hence reducing it to a mere intergovernmental entity does not consider the fields in which the EU is progressively strengthening its supranational powers.

It is not clear whether it will evolve towards a Federation of States in the future, but what is certain is that if the main actorness criterion remains the one of statehood the EU will unlikely enter the fulfil the requirement. Furthermore the Union undeniably represents one of the world regions and this have lead some authors to develop the concept of regional agency and of the EU as an actor of regional governance. Under this optic, actorness requires the entwining of both endogenous and exogenous

12 For further reading see Telò M., Dallo Stato all’Europa, Carocci, Roma, 2004
forces. Indeed actorness needs an increasing capacity to act that is eased by the reinforced presence of the regional unit in different contexts, in addition to the actions that follow from the interaction between the actor and its external environment. This means that actorness is linked to the idea of “regionness” that involves cohesiveness at the internal level. Others, like Ruggie, defined the European Union as a multilevel actor. In its approach the EU, in which its national and sub-national institutions and/or players co-exist behaves like an emergent actor attempting to assume and safeguard its legitimacy. Such conception of the Union has the advantage of overcoming the deadlock of prematurely assessing the non-actorness of the EU, due to its absence of similarities to already existing actors. This constructivist framework has allowed for the EU to be dealt with as a sui generis entity that, consequently, can act like a wholly new actor or like several actors at the same time. These intricacies have resulted in recurring and increasing efforts to more comprehensively define the relevant criteria for international actorness.

Having abandoned the idea that actorness must rely solely on the criterion of statehood and having examined the possible implication and shortcomings of adopting a theory, we shall try to investigate over the criteria that will be utilized to answer our question. As previously outlined, another relevant approach that has been used to discuss the concept focuses on behavioural criteria. Under this criterion a minimal definition would be referring to “an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions, and thus engaging in some form of purposive action”. What is intrinsic in this description is the notion of autonomy, as theorized by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett. According to the two authors, in order to assess Actorness three criteria have to be fulfilled:

1. The degree of autonomous decision-making power embodied in its central institutions
2. The extent to which it performs significant and continuing functions having an impact on interstate relations
3. The significance attached to it in the formation of the foreign policies of states, particularly those of its members.

What emerges from this definition is that not only autonomy is relevant, but also the ability to have an impact and the perception of other actors are essential elements. The concept of autonomy itself must be further clarified. Here we are not referring to concept of “strong autonomy”, meaning that the actor must be fully dethatched from the interests of its members. On the contrary we are referring to the idea

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14 Bretherton C., Vogler J. The European Union as a Global Actor, Taylor & Francis, 2005, p. 17
of “separateness”, denoting the presence of separate institutions with separate headquarters and a separate decision making process\textsuperscript{16}. Cosgrove and Twitchett concluded that the at time EEC could be considered to be an influential actor because of its strong decision making machinery and the autonomy of its Court of Justice. They indeed stress that no other institution had such an autonomy and was so uninhibited nor by the member States nor other institutions\textsuperscript{17}. Also the cooperation between France and Germany is regarded as an important means of advancement of the organization. An interesting point in their analysis is that they suggest the relevance of personal characteristics of senior civil servants, stressing how the latters have a deep impact on the development of those institutions\textsuperscript{18}. The individual level is also particularly relevant in the domain of the ESDP, which has experienced a deep influence of the first HR Javier Solana. In sum, the approach of Cosgrove and Twitchett propose three essential elements to discuss the actorness: autonomy, having an impact and being perceived by other actors. However this embryonic definition needs to be further enlarged to answer our research question.

An author that has enlarged the definition of actorness is Sjöstedt, who introduced the concept of “actor capability” that deals with the external relations of the (by the time) EC. In fact for the author actorness could be defined as the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system\textsuperscript{19}. Such concept is closely connected to the notions of autonomy and of cohesion. To him the notions are interrelated because in order to have autonomy the actor must possess a degree of delimitation from other actors (separateness) and internal integration (cohesion). This triadic relation confers the actor capability that, however, needs to be complemented by some structural criteria. Those criteria are:

1) Basic Requirements: interests and goals articulated for external actions within a “community of interests”, common resources and a resource mobilization mechanism.
2) Decision-making and Monitoring Facilities: the presence of a crisis management system that allows the preparation of external policies.
3) Action-performance instruments: communication channels, delegations, offices in third countries and IOs, external agents\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13
\textsuperscript{19} Sjöstedt, Gunnar, The External Role of the European Community, Lanham, Lexington Books, 1977, p. 16
The first point highlights the importance of a community of interests, since the latter is an essential precondition for cohesion and the formation of common goals and policies, as well as the delimitation of the conditions and the purposes for which such instruments are employed. The second point focuses on a crisis management system that needs the existence of an ad hoc decision making process able to boost it. Moreover, as evident also in the last point, such mechanisms must be supplemented with collaboration with other relevant actors, namely the UN and NATO, as well as other regional organizations.

Step forward in the definition is constituted by the notion of “presence” elaborated by Allen and Smith, concept the further allows to bypass a state-centric vision. To them, presence means that the ways in which a particular notion or set of expectations is shaped by the attention of policy makers and institutions can itself enter into the realm of political reality and play a consequential role in unfolding events\textsuperscript{21}. Presence is hence composed by the entrenchment of three elements: legitimacy, the capacity to mobilize resources, perception and expectations of policy makers. The idea of expectation has been deeply analysed by Christopher Hill, who evaluated the role of the EU (at the time EC) in international politics through its ability to satisfy third parties expectations towards it. Hill has pointed out that the EC has been operating creating a significant gap between exterior expectations and the effective capacities of the Union in its external action (capability expectation gap). In his rather pessimistic vision of the Union, the main flaws were to be looked at in a lack of resources, both material and organizational. On the one hand a shortage of economic and military assets, on the other the incapacity to actually implement decisions taken. Therefore capabilities are linked to the actor’s ability to agree on a common decision, to the resources at its disposal and to the instruments (policies, institutions) available to implement such decisions\textsuperscript{22}. Presence is also set as a key characteristic by Bretherton and Vogler together with opportunity and capability. According to the authors these three notions are essential in shaping the EU’s external activity and constitute a preliminary framework for actorness “in the making”. Indeed Presence is an indicator of the EU’s structural power that entails the ability of the EU to exert influence outside its border due to its existence. It combines understandings about the identity of the EU and the consequence of the latter’s internal priorities and policies. Opportunity refers to the structural context in which the Union operates, thus constraining external events. Capability instead, refers to internal factors like the instruments available as well as the actor’s ability to

\textsuperscript{21} ALLEN D., SMITH M, “Western Europe’s presence in the contemporary international arena”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 16, No.1, pp. 19-37, 1990, p. 21

effectively use such instruments coherently with opportunity and to achieve presence\textsuperscript{23}. These three concepts are used to describe the elements shaping the EU’s external activities, however they are not inserted in the list of the criteria for actorness. The set of criteria they provide are the following:

1) Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles;
2) Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy
3) The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate consistent and coherent policies (where consistency means the correspondence with member state’s policies and those of the EU and coherence to the internal coordination of EU policies
4) The availability of, and capacity to utilise, policy instruments (diplomacy, negotiation, economic and military means)

Similar in many ways to Bretherton and Vogler’s criteria, are the criteria elaborated by Jupille and Caporaso: recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion. According to Jupille and Caporaso, recognition constitutes a \textit{minimum condition that adds little substantive understanding of any given entity, but simply registers it on the analytical radar}\textsuperscript{24}. Such criterion can be understood in legal terms \textit{(de jure)} or in a broader sense \textit{(de facto)}. The first understanding refers to the legal recognition according to international law, hence in embassies or in diplomatic arrangements or inside an IO. As we mentioned, the recognition of a post-Westphalian entity like the EU is not automatic, nevertheless the Union has been recognized as a legal person. However, Jupille and Caporaso maintain that necessary for recognition are third parties’ interactions with the EU. Hence the criterion is satisfied when a third entity deliberately interacts with the EU instead of with a single member state. The extent to which the Union entwines bilateral or regional relations with third parties denote its recognition and thus, that its actions are respected and considerate to be legitimate by the international community. In our work we will relate the concept of recognition to the one of legitimacy, showing how this criterion has been satisfied by the EU, that since its early beginnings has entrenched relations with the Mediterranean. Not much in contrast with what maintained by Sjöstedt, Jupille and Caporaso perceive autonomy as related to separateness and independence from other actors, in other words the presence of a separate institutional apparatus. Nevertheless autonomy is not described as an absolute concept: there still might be areas in which he Union needs to be bond to its member states, e.g. when it represents it on a higher level. The fact that the EU is representative of its members in the \textit{(intergovernmental


institutions especially) does not mean that in supranational institutions it has do be dependent on them. Authority is defined in terms of legal competences, as what the EU is entitled to do and the stress is on its competences. Finally cohesion is not strictly necessary to have an impact not presence, but is considered to be essential for actorness. The EU would have an effect on third parties even lacking cohesion, but its policies would be inconsistent and incongruent, thus rendering them the outcome of a non-actor\textsuperscript{25}. The problem with their approach is that, even providing four useful categories, it does not consider the comprehensiveness of EU policies and the issue of coherence, which will be discussed later.

As it is evident by the excursus that has been traced over the various definitions of actorness, some characteristics are common even if with different nuances. An element that is common to all the authors is the one of Legitimacy. For Cosgrove and Twitchett it is the underlying idea of being perceived as actors by other entities, for Jupille and Caporaso it is recognition, Allen and Smith also talk of legitimacy, for Bretherton and Vogler presence is important. Those concepts are not synonyms and do entail conceptual differences as we have outlined; however they share the emphasis on the importance of other actor’s perceptions and on the ability of the EU to entrench relations with third parties. Hence in our testing of the hypothesis we will assess European actorness by grouping these concepts in the analysis. Hence we will refer to legitimacy entailing concepts like presence and recognition by others. Also Authority and Autonomy are somehow present in all the definitions. The most agreed upon features essential for actorness are precisely those indicated by Tom Delreux: recognition, autonomy and authority.

However, until this point we have not been focusing enough on non structural criteria that can be called “ideational” aspects. Among these can be found values, identity, the way in which an actor perceives itself, its “actorness essence”. Hence not only is the perception of third parties of the EU relevant, but also the way in which the EU perceives itself and what it seeks to promote and communicate to the outer world. In the case of the Union and its identity, it can be argued that its orientation towards integration is an essential element in its identity that influences the member states part in it. Moreover also the identities of the member states shape the EU as such in a synergetic interaction between Europeanization of national policies and national projection of the latters on the European level. Such aspects need to be further examined, indeed the limit of a strictly constructivist and a strictly realist approach is that they do not consider the importance of identity. The latter,

introduced also by Bretherton and Vogler as a commitment to shared values and principles, has a significant influence on foreign policy itself. As Javier Solana has pointed out:

“'Realist' and 'structuralist' accounts miss out one crucial factor. And that is the impact of identity on foreign policy. For what you do on the international stage is surely also a function of your identity-of how you define yourself and the values you seek to promote abroad”.

To sum up, we have seen how many authors define actorness and, using the key concepts proposed by the scholars, we will collect a list of elements that distinguishes between ideational and material aspects of actorness. Hence the distinction would be as follows: among the material aspects will be found capabilities, authority, autonomy, presence and legitimacy. Among the ideational aspects we will find those elements that can be summarized as the “actorness essence”.

Figure 1. The relationship between Roles, Identity and Actorness Essence

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In the scheme reported from the study of Koops\textsuperscript{27} (Figure 1) it is evident that these are sharing of norms, the different identities, roles, and strategic culture. In this work we will use the word cohesion to designate the extent to which the different member states share an identity and have the same role perception and strategic culture. The role perception is relevant because it indicates the way in which the Member States perceive the EU and the role it should have in the international arena. The EU can have several roles: economic, civilian, military and normative. However, different member states have been supporting a specific dimension instead of others, coherently with their own role perceptions. This means that coherently with such visions those Member States will promote a certain role of the EU, from a more civilian to a more military. This is interesting because, as it will appear in the course of the analysis, member states with a more military-oriented strategic culture and that endorse the formation of a stronger external dimension of the EU are more likely to have a stronger impact in the decision making process. Thus in our work we will try to bridge structural elements and agency. A theory that allows this combination is precisely role theory, whose focus is on role perception. Nevertheless the theory will be used as a tool to bridge the two concepts and to stress the importance of self-conception and how it shapes actions. The purpose of this work is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the EU foreign policy under the lens of role theory, rather to focus on the extent to which member states have diverged over the conception of the EU to promote to the outer world. Indeed as shown by the concept of “actorness essence” the Union displays several dimensions: from the military, the civilian, the normative and each one has been emphasized in different historical contexts and in different member states. Studying the approach of the EU towards the Libyan crisis entails to assess the development of Europe towards a more military dimension and how this evolution has been welcomed internally and externally.

1.2 Authority

In the previous paragraph we have been overviewing the main characteristics necessary to assess actorness of the EU. Among those features, the scientific community agrees that authority occupies a first line role. Authority is often defined in terms of legal competences\textsuperscript{28}, however in this work it will be maintained the relevance of studying what kind of authority an actor possesses. Indeed the level of

\textsuperscript{27} Koops J.A. “The European Union as an Integrative Power?: Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations”, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 131

\textsuperscript{28} DELREUX T. “EU Actorness, Cohesiveness and Effectiveness in Environmental Affairs”, \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}, Vol. 21, No.7, 2014, p. 1018
authority and the extent to which is this binding can give precious information on the outcome foreign policy. Authority can be exercised in panoply of arrangements and by an array of decision units. Those units can be constituted by cabinets, coalitions, leaders, prime ministers, presidents, inter-agency groups et al. Milestone in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making processes are Margaret and Charles Hermann, that propose a methodology for classifying three main types of ultimate decision units. The scholars define ultimate decision units as being the units with “the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed”\(^\text{29}\). When an issue becomes relevant for a given government and urges a solution to be reached, the process of decision-making begins. Such process can reach a stalemate if the parties are not able to take a decision, as well as the opportunity to act is overhauled by external events or if the parties involved refuse to deal with the matter that they perceive outside their interests. In the case of the EU, in which States represent relevant decision units, it can even occur that a problem is considered to be vital only for some member states and not for all, thus hampering preliminarily the decision making process. In order for a decision to be taken the actors involved in the process need to have both a) the ability to commit or withhold the resources of the government in foreign affairs and b) the power or authority to prevent other entities within the government from overtly reversing their position without significant costs (costs which these other entities are normally unwilling to pay)\(^\text{30}\). The entity that owns these two abilities is the ultimate decision unit. What is interesting in the analysis is that such ultimate decision unit can vary based on the issue upon which a decision must be taken. For routine problems the process can take place at a lower level than for crucially important issues, of which the government takes charge. Understanding the composition of a decision making process and particularly who is entitled to take decisions allows to more accurately analyse the outcome of a foreign policy. In fact, as Hermann systematized, the relation between the decision unit and the outcome is the one described by Figure 2\(^\text{31}\).

The theory has not been elaborated to analyse the European Union, but sovereign States. Nevertheless the tools that it provides can be useful to understand mechanisms at a higher level. In fact the purpose is not to apply her theory as a whole to this study, rather to apply her study on decision-making process based on coalitions. Indeed, as it will be maintained forward in this work, the EU Foreign Policy making favours the formation of coalitions instead of single groups or leaders. At the


\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 363

\(^{31}\) The Figure is taken from HERMANN M. G., “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework”, International Studies Review, Wiley on behalf of The International Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, p.52
State level it will be hinted that member states with a stronger hierarchical foreign decision making mechanisms are those advantaged at the EU level summits\textsuperscript{32}.

**Figure 2: Decision Units Framework**

However the main focus will be on the EU level, where it will be studied how the intergovernmental nature of the Lisbon Treaty in the part dedicated to foreign policy issues hinders the formation of a ultimate decision unit. The reason why this methodology is relevant is because, since as stated Authority constitutes an essential criterion in assessing Actorness, a deeper examination of what kind of authority is exerted allows to better clarify the concept

The three forms of authorities that are indicated by Margaret Herman and Charles Herman are as follows: predominant leader ultimate decision unit, single group ultimate decision unit and finally multiple autonomous actors type of ultimate decision making unit. The latter adequately suits the form of authority of the EU. In fact this category is composed by two or more separate entities with independent authority structures, none of which is able to employ the resources of the regime without the agreement (or at least not open opposition) of the other parties. In this scenario, one actor can have several tools to block the common initiatives. For instance it might use a formal veto power, it can withhold the necessary resources thus impeding others to attain to them or threatening to withdraw support. In decisions concerning military missions the ability to withhold resources is particularly interesting as some member states possess economic and structural capabilities (like OHQs) that might refuse to employ. The intergovernmental nature of decision-making process inside the EU renders any

member state equally authoritative in the domain of ESDP, thus making impossible the creation of a unit able to overcome the will of another member state. Also because resources at the EU level are not common in every domain, an ultimate decision unit cannot force sovereign states to commit their resources to deploy an ESDP mission. In fact the budget to employ in military missions is provided through an arrangement between the member states and does not draw from a common budget\textsuperscript{33}. It is self-evident that a fragmented intergovernmental decision making process has not to be confused with the extent to which decisions are binding when taken. At this point our analysis is on the moment antecedent the decision taken. In fact once the decision is approved \textit{the Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area}\textsuperscript{34}. Furthermore they shall cooperate to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. \textit{They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations}\textsuperscript{35}. The task of ensuring compliance with these principles is of the Council and of the HR. However, as Keukeleire and Delreux point out, the provision has a conditional binding power. In fact the member state’s compliance directly depends on how the policies have been shaped, to what extent EU interests have been specified and on how the Union is working to boost cohesion on a specific issue\textsuperscript{36}. When the latter conditions are not fulfilled, the Treaty authorizes member states to pursue their own policies.

When decision-making unit are multiple, the final decision will hence be the result of a compromise and will seldom be definite without leaving margin of manoeuvre to its members. If the policy does not leave room for interpretation and require strong compliance, the parties might be less prone to agree. A major problem at the European level is the vague and general nature of its policies that allows states to exploit its ambiguities\textsuperscript{37}. To precisely assess the nature of decision units, Hermann suggests answering a series of questions, the responses to which will help in the determination of the units. Understanding the way in which policies are made will allow us to better understand the dynamics at the basis of the decisions taken for the solution of the Libyan crisis and what facilitated France and the Great Britain to gain a preeminent role.

\textsuperscript{34} TEU ART. 24.3
\textsuperscript{35} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid} p.159
Figure 3. Factors involved in determining the nature of the authoritative decision unit for an occasion for decision.

Figure 2 shows the scheme Hermann provides to assess over the matter. What will emerge is a relation between internal cohesion and authority. Indeed, at a State level, countries with few cleavages and social fractures are most likely to form a highly hierarchical decision making process. Countries in which social cleavages are deep discourage the presence of a strong executive. Member States constitutional designs and the way in which authority is structured influence the European level policy making. It is not a case that France and the UK, the two countries that occupy the most prime line role in the EU foreign policy, have both a majoritarian system.

Apart from the judiciary, the two major organs in a democracy are the executive and the legislative/representative. Purpose of the first is the ability to take decisions; aim of the second is to make laws and to represent its citizens. Every democracy, in accordance with the needs of its social structure, establishes the ways in which it intends balance decision-making and representation. Cohesive democracies with only few social cleavages tend to (or have the opportunity to) privilege the

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38 The Figure is taken from HERMANN M. G., “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework”, *International Studies Review*, Wiley on behalf of The International Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001 p.58

role of the executive. The (quasi total) absence of minorities or of groups that might fear not to be represented facilitates the formation of a strong executive able to take binding decisions with few compromises. The most cited example is the case of Great Britain\(^\text{40}\). On the opposite side, profoundly divided societies composed by different groups seldom achieve a highly hierarchical executive. The major concern of those democracies is to represent every group and minority, thus privileging a proportional system like in the case of Belgium\(^\text{41}\). The two poles represent the extremities of a continuous axis in which each democracy positions itself to balance the two needs. There is seldom a complete correspondence between strong executive, majoritarian system, lack of cleavages, two party system on a side and loose executive, perfect proportionality, bottomless social fractures and panoply of parties on the other. However the two extremes serve as an exemplification of how a cohesive society favours the presence of a strong executive, thus able to take binding decisions.

In foreign policy this is particularly evident, since in such field it is required to speak with one voice and a fragmented position is a disadvantage. Therefore, in spite of the differences among the two, the majoritarian systems of the UK and France (at least in the presidential elections) and the consequent formation of a clear executive is an asset in foreign policy, even at the European level\(^\text{42}\). At the European level the issues upon which there is most consent due to a lack of cleavages hindering the formation of common interests are decided with a supranational method. On the contrary, the issues that fall under a domain in which every state fears that its interests will not be represented as such interests are in contrasts with those of the other members, are agreed upon with the consent of all. This is not to assess that in economic fields and in those dealt with through the communitarian method there are never opposite interests, but that foreign policy issues that entail a higher level of cooperation suffer from deeper differences of conception of the EU itself. This is the reason why in our analysis of actorness not only structures but also agency criteria must be analysed. Indeed we will maintain that ideational aspects like identity, strategic culture and role conception do influence the way in which decisions are taken and accepted. Without understanding the more ideational aspects of the concept of actorness, the study of authority would be lamed. Policies are channelled through legal processes and institutional structures, but the latters are built by societies in the way that best suits their needs and

\(^{40}\) On how such system favors the formation of a centralized leadership, and how in turn this that allows the formation of a strong Foreign Policy see PANEBIANCO, Angelo, “Guerrieri democratici. Le democrazie e la politica di Potenza”, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, 336 p.


adapt to their compositions.

1.3 Defining Coherence

To answer our research question, it is important to analyze the approach of the EU towards Libya to assess if the latter was coherent. In the previous paragraphs we have been coping with issues defining actorness. The element of coherence has sometimes been hinted but seldom comprehensively as a fundamental characteristic of an actor. In fact together with the analysis of material and ideational elements, coherence is essential for an actor as it encompasses the interaction of several of the elements outlined before. Nevertheless before starting with the analysis it will be useful to give a definition of what will be meant by the use of such word. In fact coherence must non be misunderstood with apparently similar concepts like cohesion and, to a more limited extent, consistency. A minimum degree of coherence might be seen as present in Bretherton and Vogler’s work as indicating a common share of values and common politics. Also the analysis of Sjöstedt and Jupille and Caporaso indicate the concept “cohesion” and consistency. Here we need a terminological differentiation in order not to incur in terminological confusion. Coherence, consistency and cohesion are not complete synonyms. Cohesion will be understood as referring to a value linked dimensions, sharing of a common identity, strategic culture and role conception. Coherence instead does not refer to ideational aspects of actorness but includes a legal dimension, as it is regarded as essential in EU level policies. In this point it is worth providing further elucidation, as the Treaties, from the SEA to the TEU, call upon the necessity for consistency. Nevertheless the French translation of the Treaties reports the word cohérence and the German Kohärenz. However consistency and coherence, from a legal perspective, carry slightly different meanings, the first indicating a mere absence of contradiction and the second designating a wider synergy. Hence, the latter implies that there can be different degrees of coherence, whereas it is impossible to assess that a policy is to a certain extent consistent: either it is either it is not. In this work we will thus analyse coherence rather than consistency as it imposes not sharp definition, but allows for more nuanced discussion. However we remind that when the word “consistency” will appear as quoted in a Treaty it might denote coherence at a wider level, since we have seen how the word has been translated differently in the languages of the Union. Coherence is hence a “desirable plus” that involves positive connections and will be defined as composed by four

distinct levels: the horizontal, the vertical, the institutional and the multilateral coherence. The first one, Horizontal Coherence, refers to a) the consistency of various EU crisis management policies and b) the synergy among them. In accordance with the work of Missiroli we refer to consistency as to a first step lack of contradiction whereas to coherence Secondly Institutional coherence is about the interaction among the various institutions that, entwined, deal with the crisis. Thirdly, Vertical coherence copes with the extent to which the member states adopt policies that are both consistent with and desirably reinforcing the EU level policy. Finally multilateral coherence refers to the coherence of the EU’s response with those of other international actors (such as the African Union, NATO and the UN)\textsuperscript{45}. All of the four above mentioned levels of coherence require both a basic consistency and a deeper mutually reinforcing cooperation. Thus coherence does not entail solidarity or an abstract but shared sentiment of common identity like cohesion, but this does not mean that there is no link among the two concepts. Indeed the latters are entrenched, as a complete absence of cohesion and common vision would hinder synergetic cooperation in policies at least at a vertical level. In this work we shall analyse whether the response to the 2011 Libyan crisis has been coherent (or at least consistent) differentiating the four levels. The study of coherence is relevant because not only does a lack of coherence hinder effectiveness of a policy, but because the way in which a crisis is approached is an essential indicator of actorness. Indeed vertical incoherence is a symptom of a lack of cohesion and of a non-strongly binding authority, whereas multilateral coherence copes with the perception of relevant others. Also at the institutional and horizontal levels, contradictory policies and declarations show the extent to which the Lisbon Treaty has actually managed to achieve the goal of “speaking with one voice”. Coherence and comprehensiveness of policies have been of great concern of the Commission and the Council that auspicate it in foreign policy. Indeed The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) itself provides the legal basis for coherence in EU foreign policy. According to its Article 7, among the principles of the Union, is stated that the latter shall ensure consistency between its policies and, as far as its external actions are concerned, it is the HR that has the role of ensuring such consistency, as maintained by Article 18. The Article 26 of TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, states that The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. Coherence (or a minimum level of it) is thus a responsibility for the actors involved in the EU foreign policy to harmonize their policies to produce at least

\textsuperscript{45} Koening N. ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In quest of coherence?’, \textit{The International Spectator}, Vol. XXII/5, 2012
consistent and coherent outputs\(^4\). Furthermore, what emerges from Article 26 is the concept of effectiveness: in fact for the latter to be accomplished a minimum degree of coherence is a prerequisite. As elucidated by Missiroli, “by acting unitarily and with a common purpose, the EU...becomes also, \textit{ipso facto}, more efficient and effective\(^4\). Even though a clear definition of effectiveness is seldom provided, we can distinguish between pseudo and real effectiveness. Pseudo-effectiveness entails meeting self-prefixed roles, even if the latters are not ambitious and aimed at producing external visibility. Real effectiveness instead, as argued by Ginsberg, entails a long-term perspective aimed at producing an impact whose sole scope is not the one of achieving prestige\(^4\). This study will not be centred on the concept of effectiveness, even though it will be hinted that a lack of coherence in the approach towards the crisis has had negative consequences on the formation of an effective policy itself. We will not even cope with the long-term effects of the EU foreign policy towards Libya in 2011, hence the concern will not rest on its qualitative or normative evaluation. What is at stake is whether the European Union, after having developed ad hoc tools and having conveyed its efforts to improve crisis management and response, has shown to display the features of a coherent security actor. Since a comprehensive security actor (like the EU seeks to be adopting the so-called “comprehensive approach”) entails both military and civilian missions, the study of horizontal coherence is a useful tool to answer the question. Moreover institutional coherence contributes building the image of a unitary and accountable actor, as well as the interaction between the member states in reaching decisions influences the vertical coherence.

1.4. The Research in Foreign Policy Analysis

We have seen in the previous paragraphs that the IR approach did not fully consider non-state actors, and hence the need to move to other theories to answer our research question. Subfield of the IR, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) proposes alternative paradigms, based on the study of decision-making as in the work by Snyder R.C., Bruck H.W. and Sapin B. “Decision-Making as an Approach to

the Study of International Politics”, on Man-Milieu Relationship as in the work of Harold and Margaret Sprout “ Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics”, et al. The work of Snyder was aimed at looking beyond the nation-state level of analysis to stressing the need for a study on Decision-Making Processes. Such study will be crucial in this work too. In fact the objective of this thesis will not be to assess the effectiveness of a given policy, but rather to understand the process that created it and, as a second step, to assess over its coherence. The study will be in turn aimed at assessing whether the EU has displayed the features of a security actor in Libya in 2011, and in order to proceed with the assessment it will be essential to understand how decisions have been reached. In this chapter we have been defining actorness as composed by both material and ideational aspects, separation that matches with the agency-structure division.

A useful theory that analyses both aspects and bridges them in the analysis of foreign policy is role theory. In fact role theory allows understanding the self-perception of an actor and the image of itself it wants to promote. This is useful because when talking of a union of states it is essential to understand the goals that these states want to pursue together. The very aim of collective action is indeed to create institutions that will allow reaching goals that alone cannot be achieved. Hence such goals influence the policies pursued. When applied to the EU level role theory is closely connected to the issue of actorness as it studies how role perceptions as well as structures influence decisions. This work aims at addressing the issue of EU actorness analysing both but considering to what extent perception by others and self-perception are concepts entwined to capability and authority and autonomy. Finding its roots in sociology and psychology, role theory presents an analogy with a stage in which roles are played by the actors and attributes great importance to the constitution of the “ego” and the “alter”, together with the expectation of other. Interesting in this sense is the work of Holsti, which has applied role theory to the study of foreign policy and challenged the vision according to which roles were determined by structures. In this optic structural features like capabilities and autonomy matter, but they are understood as being related to national roles. Role conception is the self-perception that the actor has and that is determined by history, culture and memory. This does not mean that these self-images are unchanged in time, they can evolve interacting with other actors and can be influenced by expectations. Furthermore it redresses one typical problem of FPA, that is not

considering the expectations and role prescriptions from others⁵².

The purpose of this thesis is not to give a comprehensive analysis of role theory, but to employ the concepts it provides to have a theoretical framework on role conception, stressing how diverging on this fundamental issue might present difficulties in agreeing on wider objectives. Moreover the image that Europe seeks to promote to the outer world also influences the way it will act and the way it will develop its policies, also relating to third parties expectations. The way in which the theory will be employed will try to explain how different views and hinder the formation of a supranational authority, as member states are unwilling to renounce to their bargaining power. In fact in Holsti’s theory role performance is influenced by expectations of peers, organizational rules, social mores, traditions and laws⁵³. Instead in this work, as far as the EU is concerned, laws and rules will be considered to be outcomes of role conception instead of the contrary. Indeed Europe has progressively developed its institutions in accordance with the role it searched to promote. Furthermore the perception different member states had on the role the EU should have has influenced the rise of such institutions, that have been built coherently with such views. In other words rules are not given, but rather they are agreed upon starting from what is perceived to be important by those who agree upon them. Not only rules, but also decision-making processes are designed to answer specific needs. If sovereign states want to build an institution unable to bind them and to commit their resources in specific fields (in our case Foreign Policy), they will design a decisional mechanism in which any decision unit has equal power and in which all must agree to take a decision. Hence role theory will be related to the processes through which decisions are taken.

In FPA, authors of this ilk employ the acronym of FPDM, to designate the fact that they stress primarily decision-making processes⁵⁴. Among the contributions of FPA to IR theory is to identify the points of theoretical juncture between the chief determinants of state behaviour: material and ideational factors. Nevertheless such point of connection is not the state, but rather human decision makers⁵⁵. If IR theories do not comprise human beings, they will erroneously describe a world of no change, no creativity, no persuasion and no accountability⁵⁶. In this work human beings do play a role. When we employ the study of role conception we are not taking culture and identity as a reified entity that

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⁵² Ibid. p. 241
⁵³ Ibid. p. 243
⁵⁵ HUDSON, V. M. p.3 “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, I, 2005, p. 3
⁵⁶ Ibidem
governs decisions. We are on the contrary considering the human nature of decision makers that are influenced in their actions by their view of the world and by the interests they seek to defend. Even though we are not operating in the framework of the leader personality, also because at this step we lack psychological tools, we cannot refute that individuals do play a role in their approach towards policies. As a matter of fact if, as it will be seen, the primary location for Foreign Policy making is the Council, we can assess that leaders in charge and present at the meetings do give their footprint on decisions and problem framing. Moreover such institution represent the executives of the member states, and hence it is reasonable that such leaders will safeguard the interests of their nation, thus refusing to support policies that are perceived as in opposition to national interests. In sum, as Hudson puts it, “states are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency”57.

Such consideration that individuals and their relations do play a role will remain an issue of second level, as the subject of this work is more related to decision-making processes. Instead of focusing on leaders and their personalities we will focus on how those in charge of representing their country at the EU level will act as gatekeepers of their interests and will be influenced by ideational aspects. Hence we will combine the study of role-conception with the study of decision-making processes, to the extent that the way in which a member states perceives itself, the EU and itself in the EU has an impact on policies it will support or block. Furthermore the presence of variegated perceptions in contrast makes member states unwilling to cede a part of their sovereignty in Foreign Policy. Joining the two aspects is important, as focusing only on decisional mechanisms or not at all would lead us to maintain either that institutions are the sole responsible for the formation of political outcomes, either to maintain that they are negligible. Therefore, we can summarize the way in which the concepts interact in a scheme. It is noteworthy to stress that these relations are those utilized in this work but that they do not entail that there couldn’t be also other relations. For instance it could be argued that External Relations are also shaped by geographical contiguity, power et al. Nevertheless since the focus is on actorness we will merely say that the relations that the EU establishes are influenced by what it seeks to promote and its legacies, like in the case of the Mediterranean and former colonial powers. The way in which an entity acts gives it Legitimacy and shapes the external expectations. Again it could be argued that the latters might be composed by other factors, but in this work we will remain focussed on how the way in which the EU constructs itself (e.g. as a military, integrative, civilian power et al.) shapes what relevant others will expect from it.

But ideational aspects influence also the way in which rules are established and the decision-making process institutionalized as well as capabilities. In fact a country’s self conception influences the amount of resources it will devolve, for instance, on defence or military missions. Hence the EU level Foreign Policy is to some extent influenced by the way in which its members conduct foreign Policy. If every State conducts a sort of ‘‘two-level’’ game, which means that national decision makers must simultaneously play the game of domestic politics and the game of international politics (Putnam, 1988), for European member states the game becomes threefold, as in addition to the national and the international levels there is the European one.

1.5 Research Design and Methodology

After having provided the definitions necessary to the work, we shall continue outlying what will be the research design. To assess whether the EU has displayed the features of a security actor in the Libyan crisis we will examine the characteristics that we have reported as essential and verify if they were present in the approach of the EU. In this chapter we have been defining actorness as composed by both material and ideational aspects. Hence, as outlined in the paragraph regarding actorness, we will define the concept as composed by both, agency and structure. The issues related to agency would be the ideational aspects like strategic culture, role perception, and external expectation whereas among the material there would be capabilities, authority and autonomy.
The research hence will proceed as follows: the next chapter will assess the issue of actorness discussing both material and agency-related aspects and verifying if the criteria have been fulfilled by the EU in its approach towards the Libyan crisis. The next chapter will try to define the self-conception of the EU and how it has been influenced by the expectations of relevant others (namely the UN and NATO). It will be underlined how different member states have, since the early beginnings of the Union, conceived the role the EU should have had in different ways. To assess whether the EU has a shared role conception the method used will be to analyse the way in which it has progressively developed its institutions, the compromises that have been necessary and whether there has been convergence of its members. The limit will be that it would not be possible in this work to comprehensively assess the histories of all the European member states to assess the extent to which those legacies have influenced their foreign policies, not even to provide a complete enumeration of all the interests at stake. At this step, through a historical overview, it will be simply maintained that the existence of distinguished identities and the presence of sometimes-divergent interests complicates the formation of a shared role conception.

The following paragraph further discusses the issue of the role of the EU but in a different optic. The purpose will be to show how the EU has been relating with the Mediterranean and to what extent the building of such relations rendered it a legitimate actor in coping with the Arab Spring. In fact in the study of Actorness Legitimacy is an important criterion and to assess whether the EU was perceived as an actor in the area we will outline the relations between the two. Indeed, as previously mentioned, for a non-State actor it is essential to be recognized by the international community and the very stipulation of legal binding treaties denotes that the entity is recognized as legitimate. Hence the paragraph outlines the policies of the European Union towards the Mediterranean and hints some of its limits, for instance the homologation of all the Countries of the area without considering the differences (cultural, historical and religious) between them. The following paragraphs will be dedicated to the study of structural aspects like authority, capabilities and autonomy. Autonomy and Authority will be discussed together since the two are interrelated: indeed an actor is autonomous (independent from its member states\textsuperscript{58}) when it is legally entitled to take a specific decision. The more authoritative an actor is the more it can act autonomously. Hence authority will be studied in detail and, attaining to Hermann’s methodology we will try to understand what kind of authority the EU possesses.

\textsuperscript{58} DELREUX T. “EU Actorness, Cohesiveness and Effectiveness in Environmental Affairs”, \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}, Vol. 21, No.7, 2014, p. 1018
In order to analyse the kind of authority Europe has the research will try to answer the questions Margaret Hemann proposes to assess over the decision units involved in the decision-making process. The limit of this work will be that it does not seek to provide a reading of the events under the lenses of the theory elaborated by Hermann, but it rather employs her work limitedly to the analysis of decision making units and the process in which they operate. To answer the questions, which primarily focus on decision-making processes and the eventuality of the formation of ultimate decision units, the method utilized will be the analysis of the pertinent articles of the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed the latter has deeply modified the method under which decisions are taken, institutionalizing an intergovernmental regime that leaves the majority of the bargaining at the State level. For this purpose the legacy of the Lisbon Treaty must be studied as it provides the legal framework in which the EU can act. The work is not even aimed at providing a complete analysis on the European legal framework; it will rather employ a study of the Treaty in order to understand whether the EU has managed to centralize its Foreign Policy making or if member states are still the ultimate decision units.

On the autonomy criterion several explanations can be attached and those depend on the definition employed to expound autonomy. If the latter relies on having the legal capabilities to act and on possessing separate institutions, then the analysis can be held together with the study of authority. Instead if we consider autonomy in a broader sense, hence considering autonomy also in terms of economic and operational assets, a paragraph on capabilities will be needed. The study of capabilities itself is extremely relevant when assessing actorness, since it explicates what can be achieved with the means available. So we will proceed by studying, legally, how resources are allocated and whether all member states contribute equally. The research, being aimed at understanding if capabilities were adequate to perpetrate missions autonomous from other IOs, will be limited in assessing whether resources were lacking and what hindered their pooling and sharing aimed at sustaining an autonomous CSDP mission in Libya. Hence briefings, official meetings and reports will be studied to understand whether or not the EU has faced a scarcity of resources when approaching the crisis.

As a second step, after having observed European actorness and the way in which it manages to take decisions and to formulate policies, it will be possible to evaluate the coherence of such policies themselves. Indeed it is necessary to relate the concepts of actorness and coherence because a minimum level of the first is essential to achieve the second. The research will hence assess the coherence of the European approach towards the Libyan crisis using this theoretical framework. In accordance with the work of Missiroli, and his differentiation of four levels of coherence (horizontal, vertical, institutional and multilateral) the study will proceed by approaching each level separately. As far as Horizontal
coherence is concerned, the examination will proceed by analysing the decisions taken during official meetings and summits at the EU level and to verify whether the goals pursued are at least consistent with each other. This work will not provide a qualitative evaluation over the effectiveness of European policies in Libya, but rather it will look at contradictions and if those can be found in the objectives defined by the EU institutions.

Vertical coherence instead, focusing on the approaches of different member states, requires a different method. In fact declarations of political leaders of the most relevant countries will be examined. By relevant countries it is not meant any evaluation over the international power or prestige, rather the fact that some countries have been more involved than others. For instance the Big Three, namely France, Great Britain and Germany, occupy an important role since they are large contributors in the European Defence expenditure and since they play an important role in the decision making process. Particularly France and Great Britain, being the most favourable towards a military intervention are interesting, as well as Italy due to its bonds with Libya and with its involvement in the Hermes operation. It would be complex and also counter-productive to analyse all the discourses and speeches of all the leaders of European Countries in 2011, hence strategic periods will be examined in the analysis. For instance it will be more noteworthy to observe declarations before and after meetings and, when possible, to study how bargaining inside the institutions have occurred. The methodology though cannot properly be considered to be a discourse analysis, as also non-verbal acts can be considered to be explicative of the position of a Country over a matter. Indeed policies and concrete decisions will be utilized in assessing coherence. For example the French decision to block the frontier in Ventimiglia, even if not through a speech, shows incoherence with the position on migration and caused frictions with Italy, thus entailing absence of vertical coherence in the field.

Focusing on declaration coming from the most important European Institutions will also assess institutional coherence. Moreover the eventuality of battles for turf will be investigated as the presence of the latters would shows (at least to some extent) a lack of coordination between the institutions. Finally multilateral coherence will be assessed by analysing the relations between the EU and other relevant actors. Among those actors can be found the UN, NATO and the AU, actors that were seized over the matter of the Libyan crisis and with which coordination was necessary to establish mutually reinforcing relations aimed at producing coherent policies. To do so, it will be studied whether meetings have been held between the EU and the above-mentioned IOs and whether the objectives of the latters were shared by Europe. Hence the stress will be more on contents rather than on discourses.
CHAPTER 2
Assessing Actorness

2.1 A Security Community: The European self-conception

Since its early beginnings, the European Union (EU) has been deeply engaged in the goal of building security. Indeed initial economic integration had the effect of consolidating peace among States that had been facing violent conflicts until the previous decade. For this reason post war Europe could be defined, with the words of Richard van Wagenen and his colleague Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, as a “security community”. By such expression, initially applied to the UN case, the two scholars meant that the members of a security community engage in settling their disputes in ways other than war. Indeed such sui generis actor was born from a strong will to put together resources to avoid bloody clashes and the experience of France and Germany had shown how, if a short-sighted view of neighbourhood relations could lead to conflicts, the latter could be overcome by a constructive regionalism. Such peace project, nested in the functionalist vision of Mitrany and Haas, eventually led to a further integration of institutions, policies and common instruments to achieve stability also with neighbouring States. Indeed the founding of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1986 with the Single European Act and its consolidation in 1992 with the Maastricht treaty expanded the debate on European security and the role that the Union as a whole had to assume.

Before the nineties, the European self-perception was the one of a civilian power. Coined by Duchène, the expression conceptualized the will of the Union to trust primarily on non-military tools, relying on economic instruments and promoting peaceful relations with its neighbours. Duchène’s argument was that in a period of nuclear deterrence, in which the main actors were the USA and the USSR, military power was to be devalued and major importance was to be given to civilian forms of action. Hence to achieve a secure international context civilian tools aimed at persuasion instead of coercion were seen as more adequate to pursue peace. As we will see in the next paragraph, among the

main policies originated by this conception of the role the Union had to support were enlargement policies in the inside and neighbouring policies in the outer borders. Through both the EU was able to promote human rights, economic development et al., thus exerting an influence strengthened by the use of positive and negative sanctions. The fall of the Berlin wall further boosted such process, as ex-soviet countries started to converge towards the European orbit and soft power policies were of great use in the new system.

The end of the cold war had also other consequences as the Union, in the new external environment, started to seek a more autonomous role from the US. Furthermore, the failure in the Yugoslav wars and the inability to react against a genocide in the immediate backyard posed the issue of a military development. On December 1998, at the Franco-British St. Malo Summit, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair agreed to launch a joint initiative that revolutionized the conception of the European role in Foreign Policy and influenced the development of the European common defence policy. Such initiative became a European project that, born in the 1999 Cologne European Council, was later enshrined in the 2001 Treaty of Nice. Such project, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) showed how the EU was evolving towards a more military dimension instead of a mere civilian one. In order to achieve such result the St. Malo Joint Declaration on European Defence implied a compromise among the different visions that France and the United Kingdom had on European security. France’s vision, traditionally supporter of a European autonomy from NATO and the US, can be exemplified by the statement “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. As Keukeleire and Delreux point out instead, the British position is summarized in the following part of the declaration: “while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.” Hence the CSDP itself was born thanks to the reaching of several associated equilibria: between France and the UK, between the EU and the US, between EU-oriented and NATO-oriented member states, between neutral and NATO members, between civilian and military crisis management traditions.

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As Koenig points out, the paradigmatic shift from a civilian to a military self-conception has entailed both vertical and horizontal contestations\(^65\). At the horizontal level the entrance of a new apparatus within the EU’s institutional architecture generated rivalries between institutions. In fact if traditionally it was the Commission to have a preeminent role in civilian crisis management, now the new instruments were inserted among the competences of the Council Secretariat. Such overlapping of roles, aggravated by the separation of the civilian and the military, also triggered turf battles inside the institutions. It is interesting to note that the new competences were set under the domain of an intergovernmental organ, the Council, instead of a supranational one like the Commission. In fact the new-born CFSP was constructed on intergovernmental structures that reflected the deeply diverging visions of the Union maintained by the member states. At the vertical level, member states had a different idea of the future evolution of Europe. Germany and the Nordics, traditionally pacifist and more UN-oriented, stressed the new military tools should be equipped with civilian crisis management structures and resources. France, on its side, pushed towards a *Europe de la défense* by endorsing the development of military capabilities. Moreover, dreading that such military power would not be sufficiently developed thus remaining too soft and tangled with the civilian tools, France called upon a strict division of the military command chain from the civilian\(^66\). Britain instead, concerned by the problem of duplication with NATO was against a common European command structure. The dichotomy between States in support of deeper integration and those in opposition hindered, already at the time, the formation of a truly supranational foreign policy able to go beyond National interests. Hence, lacking binding decision making procedures and common resources made it difficult for the Union to face the new security challenges, fuelling the arguments of who saw a “capability-expectation gap”\(^67\).

The will to search a compromise and not to overcome none of the parties was shown at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 where it was stated that “The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This

process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.”\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore “appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management”\textsuperscript{69}. Indeed from 2003, when the Brussels European Council approved the EU’s first European Security Strategy, the first military missions were launched. Developing military capabilities became necessary to give CSDP further tools together with soft power ones. From this moment an animated academic debate questioned whether a step towards the development of military tools meant the end of the EU as a civilian power and whether it had positive consequences for the relation of the EU with the US, the UN and NATO\textsuperscript{70}. The outcome of the birth of CSDP for the EU-US relation was the reaching of the Berlin Plus agreement. The US accepted the new policy under the condition of a European respect of the “three Ds”: no Decoupling, no Duplication and no Discrimination. In other words the new CSDP had not to uncouple itself completely from NATO nor create a replication of capabilities and not discriminate NATO members not part of the EU. The Berlin Plus agreement provided necessary equipment to the EU for military operation and institutionalized the interlocking relation with the International Organization\textsuperscript{71}.

Institutionalizing a functional cooperation was essential. In fact after the Treaty of Nice had formalized the creation of the Political Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) it was evident that the institutions of the ESDP had to be modelled on NATO’s. The PSC was shaped on the North Atlantic Council and the EUMS and the EUMC on NATO’s International Military Staff and Military Committee\textsuperscript{72}. The EU, having developed its own military tools, was ready to launch three autonomous missions: Althea, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad/RCA. The launch of the latters had spill over effect on the 2005 Franco-British-German proposal of the EU Battlegroups, composed by either a single country either by a multitude, and that became operational on January 2007. The groups, originally designed to support the UN in Africa, were seen as potential rivals by NATO since Battlegroups attained at the same resources as NATO’s

\textsuperscript{69} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{70} Ibidem
Response Force (NRF). Politically, connecting ESDP to the UN has permitted the EU to promote its defence identity as inextricable from a worldwide collective security strategy. The will, on a side, to pursue autonomous missions and on the other to strengthen capabilities with the support of the Atlantic Alliance set the basis for an agreement. Berlin Plus allowed the EU to have access to NATO planning when conducting a crisis management operation, an exchange of information, access to NATO structures, assets, and procedures of monitoring when leading an operation. This was consistent with the previous year’s Declaration on EU-NATO relations (2002) in which partnership, effective mutual consultation, mutually reinforcing cooperation, equality and respect for both decision-making autonomy and interests were set as principles in which to ground their relations. In spite of these attempts to overcome tensions between the EU and the Atlantic solidarity, France’s position towards NATO (together with the disputes between Turkey and Cyprus) hindered a deeper collaboration. Nevertheless the first divide was largely bridged in 2009 thanks to the decision of the at the time President Nicolas Sarkozy to re-enter NATO’s military command. If CSDP had been conceived by the French to strengthen European military capabilities over the Atlantic Alliance, Sarkozy’s reconciliation with NATO has made CSDP (and now ESDP) less important for France. Such swift in France’s foreign policy is one of the reasons that pushed France in privileging NATO (even though in a second step) over Europe in its approach towards the 2011 Libyan Crisis.

Nonetheless the progressive strengthening of Security tools of the EU shows how the latter has been trying to portray itself as an Actor that can have an impact in leading operations. Both the quest for a more autonomous role, independent from other organizations and both the consolidation of capabilities necessary to be present in areas of interest confirm this trend. From the side of the search for a role autonomous from both the UN and NATO it is interesting to note, as Hanna Ojanen does, that the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) never mentions the word “mandate” when referring to the United Nations. Even if in favour of the latter’s fortification the EU, coherently with what stated in the Gothenburg European Council of 2001, seeks to autonomously take decisions and to pursue its foreign policy using its resources differently from what the UN might propose. The latter on the other hand,

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73 Ibid., p. 109
75 Ojanen H. “The EU as a security actor: In and with the UN and NATO” in “The EU presence in international organizations”, ed. by Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, Routledge, 2011, p.70
has recognized to the EU such role, thus giving it legitimacy. Being (more than) a regional organization it can assist other International Organizations in the areas of its neighbourhood under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and promote values attached to the European model but also to the one of the UN. In other words a more independent role of the EU that includes the development of further capabilities is seen positively, as far as they are not in competition, to share the burdens.

The self-conception of the EU and the perception that external actors like NATO and the UN had of it was, as seen, in competition. To overcome such rivalry, the EU progressively framed a new image: not anymore merely civilian nor military, but “comprehensive”. The 2003 Security Strategy maintained the importance of conflict prevention and urged the use of a full spectrum of tools in crisis management, from diplomatic to military to civilian. Such new paradigm was defined “comprehensive approach” and aimed at providing a wide range of instruments when dealing with complex crisis spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields. It furthermore requires cooperation with other actors avoiding overlapping competences and a minimum degree of coherence (consistency) among the member states. Indeed:

*The EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and vision. This is what the comprehensive approach is about.*

As Koenig puts it, this renewed self-conceptualization helped smoothing vertical contestations of member states, as it allowed traditionally pacifist member states to interpret the comprehensive approach as primarily civilian approach sometimes contoured by military actions. At the same time this did not hamper France’s will to develop military capabilities and permitted the British to see the military as a means of alleviating burdens to NATO. As a proof that this comprehensive approach was seen as a compromise, the French White Paper on Defence and National Security in 2013 stated that overcoming the divergences between member states about whether to give priority to civilian or

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78 Ibidem

military management of crises would have strengthened the CSDP\textsuperscript{80}. As far as other relevant external actors are concerned, the USA set aside initial suspicion and accepted the ESDP, also because the latter could concretely give a contribution to NATO, which lacked civilian capabilities, and to the UN. Finally the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 further enhanced the narrative of the EU as comprehensive security actor since, as we shall see, provides a legal framework aimed at achieving coherence in crisis response, composed by both the military and the civilian tools.

In sum, we have outlined how the EU has progressively built its role-conception and how such role has been perceived by relevant others, conferring it the legitimacy in pursuing its foreign policies and entitling it to be an actor active in its areas of competences. Such areas are particularly its neighbourhoods, like the eastern boundaries and the southern Mediterranean (as it will be studied in the next paragraph). Policies in the area have constituted an important part in the building roles of the EU that has acted as an integrative power, as a civilian, as a military and as a comprehensive actor. Additionally, the EU’s security actorness has been built particularly on soft security tools like neighbourhood policies, the spread of its normative \textit{acquis communautaire}, enlargement of the Security Community, stabilization and the deployment of both civilian and military missions. Such synergy of tools deployed to answer to specific situations reflects the comprehensive nature of the EU approach towards security and produces expectations towards the capabilities developed\textsuperscript{81}. However different member states have been endorsing the promotion of different approaches, thus rendering policies confused and seldom specific. In spite of the limits of its neighbourhood policies, the EU has managed to be perceived as an actor and to be present in the region, with the endorsement of NATO and the UN. Being recognized as legitimate by third actors is indeed fundamental for the EU if in search for actorness. However, not only external perception is relevant, but also self-perception as it influences the features of the actor itself. If self-conception is fragmented and varies between the Member States the resulting interests will differ and impede Foreign Policy to become truly supranational.

Interests sometimes can be common, but in some cases might be in opposition or even inexistent, if only one or few members share it or have an interest in rather pursuing an autonomous policy. The difficulty in having common interests is self evident especially in foreign policy issues, in which member states tend to have specific positions depending on their worldview, role conceptions, strategic

\textsuperscript{80} RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale, 2013, p. 100

and political will\textsuperscript{82}. The latters are influenced by a series of factors, from the historical background to the relations with other actors or the perception of security and the better way to ensure it, the strategic culture. In this category can be found aspects linked to the ideational aspects of actorness that shape foreign policy at the national level and therefore influence the shared one in the CFSP. The different worldviews mirror the existing debate over NATO versus CSDP, military versus civilian, supranational versus intergovernmental approach. If those views are influenced by history, it is evident that Mediterranean European countries, due to reasons of proximity and to a colonial past, are more linked to North Africa than the CEECs and the Nordics are. The latters have a strong tradition of support to the UN and, like Netherlands and the Czech Republic see their role as the one of human rights promotion. Germany and Great Britain, like most central-European countries, perceive themselves as promoters of free market. Instead Great Britain and France accept the use of violence as a mean of last resort to cope with crisis, hence the emphasis on the military capabilities. The perception of the role occupied in the international arena shapes interests, strategies, foreign policies. Hence, as it will be further analysed in the following paragraphs, the intergovernmental European Foreign Policy is itself shaped and influenced by the identities of its members. Dealing with panoply of identities and role conceptions it is difficult to achieve a unitary foreign policy. In fact states are unwilling to delegate power to a common authority when their perceived interests and strategic cultures do not converge.

\textbf{2.2.1 Mediterranean Relations with Europe: Presence and Legitimacy}

We have seen in the first paragraph how the European Union has, since its early beginnings, tried to establish peaceful relations with its neighbours and to entwine with them economic accords. Coherently with such view the EU has always felt the need to establish peaceful relations with the Mediterranean. It would not be the right circumstance to deeply examine the long history of such relations, but in order to understand the latest evolution of such relationship it is necessary to recall the roots and the interests at the basis of them. A general historical overview of the historical background from the second half of the 20th century will be given, particularly from the 90s, decade of the launch of the Barcelona Process, who boosted forward the collaboration, up to the creation of UFM, promoted especially by Sarkozy’s France. To understand such policies we shall frame them in the need, on the

one hand, to proceed with integration inside the union and on the other to have peaceful relations with
third parties. In fact integration and neighbouring policies have been a fundamental foreign policy tool
of the EU, that as been pursued both towards its southern borders and towards its eastern borders.
Moreover having always entrenched relations with the area confers the Union legitimacy and shows the
extent to which it has been perceived as an actor.

The relations between Europe and the Mediterranean have a long history since the early accords
were born to establish peaceful relationships with ex-colonies. The de-colonization process gave a
boost to the stipulation of those agreements and article 238 of the Treaty of Rome regulated the
relations especially with the Maghreb. Indeed Art. 238 stated that “The Community may conclude with
one or more States or international organizations agreements establishing an association involving
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures”. Thus in those years the EEC
held association accords with Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. Such preferential bilateral accords were
stipulated within a coordinated strategy amongst the EEC, negotiated by the Commission and
concluded by the Council, but adapted according to the particular exigencies of member states. Other
accords were at the time stipulated also with Cyprus, Malta, Spain, Portugal, Egypt and the now ex
Yugoslavia.

A turning point occurred in the seventies, even though in a different direction. Indeed the Kippur
crisis together with the oil shock and OPEC cartel forced European countries to develop agreements to
secure themselves the supply for oil. Exception made for the superpower that disposed of means to
provide for energy, the CEE was obliged not to deteriorate its relations with petroleum exporting
countries. In this context the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), founded at the Paris Summit in
1972 had immediately to face several difficulties. It is in this framework that the Neighbourhood Policy
had its origins, in order to go beyond the impasse of the previous decades. In the eighties the entrance
of Greece, Spain and Portugal, three Mediterranean countries, posed the issue on whether an embryonic
form of collaboration was sufficient to lead to complete integration. In those years, period of the EPC,
France’s policy in the Mediterranean provided the EU with a strategic vision towards the area that,
some have argued, the EU foreign policy towards Middle East deficits today. After the rejection in
1987 Morocco founded the UMA (Union du Maghreb Arabe) with Libya, Mauritania, Algeria and

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83 Di Nolfo E. Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali dal 1918 ai giorni nostri, Bari, Laterza, 2009, p. 1230
84 Only with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 will the convergence principles clarified. Later on Copenhagen 1993 and the
Madrid European Council in 1995 widened the legal constraints framework for entrance.
85 Müller P. “The Europeanization of France’s foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict – from leadership to EU-
Tunisia to create an alternative form of regional cooperation. Hence the renewed Mediterranean policy had to sustain regional projects, environmental initiatives and forms of partnerships but was never intended to provide for accession. Instead it aimed to improve relations through programs oriented to put together Universities, research and investments like the Med Campus, the Med Invest, Med Media. Such approach will be better exemplified by the at the time President of the Commission Romano Prodi through the sentence “all but institutions” in 2002\textsuperscript{86}.

In this atmosphere of detente, on November 27 and 28 1995 the Barcelona Process was officially launched at the Barcelona Conference. The strategic program was signed with unanimity between the fifteen EU Member States and twelve Mediterranean countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian National Authority, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. The exception was constituted by Libya, which, even if in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU was not invited to fully participate because under a UN sanctions regime. However Libya was invited in 1999 as an observer as a member of the Union du Maghreb Arabe. Moreover the 2000 Common Strategy covered the entire partner States including Libya to co-opt what had been built with the initiatives\textsuperscript{87}. Only in 2002 did official relations among the EU and Libya begin, when the UN sanctions were over. The European institutions made clear to Libyan authorities that access for the country in the partnership was linked the full acceptance of the Barcelona acquis, significantly vaguer than the Communitarian one based on the Copenhagen criteria. Another outcome of the Conference was the Declaration on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and in the preamble three main pillars were defined. The first one was a political goal that concerned peace and stability through the establishment of a political and security partnership that respected the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Secondly there was an economic goal with an economic and financial partnership that aimed at eliminating protectionism also by renewing the existent agreements. Furthermore there was the objective of creating a free trade area in 2010, the so-called EU-MEFTA by means of bilateral agreements. Finally a cultural goal was set regarding a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. Such projects were to be financed by ad hoc programs and by the European Investment Bank.

\textsuperscript{86} As Romano Prodi, ex President of the European Commission declared in 2002 in the speech “A wider Europe- A proximity Policy as the key to stability”, Europe had to share with its neighbors everything but institutions.

\textsuperscript{87} Even if the initiative was outside the CFSP domain, thus constituting a "cross pillar" initiative. For further reading on the argument see CARDWELL P.J. “EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean”, JCMS 2011 Volume 49. Number 2. pp. 219–241
Unfortunately structural issues that later on would have continued limiting the UPM limited the Barcelona Process. Even though the EU had launched several initiatives, no relevant steps were taken into the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship. Following the second Intifada and September 11 the EU was more focused on dialogue over security issues that on cooperation ones. Hence also the relations with the Mediterranean reflect the evolution of the EU that was gradually developing its military tools and was developing its security actor identity. Nevertheless cooperation in the defense sector was in stalemate and such topic was covered merely at the 5+5 Dialogue level. In fact the evolution of the EU towards the construction of a shared foreign policy was still embryonic, and the relations with the Mediterranean mirrored how southern European countries were the more interested in building partnerships. It is not a case that part of the dialogue were and are the five members of the UMA and the five European member States who are closer to the Mediterranean (Italy, Spain, France, Portugal and Malta). Only in 2004 was this process revitalized through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Unfortunately the ENP defined the regulation of cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbors, and only upon the insistence of Spain and Italy was its scope extended to southern neighbors88. Because of the limits of such approach, that scarcely considered the deep differences between the two regions, the EU decided to revitalize the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in line with the Barcelona process. If ENP’s main objective was to create a secure and stable environment in both Eastern and Southern regions89, the EMP was meant as a network to pursue such cooperation projects90. The multiplying of policies with a substantial focus on the Mediterranean suggests a disjointed European approach towards the region. Therefore, some argue that the EU might face the danger of chasing an endless rejuvenation of ideas and policies in new packaging91.

When talking about EU foreign relations one fundamental question is: as the EU slowly evolved towards the attempt to give common voice in foreign affairs, how to relate with southern neighbors in not only economical terms but also political ones? Starting from the 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy, passing trough the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (1990) and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) the EU tried to find a common solution in order to deal with its Mediterranean neighbors. Among the limits, the fact that Europe did not manage to differentiate its neighboring policies towards the various

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88 A. Suel, "From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean", Perceptions, 2008
90 A. Suel, "From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean", Perceptions, 2008
regions, approaching them in the same manner. It would be rather simplistic to refer to the Middle East and to North Africa as to a unique cultural and religious block. In spite of the fact that the countries involved in the policy had a Muslim majority, there is deep differentiation even inside a same religion. This work is not primarily focused on the Quran schools present in North Africa or in the Middle East, but hinting the existence of cultural differences shows the extent to which Europe has failed in finding appropriate approaches that fitted each situation distinctly. All of these attempts did not achieve the goal of finding a permanent solution for regulating EU’s external relationships. It is in this lack of trust in the Process that in 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy shaped the project of Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the aim to strengthen relations with the Mediterranean and to enhance France’s policy towards the region.

Founded on 13th July 2008 in the Paris Summit the Union for the Mediterranean was an International Organization composed by 43 countries, more specifically 28 Member States of the EU, 15 Mediterranean countries form MENA and 1 observer (Libya). The original proposal was to have four priorities: to set efficient immigration policies, environmental protection, cooperation for development through cultural exchanges and a conjunct fight against criminality and terrorism. Defense issues were indeed central and it is also shown by the numerous activities for peace support between Israel and Palestine. It provided for a Permanent Council, a Central Investment Bank, a Nuclear Energy Agency, specialized institutions to monitor water issues, common audiovisual space and cultural exchange programs for universities. In fact it is composed by a Secretariat, a joint Co-Presidency, and ministerial and expertise meetings supported by EU institutions if possible In addition there are six areas of economic cooperation concerning depollution, maritime and land highways, civil protection, alternative energies, higher education and research, Euro-Mediterranean universities, Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.

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92 The original denomination was "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean". With the Marseille Declaration on 3–4 November 2008 the name was changed into "Union for the Mediterranean".


94 The UfM was established following the European Council approval of a proposal in principle on March 14th 2008; after that the European Council called the Commission to present the details of the Barcelona Process.

95 The Secretariat is responsible for launching economic and social projects, providing information and directives to the G-Med and monitoring the implementation of UfM Work Program.

96 The Co-Presidency is held by two representative, one from selected for the EU Member States and one from the Mediterranean partners, and is elected from all the members. Its function is to supervise, coordinate and promote UfM's activities.
Another relevant issue that must be dealt with regards what kind of dynamics emerged among European partner during the making process of the UfM. Indeed it is possible to affirm that the issues arrived on the top of the political agenda “from above”, as a result of high domestic politics\(^97\). The UfM is the output of internal dynamics and different point of views of EU Member States. France can be considered as the main actor since, as previously mentioned, UfM was founded on Nicolas Sarkozy's 2007 proposal and because of France’s historical legacy of interests in the region. Germany contrary pushed for a higher EU involvement, so it spearheaded a group of countries in order to obtain EU's fuller participation. Moving on to Spain and Italy their idea was to become France co-entrepreneurs, but did not succeed in that: they where in a way relegated to being low-profile supporters\(^98\). Notwithstanding initial enthusiasm, even the UfM did not really achieve relevant goals. The biggest problems were related to the political instability of the region. The MENA region, characterized by great unemployment, corruption and social inequality all worsened off by the economic crisis. European countries committed the mistake of not being judicious in foreseeing what path that region had initiated. Moreover, underestimating the differences between the Countries in the region they have been treated all with the same approach, simplistically trying to apply the same policies to different contexts. The whole process resulted in the so-called Arab Spring; indeed most of the European countries had not predicted that in the region the tensions of rebels against their governments. Furthermore the EU and other Western countries still relate to Mediterranean countries as a homogeneous bloc, underestimating differences like religious and ethnic divisions.

Nevertheless the Mediterranean was not only a catalyst for Europe but also for the United States and the whole NATO system. During the Cold War the Mediterranean was purely one among the many peripheral theatres in the Eastern-Western hostility and it was perceived by the United States as a highly NATO-centric issue. This meant that it was seen through a security perspective and with the purpose of containing the Soviet power. However, due to the wide changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, there had been a redefinition and a rethinking of the Atlantic security issues. The NATO’s reorganization proved a significant contribution in this respect as the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept of 1991\(^99\) was an attempt to deal with a deeply transformed international scenario. Risks to security were considered now to be a consequence of the instabilities caused by


\(^{98}\)ibidem

\(^{99}\)The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 7-8 November 1991
economic, social and political difficulties (including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes). NATO members started to focus their attention on the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East area, establishing a direct link between the stability and peace of the southern periphery of Europe and the security of the Alliance, in particular after the developments of the Gulf War in 1991. France was particularly opposed of NATO’s projection beyond the Euro-Atlantic area as it dreaded that the Alliance’s involvement could overshadow the Union’s increasing outreach towards Africa. Hence, the Mediterranean was a matter of concern for the US primarily in the defence circles (including NATO’s department) and the foreign policy subdivisions in charge for those areas. These agents focused on the countries in which military bases were set. The Mediterranean was progressively becoming a matter of concern, as showed by the first Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) organized in Malaga in 1992, that called upon the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the area. Moreover the Arab-Israeli issue gave a renewed importance to the area and the 1991 Madrid talks and the 1993 Oslo agreement marked a very active phase by the US diplomacy.

The Mediterranean Dialogue of 1994 represents one of the most consistent NATO attempts to develop partnership and cooperation programs. In 1995 Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria were invited to take part in bilateral dialogues with NATO. The need for a more active role in the region was justified by concerns about weapons of mass destruction and transfer of missile technology from the former Soviet sphere of influence to MENA countries. The Mediterranean Dialogue was not seen, as in Europe, as an important part of the North-South relations; it was rather considered in terms of defence and security. The Barcelona process was a perfect example of the differences standing between the American and the European approach toward the Mediterranean. Fluctuating between competition and cooperation, the role of the US in official meetings was not yet defined. After several consultations the Spanish Foreign Minister Solana visited President Clinton in 1995 but, despite the formal declarations of satisfaction for a renewed US interest in the Mediterranean dialogue, the US finally participated to the Conference only as an ‘observer’. This example shows the divergence between European and American positions and, since the mid-Nineties, the US tried to promote its own development and security initiatives, not necessarily in coordination nor consultation.

100 RATTI L. "Stepping up to reintegration: French security policy between transatlantic and European defense during and after the Cold War”, Journal of transatlantic studies, Vol.12, No.4, 2014, pp. 372-273
101 Inter-Parliamentary Conference On Security And Co-Operation In The Mediterranean, Organized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Malaga (Spain), 15-20 June 1992
102 Algeria was invited in 2000.
with the European partners. However, changes in the Euro-Atlantic security system occurred in late Nineties, especially due to the war in Kosovo (and the following NATO intervention) and the NATO enlargement, which underwent a new phase of reforms\textsuperscript{103}. Furthermore the end of the Cold War implied that the EU were less a core interest and that the latter had to start sharing the burdens as an actor. The USA progressively stepped back from Europe as its main concerns became others.

The events of 9/11 implied substantial changes in the magnitude and the extent of the proactive American interests towards Mediterranean countries\textsuperscript{104}. Also in Europe, during the Conference of the Euro-Med Foreign Ministers of Valencia in 2002, an ‘Action Plan’ was promoted, with the aim of implementing new answers to the changed context\textsuperscript{105}. On that occasion, the issue of terrorism was officially embedded in the Barcelona Process, including other measures to reinforce political dialogue.

So, the Mediterranean and MENA countries turned to be a focal point of attention for the interests of the US, becoming then more embedded in a solid and coherent Mediterranean dimension of NATO. This feature was due to the relevant developments occurred after 2001, in particular with regards to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of Islamist fundamentalism, illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs. The U.S. became more involved in the Afghanistan and Iraq war, and to fight the above-mentioned threats had been increased the defence budget. Perhaps the involvement in other regions and the changes underwent by NATO itself concurred in a lack of interest in getting involved in European issues, thus the strategy to “lead from behind” and to avoid getting caught up in the Libyan crisis\textsuperscript{106}. Indeed the US, in the years before the Arab Spring were spending about 4 per cent of the National GDP in defence budget\textsuperscript{107}. Europe, on the contrary, was on a different path. Several projects had been created in previous years in order to establish and strengthen relationships and partnerships with the southern countries of the Mediterranean but even the most promising project, the Barcelona one, reached a stalemate.

The beginning of the Arab Spring, started with the immolation of the Tunisian Muhammad

\textsuperscript{103} FINIZIO Carlo, THIELE Ralph, MATTERA Olga, et al. “Mediterranean security after EU and NATO enlargement: A Joint research project between Military Centre for Strategic Studies and Bundeswehr Transformation Center, Rome, Rubbettino, 2005, p.75

\textsuperscript{104} For further elucidation see Di Nolfo, E., Dagli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici. La politica internazionale dal XX secolo a oggi, Laterza, Bari, 2007

\textsuperscript{105} As stated in the V Euro-Mediterranean Conference Of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22-23 April 2002, Presidency Conclusions

\textsuperscript{106} WU X., “An Analysis of the EU’s Military Intervention against Libya”, Institute of European Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 2012, pp. 1-11

Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid on December 2010, further posed the question of European Actorness. Indeed the EU was facing the dilemma of whether to remain a spectator or to actively display a coherent and sustainable effort to cope with the crisis\textsuperscript{108}. The governments of the EU member States, with the conclusions of the European Council of the 4th February and the conclusions of the 21\textsuperscript{st} February Foreign Affairs Council in 2011, expressed their support for the transition process in the region\textsuperscript{109}. Hence the High Representative and the Commission, to respond to the revolts of the Arab Spring, presented a “Partnership for Democracy and Stability with the South Mediterranean”. The aim was to give a new emphasis on democratization of institutions, constitutional reforms, economic development, and on a renewal of healthcare and education systems. Like in the past, the logic behind was the one of “more for more”\textsuperscript{110} in order to give support to Mediterranean countries in exchange of deep reforms (e.g. in the judiciary, in reducing corruption). New in the approach was the idea of “less for less”, according to which the EU engaged itself in reallocating support for Countries that did not proceed in the reform process. This partial renewal of an old paradigm (from “more for more” to “less for less”) shows how the EU has been increasingly determined and committed in the area. Nevertheless not only were the key points similar to those of the ENP, but also the weaknesses remained unchanged. Nebulously defined reforms and the fact that, empirically, Arab Mediterranean States have seldom considered the reward to be enough to boost compliance to the democratization process have hindered the functioning of the policy\textsuperscript{111}. In sum, like its predecessors EMP and ENP, the newly launched partnership had been lacking a forward-oriented approach able to enhance democratization without interfering and benchmarking clear goals. In fact the Commission and the HR refer to a measurement of the progresses through standards of human right and on benchmarks that are not defined. Such absence of clarity, as it will be argued later, is closely connected to a parallel absence of coherence in the EU’s foreign policy in the area. Furthermore the pre-eminence of some countries in the relations with the area and the quasi absence of others precluded the fragmented approach towards the Arab

\textsuperscript{108} SCHUMACHER T., “The EU and the Arab Spring between Spectatorship and Actorness”, \textit{Insight Turkey Vol. 13 /n. 3}, pp. 108, 2011


\textsuperscript{110} As stated in the European Commission/HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, p.5.

\textsuperscript{111} SCHUMACHER T., “The EU and the Arab Spring between Spectatorship and Actorness”, \textit{Insight Turkey Vol. 13 /n. 3}, pp. 109, 2011
When in Libya protests started to outburst the approach was as disjointed as it had always been in the area. Nevertheless the economic and political ties gave Europe legitimacy in portraying itself as an actor in the area. We shall see forward if, even though perceived by external actors to be entitled to have a role, Europe has effectively managed to be a relevant security actor in Libya.

2.2.2 The Outburst of the Libyan Crisis

Following the path initiated since December 2010 by Tunisia and Egypt, early February 2011 saw the outburst of protests in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against its leader Mu’ammar Al-Qaddhāfi, who had been ruling the countries for more than forty years. However, whereas in the first two countries the regimes reacted with measures of restriction, the Libyan government declared war on the protesters. Colonel Qaddhāfi threatened protesters to be ‘hunted down door to door and executed’ and vowed to chase them ‘house to house’. He publicly employed the word ‘cockroaches’ to describe those who were rising against him in Benghazi in February 2011. After the televised speech, thousands of regime’s supporters converged in as-Sāḥah al-Khaḍrā’ (the Green Square), wearing green bandannas and wielding large machetes. The crisis in Libya was the first test for the newly approved Lisbon Treaty and for the institutions that had provided to cope with this type of events. The crisis arose with an astonishment of many European countries, since Libya had become an economic partner for several European countries: Italy had signed with it a Treaty in Benghazi based on billionaire economic cooperation and France and Great Britain had also opened economic relations with it. In fact the renounce from the part of Qaddhāfi of nuclear ambitions since 2004 had seemed to portray Libya as a more suitable partner. The initial peaceful manifestations began on February 15 in eastern Libya, in Benghazi and Al-Bayada, but soon the protest spread in the west of the Country like

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112 The name of the Libyan leader has been transposed in many ways in different languages, spanning from (Muammar or Mu’ammam) Gaddafi, to Qaddafi to Gadhafi or Kaddafi et al. In this work I shall use the form Mu’ammar Al-Qaddhāfi since it constitutes a most precise transliteration of the original Arab name مُعَمَّرْ أَلْ قَلْدُحَيْفٍ.


in Al-Zawia on 20 February until the uprisings expanded in the whole Libya.

When the government violently reacted to the protests, the news gained a wide echo in the West, and was sharply condemned by both Europe and the United Nations. In the subsequent weeks, the UN repetitively denounced the violence perpetrated by the Libyan government and with Resolution 1970 on February 26, it imposed measures such as arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban. The resolution, that contemporaneously called upon an end to the violence and...steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population. Moreover, it expressed concern over the rocketing number of refugees forced to flee the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and decided to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the ICC. The day before the UNSCR was approved, on 25 February the Human Rights Council had assembled a special session on human rights violations in Libya and, on the same date, the UNSC adopted Resolution S-15/1 that urged the Libyan Government to ‘meet its responsibility to protect its population. It moreover recommended that the UNGA consider the suspension of Libya from Security Council membership, which occurred on March 1st.

As the crisis was on going, since the 5th of March, an opposition group formerly part of the government established the NTC, National Transitional Council in Benghazi. The NTC, that portrayed itself as the sole legitimate actor able to represent Libya was recognized unilaterally by France on March 10. In the following days Libya was also removed from the Human Right Council by the General Assembly. When the use of violence was not ceased also against civilians the UNSC, invoking R2P, called upon the creation of a no-fly zone through the adoption of resolution 1973 on March 17. Pressures over the creation of a no-fly zone had already arrived on March 12 from the Arab League, that also expelled Libya, and that stressed the need for cooperation with the OIC, the EU, the UN and the AU. The events occurring in Libya represented the archetypal type of crisis for which the EU had been progressively developing the military capabilities since the inception of the ESDP. Libya was the first litmus test for the EU as actor since its failure in the Balkan backyard in the

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121 COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF THE ARAB STATES, Meeting at the Ministerial Level, The implications of the current events in Libya and the Arab position, Cairo, 12 March 2011, Res. No.: 7360 (Submitted to President of the UN Security Council as S/2011/137)
nineties. Coherently with the tools developed, the EU should have, in the context of the CSDP, planned an intervention recurring either to Berlin Plus assets either to its own resources. Still, a CSDP mission was never fully considered as a valid alternative by the Union, whose member states were torn in an intricate debate over the eventuality of an intervention.

On March 20, a coalition led by France, Great Britain and the USA was able to start a military campaign against Qadhāfi forces. The Mission originated by the UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 saw the participation of a coalition of the willing and took different names in the countries involved: *Odyssey Dawn* in the USA, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Spain, UAE and Qatar; *Ellamy* in Great Britain; *Mobile* in Canada; *Freedom Falcon* in Belgium and *Harmattan* in France. The latter was in favour of an intervention independent from NATO, led jointly with the UK. France argued its reluctance to hand over the mission to NATO expressing concern that the presence of the US could hinder cooperation with Arab countries, whose support was vital. When President Sarkozy realized that a CSDP operation was unlikely, he encouraged British Prime Minister David Cameron to deploy the mission under the *aegis* of the Franco-British Treaty of 2010. Still, only NATO had operational planning commodities like the SHAPE able to conduct such an operation. In fact, as hinted in the previous chapter, the EU faces difficulties in providing operational facilities like the OHQ. What will be maintained is that a lack of capabilities was only a partial cause for the NATO takeover, since the main deadlock was the inability to reach an agreement at the EU level.

On March 28, the American President Barak Obama announced that following the operation responsibilities had to be transferred to NATO. At the end of the month, NATO’s operation Unified Protector seized control of all air operations, with the USA tacitly approving the French–British leadership in the operation. If the initial goal of the operation was strictly humanitarian, aimed particularly at the protection of civilians, the objectives progressively expanded. On April 2011, Barak

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124 BELKIN P., “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and issues in US-French Relations”, *Congressional Research Service*, april 4 2011, p. 18
Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron published jointly declared the necessity for a new regime to ease the start of an inclusive democratic process. As Etzioni points out, the issue of a regime change emerged in May, when Qaddhāfi offered a ceasefire. The accord would have found a compromise with the rebels thus setting an end to the violent actions, but would have entailed a negotiation between the rebel forces and governmental forces. However NATO rejected this option since it did not involve the formation of a new government and proceeded bombing Qaddhāfi residence, killing his son and three grandchildren. After five months of air strikes the rebels eventually seized Tripoli on August 22. Qaddhāfi, who had left the capital city, was captured and killed on 20 October. On October 23 the National Transitional Council declared the end of hostilities and that the country was liberated, even though NATO led operations were not over until October 31st. The seizure of control on the NTC of Tripoli and the end of operations marked the conclusion of the ‘hot phase’ of international crisis management but the intricate pathway through democracy was yet to begin.

2.3 Assessing Authority

We have seen in the previous paragraphs the agency related issue of self-perception and identity building on one side, and the presence of Europe in the Mediterranean that has further constructed its image of having a legitimate role in the area. In this paragraph a more structural issue will be analyzed, the nature of authority and autonomy at the European level. Such notions relates to the domain of what concretely is a competence of the European Union and which acts do not belong to that domain. By autonomy we will remain with the definition outlined in the first chapter, that is the ability to take decisions through separate institutions, and not necessarily the complete detachment from member state’s interests. The issue of autonomy presents controversies as it could be argued that, being foreign policy at the EU level discussed in an intergovernmental nature, Europe does not display a full autonomy. However we shall not confuse the decision making process with autonomy, as by the latter we indicate the ability of the EU to pursue a policy once it has been approved. It is self evident that the more supranational the method of decision the more autonomy the Union has as a whole, nonetheless autonomy also refers to the legal and material capability to pursue a policy that member states alone

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would not collectively do. Autonomy and authority are hence entwined but separate, as in the work we will treat autonomy in accordance with the definitions of Cosgrove and Twitchett, Sjöstedt and Jupille and Caporaso. In other words autonomy is also meant from other external actors and not only from member states. Hence the criterion is related to the perception of others and if they perceive the EU as an autonomous actor.

The EU is a sui generis entity that although not classifiable as a State displays characteristics that give it a more complex status than a mere regional organization. Hence, to study its authority means to understand the equilibria behind the decision-making process and the parties involved in each step of the procedure. To proceed in our analysis of authority at the EU level it is necessary to ask ourselves a preliminary question, that is whether the issue for which a decision is being bargained falls within a field for which there is only one dominant policy group. Secondly, the existence of a final authority able to commit the common resources in coping with the problem is another relevant variable. In order to answer such questions we will need to analyze the European Foreign Policy and its complex machinery. What will be argued here is that the European Union, due to its inter-governmental nature as regards to Foreign Policy, can be defined as a “Multiple Autonomous Actors” type of ultimate decision unit. The main characteristic of such type is that there are multiple -two or more- separate entities with independent authority structures, none of which can commit the resources of the regime without the agreement of all or some of the others. In other words there is no single group or authority that can independently take decisions that will be strongly binding for the other actors involved. The study of the process in which foreign policy decisions are taken will be conducted analyzing the procedures institutionalized by the Lisbon Treaty and the changes it brought to the European institutions.

2.3.1 The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty

The main change that the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 has institutionalized is the formation of a dual constitution decision-making regime: supranational as regards to the single market policies and inter-governmental for the foreign and defence policies. The first one prescribes a separation of powers among the four main institutions: a dual executive composed by the supranational Commission and the

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intergovernmental European Council and a dual legislative\textsuperscript{131} constituted by the supranational European Parliament and the intergovernmental and the Council of Ministers\textsuperscript{132}. By separation of power we will not only mean the separation among legislative, executive and judiciary powers, but more specifically that each institution represents different interests and therefore has a different purpose and source of legitimation. In other words in a separation of power different institutions that represent different interests cooperate and control each other through a checks and balances system. Indeed in the case of Europe the interests of the Member States are represented in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers, and those of the citizens and Europe as such are represented respectively in the EP and in the Commission. The second decision-making regime prescribes more a system of governance rather then a system of government\textsuperscript{133} to the extent that it copes with policies that sovereign States are unwilling to delegate to a supranational authority. Hence in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy the two institutions in which decisions are taken are the European Council and the Council.

The Council, that brings together heads of State and governments and the President of the EC has the role of providing the Union with a strategic direction and takes the most relevant decisions at the EU level. Its impulsion role in defining the EU interests influences decisions and, to give it one voice and external representation, since 2010 its President has become “permanent” with a two years and a half term. However, the appointment of a President has not yet proved to bring the hoped results: to provide a strategic leadership to the Union\textsuperscript{134}. In fact the nature of the Council, representing the executives of the Member States, faces the constant need to reach compromises. A fact that eloquently shows such need is the appointment of Herman Van Rompuy as the first two-year and a half mandate President. Other candidates for the role, as ex British Prime Minister Tony Blair, would have had a wider echo in foreign capitals but would have potentially undermined harmony inside the Council, causing disputes not only with other member states head of executives, but also with the newly elected British Prime Minister. Hence the assignment of the role to a less divisive figure shows how member states are seldom willing to delegate power to a too strong leader. Even though the Council alone is not

\textsuperscript{131} According to TFEU, Art. 289 co-decision over the proposals from the Commission has become the ordinary legislative procedure

\textsuperscript{132} For further elucidation see FABBRINI S. “The Dilemmas of an Intergovernmental Foreign Policy: Learning from the European Union’s Answer to the Libyan Crisis” \textit{International Politics}, Vol. 51, 2, 2014

\textsuperscript{133} FABBRINI S. “The Euro Crisis: The President of Europe. A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU” \textit{EuropEos Commentary}, No. 12, 2012, p. 3

entitled to make ultimate decisions, its meetings are extremely relevant as they confer the Union visibility and legitimacy, as showing external relevant others to have a coherent vision can be as important as concretely having one\textsuperscript{135}.

The outcome of the choice to set the intergovernmental institutions as the key cores of the EU Foreign Policy has been that the EP has been excluded from the decision making process and the Commission has been relegated to the management of technical issues whereas a pivotal role is in the hands of the European Council. Not even the ECJ has jurisdiction over the decision taken in Foreign Policy (unless in case of violation of human rights or of the principles of Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU)\textsuperscript{136}. Still, if crisis are dealt with at an intergovernmental level, the decision cannot be taken by a single authority but instead needs to obtain the approval of the Member States. Since decisions that concern the very sovereignty of States cannot be imposed at an intergovernmental level, the Lisbon Treaty has thus formalized the principle of “voluntary coordination” in CFSP and CSDP\textsuperscript{137}, meaning that it is excluded the adoption of strongly binding legislative acts\textsuperscript{138}. Foreign Policy is made through a complex system in which several autonomous actors take part in the decision making process and that are protagonists of turf wars. Examples were those over the control of specific Directorates General (DGs) within the Commission or those within the Council to gather the HR attention\textsuperscript{139}. The appointment of a double-hatted High Representative/ Vice president of the Commission (and Chairperson the FAC) aimed at limiting such conflicts\textsuperscript{140}.

In addition to the Council, the Lisbon Treaty gives an important status to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), which, together with the General Affairs Council is the only to be chaired for five years by the HR. It is interesting in these regards to note that, coherently, the FAC used to be called the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council). The institution of the HR itself had occurred in order to provide the FAC of a technical support and to detach it from the General Affairs Council Secretariat, unburdening the latter. The evolution of such role towards a double-hatted figure shows that the previously mentioned purpose was not attended, and thus the HR was reinforced by what used to be the foreign-oriented services of the Commission. Appointed by the European Council

\textsuperscript{136} TEU Art. 24
\textsuperscript{137} The CSDP, which is the former ESDP, is now an integral part of CFSP according to TEU Art. 42
\textsuperscript{138} According to TEU Art. 24.1
\textsuperscript{139} At the time Javier Solana, ex Spanish Foreign Minister and ex Secretary General of NATO who, in the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty had to work with Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Affairs
\textsuperscript{140} Cameron, F., “An introduction to European Foreign Policy”, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, p. 47
in agreement with the president of the Commission and under the approval of the EP, the HR “conducts the Union’s common foreign and security policy” (TEU Art. 18). This article enlightens the nature of CFSP itself: indeed it is conducted, guided by the new spokesperson of the EU that “shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council”. So the HR, responsible for ensuring consistency of the EU’s external actions, shall conduce the policy as mandated by an intergovernmental body of the EU and, as we will see, several other organs do play a role in such policy. The definition of consistency itself was object of debate in the 2004 intergovernmental conference since some Member States believed the HR should have rather been responsible for ensuring the “consistency of external relations with the CFSP”. Such approach was rejected because it would have subdued Commission's external policies like trade, humanitarian aid and development cooperation to the CFSP and to the Council.

Together with the EC and the FAC, a pivotal role is the one of the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives). Its members, permanent representatives or heads of delegations of Member States in Brussels, have senior ambassadorial status and have the duty to set the agenda for the FAC meetings. The issues over which the Coreper manages to reach unanimity are given an “A” category in the Agenda and thus will be approved by the Council without any discussion. More quarrelsome are the “B” category issues that are discussed by the ambassadors that, having the confidence of their governments, are able to flexibly negotiate.\footnote{CAMERON Fraser, “An introduction to European Foreign Policy”, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 46-62} Due to a lack of time, the Coreper accepts the recommendations of the Political and Social Security Committee (PSC) even though the latter is inferior in hierarchy to it. Its purpose is the one to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. Furthermore it also delivers opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or of the FR of the Union for the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or on its own initiative. PSC reports to ministers via the Coreper, so via senior EU ambassadors, towards which there is some rivalry and is considered by some to be a Junior to Coreper and with an identity not yet well defined\footnote{Ibidem} (Cameron 2012). Nevertheless the TEU confers the Council to authorize it to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation\footnote{Ibidem}. Finally the Council may authorize it to exercise political control and strategic direction (under responsibility of the Council.
itself and of the HR) for the duration of crisis management operations\textsuperscript{144}.

Among the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty is the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) that was supposed to be the diplomatic corps and the foreign ministry of the European Union. The role of the EEAS was aimed at coordination and at ensuring coherence and effectiveness to the European external action. The project to set up a joint European diplomatic service was warmly welcomed by policy makers and analysts, but its nature was matter of contestation during the negotiations\textsuperscript{145}. In fact the European diplomatic service holds a rather unclear nature: the Lisbon Treaty only defines it in Article 27.3 TEU stating that it shall assist the HR working in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States, comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. Furthermore what the Lisbon Treaty stipulates is that decisions on the functioning of the EEAS will be taken mainly by the Council after precedent consultation with the EP and only after the consent of the Commission. The equivocal nature of the Service is coherent with the fact that the EU Member States have been developing different attitudes towards the latter. The debate is on its goals and functioning, together with the impact that such organ might have on the coherence of the EU in Foreign Policy. Preliminary negotiations on the form of the EEAS were chiefly concerned with the issue of whether the EEAS headquarters in Brussels should have been constructed around the RELEX family, relegating it under the Commission’s administration, or whether it should have been positioned within the Council Secretariat, thus drawing on already existing bodies, such as the Policy Unit (PPEW), the Situation Centre (SITCEN), and the DG-RELEX on external relations\textsuperscript{146}.

The EEAS was formally launched on 1 December 2010. According to the Swedish Presidency Paper of 2009 it should be at the service of the President of the European Council, of the HR/VP (that coordinates it as stated in Art. 18.4 of the Lisbon Treaty) and the president as well as other members of the Commission. The main task of the EEAS is to support the HR/VP and to assist the president of the Commission, the Commission and the president of the European Council. Composed of single geographical and thematic desks, it should also cooperate with member states. Issues like enlargement

\textsuperscript{144} TEU Art. 38
\textsuperscript{145} Avery, G. and Missiroli, A. Foreword. in Avery, G. et al. (eds.) “The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy”, European Policy Centre, EPC Working Paper N. 28, 2007, p. 6
and trade and development remain under responsibility of the Commission. The EEAS is a sui generic service separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat and should have autonomy in budget management and staff but that has consultations with services of the Commission with external responsibilities. The budget of such organ, in a separate section of the EU budget, is proposed by the HR/VP. Its staff combines resources from several institutions, like staff coming from member states, relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission. Significant importance is given to member states, as diplomats from States should reach the one third of the staff. As admitted in the official EEAS papers, *this posed complex challenges of combining different traditions and organisational cultures alongside the difficult task and on-going inter institutional negotiations linked to setting up the service* ¹⁴⁷. Inside the domain of EEAS are also the EUSR, even though their current status needs to be revisited. Before the creation of the EEAS only the Commissions had delegations and so the EUSR, created by the Council, were linked to specific crisis and were brought under the domain of the HR only after the Lisbon Treaty. Now the web of 139 EU Delegations represent the Union and attempts are made to connect them to the EUSR, which held relations mainly with the member states through the PSC ¹⁴⁸. The attempt pre-supposes a transfer of staff and budget to the EEAS, for whom the flexibility to recruit short-term senior figures to undertake specific missions as the need arises is essential.

The newly formed EEAS has been further shaped, particularly under Ashton’s presidency, with the institution of the *Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department* (CR&OC) in 2010, and of the so-called ‘Crisis Platform’ as well as the early warning ‘Situation room’. The latters are aimed at promoting coherence and more responsive EU approach to international crises. The purpose of the CR&OC is to cope with crisis response in the first phase of a crisis and to combine short-term tools with long term tools ¹⁴⁹. Inside the CR&OC, the EU Crisis Platform has been actuated in the occurrence of the Libyan crisis with a twofold purpose: to surpass the long-lasting bureaucratic decision-making of CSDP and to supply the EU with an institution in which information-sharing and coordination between the main actors concerned with crisis response could converge. In fact the Crisis Platform unites the geographic services, the Commission and EEAS departments accountable for conflict prevention, crisis response, peace building, financial support like humanitarian aid, security

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¹⁴⁸ Ibidem

policy and CSDP, in addition to the General Secretariat of the EU Council. Critics have accused the EU Crisis Platform to be a ‘mini-CSDP’, thus in contraposition to the to the CSDP institutions\textsuperscript{150}.

The complex Foreign Policy machinery of the EU is summarized in a scheme by Keukeleire and Delreux that, in the following table, present a simplified version of the most relevant bodies\textsuperscript{151}. Indeed the aim of the work is not to explain into details the characteristics of all the elements of the EU bureaucracy, but to show the complexity of their interaction. Figure 5 shows such interaction and must be looked at considering that reading it from right to left shows the intergovernmental method whereas the communitarian is expressed on the left.

**Table 3. Institutional Framework of EU Foreign Policy making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communitarian Method:</th>
<th>Intergovernmental Method:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Action</td>
<td>CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External dimension of Union Policies</td>
<td>CSDP</td>
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After having examined the main institutions involved, it is important to assess the method of voting, as the presence of different parties *per sé* does not entail that one party will be able to block the others. The institutionalization of a process that renders the intergovernmental institutions the main protagonists of the EU Foreign Policy, in spite of the attempts to enhance formulate a common voice to all the member states, has *de facto* created a system in which decisions are taken in unanimity. Hence the point is not to state whether or not the EU has an authority at all, but to understand what type of authority it has and how difficulties linked to achieving a consensus hinder the Union to become a relevant actor in coping with crisis. All decisions in concerning the formulation of strategic interests and strategic guidelines are defined by the council by unanimity.

As we have seen, the EU Foreign Policy is made through an intergovernmental method, hence through the interaction of foreign policies of the member states. Nevertheless in this paragraph, coherently with our theoretical framework, we will assume that States cannot be considerate to be entirely unitary as in the realist perception. Instead the Member States influence the EU foreign policy making through their internal foreign policy making, their interests, and their role conceptions. In fact on the one hand foreign ministries adopt and implement European decisions, but those decisions are often achieved through a bargaining between the representatives of governments in the EU institutions. Member States and Europe mutually influence each other policies through two different processes: Europeanization and National Projection. The first one entails an expansion of themes and policy areas for member states that, before entering the EU had not developed a specific issue area. National Projection is the opposite tendency, as it allows a member state to project a policy in its interests at the EU level, benefiting from a wider range of action, expanding objectives beyond state capability. Leadership is a pro-active strategy of national projection, entailing member states following internal policy preferences through the EU. Acting as agenda setters and being originators of common policies, leaders might act as veto players, blocking or impeding European initiatives that do not correspond to their own interests.

Fundamental in the concept of authority is the study of decision-making units and the processes through which such units achieve decisions. In the case of the EU member states are fundamental decision units (at least in the foreign policy side) and therefore the internal functioning and constitutional design of member states influence the decision making process at the EU level. In fact

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such constitutional design determines the relationship between the Head of the State or Government with other relevant governmental actors like the Foreign Ministry. The constitutional design of member state is essential as it influences their foreign policies and the way in which they manage to address their interests at the EU level. The vast majority of the EU member states have a proportional representation electoral system. As we have hinted, proportionality matches with a stronger parliament as it aims at representing its citizens and eventual minorities instead of producing a sharp majority able to take autonomous decisions. It is not a surprise then the vast majority of the EU member states also have a coalition government in which more parties share power. This is the outcome of a constitutional choice, in which giving institutional recognition to all factions is considerate to be preferable than producing a strong majority scarifying a part of representation by abandoning (at least partially) proportionality as a key principle. This choice can be the result of internal considerations derived from the needs and social composition of a country but also its culture and identity.

Exceptions to this tendency are France and the UK whose systems are majoritarian. Not having a coalition government eases the coordination between institutions as all key governmental actors come from the same party. In the case of the semi-presidential France the majoritarian system is typical of the Presidential elections, so there is the possibility of the so-called cohabitation. However in France foreign policy is made at the Élysée: Article 5 of the V Republic constitution states that the President of the Republic guards the respect of the Constitution and assures, by his/her own arbitrage, the regular functioning of public powers as well as the continuity of the State. The President is also the guarantor of national independence, of territorial integrity and of respect of treaties. Thus the President exercises a hierarchical authority, intensely marked when interests perceived as essential are at stake. British system entails a highly operational coordination amongst ministries and officers that creates a unity and harmony of objectives, thus facilitating a rapid decision-making process. In the United Kingdom the Parliament becomes relevant especially when decisions over the use of force or when discussing whether to prefer the EU, UN or NATO framework. Even though France’s system differs from the British one, they both entail a clear hierarchy and strong political patterns, besides British Prime Minister and the French President reign over foreign policy. Having an efficient coordination

155 Article 5 of the French Constitution precisely states: Le Président de la République veille au respect de la Constitution. Il assure, par son arbitrage, le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics ainsi que la continuité de l'État. Il est le garant de l'indépendance nationale, de l'intégrité du territoire et du respect des traités. »
between organs combined with a highly centralized system allows both France and the UK to more rapidly develop a unitary position, which at the EU level is an asset. Countries like Germany instead, whose Foreign Minister and Chancellor come from differentiated parties, encounter difficulties in articulating a rapid, harmonious strategy. This lack of coordination and the tendency to adopt a legalistic approach to the harm of a strategic vision is a disadvantage when negotiating with other member states as it hinders rapidity of action and reaction. The level of coordination and organization makes the difference because those who have more bargaining power are those countries that, thanks to their organizational bureaucratic organization, manage to cover the more issues as possible to be prepared in the European arena.

2.3.2 Capabilities

To be an actor, an entity must possess the capabilities to pursue its own policies. In fact even having legal autonomy from its members, external recognition and the authority to take decisions, an actor can have an impact only if it holds the capabilities to do so. The latters include material assets like funds and personnel, operational assets like headquarters, institutions and the capability to actually implement a policy, together with less structural aspects like expertise. The capabilities of the EU as such rely on those provided by the member states. The founding idea is the one of “pooling and sharing” of capabilities and task specialization, aimed at optimizing costs and achieving effectiveness (maximizing the outputs in relation to the inputs). Pooling and sharing is organized in a way that allows Member States to preserve the flexibility to participate in separate missions. However not all the member states contribute in the same way in expenses on defence. Collectively, the (at the time) twenty-seven EU Member States represented the second leading military actor, following the USA. But of the entire expenditure only four countries provide approximately 70 per cent of it: Great Britain and France (the two of them accounting for 43 per cent) and Germany and Italy. The 80 per cent of the budget is reached when adding the budget provided by Spain and Holland and 90 per cent comprising the expenditure of Greece, Poland, Sweden and Belgium. The last ten per cent remains to be allocated among the remaining 17 member states. Due partially to an incomplete rearrangement to respond new challenges and to a series of impediments, and to the difficulties arisen in conflicting strategic

157 TEU Art 42
interests, merely one-tenth on the EU armed forces is actually deployable. In fact the Member States exercise political control over CSDP missions and operations through the PSC, as well as giving strategic direction to the latters. Further proof of the difficulty to concretely deploy personnel linked to political unwillingness of member states to employ their own capabilities, is the example of the Battlegroups, that have not been utilized in spite of their creation in 2007 and refuted political support during the Libyan crisis. Consequently France and Great Britain have implemented military missions outside the CSDP framework and providing their troops to NATO.

The existence of divergences and the incapability of some Member States to participate in CSDP missions should not hinder per sé military action. What is at stake is not that all members participate all missions; rather the problem is the direct obstruction for specific interests that hamper political cooperation in vital interests of the EU. In the occurrence of the Libyan case, if Europe as a whole was agreeing on the condemnation of Qaddhāfi actions and shared common interests, they could have found an arrangement under CSDP even with some Member States not actively providing capabilities. The implementation of UNSCR 1973 under a Franco-British aegis would not have obliged all to take part, coherently with the coalition of the willing principle. Nevertheless the Council has never authorized a CSDP military mission but a civilian one that needed the previous request of the UN for its activation. Even though European Institutions have progressively stressed the importance of the enhancement of the EU capabilities particularly to improve rapid response in crisis, the process is still slow moving. An example is the Council Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities endorsed in December 2008, which has provided the enlargement of the functions of the EDA and has further specified technical issues in training of troops and that also reaffirmed that the resources of the EU rely also on the Member State’s and on NATO’s. The need for a capability development rests on the high costs that redundant duplication of assets compels, and on the emergence to cope with shortage of resources that still need to be redressed. The shortage of resources has been also admitted by Lady Ashton: “We have sought to make the best use of scarce financial resources – and also to meet

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162 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, Brussels, 11 December 2008, p. 1
expectations that the EU should support progress towards democracy and prosperity in countries as varied as Libya and Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, Mali and Myanmar Burton.163

The lingering powerlessness to resolutely lessen persistent capability gaps is not only rooted in an actual scarcity of financial resources and on the unwillingness of member states to commit to tangible improvements, but is partially linked to the consciousness of the EU that it might rely on US assets for the most demanding operations. It is interesting to note that during the arms embargo and civilian protection in Libya the United States accounted for 75% of the ISR data (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and for approximately 80% of the aerial tankers to keep the fighter jets upward.164 The issue of intelligence is particularly relevant, as it constitutes a field in which the EU has most difficulties, also linked to the absence of a unitary European ISR service.

Not only intelligence, the EU lacked also precision-guided munitions and other resources that were supplied by the US. Furthermore NATO support was needed as it was only (besides the USA) with the necessary operational planning facilities. Hence the operation became a NATO one virtually by default, but an operation in which the US voluntarily stepped back.165 Together with the difficulties linked to the personnel there are also those related to the Headquarters. In fact the EU lacks planning facilities like permanent operational headquarters (OHQ), fact that impedes permanent planning that would allow rapid application of a particular plan. Such OHQs are provided by France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Greece that, if unwilling to make them available, can refuse to give access to them. Alternative to the use of OHQ is to command operations through the EUMS OpsCen, even though the activation of these non-permanent headquarters requires a Council decision, and hence a common will of the Member States. Even though the civilian side has a completely different system of allocation of resources problems remain, the main difficulty being the shortage of personnel. The reluctance of members to provide and train personnel and the lack of clarity of objectives, spanning from long-term goals to mere visibility ones, worsen the situation.166 Proposals have been made, like of the Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) to pool experts from all European nations, but member states do not seem yet to be prone to such commitments. The main impediments to the recruitment of civilian personnel are the tendency of member states to employ resources on the military than on the civil, building nearly a

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sense of path dependency, and the fact that CCM institutions have been constructed “almost from scratch” at both the EU and national level. Particularly rules on issues like regulations and institutions for registration, training and then organizing of civilian personnel were only recently settled, and not even in all countries.

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CHAPTER 3
Assessing Coherence

3.1 Four Levels of Coherence

In accordance with the principles set by the Treaty of Lisbon on the purposes and tools of the EU external action, the Union has developed instruments to cope with complex crisis that are formed by several phases. In fact the crisis cycle is understood by the EU institutions to be composed by early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building instruments to help countries achieve a long-term development. This work will be focused primarily on the crisis management and response and will not cope with the initial conflict prevention tools, nor will it be able to give detailed qualitative evaluation of the peace-building process. The attitude towards the EU external action, particularly in the crisis response field, has been guided by the so-called “comprehensive approach”, meaning that the EU employs several tools from the military to the civilian to relate to a crisis. An essential feature for the comprehensive approach is the development of a coherent strategy that, as stated in the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council in December 2013, starts with all relevant players sharing a common understanding of the situation or the challenge. In short, The EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and vision. This is what the comprehensive approach is about. Indeed a common analysis should allow agreeing on a European view of the roots of a latent emergency, ascertaining the main people and groups involved and assessing the dynamics within a crisis and evaluating the perils of both action and non-action. Not agreeing on the above mentioned issues hinders the formation of a coherent foreign policy, as if member states do not share the same perception of a crisis or the same interests they will more difficultly find a common strategy. In fact defining the Union’s interests and goals, as well as considering the available resources and

169 Ibidem
170 Ibidem
action in the region in question is a prerequisite to promote whatsoever value and have an impact in a crisis.

Coherence, together with an integrated system and mutually reinforcing institutions are essential in order to strengthen ESDP missions. Institutions shall be designed to smooth decision-making processes and to adopt effective, comprehensive policies in a reasonably short time. Coherence is hence a prerequisite to have a constructive, long-term impact not merely aimed at gaining visibility but also to pursue strategic goals. Hence the need to take decisions that combine the national positions of the member states making them converge towards a coherent position. This requires enduring communication between the crisis management committees located in Brussels, the structures of the Council Secretariat directed by the SG/HR and the EC. This first level of coherence is the Institutional, which entail the extent to which the European institutions manage to produce a common policy without being in contradiction with each other. On the contrary the latters must mutually reinforce each other and show the ability to speak with one voice. Secondly, Vertical coherence copes with the extent to which the member states adopt policies that are both consistent with and desirably reinforcing the EU level policy. Thirdly Horizontal Coherence studies the extent to which different tools and policies deployed by the EU are consistent with each other and, as further step, form a synergetic relation able to strengthen the decisions themselves. Finally Multilateral coherence refers to the level of coordination with other relevant international actors like the AU, NATO, and the UN and denotes the coherence of the EU’s response. All of the four above mentioned levels of coherence require both a basic consistency and a deeper mutually reinforcing cooperation. This chapter will try to establish whether the EU has managed to achieve at least a minimum level of coherence in the approach towards Libya in 2011.

3.1.2 Institutional coherence

The innovations described in the previous chapter institutionalized with the Lisbon Treaty were aimed at providing the European Union with the ability to adopt unitary positions and to “speak with one voice”, thus ensuring coherence of the EU’s external action. In fact a minimum level of coherence is essential to be a credible internationally, as the EU in seek for a recognized role as a security actor requires the promotion of the Union as an accountable actor able take decisions and to implement them unitarily. When the Libyan uprisings began, only one month after the coming to existence of the EEAS, the HR Catherine Ashton strongly expressed her deploring of repression and statements of
condemnation came from the main institutions of the EU. The President of the EP Jerzy Buzek urged “the authorities in Libya to halt all violence against the demonstrators”171, two days later the president of the EC José Barroso affirmed that “it is intolerable to see the army using force against civilians as we have been seeing during the last days”172 and the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy abhorred “the violence that is being committed against people who stand for freedom and justice in Libya”173. Furthermore they all incited the Libyan authorities to restore freedom of information by providing free access to the Internet. At least at the level of official declarations the EU Institutions have proven to having achieved a basic level of consistency. Nevertheless some argued that the fact that those institutions reacted similarly in condemning the use of force does not similarly entail that they are speaking with one voice but rather a “constructive polyphony”174. In fact even though there were similarities in addressing Qaddhāfi in ceasing violence, coherence lacked in the vision on longer-term goals and instruments to accomplish them. Further in the unfolding of the crisis, divergences started to appear even inside the European institutions. In fact the matter of controversy was about the military intervention and the goal it had to pursue. The High Representative and the President of the European Council reportedly issued divergent statements on the goal of the military intervention in Libya. While the president of the European Council stated that the goal of the intervention was regime change, the HR subsequently contradicted this. Such internal confusion rather than cohesion can be considered to be a sign of incoherence inside the institutions.

However the problem with the institutional level of coherence cannot only be studied on the basis of declarations, but also considering the rivalries between institutions themselves. As analysed, the Lisbon Treaty has prescribed a complex apparatus for foreign policy, dislocating many competences at the intergovernmental level. Still, competences can be matter of controversies on who should be entitled with a certain task, and institutional conflicts can generate battles for turf and hinder cooperation The Gothenburg programme of 2001 had, before Lisbon, set a programme to define the

roadmap in prevention of violence. What had been decided at the Gothenburg European Council was that the Council should deal with security matters whereas the Commission, that withheld more resources, had to cope primarily with conflict prevention. Indeed the Commission possesses the human and financial resources, but lacks the authority conferred to the Council, as member states are unwilling to cede to a supranational institution the power to take foreign policy decisions. The outcome of such arrangement was that cooperation between the Council and the EC rested primarily on the personal relationship between the commissioner for external relation and the SG/HR\textsuperscript{175}. Indeed even now the field for which there is a EU budget not negotiated by the single member states are precisely the humanitarian and civilian one\textsuperscript{176}.

The budgetary issue had been a contentious aspect of the creation of the EEAS itself, of which all institutions (and the member states, particularly the “Big Three”) wanted to hold control. Even the executive secretary general of the EEAS, Pierre Vimont, has defined the latter a “strange animal”, referring to the complex nation of the institution that fuses the cultures of the EC, the Council and the member states\textsuperscript{177}. Turf battles have also been the basis of a scarce coordination between DG ECHO, the EEAS and the newly created Crisis Response & Operational Coordination Department\textsuperscript{178}. Also Agostino Miozzo, director of the CR&OC has highlighted how synchronization is quintessential in order to activate a rapid reaction, and added that hesitancy to cede control to a central coordinating figure has damaged the impact and visibility for the Union in crisis response\textsuperscript{179}. Problems in coordination are also due to the fact that such institutions have been created only recently, the EU Crisis Platform under the EEAS being founded specifically in the occurrence of the Libyan crisis. Furthermore the Arab Spring has been a traumatic test for the Lisbon Treaty and has, for the first time, assigned a complex task to the new HR that, because of the numerous assignments of which he or she has been appointed has seldom the possibility to participate every meeting, not being ubiquitous. This has probably been one of the causes for which the action of Lady Ashton has been criticized, to the point that during the hearings of the EP’s foreign affairs committee on March 22 she has been accused

\textsuperscript{175} Cameron F., “An introduction to European Foreign Policy”, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, p. 207
\textsuperscript{177} Cameron F., “An introduction to European Foreign Policy”, London and New York, Routledge, 2012, p. 77
\textsuperscript{178} KOENING N. ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In quest of coherence?’, The International Spectator, Vol. XXII/5, 2012, p.8
\textsuperscript{179} Dr Agostino Miozzo on the EU Crisis Response, post event report by Barry BARRY, Linda, “Dr Agostino Miozzo on EU Crisis Response”, Institute of International and European Affairs, post event report, 8 march 2012, pp. 1-2
of representing a superfluous position and adopt a non enough proactive approach\textsuperscript{180}.

3.1.2 Vertical Coherence

Vertical coherence is the element that the approach of the EU towards the Libyan crisis has been lacking the most. Member States were divided among the more interventionists (the two nuclear powers France and Great Britain), the most contrary to the intervention (the traditionally pacifist Germany and Poland) and those who were in favour of an intervention even without occupying a primary role in the debate. This should be no surprise as Europe has always been torn between different conceptions over the use of force and when and whether to use it. This, as outlined, has been also the result of different historical legacies and strategic interests that are reflected in the approach towards the UN, the US and NATO, the relation with whom vary inside the European Union\textsuperscript{181}. The months of the crisis have been characterized by contradictory declarations by the Member States and the EU as such. On the 20\textsuperscript{th} of February Silvio Berlusconi declared to the press that he had not called Gaddafi because he did not want to disturb him\textsuperscript{182}. In the same period the Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini warned his European equivalents on the effects opposing Qaddhāfi could have, dreading that the Libyan leader was the sole that was holding the country together\textsuperscript{183}. The two statements of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign Minister denote a cautious approach of the Italian government towards the crisis, more compromise-oriented also because of the diplomatic ties between the two countries. Regardless of the reasons behind the approach Italy, what is certain is that the statement was in contrast with what declared on the same day by the HR/SG, that the EU urged the authorities to immediately refrain from further use of violence against peaceful demonstrators\textsuperscript{184}.

If Europe as such had been sharply critical towards Qaddhāfi since the early beginning of the

\textsuperscript{180} DAWN, «Europe’s foreign policy on fire over Libya», site of the Dawn, 24 march 2011 \url{http://www.dawn.com/news/615507/europes-foreign-policy-in-line-of-fire-over-libya}
\textsuperscript{181} GNESOTTO N., DE MARGERIE S., “Defence: The French Ambition for Europe”, \textit{Jacques Delors Institute}, 29 April 2013, p.2
\textsuperscript{182} KOENING N. ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In quest of coherence?’, \textit{The International Spectator}, Vol. XXII/5, 2012, p. 9
crisis, Italy’s position was more moderate, also because of deeper diplomatic and economic ties with Libya\textsuperscript{185}. In 2008 Italy had signed with Libya a Treaty that normalized the relations between the two countries and included an apology for the Italian colonial past alongside the wish to establish an economic cooperation. In fact trade relations between the two countries have always been significant and Libyan investments in Italy had been increasing constantly in the previous years. The Treaty also encompassed a fight against illegal immigration, which called for Libyan coastline patrol by hybrid crews and land border satellite surveillance\textsuperscript{186}. Italy was the European country with which Libya had profounder bonds and interests\textsuperscript{187} and at an initial stage it was less prone to call for a regime change but rather to support a gradual pathway through democracy. Indeed the Italian minister also stressed that Europe should have avoided to interfere and to export its model of democracy, and should have instead pressed for a reconciliation\textsuperscript{188}.

This position is sharply in contrast with the one of the French government. During the same days at the beginning of the crisis, on February 25, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy first declared "Mr Gaddafi must leave," at a news conference with his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul in Ankara\textsuperscript{189}. It should be no surprise then that on March 10 France unilaterally recognized the NTC as the only legitimate representative of Libya, before the EU could discuss the issue in an \textit{ad-hoc} summit. On the 4\textsuperscript{th} of April also Italy recognized the NTC, being the third country to do so after France and Qatar Cameron government officials spoke frequently of their view that the Libyan crisis was a threat to Britain’s interests. On 2 March, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg maintained that Libya was vital for both the UK and the EU interests since, caused by the violence perpetrated, the level of immigrants could reach a peak from North Africa. Also David Cameron expressed his concern over the possibility for Libya to become a failed state, becoming a threat for Europe. Moreover the Clegg stressed how North Africa was merely fourteen miles distant from the EU, and such neighbourhood was crucial

\textsuperscript{185} KASHIAM M.A.A., “The Italian role in the Libyan spring revolution: is it a shift from soft to hard power?”, \textit{Contemporary Arab Affairs}, 5:4, 2012 p. 559
together with the importance of the region in terms of energy, environment and counter-terrorism. The incoherence at a vertical level is also shown by the divergence over the mention of a military action in the 11 March communiqué of the European Council. The meeting itself was set after the request of France and Great Britain to discuss the eventuality of a military intervention and a no-fly zone. The position of the two countries over the Libyan crisis had been made clear to the European Institutions with a letter sent to Herman Van Rompuy by Sarkozy and Cameron.

France and the UK are committed to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. (...) We welcome the formation of an Interim Transitional National Council based in Benghazi and we are engaging with the Council and its members to develop a cooperative dialogue. (...) We support continued planning to be ready to provide support for all possible contingencies as the situation evolves on the basis of demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and firm regional support. This could include a no-fly zone or other options against air attacks, working with Allies and partners, especially those in the region.

In the occasion, when the proposals were rejected, the French President and the British Prime Minister reproached the HR Catherine Ashton of passiveness and the meeting escalated with Nicolas Sarkozy yelling Vous avez tout raté, votre service a échoué in the corridors of the Council. The disappointment of France can be considered also under the lens of the expectation it had to conduct the mission with the UK in the framework of the Franco-British Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation of November 2010. Being not only the European countries with more military capabilities, but being also able to exercise a leadership internally and internationally, France and Great Britain were the two natural directoires of the intervention. Furthermore the experience of the Libyan crisis has shown how member states like France and the Great Britain have increasingly and mutually influenced their agendas with the one of the European Union. The Franco-British Treaty consolidated their entente.

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193 As it can be read from the «Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy», site of The Guardian, 10 March 2011 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/libya-middleeast
entailed started in St. Malo and entailed a cooperation in the field for a 50 year period, combining military efforts in aircrafts, nuclear submarines, research and technology et al, as well as the formation of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). The CJEF was designed to pursue either bilateral operations, either joint ones with NATO, the EU or other coalition arrangements\textsuperscript{195}.

The member states reacted in different ways and motivated their unwillingness to get involved with Libya. Romania for example argued that “a no-fly zone is a mission that only NATO can have and not the EU” and Bulgaria that it feared the presence of oil interests\textsuperscript{196}. Also the traditionally Atlanticist Poland criticized the proposal of an intervention, maintaining the need to be neutral in perspective of the Polish Presidency in Autumn 2011\textsuperscript{197}. From its side Germany pursued an inconsistent policy and declarations from its Defence Minister intensified frictions with France and Britain. Indeed Minister de Mazière in an interview alluded to oil interests, even though he later stated that it was not an insinuation but rather a call for caution when coping with interventions\textsuperscript{198}. He in fact declared that it would not be possible and perhaps not desirable to remove all the dictators with a military mission\textsuperscript{199}. In fact he added “the responsibility to protect a country’s civilian population if its government violates human rights is firmly anchored in international law. But does that mean we are allowed to intervene?”\textsuperscript{200}. Hence Germany, on March 17\textsuperscript{th}, abstained from voting the UNSC Resolution 1973 and partially justified the decision by judging the resolution poorly prepared\textsuperscript{201}. The decision was nonetheless very sharp and departed from expectations, as Germany could have simply voted in accordance with USA, France and the UK but not taking actively part in the no-fly zone operation\textsuperscript{202}. For this reasons some have argued that the reluctance of Germany to intervene could be explained, at

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\bibitem{197} LINDSTRÖM M., ZETTERLUND K., “Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya. Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO”, \emph{FOI}, October 2012, p. 53
\bibitem{199} Ibidem
\bibitem{200} Reported in MISKIMMON A., “German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis”, German \emph{Politics}, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2012, p. 398
\bibitem{201} MISKIMMON A., “German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis”, German \emph{Politics}, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2012, p. 397
\end{thebibliography}
least partially, by domestic pressures\textsuperscript{203}. Nevertheless, after the latter had been approved, Chancellor Merkel declared that the resolution had become “also our resolution”\textsuperscript{204}. It was henceforth obvious that the only role that could be searched for at the EU level was a minimum role, like the one implied by EUFOR Libya.

Immediately after the authorization of a military mission by UNSCR 19713, France began its unilateral air strikes against Qaddhāfi in Benghazi, operation Harmattan. In the same days David Cameron was assembling a session of the House of Commons for consultations over the matter\textsuperscript{205}. The military operation became essentially a Franco-British mission, since the two countries deployed 50 per cent of the air strikes. It is not a surprise also considering that France and the UK alone provide more than 40 per cent of the EU defence budget, even if in the case of Libya they could rely on assets from the US. Moreover also Italy, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands participated the operation. Romania and Bulgaria arranged a rather symbolic naval vessel in support to the UN arms embargo. Hence only nine out of twenty-seven member states participated the air operation but among them only five deployed combat aircrafts.\textsuperscript{206} The Libyan crisis has been a test for the tools developed by the EU for crisis management and response, and has shown to what extent a lack of permanent planning structures hinders the formation of a policy agreed upon in a restricted amount of time. In fact the EU has needed two months to reach a preliminary agreement on the plan to adopt, whereas NATO had prepared four operational plans within two weeks, procedure lasted four times less than the one of the EU\textsuperscript{207}.

Another proof of incoherence has emerged in the approach towards another issue related to the crisis: immigration. Part of the Benghazi Treaty between Qaddhāfi and Italy regarded the fight against illegal migration and the beginning of the crisis brought concern about the possibility that immigration could reach a peak. The fact that the majority of migrants in the period were Tunisian did not release

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\textsuperscript{203} As argued by BUCHER J., Engel L., HARFENSTELLER S., DIJKSTRA H. Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya, European Security, 2013 Vol.22, No.4, pp. 524-539
\textsuperscript{204} WITTOCK, Philipp, «Paris and Berlin at Odds over Libya Operation », site of the Spiegel Online International, 24 March 2011, \url{http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/setback-for-franco-german-relations-paris-and-berlin-at-odds-over-libya-operation-a-752992.html}
\textsuperscript{205} HOWORTH J. “‘Opération Harmattan’ in Libya: a paradigm shift in French, European and transatlantic security arrangements?, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol.12, No.4, 2014, PAGINA
\textsuperscript{206} GNESOTTO N., DE MARGERIE S., “Defence: The French Ambition for Europe”, Jacques Delors Institute, 29 April 2013, p.2
\textsuperscript{207} Lindström M., Zetterlund K., “Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya. Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO”, FOI, October 2012, p. 53
\end{footnotes}
the tension over Libya. In late February, before the military intervention, Italian authorities declared that they feared that the Libyan crisis could provoke the arrival of thousands of migrants, more than those who arrived before the Treaty. A 7 March column of the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera warned Europe that if Libya became a failed State it would become a basis for criminality and a transfer for migrants from North Africa and Italy would be in the front line to suffer such consequences. Fearing an increase in migration Italy requested assistance to the European Union, specifically to the Frontex, the EU agency accountable for border security. Together with funds it called upon a common strategy to deal with a potential humanitarian crisis, requesting an allocation of migrants among the member states and stressing that Mediterranean European countries could not be left alone in the reception of migrants. In response to the request of Italy to Frontex in February 15 the Joint Operation Hermes has been launched, even though not all the European Member States agreed upon the risk of an immigration crisis. In fact German Minister de Mazière denied the existence of a refugee influx and tensions between the member states on the issue of immigration arose.

In April 2011 the numbers of immigration were consistently rising. Nearly 23,000 northern African refugees had arrived in Lampedusa, in Sicily. Overwhelmed by the situation, Italy announced that it would issue migrants with a six-month travel visas. The majority of immigrants were indeed directed to other member states like France and Germany and, accordingly to the Schengen Agreement of 1985 they would be allowed to freely move across Europe with the travel visa. This decision from the Italian Government deepened frictions France and Germany that, on 11 of April At the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 11 April, accused Italy of violating the “Schengen spirit”. The German interior minister maintained that 23,000 people were not a catastrophe for a large country, whereas Italy felt threatened and abandoned. France instead reacted by closing a rail connection in Menton and Ventimiglia, near the boundary on April 17. Moreover the crisis fuelled the debate over a temporary suspension of Schengen, comprising the restoration of controls along the Franco-Italian frontier. The Italian foreign ministry defined illegitimate the French move and that it violated the

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“general European principles”.  

Faced with an escalating challenge to a core principle of the EU, Paris and Rome searched for a way to surpass out of the political obstacle, being worried by the economic consequences of a revision of Schengen. On April 26, the French and the Italian leaders Sarkozy and Berlusconi meet in Rome for a bilateral summit that resulted in a joint letter to the European Commission calling for the reinforcement of FRONTEX, durable agreements in support of development in the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, a new European asylum policy and a revision of Schengen governance. Anyhow, the bilateral agreement agreement was reached the day afterward the Italian announcement of its decision to militarily contribute to operations in Libya.

In sum, analysing coherence at the vertical level has shown how the member states have diverged not only on the nature of the intervention, but primarily on the problem framing, step that is regarded as essential to the formulation of a comprehensive strategy by the EU institutions. Diverging on objectives to pursue has hindered the formulation of a coherent policy and of a joint decision, as a military intervention was conducted outside the domain of CSDP. This aspect is of particular significance, as it implicitly suggests that the issue of Libya was not perceived as a threat by all the member states, which hence did not homogeneously provide logistic support for the operation. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this study on vertical coherence is that the positions of the member states towards Libya have reflected their role-conception of Europe. We are not comprehensively judging the policies of the at the time twenty-seven member states and understanding whether they were in accordance with their role conceptions of Europe. Nevertheless a tendency can be noted for the traditionally pro-NATO member states to be in opposition to a European military intervention, maintaining that only the UN and NATO could call upon a no-fly zone in the area (like the CEECs).

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3.1.3 Horizontal Coherence

As far as Horizontal coherence is concerned, the EU has at its disposal a set of policies and instruments to address the challenges in its external action, covering the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields. The EU has shown to have made several progresses in the area, becoming the world's largest trading block and, jointly, the major donor of official development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid. The goals for which such instruments might be deployed include the peaceful resolution of conflict through diplomatic measures, providing humanitarian aid to victims with ad hoc missions, to impose restrictive measures and to control migration flows by means of border measures. Indeed to achieve peaceful conflict resolution diplomatic measures (like declarations, speeches, meetings et al.) are adopted. The deployment of civilian and military tools is coherent with the comprehensive rhetoric that has been discussed in the previous chapter and with the purposes of the comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, the Libyan crisis has proven the extent to which the EU was still unprepared to become a military actor, remaining more focused on the civilian side.

The HR Catherine Ashton expressed, on February 20, the concern of the EU in the events occurring in Libya and declared that the EU urged “the authorities to exercise restraint and calm and to immediately refrain from further use of violence against peaceful demonstrators”. Coherently, an extraordinary European Council meeting stated the loss of legitimacy of Qaddhāfi regime that was no longer referred to as interlocutor for the EU. An important role in the establishment and maintaining of diplomatic ties with the Libyan transition authorities was held by the newly born EEAS. In fact its Crisis Response Department (CR&OC) led missions on the ground to enhance the relations with the NTC and to preliminarily examine the situation in order to prepare an adequate planning for the missions. The EEAS, aspiring to increase the legitimacy of the anti-Qaddhāfi forces, opened two European offices in Libya: the first one on May 22 in Benghazi and the second in Tripoli on August 31. Moreover the EU Crisis Platform was convoked regularly in the attempt to guarantee the coherence of the EU response to the Libyan crisis.

214 Ibid., p. 3
Combined to diplomatic tools, the EU has implemented tools to provide humanitarian aids to the victims of the conflict. With the approval of his Commission and in support of the appeal made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the EC President Barroso called upon a joint approach to face the 140,000 refugees fleeing North Africa. For such purpose the European Commission activated the civil protection mechanism through the Monitoring & Information Centre (MIC) on February 23 and the humanitarian assistance on May 30. The first one dealt with distinct missions: the MIC, under request of the Presidency and in accordance with the HR, sustained Member States’ consular operations and assisted (even through co-financing for additional transport support) Member States’ consular authorities. Thanks to such instrument, and to the coordination of MIC, ECHO, EEAS, Sit Cen, EU Military Staff and EC Presidency, an estimated 5,800 Europeans were evacuated from Libya. The second, instead, provided more than €144,8 million for humanitarian aid and made the EU as a whole the main humanitarian donor.

Together with the allocation of funds for humanitarian purposes and the efforts to protect civilians, another goal that had to be addressed to comprehensively respond to the crisis was the one to limit the inflow of immigrants. Following a formal request from the Italian government on February 15, operation Hermes has been deployed on the 20th of February by the FRONTEX, the EU Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders. Operation Hermes was not only launched to respond the situation in Libya, but was aimed at containing the influx from the whole North Africa, at the time particularly from Tunisia. The mission was comprised of experts from member states (from Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) and of the Union as such, Italy provided naval assets and aerial means were ran by Germany, France, the Netherlands, Malta, Spain and Italy as well. Additionally the mission was designed to provide risk analysis to better study security challenges in the peripheral boundaries of the EU with the support of Europol in fighting organized crime. A second

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step of the mission was to ensure assistance in return operations of migrants who had been rejected the permission to remain in the EU to their home country\textsuperscript{223}.

On the issue of political and economic reforms Barroso stressed the need for a renewed political paradigm in the connections with the Mediterranean Neighbourhood and for a “Pact for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”. The European Institutions were aware of the importance of prompting and enhancing the consolidation of democracy in the area after the crisis. In these regards the EC President declared that “Of course, we all know the risks in these transition processes very well. But Europe would rather be accused of holding illusions of democracy than be guilty of cynicism or of missing this rendezvous with history” \textsuperscript{224}. Matter of primary concern were constitutional and judicial reform, support to non-state actors like NGOs, trade unions, women organizations and media. The conditionality principle was once again put in place, as in the years preceding the Arab Spring, with a system designed to reward the attempts to boost the implementation of rule of law and the protection of liberal values and human rights. To help in the reconstruction and new jobs creation the leverage of the European Investment Bank was used, as well as the contribution of the EBRD.

Overall, the horizontal level was the one in which the European Union has proven to be more coherent. In fact the policies discussed and implemented were in line with each other and were planned to respond to the main problems caused by the crisis: from migration to the humanitarian aids, to the evacuation of European citizens et al. Nevertheless in spite of the consistency of such policies difficulties have arisen in the immigration issue, as argued in the paragraph on vertical coherence. Also a comprehensive peace-building strategy has been only partial, as like in the past it was proposed the promotion of rule of law through the “more for more” mechanism and did not manage to effectively create a sustainable environment in Libya, as the most recent events have tragically shown.

3.1.4 Multilateral Coherence

If the EU seeks to be perceived as a relevant actor it has to pursue cooperation with other organizations like NATO, UN and AU in a mutually reinforcing multilateralism. This is the meaning of “effective multilateralism”, called upon by the ESS that auspicates a synergetic, reciprocally strengthening relation between the EU and other IOs. Nevertheless, at the multilateral axis,

\textsuperscript{223} IBRU « Frontex begins Operation Hermes in Lampedusa following request from Italy » site of the Durham University IBRU, 22 February 2011 https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=11608&

\textsuperscript{224} PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, \textit{Statement by President Barroso on the situation in North Africa}, Brussels, 2 March 2011, SPEECH/11/137, p.3
Coordination with other relevant actors has encountered several difficulties. As an initial step of the coordination between the EU and the UN, the European Union implemented the sanctions called upon by the United Nations and also extended them. In the months of the crisis the EU participated several conferences and international summits like the International Contact Group on Libya on April 13th, May 5th, June 9th. Participants of the Group were the EU, NATO, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Moreover the African Union attended as an invitee and six countries from the World Bank and OCHA attended as observers

The Group, on its second meeting occurred one day before the EU-NATO ambassadorial meeting, expressed its support for the NATO-led operation Unified Protector, that was defined as crucial to achieve the goals of UNSCR 1970 and 1973. As far as the EU is concerned, the group praised its initiative to designate six ports in Western Libya which would assist in preventing the regime from acquiring resources that fuel its military campaign and its decision to open an office in Benghazi and the opening of humanitarian offices there by UN agencies and the OIC. Hence in those occasions the EU has proven to work coherently with other international actors.

Nevertheless, as it has been maintained in the second chapter, the EU and NATO have encompassed several impasses, due to will of the EU to progressively becoming more autonomous but at the same time needing support and resources. During the early beginnings of the rebellions in Libya it was uncertain whether NATO would occupy a role whatsoever. The uncertainty was also linked to the new tendency of the USA to “lead from behind”, that is to make the EU take responsibility for crisis management in its own backyard. Indeed its Secretary General Rasmussen declared on March 03 that NATO was not willing to intervene in Libya, also because the UNSC Resolution did not involve the use of force. He nevertheless added that, being a defensive alliance the organization would have prepared a “prudent planning for all eventualities” even if it had not the intention to intervene militarily.

Regardless of the intentions during the Libyan crisis “NATO and the EU have held regular

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225 The latters participated at the second meeting, as it can be read in the INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP ON LIBYA, Chair’s Conclusions on the Second Meeting of the Contact Group on Libya, Rome, 5 May 2011, 4 p. http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc/20110505_meetingconclusions.pdf
226 INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP ON LIBYA, Co-Chairs’ Statement of the Third Meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya, 9 June 2011, p. 3
227 NATO, “Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Prime Minister of Montenegro Mr. Igor Lukšić”, 3 March 2011. In the recordings of the meeting the issue of Libya is dealt with at minute 8:35 and can be listened to at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/audio/audio_2011_03/20110303_030320100_transcript.mp3
consultations since the beginning of the crisis, an issue of great concern to both organisations”\textsuperscript{228}. Nonetheless the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May ambassdorial meeting between the two entities, was informal and hence no formal decision was taken, nor was any other meeting organized. Hence, in the preparation of humanitarian operations, cooperation between the two has been scarce. In these regards a senior NATO official declared that probably due to the fact that the “EU did not propose anything that required more intense cooperation”\textsuperscript{229}. Ultimately NATO proclaimed on March 25 that it would progressively take control of the operations until complete taking over of command on March 31, with France and Great Britain occupying a first line role and the US deliberately ceding such pre-eminence\textsuperscript{230}.

As far as cooperation with the UN is concerned, the EU announced to support the latter with the deployment of the humanitarian mission EUFOR Libya on April 1\textsuperscript{st}, that should have used the OHQ in Rome. A humanitarian mission was the only agreed upon by the Union, which never managed to agree on the deployment of a comprehensive CSDP mission. Henceforth EUFOR Libya lacked a military component, essential in CSDP mission that aim at comprehensiveness of tools involved. Indeed it should have comprised both military and civilian components, more specifically police for supporting security sector reform and demilitarization, disbandment and re-integration operations. The major problem with EUFOR Libya was that, to be launched, it needed a preliminary request from the UN OCHA. Such request never occurred also because “the UN repeated several times that they did not need this humanitarian operation – and NATO knew that”\textsuperscript{231}. In fact the presence of this EU led humanitarian mission was not warmly welcomed by the UN for fear that it could jeopardize humanitarian efforts\textsuperscript{232}.

Regarding cooperation with the African Union, the latter seemed to initially maintain the same position as the EU. In fact in accordance with the rest of the International community, the AU condemned violence in Libya on February 23\textsuperscript{233}. When the Libyan crisis was at its dawn, a series of AU–EU summits took place inside the framework of JAES. Nevertheless difficulties in coordination


\textsuperscript{229} Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, 9 June 2011, quoted in KOENING N. ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In quest of coherence?’, \textit{The International Spectator}, Vol. 22, No. 5, 2012, p. 12

\textsuperscript{230} ETZIONI A. “The Lessons of Libya”, \textit{Military review}, January-February 2012, p. 52

\textsuperscript{231} Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, 9 June 2011, reported by KOENING N., ‘The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In quest of coherence?”, \textit{The International Spectator}, Vol. 22, No.5, 2012, p. 12


\textsuperscript{233} On the 216th meeting between the AU and the EU, on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of February 2011
soon appeared. The AU supported a solution that comprised a compromise that could have included Qaddhāfi. Accordingly, it rejected the ICC arrest warrant against the Libyan leader. Such different vision hindered the formation of fruitful relation between the EU and the AU and produced a grave political fracture between the two, also due to the European support for the ICC. On 10 March, the AU established a committee with the purpose to negotiate a political solution and, most importantly, expressed its contrariety towards any form of foreign military intervention\textsuperscript{234}. When UNSCR 1973, voted by the three African UNSC members (South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon), was implemented the AU’s position was evidently isolated. The approach of the EU was indeed perceived by critics as an intervention filled with post-colonial paternalism. In Europe the influence of a normative human rights discourse has paired with a shared support of sanctions, emphasis on the “responsibility to protect”, interventions and the legal prosecution. Instead in Africa the legacy of colonialism has rendered the AU suspicious towards external interference and supportive of non-interventionist policies\textsuperscript{235}. Frictions were also inevitable as since March 22 the EU as a whole had recognized the NTC, whereas the AU did not. Some African states did recognize the NTC after Tripoli’s fall in August, but the Union as such denied NTC recognition until 20 October 2011. In spite of discrepancies, attempts have been made to find an institutional solution, as with the Africa-EU joint task force meeting in April, with the Fourth Annual Joint Consultative Meeting in Addis Ababa, together with the fifth College-to-College meeting of the AU and EU Commissions in Brussels. Seldom have those meetings produces substantive arrangements or have they allowed providing concrete responses to the crisis. All countries agreed with the necessity to protect civilians, but an effective instrument to achieve such goal has not been created. The joint task force meeting merely referred to Libya as to a disastrous event and the joint declaration of the College- to-College meeting did not even mention Libya directly\textsuperscript{236}.

In sum the crisis in Libya has shown the extent to which the attempt to transpose decision-making at the European Level has not been fully a success, since the most relevant decisions have been taken from the capitals of member states and not in Brussels. International initiatives like the Contact Group have undoubtedly pursued political cooperation, but such coordination has seemed to be more programmatic than really proactive, as countries followed autonomous policies in the approach towards the crisis. As a proof to this is the fact that only eight of the NATO members have participated the

\textsuperscript{234}AFRICAN UNION, Communique of the 265th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa,10 MARCH 2011, PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV)


\textsuperscript{236}Ibidem
intervention and this is a symptom of a wider lack of lack of shared interests. Divergence over perceived threats and the absence of a common ground strategic culture has hindered the formulation of a common policy at the EU level and has confirmed a new tendency inside NATO. Indeed if decisions are taken at the national level the inclination to prefer temporary “coalitions of the willing” can be expected to be reiterated in the future. Nonconformity in the perception of strategic interests and threats, as well as on the use of force and the circumstances in which it can (or should) be deployed risks creating blocks inside the same IO or inside the EU itself. If on the one hand this leaves more autonomy to the national state that is not forced to cede a part of its sovereignty on foreign policy issues, on the other hand it obstructs coherent, comprehensive responses. The outcome of the crisis has had a different impact for NATO and the EU. If for the latter the Libyan crisis has been considered the failed test of the Lisbon Treaty, for NATO Libya has been a success.

Conclusions

In the course of this work we have been trying to assess European Actorness in the 2011 Libyan Crisis and whether the EU managed to pursue a coherent policy. To begin in the analysis though, we have provided preliminary definitions and tried to understand the essential criteria necessary to investigate over the matter. The majority of the studies focus either on agency related issues either on structural issues, whereas in this work we have been trying to assess European Actorness by bridging the two elements. On the one hand in fact structural factors help in the understanding of legal constraints and the frame in which actors can operate. On the other hand it is also true that merely analysing legal and structural criteria does not provide a comprehensive vision of the EU actorness. In fact there is the need to integrate the study with more agency-oriented criteria that are ideational and linked to immaterial factors. Among the latters are strategic culture, identity, self-perception. The way in which an actor perceives itself deeply influences the way in which it will aim to be perceived by others and how it will operate. Hence, combining material and ideational aspects, the criteria studied in this research have been role perception, presence and legitimacy, authority and autonomy and capabilities. The first shows how the EU has gradually developed its own image to promote and its relation with relevant external actors like the UN and NATO. This is why in the second chapter we have outlined the process through which the EU has progressively evolved its self-conception from being a more integrative power to gradually developing military tools. This process has not be immune from clashes in point of views, as more traditionally pacifist member states opposed the promotion of a
military Europe, whereas, even though for different reasons, countries that have traditionally accepted
the use of force as a last resort to achieve goals have favoured it.

Even though the aim of this work was not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the way in
which ideational aspects have shaped how each member states thought of the EU, it is undeniable that
there has not always been a correspondence of vision. What is at stake is that if the member states do
not share the same strategic interests and culture and diverge over the role the EU should have it will be
more difficult to act unitarily. Moreover if there is no convergence of vision and interests, the member
states will be reluctant to cede a part of their sovereignty to build a supranational authority, but they
will instead prefer to keep their power to block decisions that must be reached at unanimity. Hence the
need to bridge agency and structure, since structures shape Foreign Policy decision-making process and
outcomes, but structures are themselves shaped by the visions of those who have created them. What
has been maintained is that the self-conception of Europe has evolved and has only recently entailed
the development of military tools, also due to divergences in the views of member states. Different
historical legacies, identities, strategic cultures and interests determined such different views. Being the
result of entangled compromises, the EU has gradually gained an autonomous role from other IOs and
has gained the legitimacy to pursue autonomous missions, both military and civilian. The issue of
legitimacy has been further analysed by showing the extent to which the EU has, since its early
beginnings, built relations with the Mediterranean in which, especially some European countries, have
always had deep interests. That Europe has vital interests in the area behaves no further explanation, as
they entail trade routes, energy supply and migration among the most self-evident. This is one of the
reasons why Europe has always tried to be present in the region and to be considered to be a legitimate
actor entitled to interact and sometimes to provide aid in turn of certain conditions. What is at stake is
that the neighbouring policies towards the Mediterranean, regardless of their limits, have permanently
constituted an integrative part of the European Foreign Policy, which aimed at achieving stability
inside its borders through integration and in its backyard through the establishment of positive
relations. However these policies have not always been effective and have not always encountered the
full participation of Europe as such, thus being pursued mainly by southern European Union and
France. Moreover the conditionality principle to bolster reforms in the area has been pursued with little
clarity in the objectives and in the means to evaluate progresses. Even though this would not constitute
the right circumstance to assess the weaknesses of the EU Neighbouring policies, what can be stated is
that Europe has been short-sighted in its approach, and the outburst of the Arab Spring has been a wet
blanket for the intents of the Union.
As far as autonomy and authority are concerned, it can be held that they explain the institutional constraints that shape the European Foreign Policy. In fact, as we have seen, institutions matter as they provide a legal framework in which member states can operate. Nevertheless also the internal composition of the member states does to the extent that the intergovernmental arrangement of the Lisbon Treaty, with regards to the domain of Foreign Policy, has allowed more margin of manoeuvre to States that manage to gain an advantage in the field like France and Great Britain. The latters, due to their colonial legacy and thanks to a constitutional organization designed to grant decisional centralization in Foreign Policy, are advantaged in European inter-governmental bargaining in the field. The institutionalization of a CFSP has created a competitive arena in which it is essential for member states to affirm and project national interests and this has in turn favoured those who have rationalized their decisional structures.\textsuperscript{237} In the work it has been examined the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, showing that it has institutionalized a double constitution that, as a \textit{Ianus Bifront}, prescribes different decisional processes for different fields. The policy areas in which there is more convergence of interests are regarded at in a supranational arrangement, whereas those in which member states are still deeply diverging are decided in an intergovernmental bargaining. It is not a case that in Foreign Policy pre-eminence is given to the Council instead of the Commission, thus favouring a decision making process based on negotiations in which there is not a ultimate decision unit able to take final decisions that must be respected.

The EU Foreign Policy is thus a multilevel one that entails national, supranational, bureaucratic, individual levels that jointly interact. Nonetheless the disposition of separate policy instruments dictates the involvement of distinct policy actors that act through dissimilar decision-making procedures, which in turn facilitates clashes and incoherence.\textsuperscript{238} The need, instead, for a more unitary view in approaching Foreign Policy issues is explicitly called upon the newly born EEAS, that encourages the EU to, \textit{whenever possible, work across institutions and with Member States to develop a single, common strategic vision for a conflict or crisis situation and for future EU engagement across policy areas. This should then set the overall direction for EU engagement\textsuperscript{239}}. Even if the Lisbon Treaty has tried to provide the EU with one voice in Foreign Policy, with the double-hatted HR, the

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\item\textsuperscript{239} EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, \textit{EEAS Review}, July 2013, 23 p.
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unwillingness of member states in reaching unitary decisions have hindered this process. The Libyan crisis has constituted the litmus test for the institutional development of European capabilities to respond to crisis that had its roots in St. Malo and that had culminated with the Treaty of Lisbon. The debates over the role of the EU and the progresses made to strengthen the ability of the Union to pursue autonomous missions, perceived as legitimate by the international community have been verified with the crisis in Libya. The EU has indeed managed to be perceived as legitimate and its contributions have been, even with initial reluctance, welcomed by the US and NATO that have started to feel the need for burden sharing in reaching stability. Nevertheless the reformed institutions have been unable to produce a coherent policy towards the Mediterranean and have shown that without a restructuration of the resource allocation method, even capabilities are insufficient to autonomously start a mission. In fact shortage of personnel and of resources like permanent OHQs, combined with the unwillingness to pool them together, have made once again the intervention of NATO necessary. Hence the EU, even if legally autonomous and entitled to deploy operations through its separate structures, is still too dependent on the assets of member states and of other international actors.

On the last point, the issue of coherence, the conclusions must be reached separately on the four different levels. The Horizontal level has been the least problematic, as the EU has individuated the goals to follow and has indicated the tools to deploy. In fact there is at least consistency in addressing the challenge of migration and the one of humanitarian aid and there is no contradiction between all the objectives delineated. Nevertheless there has not been a synergy between them, as the success of those policies has been hampered by lack of coordination at the other levels. Not of less importance, the EU has not managed to agree on a comprehensive policy to cope with peace building and reconstruction, the most delicate phase in a crisis. At the Institutional level more than incoherence per sé it can be maintained that the EU has not yet perfected how to speak with one voice and has instead shown a polyphony of its main institutions. In the judgement it could be argued though that some institutions were not yet consolidated and that the figure of the HR is entitled of such an amount of tasks to make his/her job extremely hard. However the main proofs of incoherence have come from the institutional and multilateral levels. The member states have indeed shown to be radically diverging on the Libyan crisis and have shown deep fractures on interests. As we have seen in fact, before a policy can be adopted the decisional actors involved must preliminarily agree on whether the issue under analysis constitutes a problem perceived as of vital interest for all. If European members diverge on this fundamental phase, building a coherent policy presents serious complications. The former HR and the former Commissioner for External Relations themselves, Javier Solana and the Chris Patten,
identified a common political will as essential in managing crisis and in overcoming lack of coherence inside the legally and bureaucratically uneven European foreign and security policy system\textsuperscript{240}.

Moreover Europe has shown the extent to which the process through the development of CSDP tools was not shared unanimously. The fact that CSDP tools were not seriously considered in the deployment of a military mission shows how divergences are not only on the policy level, but instead on the role conception of the EU as such. These factors, combined with a lack of multilateral coordination with other IOs, have denoted that the EU has only partially proven its actorness in the Libyan crisis. Many have blamed the Institutions and the Treaties for the failure of a unitary Europe in Libya, but this would mean hiding behind a vague anti-European sentiment instead of looking at the responsibilities of member states. It is true that the nature of European Institutions and its decision-making mechanisms have made it difficult to join a common and coherent policy, but those institutions have been modelled on the interests of member states themselves. If the latters are not intentioned to completely pool resources and to cede a part of their sovereignty in Foreign Policy to a supranational authority, then the EU as such will not progress forward in the ability to “speak with one voice”. Bridging suspicions and divergences is a challenge that must be addressed in order to better respond to future emergencies. Finally the Libyan crisis has confirmed once again what Europe knew already: \textit{nobody will protect our vital interests for us}\textsuperscript{241}. The decision of the USA to lead from behind and its disinclination in assuming responsibilities in the European backyard have requested more leadership from the part of the EU, at the very least in what it considers its Neighbourhood. Whether the European Union will find its path to take, unite, this challenge is yet to be verified.

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Summary

The research question of this work is whether the EU has displayed the features of a coherent security actor in the 2011 Libyan crisis. To answer the question we have preliminarily provided definitions of the concepts of actorness and of the concept of coherence. In defining actorness the approach utilized has been to combine both material and ideational factors. Indeed the majority of the studies focus either on agency related issues either on structural issues, whereas in this work we have been trying to assess European Actorness by bridging the two elements. On the one hand in fact structural factors help in the understanding of legal constraints and the frame in which actors can operate. On the other hand it is also true that merely analysing legal and structural criteria does not provide a comprehensive vision of the EU actorness. In fact there is the need to integrate the study with more agency-oriented criteria that are ideational and linked to immaterial factors. Among the latters are strategic culture, identity, self-perception. The way in which an actor perceives itself deeply influences the way in which it will aim to be perceived by others and how it will operate. Hence, combining material and ideational aspects, the criteria that have been tested to answer the research question have been role perception, legitimacy, autonomy, authority, and capability. Thus this work has analysed European actorness in the crisis, starting from the relations with the Mediterranean and assessing how decisions have been taken on the topic. The research has shown that the lack of a common strategic culture, identity and role conception has been an obstacle to the formulation of a shared policy.

Nested in the aim of pursuing peace, the project of Europe eventually led to further integration of institutions, policies and common instruments aimed at achieving stability both internally and also with neighbouring States. Developing peaceful neighbourhood relations, like those with the Mediterranean, has been one of the tools utilized for such purpose. Thus, the issue of legitimacy has been analysed by showing the extent to which the EU has, since its early beginnings, built relations with the Mediterranean in which, especially some European countries, have always had deep interests. This is one of the reasons why Europe has always tried to be present in the region and to be considered to be a legitimate actor entitled to interact and sometimes to provide aid in turn of certain conditions. Neighbouring policies towards the Mediterranean, regardless of their limits, have permanently constituted an integrative part of the European Foreign Policy, which aimed at achieving stability inside its borders through integration and in its backyard through the establishment of positive relations. However these policies have not always been effective and have not always encountered the full participation of Europe as such, thus being pursued mainly by southern European Union and France. The outburst of the so-called Arab Spring has requested a redefinition of the policies oriented
towards that area and has showed the limits of a short-sighted approach.

In parallel to this tendency to achieve peace and stability, the EU has progressively developed the capabilities to become a security actor, able to deploy military and civilian missions. This process has not be immune from divergencies, as more traditionally pacifist member states opposed the promotion of a military Europe, whereas, even though for different reasons, countries that have traditionally accepted the use of force as a last resort to achieve goals have favoured it. Different historical legacies, identities, strategic cultures and interests determined such different views. This is the reason why in the second chapter it is outlined the process through which the EU has evolved its self-conception from being a more integrative power to gradually developing military tools. Indeed the EU has increasingly developed its own identity and image to promote abroad and its relations with relevant external actors like the UN and NATO. The importance of discussing such an ideational aspect rests on the fact that if the member states do not share the same strategic interests and culture and diverge over the role the EU should have, acting unitarily will face more obstacles. This is also due to the fact that an absence of convergence of vision and interests renders the member states reluctant to cede a part of their sovereignty to build a supranational authority. They will prefer instead to keep their power to block decisions that must be reached at unanimity. Hence the need to bridge agency and structure, since structures shape Foreign Policy decision-making process and outcomes, but structures are themselves shaped by the visions of those who have created them.

The existence of divergences particularly in the field of Foreign Policy has hindered the formation of a supranational decision making process. Indeed the Lisbon Treaty has formalized a dual decisional mechanism, supranational for communitarian issues and intergovernmental in Foreign Policy. The EU Foreign Policy is thus a multilevel one that entails national, supranational, bureaucratic, individual levels that jointly interact. Nonetheless the disposition of separate policy instruments dictates the involvement of distinct policy actors that act through dissimilar decision-making procedures, which in turn facilitates clashes and incoherence. The necessity for a more unitary view in approaching Foreign Policy issues is explicitly called upon by the newly born EEAS and with the attempt to provide the EU with one voice in Foreign Policy, with the double-hatted HR. Hence decision-making processes are studied to analyse the extent to which a lack of cohesion and views on objectives hinders the creation of coherent policies. The Libyan crisis has constituted a first test for the institutions created with the Lisbon Treaty and for the newly formulated need of the EU for a comprehensive approach to crisis. Moreover the Treaty of Lisbon, in spite of its attempts to give the Union a common voice, has not resolved the problem of fragmentation of the European institutions and
has failed to prescribe a supranational authority able to take final decisions and to commit resources. It is self-evident that a fragmented intergovernmental decision making process has not to be confused with the extent to which decisions are binding when taken. At this point our analysis is on the moment antecedent the decision taken.

This topic brings our discussion to a further discussion of the definitions of autonomy and authority. Authority is often defined in terms of legal competences, however in this work it will be maintained the relevance of studying what kind of authority an actor possesses. Indeed the level of authority and the extent to which it is this binding can give precious information on the outcome foreign policy. Authority can be exercised in panoply of arrangements and by an array of decision units. What is interesting in the analysis is that such ultimate decision unit can vary based on the issue upon which a decision must be taken. For routine problems the process can take place at a lower level than for crucially important issues, of which the government takes charge. Understanding the composition of a decision making process and particularly who is entitled to take decisions allows to more accurately analyse the outcome of a foreign policy.

When decision-making unit are multiple, the final decision will be the result of a compromise and will seldom be definite without leaving margin of manoeuvre to its members. If the policy does not leave room for interpretation and require strong compliance, the parties might be less prone to agree. A major problem at the European level is the vague and general nature of its policies that allows states to exploit its ambiguities. Understanding the way in which policies are made will allow us to better understand the dynamics at the basis of the decisions taken for the solution of the Libyan crisis and what facilitated France and the Great Britain to gain a preeminent role.

What will emerge is a relation between internal cohesion and authority. Indeed, at a State level, countries with few cleavages and social fractures are most likely to form a highly hierarchical decision making process. Countries in which social cleavages are deep discourage the presence of a strong executive. Member States constitutional designs and the way in which authority is structured influence the European level policy making. It is not a case that France and the UK, the two countries that occupy the most prime line role in the EU foreign policy, have both a majoritarian system. The (quasi total) absence of minorities or of groups that might fear not to be represented facilitates the formation of a strong executive able to take binding decisions with few compromises. On the opposite side, profoundly divided societies composed by different groups seldom achieve a highly hierarchical executive. The major concern of those democracies is to represent every group and minority, thus privileging a proportional system. The two poles represent the extremities of a continuous axis in which
each democracy positions itself to balance the two needs. There is seldom a complete correspondence between strong executive, majoritarian system, lack of cleavages, two party system on a side and loose executive, perfect proportionality, bottomless social fractures and panoply of parties on the other. However the two extremes serve as an exemplification of how a cohesive society favours the presence of a strong executive, thus able to take binding decisions.

In foreign policy this is particularly evident, since in such field it is required to speak with one voice and a fragmented position is a disadvantage. Therefore, in spite of the differences among the two, the majoritarian systems of the UK and France (at least in the presidential elections) and the consequent formation of a clear executive is an asset in foreign policy, even at the European level. The latters in fact, also due to their colonial legacy and thanks to a constitutional organization designed to grant decisional centralization in Foreign Policy, are advantaged in European inter-governmental bargaining in the field. The institutionalization of a CFSP has created a competitive arena in which it is essential for member states to affirm and project national interests and this has in turn favoured those who have rationalized their decisional structures. Indeed, at the European level, the Lisbon Treaty has institutionalized a double constitution that, as a Ianus Bifront, prescribes different decisional processes for different fields. Hence the issues upon which there is most consent due to a lack of cleavages hindering the formation of common interests are decided with a supranational method. On the contrary, the issues that fall under a domain in which every state fears that its interests will not be represented as such interests are in contrasts with those of the other members, are agreed upon with the consent of all. It is not a case that in Foreign Policy pre-eminence is given to the Council instead of the Commission, thus favouring a decision making process based on negotiations in which there is not a ultimate decision unit able to take final decisions that must be respected. This is not to assess that in economic fields and in those dealt with through the communitarian method there are never opposite interests, but that foreign policy issues that entail a higher level of cooperation suffer from deeper differences of conception of the EU itself.

Autonomy as well relates to the domain of what concretely is a competence of the European Union and which acts do not belong to that domain. By autonomy we will indicate the ability to take decisions through separate institutions, and not necessarily the complete detachment from member state’s interests. Such issue presents controversies as it could be argued that, being foreign policy at the EU level discussed in an intergovernmental nature, Europe does not display a full autonomy. However we shall not confuse the decision making process with autonomy, as by the latter we indicate the ability of the EU to pursue a policy once it has been approved. It is self evident that the more supranational the
method of decision, the more autonomy the Union has as a whole. Nonetheless autonomy also refers to the legal and material capability to pursue a policy that member states alone would not collectively do. Autonomy and authority are hence entwined but separate.

Finally, together with the issues of role perception, legitimacy, authority and autonomy, to be an actor an entity must possess capabilities to pursue its own policies. Indeed even having legal autonomy from its members, external recognition and the authority to take decisions, an actor can have an impact only if it holds the capabilities to do so. The latters include material assets like funds and personnel, operational assets like headquarters, institutions and the capability to actually implement a policy, together with less structural aspects like expertise. One major problem related to the the capabilities of the EU as such is that they rely on those provided by the member states. Moreover due partially to an incomplete rearrangement to respond new challenges and to a series of impediments, and to the difficulties arisen in conflicting strategic interests, merely one-tenth of the EU armed forces is actually deployable. In fact the Member States exercise political control over CSDP missions and operations through the PSC, as well as giving strategic direction to the latters. The existence of divergences and the incapability of some Member States to participate in CSDP missions should not hinder per sé military action. What is at stake is not that all members participate all missions; rather the problem is the direct obstruction for specific interests that hamper political cooperation in vital interests of the EU.

In the occurrence of the Libyan case, if Europe as a whole was agreeing on the condemnation of Qaddhāfi actions and shared common interests, they could have found an arrangement under CSDP even with some Member States not actively providing capabilities. The implementation of UNSCR 1973 under a Franco-British aegis would not have obliged all to take part, coherently with the coalition of the willing principle. Nevertheless the Council has never authorized a CSDP military mission but only a civilian one that needed the previous request of the UN for its activation. Even though European Institutions have progressively stressed the importance of the enhancement of the EU capabilities particularly to improve rapid response in crisis, the process is still slow moving. The lingering powerlessness to resolutely lessen persistent capability gaps is not only rooted in an actual scarcity of financial resources and on the unwillingness of member states to commit to tangible improvements, but is partially linked to the consciousness of the EU that it might rely on US assets for the most demanding operations, including the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). The issue of intelligence is particularly relevant, as it constitutes a field in which the EU has most difficulties, also linked to the absence of a unitary European ISR service. The reluctance of members to provide and train personnel and the lack of clarity of objectives, spanning from long-term goals to mere visibility
ones, worsen the situation. Also on the civilian side the main impediments to the recruitment of civilian personnel are the tendency of member states to employ resources on the military than on the civil, building nearly a sense of path dependency, and the fact that CCM institutions have been constructed “almost from scratch” at both the EU and national level. Particularly rules on issues like regulations and institutions for registration, training and then organizing of civilian personnel were only recently settled, and not even in all countries. In the case under analysis shortage of personnel and of resources like permanent OHQs, combined with the unwillingness to pool them together, have made once again the intervention of NATO necessary. Consequently the EU, even if legally autonomous and entitled to deploy operations through its separate structures, is still too dependent on the assets of member states and of other international actors.

The Libyan crisis has constituted the litmus test for the institutional development of European capabilities to respond to crisis that had its roots in St. Malo and that had culminated with the Treaty of Lisbon. The debates over the role of the EU and the progresses made to strengthen the ability of the Union to pursue autonomous missions, perceived as legitimate by the international community have been verified with the crisis in Libya. The EU has indeed managed to be perceived as legitimate and its contributions have been, even with initial reluctance, welcomed by the US and NATO that have started to feel the need for burden sharing in reaching stability. Nevertheless, in order to discuss wether the EU has been a coherent actor in solving the Libyan crisis, one must preliminarily set the time and field limits of this research. In accordance with the principles set by the Treaty of Lisbon on the purposes and tools of the EU external action, the Union has developed instruments to cope with complex crisis that are formed by several phases. In fact the crisis cycle is understood by the EU institutions to be composed by early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building instruments to help countries achieve a long-term development. This work will be focused primarily on the crisis management and response and will not cope with the initial conflict prevention tools, nor will it be able to give detailed qualitative evaluation of the peace-building process. The attitude towards the EU external action, particularly in the crisis response field, has been guided by the so-called “comprehensive approach”, meaning that the EU employs several tools from the military to the civilian to relate to a crisis.

The outcome of the previously mentioned limits and approach in Foreign Policy, has been a policy that has lacked coherence at the majority of its levels. In fact we have deconstructed the issue of coherence into four levels: institutional, horizontal, vertical and multilateral and have proceeded in assessing each one of them separately. This first level of coherence is the Institutional, which entail the
extent to which the European institutions manage to produce a common policy without being in contradiction with each other. Horizontal Coherence, refers to the consistency of various EU crisis management policies and the synergy among them. We will refer to consistency as to a first step lack of contradiction whereas to coherence Secondly Institutional coherence is about the interaction among the various institutions that, entwined, deal with the crisis. Vertical coherence copes with the extent to which the member states adopt policies that are both consistent with and desirably reinforcing the EU level policy. Finally Multilateral coherence refers to the level of coordination with other relevant international actors like the AU, NATO, and the UN and denotes the coherence of the EU’s response. All of the four above mentioned levels of coherence require both a basic consistency and a deeper mutually reinforcing cooperation. The first level, coping with institutional coherence, has shown the difficulties of cooperating in a highly fragmented institutional arrangement and the incomplete path towards providing the Union with one voice in its External Relations. Indeed, as outlined in the paragraph on the Lisbon Treaty, the absence of a single authority in Foreign Policy has made the process of reaching a unite position valid for all the institutions more complex. Nevertheless it could be argued that in the occurrence of the Libyan crisis some institutions were not yet consolidated. Moreover, the newly institutionalized High Representative had been entitled of such an amount of tasks to make his/her job extremely hard.

Horizontal coherence instead has been the least problematic, as the EU has achieved a basic degree of consistency of goals to pursue, understood as absence of contradiction, even though a second step synergetic approach has lacked in crucial fields like peace building. Overall, the horizontal level was the one in which the European Union has proven to be more coherent. In fact the policies discussed and implemented were in line with each other and were planned to respond to the main problems caused by the crisis: from migration to the humanitarian aids, to the evacuation of European citizens et al. Nevertheless in spite of the consistency of such policies difficulties have arisen in the immigration issue, as argued in the paragraph on vertical coherence. Also a comprehensive peace-building strategy has been only partial, as like in the past it was proposed the promotion of rule of law through the “more for more” mechanism and did not manage to effectively create a sustainable environment in Libya, as the most recent events have tragically shown.

Thirdly, Vertical coherence copes with the extent to which the member states adopt policies that are both consistent with and desirably reinforcing the EU level policy. Overall the major incongruities have occurred at the vertical level, with member states highly disagreeing on problem framing and consequently on approached proposed, and on the multilateral one, where Europe has failed in boosting
coordination with other IOs. The analysis of such level of coherence has shown how the member states have diverged not only on the nature of the intervention, but primarily on the problem framing, step that is regarded as essential to the formulation of a comprehensive strategy by the EU institutions. Diverging on objectives to pursue has hindered the formulation of a coherent policy and of a joint decision, as a military intervention was conducted outside the domain of CSDP. This aspect is of particular significance, as it implicitly suggests that the issue of Libya was not perceived as a threat by all the member states, which hence did not homogeneously provide logistic support for the operation. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this study on vertical coherence is that the positions of the member states towards Libya have reflected their role-conception of Europe. We are not comprehensively judging the policies of the at the time twenty-seven member states and understanding whether they were in accordance with their role conceptions of Europe. Nevertheless a tendency can be noted for the traditionally pro-NATO member states to be in opposition to a European military intervention, maintaining that only the UN and NATO could call upon a no-fly zone in the area (like the CEECs).

Finally multilateral coherence refers to the coherence of the EU’s response with those of other international actors (such as the African Union, NATO and the UN). In sum the crisis in Libya has shown the extent to which the attempt to transpose decision-making at the European Level has not been fully a success, since the most relevant decisions have been taken from the capitals of member states and not in Brussels. International initiatives like the Contact Group have undoubtedly pursued political cooperation, but such coordination has seemed to be more programmatic than really proactive, as countries followed autonomous policies in the approach towards the crisis. As a proof to this is the fact that only eight of the NATO members have participated the intervention and this is a symptom of a wider lack of lack of shared interests. Divergence over perceived threats and the absence of a common ground strategic culture has hindered the formulation of a common policy at the EU level and has confirmed a new tendency inside NATO. Indeed if decisions are taken at the national level the inclination to prefer temporary “coalitions of the willing” can be expected to be reiterated in the future. Nonconformity in the perception of strategic interests and threats, as well as on the use of force and the circumstances in which it can (or should) be deployed risks creating blocks inside the same IO or inside the EU itself. If on the one hand this leaves more autonomy to the national state that is not forced to cede a part of its sovereignty on foreign policy issues, on the other hand it obstructs coherent, comprehensive responses. The outcome of the crisis has had a different impact for NATO and the EU. If for the latter the Libyan crisis has been considered the failed test of the Lisbon Treaty, for NATO
Libya has been a success.

In conclusion it can be underlined that, as underlined by the former HR and the former Commissioner for External Relations themselves, Javier Solana and the Chris Patten, a common political will is essential in managing crisis and in overcoming lack of coherence inside the legally and bureaucratically uneven European foreign and security policy system. Moreover Europe has shown how the process through the development of CSDP tools was not shared unanimously. The fact that CSDP tools were not seriously considered in the deployment of a military mission shows how divergences are not only on the policy level, but instead on the role conception of the EU as such. These factors, combined with a lack of multilateral coordination with other IOs, have denoted that the EU has only partially proven its actorness in the Libyan crisis. Many have blamed the Institutions and the Treaties for the failure of a unitary Europe in Libya, but this would mean hiding behind a vague anti-European sentiment instead of looking at the responsibilities of member states. It is true that the nature of European Institutions and its decision-making mechanisms have made it difficult to join a common and coherent policy, but those institutions have been modelled on the interests of member states themselves. If the latters are not intentioned to completely pool resources and to cede a part of their sovereignty in Foreign Policy to a supranational authority, then the EU as such will not progress forward in the ability to “speak with one voice”. Bridging suspicions and divergences is a challenge that must be addressed in order to better respond to future emergencies. Finally the Libyan crisis has confirmed once again what Europe knew already: nobody will protect our vital interests for us. The decision of the USA to lead from behind and its disinclination in assuming responsibilities in the European backyard have requested more leadership from the part of the EU, at the very least in what it considers its Neighbourhood. Whether the European Union will find its path to take, unite, this challenge is yet to be verified.