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Mário Soares and the Carnation Revolution

Between internal duty and transnational relations (1974-1976)

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I would like to thank, for his kind and generous support, comrade Pierre Schori, who helped a young non-Swedish speaking student in need in Stockholm in his path for knowledge. Swedish international solidarity applies for Italian students too!

In memory of my first mentors, Luigi, my father, and Raffaele, my grandfather.

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Introduction

1.0.1 In this dissertation we will discuss the difficult path of democratization of Portugal after the Carnation Revolution. First of all, we want to follow and analyze the several upheavals that shook Portugal in few years, focusing on the period between 1974 and 1976. Clearly the complexities of Portuguese history need an appropriate degree of focus to understand why and how so many foreign observers of the time, no matter how well prepared or expert in judging the trends of their period, not only failed to understand the deep contradictions of Portugal, but even arrived to forecast a long-continuing stability of the Portuguese state under the guise of its old colonialism and the Estado Novo regime. Even while we will closely follow the Portuguese developments, we will dutifully take in consideration the international and diplomatic aspect of those and how the events were also shaped by what happened, or was happening, in the rest of the world and on the many fields on which the Cold War took place.

1.0.2 Second, this dissertation is about Mário Soares and the achievements that he reached both internally and externally thanks to his party, the Socialist Party, and to the network of connections that he managed to build during his exile and with the support of many political figures of primary importance in the Europe of that time, from Willy Brandt to Harold Wilson, united by the common ideal of democracy and socialism and the membership in the Socialist International. Mário Soares was at the same time a political leader, a diplomatic actor and a true statist. His ability was eventually recognized by the very same Kissinger who warned him he would have become the Portuguese Kerensky. The patience, the pragmatism and the commitment to the ideals of democratic socialism, coupled with the network built in Europe and partially in Africa through the Socialist International, allowed him to act as the main protagonist of the Portuguese democratization, to bring the Socialist Party in power and to returning the country to Europe.

1.0.3 Finally, we will study the relationship that existed between the Portuguese Socialists and the Swedish Social Democrats. The strong connection that linked together the PS to the German Social Democrats is well known as many scholars noticed and studied the issue, as it is one of the most exemplar achievements of the SPD and of the fundamental Ebert Stiftung Foundation. The same cannot be said for the bond that came to unite the Swedish SAP and the Portuguese Socialist Party and that is the reason that pushed us in trying to assembling the pieces that composed such a genuine cooperation that has all the

reasons to be brought on higher consideration. As we will see, the Swedes had a major role, in a way, also in the very premises of the Carnation Revolution, as they supported the African liberation movement that were the dramatic origin of the military discontent. Hopefully our findings may help in cast light on the intricate web of solidarity, visits, financial supports and international meetings that united Stockholm to Lisbon through Southern Africa and Eastbourne.

1.0.4 The dissertation will also deal with the proper issues of the Portuguese decolonization. The fall of the Portuguese colonial empire, the first to rise and the last to disappear, is a litmus test of both the Portuguese political events and of the international situation. As the Portuguese struggled to achieve the much needed national unity on how to deal with the colonies and their liberation movements, the confrontation between East and West cast its shadow over the future of the several new states emerged by the decolonization. Despite the confrontation between General Spínola on one side and the MFA and most of the political parties on the other, the Portuguese managed to hold a certain degree of initiative against external threats to the decolonization process and this is a clear sign of resilience of the little iberian country. Unfortunately, as the agreements were signed and the situation in Portugal evolved, the infightings slowly but steadily removed the Portuguese initiative and any possibility to regain it, while civil war in Angola became a reality.

1.0.5 The dissertation concludes that, among many different cleavages that coexisted, the one that, eventually, imposed as the most important cleavage, was oh the role of political parties as means in the political life. On this issue the MFA experienced an increased factionalism and on this lack of understanding many leading Portuguese figures attempted to create a democracy that should have been different from the Western model (and from the Eastern model of people's republic, for those who did not share the Communist orthodoxy of the PCP). The confrontation on this issue has not always been clear though: as we have seen, most of the time it was discussed under the codeword of "pluralism".

1.0.6 Despite many contradictions and failures, the achievements of the Carnation Revolution are impossible to deny: a rapid and generally bloodless decolonization, the eventual transition to democracy after two years of uncertain progresses, the new social, political, civil and labour liberties, and the birth of a political system that showed itself capable to adapt to very different times, as it does still today, as one of the few European exceptions to the rise of nationalism or fanatic populist parties.

The Carnation Revolution breaks out

2.0.1 “You are a Kerensky... I believe your sincerity, but you are naive” US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said to Mário Soares¹. It was September 1974 and Soares was Foreign Minister in the government led by General Vasco Gonçalves. Kissinger did not approve Soares’ opposition to the communists, which he perceived as too weak, well intentioned but ultimately naive. History proved this prophecy wrong, like many other prophecy regarding the future of Portugal. Henry Kissinger, the director of the Office of Iberian Affairs Mr. Ellwood M. Rabenhold Jr. (“I don’t think one can assume that anything, even this book [*Portugal e o Futuro* by Antonio de Spínola], can bring about drastic change rapidly” he said in March 1974) and Communist leader Alvaro Cunhal (“I promise you there will be no parliament in Portugal”, he announced defying the electoral results during an interview by Oriana Fallaci in June 1975). Today we know that none of this prophecies became truth.

2.0.2 When *Grandola, Vila Morena* aired on that 25th of April, nobody outside of Portugal were expecting what was happening or had the means to understand the nature and the origins of the Carnation Revolution. The very idea of a progressive military coup was something quite difficult for most Western observers to digest. Sure, Europe and Iberia in particular were no alien to the military asking for better and freer government. The class of educated officers was fundamental for the eventual fall of the ancien régime in Spain and Portugal, but that was in XIX century. After that, military coups and *pronunciamento* became a feature of reactionary takeover in contemporary Europe. Anyway, what is true for Europe, may not be valid for Africa, a continent where soldiers and officers were often pivotal and sometimes even protagonist of leftwing movements and revolutionary initiative during the decolonization as in the post-colonial stage. Portugal cannot be understood without taking into account the reality of colonial war in its wide colonial empire.

Colonialism and Caetano.

2.1.1 The colonial conflicts were the most important factor that later allowed the Carnation Revolution and that, in a way, prepared the troops and their officers on the ground to become the vanguard of a revolutionary

¹ “Lisbon and Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution”, Tad Szulc, *Foreign Policy* 21 (Winter 1975-76), p. 3.

movement (although not all of them felt to be part of the same revolutionary movement or would have agreed about the matter and the extent of their revolution). Colonialism is also the most prominent feature of Portugal that was perceived by foreign powers and public opinion. Portugal was in fact the most long-lasting colonial empire, whose grip in Africa, even if constantly challenged and often precarious, seemed no less the proof of a secure and stubborn commitment to avoid decolonization. A commitment that resisted even when the relationship between Portugal and USA soared because of the staunch position of President John F. Kennedy. Foreign leaders and government came to know the anticolonial movements better than the democratic opposition within Portugal, also because of the frequent meddling of foreign powers within the diverse framework of anticolonial movement in Portuguese Africa, especially in Angola, where no less than three different and rival anticolonial movements, MPLA, UNITA and FNLA, were competing to challenge Portuguese occupation, win foreign support and ousting their rivals.

2.1.2 António de Oliveira Salazar had a strong position on Portugal's role in the world. Portugal should have stayed in NATO, therefore in the so called Western free world, but this allegiance had no political values besides the common anti-communism. Salazar opposed liberalism and remained true to his ideal of a strong, modest, corporatist and traditional state for all his life. He was so resolute in his will to keep Portugal stable and under a traditional regime that he opposed any risk of change both internally and externally. He opposed decolonization, of course, but he did so with arguments that were clearly at odds with the rest of the colonial powers. On one hand, he believed in the glorious history of Portuguese colonialism and had little regard for the cry of national independence by native populations, which Salazar believed to be benefitted by Portuguese rule. On the other hand he claimed that Portuguese colonialism was unique in its kind: Portugal, while ruling on massive oversea territories, were not superiors to their subjects. Actually, the Estado Novo argued, Portuguese colonialism created a multiracial society where ethnic Portuguese and native Africans stood on the same ground. According to the propaganda of those times, Angola was just like the Algarve: a province in a oceanic and diverse empire.

2.1.3 The lack of flexibility was the main weakness of this radical position. Considering any and each oversea territory as an integral part of the Portuguese nation meant that the government couldn't but rule out any compromise on decolonization. When Goa was occupied and annexed by the Indian forces, it was clear that any attempt to defend the Estado da India was bound to be vain for the severe lack of manpower, equipment and supplies. Nonetheless, the government

ordered Governor-General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva to defend it to the last men, and to resist for at least eight days for the reinforcements to arrive. The actual aim was rather to set an example for the rest of the colonial empire and to the eyes of the world though. Acknowledging the impossibility to resist, the Governor-General surrendered after a formal resistance. Refusing to accept the *fait accompli*, Salazar had him court-martialled and the state press branded as cowards the officers and units who surrendered without an adequate record of fighting. Such harshness shocked the military establishment. "The example of Goa is a precedent which haunts the future we fear" Spínola wrote in his book, bringing up the widespread feeling among the officers.

2.1.4 Besides Salazar's traditionalist attachment to the colonial empire and the propaganda the Estado Novo offered to his allies and enemies (and itself), there were of course much more concrete reasons for the refusal of decolonization. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira feared that, without the empire, Portugal would have been *de facto* absorbed by Spain². The Espirito Santo Bank was instead more worried by the loss of its assets in Africa. When Marcelo Caetano became the new President of the Council of Ministers and begun his attempt to show a soft liberalization of Portugal (called "evolution in continuity" by him) there were hopes for a more realistic approach towards the colonial question.

2.1.5 Commander-in-chief in Guinea, General Spínola was somehow hopeful. Guinea hadn't the same white population of Angola and Mozambique, so the interests of the Portuguese business and of the local black African population were prevalent³. Also, while the other two African colonies could count on the support of the white regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, Guinea was substantially isolated, with Senegal supporting the PAIGC guerrilla. In 1968, few months before Salazar suffered his incapacitating stroke, Spínola realized the war was lost and recommended to regain ground only in order to achieve an honorable settlement with the victorious Amílcar Cabral. And so he did: in the following years the Portuguese Army regained ground thanks to several brave policies implemented by the commander's staff to restore military confidence and win local supports through the incorporation of Africans into the colonial administration and forces. In 1972, when he secretly met with Senegalese President Senghor, who suggested him a cease-fire and to begin direct talks with

² Cfr. "The Making of the Portuguese Democracy" by Kenneth. Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 29.

³ Ibidem, p. 32.

Cabral, Spínola believed to have reached his goal and asked permission to Caetano to proceed.

2.1.6 He was sorely mistaken, as Caetano clearly answered that a military defeat was preferable to a negotiation with terrorist, which would open a precedent for the rest of Africa. Spínola was shaken but this attitude as he saw arising the threat of a new Goa. This led him to the decision to publish his book, whose first and foremost aim was to introduce the much-needed dose of realism into the Portuguese political position. In the meanwhile, PAIGC successfully reacted and proclaimed an independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau in the held territory, where the Soviet Union quickly dispatched modern ground-to-air missiles, which finally deprived the Portuguese of the dominance of the sky. Spínola's "Portugal and the future" was published in this period, and represented the first visible crack in the Estado Novo for the foreign observers to see.

2.1.7 The other fundamental mistake of Marcelo Caetano was the proposed bill that would have equalized the position of non-professional officers of the militia (whose use was extensive in Africa) to those of the Army. This bill and the aforementioned hardline on defending the colonies to the last man, ultimately provoked the rise of the MFA out of the professional grievances that caused so many well positioned and respected military leaders of the Estado Novo to turn against its head, Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano. The initial program of the MFA mainly provided a framework for the transition and for a two-year period open to decide the new political system. It was vague and limited in scope, barely promising a liberal democratic institutional settlement and only opening the possibility to negotiate with the anticolonial movements, certainly not to immediately give in to their request of decolonization and independence, as this opinion was not shared among all the backers of the coup. How it quickly turned into the revolutionary vanguardist movement that General Spínola failed to govern and that assured a quick, even if sometimes chaotic, decolonization, is an ironic example of heterogony of ends⁴.

2.1.8 Previously in Portugal the very existence of a viable democratic opposition was somehow debatable in the eyes of external observers, especially after the murder of General Humberto da Silva Delgado at the hands of PIDE in the Spanish border town of Olivenza. PIDE was itself an important factor in the general ignorance about Portuguese internal struggle against democracy. On one

⁴ And a demonstration of how much it matters, in uncertain times, to have clear ideas, as Melo Antunes had, or a solid organization, as the Communist Party had, in order to shape the political course of a country.

hand, the restless struggle against communists (whether real or phantom) highlighted the presence and importance of the Portuguese Communist Party at the expense of the rest of the fragmented and diverse opposition.. On the other hand, the “red scare” propaganda highlighted the importance of the PIDE itself and also allowed the regime to present itself as a strategical anti-communist bulwark to the eyes of the western observers. The democratic non-communist opposition couldn’t but look petty in comparison to the dreaded communists.

2.1.9 Ironically, PIDE was itself blind that the real threat to the regime existed within the army. This blindness infected also the CIA, whose presence in Portugal was perceived as of little importance by the and Lisbon was mainly regarded as a retirement post⁵. We already mentioned the importance of the colonial war for the emergence of a threat to the Estado Novo in the core sector of the army.

2.1.10 Therefore, when the Carnation Revolution finally ended the Estado Novo, there was a general uncertainty about who these MFA soldiers and officers were and, even more important, what they wanted to achieve. As we said, it would have been difficult anyway to understand the aims and principles of the MFA, its original manifesto being very vague and actually modest, as we said. Five broad groups could be recognized within the MFA once the Carnation Revolution was triumphant.

2.1.11 The most leftwing was “a populist radical group with fuzzy ideological views but with strong military support” that “stood for a vaguely defined people’s power”⁶ and who had very little consideration for political parties, including the PCP. The most prominent leader of this group was Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, commander of the powerful *Comando Operacional do Continente* (COPCON), founded in the immediate aftermath of the Carnation Revolution and that presided over the military operations in the Military Region of Lisbon.

2.1.12 On the same side of the political specter but with a radically different ideology, stood the communist faction, led by Colonel (then Brigadier General and Prime Minister) Vasco Gonçalves. Working closely with the PCP, the procommunist faction was the most powerful: it founded and controlled the Fifth

⁵ “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth. Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 69.

⁶ “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth. Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 89.

Division, in charge of raising the political consciousness of the Portuguese people and soon become a communist political commissariat⁷, it controlled the ministry of social communication and the ministry of labour, it dominated (after the March 1975 affair) the commission that was established to dismantle the PIDE, and it established and controlled a new intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, the SCDI.

2.1.13 Major Melo Antunes was the most prominent figure of another leftwing group which saw the MFA an instrument in the revolutionary process that was to peacefully establish socialism in Portugal. Antunes, a Marxist of the Gramscian school, and his comrades believed in the need of a social support broader than the mere PCP and also recognized the need to cooperate with the other political parties if the MFA was not to be put in opposition to the majority of the population. Therefore, they could not but resent the way the Gonçálvist controlled the MFA and the direction they were undertaking. Their support base was strong in the southern and central military regions of Portugal, whose commander were members of this group.

2.1.14 Another faction had developed the personal entourage of General Antonio de Spínola. This was the most conservative group, whose aim was mainly to remove Caetano, whose leadership was recognized as inadequate, to begin a dialogue with the anticolonialist fighters (whithout rushing the decolonization process and trying to keep some kind of formal link with the colonies) and slowly liberalize the economic and political life in Portugal. It soon found itself outmaneuvered and detached both from the MFA and the political reality when General Spínola tried and failed to disband the *Comissao Coordinadora do Programa* (CCP). This group eventually fell in disgrace after the March 1975 events.

2.1.16 Closer to the political center, the last but not least group represented the professional interests of the officers corps, a fundamental element for the sparkle of the very Carnation Revolution. Counting Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Ramalho Eanes, Major Hugo dos Santos, Major Monge, Captain Casanova Ferreira and Captain Salgueiro Maia among their members, this factions increasingly resented the political line taken by the CCP and believed the MFA was to act as neutral guarantor of the democratic transition on a western model without being involved in active political debate. This position

⁷ Cfr. "Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On", by Hugo Gil Ferreira and Michael W. Marshall, Cambridge University Press (2010), p. 193.

enjoyed a wide support, especially in the cavalry, as emerged in the elections between the various branches of the army in January-February 1975⁸.

2.1.17 Another important factor is the North-South cleavage that divided the country, along with the usual urban-rural cleavage that can be found in most societies. This geographical cleavage was, as usually happens, both socio-economic and political, and invested specially the rural world⁹. The South, particularly in the Alentejo, was dominated by the great landowners and their massive plantations, while the North was characterized by a more modern and dynamic economic sector, with small and medium properties, craftsmanship and a more diversified production of high quality wine grapes, notably the Douro, favoured by the old Methuen Treaty with Great Britain. During the civil war between liberals and absolutist miguelites (1828-1834), it was the North that hosted the majority of liberal movements, revolts and attempted coups against the absolutist rule of King Miguel and that, later, furnished liberal King Pedro VI, former Emperor of Brazil, most of his troops. The South, dominated by the forces of the ancien regime, the landed aristocracy and the clergy, was more supportive of Miguel's cause. As we will see, the political spectrum of the South could not but radically change in almost 150 years, but it still remained until today even if in its evolved form: on one hand, the large masses of disinherited peasantry, employed in the massive farms of the Portuguese economic oligarchy, came to be the base of support and consensus of the Portuguese Communist Party; on the other hand, along with the liberal urban dwellers, the introduction of universal suffrage¹⁰ gave political voice to the catholic community of the North. When the Carnation Revolution will lead to the occupation and, later, the distribution of the land to the farmers through the form of cooperatives, the South and the North will react in the opposite way: an opportunity for a better life, under the auspices of communist ideals, for the formerly oppressed laborers of the South, an outright dispossession of their sweated family holding for many of the Northern farmers. A particularly keen analyzer on this matter was Alvaro Cunhal himself,

⁸ Cfr. "The Making of the Portuguese Democracy" by Kenneth. Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 69.

⁹ Also because most of the major cities of Portugal were, and are, located in the central and northern districts of the country.

¹⁰ The suffrage had always been limited in the regimes predating the Estado Novo.

the Communist leader, who wrote *A Questão Agrária em Portugal*¹¹ trying to assess the situation of Portuguese agriculture and its contradictions.

International background of Mario Soares.

2.2.1 As we can see, in the immediate post-revolutionary period, the Portuguese situation was dire, unstable and shifting. Even worse, the world had no idea who the new leaders of Portugal were or what they wanted. This is why the choice of Mário Soares, returned back of his exile on 28th of April, appeared natural to the National Salvation Junta, when he was appointed Foreign Minister in the first Provisional Government led by Adelino da Palma Carlos.

2.2.1 Mário Soares had indeed a recognized and respected international background, unlike many other protagonist of the Carnation Revolution, and his anti-fascist credentials were undeniable. As a young student, Soares was a leading figure in the Communist Youth of his university (a militancy that he would have later justified with the reasoning that, back then, the Communists were the only to offer a path for young dissatisfied students)¹² and was among the founders of the youth wing of the *Movimento de Unidade Democrática*. He was very active within the electoral committee of General Humberto Delgado. As a lawyer, he represented several opponents and dissenters of the regime, from Delgado's family to Álvaro Cunhal. Most importantly, in 1964, in Geneva, Switzerland, he founded the *Acção Socialista Portuguesa* (Portuguese Socialist Action), now distinctly distant from communism. His opposition to the regime gained him, as many other comrades and colleagues, the persecution by the regime. He faced indeed two exiles, the first in the island of Sao Tome, revoked by the new Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano in an attempt to show an apparent political liberalization of the Estado Novo, the second one in Rome, later in Paris.

2.2.2 In this otherwise sorrowful period, Soares presided over the transformation of the ASP into the *Partido Socialista* during the conference at Bad Münstereifel in Germany, an event for which trips and accommodations were

¹¹ "A Questão Agrária em Portugal", Alvaro Cunhal, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1968.

¹² "Mais tarde, Soares justificaria esta opção pelo facto de ter sido tocado pelo <<apelo à ação>> dos comunistas, e porque <<na universidade, nessa altura, a única presença oposicionista organizada era a das juventudes comunistas. Aí, encontrava a oferta de um caminho. Discutível, nas suas múltiplas implicações, *mas um caminho!*>>", (David Castaño, "Mário Soares e a Revolução" [E-reader version, if applicable], Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012).

completely covered by the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (FES)¹³, the political foundation associated to German SPD. In this period Soares was also focused on gaining international support for the democratic struggle of the Portuguese opposition, with alternate luck. Soares knew the importance of contacts with main European socialist parties, such as the afore-mentioned SPD, the French PS, the Italian PSI, the Swedish SAP and the Austrian SPÖ. ASP could become member of the Socialist International in 1972 thanks to the support and friendship of other members, most notably the SPD. In this period the connection to the SI was an asset also because many of its members were in governing position in their countries. Willy Brandt, already Foreign Minister, became German Chancellor in 1969 and remained in government even if in a junior position even after he had to resign because of the Guillaume Affair in 1974, and became President of the Socialist International in 1976. The charismatic Bruno Kreisky became Chancellor of Austria in 1970. Olof Palme, Prime Minister from 1969 to 1976 and then again from 1982, suffered electoral defeats in 1976 and 1979, which interrupted the otherwise continuous Social Democratic leadership at head of the Swedish government. Labour Harold Wilson was elected UK Prime Minister in 1974 and was succeeded by his colleague James Callaghan in 1976.

2.2.3 Soares knew well how to not be overconfident when it came to put pressure on Lisbon, though. When he was young, he hoped in a change in the relationship between Lisbon and London when a new Labour government was elected and Ernest Bevin became Foreign Minister, only to be embittered by the fact that the British government still agreed with Salazar on the vital topic that Portuguese people was not mature enough for democracy and that no one was in position to substitute the aged Prime Minister and builder of the Estado Novo¹⁴ (which we may consider a correct assumption, considering the many mistakes that brought his successor Caetano to his eventual downfall). The Mário Soares who wrote to Willy Brandt in the '60s was already much more realistic and learnt the necessity to tolerate the contradiction of his interlocutor, whose revolutionary *Neue Ostpolitik* was rather conservative about the relationship with the Portuguese dictatorship, which represented an important economic partner for Bonn.

¹³ Cfr. "West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968-1974: Between Cold War and Colonialism" [E-reader version, if applicable], Rui Lopes, Palgrave Macmillan (28 October 2014 edition), p. 216.

¹⁴ Cfr. "Mário Soares e a Revolução" [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. "Antecedentes".

2.2.4 With this international experience and with a foreign backing that was impossible for most of the other new protagonist of Portuguese politics, Soares assumed the office of Foreign Minister well equipped to improve Portugal's international standing. It is to underline that initially Mario Soares did not imagine for the newborn Socialist Party to lead the government or even to overcome the Communist Party. As he declared in an interview with Maria João Avelaz of *Público*, he hoped that Portugal could become "a tranquil democracy, with a strong christian-democrat party and a liberal republican one", with other parties of the former regime to constitute the new right-wing, while the left-wing a Socialist Party that would be a "minority in relation to the Communists, much like the Italian Socialist Party"¹⁵. But as he would have soon discovered, in order to achieve democratization, to improve Portugal's international standing and to avoid for Portugal to be either a Soviet puppet or a new Chile, there was no avoiding the task to raise the PSP's own standing among Portuguese citizens.

¹⁵ Ibidem, Sez. "O Regresso ao País".

Ongoing Revolutionary Process

3.0.1 Soares and the Portuguese Socialists had to fight on both their sides: on their right, with Sá-Carneiro's PPD, to emerge as the privileged spokesman for the West, and on their left, to avoid a further radicalization of the military and to overcome the Communist Party without losing their own anti-fascist credentials. All this happened in a pre-revolutionary environment that pressured people and media all alike. As we will see, this kind of challenge was present also externally.

3.0.2 The Carnation Revolution surprised the world and Portugal in the same way. From Germany, the PS officially announced support and gratitude to both the MFA and Spínola. Mário Soares prepared to return immediately from his exile to Lisbon on April 28th, where a 5-8 thousand-strong crowd of supporters¹⁶ cheered him, not as the leader of the still semi-unknown PS¹⁷, but as a man who paid his opposition to the former regime that finally could live in his country once more. Speaking with journalists, he highlighted the economic situation, the necessity to institute free trade unions and the importance of the decolonization as main priorities. He also took the chance to specifying how the leaders of the African movements that he met with during his exile, were fighting against fascism and colonialism, and not against the Portuguese people. He warned also about the risk of a possible white separatism that, with the malicious aid of South Africa, could have possibly developed the Portuguese Africa in a collection of new and true "Vietnams"¹⁸.

3.0.3 Despite his enjoyment of this warm and triumphal welcome, Soares could not forget that the Socialists had a long path before they could reach actual political relevance. As underlined by António Reis, the Socialist Party was organized in Germany and in other foreign countries better than in Portugal. The PS needed to get in touch with the people, most of whom did not even know of its foundation, to obtain enough funds to sustain its activities and to achieve an operational organization. Even more troublesome, the very existence and freedom of political parties was yet to be considered achieved for good: General

¹⁶ "Coups in Portugal: Sitrep No. 11", cable of the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1974, April 29.

¹⁷ At this moment, the PS was a little party with few hundreds of members. The former ASP had 190 members (Susana Martens, 2005) and the membership of the PS at the time of Soares return to Lisbon is appraised to be between 600 and 3000 militants (Maria José Stock, 2005).

¹⁸ "Mário Soares e a Revolução" [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. "O Regresso ao País".

Spínola had a natural distrust in party politics while the MFA barely defended the existence of “political associations, possible embryos of future political parties”. Quite troubling and ironically, the MFA program officially proclaimed the abolishment of censorship in one of its articles but, in a comma to that article, it mentioned that a special “ad hoc” commission was to be established to “safeguard military secrets and avoid disturbance of the public opinion created by ideological aggressions by the most reactionary means” through the control of “enterprise, radio, television, cinema and theater”. Spínola and the MFA surely diverged over the aims and methods of such a commission but both of them saw the necessity for its presence in their new Portugal. Clearly most of the new political parties were concerned by these provisions but to protest against them was considered premature and risky: they were still young and weak, and there was still hope to bargain a positive outcome with the support of either Spínola or the MFA¹⁹.

3.0.4 In his first meeting of Mário Soares with General Spínola, the General argued that the Revolution needed to achieve international support and asked Soares to accept the position of Foreign Minister because of his wide network of friendship and contacts across Europe and the world, which he hoped could be the gateway for the return of Portugal in the international community. Soares accepted the offer after the General ruled out that he took part in any way to the assassination of the PAIGC and Guinea-Bissau leader Amílcar Cabral. Soares also specified that he accepted the General’s proposition as General Secretary of the Socialist Party, and not as a mere symbol of opposition to the fallen regime, and advised the General to proceed with the quickly acknowledgment of free political parties. Spínola expressed his concerns about the forthcoming manifestation of the Intersindical, to which Soares assured there would have been an appeal to the sake of order and peace through the television and argued that there was nothing to fear from the celebration of the Workers’ Day²⁰. According to the US Embassy in Portugal, at this point Soares was concerned mostly by two issues: the build-up of the Socialist Party, whose main rival was identified in the PCP, and to avoid the surge of a white separatist

¹⁹ The Communist Party was somehow an exception, since, as we are going to see, it was their program to stick with the MFA and to enforce a revolutionary program through their influence among their allies in the new military establishment. But even the PCP could not trust the MFA as a whole, for the deep differences within the different political branches. To understand whether the PCP has overestimated the possibility to keep the other factions under control is one of the aim of this work.

²⁰ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “O Regresso ao País”.

movement in Angola and Mozambique, as happened in South Africa, Rhodesia and Algeria²¹. This was confirmed on April the 30th in his interview with the RTP.

3.0.5 On the same day, Soares reached the US through the SDP chief for international relations Dingels, who reported to the US Ambassador in Bonn that Soares “hoped US authorities would draw correct conclusions from Portuguese coup, which had nothing to do with anti-NATO feelings”²². It is to be noted that Soares avoided to directly contact the Americans through the Lisbon Embassy and that he would have kept this behaviour well beyond his official appointment as Foreign Minister.

3.0.6 So the first International Workers’ Day since the fall of the Estado Novo was finally celebrated in Lisbon. On the occasion, a display of unity between Socialists and Communists was performed. Soares and Cunhal took part in the procession hand in hand. In his speech, Cunhal supported the unity of communists, socialists, catholics and liberals in the construction of a new democratic society, warned of the risk of reactionary movements supported from abroad, a clear reference to Chile, and promised the end of colonial war and the establishment of an actual party democracy in one year, with the support of the MFA.

Between the USA and the EEC.

3.1.1 The day after, Soares left Lisbon for his voyage in European capitals as envoye of the National Salvation Junta, as asked by General Spínola, but even now it was apparent that he was more than a mere spokesman of the General: he asked support for the Portuguese decolonization process and the national independence of the African colonies and the presented himself and his Socialist Party as the only possible alternative to the Communists who, he argued, were supported and maneuvered by Moscow. Soares met with Foreign Minister James Callaghan and Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London where he expressed interest for the “total support” of both British and American governments for a bloodless decolonization and hoped to meet US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was at that moment in the Middle East, as soon as possible. He met also with Mitterand and with Senegals’ President Senghor in Paris; in Bruxelles with Belgian Foreign Minister Van Elstrand, with MPLA leader Agostinho Neto, with Otto Kersten, President of the International Confederation

²¹ Ibidem.

²² “Mario Soares”, cable from the US EMbassy in Bonn, 1974 April 30.

of Free Trade Unions, who promised him financial support for the creation of free and independent unions in Portugal, and members of the Commission Altiero Spinelli and Henri Simonet, whom he expressed the Portuguese desire to closer relations with the European Economic Community. As a first step, he hoped that Portugal could reach an agreement of association of the likes of the one that was signed with Turkey. Doing so, he expressed the need felt also by the Portuguese industrial and business world.

3.1.2 In Bonn, he met with Willy Brandt. They discussed of the common interests of Germany and Portugal, on the necessity to continue and deepen the bilateral relations and cooperation, and on the possibility of new agreement with the EEC. The SPD expressed congratulations and support for the development of Portuguese internal situation and proposed to prepare a study on the possibilities of cooperation between Portugal and the EEC.

3.1.3 Overall, West Germany had major interests in supporting the new Portugal and not because of new opportunities (beside the possibility for the forthcoming European integration for Portugal). The reason was quite the opposite: the harsh truth is that West Germany had been one of the most vital allies of Portugal during the Estado Novo, certainly no less than United States of America. And on his part, Portuguese Foreign Ministry moved with extreme prudence within German politics, also establishing contacts with the SPD and Willy Brandt himself since 1965, when Lisbon feared a possible victory of the social democrats (which would have actually arrived only 7 years later). The West German elite specially appreciated Marcelo Caetano "soft" reformism and brokered several deals concerning both economic and military provisions and Chancellor Kiesinger even visited Lisbon once it became clear that Caetano government was stable enough after the succession to Salazar²³. Despite his declared will to bring Portugal and Europe together, Kiesinger was eventually forced to try to downplay its political meaning. We have already seen how the SPD kept contacts with both the Estado Novo and the Socialists. Moreover, West German foreign policy faced a dilemma concerning the African question. On one hand, a peacefully negotiated self-determination of the Portuguese colonies would have made the German-Portuguese easier and less politically inconvenient, while also opening up the possibility for new and deeper cooperation between Portugal and the EEC, and West German reputation among

²³ West Germany mostly feared the resistance and a possible coup from the ultra-right of the regime. The possibility of an alignment between different sections of the military and the presence of leftwing opposition among soldiers and lower officers was not conceivable also for Bonn at that time.

African states would have increased as well. On the other hand, the loss of Africa meant a political, social and economic crisis for Lisbon that could have infected also Spain and the rest of Europe²⁴. The outbreak of the Carnation Revolution forcibly ended this dilemma but put at risk the German-Portuguese relations. The mutual interests of the two countries (especially of their ruling class) and the deep political and personal links between Portuguese Socialists and German Social Democrats allowed the Federal Republic to continue a profitable bilateral relation and granted support for Lisbon for its difficult post-regime reconstruction and forthcoming colonial settlements.

3.1.4 In his travel in West Germany, Soares also established contacts with the ambassadors of USA, USSR, Yugoslavia and Algeria. The meeting with the US Ambassador was organized by the SPD politician Hans-Jurgen Wischnewsky and mainly regarded the African policy and the request for a meeting with Secretary of State Kissinger²⁵. Then Soares moved in the Netherlands and in Scandinavia, where he received support from his comrades of the Socialist International. On May the 5th he arrived in Rome where he met with PSDI leader and Finance Minister Mario Tenassi and many prominent PSI figures, among which the old Italian PSI leader and senator Pietro Nenni, who so wrote on his Diary about the meeting:

“[Soares] is totally aware of three difficulties: the solution to the colonial question; the drama of the economic and social situation; the weight of the Communists against whom the Socialists have more popular support and among the middle class but a lower organization.

I ask him if the whites in the colonies (the *pieds noir* of Portuguese Africa) could mount a counter-offensive against General Spínola. He [Soares] rules it out for the time being but not for a close tomorrow if the democratic power fails to take root”²⁶.

3.1.5 In Rome also met with Cardinal Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State. On this occasion he begun a strategy of reapproachment to the Catholic Church that he considered fundamental. Even criticizing the support given by the Church

²⁴ “West Germany and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1968-1974: Between Cold War and Colonialism” [E-reader version, if applicable], Rui Lopes, Palgrave Macmillan (28 October 2014 edition), p. 237.

²⁵ “Visit of Portuguese Socialist leader Soares to Bonn”, cable from the US Embassy in Bonn, 1974 May 7.

²⁶ “Quando il passato ci proietta nel futuro”, Pierpaolo Fontana Nenni, Mondoperaio, 20th December 2009, p. 6; <http://www.mondoperaio.net/archivio-pdf/2009/011%20dicembre/008nenni.pdf>. Accessed September 8, 2016.

to the *Estado Novo*, Soares showed to know and respect the works on civil and social matters by several leading figures of the Portuguese catholic hierarchy and asked for catholic support for the democratization process of the Carnation Revolution, whose new Provisional Government, Soares announced, would have seen the fundamental participation of catholics. Talking with the US Ambassador in Rome, the otherwise un-enthusiast Casarolli described Soares as “intelligent, moderate and well-balanced”, “far from being a doctrinary Marxist”.²⁷ Later, he hold the same attitude in Portugal: first by visiting new Apostolic Nuncio Giuseppe Maria Sensi, ignoring the etiquette that would the Foreign Minister receiving him in the *Palácio das Necessidades*, instead personally visiting him the day before, which is an important signal in a political environment where catholics were unable to organize after 48 years of traditionalist regime; then by paying visit also to the Patriarch Cardinal of Lisbon, Antonio Ribeiro.

3.1.6 Soares considered the anticlericalism of the First Portuguese Republic as one of the reason of its demise, as it alienated the large catholic masses of the peasant world, and considered necessary to avoid the same path. While a secular person heading a secular party, Soares needed to prevent the conservative and reactionary forces still present in Portugal (or in Spain, in a forcibly silent exile) to find an easy ally in an alienated Church. Moreover, Soares considered the catholic support an asset in the difficult task of a quick and peaceful decolonization, also to avoid white separatism in Angola.

3.1.7 After his European tour and his spontaneous display of political sagacity as abroad as in Lisbon, for while it appeared he would have become Prime Minister, as reported by the US Embassy in Stockholm²⁸ and by Pietro Nenni in his diary²⁹. But the Socialist Party was still a paper organization in Portugal and, while acknowledging his competence and shrewdness in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy, neither Spínola nor the MFA nor the other main political forces (the PCP and the broad factions of liberals, democrats and catholics) could sustain a Socialist leadership for the first Provisional Government.

²⁷ “Vatican-Portuguese relations” cable from the US Embassy in Rome, 1974 May 29.

²⁸ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “O Regresso ao País”.

²⁹ “Quando il passato ci proietta nel futuro”, Pierpaolo Fontana Nenni, Mondoperaio, 20th December 2009, p. 6; <http://www.mondoperaio.net/archivio-pdf/2009/011%20dicembre/008nenni.pdf>. Accessed September 11, 2016.

Negotiations in Lisbon and in Africa.

3.2.1 The National Salvation Junta was leading the State in the month following the successful coup but a new, actual government was to be installed. This was the first occasion of division between the General and the MFA. Spínola would have preferred a military government but this option was defeated soon, therefore the negotiations internal to the Junta and the MFA moved on the selection of the first Prime Minister of the Provisional Government (PG). Before reaching an agreement, the name of Raul Rego, director of socialist newspaper *Republica*, was proposed, but Soares quickly dismissed the hypothesis. Raul Rego was a journalist of little political experience and in the PS he was hierarchically unsuitable for the difficult task. In the best scenario, Raul Rego would have been a symbolic appointment, of the likes of those that he opposed in principle also for himself. In the worst, he would have been an easily circumvented Prime Minister.

3.2.2 The other two proposal advanced by the MFA (Miller Guerra and Pereira de Moura) failed to reach an agreement with General Spínola, who eventually successfully proposed and appointed Adelino de Palma Carlos as Prime Minister to lead the first provisional government of the new Portugal. An historic opponent of the Estado Novo regime, Palma Carlos was a wealthy and educated individual, freemason and of liberal background. It was Spínola's intention to build a large centrist coalition around the newly founded Popular Democratic Party (*Partido Popular Democrata*, PPD) leaded by Francisco Sá Carneiro and many other former reformers of the Caetano period. With their aid he meant to marginalize the very MFA, whose radical position emerged as soon as the Carnation Revolution took place. The "3 Ds" slogan (Democratisation, Decolonization, Development) became the password of the MFA from the 26th April onwards and, while apparently similar to the General's plan, it had a radicalism and a demand for resolution and urgency that was incompatible.

3.2.3 In laying out his plan, Spínola extended the participation in government not only to conservatives and socialists, but also to the communists. Their leader Cunhal would have been a Minister without portfolio, while the influential bank clerk and unionist Avelino Gonçalves became Labour Minister. At this early stage, the main parties were basically allied, since they were members of the Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Committee (*Movimento Democrático Português/Comissão Democrática Eleitoral*, MDP/CDE) the main organization of the semi-legal opposition to Caetano, now a loose confederation of anti-fascist and democratic parties which

became increasingly incompatible to each other as current of opinions became factions and factions became parties.

3.2.4 The government also needed the communist participation in order to effectively control and resist the increasing demands of the workers. The Communist Party was indeed capable, through its superior organization, to control *Intersindical*, the union-coordinating organization that later developed into the first trade union of the country, the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (CGTD), since the lift of the ban on unionism that characterized the Estado Novo. Spínola did not want to give in to the demands rising from the union, but he feared a scenario of direct and radical opposition against the working class and the communists united against the new government. Having the communists to participate in the government and to control the Labour Ministry a season of hot social unrest could actually be avoided.

3.2.5 This was a key step for the development plan that Spínola and the leading figures of Portuguese economy hoped to achieve, which was a smooth modernization of plants and techniques and with the progressive adaptation of the Portuguese economic system on the Western European one. Indeed the very same day Alvaro Cunhal came back from his exile, Spínola met with banker-industrialists Champalimaud, Quina, banker Espírito Santo and industrialist De Melo. It was a fairly representative group of Portuguese leading economic oligarchy. Later, Champalimaud would have regretted the moderation that was supposed to with the modernization program: “the excuse of prudence drastically limited the activity of those who had initiative. Any delay in simplifying the economic situation even before restructuring it would lead to a loss of valuable opportunities”³⁰.

3.2.6 Unfortunately, there was no room for compromise between this plan and the communist program. The moderation he asked from them and from the unions was already part of the PCP’s strategy, which took note of the Chilean experience to avoid the same fate of Allende. This explains the necessity, for the Communists, to keep close and warm relations with the military and to seek a new consensus among the the middle class, whose opposition proved to be fatal for Allende in Chile³¹. On the other hand, the resolution to marginalize and strike

³⁰ “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 77.

³¹ As the success of communist-oriented unionization and the appointment of Avelino Gonçalves prove, this quest was rather successful among the lower strata of the middle class.

the two remaining pillars of the previous regime, the great landowners in the South and the oligarchic cartels, grew. This political impasse could be resolved only through the defeat of one of the two options.

3.2.7 On the other hand, General Spínola demanded and gained only what the Communists were only too willing to concede. The PCP learned the Chile lesson: moderation, caution and patience would have been the codewords for the starting communist strategy in any case. Indeed the PCP actively sought to control labour unrest and did so effectively. Spontaneous occupations of land and factories decreased and violence in both workplace and university was generally absent, while the climate remained hot, as strikes and, in most extreme cases, demands to remove former bosses with links to the fallen regime remained regular and continuous assemblies took place of classes in universities.

3.2.8 Furthermore, in Portugal the forces on the right of the center were still silent and unable to effectively organize and raise their voice. Anesthetized by 48 years of traditionalist regime and used to be directed by the regime in its consensus machine (namely the Legion and its youth association) they were also muted by the media, whose censorship, as we saw, was all but removed, and whose left-leaning positions were galvanized by the revolutionary climate. But the catholic community and the conservative rural peasantry in the North were still important constituency. Beside the already mentioned PPD, the *Partido do Centro Democrático Social* was founded in 19th July 1974, its first leader being Diogo Freitas de Amaral, who had been Caetano's favorite student and protégé³². It was founded on the principles of christian democracy, classic liberalism and moderate conservatism, thus it was the first party clearly identifiable with center-right positions, even though, as the PPD, it would have still adopted a leftish label and orientation for the first months.

3.2.9 Another factor Spínola severely undervalued was the American reaction to the presence of the Communists in the government. Unlike the Communists, he did not learn from the Chile experience. If, as Kissinger seems to have declared, Chile is a missile pointed at the heart of Antarctica, Portugal strategic importance was vastly superior. The reason of this importance was the Azores archipelago, seat of an important NATO military base that functioned as bridge between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The Azores proved to be fundamental both in WW2 and during the Operation Nickel Grass, the American massive air-lift which supplied Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

³² "The Making of the Portuguese Democracy" by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 76.

3.2.10 Actually the Azores base of Lajes was actually losing its importance because of the capabilities of the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which were handing the Azores base to the era of obsolescence. Its importance grew because of a non-NATO question, which was the Middle East policy of USA and their need to support Israel in a situation where all the European nations closed down their airport for Operation Nickel Grass in fear of an Arab oil embargo as retaliation. The only exceptions were Portugal and the much less geographically convenient Netherlands. This was enough to raise the importance of the Lajes base from “lowering” to “vital”.

3.2.11 When a Yugoslavian counsellor of Embassy enquired to the US Ambassador in Paris whether the PCP participation in the new Portuguese government jeopardized NATO and Portugal’s position within it, the Ambassador replied that was not the case with Iceland few years before³³. Iceland indeed saw the participation of pro-Moscow Communists in the government under the guise of the left-wing People’s Alliance, a coalition of communists, socialists and left-wing social democrats that was included in a governing coalition for the first time by the centrist Progress Party along with the Social Democratic Party. The Communists, who controlled the Ministry of Fisheries, influenced the government to take an hardline position on the issue of territorial waters, exclusive economic zone (EEC) and fishing rights against the interest of the United Kingdom. The tension between the two countries rose to the point that there three so called “Cod Wars”, all of which saw the US Government eventually supporting Iceland and restraining the British.

3.2.12 The comparison was, of course, substantially wrong. The only thing in common was the presence of a strategic NATO base in the country, which for Iceland was Keflavik, which was the most advanced line of defense against Soviet air vectors and naval operations in the Arctic Sea and the Northern Atlantic Ocean. The rest was of the important factors was different: the Icelandic pro-Moscow communists were merely a faction in the left-wing People’s Alliance, which on his own was a junior partner in a diverse coalition; while in Portugal the right-wing positions were silenced by the revolutionary climate, in Iceland they were strong through the Independence Party which hoped in a quick return to the government; the coalition allies of the People’s Alliance, both the agrarians of the Progress Party and the pro-Western and pro-Nato Social Democrats, were vocally against the most extreme positions within People’s Alliance (especially when, at the peak of the first Cod War, filo-Soviet Fisheries Minister Lúdvik

³³ “Yugoslav Interest in Portugal”, cable from the US Embassy in Paris, 1974, May 22.

Jósefsson went to Moscow to ask for loans in order to acquire more trawlers); the substantial military weakness of Iceland, whose most powerful branch was the Coast Guard, united with the actual legal validity of their case for the expansion of Icelandic EEC, made any hard opposition to the country not opportune and any military intervention out of the question; unlike Portugal, the US government and diplomacy knew very well the Icelandic internal situation and was already used to bargain concession to most of the ruling parties in order to avoid a success of the communists and then of the hardline socialist People's Alliance, to the point that in Washington many bitterly reminded the "dictatorship of the weak" paradox by Otto von Bismarck and considered Icelandic government a clear cut case of "communist blackmail"³⁴, as both the Independence Party and the Progress Party used to exaggerate the communist influence in order to achieve financial and political support to their policies as they argued about the first Cod War "the [Icelandic] Foreign Minister claims that unless he does this the Communists will take over"³⁵. In addition to this, while the pro-Soviet current within People's Alliance was mostly despised by other political parties and media, their crusade to extend and defend the fishing rights of the Icelandic people was nationally heartfelt and united both Left and Right, if not on the methods, at least on the aim of the Cod War, which made it difficult for both Washington D.C. and London to push Reykjavik to concede. Furthermore, the position of the relative NATO base was also more favourable to Iceland in term of internal location than it was to Portugal: as we will see, the detached position of the Azores made plans of support for separatism or for direct military seize of the archipelago possible, while the Keflavik was just 40 minutes by car far from Reykjavik. Finally, back then the US President was Dwight D. Eisenhower: the containment strategy of the US government against communism, and the following doctrine of "roll back" cannot be compared by the strategy of brinkmanship and resolute opposition employed under the Nixon administration. In such a way, 9/11/1973 is a watershed, and both the US Ambassador in Paris and that Yugoslavian counsellor knew it. Alvaro Cunhal and the PCP knew it as well, while General Spínola should have had.

3.2.13 The Carnation Revolution could not have come in a worse moment for the history of the American-Portuguese relations. While Kennedy

³⁴ "How 'cod war' came: the origins of the Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute, 1958-61", Gudni Thorlacius Jóhannesson, Historical Research, vol. 77, no. 198 (November 2004), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

³⁵ N.A.R.A., RG59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Political-Military Numeric Files, 1953-62, Box 15, excerpt from a letter from Dulles to Eisenhower, 7 May 1958

administration tried to push Portugal on the track of decolonization, ultimately failing and achieving only the deep hatred of Salazar and the scorn of his shrewd Foreign Minister Nogueira, Nixon and Kissinger reversed their predecessors' politics, restoring more than amiable relationship with Lisbon and the Estado Novo. Ironically, in that period NATO was progressively opening to the acceptance of the concept of "inter-continental Portugal". The strategy that led to the relationship between Lisbon and Washington DC prior to the coup, could not but negatively affect the future relationship of the two countries. Not only this, even the détente with the Soviet Union, already challenged in the Congress, was at stake because of Portugal, which could have been interpreted as the first failure of Nixon administration in dealing properly with the Soviets, no matter how this charge was actually groundless.

3.2.14 Moreover, not only the CIA lost his primary source of information with the fall and abolishment of PIDE/DGS (for how partial and ineffective that point of view eventually proved to be in relation of the military turmoil) but the US Government was furtherly blinded by the mistrust it placed in its own Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott, albeit there were good reason for it. Just as the CIA seat in Lisbon, also the Embassy became to be considered as a pleasant retirement post. Stuart Nash Scott was an elderly lawyer who lacked a proper diplomatic experience. On the 25th April he was in the Azores, visiting the NATO military base on which negotiations for its renewal were starting. As the military closed the Lisbon airport, Scott was unable to reach its post. So he decided to fly to Boston to attend a class reunion at Harvard Law School in the midst of an armed insurrection. His deputy chief of mission Perry left in Lisbon, instead, was awoken in the middle of the night by one of his guards, a former agent of PIDE, who screamt "*perigo, perigo*" ("danger") at the phone. The deputy and his wife thought it was the guard's name and hung up and went back to sleep, until the military attachés called him in the morning to inform him that there were tanks in the street and military music on the radio. Such an incredible collection of gaffes contributed to undermine the credibility of both the Ambassador and the Lisbon post in Henry Kissinger's eyes³⁶.

3.2.15 Therefore, when Scott reported to the Department of State anything different from the situation that Kissinger imagined (and wanted to see) different, the estrangement of Kissinger and Scott increased, at the expense of the capability of the Department of State to actually know and understand the development of the events in Portugal until Scott was eventually substituted by

³⁶ "The Making of the Portuguese Democracy" by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 67.

Frank Carlucci³⁷. It is interesting to note that Mário Soares could have been somehow conscious of this situation. For many months he indeed ignored the US Embassy in Lisbon, while at the same time he continued to search continuous contacts with the USA and especially Henry Kissinger through a collection of diverse third persons and institutions. While it can be easily understood why he refrained to engage in talks with the Lisbon Embassy before he was appointed Foreign Minister, the same cannot be said for the following period, as the constant bypass of the Lisbon post was a such a violation of the diplomatic protocol and etiquette that Soares, knowledgeable as he was, could not have been unaware of it. Instead he preferred to act in more indirect ways, mobilizing European comrades such as SI General Secretary Janitschek, British Foreign Minister Callaghan and US Ambassadors in foreign countries, especially in order to achieve the much desired meeting with Kissinger.

3.2.16 Kissinger at the time was closely following the Middle East developments on the field, in Jerusalem, and as a result of his little time and less inclination to follow and understand the Portuguese situation (or to meet Soares), his reaction was mostly reflexive and rigid. On one hand, the Portuguese were immediately excluded by the reserved NATO communication in fear of pro-Soviet leaks from the Portuguese communists, a prudent decision since the PCP was certainly not the only (and actually not even the first) Portuguese actor who could have leaked sensitive or politically inconvenient information.

3.2.17 With the disband of the PIDE/DGS and with the overtake of the Foreign Ministry many secret information and data were available for the diverse coalition of revolutionaries. They were hard proof of the close cooperation between PIDE and CIA, of their common operations, of the secret deals between the US Governments and Salazar and Caetano. Most urgently, the recent approximation of the Nixon administration to the apartheid regime of South Africa and the provision of embargoed weapons to Portugal for its African wars, threatened the whole foreign policy of the government and its international reputation.

3.2.18 But also the Communist Party had a major interest in keeping secrecy and reserve on certain aspects of the Estado Novo. The PCP was the most

³⁷ E.g. the description of Cunhal by Scott after a meeting at the Embassy reported him as “an impressive and attractive man” who “makes great point of not being diplomat and speaking frankly and appears to do so. In excellent french he speaks reasonably” to the point that the Ambassador wrote that “in my innocence he impressed me as a man with whom one could deal frankly and directly across the table”. Whether it would have been possible for the US to deal frankly and directly across the table is a question without answer.

persecuted party under the years of both Salazar and Caetano and paid a heavy price for its resolute opposition. But it was not alien to episodes of cooperation with the regime and the number of communist figures who were informants or double agents for PIDE was not a negligible one. Furthermore, the PCP had little interest in exposing all the collusion with the former regime and not only because it was involved in it as well. At this point, as we previously explained, the Communists were still adhering in a policy of constraint and had nothing to win from a premature break-up of the revolutionary unity that would have only weakened the Carnation Revolution itself and threatened even its little initial achievements, possibly favouring a reactionary movement in Portugal or in the white population in the colonies.

3.2.19 It can be said that the Portuguese Communist Party and the US Government had a common enemy in the ultra-left forces within the MFA. Despite the creation of a commission to overview the extinction of PIDE and the inquiry of its activities, and despite the theoretical control on the information that this commission was mandated to enforce, some cases leaked nonetheless, causing scandals at home and abroad. The most severe one was about the assassination of Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC leader, in 20th January of that year, as the involvement of a personal collaborator of General Spínola and the secret services of both Spain and France was exposed. In the weak condition of the Portugal that emerged from the Carnation Revolution, it was a common interest that certain issues remained secret for the time being.

3.2.20 As we said, Kissinger had neither the time or the inclination to share this conclusion. Indeed, while the NATO immediately marginalized Portugal, a new Mediterranean domino theory developed along the lines of the East-Asian domino theory. The main difference between them was the entirely ideological nature of the Mediterranean one. Portugal, an Atlantic country, had only one thing in common with the proper Mediterranean countries to the eyes of Kissinger: the threat by local parties to gain access to the government. The main difficulty for Kissinger was indeed the impossibility to openly accept the Communist accession to government in a European state. Italy and France already have two strong Communist Parties who were realistically aiming to be officially included in a government in short time, either by the election of a left-wing coalition (the alliance of Communists and Socialists in France and the “left alternative” in Italy) or through the inclusion of the Communists in the already existing government (through the “historic compromise” in Italy between the DC and the PCI). In Greece the fall of the military junta and the *metapolitefsi* through democracy guided by Prime Minister Konstantinos

Karamanlis had led to the legalization of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) whose re-union with its eurocommunist split and with another democratic socialist party also risked to join the government. A lesser imminent possibility was also present in Francoist Spain, whose slow democratization could have included the Communists, especially under the eurocommunist leadership of Santiago Carrillo, in the government under the auspices of their French and Italian comrades. To accept the PCP inclusion in the government of Portugal was out of discussion for Kissinger, especially considering the fact that the PCP was not even eurocommunist. Quite the contrary, the PCP was an hardliner of Stalinism until very recent times, and was among the few European Communist parties which supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, on pressure of their leader Cunhal. Cunhal himself was regarded as both a Stalinist and too much pro-Soviet. His return to Lisbon directly from Prague certainly did not help his image among the Americans³⁸. In the words of Pietro Nenni, Prague was an “ugly place of departure”³⁹.

3.2.21 The situation that Kissinger pictured in his mind was therefore quite catastrophic, but the decision of the Department of State to avoid any decision, to wait and see instead of either supporting or opposing the new Portuguese government, would have proved to be like “leaving a small baby in a bath for a week and wondering afterwards why it drowned”⁴⁰. Indeed the situation for the US government deteriorated quite rapidly.

3.2.22 The first show of disunity between the National Salvation Junta on one side and the main political parties, the press and the left on the other. The reason was the exile of Marcelo Caetano and Américo Tomás in Brazil, which meant they would not have been trialed for their responsibilities as Prime Minister and President of the Estado Novo. While all the leaders remained moderate on the matter, both because they were part of the government and because they clarified that it was a decision taken by the NSJ before the installation of the PG they were already aware of, their parties and the press

³⁸ The same can be said about European democrats, socialists and even communists. Cunhal was a thorn in the back of many eurocommunist parties who felt damaged by Cunhal orthodox interpretation and application of marxism-leninist which clashed with their attempt to better adapt to democratic institutions. Notably, as we will see, Cunhal eventually became inconvenient also for the national Communists of Yugoslavia and Romania.

³⁹ “Quando il passato ci proietta nel futuro”, Pierpaolo Fontana Nenni, Mondoperaio, 20th December 2009, p. 153; <http://www.mondoperaio.net/archivio-pdf/2009/011%20dicembre/008nenni.pdf>. Accessed September 12, 2016.

⁴⁰ Cit. “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 79.

were critical. In particular, PCP Central Committee and Socialist newspaper *República* were particularly poignant against the exile.

3.2.23 The first crisis in the Portuguese government happened as soon as June. General Spínola and Prime Minister Palma Carlos tried to curtail the influence of the MFA and of political parties. The two attempted to outmaneuver the MFA (and the political parties) out of their position of power but ended up reinforcing the MFA. Palma Carlos had tendered his resignation to the President unless his proposals aimed to increase the powers of the Prime Minister were met:

1. The main point on which Palma Carlos resigned was his proposal for prompt election for President be held to legitimize position of General Spínola. This not only would have upset timetable set by MFA, but was more risky than convenient for the prospective of the yet-to-born Portuguese democracy. First of all, no one was questioning Spínola's legitimacy; second, if no one ran against Spínola the whole election would be regarded as a farce, like those of former President Tomás; even if genuine opposition candidates ran, this would have broken the collegiality of the PG and divide the country along party lines before the times were mature for it to sustain a return to active partisanship.
2. The second proposal of Palma Carlos was simply inconsistent with the first one: the deferral of general elections from 1975 to 1976. In that case the early legitimacy for the President and the deferred legitimacy for the Assembly would have caused a shift of power and of actual mandate between the two. This too would have changed the agreed timetable of the MFA and, according to Soares⁴¹, would have led to suspicion of just another military junta always talking about democratic elections but never getting to them.
3. The third proposal was to give greater powers to the Prime Minister, including power to legislate without consent of the Council of Ministers. Palma Carlos argued about the instability of such a diverse government, that comprised many different position going from technocratic liberals to communists through catholics and socialists. In particular, Palma Carlos complained about Pereira de Moura, whose attitude was considered uselessly disruptive (and would not indeed have been confirmed in the following government) and the leftist disagreement with

⁴¹ "Soares Views on Palma Carlos Proposals", cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1974, July 16.

him over a new labour law, which of course was a central issue of the new government. The weak points to this position (which mentioned actual facts) and this proposal were two. First of all, beside the aforementioned problems the government was faring quite well, especially regarding the African negotiations with PAIGC, whose steady continuation was actually hindered by the political crisis created in the government by the Prime Minister. Finally this transfer of power to the Prime Minister would have worryingly resembled to the Estado Novo structure of cabinet, where the Prime Minister could act on his own will without the consensus of the Ministers.

4. Last but not least, the only proposal by Palma Carlos which was approved by the Council of State: the appointment of Ministers by the Prime Minister, previously appointed directly by the President (who kept a power of approval or veto to those appointment).

3.2.24 It is clear how this arrangements would have strongly favoured the political power of General Spínola, while would have weakened both the political parties and the MFA. Notably, along with the Prime Minister, also liberal and technocrat ministers tendered their resignation, and also PPD leader Sá Carneiro joined his resignation to the others.

3.2.25 Focussing on the criticism moved by Soares, that the negotiations were going particularly well, we have to consider how that was actually a problem from the point of view of Spínola (and we may say of Palma Carlos as well). First of all, the negotiations started, in a way, behind the President's back: PS executive Ramos da Costa had gone to visit the Norwegian Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party, litt: Workers' Party; AP) in Oslo where he met the Foreign Minister and the subsecretary of State, to whom he reported that Spínola was ready to open negotiations with the PAIGC. After the visit of the Education Minister of Senegal⁴² to Oslo, a Norwegian delegation led by the vice-president of the AP, Reiulf Steen, then arrived in Lisbon to pressure the President to start negotiations. With the Carnation Revolution several informal cease-fire were almost immediately applied in the colonies between the Portuguese Armed Forces and the liberation movements. It was Spínola's opinion that a formal cease-fire was needed as a precondition for the negotiations to start, while President Senghor, who initially acted as a mediator, disagreed with this assumption. Eventually Soares left for Dacar to meet Aristides Pereira, influential

⁴² As previously said, President Senghor of Senegal was the main sponsor of the PAIGC.

figure of the PAIGC and future President of Cabo Verde, but meeting this was and should have been, in Spínola's word, nothing more than a symbol of good will.

3.2.26 Soares interpretation of Spínola's mandate was extensive: once he told him that such a condition was a difficult one to achieve, he instead proceeded to obtain the acceptance with the PAIGC leaders of the current informal cease-fire, and fixed a future meeting in London as the occasion to discuss about a formal one. Then, in Lisbon, Soares went directly to the meeting of the government to present his own program of "active diplomacy" and report that he considered the conditions mature to start formal negotiations with the PAIGC in Guinea, the FRELIMO in Mozambique and MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola. All the other liberation organizations were excluded for their little relevance on the territory. Also Cabo Verde, where no liberation movement was directly active, stood out of the discussion.

3.2.27 The position of Spínola and of other moderates on the matter was clearly different from those of most of the cabinet and MFA as well and it was clear that Foreign Minister Soares was among the most resolute supporters of decolonization and had no sympathy whatsoever towards the dream of a Lusophone Confederation or Commonwealth. Soares and Spínola had different plans and different interpretation for the concept of "free choice" of the local populations in the colonies. While Soares considered autodetermination an unavoidable goal to be reached as soon as possible (which is, before that the white African dwellers could mount a separatist movement) Spínola considered that a free choice could be done only after a certain period of normalization in the colonial rule: under the threat of continued guerilla by the anti-colonial movements, and in a situation of hasty negotiations towards independence, there was no actual possibility to freely choose between independence and the permanence in a reformed Lusophone Commonwealth. And while, as Spínola knew only too well, Guinea-Bissau was after all the most difficult colonies and with less interest and probability to join such a scheme under any circumstances, he was aware that Soares would hold the same attitude towards decolonization also in Angola and Mozambique, and that was the major threat for the application of the plan he outlined in his *Portugal e o Futuro*.

3.2.28 Indeed what mostly troubled the General, were not, per se, the negotiations with PAIGC, but those with FRELIMO. The role played by Senegal, Norway and, later, Algeria in the negotiations with PAIGC, in the negotiations with FRELIMO was played by Zambia, whose President Kenneth Kuanda met with Mário Soares in London. FRELIMO was led by Samora Machel, a charismatic character who moved FRELIMO towards his Marxist-Leninist ideals and defied

General Kaúlza de Arriaga, then military commander in Mozambique and leading figure among the known military adherents to the extreme right-wing. As the PAIGC, Machel immediately ruled out any possibility for a referendum on independence (“You don’t ask a slave if he wants to be free, particularly when he is already in revolt, and much less if you happen to be a slave-owner”⁴³) and refused to establish a ceasefire, even though not only Soares desired to reach it, but even African leaders such as Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, considered a ceasefire and a referendum useful to avoid a future civil war on the scale of the one that was ravaging Congo⁴⁴. The talks were forced to end because of the limited mandate of which Soares was vested, but it was still a first step that allowed the two sides to meet and better understand each other’s position⁴⁵. FRELIMO, as most of African leaders, was frustrated by Spínola’s ambiguity and opposition to the principle of eventual independence but started to understand that his power was far from being strong in Portugal, instead realizing the importance of the MFA, whose positions were sympathetic to those of the independentists⁴⁶.

3.2.29 This fact was finally emerging thanks to the participation of Brig. Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho to the talks in Lusaka. He was included thanks to the pressure put by the MFA of the President. Soares and Saraiva de Carvalho got to know each other during their travel to Lusaka. Then Soares discovered the prominence of the Brigadier in the MFA and his role as one of the “brains” of the Carnation Revolution. The Brigadier also gained the immediate friendship of Soares once he revealed that he considered himself a socialist of the likes of Olof Palme⁴⁷. Despite this, during the first talks in Lusaka Soares had to often hold back the military man as he usually sided with FRELIMO. As a matter of fact, within the FRELIMO delegation there was Jacinto Veloso, a childhood friend of

⁴³ *How Fast the Wind? Southern Africa 1975-2000*, Sergio Vieira, William G. Martin, Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Africa World Press (1992), p. 19.

⁴⁴ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “Nos Governos Provisórios”.

⁴⁵ Soares-FRELIMO Talks End”, cable from the US Embassy in Lusaka, 1974, June 7.

⁴⁶ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “Nos Governos Provisórios”.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

Saraiva de Carvalho⁴⁸. But more than childhood friendship, it was a radical and almost Third-Worldist ideology that commanded Saraiva de Carvalho's position.

3.2.30 These are some of the reasons that convinced Spínola of the urge to act against the influence of the MFA and the diplomatic line supported by Soares. But the admission of only one of Palma Carlos' proposals by the Junta, marked the failure of this maneuver and produced the opposite outcome. Moreover, both the major parties and the press defended the collegiality principle of the cabinet and criticized the former Prime Minister for his attempt to overcome it. The rightist sectors of the government were pointed as the responsible of the political crisis⁴⁹ and President Spínola was forced to appoint pro-communist General Vasco Gonçalves as the new Prime Minister. At the time his political allegiance was still unknown to the public, especially the foreign one, beside the self-evident fact that he was one of the leading figures of the MFA and therefore an opponent of General Spínola. His dubious political allegiance probably benefitted his choice over more open leftist such as Melo Antunes who still could have been by Spínola as the provisional President. The US Embassy in Lisbon reported this uncertain identikit of the new Prime Minister:

Little is known about Col. Goncalves except that he is one of the original leaders of the MFA. Many people have told us in the past that goncalves is a political liberal and he has been called the "ideologue" of the MFA political coordinating committee. Others go farther and label him a "leftist" or "Marxist". One source called him the "most anti-Spinolist" in the MFA. Judging from television interviews with him, Goncalves is calm, a man of few words, and without a sense of humor. [...] He is married and has two children of university age. We understand that he enjoys travel, mathematics, philosophy, music and "good theater."

3.2.31 It was probably at this point that many political analyzers and commenters must have realized that *Portugal e o Futuro* would not shape the future of Portugal, but the MFA program would. There was no room of compromise between the two projects: even to retain Angola and Mozambique for a mere short term, would have meant the prosecution of the very wars the MFA made a coup to end. Although General Spínola had seen a reduction of his power, influence and prestige, he retained the Presidency and the support of the

⁴⁸ "Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo" (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 213.

⁴⁹ "Spinola Accepts Resignation Of Prime Minister; New Government To Be Formed", cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1974, July 12.

NSJ. His capability of initiative to block the application of the MFA was anyway irretrievably curtailed. The next phase of negotiations with PAIGC and FRELIMO and the beginning talks about Angola showed that.

3.2.32 Before analyzing the process of those negotiations and their consequences and reactions, though, it is useful to explain further the reasons of the odd alliance that naturally emerged between the anti-colonial liberation movements and the old clandestine opposition in Portugal, especially the MFA, as this unique alliance between colonialist officer corps and its opponents, albeit temporary, proved to be irresistible. We already mentioned the basically human need for many soldiers and officers to put an end to an unwinnable war, but that alone does not explain the solidarity that ensued and held even when the possibility for a *divide et impera* strategy was viable (which was the case in Angola).

3.2.33 PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA were always careful on the matter: they distinguished the Portuguese regime, against which they were fighting, and the Portuguese people on which they counted for support⁵⁰. Indeed they had several contacts with the anti-Salazar underground in the metropole and that proved to be a valuable asset in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. On the other side, as the MFA explained in one of its bulletins:

“Those who benefited from the war were the same financial groups that exploited the people in the metropolis and, comfortably installed in Lisbon and Oporto or abroad, by means of a venal government obliged the Portuguese people to fight in Africa in defense of their immense profits”⁵¹.

3.2.34 Marxism, in his various and sometimes contradicting interpretations and declinations was clearly another vector for convergence, as it furnished the ideological framework to achieve such a moral equalization of the Portuguese and the African people as both victims of the same dictatorship.

3.2.35 In addition to this, both the MFA and the liberation movements shared a common hostility to liberalism. For the African side, the influence of Marxism and third world ideals was an important factor in this rejection of liberalism, to which imperialism was seen as the natural prosecution abroad. Neocolonialism was just a more refined version of old fashioned colonialism, more adapted to represent the need of free trade and the preference of economic

⁵⁰ “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 98.

⁵¹ Ibidem.

dominance over military occupation that were to define the new capitalist system.

3.2.36 In Portugal this resounded with a similar hostility. Liberalism was politically bankrupt in Portugal among the military opposition to the regime. After all, what led to the regime Salazar were the ineffective liberal rule and contradictions that exploded in the country when it struggled between a precarious constitutionalism at home and a difficult colonialism abroad. The contradictions of liberalism were unleashed on the Portuguese people without being understood by the political elite. The advent of individuals liberties was coupled to removal of the few traditional protections that the lower classes had enjoyed, while the adoption of free trade meant that a backward country such as Portugal, with an almost non-existent industrial base and with few exports being mainly agricultural luxuries as wine, meant the impossibility of the sustained growth which should have offset the downsides of economic liberalization for poor people, and the total subjugation of the country to stronger foreign countries which had an already developed and expanding industrial base. In this last specific regard, the MFA shared the opinion of Salazar and his Foreign Minister Nogueira, that liberalism led to the dominion of strong countries over weak countries through economic power.

3.2.37 Last but not least, being the end of the hostilities the main (and in a way, the only) clear objective for which MFA had ousted Caetano and started the revolution, the liberation movements had the power to decide over their course of action freely: they did not expect a political revolution to happen in Lisbon and were therefore prepared for a long prosecution of their fight against the Portuguese troops. PAIGC was recognized by over 80 countries as the independent Republic of Guinea-Bissau and was even accepted in the United Nations Organization in November 1973, in an unprecedented move which ruled the Portuguese presence as an illegal occupation. Only Cabo Verde was considered by PAIGC to be eligible for a theoretical referendum, being under actual control of the Portuguese. FRELIMO was even more combative: it was in its leaders and fighters' heads to continue their guerilla for many years to come when the Carnation Revolution happened. Now they were ready to ask for nothing less than the recognition of the independence of Mozambique and of FRELIMO as the only representative organization of the people before they would agree for a ceasefire. To reinforce their position, FRELIMO indeed resumed military operations during that summer, encountering little to no resistance from the Portuguese Armed Forces who preferred to remain in their

barracks. This made the position to resist the independentist movement untenable.

3.2.38 The new government could therefore proceed with the application of the MFA program and Soares had now an easier path to bring forward the negotiations without being restricted by Spínola. Moreover, July saw the establishment of the powerful COPCON led by Saraiva de Carvalho and the emergence of the leadership of General Francisco da Costa Gomes, who was, as the number 2 behind Spínola, the main figure behind the decisions taken by the Junta in compromise with the Coordinadora of the MFA. Indeed the Gonçalves government survived his first months with the cooperation of both the Coordinadora and General Costa Gomes. The rest of the summer saw a reprise of the talks in improved conditions both for PAIGC and FRELIMO as well as the recognition of Portugal by an increasing number of countries, notably Yugoslavia and Soviet Union: the latter's opening towards the Portuguese government was specially important, as the decolonization have yet to take place, although this was not welcomed by all the African states. Other international successes were achieved as Portugal was recognized by other Eastern states, from DDR to Romania, and African states, such as Tunisia and Senegal. On August 29th Soares hold a speech at the UN General Assembly defending the "new Portugal" who had nothing to do with "the Portugal so much repeatedly condemned within the United Nations"⁵².

3.2.39 Now without the former impositions, Soares successfully negotiated agreement with PAIGC for the national independence of Guinea-Bissau, which was signed on August 26th. PAIGC achieved the recognition without any condition for the mainland, while it conceded the ceasefire and that Cabo Verde would have been dealt separately. Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, who previously longed for unification of Portuguese Guinea and Cabo Verde, now opposed to the separation of the archipelago but PAIGC itself resisted to this pressure⁵³. On this matter, the USA considered the archipelago as strategically useful, but not necessary for US or NATO need, noting that the only threat would have been for the archipelago to fall in hands hostile to Western allies, who could realize an aerial, naval and surveillance operational base in the Atlantic⁵⁴; US stance was therefore to see the archipelago

⁵² "Mário Soares e a Revolução" [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. "Nos Governos Provisórios".

⁵³ "Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Relations", cable from the US Embassy in Conakry, 1974, August 29.

⁵⁴ "Strategic Importance Of Cape Verdes", cable from the US Department of State, 1974, June 26.

“being denied to element hostile to US interests” but the US was also aware that the possibility for Portugal to keep the territory, even through a trusteeship, was nil, both for political and economic reasons⁵⁵. The American position was, therefore, eventually neutral towards both Spínola and Soares, who respectively met with President Nixon in the Açores and Secretary Kissinger in Ottawa. Nixon, while very cordial towards the General, did not open for any specific support for Spínola or his postcolonial projects, as he was surely stumped by the Watergate scandal that occupied his mind and time and also made impossible for him to have an personal initiative in diplomacy also for political reasons⁵⁶. Considering the forces already on Soares’ side, this moderate approach benefitted Soares and his decision to grant independence to Cabo Verde once its separation from the mainland was secured⁵⁷. Guinea-Bissau was officially recognized by Portugal on September 10th. Cabo Verde, for its peculiar situation, remained detached for the moment, but an agreement would have been found in December 1974, with June 1975 set as the date for the independence of the colony.

3.2.40 On the other side of Africa, the negotiations with Mozambique were more troubled. As noted by the US Embassy, the outcome of Guinea-Bissau could not but increase the expectations in the rest of Africa, although Soares optimistically said Guinea would have not set a standard for the other negotiations. Actually, Soares himself was less involved in the negotiations with FRELIMO than he was with PAIGC, mainly because of the increasing activism of the MFA, especially Melo Antunes who even held foreign meeting on his own initiative, as he did in Tanzania. The Portuguese position was to establish a coalition government in Mozambique to hold constitutional elections and prepare for the independence of the country. FRELIMO instead demanded for the recognition of FRELIMO as the only interlocutor in Mozambique and for the independence without conditions and was ready to back those demands with military actions if needed. On the first point, whether it was true or false, it was of little importance for Soares and the MFA as their first and foremost necessity was to avoid a civil war. Particularly troublesome was the activity of Jorge Jardim, former Secretary of State under Salazar and then Consul in Mozambique,

⁵⁵ “Future Of The Cape Verde Islands”, cable from the US Permanent Representative to UNO, 1974, July 12.

⁵⁶ Once again, US consideration for Portugal, and subsequent opportunity to intervene, are thwarted by other circumstances that draw most of the attention of the US government at the expense of the Portuguese situation.

⁵⁷ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “Nos Governos Provisórios”.

at this time fell out of grace. The suspicion was confirmed when Samora Machel showed Soares a letter he received from Jardim, who offered him a mercenary force in exchange of his inclusion in the state-building process of the new Mozambique. The unity and position of strength of FRELIMO eventually achieved a mediation strongly favourable to the liberation movement, as a coalition would have to be formed with ⅔ controlled by FRELIMO. More importantly, Portugal was denied his demand to “save her face” which is to assure Mozambique would have had free and fair elections, but the alternative was the resume of the fight. Therefore the three Portuguese negotiators, Soares, Melo Antunes and Almeida Santos threatened to resign if Spínola was to veto the agreement. According to the agreement of September 7th, Mozambique would have received full powers and independence by the Portuguese on June 1975.

3.2.41 The white population of the colony, which in 1974 amounted to 250'000, manifested in opposition to the outcome of the negotiations though. After disorders in Lourenço Marcos caused by the defacement of a Portuguese flag by FRELIMO militants, the white population surged in the Movimento Moçambique Livre and occupied several buildings in the capital, such as the radio station and the airport. Some imprisoned PIDE agents broke out of prison and around twenty thousand people massed on the streets asking to be consulted about the future of Mozambique, as the massing of South African troops on the borders contributed to the risk of an extended civil war. General Costa Gomes quickly faced and solved the explosive situation by deploying the Portuguese troops to restore order. In the meanwhile, Soares, with Almeida Santos, was become the *bête noire* of the white settlers, mostly because of his public figure as the first proponent of the “acceleration of decolonization”. As most of those settlers would return to Portugal, firstly for fear, then for banishment of the independent FRELIMO government, Soares would have newly encountered them in Portugal, with very little possibilities to gain their electoral support.

3.2.42 Outmaneuvered in Lisbon, Spínola had still an opportunity to retake his political and diplomatic initiative through Angola. Angola was the colony where the Portuguese had most of their successes in countering the liberation movements. The main reason for this was in the fragmentation of the anticolonial struggle. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was the most important of these movements, even though its military capability did not mirror the political capabilities of MPLA. MPLA was strong in the urban part of the country, especially in the capital Luanda and the nearby slums, the *musseuques*. In addition to this, support for MPLA was concentrated in

the strategically located central regions of the country, from Luanda to Malange and among the 1.3 million strong Kimbundu (or Ambundu) people, one of the main four ethno-linguistic groups of Angola. MPLA and was staunchly critical of both racism and tribalism: this is why many *assimilados*⁵⁸, mulattoes and even whites had achieved to reach the higher echelons of the MPLA from the beginning⁵⁹. Agostinho Neto was a charismatic and smart leader, who made good use of his connections abroad and in Lisbon. Neto was in friendly relations with the historic leaders of PAIGC and FRELIMO, and received a certain support from the Nordic countries, especially Sweden. Moreover, he already met with Soares, which meant he was in several ways advantaged over alternative Angolan leaders as the representative of Angola abroad no matter what. On the other hand Neto and MPLA were hindered by the strong factionalism of their organization: the Eastern Revolt, strong among the Ovimbundu people and led by Daniel Chipenda, opened a dangerous flank that was susceptible to external attacks (and Spínola knew this only too well). But even with its factionalism, or maybe also because of it, MPLA remained the recipient of the considerable support by USSR and Cuba, whose aid and political support was always destined, if not to the MPLA as a whole, at least to one of its factions.⁶⁰

3.2.43 The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was the strongest among the military opponents of the Portuguese in Angola. Led by Holden Roberto, FNLA was the protagonist of both a stunning succession of different foreign sponsors and a bloody streak of massacres against whites before the Carnation Revolution. The main ally for Roberto was Zaire and his President Mobutu Sese Soko. FNLA was also supported by the Kennedy administration in 1961, by Israel in 1963-1969 and by the People's Republic of China in 1964. Support for FNLA was strong especially in the Bakongo backlands of the North.

3.2.44 The National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was the only group that agreed to a ceasefire with the Portuguese in June and already opened its negotiations with a variety of white civilian and business group. In mid 1974 UNITA was the minor threat for the Portuguese. Consisting in no more than 1000 trained guerrillas (but probably the number was closer to 400)⁶¹ with

⁵⁸ The natives whose language, culture, education and habits were Portuguese.

⁵⁹ "The Making of the Portuguese Democracy" by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 99.

⁶⁰ See Appendix B1 and B2.

⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 101.

ancient and inadequate weapons, it was strong among the Ovimbundu group, the same ethnic group of its leader Jonas Savimbi. Its operational base was the eastern province of Moxico. UNITA had enjoyed the dubious benefit of being supported by both the apartheid regime of South Africa and the USA and Savimbi was suspected to have been under a covert protection from Portuguese military intelligence and PIDE for some years, with the aim to divide the the liberation movements and to use tribalistic divisions against MPLA. This bad reputation was reflected in the fact that the Organization for African Unity (OAU) recognized at different times both MPLA and FNLA but never recognized UNITA until the last minute, between 1974 and 1975. It was the earnest opinion of Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho (Portuguese high commissioner in Angola), anyway, that these charges against UNITA were exaggerations supported by its enemies and that UNITA was a genuine liberation movement, albeit a local and tribalistic one⁶².

3.2.45 As summer was ending, the split within MPLA became more apparent. The Congress held in Lusaka on August 8th saw the 400 delegates present divide in three factions: 165 for Neto; 165 for Chipenda; 70 for Mário de Andrade, former president and founder of MPLA and now leader of Active Revolt, another faction of the movement. While Neto retained his international prestige and network, Chipenda led the major fighting force. The congress, whose aim was to re-unite the MPLA, failed: Neto's faction left and the rump congress elected Chipenda president, which had of course very little effect. The Soviet role in the matter was, as for any other foreign power, dubious: it had supported Chipenda until 1973, when USSR, after inviting Neto in Moscow, informed him of an assassination plot by Chipenda, so it was again supporting Neto.

3.2.46 In this scenario, General Spínola considered to have a good opportunity to enforce his ideas and to recover his initiative at the expense of the MFA. In Angola there were still 60'000 Portuguese soldiers, supported by an extensive network of paramilitary units, and the PIDE, renamed Police of Military Information (PIM) was still operative in the region under the authority of the chief of staff⁶³. As Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho said about Angola:

"... in Angola, the Portuguese forces controlled practically the whole of the territory. The movements, to some extent, were being defeated [...] The MPLA was virtually defeated by a military viewpoint. Of course, this situation subsequently complicated the decolonization problem, because the

⁶² Ibidem.

⁶³ Ibidem.

movement with the greatest political support was at the time militarily the weakest”.

3.2.47 Since his recent internal defeat and the lack of reliable and powerful allies in Lisbon, he needed an external support. He found it in the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Soko. Spínola's public plan accounted for a two-years period of transition for Angola, with a provisional government with the participation of the three liberation movements together with representatives of the major ethnic groups and the white population. Then constitutional elections with universal suffrage would have taken place. The two presidents met secretly in Sal, an island in the Cape Verde archipelago, on September 14th 1974. Spínola's hostility towards Neto was renown (“He received his orders from Moscow” argued when insisting that no negotiations should take place with the MPLA). According to Coutinho, the secret plan basically consisted in installing Holden as Angolan leader, with Chipenda and Savimbi at his side, and to eliminate Neto from the equation. Chipenda was preferred by Mobutu as the Eastern Revolt supported autonomy for Cabinda, the Angolan exclave that bordered with Zaire, and was regarded by both Mobutu and Spínola as persuadable. The idea of Foreign Minister Soares was once again different, as he considered to recognize only the liberation movement acknowledged as such by the OUA, MPLA ad FNLA excluding UNITA, at that time still not recognized by the OUA. Mobutu reached out to Julius Nyerere, resident of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, to achieve support for the plan of Sal.

3.2.48 Spínola, on his own, continued with his internal plan to reinforce the NSJ at the expense of the MFA and was also slowly working his way within the *Coordenadora*, the coordinating committee of the program (CCP) to spread and sponsor his idea for decolonization, which, after Mozambique, now gained a more significant appeal. The MFA reacted during the summer by expanding its base, so that from a mere membership of 350-400 officers, of which only 100 were active, it reached over 2000 members at the time of September. After a difficult summer, Spínola was nonetheless gaining some results in imposing himself through his presidential position. His official proposition for Angola⁶⁴ was now relatively popular, his meetings with Mobutu allowed him to regain the diplomatic initiative he wished for and he obtained to establish a decolonization

⁶⁴ The project was the same that he previously sustained for the other colonies: a transitory government that would have organized a referendum in few years, with the aim to establish a Lusophone confederation.

committee under his aegis. Whether it was *hybris* or fear for the solid powerhouse of MFA, he decided a showdown was useful for his goal.

Silent majority and shady minority.

3.3.1 In the morning of September 19th over 50'000 green posters appeared in Lisbon⁶⁵. The featureless figure of a stylized man had the words "*maioria silenciosa*" in the place of his mouth. A clear reference to the words used by Nixon to mention the alleged silent majority of Americans in favour of the war in Vietnam. The poster read: "Rally in support of General Spínola: no to extremists, yes to firmness and fidelity to program of Armed Forces Movement⁶⁶". The poster was anonymous and no date or location were set, which raised many concerns and allowed the Left to accuse the whole episode to be a fascist provocation to tarnish Spínola's name and to split the MFA. *República* accused Francisco Hipólito Ravoso, relative of the editor of the independent conservative weekly *Tempo Novo* and already under suspension for 60 days by order of the MFA, to be among those behind the campaign. Also General Galvão de Melo, a conservative member of the NSJ, was among the leaders of the campaign.

3.3.2 As the US Embassy in Lisbon reported, the original idea was to organize a rally for "Fatima and Patria" on the 13th October, following the celebrations for the Virgin of Fatima in which hundreds of thousands of faithful were expected to participate⁶⁷. Instead the date was then set to 28th September in the Praça do Império in Belém, Lisbon. The reaction of the government, the Left and the MFA was resolute and strong. The manifestation was banned by the MFA, the Minister of Social Communication reads a statement of the Provisional Government against the manifestation in the radio issued every half hour and many personalities of the old regime are preemptively detained⁶⁸. The Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the several minor leftist parties both protest against the demonstration and call for popular unity and watch against the reaction, which concretizes also in the form of street barricades. The slogan "*maioria silenciosa*" is overturned in the "*minoria tenebrosa*", an accusation to the shady organization of the campaign and its links with the old establishment of

⁶⁵ See Appendix B10.

⁶⁶ Once again, the vagueness of the original program of the MFA allows every side to claim his own fidelity towards it.

⁶⁷ "Posters Calling For Pro-spinola Rally Appear" cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1974, September 20.

⁶⁸ "Possible Coup Attempt", cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1974, September 28.

the Estado Novo, while the stylized man of the silent majority is defaced into a grotesque general that displays a Nazi military decoration and the symbol of the dollar on his epaulettes.⁶⁹

3.3.3 The opposition against Spínola succeeded and no rally took place on the 28th September, besides the military patrols and checkpoints, a meager 2'000 people before the Presidential Palace and other 1'500 in a peaceful counter-manifestation called by the MDP. Two days later, the President resigned and was substituted by General Francisco da Costa Gomes, who once again showed the truthful nature of his nickname gained since the times of the late Estado Novo regime, "the crow", for his political moderation and inscrutability that allowed him to be and remain an authoritative figure among the high military officers in ever-changing political conditions. At the same time, the MFA finally proceeded to purge the National Salvation Junta of its most conservative figures, such as aforementioned General Galvão de Melo, Manuel Diogo Neto and Jaime Silvério Marques. Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves rejoiced for the victory over the reactionary forces, while the MFA concluded his reinforcement by instituting the Council of Twenty as the new official organ of the MFA leadership.

3.3.4 In addition to this, President Costa Gomes allowed the creation of the Fifth Division, a political organ whose aim was to raise the political consciousness of the Portuguese through an effective propaganda⁷⁰. Led by well-known communist Colonel Varela Gomes, the Fifth Division played a major role in the radicalization of the country and after March 11th it greatly intensified its activities.

3.3.5 Meanwhile, in Africa, the MPLA solved the fracture with the Andrade faction but Chipenda's Eastern Revolt remained a major threat. It was Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho who thwarted the Spínola-Mobutu plan to remove Neto. Coutinho, dubbed by Spínola and the white settlers as "the Red Admiral", had a vicious hatred towards the FNLA and notoriously regarded President Mobutu as a "black fascist". Rosa Coutinho distributed financial assistance to the liberation movements, but doing so he heavily favoured Neto and his MPLA.

3.3.6 Therefore, the plan laid out in Sal failed for several reasons. It failed for further political defeats of President Spínola in Lisbon, that forced him to resign in September 30th, and for the MFA stance in Luanda, especially because of Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho's resolution in supporting Neto. Thanks him, a

⁶⁹ See Appendix B11.

⁷⁰ "Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On", Hugo G. Ferreira and Michael W. Marshall, Cambridge University Press (1986), p. 193.

new basis for negotiations was settled and, under the patronage of President Boumédiène, Agostinho Neto and Melo Antunes met in Algiers in November 1974 and negotiated the much wished ceasefire agreement, followed a week later by a similar agreement with the FNLA.

3.3.7 Foreign Minister Mário Soares met with Roberto and Savimbi who agreed to a FNLA/UNITA treaty for peace and cooperation towards national independence. Soares then met with representatives of FLEC, the movement that asked for the autonomy of Cabinda, but he underlined how the territory would have been part of the future Angolan state. He met with Chipenda, whom he told Portugal would have recognized Neto as MPLA leader. Therefore, as UNITA eventually achieved the OUA recognition, the trinity of liberation movement would have been composed by only MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, while Chipenda's Eastern Revolt, FLEC and white settlers would not have been represented. After the FNLA/UNITA agreement of November, a similar treaty between FNLA and MPLA followed in December, while in January 1975, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA met in Mombasa and agreed over a common position for the upcoming negotiations with Portugal and in defense of national integrity and independence, a principle already accepted by Soares on December. The discussion was therefore on the means and procedure of the independence.

3.3.8 The first following meeting was held at the heavily guarded Penina Hotel in Alvor, Portugal. The Portuguese side was led by new President Costa Gomes, Mário Soares, Melo Antunes and Rosa Coutinho. The outcome was the so called Alvor Agreement. The territorial integrity of Angola was reasserted; a transitional government would have been composed equally by the three liberation movements, with a Prime Ministerial College with rotating Premiership at its head, composed by three representatives of the movements; the high commissar and vice admiral Rosa Coutinho would have stayed on his role to control security and defense and a Portuguese arbiter, while the Angolan Defence Forces would have comprised 48'000 soldiers: 24'000 Portuguese and 8'000 from each liberation movement, but no means to verify the application of these provisions were set⁷¹; any decision of the ADF was to be approved by all the four military headquarters. The timetable set 11th November 1975 as the date for the independence, imposed a period of nine months for the following government to organize constitutional elections, and fixed the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops by February 1976.

⁷¹ "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation" by Donald S. Rothchild, 1997.

3.3.9 At the end of the meeting, Agostinho Neto paid a meaningful tribute to the Armed Forces Movement, calling it “the Fourth Liberation Movement”⁷². Soares saluted the agreement with joy and relief and underlined that under the current circumstances in Angola it was not possible to achieve a better result⁷³. But the weak point of such an agreement was clear: it could not hold without the mutual trust between the liberation movements. Moreover, it excluded important ethnic groups from representation such as the Bakongo people, beside of course the white population, and obviously angered the FLEC. The contradictions of the agreement and the rivalry between the liberation movements would have soon proved unsolvable by the weak transitional government and thus the 11th November 1975 marked the beginning of the Angolan Civil War, which of course became the typical African proxy war between the Soviets, who supported the MPLA along with Cuba and the DDR, and the Americans, who sided with FNLA and UNITA along with South Africa and Zaire. Over 500’000 civilians would have lost their life in the civil war.

3.3.10 The Alvor Agreement also displeased Kissinger, who could not accept the participation of MPLA to the transitional government of Angola, and much less Neto actual protagonism thanks to the favoritism he received from Rosa Coutinho. It must be noted that Kissinger and the African analysts of the US Department of State have widely different evaluations and opinions on what to do on the matter, but Kissinger had little trust and consideration for their category and replaced many of them. The same fate arrived for the US Ambassador Nash Scott, who was finally substituted by Frank C. Carlucci in January 1975. US Ambassador Carlucci arrived in Lisbon with the support of an extraordinary team: Herbert Okun was his deputy and Colonel Robert Schuler was the defense attaché. The three were fluent in Portuguese as they in Brazil with Walters, CIA Deputy Director, at the time of the American backed coup against President Goulart⁷⁴. The US Embassy in Lisbon was ready to become a vital source of information for the Department of State once again, but the presuppositions of the Secretary of State remained. While he realized that it was impossible to hope for the Communists to disappear, he also noted how the moderate forces were actually capable to win the confrontation in Portugal, and

⁷² “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 104.

⁷³ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “Nos Governos Provisórios”.

⁷⁴ “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 95.

specifically identified in Mário Soares the best opportunity in this sense. But, as Maxwell reports, when Carlucci argued that Soares was “the only game in town” Kissinger shouted in dismay at his staff: “Whoever sold me Carlucci as tough guy?”⁷⁵.

3.3.11 In Washington D.C. the situation was dire. Nixon was forced to resign in order to avoid the impeachment and the consequences of the Watergate also damaged Kissinger, while confidential and secret informations, especially those regarding the CIA activities abroad, risked to be easily leaked to the press. The fact was enough troublesome per se, but it also prevented further actions for fear of a rapid and inopportune exposure. This doubled the threat that was firstly perceived when it became clear communist and pro-Soviet forces were present in NATO chain of command through Portuguese MFA. After the African negotiations and the failed showdown forced by Spínola, now non-aligned and even Soviet allies were going to govern in Africa while in Portugal the MFA and the Communists were reinforced. The pessimism was consequently higher than usual. In a conversation between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Kissinger expressed his concern about Portugal, saying that there was “a 50% possibility to lose it”. Schlesinger replied that they already had a contingency plan that consisted in supporting the local independence movements taking over the Azores⁷⁶. At this end the US Embassy in Lisbon had previously reported any significant development in the little Pacific archipelago since the local Consulate was contacted by Nunovas Cocabaralda Camara, an aged exponent of the Azorean wealthy elite, who asked for financial support for his movement⁷⁷ but did not took action in that sense or to damage Portugal in any sense and refused to encourage Camara⁷⁸, but clearly the Azorean political climate was under special attention in case of need.

3.3.12 While the US government reorganized its approach towards Portugal and tried to improve its standing in the region with alternate luck, in Lisbon the effect of the end of African negotiations begun to erode the national unity of the government. Until now the Socialists, the Communists and the MFA

⁷⁵ “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 107.

⁷⁶ Memorandum of conversation Kissinger-Schlesinger, 1975, January 22: <https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/kissinger-schlesinger.pdf> last seen on 09/23/2016.

⁷⁷ “Azores Independence Movement” cable from the US Consulate in Ponta Delgada, 1974, May 25.

⁷⁸ “Azores Independence Movement” cable from the US Department of State, 1974, June 4.

were on the same side of the barricade because of their common enemy, General Spínola, and of the unavoidable necessity to achieve a quick solution for Africa and the much needed cease-fire agreements. Once those two factors were out of the equation, the contradictions between and within these actors became evident and urgent.

3.3.13 The reason of dispute was the new proposed union bill. Taking advantage of their stronger organization in *Intersindacal* where they hold a basic dominance, the Communists wanted a unique union heavily centralized. The Council of the Twenty publicly endorsed their position, while the Catholic Church, breaking its silence for the first time since the fall of the Estado Novo, publicly opposed it and called for pluralism. Realizing the threat of such a proposition, the PS and the PPD proposed amendments to the law that guaranteed free elections for local union officials and committees. The voting in the cabinet showed a fundamental division. Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves and Captain Costa Martins, Labour Minister, voted with Cunhal against the amendments while on the other side the PS, the PPD, Major Melo Antunes and other moderates of the government voted for them. For the left, this was the classic division between those who supported a vanguardist and revolutionary approach and those who favoured a democratic or reformist approach towards socialism.

3.3.14 This showed also how Alvaro Cunhal and his PCP eventually came to consider the alliance with the MFA necessary and vital for the communist cause. This alliance was, according to the Communists, the only way to prevent a reactionary overturn of the armed forces and to prevent any meaningful reaction by other reactionary cliques such as the economic oligarchy or the former leaders and rank and files of the Estado Novo. Remaining on the side of the military was therefore good per se but also against other menaces. Cunhal was, in a way, the less plausible man to make or accept such an analysis: before the Carnation Revolution he often warned against the petty bourgeois radicals and their pseudo-leftist rhetoric which was not coupled by the scientific attitude of Marxism-Leninism. The radical officers were after all what he always disdained in his previous years. Certainly his vision was affected by what happened in Chile, but that alone would not be sufficient, in our assessment, to explain PCP attitude towards MFA. Indeed the two allies were not always at the best terms between them. Many in the MFA have a very unfavourable opinion for the Communists, whether it was because of the moderation that characterized most of the common officers without public relevance or whether it was for the ultra-leftism that fascinated an increasing number within the military personnel

since the colonial wars. And surely the PCP was well aware of this simple fact, even though it believed that these different factions could be set against each other and could be outmaneuvered through the support of the disciplined pro-communist faction. As we will see, this assessment was not completely wrong, as the unification of the non-communist and moderate broad front did not happen until a whole series of certain conditions, which we will analyze later, were met. One fundamental mistake, that gave way for the others to manifest, was to undervalue the possibility of a rupture between MFA and the people exactly because of the MFA/PCP alliance. It is important to underline that such a possibility was feared and accounted exactly by those who were going to become the Group of Nine, whose most intellectually prominent leader was Major Melo Antunes, the Gramscian student.

3.3.15 The first important separation was the one that occurred between Communists and Socialists because of the political struggle over the unions. This allowed for some of the contradictions that developed during the first months of provisional governments to arise against the Communists. As they were the first to hold the Labour Ministry and anyway controlled the *Intersindical* their responsibility in the matters of wage increase and labour policy was clear to many. To keep the labour movement restrained the PCP could not limit itself to call for moderation and to refuse to support strikes and other actions (which was anyway enough for some workers and many leftists to lose confidence in the PCP) but even resorted to more hostile actions as scabbing. An exemplary episode happened in June-July, when over 1'500 fishermen near Oporto went on strike, demanding the canners for a fixed wage of 4'000 *escudos* (equivalent to more or less nowadays 820 USD) instead of the piece work pay. system. Solidarity strikes were decided by other sections such as boat operators and shellfish gatherers. The reasons of the strike were to be found in the underdeveloped state of Portuguese fishing industries, that employed old fishing boats unable to sail in deeper seas and were unprovided of refrigeration equipment, therefore causing a seasonal shortage of sardines every spring, when the catch is so low the fishermen faced many difficulties in making a living. The PCP, while vocally supporting the strike, discretely mediated the sale of sardines with the Soviet fishing vessel *Nackichevan*. The canners went in Sweden where the vessel was located and negotiated a sale of 3'400 tons of frozen sardines. Clearly the PCP left the dubious credit of such an operation to the canners themselves, but the involvement of a Soviet vessel could still not hold bad rumors. The strike became therefore ineffective and a compromise between the

canners and the fishermen was mediated once again by the PCP, which accepted only limited demands from the strikers and only on a temporal base⁷⁹.

3.3.16 The Socialists could therefore capable to make meaningful inroads within the labour movement. The first sign of this change was when Avelino Gonçalves, former Labour Minister and charismatic banking union official in Oporto, was voted out of office in a local union election. The Communist support and organization remained strong, especially in the southern regions and also in the aforementioned banking sector, but it became clear the Socialists were able to exploit the contradictions of the PCP, pushed between its commitment to the labour movement and its desperate need to be acknowledge as a responsible and respectable governing party.

3.3.17 The other meaningful object of confrontation was the transformation of the MDP into a political party. For the Socialists it was clear the MDP could not be, at the same time, a confederation of organizations and a political party, therefore they left the MDP before the decision in dissention with it. Soares argued that the unity of the democratic opposition was necessary under the regime to dynamize the political scenario and that a democracy can only function if it is articulated in and by different political parties. The Socialists had also in mind the experience of the unity coalition of Eastern Europe which were essential for the triumph of the Communists there. Soares tried to privately discuss of the issue with Cunhal and suggested him that PCP should follow the PS and leave the MDP as well. Cunhal refused and argued that for the PCP the MDP was much more important than the PS. Days later, Cunhal explained that he meant the PCP is not able to face the democratic transformation alone and that the union of democratic forces was necessary to achieve such a result. But despite his statements about the importance and weight of the MDP, the criticism by Soares that it would have become a duplication of the PCP were to appear evident in the first free election of the Portuguese Republic.

3.3.18 A particularly important episode was the public manifestation organized by the Socialist Party on January 16th. Over 10 thousand people attended. Lopes Cardoso, the first to speak, denounced the proposed only union as a transmission belt of a particular party or the State. Salgado Zenha, the most acclaimed speaker of that night, was a prominent opposed of the union law as Justice Minister, and warned that if it was to pass it would have meant the annihilation of the working class, and denied it was truly discussed with the

⁷⁹ "Scab Soviet Sardines Help Break Fishermen's Strike" cable from US Embassy in Lisbon, 1974, July 26.

unionists. Notably, his speech was often interrupted by slogan of the crowd who shouted: “PC escouta, o PS está en luta!” (PC listen, the PS is fighting), “a ditadura não passará” and even “abaixo o social-fascismo”, in one of the very few times it was used by Socialists to denigrate (also) the Communists. The manifestation was closed by Soares who underlined how the PS a great party of the working class and that it was fighting to save the conquests of the Carnation Revolution.

3.3.19 Winter passed with many former alliances in Portugal being progressively eroded and broken and with the slow increase of the Communist offensive, but the PCP suffered also several setbacks. NATO “Blocked Door” military exercise took place in Portuguese waters and the PCP was forced to accept it as an exercise of allied NATO units even though Cunhal criticized its timing for being “poorly chosen”⁸⁰. The exercise was supported by the PG and the moderates, therefore Carlucci suggested Washington DC to go through it as renouncing would have demoralized the moderates and made them feel left alone⁸¹. Carlucci, while starting to individuate the Communists in the military using the NATO membership issue at his advantage, also obtained that the US government would have sent aid to Portugal, which meant another success for the moderates. Moreover, the moderates within the MFA increased and won some key internal votations. Aware of these shifts, Costa Gomes marked the greatest achievement for the democratic forces as he finally gave a speech on the elections whose date was fixed to be on 25th April, one year after the Carnation Revolution.

3.3.20 The Communists were in difficulty also among their comrades in Europe. The eurocommunist parties, PCI (Italy), PCF (France) and PCE (Spain) were increasingly concerned by PCP rigidity and intransigence and felt they were being damaged by Cunhal’s stubbornness. The Italian Communists publicly criticized the PCP for its third-worldism and for the alignment with the MFA. The French Communists instead renounced to criticize the PCP and never retracted their official support, although they eventually came to regret the strategy of the PCP as well, when the failure of the Portuguese revolution became clear. This fracture was evident when, while Georges Marchais went in Lisbon and reiterated his support for the PCP, PCE leader Santiago Carrillo and PCI delegate Ugo Pecchioli met the representatives of the other parties, first and foremost the

⁸⁰ “Alvaro Cunhal On “Locked Gate” And Possibility Of Civil War” cable from US Embassy in Lisbon, 1975, February 14.

⁸¹ ““Locked Gate” and Possible Rightist Coup” cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1975, February 4.

Socialist Party⁸². Also Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Romania, had mixed feelings towards the PCP and their opinion of them was bound to decrease as time went on.

3.3.21 But all this was made questionable once again on March 11th, as another severe crisis for the new Portugal arose with the attempted *putsch* by rightwing military and the improvised participation of General Spínola. Voices of a possible rightist coup were already spreading in the previous days, in the media and by the PCP propaganda as well. The US were aware of it, and, on advice of Ambassador Carlucci, turned down a request for equipment since, assessing the risk of failure, a failed coup with US support would have reinforced the Communist position more than anything⁸³.

3.3.22 The coup itself was rather clumsy and was defeated with ease during the afternoon. As it was revealed, it was organized mostly by personalities of the old regime, while other suspected figures close to Spínola, such as Galvão de Melo, who as general of the Air Force was linked to the paratroopers involved in the failed coup, were actually innocent and remained loyal to the MFA. Spínola was therefore implicated in the worst kind of operation he could have thrown himself into and fled from Portugal. He went to Brazil via Spain, and in Brazil he founded the *Exército de Libertação de Portugal* (ELP), Liberation Army of Portugal, a paramilitary terrorist group of the extreme-right.

3.3.23 The political parties were quick to condemn the coup (and the PPD was the first to do so, aware as it was of being a possible target of a probable take down on counter-revolutionaries, as Cunhal started to demand). PS and PPD considered that the coup was aiming to prevent the scheduled elections and asked for them to go through. The CDS condemned all anti-democratic movements and attacked both the extreme right and the extreme left. The PCP obviously stayed true to the MFA alliance, criticized the security measures and, as said, demanded a purge within the military and the civil service against those who were implicated with dreams of reactionary restoration and specifically demanded an acceleration in the application of an economic program of nationalization, social reforms and land redistribution. In this period Europe witnessed the largest occupation of land since the Russian Revolution.

⁸² "The Making of the Portuguese Democracy" by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 134.

⁸³ "Possible Rightist Coup: Request For US Equipment" cable from the US Department of State, 1975, February 1.

3.3.24 The MFA proceeded to further its institutionalization: the *Conselho da Revolução de Portugal* (Revolutionary Council of Portugal) was established and absorbed the functions of the National Salvation Junta, of the Council of State and of Council of the Twenty. While it had several members of the former Junta, the shift on the left was clear also in its membership. The MFA Assembly, whose importance grew after Spínola's defeat in September, was once again reinforced. In the following days the tension arose again, as many party headquarters were sacked, especially those of the CDS, and many prominent figures of the old regime and of the economic oligarchy, included but not limited to Espirito Santo high officials and Champalimaud, were arrested. The Partido da Democracia Cristã (PDC) a minor christian democrat party on the right of CDS, was banned, and the label of "reactionary" was explicitly applied on any non-communist popular party, which raised major concerns for the legal survival of CDS. The PDD was not ostracized as the CDS mainly because it kept its ambiguity about its being either a European popular and liberal party, or a social democratic one. On a meeting with US Ambassador Carlucci the day after the failed *putsch*, Mário Soares looked exhausted and demoralized⁸⁴.

3.3.25 Although the leaning on the left started with the failure of "silent majority" manifestation, the period that started on 11th March was dubbed *Processo Revolucionário Em Curso* (PREC), which means Ongoing Revolutionary Process, as the researched goal seemed to be the establishment of a socialist state dominated by the Communists. And the fact that, since the Carnation Revolution, the Soviet Union had intensified its presence in Portugal in several ways, such as multiplying their diplomatic personnel, organizing a steamroll of cultural events connected to their Embassy in Lisbon, and of course giving financial aid to the Portuguese Communist Party, only contributed to the impression that Portugal was an encore performance of the Czechoslovakian communist takeover, with Soares as the unwilling interpreter of the Portuguese Masaryk, as feared at first by US Ambassador Carlucci⁸⁵, without meaning to be disdainful as happened with the Kerensky analogy. But there were also reasons that showed that the situation, while dire and bleak, was not hopeless for the democratic forces. The call for the respect of democratic legitimacy was met, as Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves announced the elections were to take place as decided previously. Moreover, the masses of the North remained conservative and catholic and the US aid package was not discontinued. The slow but

⁸⁴ "Conversation With Foreign Minister Mario Soares" cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1975, March 12.

⁸⁵ Ibidem.

unstoppable arrival of the *returnados*, the white refugees from the collapsing colonial empire, raised mixed concerns and hopes. It was clear that this mass of people, that only in September 1974 already amounted to 100'000, could not support neither the MFA nor the Communists, but they also despised Mário Soares and the Socialists and, in general, nothing suggested that they would have supported a democratic alternative to the left-wing, such as the PPD. The fear was that democracy in Portugal was to be defeated, and the choice was just between a communist proletarian dictatorship and another reactionary dictatorship.

3.3.26 Actually in America there was little hope for a successful intervention in Portugal and many within the US Department of State begun to accept the impossibility to avert communism in Portugal, a pessimism shared also by Kissinger. Reflecting this shifting feelings, a new theory substituted the previous "Mediterranean domino theory" and was called "vaccination theory". Since it was impossible to save Portugal from communism, the only path forward was to make an example out of it. The aim was once again to prevent communism in other Southern European countries, namely Italy, France, Spain and Greece.

The Swedish SAP and the Portuguese Socialist Party

4.0.1 In the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution many countries and European parties made a contribution to the Portuguese democratization process by supporting the Socialist Party. This support could be political, financial, logistic (such as the hosting of the ASP/PS congress by the Ebert Stiftung Foundation) or diplomatic. The deep relationship between Soares on one side, and other European socialist leaders, such as Willy Brandt, Olof Palme and Bruno Kreisky, the so called Socialist Trinity⁸⁶, François Mitterand, James Callaghan (as Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister), Bettino Craxi (as PSI delegate to SI and PS congresses and then party leader), Trygve Bratteli and many others.

4.0.2 The German contribution of the SPD in particular has been studied in deep by several scholars: Rui Lopes, Sotiris Rizas, Christian Salm and Munoz Sanchez among many. The aim of this dissertation is to furnish a deeper view of the links and cooperation between the *Partido Socialista* and the *Sveriges socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti* (Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party, SAP) in the general context of the Socialist International and of the détente. On times, we will integrate our previous analysis with the point of view of SAP on Portugal and Africa. We will first introduce Sweden as a country and an international player and then show how Sweden was involved with Portugal.

Origins: Africa and the Socialist International.

4.1.1 Sweden at the time was (and it still is) a neutral country, but it did not interpret its neutrality in a passive way at all: the country was ruled uninterruptedly by SAP since 1932 and this allowed the Social Democrats to put their vision of foreign policy at work over time, although the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and, of course, the bourgeois parties did not always share it. As a result, Sweden favoured disarm, was one of the most outspoken supporters of the détente and an harsh critic of colonial rule, even though the stand of Swedish governments often puzzled the American diplomacy, especially during the rule of

⁸⁶ Clearly such a term was just an enthusiastic apology, popularized by SI Secretary-General Hans Janitschek, of these three leaders who held a great influence within that time Socialist International, and does not account for their divisions nor their mistakes or debatable attitudes, e.g. the conflict between Brandt, then SI President, and Bernt Carlsson, SI Secretary-General, who criticized Brandt for his authoritarian approach. Janitschek's book, "Mário Soares: Portrait of a Hero", while being an apology in itself, does take account of the divisions between Soares and the "Trinity" nonetheless.

Olof Palme. Olof Palme himself was, at first, a riddle of unpleasant kind for the American observer. Born in a wealthy and conservative upper-class family of the capital's bourgeoisie, Palme had graduated at Kenyon College, Ohio, where he was on a scholarship. This was only his first time in the US, as he travelled frequently, not only in the US, where he went many times, but also in Third World countries. He returned as a socialist from the US in Sweden, where he signed for the SAP membership and, once he completed his studies, begun his political career, until he became political advisor of charismatic Prime Minister Tage Erlander and then Education Minister. He succeeded Erlander in 1969, and he was expected to be a respectful and even friendly interlocutor for the US, despite the ideological difference, because of his personal closeness to the USA and for his background. Palme already caused a diplomatic affront to the eyes of the USA as he partook, as Education Minister, in a protest against the war in Vietnam together with the North Vietnamese Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Tho Chan. Since he was already a sort of an heir apparent for the aged Erlander, his leftist attitudes were easily understandable by the US as efforts to overcome his background in order to be accepted by the party membership and its young militants, who were used to the school teacher's son Erlander. Instead not only Palme continued and renovated the policy of his predecessor, but he invigorated the rhetoric and the solidity of Swedish positions, starting with the opposition to US intervention in Vietnam war. The US recalled their Ambassador after Palme's speech about the Hanoi massacre:

"We should call things by their proper names. What is going on in Vietnam today is a form of torture. There cannot be any military justification for the bombings . People are being punished, a nation is being punished in order to humiliate it, to force it to submit to force. That's why the bombings are despicable. Many such atrocities have been perpetrated in recent history. They are often associated with a name: Guernica, Oradour, Babi Yar, Katyn, Lidice, Sharpeville, Treblinka. Violence triumphed. But posterity has condemned the perpetrators. Now a new name will be added to the list: Hanoi, Christmas 1972".

4.1.2 On the other hand USA and Sweden, while not allied, did not refrain from cooperating either formally and informally. Palme coupled his stirring criticism of US military interventionism, colonialism, Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile and the apartheid regime in South Africa, with the awareness of Sweden's need to defend from USSR, both strategically, by encouraging détente and peaceful resolutions, and politically, by containing the Communist Party of Sweden which, being the only opposition party on the left of the SAP, threatened

to subtract supporters and voters from the Social Democrats⁸⁷. Therefore not only did Palme and SAP criticized the Eastern Bloc, especially on the ground of human, civil and political rights: Sweden was dependant on NATO for its national defense in case of Soviet amphibious assault, and Sweden also functioned as a base for repair and protection for Western secret services, such as CIA, in their activities towards the Soviet Union. This attitude was received with confusion at best by the USA but they eventually arrived to understand Palme's agenda, although not sharing it, at least because of the necessity to keep Stockholm's good offices in the field of international détente and of mutual security.

4.1.3 The relationship between Portugal and, in particular, with the PS, started with Swedish support for the liberation movements in Africa and was possible because of the antifascist commitment of the ruling SAP. The history of Swedish foreign policy in Africa is older than one could think. It started in 1924 when, during the meeting of the League of Nations, Hjalmar Branting opposed the the South-African mandate over Namibia, then South-West Africa and former German colony, arguing that South Africa did not meet the requisites defined by the League⁸⁸.

4.1.4 South Africa would have remained a main issue for Sweden which became a loud opponent of the apartheid regime when this was later established by the South African National Party. Sweden opposed the apartheid and sent aids to the liberation movements there. Among many initiatives, we may mention a fundraising from Swedish students to black students excluded from South African universities in 1949 as worthy of note: Eduardo Mondlane, future founder of FRELIMO, was studying at the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg when he was forced to abandon the university and then forced into exile; he was reached by the solidarity funds of Swedish students, with Olof Palme among them: this helped the development of the personal friendship between Mondlane and Palme⁸⁹.

⁸⁷ The Communist Party of Sweden, which was renamed Left Party - Communists (*Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna*, VPK) in 1967 under the influence of the Eurocommunist majority of the party, was not a risk per se for the Social Democrats, as his electoral performance were solidly below the 10% while at the time SAP was oscillating between the 40% and 50%, but even a little transfer of votes to them from the SAP could mean the end of the Social Democratic majority in the Riksdag, possibly opening for a coalition government of the bourgeois parties in the centre-right Alliance.

⁸⁸ "The impossible neutrality - Southern Africa: Sweden's role under Olof Palme", Pierre Schori, David Philip Publishers (1994), p. 3.

⁸⁹ "Contos Proibidos - Memórias de um PS desconhecido", Rui Mateus, Publicações Dom Quixote (1996), p. 41.

4.1.5 Sweden was the first country to get involved in South Africa, but its interest expanded also to the neighbouring countries. Among the organizations supported by Sweden and by the Social Democratic Party Treasury and, after its foundation in 1968, the International Solidarity Fund: the ANC in South Africa, the SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU and ZAPU in Rhodesia, the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique and the PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea. As the liberation struggles developed in Africa, Sweden increased the quality and the quantity of her support, to the point that relationship between Salazar's Portugal (an already isolated country) and Erlander's Sweden were at minimum: Portugal repeatedly threatened to boycott Swedish goods and it even organized anti-Swedish manifestation in Lisbon, at the gates of the Swedish Embassy, through the Portuguese Legion⁹⁰. It must be noted that these demonstrations found the support in Sweden of the centre-right opposition (known as the Alliance), which had the time was not shy in stating it preferred Salazar and Caetano rather than what the bourgeois parties perceived as terrorists and communist guerillas. The government defended and reaffirmed its stance, explaining that it was acting under the umbrella of the UN resolutions that previously condemned the Portuguese occupation and called the members to act on behalf of the liberation movements.

Portuguese crossroads.

4.2.1 There are two protagonists of the complex network of relationships between Portugal, Sweden and the African liberation movements, that we still need to introduce: one of them is Rui Mateus. Mateus fled from Portugal as a refugee, first in UK and then in Sweden, to avoid conscription into the colonial wars. He attended the Lund University and was among the founders and organizers of the ASP abroad. When the ASP became a party, Mateus became its International Secretary and then worked with Soares when he became Foreign Minister.

4.2.2 Pierre Schori is the other protagonist. Schori was International Secretary for SAP and personal advisor to Olof Palme. In 1967-1969 Schori was indeed one of the builders of the bridge developed between the Portuguese socialist world, at that time still in clandestine opposition, and the Swedish one, as Schori was member or leader of several delegations of Social Democrats in Portugal. Their aim was to meet the local opposition against the Estado Novo,

⁹⁰ "Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo" (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 210.

since as we said previously the world of the democratic opposition to Salazar was very little known abroad.

4.2.3 In his first visit, Mário Soares and Raúl Rego were among the first people met by Pierre Schori⁹¹ and the SAP delegation, which established contacts with the wide dissident world, "from the liberals and christian-democrats to the socialists and the communists"⁹². Schori was surprised to find how much exotic was Portugal in comparison even of Franco's Spain, where Schori also went previously. The backwardness of the country led Schori to compare it to a Latin American country such as Portugal, rather than a Western European one or even Spain. The visit was important not only because of the achievement in becoming one of the few countries with contacts within the antifascist opposition in Portugal (whose lack so much hampered US strategy and competence in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution), but especially because the SAP delegation obtained the very first complete list of political prisoners in Portugal. Therefore, before returning to Sweden, Schori contacted the Swedish Embassy in Lisbon in order to let them send it in Stockholm in a diplomatic case, to protect the list from the Portuguese. The Embassy, unfortunately, rejected this request on the ground that it would have been a violation of the administrative procedure within the Foreign Ministry of Sweden. Whether it was a sad example of Swedish lack of flexibility or, more reasonably, the will of the Embassy to avoid being involved with quasi-revolutionary activities that could have been easily discovered by PIDE (and maybe were) and then used against Sweden. But without the intermediation of the Embassy the risk of discovery of the list increased and with it increased the risk for arrest of the SAP delegation for espionage by the Portuguese regime and that would have been an even worse outcome. Whatever the reason, Schori was in Lisbon with the SAP delegation and for the SAP and, while SAP ruled the country, yet they lacked the needed backing. The list made it to Stockholm anyway, overcoming the PIDE perquisition in front of the plane, hidden in the delegate's underwear, and was then sent to Amnesty International in London. Schori then wrote a report for the SAP and the Socialist International:

⁹¹ After the Carnation Revolution Raúl Rego discovered that their meeting was known and even photographed by PIDE agents, as the picture of them in the garden of Soares' house in Sintra were found in the disclosed archives. Yet another proof of the efficiency of PIDE infiltration and surveillance over the civil world.

⁹² "Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo" (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 206.

“The report had the audacity to predict that the socialist party [then still ASP], with its few members, was, however, the greatest potential for the future. For this reason, it was important to support it and, for example, to invite its leaders to our congresses and countries, in order to break the isolation”⁹³.

The report ended stating that: “amidst all their cruelty, the colonial war gives hope that a dictatorship may die, an empire may fall and vast peoples may achieve their freedom”.

4.2.4 The international socialist support is indeed what ensued. Mário Soares went in Stockholm where he met Tage Erlander and was photographed with him. This was the first time that Soares arose to a certain degree of international notoriety and helped him to strengthen his position at home as well. After the Swedes, the first to move and in a much significant way was the UK Labour Party, which invited Soares to their conference in Scarborough, which took place in 2-6 October 1967. The United Kingdom and the Labour Party were among the most important supporters for Soares and the Portuguese opposition, but their influence and interest there was fated to dwindle and extinguish: in 1970 the Conservatives won the elections, but the Labour Party continued to stay close and support the ASP until the elections of 1974 brought back Harold Wilson in government. His decaying health, his reformist effort and the increasing internal problems faced by him and his successor Callaghan, who was forced to resume to a coalition government to continue, hampered the British capability to follow and affect the Portuguese events. The London section of ASP became particularly notorious on the occasion of Marcelo Caetano’s official visit in 1971, when many Portuguese socialists demonstrated against the dictator. Anyway, despite the initial commitment and the help that Callaghan, as Foreign Minister, gave to Soares in the diplomatic field, the Labour Party never gave financial support to ASP or PS, and even the important ASP section of London was realized without the material support of the Labour Party⁹⁴.

4.2.5 Another important act of solidarity concerned the magazine *Portugal Socialista* whose edition was realized partly in clandestinity and partly abroad. Tito de Moraes, the chief editor, worked on it from his little flat in Rome

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 207.

⁹⁴ Contos Proibidos - Memórias de um PS desconhecido”, Rui Mateus, Publicações Dom Quixote (1996), p. 40.

and was himself financially supported by the *Partito Socialista Italiano*⁹⁵ (Italian Socialist Party, PSI). Here, the SAP cooperated with the PSI in supporting their Portuguese comrades. The Italian Socialists furnished the funds for the printing of the magazine, while the Swedish Social Democrats took charge of its first distribution in Portugal. They sent the magazine in envelopes from different Swedish popular movements which acted as intermediate dealers and gave their coverture for the ASP⁹⁶. With varying degrees, an increasing number of European and Socialist parties contributed to the solidarity towards the Portuguese Socialist Party, from the “little but always supportive Socialist Party of Pietro Nenni and Francesco de Martino”⁹⁷ to the German SPD, whose main actions through the Ebert Stiftung Foundation were already mentioned in Chapter 1.

4.2.6 In 1969 Marcelo Caetano held what were to be the first free and democratic elections of Portugal and the Socialist International sent a delegation to oversee the democratic process. The delegation was led by Hans Janitschek and was composed by delegates of UK Labour Party, Irish Labour Party, Italian PSI and PSDI (Social Democratic Party of Italy) and Pierre Schori as delegate of SAP. Of course, it was no difficult task to understand that those elections, with an already limited suffrage, were not free or democratic at all. All the parties were illegal, the electoral campaign lasted only 28 days and censorship and restrictions on the right of assembly prevented any chance for the opposition to succeed. On this occasion the delegation met the opposition movements in a theater of Lisbon, with 1'500 people attending. When it was mentioned that Sweden was providing financial aid to the african liberation movements of FRELIMO, PAIGC and MPLA, the assembly rejoiced and cheered, showing the genuine support of the Portuguese socialists for the African decolonization and their heartfelt hostility towards colonialism and its wars. The delegation could not assist to the elections though as it was arrested by PIDE and then expelled from Portugal with the charge of “undue interference”⁹⁸.

4.2.7 The year 1969 also saw the fundamental 11th Congress of the Socialist International in Eastbourne, UK. ASP would have become member of SI

⁹⁵ “Contos Proibidos - Memórias de um PS desconhecido”, Rui Mateus, Publicações Dom Quixote (1996), p. 42.

⁹⁶ “Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo” (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 208.

⁹⁷ “Contos Proibidos - Memórias de um PS desconhecido”, Rui Mateus, Publicações Dom Quixote (1996), p. 27.

⁹⁸ “Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo” (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 209.

only in 1972 and Soares was therefore called “Senhor Soares, leading Portuguese Socialist”. There was the socialist establishment of the world reunited: of course Brandt, Kreisky and Palme, who proposed and elected Hans Janitschek as SI Secretary-General, but also Pietro Nenni, Harold Wilson, Golda Meir, Kalevi Sorsa, Joop den Uyl, Sicco Mansholt.

4.2.8 Soares opened his speech arguing that: “In Portugal the socialists have been living in a political ghetto. This explains the absence of international contacts between Portuguese socialists and their comrades”. The congress in Eastbourne allowed him to make his first contacts and the first relationships within the influential socialist world. After his speech, Soares was followed by another socialist from Southern Europe, Andreas Papandreou.

4.2.9 Sweden and SAP continued their support to the liberation movements, both financially and politically, by inviting their leaders and delegates in their congresses and conferences. 1971 was the year SAP, on inquiry of Soares, decided to start providing financial support to the Portuguese Socialists. Bernt Carlsson wrote to Soares, then in exile in Paris, that SAP decided for a contribution of 10'000 SEK (nowadays' 12'226 USD ca.) and announced that the same contribution would be renewed for the next year as well⁹⁹.

4.2.10 This financial aid was extremely important for the ASP and was a major contribution in comparison to other parties of the SI. They were, as a matter of fact, a little thing when compared to the money sent in Southern African liberation movements: in 1973, Sweden sent almost 44 million USD¹⁰⁰. The reason of this disproportion is that while the latter aid was sent mostly in form of commodities (and in any case only for civilian usage) from the Swedish budget, the aid sent in Portugal came from the SAP Treasury alone. Under this perspective, the importance of the commitment of Swedish Social Democrats towards the Portuguese Socialists can be better understood.

4.2.11 The Carnation Revolution finally allowed the Portuguese dissidents to return from their exiles and to be freed from prison. As soon as the early days of May the Nordic countries sent a common delegation of their workers' movements: Danish Social Democratic Party secretary Einar Hovgaard-Christiansen, Kari Tapiola for the General Union of Workers of

⁹⁹ “Contos Proibidos - Memórias de um PS desconhecido”, Rui Mateus, Publicações Dom Quixote (1996), pp. 40-41.

¹⁰⁰ “Sweden Increases Aid To South Vietnam Prg And African Liberation Movement” cable from US Embassy in Stockholm, 1973, September 7.

Finland, Norwegian AP vice-president Raiulf Steen, Rune Gerhardsen for the AP youth wing, Kåre Sandegren for the Norwegian trade unions, SAP Secretary Sten Andersson, Secretary of Central Labour Organization (LO) Rune Molin and Pierre Schori, by then Prime Minister's special assistant for Foreign Affairs. As he said with US Embassy in Stockholm a week after the Carnation Revolution, Schori had deep suspicions about Spínola who clearly did not appear, and was not, a sustainer of African actual decolonization, but would have tried to keep an open mind¹⁰¹. The delegation met with Spínola in the Belém Presidential Palace and then had a lunch with Ramos da Costa and other socialist acquaintances before returning to Scandinavia.

4.2.12 In the chaos of young officers surging to national importance, SAP tried its best to understand who was who and what the MFA was up for, both in Africa and in Portugal. Therefore several meeting and visits in Portugal were arranged with this aim. Schori met several high ranking officers of the new Portugal. He discovered how much little was the colonial world for those who lived there and the importance of Africa as the birthplace of the Carnation Revolution and the MFA. Mozambique and FRELIMO in particular seemed to have been highly influential. Brigadier Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, born in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo), revealed to Schori how he had been schoolmate of many FRELIMO leaders in their youth. The young officers used to read the works of Amílcar Cabral, of Eduardo Mondlane, of Agostinho Neto and other African leaders. They probably had their first contacts with their thinking through their prisoners, who “most of the time were more ideologically and psychologically prepared than Portuguese soldiers”¹⁰². In the words of Pierre Schori, *the colonizers had been ideologically colonized by their enemy*. As some early members of the MFA explained to Schori, even the initial organization in cells of the MFA was an imitation of FRELIMO¹⁰³.

4.2.13 The flux of money that, from Eastern Europe, arrived to the PCP, was esteemed to be 27 million USD (nowadays' 138 million USD) and the communist control over the media was threatening as well. In Sweden, Sten Andersson developed an idea in order to raise more funds, since, without the possibility to intervene as a government (which could have been legitimately protested as undue foreign interference), SAP Treasury alone was not able to

¹⁰¹ “Swedish Socdem Delegation To Portugal” cable from US Embassy in Stockholm, 1974, May 7.

¹⁰² “Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo” (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 213.

¹⁰³ Ibidem.

contribute more than it did already. The idea was to organize a solidarity campaign towards the Portuguese Socialists among the Swedish civil society: SAP, LO, local sections of the party, In September, the Swedish met in Paris with Soares, whom welcomed the proposal. The raising started on October 3th.

4.2.14 Meanwhile, Soares turned to Palme asking for help in talking with the MFA in order to put pressure on the newly elected President Costa Gomes. After an initial uncertainty, Palme decided to accept the request and went in Portugal on 26 October, but did so as SAP leader, not as Prime Minister. This “divorce” of his role as Party leader and Head of Government appalled certain figures in the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy, as Foreign Ministry official Thyberg lamented with the US Ambassador in Stockholm. The US Ambassador though welcomed the initiative, as its aim to support the Socialists and the non-communist labour movement was clear, and could not but accord with US interests¹⁰⁴.

4.2.15 Palme headed a Swedish-Norwegian delegation, as also the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund, was present. They met with Costa Gomes, who promised elections for the first anniversary of the Revolution, April 25 1975, and had a dinner with Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho and Brigadier Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who listened Palme with utmost respect but did not appear particularly committed to a democratic path for Portugal. Since their position as influential MFA leaders, this fact was reason of concern for the Social Democrats. On the other hand, it was clear that those officers were not dreaming of a stalinist dictatorship. The risk was rather a *Peruvian solution*: in fact the Latin American country have had a left-wing military coup in 1968. The new President, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, opened a season of radical reforms in the social, economic and civil fields, but also abolished elections altogether and repressed political rights. This concern was shared also with the USA by Olof Palme¹⁰⁵. It was only later, when the communist allegiance of Prime Minister Gonçalves became increasingly clear to Swedish Social Democrats, that SAP too came to fear a “Czech scenario” for Portugal, namely the triumph of the communists and the instauration of a Socialist Republic on the Eastern European model¹⁰⁶, and that convinced SAP to send a new 14-strong delegation in Portugal, this time led

¹⁰⁴ “Palme To Lead Socdem Delegation To Portugal” cable from the US Embassy in Stockholm, 1974, October 19,

¹⁰⁵ “Nordic Social Democratic Visit To Portugal” cable from the US Embassy in Stockholm, 1974, November 7.

¹⁰⁶ “Swedish Social Democratic Delegation To Portugal” cable from the US Embassy in Stockholm, 1975, January 22.

by Rolf Theorin, SAP deputy chief of the organizational section, to assess the need of the Portuguese Socialists and the possible means to help them.

4.2.16 The Nordic delegation of September had nonetheless judged that the situation, while far from being perfect, was sufficiently good to allow for further aid. Norwegian Foreign Minister Frydenlund promised to supply to 500 tons of paper to Portugal, to be used by all parties to print ballots, posters, and other material for the Portuguese elections of April 25 1975. While the visit was not official. Speaking to the press on October 28, SAP Secretary Sten Andersson said that "conditions now exist" for assistance to be granted to Portugal by the Swedish government (as opposed to the SAP). The conditions had been earlier set by the Nordic Social Democratic parties, were that a democratic development must be initiated in Portugal and that decolonization must be moving at a fast pace¹⁰⁷. The Swedish opposition, both conservative and communist, was furious. The Prime Minister had gone in an intriguingly "unofficial" visit in Portugal, where he promised official Swedish aids. The Alliance deplored the ploy to transform Portuguese democratization into the "circus show envisioned by Sten Andersson", in the words of the conservative *Svenska Dagbladet*¹⁰⁸.

4.2.17 When it first arrived in the airport, the Swedish-Norwegian delegation was cheered by PPD supporters with Swedish flags: "We are the true social democrats, the actual follower to Bad Godesberg¹⁰⁹!" was the slogan shouted by the crowd. PPD was biggest and most important of the five Portuguese parties who asked for admission in the Socialist International, hoping to gain access to the influential and convenient world of the "Eurosocialist" establishment. This appeal would have rejected. Not only Olof Palme and SAP never doubted that PPD was a liberal party, but Mário Soares and his PS were too respected and popular in the SI to argue their (legitimate) opposition to the entry of PPD or other minor socialist or social democratic-like parties.

4.2.18 On December 1974, the First Congress of the Portuguese Socialist Party was held, finally in Portugal. Mário Soares opened the works on 13th December with his speech to the Assembly: "*Socialismo, sim! Dictadura, Não!*"

¹⁰⁷ "Nordic Social Democratic Visit To Portugal" cable from the US Embassy in Stockholm, 1974, October 31.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁹ The reference is to the SPD Convention in 1959, when the Social Democratic Party of Germany rejected Marxism, nationalization and neutralism in the bipolar world. On this base, PPD argued that the Portuguese Socialist Party was not an actual social democratic party. The claim was considered preposterous and the PPD never achieved the desired inclusion in the Socialist International.

("Yes to Socialism! No to dictatorship!"). Soares reaffirmed his distance from both the Eastern socialism and the European social democracy, reaffirming his and his party will to achieve a democratic transition to socialism in a pluralistic framework. Soares did not accept the authoritarian nature of the Eastern "real socialism" and rejected the idea to "govern capitalism in a reformist framework" instead of overcoming it. But it also considered the freedom of enterprise as important as the freedom of information. While he expressed his respect for the Scandinavian social democracy, he considered it unfeasible for Portugal because of the different conditions: a country such as Sweden was a "super-developed" country while Portugal was an underdeveloped one. The Party called for nationalizations, the public intervention in the economy with aim to remodel and modernize it, the public control over the banking system and the means of production, an agrarian reform and a general economic policy to foster development. The Socialist Party was not immune to factionalism of course. During the Congress, Manuel Serra presented an alternative platform to the official position of the Party leadership. This platform was closer to the communist positions and was supported by many delegates who had important links with the MFA. Soares fiercely attacked Serra's positions as "suicidal". The Secretary's list received 63% of the votes while Serra obtained the remaining 37%. Secured his victory, Soares worked to ease the tension and to recover a climate of unity and brotherhood and he embraced Serra in sign of reconciliation, and regarded that their confrontation "hasn't been that harsh". The Congress then moved to vote on the motion of his re-elected General Secretary and approved it almost unanimously. Soares was supported by many comrades, and especially important was, from a strategical point of view, the presence of the *Grupo Autónomo do Partido Socialista* which publicly defined itself as social democrat and therefore allowed Soares to present himself as the middle ground between a social democratic wing and Serra's populist-radical one. Serra abandoned nonetheless the Socialist Party to found the *Frente Socialista Popular* but this did not affect the PS or the Portuguese politics in general.

4.2.19 When he was questioned by Hans Janitschek about the ideological difference from Soares and his namely rejection of social democracy, Palme replied observing that "the moment a Socialist arrives to govern the nation, that is the moment he becomes a Social Democrat". Fundamentally, the difference between the Socialism of Soares and Social Democracy, was mostly a rhetorical argument aimed both at PPD and PCP at the same time, albeit for opposite reasons. It was against PPD, because PPD claimed to be social democratic and it was against PCP because the PS could not risk to be assimilated to the PPD or to

lose support of the most radical area of PS to the Communists, as happened with Serra.

4.2.20 Another explanation, which completes the previous one, is grounded within the complex situation of the “Eurosociologist” parties of the time. Soares was and considered himself a friend of François Mitterand and admired his coalition with the PCF¹¹⁰. As previously said, he would have supported such a solution also for Portugal, if only PCP was more open to the Eurocommunist ideals and did not consequently rejected any proposal of unity, instead arguing for a broader (and much more unbalanced) popular unity of all the antifascist parties, which could not but resemble the communist-directed coalitions of Eastern Europe.

4.2.21 During the spring and the summer of 1975 Sweden increased its aid, giving cloths and food for a value of 10 million SEK (nowadays’ 8 million USD ca.) to support the *returnados* from Angola. In coordination with other EFTA members, a fund for the development and renewal of Portuguese industry was opened. The fund was capitalized for 450 million SEK (almost nowadays 400 million USD) and Sweden contributed for a third of this sum. Other forms of aid, such as help for cooperatives, residential planification, adult education and professional formation amounted to a total of 5 million SEK. This flux of money was detected by conservative American pundits Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the spring of 1975: the two wrote an article about “The Swedish Money in Portugal”, which became another argument in the Portuguese debate as the authors criticized Ford administration for its passivity towards Portugal¹¹¹.

¹¹⁰ Hans Janitschek, “Mário Soares: Portrait of a Hero”, Palgrave Macmillan (June 1986), p. 46.

¹¹¹ “Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo” (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 216.

Socialist victories

5.0.1 Since the start of PREC the Socialists and other democratic forces have been under severe pressure. The Gonçalves government was confirmed and also the participation of both PS and PPD (beside, of course, the PCP), which was not to be taken for granted, was renewed. Mário Soares was replaced as Foreign Minister by Melo Antunes, who, enjoying more trust of the MFA from Soares, restarted the discussion about the Lajes base negotiations with the USA. Despite this, the relationship between Lisbon and Washington did not improved at all. The Ford administration and Kissinger were puzzled and appalled by Gonçalves odd and contradictory stance. In his opinion, Portugal would have respected its commitment to NATO, while at the same time assuming a neutralist approach to international relations. US Ambassador Carlucci eventually solved the riddle after several conversation held with the Portuguese Prime Minister: Gonçalves argued that for neutralism he meant to achieve better relations with Third World countries and communist countries without abandoning the Portuguese duties towards NATO allies. Lying implicitly in Gonçalves' words, was the assumption that the international relations were to change to the point in which the NATO itself would changed its nature. At the same time, Gonçalves, who like most of Portuguese was easily offended by what he conceived as foreign interference in Portuguese internal affairs, recognized the legitimate security concerns of the US and was willing to discuss them. While clearly dissenting from this overly optimistic view of future international relations, and although remaining resolutely opposed to any government that involved communist forces, the Ambassador and the Department of State understood the temper of the interlocutor, and acted accordingly in the following months. The Americans would have abstained from directly judging the Portuguese internal situation, but rather presented the problem of having a communist force at the government of a country within the anti-communist NATO. While this was not an issue that could be resolved through debate between Ford and Gonçalves, the improvement in improvement in the communication between Portugal and USA in general was a valuable achievement after one year of chaos.

5.0.2 Because of the full scale nationalization of the new government after March 11 1975, the state took possession of the large estates and all the assets previously owned by the economic oligarchy. Thus the revolutionary government of Vasco Gonçalves controlled more African assets than the governments of the Estado Novo never did. This caused confusion, frictions and

rivalries within the MFA, which lost its initiative in Africa in the moment it was most needed. While Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique could manage this period thanks to the unity embodied by their single liberation movements, Angola was on the brink of civil war. As the infighting between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA begun, the white population, who used to control and manage most of the Angolan economy, fled in Portugal, leaving the country crippled. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Army was unable to keep the country in check and to provide the security the Alvar Agreement charged on it.

5.0.3 After fears of South African intervention in Mozambique were dissipated, also because of Admiral Vítor Crespo resolution in not accepting any interference with the smooth transfer of authority to FRELIMO, USA and South Africa accepted the fact of a Marxist Mozambique because of the economic interdependence it would have had in relation to South Africa, to the point that Pretoria hoped that good relations with FRELIMO could discourage any aid to guerrillas in Zululand and eastern Transvaal¹¹². In addition to this, the solidity of the Portuguese and the military capability of FRELIMO, made the military option unconceivable at this point. On the other side of Africa, instead, there was no economic leverage to keep a radical Angola in check, and the military option was an easy temptation because of the division within both the Portuguese and the liberation movements. South Africa had much to fear, since Namibia was its weak spot. As the tension in Angola increased, the Portuguese lost capability and common political will to intervene in the region: although the government and the society in general could not but be concerned for Angolan evolution of events, the Portuguese initiative was irreversibly lost.

Constitutional elections.

5.1.1. A constitutional platform of understanding between the parties and the MFA was developed and “negotiated” by Rosa Coutinho. The agreement preserved the political primacy of the military over the civilian world for three years, setting a timetable for the democratization process. Coutinho considered the Portuguese civil society and its political world to be, after all, truly too immature for democracy, echoing the justification of Salazar and Caetano and of the Anglo-Saxon world for the existence of the Estado Novo. In a conversation with US Ambassador Carlucci, who considered the Admiral to be the most sophisticated MFA leader, Coutinho notably expressed how he considered the political world unready, lacking a party of trust of the MFA to carry on its

¹¹² “The Making of the Portuguese Democracy” by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 127.

program. It was clear to Carlucci that Coutinho held the PCP in a lower consideration than it was expected¹¹³. This conclusion was confirmed by Coutinho himself in a conversation with Pierre Schori, later in the summer: "it is we who make use of the PCP, not the contrary"¹¹⁴. Coutinho explained that the MFA had two equally necessary pivots: a left pivot, the PCP, and a right pivot, the PS. While PCP had proven loyal in every situation, the PS was often conflictual. Therefore the MFA had to rely more on the left pivot of PCP, which caused the foreign observers to interpret the alliance MFA-PCP as an organic union. As most of the Portuguese leaders of that time, Admiral Coutinho treated foreign analysis with contempt, but his opinion of the PCP as a mere instrument was honest and clearly reflected the opinion of many non-communist radicals of the MFA, albeit for different reasons. What prevented Admiral Rosa Coutinho to consider a truly democratic path for Portugal was his ideal commitment to direct democracy, especially in the form of economic democracy and council democracy, and his open hostility for the political parties. This explains certain positions of Coutinho which would be otherwise difficult to understand: the call for a new socialist party, which would substitute the defective PS pivot, and the call for a blank vote in the Constituent elections, which were mainly aimed to delegitimize not their result, but rather the young Portuguese party system as a whole. Coutinho had his own agenda, and it was incompatible with both Communism and democracy.

5.1.2 The anniversary of the Carnation Revolution marked the first free and democratic elections for Portugal. For the first time universal suffrage was applied in the little Iberian country. The Catholic Church, while not explicitly taking position, called all the catholic masses to participate in the electoral process, whose importance was marked as "extraordinary", and to vote according to their conscience (that this, for almost anything besides the Communists, as the catholic masses already knew without need for reiteration). The result was, as the US Embassy reported, a double cheer for democracy¹¹⁵. The Socialist Party won an impressive 38%; the PPD came second with more than 26%; the PCP obtained a modest 12.46%; the CDS gained the 7.61%, a result that, even if modest in comparison to the other major parties, still gave the right-wing party the legitimization it desperately needed; the "fellow travellers" of the Communists, the MDP and the People's Democratic Union, received

¹¹³ "Conversation With Admiral Alva Rosa Coutinho" cable from the US Embassy, 1975, April 21.

¹¹⁴ "Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo" (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 221.

¹¹⁵ "Initial Assessment Portuguese Elections: Two Cheers For Democracy" cable from the US Embassy, 1975, April 26.

respectively 4.14% and 0.79% while the pro-Communist and pro-MFA FSP, led by Manuel Serra, did not achieve any representation in the Constituent Assembly although it received 1.16%. The turnout was over 91%, a resounding success for the young democracy, while blank and void votes were below 7%.

5.1.3 The Socialist Party did not win only a relative majority. The distribution of votes and seats revealed a divided Portugal. In the Southern region, especially in the Alentejo, the PCP was resoundly the first party, as the dispossessed masses remained loyal to the party that granted the abolishment of the latifundium and distribution of the land to its workers, through the use of large cooperatives to avoid an excessive fragmentation. The Northern region voted instead for PPD and CDS. The PS won decisively in the urban areas such as Lisbon and Oporto, it was the first party in many central provinces and, more than anything, it was the second party both in the communist and in the conservative regions. The PS achieved the strategical position of being considered the progressive alternative to the PPD in the North, and the moderate alternative to PCP in the South, without being assimilated to any of them. More than everything, the PS received an implicit mandate to act for the national unification of the country.

5.1.4 The elections represented a turning point for Portugal, although their political meaning was miscalculated by the MFA from the very beginning. With such a wide popular support for the moderate parties, the legitimacy of the status quo embodied in the agreement imposed by the MFA before the elections was questionable. And while it clearly delayed the normalization of the institutional settlement on a Western European model, it could not prevent. To believe the opposite was a mistake shared by Rosa Coutinho, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Vasco Gonçalves, the PCP and the fractured world of the extreme left. This failure to understand how the situation changed after the elections contributed the chaos of the following summer.

Verão Quente.

5.2.1 The other factor of that hot summer was the economic crisis. Until this moment Portugal managed to handle the traumatic decolonization process and the political and institutional turmoils developed after the Carnation Revolution thanks to the most concrete and useful heritage left by Salazar and his decades of extremely conservative financial policy: a reserve of over 2.8 billion USD, of which 1.2 billion were in gold. This reserve acted as a cushion to absorb the tremendous costs of reforms and structural interventions, but it was quickly drained once Angola, with its fundamental trade surplus, became

independent. By the spring of 1975 Portugal had lost this cushion, and USA and the EEC regained the initiative they lost one year before, as Lisbon was now again dependant on the economic support of its economic partners. In addition to this, the Portuguese instability and the introduction of labour rights had two major victims: tourism progressively tanked in both 1974 and 1975 summers and capitals began to flee from Portugal. During the Estado Novo the primitive model of economic development worked mainly because of the lack of labour rights and the forced absence of workers' demands. This ended in 1974 and caused, at the same time, the lack of investors and the raise of wages. On the short run this caused a little economic boom in the field of consumptions, but when the cheap raw materials from the colonies ceased to arrive and the production consequently hampered, this consumption caused an increase in foreign imports, furtherly aggravating trade and payment deficits. Portuguese economy was in full-blown crisis and the government had no means to face it properly.

5.2.2 Those who believed that the elections were insignificant despite their results, considered the *República* and the *Rádio Renascença* cases as omen of a future communist Portugal, although their seizure by radical workers was the result of the far left propaganda, more than the design of the PCP or of the MFA, who mostly thought to take advantage of the situation, not understanding the consequences of those events. The graphic workers union of the socialist newspaper, claiming an "apolitical" stance for the newspaper, tried to remove Raul Rego to install Belo Marques, a socialist as well but suspected to be an opportunist, although there was no legal basis for the maneuver, as the new law on democratic control of workers gave this power to the editorial board only, which massively supported Rego. The editorial staff was therefore under a virtual siege and forced to negotiate with the left-communist¹¹⁶ unionist who warned that, if and when the staff would leave the building, it would be not allowed to return. It was a yet experimented pattern as it was previously used by Communists to gain control of the state television and other newspapers and radios. The reaction of the Socialist Party was immediate and strong. Thousands of socialists demonstrated against the occupation while Soares called for the defense of "freedom of information and expression" and of the "only independent voice of the Portuguese press". The COPCON intervened formally to avoid clashes, but it actually prevented Soares, Zenha and socialist crowd to enter in the building, even resorting to shooting in the air to disperse the crowd. The

¹¹⁶ The crowd was mainly composed by UDP (People's Democratic Union) militants, fellow travellers of PCP, and other extremists on the left of both UDP and PCP. The PCP itself was therefore a strict minority in such a group.

result was the outrage of all the moderates and an even stronger resolution of the socialists, who confronted the troops. Not used to face such a resistance, the COPCON troops justified themselves arguing they were only following orders and promised they would not have opened fire anymore. The discipline within the left-wing ranks of the MFA was finally showing signs of a slow collapse that would have only become more chronic as time passed. Minister of Social Communication Correia Jesuino intervened, sealing *República* offices and referring the matter to an autonomous press council, practically sanctioning the victory of the mob that aimed to silence or control the newspaper. The assault on *República* not only was perceived and denounced as an attack against Soares and PS, and discredited Portugal to eyes of the world and NATO, causing a strong international campaign of solidarity for the freedom of information, but also forced PS and PPD to oppose the MFA and the PCP with unprecedented resolution. In fact, in the words of US Ambassador Carlucci, “the Socialists feel themselves backed against the wall”¹¹⁷ and therefore they could not but consider this political struggle as a matter of life or death.

5.2.3 The situation furtherly deteriorated when the General Secretary for the Councils of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors called for the disbandment of the Constituent and the establishment of a revolutionary government, to which the Revolutionary Council replied negatively and reaffirmed its adherence to pluralism and the rejection of proletarian dictatorship. On May 28th the Socialists demonstrated in defense of the Revolutionary Council and in defense of the *Plano de Ação Política* (PAP), recently publicized by the Revolutionary Council after its debate and realization in several MFA Assembly meetings. The PAP, while reiterating the need for a “political de-colonization” through the cultural dynamization operated by the Fifth Division, indicated that a socialist society had to be achieved through and with respect for pluralism, rejecting dictatorship and violence. The PAP seemed to be capable to achieve the quadrature of the circle and to enjoy a broad consensus, but Vasco Gonçalves and his pro-communist faction opposed the substance of PAP, favouring a vanguardist transition to socialism. On the other side, the so called Group of Nine proposed the *Documento-Guia de Aliança Povo-MFA* which supported a transition to socialism that completely ignored the Constituent Assembly in order to establish a council democracy that safeguarded pluralism but did not rely on a democratic party system or western democratic institutions. It was, long story short, a third way between communism and social democracy and was therefore a relatively moderate group in the MFA at this time. It was composed by Melo

¹¹⁷ “Republica crisis” cable from the US Embassy in Lisbon, 1975, May 22.

Antunes, Vasco Lourenço, Pedro de Pezarat Correia, Manuel Franco Charais, Canto e Castro, Costa Neves, Sousa e Castro, Vítor Alves and Vitor Crespo. They were all part of the initial group that organized the Carnation Revolution and could not be easily targeted as reactionary even if it furtherly splitted the left of the MFA. The PS, anyway, in a long official statement, denounced the *Documento* as violating both the MFA Program and the previous agreement negotiated (and imposed) by the MFA with the parties before the elections. Therefore, the PS appealed to the Revolutionary Council and President Costa Gomes to solve the gordian node and to reestablish legality regarding the closure of *República*¹¹⁸.

5.2.4 Cunhal chose this moment to throw fuel on fire: to the Cuban newspaper *Granma* he declared that a “military intervention in alliance with the people” could be a solution and that a “military government does not mean necessarily dictatorship”; to Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci he declared that the previous elections were politically meaningless, as the Constituent Assembly could not act as a Parliament (the MFA agreement specifically denied this possibility) and that the choice was between a strong reactionary government and a strong communist democracy.

5.2.5 The case of *Rádio Renascença* (known also as RR) can be considered a symbolic one of the contradictions of the Carnation Revolution. The catholic radio was the one that aired *Grandola Vila Morena* the year before and as *República* it was occupied by workers¹¹⁹. The Northern region of Portugal was already hostile to the left-wing in general and the Communists in particular. The small and middle landowners and businessmen were quick to, respectively, organize in the Portuguese Confederation of Farmers (CAP) and to join the Portuguese Confederation of Industrialists (CIP). Along with the Catholic Church, these organizations acted as catalyzers for the dissent against the radicalism of both MFA and PCP. Furthermore, the campaign for cultural dynamization organized by the Fifth Division was completely counter-productive, as the officers were completely unable to understand how to conduct an effective propaganda and how penetrate an ideologically different territory. To use the words that American journalist Jane Kramer wrote for the New Yorker, the young military zealots were unable to understand that “a sack of fertilizer delivered to the right might make more converts than a sack of pamphlets”. The

¹¹⁸ “Mário Soares e a Revolução” [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. “O Líder do Massas”.

¹¹⁹ Unlike the other radios, RR had never been nationalized and was formally owned by the Church even during its occupation. Nonetheless, the occupation lasted until December 1975. This shows how this episode was just one of the many factors that caused the northern revolt against the PCP.

occupation of RR, the economic crisis and the repressed wrath of a year of passivity, eventually caused an agry reaction of the conservative masses of the North who assembled in angry mobs to attack and destroy PCP and other radical leftist headquarters and to chase off the Fifth Division field officers, while the Army was confined in the barracks, incapable in the face of the street protests.

5.2.6 It was in this explosive climate that Soares decided to abandon the government, on July 6th, closely followed by the PPD few days later. On July 11th the Party unanimously approved the decision of the Secretary. The decision greatly improved the democratic credibility of Mário Soares and of the rest of the opposition¹²⁰, in a dramatic phase in which the hopes for a Portuguese democracy were particularly bleak in the eyes of Western world. No one could claim Soares was a fascist given his anti-Salazarist past¹²¹. The Socialists provided a sustainable democratic coverture for the large and sometimes violent mass protests against Gonçalves and his Fifth Provisional Government.

5.2.7 The international tension risked to rise too as a consequence of the Portuguese events. West and East were in fact reunited in Helsinki to discuss and sign the homonymous Accords, which were a cornerstone for the détente. What was happening in Portugal was a serious obstacle for the Ford administration, which felt that Brezhnev was playing the détente just as a façade while, at the same time, Soviet Union was “fishing in troubled waters” in Portugal as in Angola, as poignantly protested by President Ford.¹²²

5.2.8 July 17th marked the first notable success for the opposition. With the PPD abandoning the government as well, the Revolutionary Council disbanded the whole coalition government and announced a new non-party government would have to be created by Gonçalves. On the same day, the Socialists hold a rally in Lisbon while the PPD hold another one in Oporto. The PCP denounced the demonstrations as a replica of the “silent majority” manifestation called by Spínola the previous autumn, but it was impossible for the COPCON to try and block the rallies. They were highly successful, while far left counter-manifestation in Lisbon had a low attendance.

¹²⁰ In this period, the opposition was celebratorily referred as “the resistance” in the rest of Europe.

¹²¹ *The Making of the Portuguese Democracy* by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 151.

¹²² Actually in Angola the situation was rather different. Angola was not object of a Soviet ploy as feared by the USA as the Cubans were those who asked for Soviet equipment and materials in order to support MPLA. While the Angolan civil war could not be avoided, the détente was saved also thanks to the Swedish mediation between Fidel Castro and Kissinger.

5.2.9 In the Haga Palace, Stockholm, a meeting of socialist governments and parties from Europe took place on August 5th after the appeal of Olof Palme to discuss the Portuguese situation and other concurring issues. It was another impressive meeting of the “eurosociologist” establishment: Bruno Kreisky, Anker Jorgensen, Harold Wilson, Joop de Uyl, Yitzhak Rabin, Trygve Bratteli, Helmut Schmidt and Palme were leading the government in their respective nations. With them, party leaders Kalevi Sorsa, François Mitterand, Bettino Craxi, Reiulf Steen, Willy Brandt and of course Mário Soares were as well present. The meeting affirmed a common line. Harold Wilson notably declared to journalists that he was disappointed by the talks he had with President Costa Gomes in Helsinki and specified that “as long as Portugal fails to give evidence of a quick return to a pluralistic democracy, we shall be very cautious with our aid”¹²³, pressing a very sensitive spot for the Portuguese government, in need as it was of foreign support to keep the country afloat. On the diplomatic front, Palme took charge in holding several meeting and conversations with the interested countries. He spoke with Brezhnev whose opinion was to avoid intervention in Portuguese affairs, clearly dissenting with the approach of the Haga group. Then Palme had talks with Henry Kissinger, the MFA and Fidel Castro. The latter was particularly important as he was the model that many MFA leaders were looking to. According to Soares, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in particular was brainwashed by Castro during his visit to L’Avana with Prime Minister Gonçalves, earlier in July. Palme and Castro discussed how the Portuguese Revolution now risked to degenerate from the “Prague 1948” scenario to a “Santiago 1973” one if the will of Portuguese people and of the geopolitical situation were not taken in dutiful consideration. Palme registred how Kissinger and Castro agreed about the future of Portugal as an odd military communistic country. On the MFA front, the Swedish invited Coutinho and Carvalho in Harpsund in order to make their case for a democratic path.¹²⁴

Democratization, for real.

5.3.1 As August was ending, the Group of Nine prepared for the removal of the Gonçalves government, mobilizing their military base which was particularly strong: several military commanders in the south and center of Portugal and also units in the north which, under command of a Gonçalvesist

¹²³ “Stockholm Meeting of Socialist Leaders” cable from the US Embassy in Stockholm, 1975, August 5.

¹²⁴ “Olof Palme, la Guerra Fria y el poscomunismo” (Álvaro Eljach trans.), Pierre Schori, Escila y Caribdis, Fondo de Cultura Economica (1994), p. 228-229.

officer, refused to obey him and put themselves at the disposition of the central military region. On 26th they closed down the Fifth Division. On 29th, Gonçalves was removed from government and his positions were harshly criticized by Melo Antunes in a meeting with President Costa Gomes. A new government was then established, under the leadership of Admiral José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo, this time with the support of PS, PPD and the unhappy support of the PCP as well, as Cunhal, this time understanding the unfavorable turn of events, returned to suggest caution to the PCP central committee. Yet Portugal risked narrowly a civil war as the victorious Group of Nine, backed by Socialists and Populists, proceeded to gradually purge the Armed Forces of communist militants and sympathizers.

5.3.2 Kissinger protested against the renewed inclusion of the Communists in the government through US Ambassador Carlucci, who met with Soares. Soares argued that: 1) the Communists still had the capacity to cause serious problems in the region of Lisbon and Setúbal; 2) the PCP did not wish another break up in the government (yet); 3) the PCP would have received only few ministries and none of them would have been important (this assurance was respected). Moreover, Soares wanted to avoid a reunion of PCP with the gonalvists, which was still possible and concrete. His main concern was to avoid that military posts could be gained by elements close to Gonçalves, as the PCP indeed sustained, while the PS wanted them to be filled by elements of the Group of Nine. After initial misunderstanding with the new Prime Minister, the real opponent appeared to be President Costa Gomes and his waiting game that seemed to favour the Communists. Soares confronted Costa Gomes on the issue of *República*, as, during the negotiations, the President argued the PS should have dropped the demands for its immediate re-opening. Soares rejected this proposition and sustained the government need to appear strong in the eyes of the people in order to gain their respect and that no government could commend that if it was possible to seize a newspaper with just a handful of people. Pinheiro de Azevedo sided with Soares and supported the return of the newspaper to its legitimate owners.

5.3.3 After receiving a segment from a Soares' declaration appeared on Portuguese press about the lack of American support, Kissinger asked Carlucci to declare Soares "that he should not doubt of my personal feelings about it. I have it on the highest respect and admire what he has done in the last months in very complicated circumstances"¹²⁵. As soon the Sixth Provisional Government was

¹²⁵ "Mário Soares e a Revolução" [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. "Mobilizando Apoios Externos".

formally established, the west moved rapidly to support it. In early October 1975 the US and the EEC granted 272 million USD in emergency aid. But October is also the month when the PCP contradicted its previous political line and started to side with the far left extremists in their protest in order to achieve a new coalition within Portuguese society. The effect was the opposite, as this only increased the hostility towards the Communists among the moderates, further isolating the PCP. Maxwell explains this odd change of heart and mind of Cunhal as a ploy of the Communist leader to act as a smokescreen for Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola.¹²⁶

5.3.4 Nonetheless the threat was serious. On November 13th the radical left managed to mobilize 100'000 construction workers who besieged the Parliament building in Lisbon, where both the Constituent Assembly and the government were located. English political scientist Ben Pimlott, who was trapped within the building as well, recounted how a journalist trapped with him considered that "the Assembly with the Prime Minister's residence attached would be a symbolic Winter Palace to storm", The Prime Minister capitulated to the labour demands of the striking workers but managed to resolve the confrontation in a peaceful way. Military commandos were ready and willing to clear the crowd around the parliament building but were held back by President Costa Gomes who considered the risk of a civil war too high if a bloodshed was to take place in such a moment.

5.3.5 On the other hand, it was clear the government had little authority over the military forces. In sign of protest, the government declared itself "on strike". On 25th November radical paratroopers, without any officer leading them, were on the move and other leftist uprising seem to start in Lisbon and in the rest of the country. It was the moment the most moderate faction within the MFA, the "operationals" rounded around the leadership of Colonel Ramalho Eanes¹²⁷, had waited for long. They took the chance to intervene in one of the last critical turning point of the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. The counter-coup of November 25 marked the definitive end any dream of socialist revolution and Portugal was solidly on track of the democratization process. The right-wing to profit of this period by calling for the banishment of the PCP, but

¹²⁶ *The Making of the Portuguese Democracy* by Kenneth Maxwell, Cambridge University Press (May 13 1997), p. 152.

¹²⁷ It should be noted that Eanes was selected by the US Embassy personnel among those Portuguese officers who were to undertake special NATO training. Another success of the reconnaissance led by Carlucci's equipe.

the attempt was rapidly thwarted by a TV appeal of General Melo Antunes, this time supporting the democratic right of the Communists for representation.

5.3.6 In January, Mário Soares and then Francisco Sá Carneiro were both received by Henry Kissinger, a meaningful sign of esteem considering that none of the two had any official public charge at that time, and considering how much Soares had to struggle, when he was first appointed Foreign Minister after the Carnation Revolution, to obtain a private meeting with the US Secretary of State. On 26th January Kissinger began the meeting praising Soares' bravery and leadership and judging that their cooperation, after the initial exemplar difficulties, eventually proved to work very well. The two discussed many issues, from the situation in Africa to the Portuguese situation with the PCP and the Catholic Church. Kissinger reaffirmed the US opposition to a communist participation in government but he also explained that, if circumstances required it, Soares could make an exception to the rule. Soares on his own explained that his main concern was the economic crisis and the consequent social malaise. Soares returned in Lisbon with the promise of an upcoming aid package from the USA, just in time for the electoral campaign.¹²⁸

5.3.7 Before the elections of April 25th 1976, on the second anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, another event represented the culmination of the support of the Socialist International enjoyed by Soares: the European Party Leaders' Conference of the Socialist International, held in Oporto. The arrival of Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, François Mitterand, Bruno Kreisky, Felipe Gonzales and Bettino Craxi in the second Portuguese city for inhabitants monopolized the media. Only few years before Portugal was among the most isolated countries in the world and it was now going to celebrate the first democratic legislative elections of its history while hosting the meeting of the most important European political family of that moment. The PS achieved a plurality with the 35% and Soares was to govern as Prime Minister.

¹²⁸ "Mário Soares e a Revolução" [E-reader version, if applicable], David Castaño, Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. Sez. "O Início Da Consolidação Democrática".

Conclusion

The end of Carnation Revolution.

6.0.1 The First Constitutional Government of Portugal was a Socialist minority government thanks to the abstention of both PPD and CDS, as the Constitution employed negative parliamentarianism¹²⁹. In June, the first presidential elections took place and General António Ramalho Eanes was elected President with 61.59%, supported by a broad coalition that encompassed the PS, the PPD and the CDS. Eanes was a key figure: he held the highest positions in both the civilian and the military world of Portuguese and was also president of the MFA Revolutionary Council. His presidency allowed Portugal to function as a democracy and to avoid a new and risky fraction between the MFA and the Parliament.

6.0.2 Soares brought Portugal within the Council of Europe and started the process to gain admittance in the EEC but he had to face several difficult issues of economic nature. Portuguese public finances were in a sorrowful situation and Soares had to ask for the support of the International Monetary Fund, which in turn asked for austerity measures. The advantages of being, at the same time, the best representative for Portugal abroad and the strong popular electoral backing of the PS now came in contradiction with each other. While certain sector of the PS were more open to a neo-capitalist way for the PS on the lines of the SPD, Soares always refused that, both for personal conviction and for political opportunity, which compelled him to refuse a dangerous overlap with the PPD which would have played in favour of Cunhal's PCP.

6.0.3 After a coherent commitment to avoid to stay in government without the PCP on his left and the PPD on his right, Soares was now unable to replicate the previous strategy of being the dutiful mediating actor between two difficult and opposing partners, but had to negotiate in the Parliament with forces that lamented both the present and the past role of the PS. The hostility between PS and PCP had grown too large and deep to be overcome while Sá Carneiro's personal rivalry with Soares prevented a centrist coalition. Therefore,

¹²⁹ While positive parliamentarism demand that an absolute majority is needed in order to form a government, negative parliamentarism rather states that no government can hold if there a majority against it. This allows for an easier path to form a government: abstentions are not counted as votes against the government, therefore a relative majority supporting the government is sufficient for the parliamentary confidence.

when the First Constitutional Government fell, it was replaced by a quite odd PS-CDS coalition. The main democratic and socialist party and the only right-wing party that never shied away its being on the right of the center. The land reform eventually caused the collapse of the shaky coalition, as the interests embodied in the two different parties were too different to find a compromise. In the following years, Sá Carneiro and PPD campaigned for constitutional revision in order to remove the most outspoken references to a radical socialist transformation of society and bringing the military under the full authority of the civilian institutions. The elections of 1980 gave an absolute majority to the centre-right, united in the so called Democratic Alliance (AD), a cartel that embraced PPD, CDS and the People's Monarchist Party (PPM). Sá Carneiro could not reform the Constitution, though: he died in 1980, while campaigning for the election of the AD presidential candidate. Even if the second presidential elections of Portugal ended with the re-election of Eanes, they still were the sign of how Portuguese politics was shifting. The same Eanes who was a moderately conservative figure only 4 years before, was now opposed by his former allies on the centre-right and consequently supported by both the PS and the PCP, whose presidential candidate retired from the race to support Eanes once it became clear the risk of an AD victory.

6.0.4 The Constitution of Portugal was amended on two occasions. The first time, in 1982, an agreement between Francisco Pinto Balsemão, the new leader of PPD (renamed Partido Social Democrata, PSD) and Soares' PS, ended the military's control of Portuguese politics, created a Constitutional Court and reduced the presidential powers, a critic move as Eanes became estranged from Soares and was going to create his own political party few years later. This agreement was the premise on which PS and PSD created the *Bloco Central*, the centrist coalition that allowed Soares to become Prime Minister once more in 1983.

6.0.5 The second review was about the economic part of the Constitution, which was left unmodified because of Soares' opposition for its review on the neo-capitalist lines of the AD. In 1989, privatization definitively became constitutionally legal, with the support of Eanes' political party and the opposition of both PS and PCP.

6.0.6 Despite many contradictions and failures, the achievements of the Carnation Revolution are impossible to deny: a rapid and generally bloodless decolonization, the eventual transition to democracy after two years of uncertain progresses, the new social, political, civil and labour liberties, and the birth of a political system that showed itself capable to adapt to very different times, as it

does still today, as one of the few European exceptions to the rise of nationalism or fanatic populist parties.

Political parties as the essence of democracy.

6.1.1 Democracy is everyone's flag and nobody's property. Even the Communists learnt the importance of labeling the proletarian dictatorship as a kind of true "communist democracy", in the words of Alvaro Cunhal. Democracy was paid lip-service by Marcelo Caetano while he organized the rigged "democratic elections" of 1969. And, of course, the radical leftist wanted several degrees and kinds of councils' democracy, workers' democracy and direct democracy. The many factions within the MFA desired and worked for democracy, each of them in a different way and often for a radically different conception of democracy.

6.1.2 The political cleavage that, eventually, imposed as the most important one, was on the role of political parties as means in the political life. On this issue the MFA experienced an increased factionalism and on this lack of understanding many leading Portuguese figures attempted to create a democracy that should have been different from the Western model (and from the Eastern model of people's republic, for those who did not share the Communist orthodoxy of the PCP). The confrontation on this issue has not always been clear though: as we have seen, most of the time it was discussed under the codeword of "pluralism".

6.1.3 Those who opposed the active and free participation of political parties in the institutional life of Portugal and in its decision-making process, where in fact against democracy, no matter how they framed or considered their ideological proposals to be (or just appear) democratic. The turning points that shaped the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution and the future of Portugal were those that shaped, for the better or the worse, the power of the political parties and the possibility for the Portuguese to organize, vote and participate through the political parties. This misunderstanding is what caused Spínola, Saraiva de Carvalho and Rosa Coutinho among many others to clash with the democratization path even though they did not always realize this, with the exception of Vasco Gonçalves and the PCP, which aspired for the protagonism of one party at the expense of the others, as they were more conscious about their proposals.

Between internal duty and transnational relations.

6.2.1 Mário Soares was at the same time a political leader, a diplomatic actor and a true statist. His ability was eventually recognized by the very same Kissinger who warned him he would have become the Portuguese Kerensky. The patience, the pragmatism and the commitment to the ideals of democratic socialism, coupled with the network built in Europe and partially in Africa through the Socialist International, allowed him to act as the main protagonist of the Portuguese democratization, to bring the Socialist Party in power and to returning the country to Europe. Such achievements are mutually linked with each other, a fact that was difficult to understand for his contemporaries, besides his closest comrades in the PS and in the Socialist International. It was possible because he knew Portugal and correctly interpreted its reality. On the other hand, Mário Soares was quick to employ a radical rhetoric in order to popularize his positions and declarations but this rhetoric did not nullify or contradict his pragmatism and his will to modernize Portugal on the lines that were proposed and applied in the rest of Europe by the galaxy of Socialist and Social Democratic Parties.

6.2.2 The legacy of the Carnation Revolution and of the role of Mário Soares is still relevant today not only for the historic meaning value that his line of action and his diplomatic initiatives played during the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. It shows the importance of the coherence between the internal situation of a country and its foreign objectives. Such a coherence cannot be given by a technocratic approach, but only by structured and aware politics, capable to distinguish and consequently act on the short and the long period as well. It shows the historical importance of political parties also in the field of international relations, The Socialist International, in various degrees, represented the viability and effectiveness of internationalism and solidarity, capable to overcome the boundaries of a strict national interest. It was an internationalism that was alternative to the Moscovian based Communism. It furnished Soares the basis on which he would have built his network of international relations and his stature both nationally and abroad. This, and an apparently naïve trust in the ideas and capabilities of the Socialist Party, is what allowed Soares to overcome and falsify the bleak prophecy spelt by Henry Kissinger.

Appendix A

1. Receipt for the delivery of 2'016 money collection boxes.

 **socialdemokraterna** PARTISTYRELSEN
105 60 STOCKHOLM TELEFON 08/14 03 00 POSTGIRO 1 07 — 3 BANKGIRO 331-0679

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA
Rua da Emenda 46
LISSABON
PORTUGAL

att: Rui Mateus

STOCKHOLM
March, 12, 1976

FAKTURA nr 440387

	DATUM	A-PRIS	BELOPP
2.016 Money collection-box, made of metal (Value only for customs purpose Sw. kr. 7.277:76)			No Charge

2. Cable from Rui Mateus to inform the SAP of the delivery of 1'700 SEK sent to Castelo Branco by the Soedermanland (abbr. Soermland) party section and by the workers of Eskilstuna, 1980.

03
03
40413390+
13390 PS P
10683 SAPINFO S


1980 01 09

RUI MATEUS


EN 21 DECEMBER SKICKADES 1.700 KRONOR AVSEDDA FOER CASTELLO BRANCO
EDERATIONEN. 1.550. KRONOR AV DESSA KOMMER FRAAN SOEDERMANLANDS PAR-
IDISTRIKT OCH 150 KRONOR FRAAN ESKILSTUNA ARBETAREKOMMUN.
AELSNINGAR
UNILLA BANKS

3390 PS P
0683 SAPINFO S

- Organization map for the solidarity campaign organized by the Swedish SAP for the Portuguese PS. Each Portuguese region has a related Swedish province.



4. Frontpage of letter from Mário Soares to Olof Palme, February 22 1978



5. Joint declaration of Portuguese Socialist Party and Italian Socialist Party,
1974-1976.

Fontes para
a História
do Partido
Socialista

**COMUNICADO CONJUNTO DO P. S.
E DO PARTIDO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO**

Uma delegação do Partido Socialista português composta pelo camarada Mário Soares, secretário-geral do partido e por Tito de Morais, secretário para a organização e representante do Partido Socialista português em Itália, encontrou-se com uma delegação do Partido Socialista Italiano guiada pelo secretário geral Francesco De Martino.

Mário Soares fez uma exposição da situação política e social existente em Portugal e das posições tomadas pelo P. S. português sobre os principais problemas da política internacional. Informou ainda sobre o Congresso que decidiu, em Maio último, transformar a Acção Socialista Portuguesa em Partido Socialista, depois que este movimento se viu reforçado com a adesão de antifascistas provenientes de grupos dispersos de extracção marxista, católica, sindical e de personalidades independentes.

Mário Soares sublinhou a importância da ajuda que tem sido dada pelo P. S. I. desde 1965 aos socialistas portugueses e a solidariedade activa demonstrada para com a A. S. P. e agora para com o P. S. português.

De Martino manifestou a inteira solidariedade do P. S. I. ao novo Partido com o qual entende manter as mesmas estreitas e fraternais relações que teve com o movimento Acção Socialista Portuguesa.

O tema das próximas eleições em Portugal foi discutido pelas duas delegações que se encontraram de acordo em considerar que não existem as condições para o desenrolar de uma consulta eleitoral com garantias democráticas. Tomando em consideração a situação existente o P. S. português decidiu que os candidatos socialistas devem participar nas listas unitárias de toda a oposição reunida no movimento democrático, a que aderiram também comunistas, católicos, democratas e antifascistas independentes. Este movimento, autonomamente, decidiu apresentar em alguns círculos eleitorais os seus candidatos, para desenvolverem uma campanha de desmistificação desta consulta «oportunista», que o governo português organiza para se dar uma credibilidade democrática que lhe é necessária para o desenvolvimento da sua política económica monopolista e ligada com o capitalismo internacional.

O P. S. I. declarou-se interessado em enviar um observador a Portugal para seguir, in loco, o desenvolvimento da campanha eleitoral.

No âmbito da Internacional Socialista o P. S. I. procurará um acordo com os outros partidos socialistas da Europa para que se preste uma colaboração activa do P. S. português, a fim de que os trabalhadores portugueses que se encontram no estrangeiro por razões económicas, políticas ou de protesto contra a guerra colonial, se possam organizar livre e autonomamente.

O P. S. português manifestou a sua concordância com a linha geral da política internacional do P. S. I. que coincide com a sua própria linha. Ambas as partes são da opinião que para a construção de uma Europa unida é necessário assegurar uma intervenção sempre crescente das massas trabalhadoras na gestão do poder.

Estão de acordo em considerar uma grave ameaça a penetração das sociedades multinacionais, sobretudo nos países onde não existem liberdades sindicais.

6. Speech by Olof Palme, Swedish Prime Minister, in occasion of the dinner in honour of Mário Soares, May 24 1984.

ERN 24 maj 1984
by Palme, PM of Sweden, in occasion of the dinner in honour of Soares, 24th May 1984

Il y a presque exactement un mois était célébré le dixième anniversaire de la révolution portugaise, qui renversait un ordre social périmé et injuste et mettait fin à une longue guerre coloniale.

Pour nous tous qui voyons dans la démocratie une forme irremplaçable de société, "o vinte e cinco de Abril" est une date inoubliable. Elle témoigne une fois encore qu'il n'est pas possible, à la longue, de résister aux exigences de démocratie, d'indépendance et de justice sociale. Mais c'est aussi le rappel que les principes de la démocratie doivent être sans cesse défendus.

2.

La révolution plaçait le Portugal devant un défi gigantesque: après près de cinquante ans de dictature et de stagnation, il s'agissait de construire une démocratie. Aujourd'hui, nous savons que le Portugal et le peuple portugais étaient mûrs pour cette tâche. Les efforts accomplis pour jeter les solides fondations d'un Portugal démocratique ont été couronnés de succès. Dans la profondeur du peuple vivait une conscience politique et démocratique sur la base de laquelle une démocratie efficace a pu s'édifier.

porte pour une large part sa marque. Mario Soares est devenu le symbole de l'évolution démocratique qui a eu lieu au Portugal depuis la révolution.

Sa visite est aussi la confirmation des excellentes relations qui existent entre nos deux pays. Malgré des conditions géographiques et historiques différentes et des options divergentes en matière de politique de sécurité, la Suède et le Portugal ont une série d'intérêts communs. Nos pays collaborent dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'AELE et s'efforcent tous deux de contribuer activement à l'important travail qui s'accomplit au sein des Nations Unies. Ils ont des conceptions

analogues quant à la nécessité de la détente et d'une amélioration du dialogue Est-Ouest. La tâche primordiale de la communauté internationale est aujourd'hui la sauvegarde de la paix. Les petits pays comme la Suède et le Portugal ont, à mon sens, un rôle important à jouer dans l'action en faveur de la paix et de la détente.

* * *

Aujourd'hui que Mario Soares visite à nouveau la Suède, cette fois en tant que Premier ministre, et qu'il s'installe au château de Haga, il me revient à l'esprit une autre rencontre avec Mario à Haga.

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* * *

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En août 1975, juste après la clôture de la Conférence de Helsinki, j'avais invité mes collègues européens, Premiers ministres et chefs de partis, à se réunir pour discuter de la sauvegarde de la démocratie au Portugal. Helmut Schmidt et Willy Brandt, Harold Wilson et Jim Callaghan, Bruno Kreisky et Bettino Craxi, Trygve Bratteli et Anker Jørgensen, François Mitterrand et Kalevi Sorsa, Yitzhak Rabin, Joop den Uyl et Reiulf Steen: tous, sans exception, ont répondu à mon appel. Les orientations qui ont été mises au pont à Haga, avec Mario, ont pu contribuer dans une certaine mesure à la consolidation de la démocratie au Portugal.

Pour commémorer - certes avec un peu de retard - cette "réunion de famille" je voudrais remettre ce petit cadeau.

Pour conclure, je lève mon verre en l'honneur du Portugal, des relations entre nos deux pays et du Premier ministre Mario Soares.

7. Memorandum of conversation between Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, and James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Scowcroft file
NLF MR Case No 01-124
Document No #6

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General John Wickham, Jr., Military
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 22, 1975
7:45 a.m. (Breakfast)

PLACE: The Pentagon

Secretary Kissinger: We should have a program in Portugal. There is a 50 percent chance of losing it.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have a contingency plan to take over the Azores -- that would be stimulating Azores independence. We're in good shape on Libya. Our flying close brought a protest but they have been making good noises since.

We have been over some of these selective nuclear options -- the Iranian one has gone down hill. I talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff though and I think we are on the right track now.

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't think much of it before.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we either have to use Poseidon or have forces in the country.

Secretary Kissinger: It was too slow moving -- it took days to get the F-4's in.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~


DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2009-017, document 1

PHOTO COPY
FROM
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

Appendix B

1. Distribution of ethnic groups in Angola.


Grupos étnicos de Angola



2. Political-administrative map of Angola.



3. Satirical comic on Soares, aboard on the *República* aeroplane, shot by Cunhal and the MFA. Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 25 1975.



4. Mário Soares in Rome with veteran socialist Pietro Nenni, deputy Prime Minister of Italy, 1967-1968.



5. Mário Soares in Rome with Bettino Craxi, Prime Minister of Italy, 1983.



6. Foreign Minister Mário Soares in London, with Foreign Minister James Callaghan, The Guardian, May 3 1974.



7. Frontpage of *Portugal Socialista*, May 1973.




8. Poster for the Socialist International summit in Oporto, 1976.




9. From the left to right, Mário Soares, François Mitterrand, Bettino Craxi and Felipe Gonzales.



10. Green poster for the *Maioria silenciosa* manifestation.



11. Poster against the *Maioria silenciosa*.



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Summary



Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Cattedra: History of International Relations

Mário Soares and the Carnation Revolution

Between internal duty and transnational relations (1974-1976)

RELATORE

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Prof. Federico Niglia

A.A. 2015-2016

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Summary

In this dissertation we will discuss the difficult path of democratization of Portugal after the Carnation Revolution. First of all, we want to follow and analyze the several upheavals that shook Portugal in few years, focusing on the period between 1974 and 1976. Clearly the complexities of Portuguese history need an appropriate degree of focus to understand why and how so many foreign observers of the time, no matter how well prepared or expert in judging the trends of their period, not only failed to understand the deep contradictions of Portugal, but even arrived to forecast a long-continuing stability of the Portuguese state under the guise of its old colonialism and the Estado Novo regime. Even while we will closely follow the Portuguese developments, we will dutifully take in consideration the international and diplomatic aspect of those and how the events were also shaped by what happened, or was happening, in the rest of the world and on the many fields on which the Cold War took place.

Second, this dissertation is about Mário Soares and the achievements that he reached both internally and externally thanks to his party, the Socialist Party, and to the network of connections that he managed to build during his exile and with the support of many political figures of primary importance in the Europe of that time, from Willy Brandt to Harold Wilson, united by the common ideal of democracy and socialism and the membership in the Socialist International.

Finally, we will study the relationship that existed between the Portuguese Socialists and the Swedish Social Democrats. The strong connection that linked together the PS to the German Social Democrats is well known as many scholars noticed and studied the issue, as it is one of the most exemplar achievements of the SPD and of the fundamental Ebert Stiftung Foundation. The same cannot be said for the bond that came to unite the Swedish SAP and the Portuguese Socialist Party and that is the reason that pushed us in trying to assembling the pieces that composed such a genuine cooperation that has all the reasons to be brought on higher consideration. As we will see, the Swedes had a major role, in a way, also in the very premises of the Carnation Revolution, as they supported the African liberation movement that were the dramatic origin of the military discontent. Hopefully our findings may help in cast light on the intricate web of solidarity, visits, financial supports and international meetings that united Stockholm to Lisbon through Southern Africa and Eastbourne. The Swedish Social Democrats, under the leadership of Olof Palme did their best to provide support for Soares and his PS between 1969 and 1976.

The dissertation will also deal with the proper issues of the Portuguese decolonization. The fall of the Portuguese colonial empire, the first to rise and the last to disappear, is a litmus test of both the Portuguese political events and of the international situation. As the Portuguese struggled to achieve the much needed national unity on how to deal with the colonies and their liberation movements, the confrontation between East and West cast its shadow over the future of the several new states emerged by the decolonization. Despite the confrontation between General Spínola on one side and the MFA and most of the political parties on the other, the Portuguese managed to hold a certain degree of initiative against external threats to the decolonization process and this is a clear sign of resilience of the little iberian country. Unfortunately, as the agreements were signed and the situation in Portugal evolved, the infightings slowly but steadily removed the Portuguese initiative and any possibility to regain it, while civil war in Angola became a reality.

The political cleavage that, eventually, imposed as the most important one, was oh the role of political parties as means in the political life. On this issue the MFA experienced an increased factionalism and on this lack of understanding many leading Portuguese figures attempted to create a democracy that should have been different from the Western model (and from the Eastern model of people's republic, for those who did not share the Communist orthodoxy of the PCP). The confrontation on this issue has not always been clear though: as we have seen, most of the time it was discussed under the codeword of "pluralism".

Those who opposed the active and free participation of political parties in the institutional life of Portugal and in its decision-making process, where in fact against democracy, no matter how they framed or considered their ideological proposals to be (or just appear) democratic. The turning points that shaped the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution and the future of Portugal were those that shaped, for the better or the worse, the power of the political parties and the possibility for the Portuguese to organize, vote and participate through the political parties. This misunderstanding is what caused Spínola, Saraiva de Carvalho and Rosa Coutinho among many others to clash with the democratization path even though they did not always realize this, with the exception of Vasco Gonçalves and the PCP, which aspired for the protagonism of one party at the the expense of the others, as they were more conscious about their proposals.

Mário Soares led the First Constitutional Government of Portugal. He brought Portugal within the Council of Europe and started the process to gain admittance in the EEC but he had to face several difficult issues of economic

nature. The contradiction of being, at the same time, the best representative for Portugal abroad and the strong popular electoral backing of the PS now came in contradiction with each other. While certain sector of the PS were more open to a neo-capitalist way for the PS on the lines of the SPD, Soares always refused that, both for personal conviction and for political opportunity, which compelled him to refuse a dangerous overlap with the PPD which would have played in favour of Cunhal's PCP.

The Constitution of Portugal was amended on two occasions. The first time, in 1982, an agreement between Francisco Pinto Balsemão, the new leader of PPD (renamed Partido Social Democrata, PSD) and Soares' PS, ended the military's control of Portuguese politics, created a Constitutional Court and reduced the presidential powers, a critic move as Eanes became estranged from Soares and was going to create his own political party few years later. This agreement was the premise on which PS and PSD created the *Bloco Central*, the centrist coalition that allowed Soares to become Prime Minister once more in 1983.

The second review was about the economic part of the Constitution, which was left unmodified because of Soares' opposition for its review on the neo-capitalist lines of the AD. In 1989, privatization definitively became constitutionally legal, with the support of Eanes' political party and the opposition of both PS and PCP.

Mário Soares was at the same time a political leader, a diplomatic actor and a true statist. His ability was eventually recognized by the very same Kissinger who warned him he would have become the Portuguese Kerensky. The patience, the pragmatism and the commitment to the ideals of democratic socialism, coupled with the network built in Europe and partially in Africa through the Socialist International, allowed him to act as the main protagonist of the Portuguese democratization, to bring the Socialist Party in power and to returning the country to Europe. Such achievements are mutually linked with each other, a fact that was difficult to understand for his contemporaries, besides his closest comrades in the PS and in the Socialist International. It was possible because he knew Portugal and correctly interpreted its reality. On the other hand, Mário Soares was quick to employ a radical rhetoric in order to popularize his positions and declarations but this rhetoric did not nullify or contradict his pragmatism and his will to modernize Portugal on the lines that were proposed and applied in the rest of Europe by the galaxy of Socialist and Social Democratic Parties.

The legacy of the Carnation Revolution and of the role of Mário Soares is still relevant today not only for the historic meaning value that his line of action and his diplomatic initiatives played during the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. It shows the importance of the coherence between the internal situation of a country and its foreign objectives. Such a coherence cannot be given by a technocratic approach, but only by structured and aware politics, capable to distinguish and consequently act on the short and the long period as well. It shows the historical importance of political parties also in the field of international relations, The Socialist International, in various degrees, represented the viability and effectiveness of internationalism and solidarity, capable to overcome the boundaries of a strict national interest. It was an internationalism that was alternative to the Moscovian based Communism. It furnished Soares the basis on which he would have built his network of international relations and his stature both nationally and abroad. This, and an apparently naïve trust in the ideas and capabilities of the Socialist Party, is what allowed Soares to overcome and falsify the bleak prophecy spelt by Henry Kissinger. Despite many contradictions and failures, the achievements of the Carnation Revolution are impossible to deny: a rapid and generally bloodless decolonization, the eventual transition to democracy after two years of uncertain progresses, the new social, political, civil and labour liberties, and the birth of a political system that showed itself capable to adapt to very different times, as it does still today, as one of the few European exceptions to the rise of nationalism or fanatic populist parties.

For this dissertation, we have had several sources. The research itself started in the *Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek*, the Labour Movement Archives and Library located in Stockholm, and with the resource furnished by the *Fundação Mário Soares* and the related *Casa Comun* initiative. The US National Archives and Records Administration was also useful and often consulted. On a lesser level, we have also made use of the “Fondo Pietro Nenni” and “Fondo Bettino Craxi”, both of which are available online thanks to the project “Archivi on-line” of the *Senato della Repubblica*.

An extraordinary and inestimable source was Pierre Schori himself, who was a close advisor of Olof Palme and travelled himself many times in Portugal since 1967 to visit the clandestine opposition there on behalf of the SAP. His kindness allowed us to have a meeting with him, and in the occasion he revealed several interesting details and informations. He also furnished additional sources that would have been otherwise impossible to retrieve, e.g. “Olof Palme, la Guerra Fría y el poscomunismo”.

Among the secondary sources, in addition to the abovementioned Spanish book by Pierre Schori, Kenneth Maxwell's "The Making of Portuguese Democracy" and David Castaño's "Mário Soares e a Revolução" have been the fundamental texts by which the research was oriented.

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