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**COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, THEORIES AND APPLICATION: A CASE
STUDY ON US ADMINISTRATION AND LIBYA**

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Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz once said: “War is a continuation of politics by other means”. The art of politics and war are deeply connected and conflicts are often considered a consequence of bad political choices. However, in order to avoid such wars and conflicts, a series of political and diplomatic strategies able to set some rules in the interactions between states have been developed. Since I have started writing this thesis, the knowledges I have acquired made me more aware of the meaning of Clausewitz’s sentence. The purpose of this essay, in fact, is to explore the attractive strategy of coercive diplomacy in all its peculiarities and application. I took the decision to write a bachelor thesis on coercive diplomacy since it is very linked to politics and diplomacy and it needs some astuteness, intelligence and a bit of luck too. It can be applied to many circumstances such a situation of conflict to stop military aggression, in a deal between two countries, or to stop the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. It has started to be used during the period of the Cold War, since Europe was devastated and needed a rebuilding from every point of view. The two superpowers, United States and Russia, started to make agreements and deals about the acquisition of territories and first discussions started to be raised. Coercive diplomacy has been a useful tool after 1945 and nowadays it remains as such. As I will make clear throughout the chapters, coercive diplomacy is a low-cost strategy, but it can reach high results when it succeeds. Nonetheless, when it fails it can become very costly and the consequences can lead to unforeseen conditions. This interesting art includes the use of threats or, in more extreme cases, the use of force. However, this choice varies depending on the case.

This thesis is composed by three chapters. In the first chapter I will analyse the scenario in which coercive diplomacy has developed and I will describe the main theories of coercive diplomacy, together with an in depth analysis of the concept of coercion. The chapter will explain the preconditions to reach success, which unfortunately in some circumstances may not be considered very likely. For this reason, I will describe some famous cases of success and failure, but also cases of ambiguity since the definition of coercive diplomacy cannot be restricted to the binary condition of victory and loss.

In order to deeply understand the concept of coercive diplomacy and how the sticks and carrots game plays, the second chapter will focus on the famous set of interactions between Libya and United States. The second chapter will take into consideration the difficult case of Libya and the coercive process that United States has started in the country since 1970s to the year of WMD disarmament in 2003

and to the Arab Spring with Qaddafi's defeat in 2011. Libya, for more than forty years, has been ruled by a leader called Muammar Qaddafi who took the control of the country. During the first American administration, Libya has experienced a period of fortune and President Reagan was not able to undermine the position of Qaddafi in front of the international community. As a matter of fact, the Libyan leader started to develop some nuclear capabilities and Libya was found involved in many terrorist attacks. When in 1990s the Bush and Clinton administration took the presidency, the situation overturned and there was a shift from a regime change to a policy change, which went in favour of United States. That was the start of a strong coercive process for US and Qaddafi's weaknesses started to arise. However, Qaddafi was still denying about his involvement in actions of terrorism, even if the proofs were pretty evident. Due to a series of sanctions that US was imposing on the country, the economic situation of Libya started to decline. After many threats and impositions, Qaddafi decided to accept the WMD disarmament in 2003 and Libya started its long path of reconstruction. At the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, United States and NATO started a mission to overthrow Qaddafi's regime which was oppressing the population every day more. A no-fly zone has been established by the Security Council and after few months, on October 2011, Qaddafi died and at least one part of the mission was considered concluded a few days later.

Lastly, the third chapter will examine the reasons why the application of coercive diplomacy is in general hard, especially in some circumstances. The Libyan case, for instance, has underlined both the weaknesses and strengths of United States and this demonstrate how coercive diplomacy can be classified as a tough measure to be used. The second section of the chapter will focus its attention on the connection between coercive diplomacy and terrorism. This seductive strategy has been employed in the fight against terrorism many times, starting from Libya, however even if it can be a useful tool it finds many obstacles developed by terrorism and I will discuss some of these.

First chapter: a coercive diplomacy overview

1.1 The changing global context of coercive diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy is an attractive strategy used in diplomatic circumstances by international actors, especially in difficult or ambiguous situations. It is useful to reach a specific objective and it is important since it is able to shape the relations between countries. It has experienced a long historical path starting from the end of the Second World War in 1945, in which the Western world and the international community were devastated by the conflicts and they were all conscious about the tough task of rebuilding the integrity of European states. By the start of the Cold War, the main task of Western states was surely to avoid a great-power war between the two superpower blocs (United States and Russia). The two tried in fact to prevent the worst-case scenario, however there was still a strong risk that a local armed conflict could have been escalated into a nuclear war. On the one hand, Western allies were trying to deter the Soviet Union from attack the Western territories and cause a series of conflicts, but on the other hand, the Western mission started to be dissolved because of the collapse of Communism and of the Soviet Union. It was replaced, instead, by the fight against the development of some difficulties such as mass violation of human rights in the borders of sovereign states, internal wars in failing states and the possibility by a number of states and non-state actors to acquire and use weapon of mass destruction (WMD). This kind of scenario in the years following 1945, built the principal Post-Cold War objective and challenge to coerce, persuade and, sometimes, even force states to change their behaviour and act in a more peaceful intent. This led also to the increase of interests by the Western countries to use force and threats in order to reach political objectives and make advantages of their own benefits. It is not surprising that, for this reason, the favourable geopolitical and social context characterized by the military superiority and strength of Western states should be perceived as the beginning of coercive diplomacy as a strategy. Since then, the use of coercive diplomacy was employed many times, but a better understanding of the strategy and its aspects is required in order to explain the difficulty and potentiality of this hard-to-use strategy.¹ This is the initial scenario in which coercive diplomacy developed its peculiarities, however, since that moment many other cases occurred and the chapter will analyse some of them describing their outcome of success or failure.

¹ Jakobsen P.V. (2013), *Coercive Diplomacy*, Contemporary Security Studies (Chapter 17), edited by Collins A., Oxford University Press

1.2 What is coercive diplomacy? Theories and definitions

In the fifty years passed since the publication of Thomas Schelling's book "Arms and Influence", many definitions of coercion have been developed. The proliferation of definitions led to confusion in terminology and this seems pretty evident due to the development of various terms such as coercive diplomacy, military coercion, compellence, strategic coercion and deterrence. Nevertheless, authors generally agree on what is the basic idea of coercion: the use of threats to influence another's behaviour. In any case, the qualities imputed to the coercive process may differ using three different measures: the types of threats that coercion implies, the role of the use of force as compared to the threat of the use of force in coercion, and who are the actors involved in the process. As it has been established above, coercion is the use of threats to influence another's behaviour, however the actors may prefer to choose compliance rather than escalation to the use of force (i.e. by brute force).² Coercive diplomacy seeks to resolve crises and armed conflicts short of full-scale war. It is intended as the use of threats and limited force with the main aim to influence an adversary to stop or undo the consequences of actions already undertaken. The use of these threats and limited force are called "sticks" and may be associated with the use of inducements called "carrots" used to enhance the incentives of the adversary to comply with the coercer's demands. If compliance is not caused by the concern of the coercer's stick, then coercion does not take place. As a matter of fact, the stick has still to induce fear in the adversary in order to properly employ the strategy and identify it as coercive diplomacy.³

For what it concerns the difference between deterrence and compellence, many discussions and doubts have been raised. Brute force is characterized by two basic forms: offense and defence. At the same time, strategic coercion is represented by deterrence and compellence. Deterrence refers to the objective to persuade the adversary to not undertake an action. If he decides to act anyway, the punishments then occur. It is not easy to understand when deterrence succeeds or when other measures help the process. Deterrence is a "waiting game" and it is conservative since it protects the status quo. On the other side, compellence pushes the opponent to change its behaviour. Compellence starts with a demand of action and pressure that continue until the adversary decides to comply. However, there are three kinds of compellence: 1) persuading to stop short of goal; 2) release the action, such as withdrawing from a land; 3) policy change through government change. Distinct from

² Bratton P. C. (2005), *When is coercion successful? And why we can't agree on it?*, Naval War College Review, Retrieved from: <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/4e9e93e3-50b9-4fe9-b6e8-c7aca4218a9b/When-Is-Coercion-Successful--And-Why-Can-t-We-Agre.aspx>

³ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

deterrence, compellence is an active strategy and it does not protect the status quo but tries to change it.⁴

Notwithstanding, these two strategies are identified as the two sides of the same coin with an intertwined empirical nature. The paragraph will take the Joint-but-Opposite approach as a guide to analyse the distinction between compellence and deterrence. The policy of containment at the end of 1940s legitimized the use of deterrence, but the Cold War and the fall of the “iron curtain” recognised the important role of compellence. The approach recalls the first interpretation of deterrence and compellence made by Thomas Schelling, in which he classifies deterrence as “a threat intended to make an adversary to do something”, and compellence as “a threat intended to keep him from starting something”. The first strategy, deterrence, is static and it sets the stage by demanding inaction and consequently waiting for the target’s movement. The second strategy, instead, demands a specific time to be set with a fixed deadline. In Schelling’s opinion, the issuing of a threat is enough for deterrence, while both the threat and the use of force is important for compellence. Moreover, during 1970s, Paul Lauren provided a further definition of these two tactics. He focused his attention on the US foreign policy which preferred the use of deterrence, and for those who opted, instead, for the risks of compellence. He stated that both strategies use threats to affect the future decisions of the adversary and make him understand that they have the capability to inflict damages, however the real intention is not to harm the target. In this sense, Lauren (and Alexander George too) believed that compellence and deterrence have more similarities in common than expected. Furthermore, Walter Peterson in 1986, analysed some hypothesized dissimilarities between the two strategies. The deterrence theory specifies that: threats of a compellence nature are more likely to escalate in conflicts; it is so much easier to compel an adversary rather than deter him; to compel someone is a more dangerous and imprudent activity; and the compelled targets have an advantage over the coercer. Peterson believed that the first remark is considered as true if threats are established under specific conditions, the second statement is limited and the third and fourth explanations are completely false.⁵

⁴ Slantchev B.L. (2005), *Introduction to International Relations, Lecture 8: Deterrence and Compellence*, University of California, San Diego, Retrieved from: <http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps12/08-deterrence-and-compellence.pdf>

⁵ Sperandei M. (2006), *Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: an alternative approach to the study of coercive diplomacy*, International Study Reviews, Volume 8, Issue 2, Retrieved from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2006.00573.x/abstract;jsessionid=185B54330F1285441B7FED2512CE4BB3.f01t02?userAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=>

Nonetheless, many others researchers and authors have had different opinions about the issue. The table below shows the two opposite views about the inclusion of compellence and deterrence in the concept of coercion.

Theories	Authors
Coercion is different from compellence and deterrence.	Alexander George; Janice Gross Stein; Ropert Pape
Threat-based strategies as compellence, blackmail and deterrence are types of coercion.	Thomas Schelling; Daniel Ellsberg; Wallace Thies, Lawrence Freedman; Daniel Byman; Matthew Waxman

Table 1:1 Compellence and deterrence⁶

However, even if both Schelling and Freedman include other threat-based strategies as blackmail, compellence and deterrence in their umbrella concept of strategic coercion, they must be distinguished clearly. Following the Oxford English Dictionary, blackmail is defined as any payment extorted by making pressure on the adversary and intimidating him with the use of threats.⁷ Blackmail is basically similar to coercive diplomacy but it differs in the fact that the coercer takes the first step in order to coerce the opponent to abandon something valuable to him. Furthermore, compellence and deterrence are merely two types of coercive threats. Compellence is considered another term for coercive diplomacy, but it comprises both the reactive use of threats and limited force taken in response of actions by adversaries (coercive diplomacy), but also the pro-active use of threats and limited force with the aim of initiate adversary action (blackmail).⁸ In a hypothetical context where a state is coerced to cease a part of its territory, it would count as compellence and blackmail rather than coercive diplomacy since the latter comprises only conditions in which the adversary has advanced the first step. The main difference between coercive diplomacy and deterrence is deeply rooted in the reactive nature that distinguish the two strategies. For what it concerns deterrence, in the words of Robert Art “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening” and it represents the key scenario of Western allies during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The strategy consisted in threatening to respond to a hypothetical Soviet attack by using nuclear weapons,

⁶ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

⁷ Darden K.A. (2001), *Blackmail as a tool of state domination: Ukraine under Kuchma*, East European Constitutional Review

⁸ Freedman L. (1998), *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and cases*, Oxford University Press

so that it could sound convincing to the Soviet bloc that an attack to the Western world would have been too costly. However, generally if the deterrent fails in his objective, the coercer may have three possibilities: 1) Threaten the use of force to convince the adversary; 2) Stop the attack or to use the limited force; 3) Use the full-scale and brute force to obtain the enemy's withdraw. Nonetheless, it is extremely important to underline that the use of brute force does not count as coercive diplomacy, especially because since the very first beginning this strategy has been employed to avoid the use of force and it does not aim to defeat the adversary.⁹

1.3 Understanding the concept of coercion

Coercion is a type of strategy which aims to reach its goal through a series of threat of violence and negotiated outcomes, however its main objective is not to destroy the adversary. Most of the coercion theories are based on rational decision-makers and in order to understand the dynamics of the coercive process, the prospect theory can help to reach the aim. The prospect theory is a theory of bounded rationality which is particularly helpful for modelling behaviour in coercion. It seems difficult to explain, but it is possible to describe the concept in four main ways. The first method is related to reference points and risk propensity. The reference point is the status quo and it means that people care about where their evaluation of the outcome starts. The reference point has a fundamental importance to people and it is also able to value the risk propensity of the decision maker. The second factor of the prospect theory is the loss aversion, which is useful to analyse the gains and losses of the coercive process. The third axiom, instead, comprises the concept of framing which occur when decision-makers choose reference points on the basis of additional factors outside the decision and this may cause a change of behaviour. For instance, people are more willing to buy a specific product if they know everyone would buy it. The last factor of the prospect theory is decision weighting. It explains that probabilities, depending on their actual "size", are weighted differently. However, people are more inclined to give more weight to small probabilities, underweight the moderate probabilities and overweight the most secure probability. At the end of the process, decision-makers can connect all these factors and can start a framing phase by evaluating the problem and reference points and then move to an evaluation phase in which he can engage risk behaviour and decision weights. Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky developed the meta-theory (or prospect decision process) in order to approach complications in two main ways: 1) edit and look at a way to find the elements of a specific decision to form a problem set; 2) classify the problem set considering the risk propensity and decision weight.¹⁰ This generalization can be useful to provide a further overview of the coercive

⁹ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

¹⁰ Kimminau J.A. (1998), *The Psychology of coercion: merging airpower and prospect theory*, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/kimminau_ja.pdf

process. The concept of reference point is fundamental since it entails the status quo without being restricted to its rules. Generally, the reference point is not normalized by a state immediately after the loss of a territory, for instance. The general concept is that coercive diplomacy tends to succeed if the target looks at it in terms of domain of gains and is asking for an effort to improve its position. Conversely, it is less likely to succeed if the target's view is focused on the domain of losses.¹¹

Furthermore, Jack Levy wrote a book analysing the theories set in Alexander George's books *The limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (1971) and *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (1974). He believed that George's classification of coercive diplomacy applies not only to aggressors but also to defenders and that, most of the times, coercive diplomacy succeeds the more it attempts to make a positive change in the status quo. To make a concrete example regarding the use of coercive diplomacy to enhance the status quo in an actor's favour, Levy describes the case of Hitler's strategy of encroachments against Britain and France's interests in the 1930s. During the period of the crisis over the Rhineland and the invasion of Poland, Hitler clearly expected a series of demands, characterized by use of force and by tacit or explicit ultimatum. Each of Hitler's demands were clear, specific and aimed at reach his goals, but still avoiding an unwanted war (at least in the first years of 1930s) and exploiting the enemy's fear of escalation to war. Each demand was political and astute and looked at minimize the defender's motivation to resist and with a series of verbal assurance tried to increment it ("This is my last territorial demand in Europe"). On the other side, the coercing states was willing to make compromises when necessary, for example, in response to the British threat to go to war if Czechoslovakia was threatened. In terms of tactics, Alexander George has specified in many books a number of "variants" of coercive diplomacy: the full-fledged ultimatum, for instance, includes a demand and a time limit for compliance and in case of noncompliance a credible threat of punishment. Moreover, if this kind of strategy comprises an implicit form of any of these elements, it is indicated as a tacit ultimatum. Another variant can be the "try and see approach" in which a demand is formulated without the explicit threat or time limit and involves a gradual threat rather than step-level increase in pressure. All these variants are used to foster the flexibility of the coercive strategy.¹²

In addition, it is a general belief that compellence is more difficult than deterrence, because the latter requires that target states maintain the status quo, while compellence includes a change in behaviour which can result precious in terms of domestic and international legitimacy. As a matter of fact, coercion is established only when the adversary accepts the coercion's demand. Coercion, then depends on two main factors: credibility and persuasiveness. The former aspect is based on whether

¹¹ Levy J.S. (2008), *Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: A contribution of Alexander George*, Political Psychology, the enduring legacy of Alexander L. George, Vol. 29, No. 4, Retrieved from: The enduring legacy of Alexander George

¹² *Ibidem*

the target believes that the threat will persist and be executed and depends on the reputation of the coercer. Persuasiveness, on the other hand, refers to the capacity to threaten a damage on something the adversary considers as great value. Threats may be both credible and persuasive, but they can also be one just one of that. For instance, in the case of the use of nuclear weapons, the threat may result very persuasive but not credible due to the high costs of using WMD¹³.

Furthermore, three different schools represent much of the coercion literature depending on the role assigned to the use of force: coercion through diplomacy separate from the use of force; coercion exercised through the use of force; and coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force. The first school of thought believes that coercion starts even before “the first bomb is dropped”, in the sense that as soon as the use of force begins coercion has already failed in avoiding the conflict. In this school’s opinion, coercion becomes the outcome produced by sending clear signals to the target through the use of diplomatic strategies and techniques to send clear and direct threats to the adversaries. Coercive diplomacy then, tries to enhance the diplomatic and political nature of this type of coercion. The second school, as Karl Mueller analyses, sees coercion as a process taking place during the use of force or the use of sticks. Coercion applies in order to convince the target to comply with the coercer’s demand, but trying to avoid the destruction of the military force of the enemy. A notable example of military coercion can be identified in the 1945 American air and naval campaign against Japan, which led the country to surrender before the invasion and conquest of it. At the same time, the European air campaign failed the coercion against Germany. However, given the intensity of the conflicts, a tough task of this school sometimes is to perceive the distinction between coercion and brute force.¹⁴ Finally, the third school refers to the strong similarities between coercion and the use of force. There is no proper distinction between coercion without force and coercion only through use of force. In the idea of Schelling, the use of force represents the developing of a threat and for this reason, coercion may include both diplomatic techniques and the actual use of force.¹⁵

Furthermore, the lack of a shared definition of coercion leads to confusion. If many criteria and definitions exists, conclusions of when coercion is successful or not may differ. For instance, many authors believe that the use of coercive diplomacy excludes the use of force, but according to coercive military strategy the use of force does not lead to a clear success for coercion. A concrete example may be the 1990-1991 Gulf War saw as the result of different conceptual structures: some scholars indicate the Gulf War as the failure of compellence since the coalition’s aim was to force Iraq to leave

¹³ Bratton P.C., see p.4

¹⁴ Mueller K.P. (1998), *Strategies of coercion: Denial, Punishment and the future of air power*, Security Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3

¹⁵ Bratton P.C., see p.4

the territory of Kuwait without involving the use of force. Notwithstanding, compellence has clearly failed because Iraq refuse to withdraw the military force from Kuwait. Notwithstanding, other scholars believe that the Gulf War represents an excellent example of success for coercive air strategy since US used its military force to persuade Baghdad to leave Kuwait without penetrating the territory of Iraq.¹⁶

In addition, in terms of purpose, coercive diplomacy can be divided between defensive and offensive strategy. For defensive strategy it is meant forcing the opponent to reverse the objective of the plan that he has already begun, while the main purpose of offensive strategy is to force the adversary to give up what he already possesses.¹⁷

1.4 How to reach success

The key for success in coercive diplomacy depends on the cost of non-compliance that can be imposed on a state and the advantages of compliance that can be offered together with the ability to combine sticks and carrots in respect to three main criteria: proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility. The proportionality criteria focuses on the relationship between scope and origin of plans and the leverage being applied in that. However, in current policy, proportionality may lead to some problems such as the extraordinary stakes associated with the call for the regime change in the target state rather than policy change, meaning that coercing has a high degree of difficulty in a state's policy. Nevertheless, the policy or regime change differentiation still remain a proportionality threshold. Reciprocity instead comprises a strong understanding and a linkage between the coercer's carrots and the addressed' concessions. This relationship is built in a pretty long period of time but if the target is unsure, it may change its mind and ask for the return of concession. This aspect shows the important equilibrium of the exchanges that have to be built gradually and with high caution. Finally, coercive credibility is, in my opinion, the most fundamental criteria. It means that the target is aware that if a refusal to cooperate will be presented, serious consequences will arise. Credibility is acquired within a process of reciprocity and trust and, for instance, having a superior military force or a strong economic position is never enough. However, all the three elements of this strategy are more likely

¹⁶ Pape R.A. (1996), *Bombing to Win: Air power and coercion in war*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell University Press

¹⁷ Joshi S. (2006), *The practice of Coercive Diplomacy in the Post-9/11 Period*, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Retrieved from: <http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/10430/1/SharadJoshiDisstDec06.pdf>

to be achieved with the support of other international players.¹⁸ Furthermore, for an effective credibility, both determination and ability to harm must be present¹⁹.

As a matter of fact, coercive diplomacy succeeds when the communication of a threat or the use of limited force produces an adversary compliance with the coercer's demands. In addition to the three criteria discussed above, four factors complicate this task. The first factor regards many studies of coercive diplomacy that used to define coercive diplomacy in: either it fails or it succeed. However, it should be seen more as a question of degree. Coercive diplomacy is a kind of bargaining process which resolve conflicts short of full-scale war and usually requires compromises by both parties. A related second problem may be compliance that needs to be caused by fear to take place. To make an example, the case of Kosovo represents this concept, in fact Serbian's compliance would not have been possible without the intervention of NATO in the air campaign. In this case, the stick is not required to be sufficient and the question to add is whether it has been a contributing factor. The key is whether the threat of use of force has been used to produce compliance in association with other variables such economic sanctions, confidence-building measures, positive inducements and diplomatic isolation. The third factor is that the price of success must be calculated against the degree of coercion. Usually, coercion should not be applied to solve any disputes. However, if the threshold from persuasion to coercion is crossed, the degree of success is negatively linked with the amount of coercion in order to use compliance with the adversary. Moreover, when the threshold between limited and brute force is overcame, this means that coercive diplomacy has failed since it is used in order to avoid it.²⁰ Lastly, the forth factor is important to distinguish tactical/temporary and strategic/lasting success. Tactical/temporary success often belongs to the Western use of coercion which involves a series of uncertain coercive diplomacy exchanges followed by new acts of non-compliance. For instance, the Western use of coercion in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 represents the case at best. Seven major coercive diplomacy exchanges have been involved in Bosnia but three of them are considered of tactical/temporary success: 1) Bosnian Serbs acts of aggression; 2) threat of use of force by Western powers; 3) the response of Bosnians Serbs to the threats.²¹ However, from a strategic view they cannot properly be considered case of success since compliance did not last for long. This underlines that tactical success may be achieved by threats and use of limited force but it

¹⁸ Jentleson B. (2006), *Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World*, The Stanley Foundation, Policy Analysis Brief, Retrieved from: <http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06CoerDip.pdf>

¹⁹ Joshi S., see p.10

²⁰ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

²¹ Jakobsen P.V. (1998), *Western use of Coercive diplomacy after the Cold War: A challenge for theory and Practice*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press

needs to be followed by a further diplomatic effort. In this way, coercive diplomacy resulting from the use of threats and sanctions is depicted as cheap success but from the use of limited force is defined as costly.

Nonetheless, Robert J. Art in his book *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (2003), examines George's eight preconditions of success. However, they do not assure the realization of the case: 1) transparency of the objectives to be reached; 2) a coercing state who firmly accepts the demands; 3) support on the domestic and international side; 4) strong coercer authority; 5) the terms of settlements must be precise and clear; 6) the coercer should develop a sense of urgency in the mind of the adversary; 7) the target should be worried about the possibility of an unacceptable escalation; 8) imbalance in the coercer's motivations. All these elements are considered fundamental in order to reach the goal. Motivation, clarity, support and strength are the right ingredients for success, but the situation can still vary from one case to another. Moreover, the last two elements explain that the target state must feel the fear of escalation provoked by the coercer, for punishment or for denial, and the consequences of it must be unavoidable. If the adversary does not perceive the level of costs that will derive from an escalation, he will not feel any motivation to comply with the demands. Furthermore, the coercive process would have more probability to fail if the coercer is less motivated to achieve its goals than the adversary's belief strength to resist to threats. As George states, indeed, "the outcome of coercive diplomacy is extremely sensitive to the relative motivations of the two sides."²²

1.5 Famous cases of success and failures

In the international arena, it is possible to analyse many cases regarding coercive diplomacy and the outcomes of the strategy may be restricted to a binary definition of success and failure. However, there are some limitations with this approach since it does not evaluate the degree of success and how costly it has been, in terms of losses.²³ For these reasons, coercive diplomacy had never really failed or succeeded but its effects are located between the two. The chapter will analyse and describe some famous cases of success, failure and ambiguity so to show how coercive diplomacy can react differently depending on the circumstances.

²² Art R.J. (2003), *Coercive Diplomacy: What do we know?*, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Chapter 9), United States Institute of Peace Press

²³ Motwani N. (2012), *The relevance of coercive diplomacy despite its mixed results*, Burgmann Journal I

1.5.1 Kosovo

When in spring 1998, violence finally broke out in Kosovo the Serbian forces responded to the armed bid of independence demanded by KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) with an excessive use of force. In the meantime, NATO threatened to undertake air strikes in 1998 if the Serbian forces would have withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo. The kind of threat that NATO launched was undermined by Russian opposition to the use of force and so the credibility has been weakened. Few months later, in October 1998 the implementation of the coercive process meeting the requirements of the “ideal policy” led to the deployment of two thousand observers in Kosovo. In order to induce the Serbians to comply, NATO postponed its deadline twice and the underlying sources of conflicts were not addressed. By the time, a series of fights resulted in peace negotiations, but the failure of these resulted in a NATO ultimatum demanding the Serbian signature of the proposed peace agreement or an air campaign would have start. The agreement gave to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization access to all of Serbia, leading to a deployment of a huge NATO force in the territory. However, at that time the context was not close to success especially because Russia and China were against the use of force and compelled NATO to attack without a proper UN mandate. Furthermore, US had publicly eliminated the use of ground forces in Kosovo. For these reasons, Milosevic decided to reject the peace agreement and fight for a better one and later succeeded in doing so²⁴. Between March and June 1999, NATO’s “Operation Allied Force” took the decision to bomb selected targets in Yugoslavia in order to force the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to stop any kind of hostility against Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. Seventy-eight days of aerial bombing campaign had been established and achieved its result, even if only partially. NATO won the war, but it was not that easy to achieve as it has planned.²⁵ But how is it possible to explain Serbian compliance after seventy-eight days of bombing? The final agreement affirmed Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the NATO forces deployed in Kosovo had a UN mandate and the further participation of Russia. Moreover, three factors pushed Milosevic to comply with the final agreement: 1) NATO’s ability to escalate its bombing campaign and maintain its strength; 2) a credible threat of a ground invasion if the bombing failed; 3) loss of Russian participation. These three elements showed that the principles of the “ideal policy” had been achieved²⁶.

At this point, it is important to underline the main reasons why NATO’s intervention received only a partial-success. The participation of NATO and mainly of US began with a series of miscalculations

²⁴ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

²⁵ Motwani N., see p.12

²⁶ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

and mistakes and it was not a coherent strategy from the first time. The first explanation is that in the first air campaign of twelve-day bombardment in 1995, NATO expected the quick cessation of Milosevic troops. However, the restriction of the use of force in the air campaign causes the diminish of the value of the threat delivered to Milosevic's government. A second cause may be that US administration excluded the use of ground forces giving more power to Milosevic and prolonged the duration of the war. Third, the air bombardment allowed Serbians to continue their hostilities against Kosovar Albanians since it was concentrated only on limited targets, and it further reduced Milosevic's cost of non-compliance. A fourth reason involves the US action without an UN mandate and showed a weaker coalition of states. Lastly, a series of disagreement among US policy makers and international players interrupted the ideas on how to respond to Milosevic's government non-compliance. After the seventy-eight day of heavy bombing Milosevic accepted the peace agreement and claimed victory even if defeated. Practically, NATO won the war and succeeded in the withdraw of Milosevic's troops from Kosovo but it was still a partial success. To recap again, the main aim of NATO's campaign was to give protection to the Kosovar Albanians attacked by Milosevic, however it has been clearly transformed into an aerial bombardment. The bombing did not protect people oppressed, instead it gave more time to Milosevic's government to aggravate his actions for seventy-eight days more. In addition, the US-led NATO campaign lacked of an agreement about sending ground forces and prolonged the war since it displayed the coercer's cost threshold against which the target was able to adjust its own cost-benefits. Moreover, there was a severe separation between an air bombing campaign without ground forces and a lack of domestic support that could have been able to enlarge NATO's participation among member countries. The last consideration is that the errors made by NATO about Kosovo not only consequently developed in an under-appreciation of the target's cost threshold, but even challenged the performance of air campaign as a coercive agent, influencing NATO's own costs. Notwithstanding, the partial-success that NATO received and the compliance by Milosevic paved the way for KFOR (Kosovo force) to enter the country and start a NATO's peacekeeping mission with the main aim to "maintain a safe and secure environment". Today, it is possible to say that the complication of success has mainly be that Milosevic was able to pursue its violence on the territory of Kosovo for about eleven weeks even though the main objective of the mission was to avoid any form of violence.²⁷

Furthermore, the conflict Kosovo demonstrated and showed again the guiding role of the US, both for its diplomatic and military means, both for the unsuitability that Europe showed in the first part of the war. During the Kosovo air campaign, American war planes flew 80 per cent of the 10,484

²⁷ Motwani N., see p.12

strike missions and supplied the 90 per cent of the command. NATO's Kosovo force has been identified as the immediate scenery to the new Strategic Concept in which out-of-area operations were codified.²⁸ Today, Kosovo thanks to NATO is certainly a better place to live, and as the first President of the Independent Kosovo Hashim Taci declared, after the NATO's force entered in Kosovo, a great victory was conquered and it represented the freedom for tyranny and oppression.²⁹ In addition, the Kosovo war also generated a new Eurocentric security framework, known as the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This has also helped to solve part of the inter-institutional tensions of the well-known EU-NATO uneasiness.³⁰ Following Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, the Alliance continued to maintain its presence on the basis of the UNSC Resolution and it is still operating in the area. NATO helped to introduce a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force and progress in the European Union dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has been reached. The key to solve the political dilemma over Northern Kosovo is to find a way for the normalisation of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo.³¹

1.5.2 Afghanistan

After the 9/11 shocking attack to the Twin towers, the US government arrived to the conclusion that Al Qaeda and its head Osama bin Laden were the mind who planned it. Washington then decided to capture Osama bin Laden from his base in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, where he was able to plan the 9/11 plot in isolation. The coercive process by the US government consisted in exercising pressure on the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. It was carried out for almost thirty days, but the Taliban refused to give him up. For this reason, the US military forces launched air strikes with a ground campaign in collaboration with the Northern Alliance. The Taliban was defeated and an interim government controlled by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Kabul has been established. During the coercion period, US military forces were still prepared to attack the Taliban but this did not mean that US forces would have attacked even if the Taliban had conformed with the demands of United States. A credible reason of why the troops were still in the region was to fully ensure Taliban's compliance without alternatives. But why the demands proposed to the Taliban were not accepted? In 2001, there

²⁸ Østerud Ø., Toje A. (2013), *Strategy, Risk and Threat perception in NATO*, NATO's European Allies (Chapter 5), edited by Matlary J.H., Petersson M., Palgrave Macmillan

²⁹ AA.VV. (2008), *Kosovo, non solo Balcani*, LIMES, Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso, rivista n.2

³⁰ Østerud Ø, Toje A. p.15

³¹ NATO (November 2015), *NATO's role in Kosovo*, Retrieved from:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm, Last access: 15/06/2016

was a sort of ambiguity over the US agenda of regime change in Afghanistan which led to many misunderstandings.³²

The Afghanistan case is interesting because it shows the limitations of coercing a target with a contradicted belief system and it is a clear example of coercion of a state sponsor of terrorism. Moreover, it may be considered a curious case since who is responsible for the provocation (Osama bin Laden) is distinct from the target of coercion (Taliban) and asymmetry of motivations during the coercive process was not in favour of US. Usually, the more important the stakes of one side, the higher the probability to coerce or resist to coercion. US government's demands were decided according to the ultimatum variant of coercive diplomacy which comprises three steps: 1) a demand; 2) a time limit or a clear sense of urgency; 3) credibility of the threat of punishment. Washington did not announce a clear time limit but the sense of urgency was evident, however this may lead to different risk of failures. The first risk is that a target might decide that accomplish to demands is considered immoral and shameful. The second is that even if the target is afraid of the risk of the degree of threat, it may still prefer to go to war and not accept demands. Lastly, the target may try to decrease threats by accepting some of the demands. Reaching the capture of Osama bin Laden by US was probably not enough; then this is why objectives did not combine with coercive results as it is shown in the table below.

US Objectives	Coercive diplomacy result
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ambiguous/mixed signals by US - No reassurances - US military strategy would have led to gains for Northern Alliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Taliban convinced that ultimate US objectives was change of regime - Asymmetry of motivation tilted in Taliban's favour

Table 1:2³³ American objectives and coercive results.

This case study shows that coercive diplomacy may be a concrete risk to not undermine and it is important to act cautiously.

1.5.3 China

China represents one of the ambiguous cases in coercive diplomacy, meaning that it is difficult to classify as either a success or a failure and it seems to be interesting in this sense. Deterrence and compellence have been well intertwined during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the disputes between

³² Joshi S., see p.10

³³ Joshi S. (2006), *The practice of Coercive Diplomacy in the post-9/11 Period*, Table 5: Taliban cases-objectives p.132, University of Pittsburgh

the two arose when the role of deterrence started to diminish. Few months after, China started to apply coercive diplomacy against Taiwan and United States. The main objective of China was to stop Taiwan from undertaking the way of independence and prevent United States from giving some support to the country. At that point, the United States decided to send two aircrafts carrier battle groups to enforce its role in the international community and protect Taiwan and the other East Asian allies. United States' plan can be considered as compellent since it decided to respond with force to force, so to push for a peaceful resolution for both parties. The role of United States aimed to enforce deterrence and it was a clear answer to China's coercive diplomacy and, for this reason, it is considered difficult and ambiguous. After the 1996 US attack in the Taiwan Strait, in fact, China did not respond again with the use of force against Taiwan, probably because China's actions already provoked a change in Taiwan's behaviour. Moreover, US was trying to avoid wrong steps and put pressure on Taiwan that could have provoked another escalation of force and the use of coercive diplomacy by China. Given all these considerations, it is not possible to find out if the actions undertaken by United States were the real reasons which led to the final result.³⁴

These three cases, together with many others, show how coercive diplomacy can be a useful tool for states in several circumstances, but at the same time it can lead to unavoidable consequences. The sticks and carrots game can be risky and sometimes to know the rules of coercion is not enough.

³⁴ Art R.J., see p.12

Second chapter: US administration and Libya

2.1 Libya and US: pre 9/11 context

In order to deeply understand the concept of coercive diplomacy and how states can play the game of sticks and carrots, I am going to take into consideration and describe in details the long relationship between United States of America and Libya. Analysing the turbulent case of Libya and the coercive process that US has applied on it may not seem an easy task, since the interactions between the two started around 1970s and they have always been hard to manage. However, in order to understand the reasons why US decided to start a coercive process on Libya and the motivations of the giving up of the latter in 2003, it is considered of fundamental importance to throw back to the years before the attack of 9/11 and examine the main events which led to the construction of this hard relationship. Libya has been engaged in nuclear programs and involved in many terrorist attacks in the years before 9/11 and the chapter will describe it deeply. This part of the thesis will highlight the main events and considerations between US and Libya dividing it into three main macro periods.

2.2 First period: 1969-1989

The first period was represented by a diplomatic breach which took place after Qaddafi's rise to power and it was defined by the imposition of many sanctions and restrictions. However, it is important to briefly describe the situation in the Libyan state in the period from 1969. Muammar Qaddafi was a colonel who led the Free Officer's Movement in 1969 and established the Revolutionary Command Office (RCC), declaring the Republic. He soon became the leader of the country and created a government characterized by anti-Soviet and anti-Western ideals.³⁵ Since 1960s, many Arab countries started to face a period of reconstruction after years of colonialism and a path to reach independence began. The wave of revolution arrived in Libya with the rise to power of Colonel Qaddafi³⁶ and, in 1970s, he closed US and British military bases and decided to expel Italian and Jewish Libyans from the country. He was very conservative and against the innovations expressed throughout the Arab world by the Western thought, for this reason he restored traditional Islamic

³⁵ Calabrese J. A. (2004), *Carrots or sticks? Libya and US effort to influence rogue states*. Strategic Insight, Volume III, Centre for Contemporary Conflict, Retrieved from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/ccc_calabrese_nov04.pdf

³⁶ Corrao F. (2015), *Islam, Religione e Politica*, LUISS University Press, p. 121

laws, such as prohibition of alcohol and speculation. Moreover, his idea to unify the Arab world increased the relations with other countries, such as Egypt.³⁷

At the same time, on the other side of the world, by 1973, the Nixon administration in US applied restrictions on arm sales to Libya and during the Carter's administration United States decided to establish partial economic sanctions on the country. Since 1979, the United States had imposed sanctions and used air forces against Libya during several occasions and, in February 1980, Carter took the strong decision to close the US embassy in Tripoli.³⁸ The closure of the embassy occurred due to a series of previous dramatic events. In 1979, in fact, a group of Iranian students took more than sixty American as hostages in Teheran due to difficult interactions between the two countries. The hostage crisis and the Iranian seizure of the US embassy led to the suspension of the formal diplomatic relations. The Libyan leader, at the same time, insisted for the release of the hostages and offered his help to President Carter. Nonetheless, in the first days of December, the US embassy was burnt during a Libyan solidarity mob with Iran and after few days, US depicted Libya as "sponsor of terrorism". Finally, on May 1980, the decision to close the embassy occurred.³⁹

Few years later, during the 1980s, Libya tried to pursue a nuclear weapons program and found all the materials and technologies aimed at reaching this goal, including: gas centrifuge technology, two mass spectrometers and modular uranium conversion facility.⁴⁰ The efforts brought about concrete results and in 1988 Libya succeeded in the completion of the Rabta Plant and in the development of other weapons of mass destruction. During that period, Libya has been also engaged in several terroristic plans, for instance the 1985 breakdown of the Achille Lauro cruise ship (which will be discussed later through the paragraph), but also the 1985 attacks to Vienna and Rome's airports. During that difficult and delicate moment of the history, it was clear that US political strategy was trying to comprise different kinds of coercion towards Libya, characterized by an economic, diplomatic and military nature. The 1980s was the time for a new administration to govern United States and President Reagan not only took the presidency, but he has also been deeply involved in the events of the delicate Libyan case.⁴¹ From the first days of April 1986, a series of antiterrorist missions with a bombing raid against Tripoli and Benghazi occurred and, during the years, many

³⁷ History, 1969 *Qaddafi leads coup in Libya*, Retrieved from: <http://www.history.com>this-day-in-history/qaddafi-leads-coup-in-libya>, Last access: 15/6/2016

³⁸ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A. (2005-06), *Who won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy debate and its implications for theory and policy*, International Security Policy, Volume 30, Retrieved from: <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47>

³⁹ US Department of State, *US-Libyan Relations 1786-2006: A Narrative Summary*, Retrieved from: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/ci/ly/109175.htm>, Last access: 15/6/16

⁴⁰ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁴¹ *Ibidem*

other operations of this nature started to be pursued. United States began to be a special target for Libya and Qaddafi was found connected to many of the happened incidents, such as the Achille Lauro case in 1985. The case started on October 10 when an Egyptian aircraft has been intercepted by US and forced to land at the NATO base in Sicily. The reason why it was forced to land was that four of the passengers were Palestinian citizens who surrendered and escaped after they took as hostages 400 people for many days on the cruise ship “Achille Lauro”. The US, which found the criminals, acted in order to prevent them from escape their trial.⁴² The cruise ship case, however, caused many discussions and polemics between US, Italy and Egypt and many judges were not sure about the original plan designated for the ship. Palestine seemed the main country involved, however Vincenzo Parisi, the director of the civilian intelligence agency, did not truly believed to the hypothesis that the operation was carried out just by Palestine. As a matter of fact, during the trial, many considerations arose and Libya seemed to be engaged in the case together with Syria, since their main objective was to weaken the Western authority and power.⁴³ Moreover, many unconfirmed plans of the leader regarding the possibility to assassinate President Reagan have been found out during that same period. However, even if Reagan became the US President in the middle of the Libyan turmoil, he succeeded and found a way to plan a strategy to manage Qaddafi and his unpredictability.⁴⁴ For instance, one of the first sanctions that he imposed regarded the 1982 embargo on crude oil imports from Libya, which in 1985 has been expanded to refined petroleum products. Furthermore, numerous show-of-force conflicts took place in the Gulf of Sidra, which led to the bombing campaign by the US against military facilities, terrorist camps and Qaddafi's family compound in 1986 in retaliation to the Berlin attack. However, US forces did not have the power to attack Qaddafi due to some prohibitions stated in the US law, especially the illegal action to assassinate foreign leaders. Theoretically, the US main objective was policy change in Libya, but it was later demonstrated during the US policy actions against the Libyan leader that the purpose of the Reagan administration was instead a radical regime change. In 1984, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that no operations short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall would have caused any powerful and enduring change in Libyan policies. Moreover, the CIA director of that time was extremely aware of the President's intention to overthrow the regime in the territory⁴⁵.

⁴² Gooding G.V. (1987), *Fighting terrorism in 1980s: The interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers*, Retrieved from: <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/yjil12&div=11&id=&page=>

⁴³ Suro R. (July 1986), *Achille Lauro case stirs new disputes*, New York Times, Retrieved from: <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/06/world/achille-lauro-case-stirs-new-dispute.html>, Last access: 14/06/16

⁴⁴ Jentleson B.W. (1991), *The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining more than remarking governments*, Political Science Quarterly, Vol 106, No. 01, pp.57-82, Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152174?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

⁴⁵ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

On April, 14, 1986, thirty-three American attack bombers assaulted some military installation in the cities of Benghazi and Tripoli, main urban areas in Libya. The President addressed the nation, calling his decision to attack a matter of self-defence in response of the behaviour of Libya and of the many attacks inflicted again United States in the last period. Following the statement by the Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, the act of bombing Libya was a necessary reaction in order to destroy Libya's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks against US and Europe. For this reason, on April 21st 1986, United States, France and Great Britain decided to exercise their veto power and block a resolution against the illegitimate act pursued by United States, explaining instead that it was an acceptable action carried by America and a direct consequence to the wrong policy of Libya.⁴⁶ As a matter of fact, by April 1986, several bombing attacks had been launched against Libya but after all the damage and losses it did not appear to be a strong coercive strategy, because it did not impact the country enough as US was hoping. Libya was resisting to attacks, and Qaddafi too and between 1987 and 1989 Libya was considered one of the most active sponsor of terrorism.⁴⁷

In the following years, Reagan underlined in many statements his policy of isolation towards Libya and invited the other countries to support his ideas. Moreover, he declared that he strongly believed that in order to combat terrorism international support and cooperation was fundamental and unavoidable, promising to act with harder measures and take further steps if that would have not been enough⁴⁸. Regarding the nuclear problem, the strategies of President Reagan had some positive effects, however in early 1990 some intelligence reports declared that the Rabta Plant was in limited production and Libya had a limited chemical weapon capacity. The CIA agency expressed "no course of action short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall will bring any significant or enduring change in Libyan policies."⁴⁹ Despite all the efforts of US to stop Libya in its run over the control of nuclear weapons and terrorism, the country still continued to pursue its plan and be unbeaten.

Before proceeding with the description and analysis of the next period, the chapter will consider the main reasons of failure of the Reagan administration: what sort of motivation can justify it? The first reason of failure is connected to the quality of the Reagan administration considered most of the time too unbalanced. The idea to stop Libya's goals was concrete and possible, but the means were limited and weak. Even if Reagan's motivations included a regime change, instead of a policy change as

⁴⁶ Turndorf D. (1988), *The US Raid on Libya: A Forceful Response to terrorism*, Retrieved from: <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bjil14&div=12&id=&page=>

⁴⁷ Wariner W.F. (1988), *The Unilateral use of coercion under International Law: A legal Analysis of the United States Raid on Libya on April, 1986*, Naval Law Review, Retrieved from:

<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/naval37&div=5&id=&page=>

⁴⁸ Calabrese J.A., see p.18

⁴⁹ Jentleson B.W., see p.20

declared in April 1986, the availability of instruments used by US were not enough. The Western Allies tried to prevent the failure and helped with limited support for sanction at a military level. Moreover, the economic and political conditions in Libya favoured Qaddafi in rejecting American coercive pressure. For instance, the 1986 air strike campaign intensified the role of the leader, instead of weakened it. Another relevant factor to take into consideration is the presence of revolutionary committees which were created by Qaddafi to strengthen the role of the Libyan population in the mobilization process, and they were from the very first time considered as a strong political tool. They provided support for many organizations involved in violent and revolutionary changes in other countries and they were considered a viable mean to radicalize the same foreign policy that President Reagan was hardly trying to overthrow and repress. Furthermore, in 1986 a series of information part of the US plan had been revealed, which included a plot against Qaddafi and plans for its resignation. The disclosure led to a scandal and the diminish of public support for the US policy, and the situation went in favour of Qaddafi who wanted to stay in office and pursue its mandate at any costs, even if his intentions were not of peaceful at all. Finally, even if the many economic sanctions imposed by US were affecting Libyan economy, it has been still able to maintain the oil production at OPEC quota level and Qaddafi succeeded in controlling the economic level using a mix of internal repression and mobilization. The approach used by the Reagan administration resulted as not enough diplomatic and too much coercive⁵⁰.

During his administration, Reagan adopted many strategies in order to identify the adversary and act in a pre-emptive way so to weaken him. He tried to depict the Libyan state as “sponsor of terrorism” in front of the international community and designated Muammar Qaddafi with many characteristics of stereotypical terrorist leader, calling him “the mad dog of Middle East”⁵¹ and depicting him as a barbarian. He believed that Qaddafi was a dishonest person, especially because he continued to deny its terrorist involvement in the attacks against United States and Europe. For these reasons, Reagan justified his pre-emptive use of force against the Libyan state, such as in the attack of 1986. However, working hard to solve conflicts and tensions with the country was not enough and many implications occurred.⁵²

2.3 Second period: 1989-1998

A second phase of the relationship between US and Libya goes between 1989 and 1998. In the first years of 1990s the willingness of Libya to take part to nuclear programs and have the control of WMD

⁵⁰ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁵¹ Winkler C. (2007), *Parallels in Pre-emptive War Rhetoric: Reagan on Libya; Bush 43 on Iraq*, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Michigan State University Press, Volume 10, Number 2, Retrieved from: <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/218557>

⁵² *Ibidem*

highly increased. Many events showed this strong desire by the country and in October 1991 Libya received nuclear materials from a German company. Few years later, in fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that in 1995 Libya, guided by Qaddafi, took the decision to renovate its nuclear program with the main intention to obtain the access to Soviet nuclear weapons, instruments and technologies. During those years, Qaddafi tried to take advantage of the delicate moment caused by the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the Libyan leader attempted to recruit scientists from South Africa for assistance during the nuclear process he wanted to start. At the international level, Libya maintained its role as sponsor of terrorism, however its support decreased considerably. Regionally, Qaddafi opted for a plan of cooperation and less sabotage, and he compromised a reconciliation with Egypt and joined the Arab Maghreb Union. In addition, Qaddafi undertook a pacification process with Sudan and Chad, but American hostilities still very present.⁵³

However, in the 1990s a significant policy shift toward Libya finally took place. The coercive diplomacy strategy adopted during the 1990s was considered more balanced in the sense of credibility and proportionality. As a matter of fact, in proportionality terms, during the first years of his mandate Bush kept Reagan's intention to overthrow the leader Qaddafi, but he seemed convinced to shift from a regime change to a policy change perspective. Moreover, in 1991 Bush decided to suspend the operation against Qaddafi. On the credibility side, however, the threat of force against the use of weapons of mass destruction was fundamental. Qaddafi claimed that a fire had destroyed the Rabta plant because he was afraid of the Bush administration reaction to that, but what he declared was not true even if the production of the plant was suspended for a period. In addition, the coercive credibility increased due to the implementation of many sanctions.⁵⁴

Moreover, despite the policy change of Libya, the Pan Am case was never forgotten. On December 21st 1988, the Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, a city in Scotland. Unfortunately, on board there were 259 American passengers. Furthermore, in 1989 the French outliner UTA flight 772 exploded over Niger killing all passengers and crew. Soon after the explosion, these two cases raised many debates but US and Europe intelligence found out that the operations were constructed by two Libyan intelligence agents. In November 1991, US, Britain and France stated that a declaration addressing Libya, explaining the urgent need to surrender for trial who planned the attacks, disclose all the information about the case, allow access to any document, accept responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials and pay compensations. The three countries tried to make Libya comply with the demands and at the end of March 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 748

⁵³ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁵⁴ Rose G. (1999), *Trans-Atlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe and problem countries*, edited by Haas R.N., Washington D.C., Brookings Institution

which called for sanctions on Libya. The hidden purpose of the sanctions by US was to diminish Qaddafi's power both in case of compliance with UN sanctions, both in case of non-compliance which would have consequently caused domestic turmoil in Libya. However, the purpose to isolate Muammar Qaddafi did not succeed and in 1993 US, Britain and France threatened to increase sanctions on Libya in case of perpetuation of non-compliance. United Nations decided to apply further restrictions to the country which were not implemented in order to weaken the economy, but the idea was to obtain a psychological impact on the population. Despite the many sanctions imposed by UN, the threats announced by US and other European countries, Qaddafi remained calm and determined, continuing to follow his path of non-compliance.⁵⁵

The Lockerbie, however, was different from the other attacks. The victims were not only Americans, but also Europeans and this lead to a formation of an ally between the Western world and US. In particular, United States and United Kingdom decided to treat the bombing attack as a crime to be judged under their domestic law and Libya was committed under an international law process. Due to the reputation of sponsor of terrorism obtained in the last years, Libya's guiltiness seemed more real than ever. United States and UK tried to convince Libya to admit its responsibility and pay appropriate compensation to the victims' families. Sanctions tried to isolate the leader Qaddafi and succeeded in producing some changes, but they did not really undermine the supremacy of Libya under the regime.⁵⁶ Moreover, a study on the effects of the sanctions revealed that the arms embargo has been somehow beneficial to the country, in the sense that it protected Libyan economy and prevented Qaddafi from wasting resources in the area. In addition, France joined the two countries and accused Libya for responsibility for the French UTA Flight 772 which went down over Chad in 1989 and they all decided to present their demands to the United Nations Security Council. The Pan Am Flight 103 case demonstrated that the bombing attack by US in 1986 did not lead to the expected result. Indeed, it may have even been a direct consequence of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing.⁵⁷

As a matter of fact, Libyan economic conditions changed considerably and the coercive pressure by US started to be more efficient. The economic instability increased in the early 1990s and Libya's gross domestic product dropped 30 percent in 1993. Unemployment rate reached 30 percent and inflation was higher than ever, about 50 percent in 1994. Economic instability started to cause a political discontent among the population and the military and Qaddafi tried in many ways to lift the country up again. However, he found many obstacles such as political problems with tribal and

⁵⁵ Rose G., see p.23

⁵⁶ Schwartz J.B. (2007), *Dealing with a "Rogue" State: The Libya Precedent*, The American Journal of International Law, Vol.101, No. 03

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*

opposition groups and many coup attempts occurred between 1991 and 1994. Qaddafi tried to resist to any kind of discontent, but the Islamist opposition started to complain about his government. Qaddafi had always believed to have built the first contemporary Islamist State and he also attempted to replace some part of the Sharia Law. The Islamic group considered his intentions as shameful and a serious threat to the traditional role of the Islamic clerics and jurists. Moreover, the Libyan leader created a conflictual relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist groups and, for this reason, many anti-government attacks against the Qaddafi regime took place by the mid-1990s. Qaddafi, however, was concerned about the Al-Qaida group which was highly dissatisfied about his government. At the end of 1998, Qaddafi seemed to show the first signs of weakness and the coercive strategy of United States was stronger day by day. Libya's economy and politics was in the right direction to be affected by US coercive diplomacy.⁵⁸

2.4 Third period: 1999-2003

American proof of change was evident during the speech of the Deputy Secretary of State Ronald E. Neumann at the Middle East Institute in 1999. Neumann recognised the effort of Libya of improving its view against terrorism and, in his opinion, the reintegration of the country in the international arena would have continued with or without the consent of the Americans and the Europeans if Libya would have increased its willingness to be involved in terrorist acts. The speech made by Neumann expressed many concerns by the international community, in the sense that it underlined the Libyan anti-American approach. Moreover, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction would have dangerously threatened US since its policy's aim was to force the abandonment of Libya's nuclear programme. Over the years since 1999, many American officials continued to recognise the changes in Libya's behaviour. Sanctions started to be efficient in the war against terrorism, and US started to believe that Qaddafi was considering to accept the demands. On the other side, Libya still covered its role of "sponsor of terrorism" and US was trying to rehabilitate the state creating a better image of it at the international level. On the economic side, Libya was putting an effort to increase the import and exports of the country and invited foreign businesses to open the trade. As foreign companies started to negotiate again with Libya, the US wanted to promote its interests over the area and challenge the European competitors.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁵⁹ Zoubir Y.H. (2011), *The United States and Libya: the limits of coercive diplomacy*, The Journal of North African Studies, Volume 16, Issue 2, Retrieved from:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629387.2011.572623#.V1_gIvmLTIU

Few years later, on December 19, 2003 Qaddafi made a surprising announcement: the full WMD disarmament. It was basically what United States waited for thirty years after a difficult diplomatic path, many intelligence programs, analysis and coercive strategies. The government of Muammar Qaddafi agreed to allow verifications on weapons and accept with an agreement to dismantle the weapons of mass destruction and restrict the range of its missiles to no more than 300 km (186 miles). The British broadcaster BBC reported in the same day a statement by the Libyan Foreign Ministry who believed that Libya's arms race would never secure the country and contradicted the idea of the Libyan government expressing concern about the equilibrium of international peace and security. President George W. Bush was satisfied after nine months of secret negotiations and a longer history of interactions between the two and express himself defining the Qaddafi's decision as the right the right way "to make the world and America a safe place, and the world more peaceful".⁶⁰

But why Muammar Qaddafi, the leader of a country called "sponsor of terrorism", accept the demands in 2003? Qaddafi started to feel the fear of his own safety by the spring 2003, and he started to develop the idea to change the nuclear program. However, Libya has always denied to possess a nuclear and chemical programs. After months of secret agreements with US, the Libyan leader was still convinced to deny any personal nuclear and chemical programs. In October 2003, US and other countries working on Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) found a shipment of nuclear equipment bound for Libya in the Mediterranean in the Italian port of Taranto. Qaddafi was publicly caught and he could not deny anymore. However, Libyans opted for another strategy. Qaddafi provided additional information about the chemical programs and missiles and still continued to deny to have projected any nuclear plan. It was a detailed work to analyse, but unfortunately nothing concrete was found to accuse Libya. Notwithstanding, in November 2003 Libya, US and Britain met again to discuss the issue, but it was clear to them that Qaddafi was trying to withhold sources and information about the nuclear program. US and Britain tried to damage him showing more evidences of the facts: they knew Qaddafi had purchased a centrifuge facility and he could not deny longer.⁶¹

Intelligence estimated that by 2007 Libya could have reached the capacity to build a nuclear warhead. However, time by time, Libya changed its behaviour on terrorism and in 1999 expelled the Abu Nidal organization from the country. The 2002 State Department Global Terrorism recognised the efforts of Qaddafi to denounce form of terrorism after the attacks to the Twin Towers in 2001.⁶² Moreover,

⁶⁰ BBC, *Libya gives up chemical weapons*, Retrieved from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/19/newsid_4002000/4002441.stm, Last access: 15/06/16

⁶¹ Tobey W. (December 2014), *A message from Tripoli: how Libya gave up its WMD*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 2014, Retrieved from: <http://thebulletin.org/message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834>, Last access: 13/06/16

⁶² Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

citing again the Lockerbie case and remembering the troubles of 1998, Qaddafi took the decision to find an agreement in August 2003 which included the payment of 2.3 million \$ to the victims' relatives. This was considered a direct consequence of coercive diplomacy's pressure. From Qaddafi's point of view, the decision to accept the payment of compensation went in his favour and as the Foreign Minister Muhammad Abdul Rahman Shalgam observed "the issue was not compensation, but the purchase of annulment of the sanctions". Libya's main purpose was to rehabilitate its reputation and get away from isolation of the previous years. The trade-off reached from this decision had its first signs in 2004 when Bush permitted US to conduct business and invest in Libya and a series of sanctions have been revoked. All the choices taken by Libya until 2003 may be described as the consequence of years of coercive diplomacy strategy and of coercer's carrots and target's concessions'. The coercive process was intensified by the change in US administration, moving from the idea of regime change by Reagan, to a policy change with Bush and Clinton which was concentrated on three main topics: terrorism, the Lockerbie case and WMD.⁶³

Many researchers have asked themselves if success just a matter of luck for the United States. The timing of December 19 2003, in fact, may rise some doubts since few days before US captured Saddam Hussein and the war in Iraq had started few months before. Qaddafi has been pushed by the diplomatic credibility of US in that time period, since the American policy seemed very efficient and strong. The Libyan leader was sure about the determination of the Bush administration and he believed to be the next on the list. The 2003 negotiations found success because of many factors and because the use of carrots, sticks and assurance has been employed in a mutually reinforcing manner. The case of Libya is unique, because it was characterized by different events, factors and policy changes that explains and influenced the behaviour of Qaddafi to not comply at an earlier stage and take the decision of disarmament in 2003.⁶⁴

The incentives that Qaddafi received were of different nature. As a matter of fact, two non-military factors need to be take into consideration. Sanctions by the UN, for instance, represent a crucial point on the relation between the two states. They were the right instrument able to strengthen the image of US and they provided a strong economic impact on the territory and a greater legitimacy.⁶⁵ The decline of oil prices incremented unemployment and socioeconomic obstacles, also leading to the Islamist opposition.⁶⁶ The other incentive was the intelligence ability in the Lockerbie case, as it was able to shift suspicious from Iran and Syria to Libya and found out the guilty party. However,

⁶³ Zoubir Y.H., see p.25

⁶⁴ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

⁶⁵ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁶⁶ Zoubir Y.H., see p.25

sanctions and intelligence ability alone do not explain the reasons for success. As a matter of fact, the intention to move from a regime change to a policy change allowed the observance of proportionality between ends and means and it was the right strategy to pursue. Another relevant motivation of success is connected to the ability of the “sticks and carrots” game, which established a strong reciprocity between offers and concessions. However, reciprocity did not always follow the right direction and was suspended different times (as in 2000 during the presidential campaign), but it was still considered balanced enough. After all the decades spent applying coercion, it was clear to Washington that the only way to obtain a compliance has been to push for a policy change through coercive strategies and the use of many incentives.⁶⁷ The domestic condition of Libya, however, may also be related to the US coercive process success. The Libyan economic market situation was critical and needed aids from the United States oil companies. The technologies used in the country, in fact, were based on US policies and the infrastructure energy was built by American firms. Moreover, Qaddafi wasted a lot of money financing some revolutionary organizations and movements around the world, but that amount of money could have been used to restore the economic market of the country. The solution left for Libya was to start trading with Western countries again.⁶⁸

For what it concerns security in the country, it is important to not underestimate the role that the cooperation between Libya and US against Al Qaeda has created. This relation, in fact, made Libya a safer country because it started to be aligned with countries that were once considered as enemies. Even before the 9/11, Qaddafi started to cooperate and offered his help to US officials to fight the Al Qaeda cells in the North African area. After the 1996 attempt to assassinate Qaddafi by the militant Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Libya started to be at war with the terrorist organization since Qaddafi believed that it was involved in the LIFG plot. Qaddafi was convinced that, through his behaviour, he could have acquired US defence from Al Qaeda. As a matter of fact, US was smart enough to create strong motivations for Libya as incentives to comply, granting the right concessions and satisfying the leader’s interests. Moreover, further elements strengthen the idea that the disarmament occurred for security reasons triggered by Iraq War in 2003. Iraq war, in some sense, shaped the attitude of Libya. Libya expressed the willingness of disarmament in the 1990s, and in 1997 the Clinton Administration came to an agreement to destroy Libya’s nuclear weapons. Later on in 1999, Libya wanted to give up the nuclear program during secret negotiations with US. Few years later, the US overturned Saddam Hussein’s regime and Libya decided to discuss again about the disarmament. Finally, in March 2003 Bush and Qaddafi discussed with Britain an agreement to

⁶⁷ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁶⁸ Boucek C. (April 2004), *Libya's return to the Fold?*, Foreign Policy in Focus, Retrieved from: http://fpif.org/libyas_return_to_the_fold/, Last access: 15/06/2016

negotiate the disarmament plan. However, the capture of Saddam Hussein was not sure at that time and this chronology of the events weaken the idea that the decision took by Qaddafi came out due to Saddam Hussein's defeat. Going beyond the Iraq argument, Qaddafi might have also been convinced that closer relations to US would have led to diminish more dangerous threats and gain security. Qaddafi tried to calculate the potential revenue received from lifting the US and UN sanction to be spent in Libya's oil industry. On the one hand, Qaddafi seemed motivated by the idea of secure the country and comply with US demands, while on the other hand, he believed that economic sanctions needed to be eliminated in order to reach a higher independence and more freedom of the country. Qaddafi's desire was to show to the world that the disarmament was an international endeavour, conducted through multilateral institutions, but at the same time he wanted to distort the image of Libya complying to US demands.⁶⁹

Analysing the difficult and long path issue by Libya and US from 1970s to 2003 it is possible to reach some conclusions. The US addressed Libya as "a sponsor of terror turned to example partner" suggested other states to follow Libya's example, since in Bush opinion weapons of mass destructions do not bring prestige to states but only isolation from the rest of the world.⁷⁰ As Jentleson and Whytock have clearly explained in "*Who won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy debate and its implications for theory and policy*" (2005-06), the Libyan case underlines the importance of the coercer state strategy that balances credible coercion with the three criteria issue by the two authors: proportionality, coercive credibility and reciprocity. The use of positive and right incentives and assurances in the coercive process game allow the opponent state to opt for compliance with a series of demands. Moreover, they highlighted the relevance of the proportionality between what the state asks for and what is offered to the counterpart. In fact, the more a state claims, the more it has to offer to the adversary to convince it. Bush and Clinton made the difficult but right choice to move from a regime to a policy change. In Jentleson and Whytock's opinion, in fact, the regime change threats are likely to fail because the adversary does not receive concessions or enough incentives to comply and this is why with the new US administrations changed Libya's behaviour day by day. In their idea, the right way to act depends on the strengths and limitations of each case that need to be considered in details to find the best direction.⁷¹

Another relevant factor regards the target state vulnerability which depends on the domestic political and economic conditions of the country. During the first period of interactions between Libya and

⁶⁹ Hochman D. (2006), *Rehabilitating a rogue: Libya's WMD Reversal and Lessons for US policy*, Retrieved from: <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/06spring/hochman.pdf>

⁷⁰ Zoubir Y.H., see p.25

⁷¹ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

US, it is evident that Reagan was not able to fulfil his strategy probably because Libya was not vulnerable on the domestic side as much as it believed. The economic situation of Libya was in danger, but not enough to cause a crisis throughout the country and Reagan was not able to inflict the right punishment and costs. Moreover, in the first years Qaddafi was able enough to contain domestic opposition through a form of internal mobilization and repression of any kind of rebellion. During the second period, from 1989 to 1998, the Bush-Clinton administration was able to turn over the relationship with Libya and obtain more result than Reagan did, for instance because of some progress of the Pan Am case. However, Libya still felt the strong desire to possess nuclear and chemical programs, but the development of a right proportionality and coercive credibility strategy allowed both Bush and Clinton to push Libya to pursue the right direction to the disarmament in 2003. However, the most important and crucial element which determined the shaping in Libya's behaviour was the shift from a regime change with President Reagan to a policy change. In fact, through the multilateralization of sanctions by US and UN Security Council, the coercive credibility of United States begun to increase and it has been strengthened. The economic condition in Libya started to worsen due to the falling of world oil prices and due to the multilateral sanctions which restricted import and exports of the country. During that period, Al Qaida was becoming in opposition with Qaddafi's ideas and behaviour. The Islamist foundation, on the other side, was not satisfied about the way the leader was ruling the country and how he was trying to replace the Sharia Law and the Koran itself. Finally, during the third period between 1999 and 2003, the Bush-Clinton administration succeeded and was balanced enough to obtain an improvement for the Lockerbie case and the payment of compensations for the victims' families. The disarmament of Libya and the weapon of mass destruction agreement was the major victory for Bush and United States, even if came out of a long and difficult journey. The coercive diplomatic success was finally obtained.⁷²

However, Libya did not only become the coercive state and Qaddafi clearly acted in favour of his own interests since he necessarily needed the technology and investments furnished by US to improve the oil and gas sector and the only possible way to obtain it was to eliminate the multilateral sanctions. US was the only nation able to rehabilitate the image of Libya and introduce the state into the international community again. United States wanted to change the policy of the country and Qaddafi, step by step, allowed that. His main purpose was to stay in power as long as possible and probably the idea of putting pressure on a regime change (as Reagan did) would have been counterproductive to a policy change because the probability of finding obstacles would have been higher. Usually, the regime change can produce some results, but in the vulnerable case of Libya it could have produced

⁷² Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

the worst scenario. Rogue states like Libya, in Jentleson and Whytock's opinion, needs to know that the coercer is convinced about not accepting any negotiation but the coercer, on the other side, needs also to pay attention in doing so because it could be risky. For instance, keeping the possibility to move again towards a regime change can be the right incentive for enhancing coercive pressure. Another decisive element that permitted the probability of success in the case US-Libya was multilateral support. The cooperation between US and Europe, but also with UN Security Council (and the sanctions emanated) made US acquire a higher credibility and a stronger condition of success. For all these reasons, Libya can be considered a great but painful case of success of the United States of America's coercive diplomacy.⁷³

2.5 Consequences: Libya in the post WMD era

After the agreement with the disarmament in 2003, Qaddafi and his government believed that in the short-run the decision would have resulted in a series of positive changes and a different approach from United States but also from Europe. Qaddafi's son Sayf Al-Islam, in fact, during an interview expressed the idea that United States of America has "committed itself to defend us", and he expected that a series of negotiations on security and military would have followed between the two parties.⁷⁴ However, not much time later, the expectations of Qaddafi and his son were still not satisfied and the leader started to believe that the compensations by US were not enough for them. One of the major reason why Qaddafi made the famous declaration in December 2003 was for self-interests matter, since he believed that a greater support by other states would have come in exchange of the decision of disarmament. He also thought that states would have developed with his country a nuclear capability for peaceful uses, but all these beliefs never became reality. Qaddafi, by 2005, declared that he expected from American, but also from Japan, Russia, China and the European Union more rewards in technological matters, so that Libya could have possessed it just for peaceful reasons. Moreover, in April 2010, Qaddafi was not invited to the event of Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC and he underlined the fact that it could have been the perfect occasion to reward Libya in front of the international community. However, in 2009 the Libyan government of Qaddafi had already decided to suspend for a temporary time the shipment from Libya's stock of enriched uranium and preferred to use what was left on his nuclear program. The stock of enriched uranium was, in fact, one of the conditions accepted by the country during the negotiation in 2003 and Sayf Al-Islam called the decision of his father an expression of disappointment and discontent that needed

⁷³ Jentleson B.W., Whytock C.A., see p.19

⁷⁴ Cigar N. (2012), *Libya's Nuclear Disarmament: Lesson and Implication for Nuclear Proliferation*, Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, Retrieved from:
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/MES%20Monographs/MESM%2020JAN%202012_lo.pdf

to be considered. The normalisation of the country after the WMD era was still slow and it was not a priority for US and the international community. By that moment the leader Muammar Qaddafi put pressure on Israel to obtain denuclearization, underlying the fact that without doing so, the other Arab countries would have felt legitimized to possess nuclear and chemical programs.⁷⁵

Nonetheless, some developments in the diplomatic interactions between US and Libya have been made. In 2004, US opened in Tripoli the US diplomatic embassy after its closure in 1972 and by 2006 Washington declared its willingness to strengthen the diplomatic presence in the country, creating a more positive relationship between the two. Furthermore, since the beginning the Bush administration was focused on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East countries, including Libya. However, Qaddafi was still considered by the international community a tyrant governing an authoritarian system established in 1969 and United States realized that the leader's policies were more focused on the economic side, than on the political one, so the country needed a change. Libya needed some reforms but policy change and economic actions gave more results to common interests. One the main purpose by US administration was to contain terrorism, especially Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) across Sub-Saharan Africa and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and having Libya on the American side meant to have an advantage on terrorist groups. As a matter of fact, Libya started to cooperate in the fight against terrorism with US before 2001 and it condemned the attack to the Twin Towers, supporting United States in the war against Afghanistan. For these reasons, US tried to help the country to increase security across the Maghreb-Sahel region and Libya was officially invited by US to take part to the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). However, Libya did not accept the invitation underlying the presence of many domestic oppositions. Furthermore, US was interested in the economic condition of Libya since it represented one the largest reserve of oil in the whole African territory. The elimination of US and UN sanctions meant for Libya trading again with American and European companies and investing in the country's economy. Libya begun to be reintegrated in the international society, mainly as an economic power useful for countries in Europe and for US. Both Libya and US had satisfied their purposes and Qaddafi succeeded to stay in power. The normalisation of Libya after the 2003 disarmament was still at the beginning and for Qaddafi and his country meant an increase of economic activities and the development of positive relations with the international society. However, he complained about Bush's behaviour and its declaration about human rights and democratization of the Arab world. Qaddafi, in fact, believed that democracy did

⁷⁵ Cigar N., see p.31

not suit well for Libya and other Arab countries, emphasizing the concept of diversity through the nations.⁷⁶

As Obama became President of the United States of America in 2009, he inherited the long set of interactions between US and Libya. Qaddafi was still complaining about the lack of rewards after the nuclear agreement and he tried to show to the President his disappointment. Under Obama administration, the American President was trying to pursue the Bush's idea of policy change and wanted to extend his willingness to cooperate with the Middle East countries, enlarging the concept of democracy and protection of human rights and recognising the fact that any violation is not allowed.⁷⁷

In addition, during a speech in 2009, the Secretary of States Hillary Clinton expressed the concept of the three Ds: Diplomacy, Development and Defence, which characterized the international approach of Obama and US. She believed that Obama administration, together with the use of diplomacy, development and defence could be able to send away form of extremism such as Al-Qaida and the Taliban who threaten United States and the whole world in what President Obama denominated the central front in the fight against terrorism.⁷⁸ Another turning point of the relations between the two was the signature of the "Defence Contacts and Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding" which established an agreement between the US and Libya and a military-to military relationship in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, peacekeeping and stability⁷⁹.

2.5.1 Arab Spring and NATO's no-fly zone

After the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Libya, in 2011 United States and NATO started an UN operation in the country to stop the Libyan civil war and the leader Qaddafi tried to convince NATO to retrieve the troops using the voluntary disarmament of Libya. Demanding an immediate ceasefire in Libya and the possibility of a crime against humanity, the Security Council decided to enforce with the help of NATO a no-fly zone and established air strikes in support of anti-Qaddafi forces. The Security Council expressed the effort to collaborate and find a way to stop the crisis and help the Libyan population. Moreover, the Council denied the possibility to Libyan commercial aircraft to land or take off from the territory. United Nations believed that there was the strong need to suppress

⁷⁶ Zoubir Y.H., see p.25

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*

⁷⁸ NPR (January 2009), *Transcript of Clinton's confirmation hearing*, Retrieved from:
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99290981>, Last access: 12/06/2016

⁷⁹ Zoubir Y.H., see p.25

Qaddafi's regime and protect the population.⁸⁰ After the no-fly zone operation was set up, President Obama made an official speech addressing the nation and declared that Muammar Qaddafi ruled Libya for many years as a tyrant, denying freedom to its population, murdering enemies in the country and abroad and exploiting the wealth of Libyans. For these reasons, in February 2011 people finally took to the streets and asked for protection of their rights and in response Qaddafi decided to attack his people.⁸¹

In that period, in fact, a wave of popular protest started throughout the Middle East and North African countries, but the uprising over the four decades of Qaddafi occurred in Libya was one of the most violent protest which led to a civil war. On the 15th of February 2011, many civilians were gathered outside the police station and many others were killed in Benghazi. However, the 17th of February was considered the official "day of the revolt" with thousands of civilian protestors taking the streets in Tripoli, Benghazi, Darnah, Zintan and other cities. Qaddafi decided to attack the population to stop the civil war, realising prisoners from Libyan jails and paying them to combat against the civilian protestors. Moreover, after the "day of the revolt" many other escalations occurred and Muammar Qaddafi hired mercenaries to increment the security forces and suppress the revolts of the civil war. After thousands of people killed, the anti-Qaddafi civil population finally took the control of Libya's second city, Benghazi.⁸²

President Obama expressed his willingness to help those people and imposed an arms embargo. US had no other choice since Qaddafi presented its intention to show no mercy to his own citizens. US collaborated with other international partners (Britain, France and Lebanon) to create a coalition against the rudeness of Qaddafi and prevent a genocide. However, Obama believed than even after Qaddafi's step down from power, Libya would have to face and rebuild forty years of tyranny which left the country devastated. Furthermore, America had a strong interest in avoiding Qaddafi's reaction over those who attacked him. A real massacre would have brought many civilians to leave and cross the borders, and there would have been damages to the peace process with Egypt and Tunisia.

⁸⁰ United Nations (March 2011), *Security Council approves 'no fly-zone' over Libya, authorizing "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions*, Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>, Last access: 14/06/16

⁸¹ The White House (March 2011), *Remarks by the President in address to the nation on Libya*, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Retrieved from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya> and https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/2011/March/032811_SpeechonLibya.mp4, Last access: 14/06/16

⁸² Al Jazeera (November 2011), *Battle for Libya: Key Moments*, 2011, Retrieved from: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/20111020104244706760.html>, Last access: 15/06/16

President Obama's opinion about the situation in Libya was, from the beginning, that history was not on Qaddafi's side.⁸³

The Libyan government expressed its disappointment and Sayf Al-Islam, probably the most exposed son of Qaddafi, declared during an interview that the intervention of NATO could be interpreted as a good lesson for every country that nobody should be trusted, with the only solution to resist them. He regretted the decision of disarmament in 2003 made by the father and condemned US and its decision of bombing Libya from one day to another. In addition, in Sayf Al-Islam's opinion, many countries secretly expressed their disappointment, calling the disarmament a clear mistake. For instance, North Korea condemned Libya's give up, declaring that in this way Libya became friendly with the West becoming weaker and more vulnerable day by day, a situation which finally resulted in the attack of US and Western powers. According to some researches, the decision of Qaddafi to collaborate with the Western powers consequently encouraged the use of military forces to all the Middle East countries. Later on, most of the Middle East states agreed with the idea of North Korea and believed in the strength and power of the Libyan leader to reacquire its nuclear program and expel Europe from its territory. The lesson of Libya was clear, Europe and US were not reliable and each country should only trust itself and its people. In 2012, an Iraqi writer from the Iraqi Communist's party explained his opinion about the lesson Libya had taught. Qaddafi needed something (nuclear weapons) in order to show his strength to Europeans, in this way they would have been more afraid and cautious to attack him. Qaddafi would have used weapons of mass destruction to acquire balance of terror and for blackmail, but then he became weaker and vulnerable to the Western threats. It is clear that the Libyan case pushed the other Arab countries to acquire nuclear and chemical programs.

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By the end of March, NATO airstrikes' task was based on three main principles: 1) Implement a no-fly zone to prevent bombing attacks on the Libyan population; 2) Enforce an arm embargo through the Mediterranean area to prevent the arrival of arms to be used by Qaddafi's forces in Libya; 3) Manage air and naval strikes against military forces attacking Libyan people. In April 2011, the Libyan leader decided to withdraw all the military forces and humanitarian aids which started to reach the Libyan people. Later on, on the 8th of June 2011, NATO and its international partners decided to continue to make pressure on Qaddafi and helped people as much as possible to rebuild their own country. Qaddafi was not strong enough to combat NATO and Western military forces, so the liberation of Tripoli occurred on the 22nd of August 2011. Furthermore, in September of the same

⁸³ The White House, see p.34

⁸⁴ Cigar N., see p.31

year, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established to keep sending aids to civilians. The resolution was created to restore public security and promote the rule of law; protect human rights, particularly those of the vulnerable people; start an economic path of recovery and promote national reconciliation.⁸⁵

However, Lieutenant General Bouchard, Commander Operation Unified Protector, declared that NATO's report on the current situation was that there were only three isolated areas where regime forces continued to impose their will: Bani Walid, Sirte and Al Fuqaha. It is clearly shown in the picture at the end of the paragraph. As October arrived, it was evident that NATO forces succeeded to prevent a massacre in Libya, helped to establish a new path of peace and freedom and finally destroyed Qaddafi's forty years' regime with the help of United States of America. The operation was coming to an end and Qaddafi died on the October 20, 2011. Few days later, on October 31, after 222 days of operation it was finally declared concluded by NATO.⁸⁶




Figure 2:1 NATO report on Libya 2011

⁸⁵ United Nations Security Council (September 2011), *Resolution 2009 (2011)*, Retrieved from: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2009\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2009(2011)), Last access: 15/06/16

⁸⁶ NATO (November 2015), *NATO and Libya*, Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_71652.htm?selectedLocale=en, Last access: 10/06/16

Source: Global Security, retrieved from:
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/unified-protector-110922-nato09.jpg>||Map showing Libya Frontlines as of 22 September 2011

2.5.2 Brief overview after the fall of Qaddafi's regime

After October 2011, the situation in Libya was considered dramatic. The country needed to re-establish a political and economic plan and rebuild what Qaddafi had previously destroyed. However, it was the lack of security which actually permitted Qaddafi to overcome the population needs and become a tyrant. As a matter of fact, the political process to create stability was long and full of obstacles, and the public confidence and trust in the democratic process was weak and poor. Given the series of economic sanctions established by United States few years before and the confusion in the country, the economic condition of Libya was still to be improved. Libya was starting to face many economic challenges to restore the economy of the nation, raising GDP and allowing the international trade. By good fortune, after 2011, Libya was driven in the right direction even if it still needed many economic reforms in order to work for the reconstruction sustainable broad-based economic growth. On the economic matter, Libya's fortune was also represented by its closeness to Europe which allowed to sell oil to Western countries and improve the international trade.⁸⁷




Figure 2:2 Economic condition of Libya 2010-2014

Source: Oil & Gas 360 (February 2015), retrieved from: <http://www.oilandgas360.com/libya-output-80/>

⁸⁷ Chivvis C.S. (2014), Martini J., *Libya after Qaddafi, Lesson and implications for the future*, Rand Corporation, Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR577/RAND_RR577.pdf

As it is clearly visible in the figure above, Libya found many difficulties and for the first period after the war was not able to satisfy the country with a stabilization of the economy. After 2011, the demand for production almost reached the level before the civil war. However, in 2013 a series of violent conflict caused the diminishing of outcomes produced and lower income for the country.

For what it concerns the humanitarian help by the international community, it was (as expected by Libya) really weak. NATO kept continuing its mission (UNISML) even if together with United States played a very limited role in the reconstruction of Libya and there were no stabilization forces deployed in the territory after the defeat of Qaddafi. It was in United States' interest to avoid another civil war, but most important to avoid Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to take over and rule the country, since it could have represented a huge threat for the Western world. Despite the efforts made by Libyans and by the international community, the country started to face a series of conflicts after the end of the war. The main cause of the proliferation was the absence of a central authority together with the reconciliation process. The conflicts arose comprised jihadist attacks, tribal rivalries and federalist manoeuvring. The violence of that years in Libya caused a slowdown in the reconstruction of all the country causing a political destabilization and threatening the work of NATO UNISMIL mission and the international community.⁸⁸

Before the outbreak in Benghazi, the country had already started to face many bombing attacks which were all linked to terrorist organizations, such as the jihadist group and Al Qaeda. The interactions between the Al Qaeda group and the militants in Libya started to be enhanced and it was considered a serious threat in the nation. As a matter of fact, many other groups were created during the years between 2012 and 2014 such as The Zintan Military Council considered one of the strongest and well-organized groups in Libya; the Misrata Brigades, aligned with Muslims Brotherhood; the Souk al Jouma and Sadun al-Suwayli Brigades group, linked to the Islamist leader Hakim Belhaj; the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room, and many others.⁸⁹

In 2014, Libya was still stuck in the middle of chaos and desperation and many asked themselves what would have happened if Qaddafi was still alive. Before his death, the International Criminal Court had authorized an act of arrest for the Libyan leader, but in the end Qaddafi was killed by his own people who have been suppressed for many years. However, if Qaddafi would have proceeded with a trial at the International Criminal Court, or under other institutions, Libya would have probably faced a different reconstruction path. The country would have probably gone through a peace process conducted by United States and other European countries, and many consequences still present today

⁸⁸ Chivvis C.S., see p.37

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*

would have been avoided. It is of general thought that the reconciliation on the political, economic, and social side would have been much easier. Nonetheless, the consequences of a hypothetical trial cannot be sure. For instance, Tamara Coffman Witer, director of the Middle East Policy at Brookings, expressed her idea about the issue explaining that a trial may have led to a faster reconciliation process or, depending from the situation of the country, to more objection and resentment. Probably Libya would have not been better off after the fall of Qaddafi, since a trial would have been a distraction to the peace and reintegration process. However, many researches still ask themselves why Western countries and United States did not give enough aid to Libya after Qaddafi's death to strengthen the country and help people to rebuild it, since in October 2011 there were good chances for a political and economic stabilization.⁹⁰

On the political side, in December 2015 a UN-Backed Government of National Unity was established. The run for power was characterized by conflicts between Islamist and non-Islamist groups and Libya's Congress was deadlocked between a leading nationalist parties and Islamist. In June 2015, the United Nations decided to put a definitive end to conflicts in the region, to political destabilization and to acts of terrorism. However, in October, the Libyan Parliament did not accept the possibility of sharing power with Islamists and denied the signature, but the two factions reached an agreement in December 2015. More recently, in March 2016, the UN-Backed Government of National Unity asked for an immediate transfer of power to the unity government and the eastern governments opposed its intention. In April 2016, the self-declared National Salvation Government signed for resignation. Today, the second civil war in Libya is still ongoing, but many changes have been reached. On 5 of April, the new unity government called "Government of National Accord" has been declared.⁹¹

The security matter in Libya does not bring, nowadays, positive news. The state seems still vulnerable and without a clear security plan. Analysing the humanitarian condition of Libya, it is still considered weak and in lack of Western aids.⁹² On March 15 2016, the UNSMIL mandate expired after five years and the Security Council decided to extend the term until June 15, 2016. The decision came unanimously from the fifteen members of the Council who emphasized the important presence of the mission in the country, but also the amount of work that it still needs to be done.⁹³ However, during

⁹⁰ Taylor A. (October 2014), *Gaddafi died three years ago. Would Libya be better off if he hadn't?*, The Washington Post, Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/10/20/gaddafi-died-3-years-ago-would-libya-be-better-off-if-he-hadnt/>, Last access: 11/06/16

⁹¹ Global Security (2016), *Libya-Politics*, Retrieved from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/politics.htm>, Last access: 15/06/16

⁹² Security Council Report (2016), *March 2016 Monthly Forecast*, Libya, Retrieved from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-03/libya_24.php, Last access: 14/06/16

⁹³ United Nations (March 2016), *Adopting Resolution 2273, Security Council extend mandate of UN Support in Libya until 15 June*, Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12282.doc.htm>, Last access: 15/06/16

a speech in April 2016, President Obama declared his failure to prepare Libya for its aftermath of the death of Muammar Qaddafi, labelling it as the worst mistake of its presidency. After many years, he stated that regretted the decision to have not intervened in Libya before.⁹⁴ Nonetheless, the conditions of Libya remain almost the same of 2003, even if some small steps forward have been made. Given the recent Obama consideration, the question of what is going to happen appears still full of doubts.

⁹⁴ BBC (April 2016), *President Obama: Libya aftermath “worst mistake of presidency”*, Retrieved from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703>, Last access: 11/06/16

Third chapter: the challenges of coercive diplomacy

3.1 Why coercive diplomacy is hard?

As the discussion in the previous chapters has underlined, the different use of instruments available to states helps them to reach the highest degree of success. In the relations between states, may they be of economic, social or political nature, nations have always tried to be in advantage over the adversaries and the strategy of coercive diplomacy has helped in this sense. However, there are many negative consequences that the coercive process may cause, since the inherent difficulties should not be undermined by anyone. The Libyan case, for instance, has highlighted both the weaknesses and strengths that a country like United States may manifest in certain occasions.

Coercive diplomacy started to be adopted many decades ago and it is as old as the art of diplomacy itself. This well-known phenomenon has always been entrenched in the international politics' history. Moreover, many classics have recognised the significant role of coercive diplomacy in the international scenario. For instance, Thucydides in the "*Peloponnesian War*" provides a clear illustration of coercive diplomacy occurred in relation to Sparta and Athens which wanted to establish their supremacy through the threats of the use of force.⁹⁵ At the same time, another famous classical work mentioned the important application of coercive diplomacy, and it is the "*Leviathan*" written by Thomas Hobbes. In his famous book Hobbes highlighted the principle of coercion as fundamental to be used as a mean against the importance of power in order to compel people threatening punishments. Hobbes believed that the Law of Nature was the original source of justice, but before the principles of "just" and "unjust" have been defined, he expressed that "there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the threat of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant".⁹⁶ However, even if coercion has always existed, the side effects were present too. So why states easily make mistakes and fail in the use of coercive diplomacy?⁹⁷

Coercive diplomacy is a tough measure to be used, since it comprises a game between the coercer and the target. On the one hand, the coercer has to frighten the adversary and impose his autonomy and strength, on the other hand, he has to reassure the enemy that no further demands will be claimed.

⁹⁵ Crystal S.H. (2015), *Coercive diplomacy: A Theoretical and Practical Evaluation*, Glendon Journal of International Studies, Retrieved from: <http://gjis.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/gjis/article/download/38941/36390>

⁹⁶ Hobbes T. (1909-14), *Of Man, Chapter XV, Of Other Laws of Nature, Leviathan*, The Harvard Classics, Retrieved from: <http://www.bartleby.com/34/5/15.html>

⁹⁷ Crystal S.H., see p.41

This means that the coercer has to be confident enough to understand where the limit is, since the sticks and carrots game may be dangerous and very risky. The adversary needs to perceive a sense of urgency, enough to take the right decision and comply with the requests demanded. However, the psychological and emotional factors may influence the choices of the coerced person/state and lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the case. Nonetheless, it is well-known that each case is different from another. For example, a case of coercive diplomacy used to stop terrorism or the creation of nuclear weapons may be tougher than a situation in which the coercion is made to expel the enemy from the country or if he demands policy change. In crucial situations like these, the effort to be made increases and there is a higher probability to escalate to the use of force. Each case requires a special consideration, because sometimes the adversary is so convinced to resist to be willing to die for his cause, or sometimes that may lead to worse consequences as it happened to United States after the 1986 bombing attack to Tripoli and Benghazi, in the Libyan case.⁹⁸

Moreover, coercive diplomacy is a seductive instrument of statecraft since it is designed to reach success at a cheaper cost than the other strategies (even if it may fail more than it succeeds)⁹⁹. Coercive diplomacy' tactic shows a worse outcome when the states involved are many and they are against more than one adversary. The consequent use of coercive diplomacy, in Art and Cronin's opinion, should not be used until the assurances to succeed are made clear and that further consequences for non-compliance will occur. Furthermore, at a first glance, it may seem difficult to understand when coercive diplomacy has really triumphed. For instance, coercive diplomacy seems to be achieved better when the designed objective is limited. In addition, if the goal seems to have positive chances to be obtained, some positive inducements needs to be provided. The probability for a state to succeed through the use of coercive diplomacy mainly occur when the plan and objectives are well defined, when the intimidations are followed by a series of incentives or carrots, when the other international players agree to the ongoing process and when the state carrying out the coercive game is convinced enough to take this path against the adversary. Nonetheless, as the chapter has highlighted above, it is hard to predict with certainty the possible outcomes of coercive diplomacy since each case is distinct and diverse in its peculiarities.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Jakobsen P.V., see p.3

⁹⁹ Art R.J. (2003), *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, edited by Art R.J. and Cronin P.M., United States Institute of Peace Press

¹⁰⁰ Art R.J., Cronin P.M. (2007), *Coercive diplomacy*, Leading the dogs of war, edited by Croker C.A., Hampson F.O., Aall P., pp. 316-317

In the book “*United States and Coercive Diplomacy*”, Robert Art analyses four factors (cited in the table below) of coercive diplomacy which can focus and explain the main reasons why this strategy is difficult to be managed.

1) Coercive diplomacy is a form of compellence and it is problematic	2) Coercive diplomacy is a form of coercion
3) Estimating resolve is a tricky affair	4) Coercive diplomacy has to worry about its power stake

Table 3:1 Coercive diplomacy is problematic

The first reason describes the interconnection between coercive diplomacy and compellence, analysing the fact that compellence is more difficult to use than deterrence, as Thomas Schelling in his book “*Arms and Influence*” observed. It is more problematic in the sense that it is hard to impose a change of behaviour on the target and it is even more difficult because it requires the alteration in a visible manner to all. Deterrence, instead, is easier for the target because he has the possibility to deny demands without having a great loss. As a matter of fact, more damage is procured in the case of compellence because to comply with the coercer’s demands may make him appear weak when he has committed his prestige many times during the process.¹⁰¹

Indeed, coercive diplomacy, being a form of coercion, can be applied in many circumstances such as denial, punishment and risk strategy. For instance, denial occurs by creating confusion in the military strategy of an adversary and in order to be successful it implies that the coercer tries to prevent the adversary to reach its political objectives through its military strategy. Punishment, instead, generates pain and tries to impose the giving up of the target. Lastly, risk strategies try to convince the target to comply by increasing the risks and side effects and make him understand that he will suffer even more after non-compliance.¹⁰² However, risk strategies have a high probability to fail because the pain inflicted to the target is greater in the present than in the future since the human mind automatically pose a higher weight to the present time and this makes the strategy more likely to fail.¹⁰³ At the same time, even punishment and denial may found no success since the limited use of force is the only possible punishment to be imposed. Simultaneously, denial may be applied only in a limited form and becomes uncertain.

¹⁰¹ Art R.J., see p.12

¹⁰² Pape R.A. (1996), *Bombing to Win: Air power and coercion in war*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell University Press

¹⁰³ Art R.J., see p.12

Furthermore, the third factor that makes coercive diplomacy hard is the process of estimating resolve that may sometimes get to a wrong direction. De facto, resolve is linked to the strength of the more tenacious party and it seems a difficult strategy because, before the process starts, nobody knows in which side the stronger party is and what are its weaknesses. Once the coercive process begins, resolves can change their direction. The fourth and last element is that the target has to be concerned about the confrontation with the adversary not only on the basis of credibility, but also of power. Both credibility and power stakes are fundamental factors in the coercer's strategy against the target. As the first chapters of this thesis describe, credibility creates stronger expectations and makes compromises problematic for the target. At the same time, power stake is important because giving way seems to be an approach used to diminish the target's capacity to resist and, at the same time, the reasons to stay rigid considerably increase, so the demands asked to the target start to limit his future capability¹⁰⁴.

As a matter of fact, United States' international politics has very often been intertwined with the strategy of coercive diplomacy in the interactions with the other countries. Being a great superpower, it has always needed to impose its supremacy over the others and sometimes coercive diplomacy has been the right method to be used. However, as it has been outlined above, coercive diplomacy is not easy and sometimes even United States has not been able to deal with it. To have an overall view of the US practice of coercive diplomacy and of the outcomes, the table at the end of the paragraph will clarify it better. Table 3:2 identifies the major coercive cases in which United States has been involved and Robert Art, through a work on Alexander George's evaluation, clarifies the different outcomes. The six cases listed are just some of the many situations in which US has applied the strategy of coercive diplomacy, but it is clearly visible that many of these have failed or stayed ambiguous, even if United States always appear as a strong independent power. Most of the motivations of failure are part of the reasons explained before.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Art R.J., see p.12

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*

Case	Outcome
1992-94 Somalia	Failure
1994 Haiti	Success
1994 North Korea	Failure
1995 Bosnia	Success
1990-98 Iraq	Failure
1999 Kosovo	Failure

Table 3:2 Cases of success-failure overview

In order to understand the reasons leading to positive and negative outcomes, the paragraph will provide a brief description of two cases cited above. Having analysed the case of success (Libya) in the previous chapter, I will consider the failure cases of North Korea (1991-1994) and Somalia (1992-1994).

The complex case between US-DPRK on the Agreed Framework tried, since 1994, to influence the use of nuclear weapons of the country. When North Korea was caught organizing its nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) failed to gain access to the nuclear sites and the UNSC started to deal with the issue, but especially United States (which is one of the permanent members). For nearly three years (1991-1994) US tried to apply coercion on the country, but failed. After June 1994, the United States concluded a deal with North Korea and in exchange promised the creation of strong diplomatic and economic relations.¹⁰⁶ As a matter of fact, it is possible to find several reasons which caused the failure. First, the Clinton Administration has probably used more inducements than force, leading to a weak coercive process. Moreover, the negotiation started with the former US President Jimmy Carter and he was very influential during all the process. In fact, the Clinton Administration has not been able to adopt the right political approach with the Asian country. The Agreed Framework made with US can be considered a clear failure because North Korea cheated on the agreement and did not reveal any information about the secret nuclear program.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Sigal L.V., *The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the ‘Crime and Punishment’ Strategy*, Arms Control Association, Retrieved from: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/sigal, Last access: 15/6/16

¹⁰⁷ United States Institute of Peace (2003), *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy: Past, Present and Future*, Retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/publications/the-united-states-and-coercive-diplomacy-past-present-and-future>, Last access: 9/06/16

Furthermore, US decided to deal with North Korea offering positive sanctions, instead of having a stronger approach to the nuclear issue and this was considered one of the main mistakes.¹⁰⁸ Coercive diplomacy was not able enough to satisfy the conditions of success, since the players involved in the case did not balance the sticks and carrots, leading to a clamorous failure. The Agreed Framework, however, has been highly controversial but the right and best choice for the Clinton Administration since it was in order to satisfy the interest of both parties. Dealing with a state like North Korea has never been an easy task and US tried to offer the right inducements during the nuclear crisis, with the aim to resolve the issue peacefully. However, US was ready to apply UN sanctions or intervene with a military action in case the pressure and the use of inducements would have failed. At the end of the nuclear crisis, the US President was willing to go to war instead of permitting North Korea to acquire nuclear capability, but this possibility was prevented by Carter. Eventually, coercive diplomacy in the North Korea framework failed for both states.¹⁰⁹

Somalia represents another famous case of failure for United States. The international intervention in Somalia is a unique situation because it has been guided by two different military intervention: United Task Force (UNITAF) and United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The 1992-1994 case represents an endeavour for United States to re-create the Somali state through the use of coercive diplomacy. The ingredients to reach success were present during the first operation (UNITAF), but they were destroyed with the evolving of the second one (UNISOM II).¹¹⁰ The UNITAF operation had a positive outcome which can be linked to the succeeding application of compellence. The international community assistance, in fact, has been able to provide humanitarian help to the population. Moreover, UNITAF succeeded because it used the threat of military force to reach the objectives. On the other hand, the UNOSOM II operation was a clear failure since, even if it reached some of the prefixed goals, it counted on a weaker military force. The second operation wanted to reach a wider range of goals with a higher difficulty and it had a far less capable unity than UNITAF. At the same time, UNITAF did not interfere with the interest of Somali leaders, while the UNOSOM II was considered an impediment for the faction leaders. The Somali military commander Aidid put the UN disarmament mission at his own advantage and tried to overcome Ali Mahdi in the run for political control. He preferred to wait for US end of campaign in Somalia and, as soon as US control was

¹⁰⁸ Martini C.H. (2002), *Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical Perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework*, Department of Political Science, Merrimack College, Retrieved from: <http://www.nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/JPR-Martin-RewardingNorthKorea.pdf>

¹⁰⁹ Drennan W.M. (2003), *Nuclear Weapons and North Korea*, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Chapter 5), edited by Art R.J. and Cronin P.M., United States Institute of Peace Press

¹¹⁰ Harrison J.C. (1995), *The limits of type D Coercive Diplomacy in Somalia*, Naval Postgraduate School, Retrieved from: <http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/31322>

weaker, he reasserted his drive for political domination. The Somali case shows how the role of military force can be fundamental during the coercive game and how it can be used as a credible threat. However, coercive diplomacy is a useful strategy when the military force is balanced with capable diplomatic efforts, but it can succeed when the target has some personal incentives in comply with the coercer's demand. The UNOSOM II operation, therefore, failed especially because Aidid did not find the right motivations to accept the role of US and United Nations in Somalia.¹¹¹

3.2 Coercive Diplomacy and the war on terrorism

Coercive diplomacy can be applied in many kinds of circumstances, and sometimes it challenges situations in which terrorism is present. During the last decades, terrorism proved to be difficult for coercive diplomacy and most of the time failed in achieving its objectives, and consequently the preconditions for success have not been met. United States' started its war on terrorism and it has followed a long path, starting from the mid-1990s but increasing after the 9/11 attacks to New York and Washington.

In order to analyse the weakness side and the strength of coercive diplomacy in relation to terrorism, a clear definition of the overspread phenomenon must be provided. Terrorism, especially in the recent years, has become an evolving and very dangerous phenomenon and it is considered nowadays on the top national security agenda of almost every country in the world. The Twin Towers attack in 2001 has been the turning point which led to the increase in measures of security and the development of technologies which consequently facilitated the process. There are several fundamental concepts that can explain the worldwide spread phenomenon of terrorism and many definitions have been provided. A proper working definition considered natural to researchers and analysts describes terrorism as a strategy or tactic used by many different groups (like Al Qaeda) with some defined characteristics included. In addition, it is "the weapon of the weak" and its use is limited to threat of violence or the use of violence directed by an organization to reach political objectives.¹¹² The violence is usually addressed to any kind of victim, most of the time including civilian innocents. Moreover, in order to consider a proper act of terrorism, one or both actors should not be a government. The variety of techniques that terrorism can have access to is diverse and includes practices like kidnapping, takeover of building and planes, assassinations, bomb attacks (car bomb or suicide bombs) and taking hostages (many of these recurring in the previous chapter). The most

¹¹¹ Bensahel N. (2003), *Humanitarian Relief and Nation Building in Somalia*, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Chapter 2), edited by Art R.J. and Cronin P.M., United States Institute of Peace Press

¹¹² Lutz B., Lutz J. (2013), *Terrorism, Contemporary Security Studies* (Chapter 19), edited by Collins A., Oxford University Press

relevant contemporary example of a terrorist organization is Al Qaeda, which works as an international network.¹¹³ Before succeeding in the attack of 9/11, Al Qaeda was guaranteed and protected by a series of connections in individual countries cooperating with Osama Bin Laden which in turn provided some financial assistance and help.¹¹⁴ In 2001, Al Qaeda had reached a strong financial and technical support by other countries which permitted the planning of the plane attack to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. When the Bush's administration pushed to invade Afghanistan and find the responsible of the attack, the organization started to become a form of global leaderless resistance. Even after the death of Osama Bin Laden, the organization continued its fight against the Western powers and the attacks, symbol of the global jihad, did not diminish.¹¹⁵

The anti-terrorism campaign that United States has led before 9/11 showed that the terrorism threat was not on the top of the national security agenda of the country. President Bush was too naïve and he undermined the phenomenon related to Al Qaeda, making some mistakes. In 1999, the British Intelligence warned the US embassy about a possible attack to the United States. They found out that Al Qaeda was organizing a plan to use commercial aircraft possibly as flying bombs against America. However, they did not know when and where the attack would have taken place and it was difficult to predict. Furthermore, in June 2001, the German Intelligence revealed information to United States of the possibility of hijacking of commercial aircrafts against America and Israel. The surveillance has been intensified by the countries involved in the threats. So many countries tried to warn United States, however, the only nations who seemed to have concrete information about the plot - Pakistan and Saudi Arabia - apparently did not reveal anything for unknown reasons.¹¹⁶

After September 11 2001, as I stated above, Bush and many other European countries decided to put security and terrorism threats on the top of the national security agenda and the priority raised the level of security measures. At a certain point, coercive diplomacy started to be applied to the war on terrorism. Coercive diplomacy, as in all the other cases, applies when the coercer tries to persuade the adversary to stop an action already undertaken. It may happen that coercive diplomacy has to deal with opponents who are also engaged in a form of compellence, such as terrorist organizations trying to withdraw the government from political engagement.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, terrorism limits the use of coercive diplomacy in circumstances that do not occur in the other situations. When dealing with

¹¹³ Lutz B. Lutz J., see p.47

¹¹⁴ *Ibidem*

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*

¹¹⁶ Thompson P., *They tried to warn US: Foreign Intelligence Warnings before 9/11*, History Commons, Retrieved from: <http://www.historycommons.org/essay.jsp?article=essaytheytriedtowarnus>, Last access: 10/06/16

¹¹⁷ Crenshaw M. (1990), *The logic of terrorism: Terrorism as the product of strategic choice*, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Retrieved from: <http://rampages.us/colombomj/wp-content/uploads/sites/2867/2014/10/Martha-Crenshaw-the-logic-of-terrorism.pdf>

terrorism, in fact, the targets change and become different and, at the same time, governments need to modify their approach. The adversaries are non-state actors or certain hidden regions, which usually are not addressed in normal coercive diplomacy's occasions. One of the difficulty that hinder success lays in the fact that coercive diplomacy is now addressed and deals with many targets in a simultaneous way, and in addition each adversary varies in its peculiarities. Another factor considered as an obstacle is that clear information within terrorist groups is difficult to be obtained and revealed, so the coercer needs to have confidence in prior motivational assumptions instead of concrete events or plots already happened. Moreover, as in the case of Libya, states being sponsor of terrorism have much more to lose by deciding to not comply with the demands, but at the same time, the possibility to be isolated may also restrict their interests and motivations. Furthermore, another element decreasing the likelihood to succeed is that terrorism is based on surprise. Understanding the precise timing of the movements and the potential terrorist actions is not an easy task and, as a consequence, identify concrete counterattacks is almost impossible. Another consideration may be related to the fact that, since terrorism's main aim is to exercise an overreaction among people, the target addressed may not perceive potential threats or the use of force as real punishments and, instead, it may appear as a sort of recognition. However, coercive diplomacy does not limit itself to fight terrorism. Through its techniques, in fact, it also aspires to eradicate the roots of the phenomenon and try to avoid future terroristic attacks. The last important element to be discussed is that the preconditions of government's secrecy diminish the strength of coercive diplomacy. As a matter of fact, any revealed information about the governments awareness may cause a change in the future behaviour of terrorists. For this reason, it is important to find a balance between the domestic and international consensus, which is necessary for the legitimacy of policy and the level of secrecy.¹¹⁸

In sum, terrorism has a crucial weight and it is spread all over the world. It needs to be contained by all the international actors but it seems difficult to be understood and its characteristics may vary from one group/organization to another. Most of the time, it is still harder to perceive its limits and deficiencies and even if coercive diplomacy is a powerful instrument to be used, sometimes seems not enough. Terrorism must be fought with all available measures and the future events are difficult to predict, but terrorism seem to be more entrenched in the day life of people than ever, especially due to the new technological advancements of the last decades. Coercive diplomacy has a high probability to fail in the fight against terrorism but there is no other option than try to respond to the threat.

¹¹⁸ Crenshaw M. (2003), *Coercive Diplomacy and the Response to Terrorism*, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Chapter 8), edited by Art R.J. and Cronin M., United States Institute of Peace Press

Conclusion

Coercive diplomacy is an attractive strategy which tries to resolve crises and conflicts short of full-scale war. This diplomatic tactic relies on the use of threats and of limited force, if certain particular case requires it. Coercive diplomacy involves in its umbrella concept many other strategies such as compellence, deterrence and blackmail. Since the end of the Cold War, coercive diplomacy seemed to be the right diplomatic instrument able to fix and shape the relations between states and superpowers which started to impose their supremacy after the end of the Second World War. Many theories have been developed by important authors like Alexander George, Thomas Schelling and Lawrence Freedman who tried to understand and explain the concept of coercion in all its peculiarities.

However, coercive diplomacy has proved to be difficult and the key to reach success depend on many fundamental factors which are based on the cost of non-compliance that can be imposed on a state and the advantages of compliance that can be offered. The prerequisites for success are difficult to be achieved and they are identified by Alexander George in eight main ingredients: 1) transparency of the objective to be reached; 2) coercing state who firmly accepts the demands; 3) support on the domestic and international side; 4) authority of a strong coercer; 5) clearness in the terms of settlement; 6) the coercer should develop a sense of urgency in the mind of the adversary; 7) the target should be worried about the possibility of an unacceptable escalation; 8) imbalance in the coercer's motivations. However, if coercive diplomacy finds the proper way to succeed in its operation, it may be the right and best solution to re-establish the equilibrium between two factions.¹¹⁹

Furthermore, in the international arena, it is possible to distinguish many cases in which coercive diplomacy has been applied in the last forty/fifty years. As a matter of fact, the outcomes of the strategy should not be restricted to a binary definition of success and failure. Many cases of ambiguity occurred and, sometimes, the result is difficult to be determined. Analysing the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and China in the first chapter, the thesis shows how coercive diplomacy can be a useful tool for states in several circumstances, but at the same time it can lead to unavoidable consequences. The sticks and carrots game can be risky and sometimes to know the rules of coercion is not enough and states need to be careful to the actions they undertake.

¹¹⁹ Art R.J., see p.12

Nonetheless, sometimes coercive diplomatic process may last for decades, like in the situation between Libya and the United States. Coercive diplomacy in the relations between the two countries proved to reach the level of success, however after having met many difficulties and obstacles from both parties. During the first period (1969-1989) of the interactions between the two countries, Muammar Qaddafi became the leader of the Libyan country, establishing the Republic and imposing his control over the region. On the United States side, the Carter administration started to deal with the strong presence of the Libyan leader and with President Carter the first economic sanctions started to be imposed. After a series of terroristic attacks occurred against US, in the 1980s the first nuclear program of the country started to be organized. Qaddafi's desire to implement a nuclear capability began to intensify and, as soon as Reagan took the presidency, he tried to respond adopting a policy of isolation. President Reagan made the attempt to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and, at a first moment, his strategies proved to have a positive effect, however Libya continue to pursue its plan and implement a nuclear program. The coercive diplomatic relations with Libya in the first period seemed to provide some favourable outcomes but Reagan's intention to pursue for a regime change limited the success of the strategy. The idea to stop Libya's goal was concrete and possible, but the instruments were weak and limited. During his administration, Reagan adopted many tactics in order to identify the adversary and act in a pre-emptive way so to weaken him. He tried to depict the Libyan state as "sponsor of terrorism" in front of the international community, but his presence was not strong enough and not ready to fight a leader like Muammar Qaddafi.

During the second coercive period (1989-1999), the attitude towards the Libyan case changed considerably. The first Bush administration took the presidency and started to implement new and different policies in the approach with Libya. The coercive diplomacy strategy adopted during the 1990s was considered more balanced than before. During the first years of his mandate, Bush kept Reagan's intention to overthrow the leader Qaddafi, but he seemed convinced to shift from a regime change to a policy change perspective. This proved to be the right move to take against Qaddafi who started to react in a more consensual way. Bush intensified the implementation of other economic sanctions, which proved that US had more control of the African country. In fact, on the one hand, due to the vulnerability of the Libyan economy, Qaddafi's role became weaker and coercive diplomacy appeared to be more successful and efficient. On the other hand, Qaddafi kept pursuing its plan to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the terrorist attacks were still recurring.

During the last period (1999-2003), which led to the final decision of the disarmament, Libya was a debilitated country from every point of view. Sanctions imposed by United States were more efficient than ever. The effort of Qaddafi to appear more consensual was recognised by US and the other

international players and the image of “sponsor of terrorism” started to be vanished. Qaddafi started to feel the fear of his own safety by the spring 2003, and he started to develop the idea to modify the nuclear program. The incentives that Qaddafi received during the long coercive process were of different nature. Coercive diplomacy, as a matter of fact, together with the right economic and diplomatic instruments, proved to be a success for United States but even for all the international community. The fight against terrorism and WMD triumphed especially thanks to the implementation of many economic sanctions, the shift from regime to policy change by Bush and the ability to equilibrate the sticks and carrots game. Analysing the crucial case of Libya and US, it is evident how coercive diplomacy is able to adjust its approach during the years, especially if the interactions between countries vary. The Libyan case, for instance, has highlighted both the weaknesses and strengths that a country like United States may manifest in certain occasions.

In addition, coercive diplomacy is a tough measure to be used, notwithstanding in a case like Libya the conditions and the coercive pressure proved to be successful, playing a vital role in the termination of WMD programmes. Together with the competent use of inducements and assurances, coercive diplomacy appeared able to terminate (even after a difficult path) the nuclear program like the one implemented by Qaddafi and obtained the end of the leader’s control. Per contra, dealing with terrorism, the conditions for success often seem to be much harder to be met. Most of the time, it is more difficult to perceive terrorism’ limits and vulnerabilities, and even if coercive diplomacy is a powerful instrument to be used, it may have a lack of feasibility. In the end, even if this sharp strategy, together with its gains and losses, is able to shape the relations between states, preventing conflicts and resolving many crisis, it is more appropriate and wise for international players to work harder and put more effort to prevent and avoid the use of coercive diplomacy in the first place, eliminating the possibilities of escalation from the very beginning.

Italian summary

La tesi “Coercive diplomacy, theories and application: a case study on US administration and Libya” tratta il tema della diplomazia coercitiva, analizzando le diverse teorie sviluppatesi ed esaminando il caso che riguarda le relazioni tra Stati Uniti d’America e Libia, dal 1969 ai giorni nostri. La diplomazia coercitiva è una strategia utilizzata da diversi tipi di attori internazionali nel campo diplomatico e politico. Questo tipo di tattica diplomatica è utile per raggiungere specifici obiettivi ed è importante perché può essere un tramite nelle relazioni tra paesi. La diplomazia coercitiva nasce dopo la Seconda Guerra Mondiale, quando i paesi europei e tutta la comunità internazionale sentono il bisogno di ricostruire le loro nazioni e la loro immagine, distrutta a causa della guerra. Con l’iniziare della Guerra Fredda, l’obiettivo principale delle due superpotenze (Stati Uniti e Russia) era certamente di evitare un conflitto di supremazia e prevenire il peggior scenario. Da un lato, le potenze occidentali cercavano di dissuadere l’Unione Sovietica dall’attaccare i territori europei e causare una serie di conflitti, ma dall’altro lato, la missione occidentale cominciò a dissolversi a causa del crollo del Comunismo. In realtà, essa fu sostituita dalla lotta contro la violazione dei diritti umani, dalle guerre interne, dai conflitti civili e dalla possibilità da parte degli stati di acquisire ed utilizzare armi di distruzione di massa. Quel particolare scenario creatosi all’inizio degli anni 90, portò alla realizzazione di obiettivi e sfide al fine di modificare e persuadere gli stati a migliorare il loro atteggiamento. Tuttavia, in certi casi, utilizzare la forza per cambiare il comportamento degli stati sembrava essere la migliore soluzione. Questo atteggiamento comportò l’incremento, da parte delle potenze occidentali, di minacce e dell’uso della forza per raggiungere fini politici, cercando di avvantaggiare i loro stessi interessi. Da quel periodo in poi, l’uso della diplomazia coercitiva è ricorso più volte all’interno degli eventi storici, tuttavia è necessaria una migliore analisi degli aspetti che la caratterizzano per spiegare la difficoltà e, al tempo stesso, le potenzialità di questa complicata tecnica.

Negli ultimi cinquant’anni sono state sviluppate diverse definizioni di diplomazia coercitiva. Il crescente numero di espressioni comportò l’attribuzione di diversi concetti legati alla strategia come compellence, deterrence, coercizione militare e blackmail. Ciononostante, i diversi ricercatori ed autori sembrano d’accordo nel stabilire la fondamentale idea di diplomazia coercitiva: l’uso di minacce per influenzare il comportamento e le azioni di un altro individuo. In ogni caso, le qualità che rappresentano il processo coercitivo si differenziano in base a tre misure: la prima misura si basa sul tipo di minaccia applicato, il secondo elemento riguarda il ruolo dell’uso della forza rispetto alle minacce dell’uso di forza e, per ultimo, quali sono gli attori coinvolti nel processo. La diplomazia coercitiva, inoltre, cerca di risolvere crisi e conflitti armati con l’intento di utilizzare le minacce e la

forza per influenzare le azioni che un individuo ha precedentemente intrapreso e le conseguenze che ne derivano da esse. Inoltre, il senso di terrore inflitto nella mente dell'avversario risulta fondamentale al fine di raggiungere un risultato positivo.

In aggiunta, la chiave per raggiungere il successo nell'applicazione della diplomazia coercitiva comprende diversi elementi fondamentali. Il successo dipende dalle conseguenze generate dopo aver negato le richieste che possono essere imposte da uno stato e, dall'altro lato, dai vantaggi che l'accettazione può comportare. L'abilità di combinare ed equilibrare incentivi e condanne è basato su tre criteri principali: proporzionalità, reciprocità e credibilità coercitiva. Il primo criterio si incentra nella relazione tra lo scopo originale della strategia e l'influenza applicata. Il secondo principio, invece, riguarda la reciprocità e garantisce la conoscenza e il rapporto tra incentivi e concessioni. Durante questa relazione, il soggetto indirizzato potrebbe esprimere insicurezza e non essere certo se accettare o meno le richieste. Infine, l'ultimo elemento è considerato di fondamentale importanza all'interno dell'intero svolgimento. La credibilità, infatti, viene acquisita durante un processo di fiducia reciproca. In ogni caso, è più semplice raggiungere questi tre criteri se il supporto di attori internazionali è fortemente presente.

Inoltre, Robert J. Art nel suo libro “*United States and Coercive Diplomacy*” (2003), esamina gli otto prerequisiti di successo espressi da Alexander George, ma che in ogni caso non rappresentano una chiara certezza nel risultato: 1) trasparenza degli obiettivi da raggiungere; 2) uno stato che accetta fermamente le richieste avanzate; 3) un supporto dal punto di vista domestico ed internazionale; 4) una forte autorità dal punto di vista del ricattatore; 5) chiarezza dei termini dell'accordo fra le due parti; 6) creare un senso d'urgenza nella mente dell'avversario; 7) l'avversario dovrebbe preoccuparsi di una possibile escalation; 8) squilibrio delle motivazioni del ricattatore.

Inoltre, all'interno della sfera internazionale, la diplomazia coercitiva non dovrebbe limitarsi alla definizione binaria di successo e fallimento. Infatti, sono stati identificati diversi casi di ambiguità in cui la tecnica è stata applicata ma che hanno portato ad un risultato incerto. Il primo capitolo, difatti, analizza e descrive brevemente diversi casi di successo e fallimento: Kosovo, Afghanistan e Cina. Questi tre diversi casi permettono di percepire come la diplomazia coercitiva cambi e si adatti a circostanze varie, sviluppando diversi esiti.

Tuttavia, per comprendere appieno il concetto di diplomazia, il secondo capitolo della tesi analizza il caso cruciale rappresentato dalle relazioni tra Libia e Stati Uniti, ed è diviso in tre fasi principali. Il primo periodo (1969-1989), esamina lo sviluppo della dittatura del leader libico Muammar Qaddafi, il quale dichiarò la Repubblica in Libia nel 1969. La sua idea politica era molto conservatrice e fu caratterizzata da un senso di ostilità nei confronti degli Stati Uniti e delle potenze occidentali. Durante

la prima fase delle relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Libia, il Presidente Nixon impose diverse restrizioni economiche al paese. Inoltre nel 1980, a causa di una serie di eventi drammatici e terroristici avvenuti nei confronti dell’America, il Presidente Carter prese la forte decisione di chiudere l’Ambasciata americana a Tripoli. Poco tempo dopo, il Presidente Reagan avviò il suo mandato e fin da subito utilizzò un approccio duro e deciso nei confronti della Libia e di Qaddafi. Dopo aver scoperto il coinvolgimento della Libia nell’organizzazione di un programma nucleare, il Presidente Reagan cercò di applicare un cambio di regime nei confronti del leader libico. Inoltre, il presidente americano decise di implementare altre sanzioni economiche, oltre quelle già imposte da Carter. Durante gli anni di presidenza, Reagan attuò una politica di isolazionismo nei confronti della Libia e dipinse lo stato come “sponsor del terrorismo” di fronte all’intera comunità internazionale. Reagan cercò in tutti modi di ostacolare il desiderio di Qaddafi di ottenere l’uso di armi nucleari, raggiungendo diversi risultati positivi. Tuttavia, durante la prima fase, Qaddafi continuò a perseguire nel raggiungimento del suo piano.

Tra il 1989 e il 1999, la situazione mutò notevolmente. La diplomazia coercitiva applicata alle interazioni tra i due paesi ebbe un esito più bilanciato. Il cambiamento fondamentale avvenne per merito del Presidente Bush che decise di modificare l’idea di Reagan di un cambiamento di regime sviluppando un cambiamento di politica. Questa metamorfosi divenne fondamentale e Qaddafi cominciò a relazionarsi diversamente nei confronti della superpotenza americana. Ciononostante, lo stato Libico persistette nel suo intento di ottenere un programma nucleare e gli attacchi terroristici erano ancora presenti. Bush decise di intensificare le sanzioni economiche, rendendo l’economia del paese più debole e vulnerabile. Tuttavia, il giusto apporto di restrizioni dal punto di vista del commercio, comportò un miglioramento del processo coercitivo che diventò più efficiente, rendendo l’America più potente di giorno in giorno.

Nel terzo periodo, che comprende il lasso di tempo tra il 1999 ed il 2003, diversi ed importanti traguardi furono finalmente raggiunti. Analizzando la situazione della Libia, il vice Segretario di Stato Ronald E. Neumann riconobbe lo sforzo del paese di riabilitare la propria immagine all’interno del contesto internazionale e di allontanarsi dal terrorismo. Dal punto di vista economico, inoltre, la situazione cambiò e ci fu un incremento del numero di importi ed esporti del paese. Pochi anni dopo, il 19 dicembre 2003, Qaddafi annunciò di rinunciare definitivamente all’uso di armi di distruzione di massa. La decisione espressa dal leader Libico fu attuata dopo un processo di coercizione durato decenni e che comprendeva diversi fattori. Muammar Qaddafi cominciò a percepire un senso di insicurezza e timore nella fine della primavera 2003 e decise fosse il momento giusto di accettare le richieste americane. Da sempre Qaddafi negò il possesso di armi nucleari, perfino davanti una forte

evidenza. Nell’ottobre del 2003, l’intento principale della Libia era di distaccarsi dalla politica isolazionista degli ultimi anni e di riemergere come una nuova potenza, riabilitando la sua reputazione all’interno dello scenario internazionale. La scelta intrapresa dalla Libia può essere considerata come la conseguenza di anni di coercizione attuata attraverso l’uso di minacce e incentivi. Infatti, gli incentivi che Qaddafi ricevette erano di differente natura, per esempio: le sanzioni economiche che modificarono l’equilibrio della Libia, la variazione tra cambio di regime e cambio di politica e l’abilità dell’intelligence di occuparsi di un caso in cui gli equilibri sono sempre stati particolarmente delicati. Secondo gli Stati Uniti, la Libia passò dall’essere “sponsor del terrorismo” ad essere un esempio per gli altri stati e gli Stati Uniti invitarono questi a procedere allo stesso modo.

Analizzando il caso della Libia, Jentleson e Whytock nel testo *“Who won Libya? The Force-Diplomacy debate and its implications for theory and policy”* (2005-06), sottolineano l’importanza del ruolo della strategia implementata dagli Stati Uniti che fu capace di equilibrare il giusto numero di minacce, insieme ad incentivi di ogni genere. Secondo la loro opinione, l’uso di stimoli e garanzie positive durante il processo coercitivo permettono di ottenere la conformità delle richieste da parte dell’avversario. Uno stato governato da un leader come Muammar Qaddafi, per essere indebolito, necessita di una forte presenza convinta di non voler accettare nessun tipo di negoziazione. Allo stesso tempo, però, agire con prudenza è fortemente necessario per non comportare inevitabili conseguenze. Dopo il 2003, la Libia attraversò un periodo di ricostruzione dal punto di vista economico e politico. Durante alcune interviste Sayf Al-Islam, figlio di Qaddafi, si lamentò della scarsa presenza americana sul suolo Libico. Dopo la decisione di disarmo nucleare, i riconoscimenti che gli Stati Uniti avevano promesso cominciavano ad essere poco presenti ed era chiaro che non fosse una priorità per la politica estera americana e, infatti, la situazione rimase intatta per diversi anni. Tuttavia, dei piccoli miglioramenti furono implementati, come la riapertura dell’Ambasciata americana a Tripoli. Dal 2009, con l’inizio della presidenza di Barack Obama, Qaddafi continuava a richiedere ricompense e riconoscimenti da parte dell’America e tentò di mostrare la sua delusione al nuovo Presidente. In aggiunta, dopo lo scoppio della Primavera Araba nel 2011 la situazione cominciò a degenerare. Gli Stati Uniti e la NATO iniziarono un’operazione ONU all’interno del paese per fermare la guerra civile e proteggere la popolazione libica, ma Qaddafi tentò di fermarli. La NATO decise di imporre una “no-fly zone” sulla regione per fermare i ribelli. Muammar Qaddafi non aiutò la sua popolazione e decise di voltarle le spalle in un momento particolarmente complicato. Dopo diverse settimane e varie operazioni, la guerra civile cessò e le forze della NATO riuscirono a prevenire un vero e proprio massacro, nonostante il numero di vittime fu notevolmente alto. Quarant’anni di regime cessarono e Qaddafi morì pochi giorni dopo la fine dell’operazione, il 31 ottobre 2011.

In aggiunta, il terzo capitolo esamina i motivi per cui la diplomazia coercitiva è considerata un'arte difficile da implementare. Come è stato precedentemente citato, la diplomazia coercitiva può essere utile e fondamentale in certe circostanze e può aiutare gli stati a raggiungere il più alto livello di successo. Eppure, esistono diverse conseguenze negative che possono derivare dall'uso di una strategia come questa. Il caso Libico, per esempio, evidenzia le diverse sfaccettature del processo coercitivo, mostrando sia le debolezze, sia la forza che uno stato può manifestare in certe occasioni. La diplomazia coercitiva, seppur utilizzata da anni, rimane una misura difficile di cui servirsi. Da un lato, colui che implementa questa strategia deve intimorire l'avversario imponendo la sua forza e la sua supremazia, dall'altro lato, deve cercare di rassicurare il rivale che nessun'altra pretesa verrà avanzata. Questo significa che lo stato in questione dev'essere abbastanza sicuro e convinto nel comprendere dove sia il limite da non oltrepassare. Al contrario, il nemico deve percepire un senso di urgenza da parte del richiedente, abbastanza forte da prendere la decisione di accettare le richieste da lui avanzate. Ad ogni modo, è pienamente riconosciuto che ogni caso sia diverso dall'altro e così il suo risultato. I fattori emotivi e psicologici, per esempio, possono influenzare l'intero processo e portare ad un possibile fallimento.

Inoltre, la diplomazia coercitiva è uno strumento fondamentale in quanto è designato a raggiungere il successo ad un minor costo rispetto le altre strategie. Alcuni autori, come Robert Art, hanno identificato diversi fattori per cui la diplomazia coercitiva è considerata complicata nel suo utilizzo e questi elementi vengono analizzati dettagliatamente all'interno del capitolo.

In ogni caso, gli Stati Uniti d'America si sono ritrovati spesso a praticare questo tipo di strategia. Essendo un'importante potenza internazionale, i presidenti americani hanno cercato un mezzo per imporre la loro supremazia, utilizzando diversi metodi e misure. Tuttavia, come analizzato in precedenza, la diplomazia coercitiva non è semplice e gli Stati Uniti non sempre sono stati capaci di ottenere il risultato sperato. Al fine di assicurarsi un'ampia visione dell'analisi della diplomazia coercitiva, la prima sezione del terzo capitolo analizza due diversi casi di fallimento degli Stati Uniti: Nord Corea (1991-94) e Somalia (1992-94). Entrambe le circostanze mettono in luce le debolezze e l'influenzabilità della strategia se non utilizzata al meglio dallo stato.

La seconda sezione del terzo capitolo, invece, analizza il rapporto tra diplomazia coercitiva e terrorismo. La relazione tra questi due può infatti non ottenere risultati positivi. Negli ultimi anni, alcuni stati, e specialmente gli Stati Uniti, si sono ritrovati ad essere protagonisti nella guerra contro il fenomeno del terrorismo. Sfortunatamente, il terrorismo limita l'uso della diplomazia coercitiva in certe circostanze, specialmente perché spesso gli avversari non sono soggetti identificabili in modo chiaro e possono essere molteplici. La mancanza d'informazione, inoltre, indebolisce il processo

coercitivo ed aumenta la difficoltà di successo. Al giorno d'oggi, il terrorismo ha un ruolo cruciale all'interno dello scenario e degli equilibri internazionali e dev'essere contenuto dagli stati, incrementando la sicurezza nazionale. Nonostante la validità che una strategia come la diplomazia coercitiva può trasmettere, rimane comunque difficile percepire i limiti e le fragilità del fenomeno del terrorismo.

In conclusione, la diplomazia coercitiva rimanere un'arte interessante da conoscere e da esplorare in tutte le sue caratteristiche. Tuttavia, i fattori che possono influenzare il percorso coercitivo sono molteplici e devono essere identificati. All'interno dello scenario internazionale la strategia può essere un elemento utile per il successo, ciò nonostante la sua applicazione può produrre risultati negativi. Al fine di ottenerne la riuscita, è importante comprendere come utilizzare gli strumenti offerti dalla diplomazia coercitiva ed è essenziale differenziare gli attori internazionali e le diverse circostanze politiche, economiche e sociali che derivano dai disparati casi.

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