



**FACULTY: POLITICAL SCIENCE**

Chair: Analysis and Evaluation of Public Policies

**THE PUBLIC POLICY CYCLE IN THE  
AUTONOMOUS CITY OF BUENOS AIRES.**

An innovative approach to empower citizens

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## Abbreviations

BA	Buenos Aires
BA PC	Buenos Aires Participación Ciudadana
CABA	Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires
CIPPEC	Centro de Implementación de Políticas Públicas Para la Equidad y el Crecimiento
CoPE	Consejo de Planeamiento Estratégico
CNRT	Comisión Nacional de Regulación del Transporte
ERSP	Ente Único Regulador de los Servicios Públicos de la CABA
ES	Estaciones Saludables
GBA	Greater Buenos Aires
GCBA	Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires
LATAM	Latin America
Macri I	Chief of Government (2007-2011)
Macri II	Chief of Government (2011-2015)
OG	Open Government
OGP	Open Government Partnership
OP	Operational Plan
PJ	Partido Justicialista
PRO	Propuesta Republicana
SAP	Systems, Applications & Products in Data Processing
UCR	Unión Civica Radical
UdEP	Unidad de Evaluación de Programas

## Spanish glossary

Barrio	Neighborhood
Cartonero	Informal waste collector
Casa Rosada	HQs of the President of Argentina
Colectivo	Bus
Compromiso	Agreement, pact, deal
Comuna	District
Coventillo	Small housing unit
Cuadra	Block
Jefe de Gobierno	Chief of Government
Metrobus	Bus Rapid Transit
Subte	Subway System
Vecino	Neighbor
Villa	Slum, informal settlement
Zona norte	Norther Buenos Aires
Zona sur	Southern Buenos Aires

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## Introduction

This dissertation revolves around the study of the public policies enacted by the Government of the City of Buenos Aires and the internal processes leading to their design, implementation, and evaluation. Led by members of the PRO, the administration of the Argentine capital plans everything strategically and according to a long-term vision for which they seek citizens' blessing. Indeed, the government vision for a more equitable, accessible, inclusive and sustainable city is the axis around which every policy, program or project rotates.

I lived in Buenos Aires for over ten months, and while I was there, I had the chance to witness the speed, accuracy, and efficacy with which the GCBA implements its projects. I was not expecting for it to be the protagonist of so many public works and renovations, but it was. From transportation to urban regeneration, and much more, the Government of Buenos Aires manages to administer a city of three million people – six during the daytime – and to answer their demands through a high quality of service provision and customer-care like support. Apart from experiencing first-hand services such as the EcoBici, the extension of the Metrobus lines, the Green Points, and others I was able to do research on-site at the National Library Mariano Moreno.

However, the most insightful notions I acquired derived from the direct contact with government officials from the Ministry of Modernization to the Ministry of Urban Development and Transport and the Agency in charge of supervising Public Service Provision (ERSP). During our interviews at Palacio Lezama and in the Microcentro, I had the incredible opportunity to extend my knowledge on matters that are pivotal for the human and urban development of Buenos Aires and its community of *vecinos*. Each of these meetings taught me that the GCBA has been able to understand an enormous paradigm shift that occurred at the end of the '90s and is now acting upon it. For them, a city is not more or less equitable if a humble or lower-income individual manages to buy his own car, rather if everyone – wealthy and poor alike – uses public transportation, being aware of the benefits that it entails.

Solutions such as the conversion of public lighting into a LED-based system play a fundamental role in saving resources and invest them where they are most needed. I attended

countless events, fairs, festivals, exhibitions, and shows organized by or with the support of the GCBA and what transpires, both online and offline, is how public servants think about governance. For the GCBA in fact, governance must be about proximity, literally *cercanía*. It must solve people's problem even before they arise and every activity its functionaries perform, must be subjected to public scrutiny through platforms such as the Open Government and the *Compromisos de Gobierno* ones. However, in the case of the GCBA, Open Government is not only referred to Technology and Data. The GCBA, in fact, is "open government" type of administration because it wants to go beyond government building and talking to the people. The GCBA keeps seeking feedbacks and suggestions coming from citizens.

The work is organized in three different chapters, and together they tell the successful story of a group of administrators that was able to change the reality around them and is working to ensure that policies have a redistributive approach.

The first chapter focuses on the evolutionary processes of both Buenos Aires and of Argentine politics. From the independence to Peronism, to the various dictatorships up to the rise of the Argentine center-right and its radical opposition to the populist left. The PRO constituted a new political class coming from the private sector that wanted to restore the country through a knowledge-based approach. The analysis of the political campaigns of 2007, 2011, and 2015 serve to demonstrate that Macri and Larreta's electoral proposals were already well-developed policies.

The second chapter deals with the process of public policy design, implementation and the subsequent monitoring and evaluation. In this section, it is stressed how important strategic planning, needs assessments and ex-ante cost-benefit analysis is for the GCBA. In particular, it focuses on those *compromisos* belonging to the 2019 Agenda, ranging from education to waste management, and how the GCBA is implementing them. It also considers important technological innovation and sustainable practices carried out by the administration. Among these, the use of SAP-connected sensors to tackle flooding, power cuts, and the reception of citizens' complaints is somewhat groundbreaking. Finally, this section explores the many M&E practices of various actors, emphasizing the importance of feedback and follow-up on government projects.

The third chapter instead, analyzes first of all the process of Modernization that led to revolutionary features within the city's public administration, such as the birth of electronic



government and many city mobile Apps for public services. Additionally, the following section offers an insight over the Open Government initiative born during Macri I and its spillover effects over government transparency and accountability. Open Government practices and the principle of civic participation merged into various programs (i.e. *BA Elige*) pushed forward by the GCBA to encourage citizens to take part in the decision-making progress and to integrate their proposals in the long-term plans. Lastly, the chapter contains an overview of the future challenges ahead for Buenos Aires and how the GCBA is already facing them.

The argument of this dissertation is that through demanding management tools, careful planning, rigorous control of expenditures and finally, technology, the GCBA is able to shape Buenos Aires in a valid Modern City. The focuses on infrastructure and sustainable service provision making it a city which will be both integrated and enjoyable. Though not to fall into traps, every strategy keen on improving someone's condition foresees complementary policies aimed at ensuring that this person – or social group – will be able to withstand future adversities autonomously. For instance, providing children with personal laptops to go to school would be highly unproductive, were teachers not to be trained to use digital supports to teach. Hence, the GCBA is focusing on empowering people through the development of human capital, so to let talents express freely and valuing their contribution to the development of Buenos Aires as a whole.

Since the GCBA is administering the city according to the principles of human-scale, social inclusion, creativity and social harmony, due to the permeability of these integrated policies, the City will become more and more inclusive in a few years, as it will be further discussed in the concluding remarks.

# Chapter I

## The rise of the center-right in Argentina: a wave of change

CONTENTS: 1.1 FROM THE FOUNDATION OF BUENOS AIRES TO THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY: THE NEVER-ENDING DUALITY OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. - 1.2 THE RISE OF THE PRO PARTY. - 1.3 RETHINKING BUENOS AIRES: THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS OF 2007, 2011 AND 2015. - 1.4 AN ADMINISTRATIVE OVERLOOK: THE ASSIGNMENT OF COMPETENCES.

### 1.1 From the foundation of Buenos Aires to the 21st century: the never-ending duality of Argentine politics.

The City of Buenos Aires, officially called the “Autonomous City of Buenos Aires”<sup>1</sup>, is the capital of the Republic of Argentina and its main urban center<sup>2</sup>. The 14 million inhabitants qualify the area of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) as the second most populous metropolitan area in South America after that of São Paulo, Brazil. It is also one of the most important political and administrative districts in the whole LATAM region and the center of economic and financial decision-making in the country.

Founded in 1580 by Juan de Garay - after the first attempt perpetrated in 1536 by Don Pedro de Mendoza was cut short by the indigenous people of the region - it was initially given the name of "*Real de Nuestra Señora Santa María del Buen Ayre*" due to the gratitude of the Spanish sailors that had managed to get safely across the Atlantic Ocean to the Río de la Plata.

First encompassed in the Viceroyalty of Peru, due to logistical problems linked with the ports and the commercial routes in the continent, within the framework of the *reformas borbónicas*, Buenos Aires was chosen as the capital of the “Viceroyalty of el Río de la Plata” in 1776. It took time for the City to consolidate itself and its growth was quite slow.

Against his better judgment, this new political settlement turned against King Charles III of Spain and, as a consequence, the inhabitants of the colony started seeking independence from the Kingdom. During the 19th century, the City was able to withstand

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<sup>1</sup> In Spanish “CABA - *Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires*”, since the constitutional reform of 1994 which granted its autonomy. It can also be referred to as “Capital Federal”.

<sup>2</sup> Currently a third of the total population of Argentina lives here and generates more than half of the country's GDP. Muzzini E., Eraso Puig B., Anapolsky S., Lonnberg T., Mora V., (2017). *Leveraging the potential of Argentine Cities*. Washington D.C., United States of America: The World Bank Group.

both British and French invasions in the name of trade demands and a few power struggles that erupted between the revolutionary and the royalist forces within the country. The revolutionary front gained the upper hand on the latter in 1816, six years after the May Revolution<sup>3</sup>, resulting in the signing of the Declaration of Independence at the Congress of Tucuman<sup>4</sup>.

The uniqueness of Buenos Aires has always been deeply rooted in Argentine history. From 1821 to 1880 Buenos Aires was the capital of the homonymous Province as a municipality depending on the federal government, until 1994 when thanks to the Constitutional reform it regained its autonomy. Many reckon that Buenos Aires started going through a deep transformation in 1853. In the decade of the '60s, it went from being an *aldea* - small town - to a considerate modern city.

By the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the City was thriving. Thanks to its economic prosperity, it became a lively multicultural city able to compete with even the most influential European capitals. Its wealth was ascribable to the control of the docks and customs, the development of the railroads and public transport, the massive increase of the livestock and, most of all, due the arrival of hundreds of thousands of immigrants<sup>5</sup>.

The traditional layout of the City changed rapidly, and the different *barrios* started having different functions and with these came hierarchy. The wealthiest sectors of the population started leaving the southern part of BA to build their new residences in the *zona norte*, in part due to the spread of the yellow fever, while the banking and commercial industries started flourishing in the *area centricá*<sup>6</sup>. With the passing of time, came new waves of immigrants from the inner parts of the country and by 1930 they were already shaping those areas that would end up being the infamous *Villas miserias*<sup>7</sup> and to the practice of living in

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<sup>3</sup> The recurrence of May 18th 1810 is now the most important national holiday.

<sup>4</sup> Halperin Donghi T., (1996). *Historia contemporánea de América Latina* (13th edition). Madrid, Spain: Alianza Editorial.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> Dirección General de Estadística y Censos del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Dinámica de una ciudad. Buenos Aires, 1810-2010*. August 2010. p. 102.

<sup>7</sup> The term *villa* literally means “small town” or “village”, but when associated with “*miseria*” it indicates a slum-like settlement made of precarious scrap structures, often without pavement on the streets, nor permanent and neither secure electrical and sanitation systems. These are born both at the edges and inside cities such as Buenos Aires, and other major ones like Mendoza Cordoba. There is actually no official data on how many households do actually live in these areas but the number is believed to be of around.

*conventillos*<sup>8</sup>. Giving way, not to a merely urban phenomenon, rather a social one that was and still is the reflection of the tremendous inequality affecting both the city within itself (where the North is wealthier than the South) and the country as a whole.

A City whose infrastructures were not even remotely ready to accommodate all the influxes above.

The Argentine economy needed farmers and rural workers able to satisfy the demand coming from abroad, thus the Government, to sustain the *modelo agroexportador*<sup>9</sup>, started sponsoring the arrival of people from all over Europe. The expansion in the number of people meant the expansion and diversification of economic and industrial activities, especially those related to raw materials destined to export.

However, between false promises and the fact that the working conditions were better in Buenos Aires than in the rest of the country, the majority of the five million people that arrived in Argentina between 1880-1910 and 1936-1947 ended up staying in the Capital for good. Once their settlements became permanent, they changed the urban profile of Buenos Aires and the demographic distribution of the population forever. The contradiction between *Villa 31*<sup>10</sup>, for example, with its houses made of bricks and plates, and the luxurious five stars hotels right in front of it originated here and still summarizes the essence of Latin America.

At the same time, with the construction of the first skyscrapers and of the Obelisk on *Avenida 9 de Julio*<sup>11</sup> the phase of modernization of Buenos Aires was starting. They demolished entire blocks to connect the Plaza de Mayo with the National Congress, giving way to the construction of the new port of Puerto Madero, followed by more impressive buildings, squares, parks, huge railway terminals, HQs of government and enterprises, etc. The system of public transport (undergrounds and trams) went along with this innovative trend, increasing its frequency and regularity of service provision. The different quality

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<sup>8</sup> A multi-families household where each family occupies one or two rooms and the rest of the house is shared. An easy and accessible solution to the housing needs of a fast-growing population. In 1887 27% of the population of Buenos Aires lived accordingly to this model. Dirección General de Estadística y Censos del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Dinámica de una ciudad*. p. 104

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* Modelo agroexportador which had allowed BA to enter the international arena started falling apart in 1930. Argentina had to review its economic model. The industrial sector - aimed at providing those goods that could not be imported. p. 109

<sup>10</sup> Villa 31 is the most notorious informal settlement in Buenos Aires.

<sup>11</sup> Avenida 9 de Julio is one of the largest urban roads in the whole world. Featuring thirteen traffic lanes in total, nine for cars and four for buses.

provision, together with the natural conditions of the ground and cultural habits of the users, soon contributed to the differentiation between a place and another, namely between the *zona norte* and the *zona sur*, much more related to the working class.

At the end of the 1940s, the industrial expansion started taking place outside the federal district, opting for the peripheries and the areas of key-access to the City. The configuration of this metropolis underwent once again deep changes<sup>12</sup>.

The railway played a significant role in this process of urban growth. Its nationalization in 1948 gave birth to subsidized tariffs to make the service affordable to as many people in need as possible. But at the same time, the lack of investments concurred to the lowering of its quality, ultimately defining the service as cheap, bad, crowded and essential<sup>13</sup>. Later on, the *colectivo* became the real protagonist of public transport, taking the place of the tram and filling in the gaps of the railways in the peripheries, accomplishing this “essential” role.

From a more strictly political perspective, Argentina and Buenos Aires went through a lot of interesting phases. Democracy managed to be born and survive well until the end of the 19th century and the 20th until the radical presidencies<sup>14</sup> were not deemed fit enough anymore to comply with the demands of the people.

The first *golpe* took place in 1930, and after that, the door to populism was opened, and never really closed. The *coup* happened at the hands of General Uriburu who thought that an authoritarian response resembling the “fascist” way would be the key to controlling the masses. This experiment was short-lived. In the ‘30s across the world and also in Argentina the inability of addressing the needs of mass societies and the problems deriving from urbanization and industrialization put liberal democracies on the stand.

Following the death of Justo (1943), a lobby within the military was born: the GOU - *Grupo Obrero de Unificación* - whose objective was to put a stop to the threat posed by Communism. Various military leaders supported the June Revolution and established a new dictatorship inspired by Salazar and Franco. Social policies were a key ingredient for the success of the revolution; the problem was how to formulate them, given the lack of contacts and experience of the new political class. Plus, Ramirez’s leadership was not strong

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<sup>12</sup> Dirección General de Estadística y Censos del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Dinámica de una ciudad*. p. 111

<sup>13</sup> Literally “*barato, malo, masivo y indispensable*”.

<sup>14</sup> Yrigoyen I (1916-1922), Alvear (1922-1928), Yrigoyen II (1928-1930).

enough to counterbalance the rise of other members of the GOU. Among those stood Juan Domingo Perón, Minister of War at the time which then moved on to be the person responsible for the implementation of the social policies of the government. The young colonel understood right away that the best way to keep the internal order was through social measures and compromises, becoming first the president of the National Department of Labour and later the Head of the Secretariat of Labour and Provision.

From this moment forward social policies would always be a national (State) matter. His ability to resolve conflicts, not the big reforms, was what truly made him gain huge popularity among the working class. This inexplicable power was what allowed him to build his electoral base.

Once Fascism collapsed in Italy people started asking for the end of the dictatorship and the beginning of a new political era, thus putting a definitive end to the June Revolution. He further understood that the return of democracy would have damaged those that had benefitted from his actions and policies. Perón wanted to find a strategy to include the radicals politically - or so he thought he needed - while safeguarding the retreat of the heads of the June Revolution.

However, his excessive activism backfired and anti-Peronism<sup>15</sup> - the democratic alternative to dictatorship - was born even before Peronism - a movement that encompassed all kinds of political parties. He renounced to all his positions and what followed was a complex struggle for power between him and Farrell and Avalos, all in the wake of workers' demonstrations which only Perón could get to stop peacefully. His actions convinced the remnants of the dictatorship to support him without the slightest hesitation, and everyone else followed right after.

Within a few weeks he had not one, but two parties ready to support him: the Labourist Party and the Radical Civic Union - *Junta Renovadora*. Both were interested in supporting him due to access to government money, which all local politicians and officials wanted to benefit from it.

The dictatorship was restless action, basically casting out conflicts, agreements, and dissent, and its candidate was implicitly promising to stick to it.

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<sup>15</sup> Its clearest expression was the *Marcha de la Constitución y de la Libertad*.

Perón, already married to the later-become-icon Eva Duarte, won the presidential elections on February 24<sup>th</sup> 1946 when dictatorship officially gave up power for a new constitutional order through democratic elections.

Once he became President, the housing problem of Buenos Aires became a key part of the Government program. In 1947, almost three million people were already living in Buenos Aires, and many found themselves in difficult housing conditions. As in other economic fields, the State was present, and it fomented the construction of working-class neighborhoods. The housing one was amongst the most important social reforms started by Perón.

The eradication of the *Villas* was not a part of the plan. The most common form of working-class settlement was the *conventillo*<sup>16</sup>, and here is where Peronism aimed at making a difference.

During the ten years of the rule of Perón, the issue of housing was not only addressed through the construction of working-class settlements. He also used it as a tool to support the particular style and cultural discourse characterizing the mandates of Perón between 1945 and 1955. The *derecho a la vivienda* became one of the basic revendication of Peronism as part of the greater right to well-being. In her studies on the right to housing enacted by the governments of Perón in the City of Buenos Aires Rosa Aboy states that “enacting the decision to have State-built-houses for the weakest sectors of society happened straight away. The success of this kind of policies survived the overthrow of Perón in 1955, and their impact reinforced the image of his government as that of a true ally of the proletariat and its demands.”

Unfortunately, the actions undertaken by the Government were not enough to sustain the migratory pressure on the recently constructed infrastructures. The *Villas* kept growing without any public oversight, sometimes next to the working-class settlements and usually the relation between the two runs smoothly.

After the *coup d'état* of 1955, the military government methodically proceeded to make a *tabula rasa* of every trace of Peronism. These military actions were not isolated acts. They

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<sup>16</sup> A big shared house with small and humble apartments.

were the starting point of the path that culminated with the planning for the massive eradication of the *Villas* in 1976.

In 1956 the National Commission for Housing was instituted, and its primary task was that of taking a census of the population of the City. In the very first report there appeared to be 21 *Villas* with 33.920 persons, within the metropolitan area. Taking a census of the population in the *Villas* meant addressing the *Villas miserias* as a “problem” for the very first time. Even though what followed was indeed eradication.

The State, in the end, could not face the problem of the *Villas*, so its policy of eradication became the enemy of the inhabitants.

With time State policies strengthened. In August 1963, the *Federación de Villas de Emergencia* handed over to President Illia a series of requests in aimed at making the quality of life within the *Villas* better and to request the formal acknowledgment of the Federation. The Government accepted the demands, and in August 1964 law number 16.601 for the construction of the housing was approved to get rid of the *Villas de emergencia*<sup>17</sup>.

The plan was only partially carried out due to another *coup d'etat* perpetrated by Juan Carlos Onganía, and that is when the political representatives of the *Villas* reinforced their sense of belonging to Peronism.

In the context of a political crisis - with the conscription of Peronism in the presidential elections and its success in those of 1965 - the relationship between the Federation and the authorities turned sour again: threats of evacuation, intentional fires, etc. The closeness between the social movements in the *Villas*, the political parties and the different factions of Peronism was important to the quest of a certain level of fighting spirit.

From the mid-'60s the population of the *Villas* throughout the country started growing by 15% annually. In 1968 the Ministry of Social Welfare put itself in charge of the “*Plan de erradicación de las Villas de emergencia de la Capital Federal y del Gran Buenos Aires*.” The plan featured the phase of eradication followed by that of “transitory housing”. The idea of civilization and education went on until the last days of the military Government. It is clear how the State, when faced with an unbearable situation went about it by changing its name into a new “technical” and impersonal one to the never ending problem of precarious

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<sup>17</sup> Dirección General de Estadística y Censos del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Dinámica de una ciudad*. p. 321



housing. With one big novelty: the creation of a new category of housing, a State provided one.

This project did crush, generating the exact opposite reaction that the Government was hoping for. Instead of trying to assimilate more and more with the middle-low working class, they just kept organizing by themselves better and better.

The restoration of Democracy in Argentina occurred merely 30 years ago, and during these years it faced much profound crises, of a more or less political nature, withstanding them all. What is certain though is that Argentine democracy has been gaining a lot of experience in regard to the pros and cons of the most various forms of leadership, the different roles of the State, the market, the international involvement of the country, the best possible institutional arrangements and policies to be implemented.

There is no possibility of understanding Argentina and its political life without understanding the role played by Juan Domingo Perón and its legacy. The story of Peronism and its evolution are intrinsically bound to the recent history of this country since it is surely one of the great inventions of Argentina, although its exceptionality is rather unclear.

The most common definition of Peronism starts off from that of populism<sup>18</sup>. Populism as a political entity more prone than other traditions to adopt the form of a movement, while relinquishing the organized setting of a political party. A phenomenon with a strong anti-pluralistic component according to which the rightful representation of the people would be in the hands of different parties with the equal right to compete in elections. Which is already an ambiguous one, especially if we consider that the most remarkable ability of this phenomenon (Peronism) has been that of reinventing itself over and over again throughout the years, adapting and evolving at the same time.

Peronism certainly has a holistic view of democracy, according to which the political order is like a natural organism with its own laws, comparable to a human body. Representative democratic institutions are in fact perceived as artificial barriers within

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<sup>18</sup> Amaral S., Cherny N., Gibson E., Palermo V., Romero L. A., Weyland K., Zanatta L., (2014). *Peronismo y Democracia. Historia y perspectivas de una relación compleja*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Edhasa.

something so harmonic and as a gap between the leader and the people. At the center of this body we find no individual, rather different social institutions of a corporative nature. There's no positive law, rather only the natural one. The Peronist one was close to an "organized community." A society of "bodies" rather than individuals, with their leader in front, people firmly convinced that the path to democracy was to be taken in the social field more than in the political one. Peronism took advantage of the scarce ability that Argentine liberalism had had in expanding the base of its institutional system, integrating its emerging social classes and most of all, considering the superficiality with which it had adopted the liberal *ethos* in Argentina. To Argentines, to the popular masses, in particular, the liberal tradition seemed something foreign.

The second element with which Peronism tried to legitimize its democratic trait was nationalism, also deeply embedded in the holistic conception. To this end, Peronism contributed to the nationalization of the masses. A material and symbolic integration of those who had been kept out of the loop until then and left at the edge of the social construction of the national identity. The enemies of the country were the enemies of the people, hence of Peronism. Country and democracy end up being synonyms. The elections<sup>19</sup> conferred Peronism its democratic aura and final jointure with liberal constitutionalism. A result of historical circumstances more than of its envision of social justice.

From a liberal democratic perspective, classical Peronism was never an example of representative democracy nor of the rule of law, rather a holistic democracy which rejected the separation of powers.

The same happened from a doctrinal point of view. In schools, Peronism was able to spread its ideology in a more and more explicit way. The educational system also reflected the approximate idea that Peronism had of democracy, thinking that simply widening the right to access to education would imply "more" democracy, renewing the belief that democracy was a social matter.

Another factor that contributed to the limited impact of liberalism over Peronism was the political isolationism of Argentina. This attitude made induced Argentina and its people

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<sup>19</sup> *Id.* The legitimacy of the elections of 1946 is still very much debated. It is said that, yes, they were indeed fair elections on that very day. However, they are also said not to have been as forthcoming in the previous weeks; given the fact that the State had its back. p. 87

to think about all the problems affecting the country like a virus injected into the community by foreign enemies.

Peronism relied on economic pressure, the control of the press, the political management of commercial ads, the acquisition of various media up to forming an editorial group, intimidation violence, etc. According to this movement, the role of the media was not that of informing the general public or to exercise democratic control over power. It was about educating the people about a political religion made of opposites. The regime started gathering the trade unions, the cultural and artistic institutions, the professional organizations under its control.

However, the Second World War changed all that. The only way left to obtain legitimization was to join forces in political parties ready to compete in the electoral arena, in a constitutional framework featuring a clear separation of the powers of the State.

The “first” Peronism surged when not only the political system that Argentina should have adopted was being discussed but so was its very social order. It became a vision of government, an informally organized party, the option for a political regime and thus a social model, even though it lacked the necessary institutions and legitimacy to establish itself indefinitely.

Among the populisms of South America Peronism has been one with the most longevity, able to plant its roots deeper in the popular segments of the population and to shape the political life and cultural mindset of society than any other. Plus, when compared to other populists in the LATAM region, it is evident that it was able to permeate more sectors of society, dealing with a wide range of projects and policies thus resulting in different outcomes. A totalitarian movement in the ‘50s and ‘70, a revolutionary force in the ‘60s and again in the 21st century, a party like the others, social democratic in the mid-’80s and conservative in the ‘90s.

For this reason, many argue that there has not been only one form of Peronism, but many. The classic(al), the one during the age of conscription and resistance, the Menem in the ‘90s and the Kirchner one. Each associated with a specific age of Argentine politics, diversified and unstable, and with different social actors.

However, this thesis does not hold when faced with the fact that as a political force it stood united, for the most part, and when it didn't, it took advantage of these contingencies to work on its issues to reunite once again. Also, its electoral pool, elites, rather informal organizational structure and ties with the State didn't change much over time, nor did its fervent antagonists.

Differently from what happened to Fascism, which was not only eliminated but also discredited due to the end of WWII, Peronism fell as a consequence of yet another *coup d'état*, contributing to its idealization as an oasis of social progress and popular democracy. The way it came to an “end” is the key to understanding its persistence.

If Peronism keeps being able to sell its downward parable as successful, it is because in Argentina there has not been an equal or even more credible vision of the world.

But is Peronism with its strong emphasis on its leadership, public resources to finance its clienteles and recruitment networks and precarious rules within the movement the solution to the political problems of Argentina or is it their cause? Is it true that it is the only political force that can rule over such institutionally fragile State where society doesn't amend the rules? Or is Peronism the driver of these tendencies that lead to this precarious governability?

As Juan Carlos Torre (1999) states, it is clear that Peronism aims at resolving the very same issues that it is a cause of. The low level of public policies is a clear demonstration of that. The lack of suitable alternatives enhanced the camouflage of Peronism in between the folds of the political scene, up to the point of becoming the hegemonic actor steering Argentine democracy.

According to Torre, Peronism has repeatedly been considered as something more than a political party, seeing that “it does not compete with the other political forces because it is not part of the system, but rather an auto-sufficient political entity.”

However, it has also been *less* than a party. It didn't function as such when it was governing nor when it wasn't. It stood out for its structural and ideological flexibility, its degree of personalization and leadership, hence for its strong instability.

The coexistence of electoral competitiveness and informality of the party structure was even more prominent during the years of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. Then the party was publicly deactivated and replaced in almost all of its functions by informal groupings with

a marked instability in the rules of the game, both for those concerning the coalition and those regulating the electoral game.

The persistence of it all as a “movement,” while showing a clear rejection of a more regulated kind of game, is a clear indication of the fluidity of its identity and its program.

In its most recent history (namely from 1983) the Peronist project was reduced to a mere form of political opportunism, amplifying its representativeness capacity and thus becoming invincible in the electoral arena. The State poses an incredible opportunity especially if we take into account the weakness of civil society.

Only in the presence of a non-Peronist political alternative which is electorally competitive did Peronism manage to stay within the present legal framework. The insistence on re-elections highlights the pivotal problem of resolving future dilemma: the succession of leadership.

In the year 1983 a new age for Argentine politics began, and so it did for Peronism. The re-established democracy was no revival. It was a true construction.

A new society where pluralism and diversity were accepted and protected by the institutions. A society where citizens started being more proactive and participative. The Peronist movement did not perceive the magnitude of the democratic turn propelled by Raúl Alfonsín as a threat. Peronists performed a campaign that would have been more suitable for an opposition party, rather than a force aiming at winning the elections. By 1989 Peronism managed to adapt to the raising poorness better than any other political force and managed to turn it into electoral support.

Starting in the middle of 1970s Argentina experienced for the first time an economy based on neoliberal policies and mechanisms - the emphasis on the market, on competitiveness and private actors - led to deep social changes. The military government enacted these policies in 1975, which were later resumed in the '90s. The economic crisis of 1989 contributed to the loss of industrial employment, the rise of unemployment, poverty, and inequality. But how did these tendencies affect the urban configuration of Buenos Aires?

The deregulation of the rent market expels those with fewer resources and the same happens with the elimination of the *Villas*; big public works take up space thus expelling even more people.

The urban area of Buenos Aires kept growing, both regarding dimension and of poverty. The problems in these new settlements were the same that the urban neighborhoods had faced in the '70s and '80s. Problems ranging from property, streets, water and dungeons, education, security, etc. Civil society stepped in where the State would not or was not able to intervene properly.

The second big change that Peronism accomplished to adapt to regarded the general “discourse.” The enemy of the people was based on the concept of “power,” which based on dominium and richness is the foundation of inequality and oppression.

They demoted the violent tone against the opponents but without giving up the focus on “us” against “them.” If the first Peronism was about promoting the workers the humbles and that of the '60s about a “revolutionary” popular class, the second Peronism assured the support of the people via the dependence to State-provided-resources. The Peronist rhetoric started to include issues such as the reform of the State, privatization, and liberalization. Being a State official now meant being in a position of power and use it to grow richer. Practices became habits, habits became attitudes, attitudes became values, and values finally became discourses.

Assuming a position of power to benefit from it was now legitimate. The '90s were like nothing ever witnessed before. Peronism started to play both the part of the people and that of the oligarchy while managing to maintain in place the apparent struggle between the two.

It was a transitory phase necessary to address two problems that classical Peronism could not have faced: on the one hand the legitimacy of the movement after Peron's death and on the other the integration of Peronism and democracy.

Since 1989 the Justicialist Party controlled the majority of the political resources of the federal system, making Fernando de la Rúa's radical presidency a difficult one. After the collapse of the currency system and consequently of the political one, the political initiative was in the hand of the PJ.

Since then opposition parties operated at the margins of the electoral system. The fact that the UCR was in power both during the crisis of 1989 and that of 2001 caused the

collapse of the bipartisan system leaving Peronism as the only viable political actor, thus creating a unipolar arena.

Thanks to its elasticity, Justicialism showed a Darwinian trait that contributed to its reshaping and survival. The influence of corporatist groups came to its apex with Menem. There was now a need for someone able to rule over the electoral machine. With him, the PJ managed to infiltrate metropolitan liberalism and to integrate its officials within the national structure of the party. For both forces, it meant the birth of a new electoral paradigm with long-term perspectives. It was the liberalization of a populist party. In the 1990s the PJ became the only “power party” [definition by Gibson], prohibiting the further development of opposition parties.

The natural heir to Peronism was Kirchnerism (2003 - 2016), where fiscal centralization and the highly discretionary appointment of Governors friends of the presidency spiraled out of control. The death of Nestor Kirchner led to his idealization/sanctification, amplifying the positive inheritance of his government while overlooking the personalist tendencies, the centralization of power and the biased use of the media. A period characterized by the growing erosion of the checks and balances system which threatened accountability.

The victory of Cristina as President of Argentina was a great one for the feminist movement and the apex of that path of social inclusion initiated by Peron in 1947. Public policies did not emerge from debates or the actual needs of the people. They surged out of the will of the popular leader and his restricted entourage.

The Kirchners fell in line with Peron’s vertical approach towards politics, continuing with the tradition of duality in Argentine politics during their mandates as presidents of the country. It is a common saying in Argentina that their Government had become a Monarchy.

The struggle between people coming from the Peronist tradition and the so-called gorillas did not have the chance to be played out at its fullest within the City, given that the elections for the position of *Jefe de Gobierno* de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires - holder of the executive power - were only first held in 1996. On December 21<sup>st</sup> 1995, the National Congress had sanctioned Ley Snopak (Law 24/620) which allowed the election of the *Jefe*

de Gobierno and of the *Vicejefe*<sup>20</sup> plus sixty representatives who would have dictated the *Estatuto Organizativo*. Before the reform of 1994, the municipality was in fact ruled by an official named *Intendente*, chosen by the President of Argentina with the approval of the Senate and a Council elected by popular vote. At the same time, at the beginning of the '90s, urban interventions<sup>21</sup> aiming at revitalizing the city perceived as decadent<sup>22</sup> and the practice of city-marketing started taking place.

The very first elected mayor of the City was a member of the UCR - *Unión Cívica Radical* - Fernando de la Rúa (1996 - 1999) whose mandate was completed by his companion Enrique Jose Oliveira (1999 - 2000).

In 2000 things were already starting to change and this led to the election of Anibal Ibarra, a more independent candidate which was anyhow supported by the PJ rather than a more liberal front so much that Jorge Alberto Telerman finished his mandate.

It was on the run for office in 2007 that the recently-founded party PRO with its candidate Mauricio Macri managed to win the spot of Jefe. It was the first time that a political grouping of liberal identity managed to obtain such an important position within the political system of Argentina<sup>23</sup>.

## 1.2 The rise of the PRO party and Mauricio Macri's leadership

Born in the City of Tandil, situated in the exterior of Buenos Aires province, in 1961, Macri hails from one of Argentina's wealthiest families. After attending the Catholic University of Argentina, where he received a degree in civil engineering, he continued his studies at the Columbia Business School and the Wharton Business School in the US. Mauricio obtained a number of senior management positions within his father Franco Mauri's companies, before attaining widespread recognition as President of the notorious Club Atlético Boca Juniors in 1995<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> The law established that in order to be elected for both positions candidates would have had to have the same requirements that usually apply to members of parliament.

<sup>21</sup> Intelligent buildings, big malls, international hotels are the icons of these era.

<sup>22</sup> Dirección General de Estadística y Censos del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Dinámica de una ciudad*, p. 116

<sup>23</sup> Knowledge at Wharton UPenn. *Will Argentina's new President bring a new reality?* December 3<sup>rd</sup> 2015. Available at: <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-argentinas-new-president-bring-a-new-reality-or-more-of-the-same/>

<sup>24</sup> Stevens A., *Mauricio Macri Mayor of Buenos Aires*. <www.citymayors.com> August 23<sup>rd</sup> 2012.



As a successful businessman, he launched the center-right Buenos Aires-based PRO (*Propuesta Republicana*) party after the breakout of the economic crisis of 2001, declaring that he was tired of the nonchalance and the carelessness with which Justicialism was ruling the country. A party which was slowly able to unite center-right politicians, people in business, non-governmental officials and young professionals who had not previously had any particular experience in political campaigning, or government for that matter, on a brand-new project. The core idea was for all of these characters to come together with the aim of renovating politics at the national level and making a difference in the country starting small, from the City of Buenos Aires<sup>25</sup>.

A pro-market party that in times of diffused state-minded reasoning, believes that public resources should serve individuals' creativity and be focused on providing chances of commercial development and not be used to subsidize the whole economy.

For years, already at the end of the '90s but especially after the default of 2001, the highest levels of Argentine civil society had been organizing itself. How? In the form of associations, foundations, and think-tanks to supplement the numerous lacks of the State and local governments - such as in the case of the Capital - and to brace themselves - to some extent unconsciously - to start a new political era. Mauricio Macri and Horacio Rodríguez Larreta were among these people, and they were already beginning to change Buenos Aires and Argentina way before anyone else started noticing.

In the case of Mauricio Macri there the very starting point was the creation of the "Creer and Crecer Foundation," officially born in 2001. He based the political growth of this think-tank on two main pillars: contracting technicians/experts and defining ideas for new public policies for the City of BA, the Province of BA and Argentina as a whole.

In the case of Larreta instead, his popularity still has ties to another very important think tank: the Sophia Group.

This organization would recruit master's students and Ph.D. doctorates of political science and economy and assemble teams for the issue of documents that would serve as trustworthy reports for those in charge of decision-making. It allowed these young people to have a not solely academic background but a working one, in a way that was between

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<sup>25</sup> De los Reyes I., *Argentina: Mauricio Macri, el hombre que puso fin al kirchnerismo*. www.bbc.com. November 23rd 2015. Available at: [http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/11/151118\\_elecciones\\_mauricio\\_macri\\_balotaje\\_perfil\\_irm](http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/11/151118_elecciones_mauricio_macri_balotaje_perfil_irm)

that of pro-bono work and professionalization. Among their projects, there was the analysis of the budgets of the national and provincial government, etc. Because of their importance and unbiased value, those in government and opposition started using these reports as proof to their arguments.

The different workgroups started resembling the same structure of a real public Ministry. Some worked more on managerial issues, other on public policies, but politics in the strict sense of the term was not present.

Loyalty was later not only measured in gratitude. The shared vision was to entitle professionals with the implementation of public policies and not to leave them in the hands of leading figures born and raised within parties. Eugenia Vidal, currently Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires and one of Argentina's most notorious politicians, famous for her strong will and technical capabilities, stated that within the Sophia Group she learned how to design, formulate and evaluate programs. In her case especially in relation to tax transfers, food security, and child protection<sup>26</sup>.

Marcos Peña, current Chief of Staff of the Council of Ministers of Argentina, and former, Secretary General of the City of Buenos Aires, another of the PRO's top managers, followed a similar path through the CIPPEC and the "Poder Ciudadano Foundation"<sup>27</sup>.

At the present moment, regarding its composition, the party is formed by people of 5 key factions: the Peronists, the radicals, the right-wings, those coming from the think tanks and those coming from the private sector. These groups reflect what bonds of the managers of the PRO; their social origins, economic capabilities, previous political experiences, alma maters, ideological orientation, and professional careers are precise indicators of each one of their political axes.

What is interesting to notice is that however various its members and ideas might be, the political clashes that happened up until now have not produced deep wounds. If anything, they strengthened the PRO's electoral capabilities<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo. Estamos, una invitación abierta*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Grupo Editorial Planeta. p. 153

<sup>27</sup> Vommaro G., Morresi S., Bellotti A., (2015). *Mundo Pro: anatomía de un partido fabricado para ganar*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Grupo Editorial Planeta. p. 38-45.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.* p. 55

Over the years, everyone recognized that the think tank played an essential role in feeding the GBCA - after 2007 - and the PRO with the right technical frameworks to work with. Together with the Fundacion Pensar which was the core institution of his presidential campaign, these think tanks are still called the “laboratories of ideas of the PRO.”<sup>29</sup>

Another series of members of the PRO - the pure - was able to get where it is, due to their unconventional access to top-notch education, with many of them being alumni of one or the other Ivy League university. After having obtained their BAs and MAs in social sciences and similar majors, they started working and gaining experience in think tanks, research centers, foundations and the tertiary sector back in the ‘90s, becoming smart entrepreneurs, investors and so on. They gifted the PRO with a specific skill set and know-how based on professionalism and efficiency, without leaving out of the equation the most sensitive dimension of social awareness and the preoccupation for the poor and the eradication of marginalization.

The presence of so many managers appeared as a guarantee for minimizing risks. The fact that Macri is deemed to be a serial consumer of consultants, advisers, pollsters, and gurus is telling of his business-like way of handling things on its own<sup>30</sup>. He likes to surround himself with people that are experts in their respective field. He knows how to delegate and how to be practical.

He assembled such a wide and fertile group of people whose work he appreciated so much that nowadays a good number of them who worked with him during his first and second mandates as *Jefe de Gobierno* are now part of his national Government and most trusted staff. He reckons that the change that they were able to bring about in the City of Buenos Aires from 2007 forward can be replicated throughout Argentina, because as he often stresses at the end “Buenos Aires is the City of all Argentines.”

By 2003, the PRO was up and running, its fortress was Buenos Aires and its undiscussed leader Mauricio Macri.

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<sup>29</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*. p. 55

<sup>30</sup> Zuleta I., (2016). *Macri confidencial - Pactos, planes y amenazas*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Planeta. p. 21

In 2003 the first try at the elections didn't go as planned. In fact, the PRO lost in the run for the City Hall. However, in 2005 they managed to squeeze in the first MPs in Congress, and from then on, they spurred on, always under Macri's leadership. More and more people started getting to know him as a passionate citizen and joined the cause of the PRO because they felt like they had something to give too<sup>31</sup>.

His biggest capability has been that of inspiring people to invest themselves in the good kind of public activity. As in the case of the former Minister of Urban Development of BA. Daniel Chain met Macri back in 2001 when he asked him to make a report on the real conditions of some of the city's infrastructures and he was the one, once in government, to supervise the works on the Maldonado Canal and states that the effects created by it were what made him really understand what politics is all about, making people's lives better<sup>32</sup>.

It must be stressed that at the beginning of his political engagement Macri was not only a famous businessman, he was also the President of the CABJ. A position which allowed him to widen even more his already quite developed qualities of team-leader.

Blending politics and sports in a country where football has an undeniable and remarkable influence was no novelty. Still, it never blossomed into something so effective. Exposing a more "civic" candidate whose background stands farther away from politics is a resource that many parties across the world have pulled to overcome identity crisis threatening to overcome them.

The people close to him and many journalists declare that Macri's political style, sometimes referred to as "cold" and "detached," in deep contrast with Cristina Fernández's usual walks among the crowds, reflects his true personality. As a keen negotiator, he believes that an amended law is better than no law at all<sup>33</sup>. According to him, the biggest problem within organizations is people's egos.

At the beginning of his administration he is reported to have recalled three fundamental pillars that any coworker of his needs to bear in mind:

- "Nobody is a star. Not Maradona nor myself."
- "Be ready to work in teams."

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<sup>31</sup> For example, Gabriela Michetti.

<sup>32</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*. p. 73

<sup>33</sup> Vommaro G., Morresi S., Bellotti A., (2015). *Mundo Pro*. p. 17

- “Don’t steal.”

According to those working with him, Macri is a good team leader because he can integrate ideas and suggestions coming from different people with different point of views. Flexibility is a high-ranked value and pragmatism a virtue. He does not appear to have any new extra original ideas that nobody had thought of before, but the indeed has something to offer: getting these implemented in a short amount of time with little to no ideology in the mix<sup>34</sup>.

Andrés Ibarra defined him as “adverse to demagogy, very rational and able to win people over with his capacity of managing situations well without making promises that he will not be able to keep, and that is why people trust him so much.<sup>35</sup>”

He understands the world we live in with clarity and is someone who goes beyond this or that ideology. In fact, during his administration, the Municipality was able to work closely with that of Montevideo (Uruguay) thus resulting in recognition of Tango as World Heritage by the UNESCO. At the same time, Buenos Aires was part of a sort go G-3 Summit to take leadership in the environmental sphere, together with Sao Paolo (Brazil) and Mexico City. He already knew that the green agenda of the 21st century would witness metropolitan areas such that of BA at the center of any valuable discussion.

In fact, the Government actively participates in the C-40 for environmental leadership and accepted the challenge advanced by NYC’s mayor Micheal Bloomberg to reduce carbon emissions in the next 18 years.

According to Zuleta, his greatest strength is that of being able to overcome adversities and adversaries from a position of the minority, exactly how when he was able to administer the City without a legislative assembly supporting him. He is the first President of Argentina - and at the time of his first election only the second *Jefe de Gobierno* - that doesn’t belong to the Peronist nor the radical tradition, even though he draws inspiration from both.

A conservative kind of politician, a supporter of economic liberalism and a liberal when it comes to his private life, he is a man who believes in the power and importance of institutions. As he once told Hernan Lombardi - the former Minister of Culture of BA, he was willing to bet on the institutions. “Here we have to transform the country, and this

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<sup>34</sup> *Id.* p. 50

<sup>35</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*. p. 74

country needs better institutions. I am going to work on that. This country needs to be more institutionalized”<sup>36</sup>.

As mayor, Macri governed the City of Buenos Aires by making quiet changes rather than initiating sudden transformations. He slightly cut social programs that his administration disliked, rather than shutting down such programs completely. In Macri’s Buenos Aires, nominal support for public schools continued, for example, but increasingly special subsidies went to private schools instead. The same was true of his approach to the city’s understaffed and under-resourced public health system<sup>37</sup>.

During his first mandate, Macri recurred to the implementation of a series of security measures which strongly marked his way to go about the City’s problems. Through the so-called “*Plan de Seguridad*” CCTV security cameras were installed throughout many public places in the City<sup>38</sup>, namely public parks and squares, malls and points of access to the City. The aim was that of “*Recuperar la Ciudad para los vecinos*” and to live in a City that would protect and take care of its citizens. Especially for those more vulnerable: mothers with their children, lovers, and older adults often visiting public squares.

Another success of the first Macri administration that he repeatedly emphasized was the attainment of the lowest ever registered child mortality rate. He was also extremely proud in underlining that his government had also achieved great things in the field of education, such as the addition of English as a compulsory subject from the very first year of elementary school. Together with the installation of Internet in 98% of the schools in Buenos Aires, claiming that the future lays in an education modeled according to the job market, respecting his belief that a more modern Argentina is indeed possible.

Confident of the progress made during his first mandate in the year 2011 he decided to run again for office, in the wake of continuity. Determined as he was he managed to win again by a disturbing margin, testing for the very first time that apparently the citizens of Buenos Aires were rather content with the doings of his administration or that they were at least allowing him to try to bring about change to the City for the second time.

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<sup>36</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*. p. 85

<sup>37</sup> Casullo M. E., *Argentina’s Cambiemos: A party from the elite, by the elite, for the elite?*. <www.nacla.org. June 11th 2015.

<sup>38</sup> Calzado M., Fernández M., Lio V., (2013). *Ciudad segura. Vecindad, víctimas y gubernamentalidad. Notas sobre la campaña electoral del PRO en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2011)*. Confluente, Rivista di studi Iberoamericani. Bologna, Italia.

In the first round of the elections, Macri took 47 percent of the vote, nearly 20 percentage points ahead of his nearest rival. In the run-off on 31 July 2011, the incumbent mayor won the support of nearly 65 percent of voters<sup>39</sup>. His final opponent was once again Daniel Filmus.

Macri recalls that the team he contributed creating is a team of “talents and good intentions<sup>40</sup>.” He reckons that there is indeed human capital and that it is this generation’s responsibility to let this energy flow freely. In the introduction of the book “*Estamos: una invitación abierta*” he defines the change started by him and the PRO as a “process based on feedback,” in which the administration is coming after his own - ideally Larreta’s one - would have been even better. The feelings that most party members shared when Macri decided to run for President of Argentina in 2015 were the same that had accompanied in the previous campaigns of 2007 and 2011. Trust, since he had gotten them as far, and hope, in the sense that they wished they would have soon been able to change the country as much as they had changed the City<sup>41</sup>.

### **1.3 Rethinking Buenos Aires: the political campaigns of 2007, 2011 and 2015.**

After the rough crisis of 2001, the Republic of Argentina and the City of Buenos Aires slowly started recovering. By 2007 the City was ready for real change. One that would put an end to the constant rivalry that had been going on for more than thirty years between the radical and the Peronist forces by giving the chance to a “third way” to express itself. The PRO party, founded in 2003, was this third way. Thanks to its victory in the 2007 elections in the municipality of BA, it became a pivotal political actor in contemporary Argentine politics; seeing that a center-right, pro-market party had never existed before.

Mauricio Macri had lost the elections as *Jefe de Gobierno* in 2003 against Aníbal Ibarra, unifier of various factions of the center-left which also demanded change, although in less clear terms. A tragedy that led to the death of 194 young people at the concert of the rock band Callejeros started the unraveling of a political maneuver which, starting with the

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<sup>39</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/justiciayseguridad/elecciones/resultados-electorales/2007>

<sup>40</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*. Introduction.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.* p. 82

families of the victims, found itself allied with factions of Macri's center-right. It started with the suspension of Ibarra in 2005 and continued until his resignation in March 2006. The justice system persecuted him but by then the political context had already changed drastically. A new mixture of political forces had been born<sup>42</sup>.

In the elections of June 3<sup>rd</sup> 2007, the big main coalitions facing each other were three: 1) The alliance of Propuesta Republicana (PRO), led by Mauricio Macri; 2) the sum of the votes of the "Alianza Frente para la Victoria" and "Alianza Diálogo por Buenos Aires", led by Daniel Filmus; 3) the sum of the "Alianza Frente Más Buenos Aires" and the "Alianza Coalición Cívica", led by Telerman and Carrió.

The registered percentage of voters who went to the polls was the lowest since 1983 and between the first and the second round it got even lower (men's vote of approximately 2% and women's by a little less). At the same time, null votes almost duplicated, being a symptom of the uneasiness or at least despondency of the PRO's adversaries and that those who had voted for the various players decided not to vote.

Macri's success widened across the whole city, being constant in both rounds, showing a positive correlation with the high sectors and a negative one with the rest. However, among its supporters, there was also a strong presence of qualified workers.

The victory of the PRO was further facilitated by the ubiquity of the Justicialist movement which supported both Telerman and Filmus. The division of said movement into different sectors was a clear symptom of the crisis affecting the representative model and the traditional political parties (the Justicialist Party - PJ - and the Union Civica Radical - UCR - are the most notorious ones), a crisis which had reached its climax back in 2001. By 2007 their political identity had vanished, or blurred at least, and these parties were in the middle of a restoration within the Argentine political spectrum. It meant that the candidates aimed at forging purely circumstantial and convenient alliances without taking into consideration a common vision able to withstand the coming years and challenges.

Macri's triumph attested the depth of this new reality which had been developing in the previous years. The year 2007 was an election year where the protagonists of the elections

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<sup>42</sup> Marafioti R., (2008). *De las falacias: argumentación y comunicación*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Biblos. p. 95-115



were not only the parties involved or their leaders but most remarkably their visions for the development of the City. The two contestants which accessed the second ballot, namely Macri and Filmus, were the reflection of two different sides of the political life of Buenos Aires, and they both bore witnesses to the undergoing political crisis.

In the months leading up to the elections, the three candidates showed very little differences regarding their political programs. In an interview with the national newspaper *La Nación*, they had the chance to summarize their electoral program, given the problems that were notoriously affecting the City in 2007.

Macri, Filmus and Telerman's electoral focuses were in fact: security, traffic, and urban hygiene. At the time of the interview<sup>43</sup> (May 20th, 2007) security was an issue that couldn't be resolved by the Municipality alone since the police answered only to the *Casa Rosada*. The *Jefe de Gobierno* himself couldn't even command a police officer to issue a speed ticket, nor fine someone because they didn't have their seatbelt on. Autonomy in this particular domain was a dream, since according to Article 7 of the "Ley Cafiero" it was explicitly forbidden for Buenos Aires to have its own police force. Luckily enough, the law above was amended, and the City was allowed to have its own law enforcement body.

Public transportation was also one of the key issues that needed to be dealt with through some inter jurisdictional solution. Due to the fact that the control actually laid in the hands of the "*Comisión Nacional de Regulacion del Transporte*" (CNRT), the 135 bus lines that serve around the city daily are not controlled by the Government of CABA. Same as with the subway system - *Subte* - whose management was passed by President Menem to Metrovias at the beginning of the '90s. It implied that the Government had no business in deciding where to locate or relocate bus stops nor in outlining the routes. A political compromise between the different levels of Government and the company providing the service was most definitely needed. And this continued even after the election of Macri, since clashes with the national government of President Kirchner were never too far away.

Another crucial topic was indeed the one regarding urban hygiene, both regarding waste management and of the flooding nightmare that affects Buenos Aires, seeing that the City

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<sup>43</sup> *La Nación* (2007). *Propuestas de los candidatos porteños*. Available at: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/910191-propuestas-de-los-candidatos-portenos>

was built over nine water channels; a nightmare for which money had been stationed by the World Bank and that had not yet been put into use.

Moreover, the impending closing of the Ensenada center meant that there would only be one habilitated center (Zona Norte 3) to deal with all the City's garbage (12.000 tons produced daily<sup>44</sup>) from then on. An overall system of waste management that was doomed to fail soon, considering that at the time there was barely one garbage container per block and that Buenos Aires features over 12.000 *cuadras*.

What follows is a brief recollection of Macri's proposals for Buenos Aires, as reported by La Nacion:

*Security*

- Creation of the Agency for the Prevention of Crime
- Salary increase for the police force and provision of more equipment
- Stationing of one policeman per block
- Institutions of "Casas de Vida" in each neighborhood to deal with addictions

*Urban development*

- Urbanization of the *Villas*

- Redesign of the drain system and focus on the Arroyo Maldonado and the areas of Vega, La Boca and Barracas. Construction of a containment barrier for when the Rio de la Plata raises.

- Potholes so not to have any in the streets
- Purchase of 20.000 new lights each year

*Transportation and traffic*

- Permanent control over the actual use of the seat belt

- Extension of the present *Subte* lines and creation of new ones

- Construction of infrastructures at the entrances to the city so that commuters can leave their car and then use public transportation

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<sup>44</sup> Apart from being a concern for the citizens of Buenos Aires it does also involve the daily arrival of roughly 7500 *cartoneros* from the urban area to dump their own waste. At about 400 millions of pesos per year (26.000.000 US\$), waste collection is the most expensive concession throughout the city.

### *Urban Hygiene*

- Have people dump their waste in container rather than in the streets
- Separation of waste beforehand
- Creation of recycling centers to change the tasks and work of the *cartoneros*
- Flexibility in timetables and shifts to guarantee recollection even in bad weather conditions

Jorge Telerman and Daniel Filmus' proposals differed slightly from Macri's ones. Both of them were also keen to create some law enforcement authority to compensate the lack of a metropolitan police within the City with more or less focus on the provision of technical equipment. In regard to urban development, Telerman's program was presenting a more concrete case seeing that being mayor at the time allowed him to know what the conditions of Buenos Aires for flooding and transport were. They were both also trying hard to fight for a better waste management system, Telerman in a continuity perspective and Filmus in the average way that politicians discuss these themes. Given the similarity of the proposals and the candidates' profiles, the fact that Macri's victory was so overwhelming should be telling on its own<sup>45</sup>. People felt like there was something new about him and the PRO, and that they had matured from their first attempt in 2003.

From the very beginning of his political career, Macri was aware that he would not have been able to call upon the masses in the typical Argentine way and this is why he worked on his way of speaking for it to be suitable for televisions, radios, etc. From 2003 on he worked on himself and his appearance and getting rid of his mustache helped him to become "Mauricio" instead of remaining "Macri."

He also worked on his ability to formulate better and present an argument, and even though he never reached the level of the best Argentine speakers, he still came off as a capable politician able to handle confrontations on his own.

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<sup>45</sup> La Nación. Las Propuestas de los candidatos porteños. May 20th 2007. Available at: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/910191-propuestas-de-los-candidatos-portenos>

Macri's victory was built on three key aspects: political renovation, extensive knowledge of the problems of the City due to his involvement with the think tank orbiting around the PRO and concrete proposals and teams of experts ready to be in government<sup>46</sup>.

Given this somewhat personal "limitation" of perceived non approachability, he came into the electoral arena with quite a few novelties and conducted a political campaign that could only lead him straight to victory.

First of all, what is interesting to analyze is the addressing of his speeches. The focus was on the common citizen. The citizen that was tired of the usual political discourses that was invited to bet on something potentially dangerous, but original nonetheless. Many think that the PRO campaign appealed to techniques of direct marketing, typical of ad campaigns in big urban settings. The contamination between advertisement and political propaganda leads us to dimensions that are further away from politics and are more related to leisure time and sports life. The style was inconsistent with the strengthening of a particular ideology and keen on advocating images for a better future.

The innovative trait was the vision proposed by this particular movement, one that was appealing to the general citizen, not to that supporting one or the other political force. A sort of illusion of mass revolution with the use of the personal pronoun "us." The idea was to communicate that every citizen would have been able to contribute to the shaping of politics and its priorities, so much that the leader becomes a mediator of will and not someone above all others.

Macri pursued a rather unusual electoral campaign - for Argentine standards in particular - by avoiding big speeches and mass rallies, and preferring instead to focus on the single *barrios* and to make his presence known to as many people as possible, minding of course that television crews and journalists would be there. The lack of a political angle proved fortunate.

Furthermore, his elevated economic status contributed to the saying "*cómo es rico no necesita robar*"<sup>47</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> De Angelis A., Vedia C. S., Guouman M., Lozada Castro P., Campos Rios M., Rossi H., (2009). *Haciendo Buenos Aires? Una crítica a la gestión macrista de la ciudad*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones IML.

<sup>47</sup> Since he is rich, he doesn't need to steal.

Another key element of the campaign was to strategically choose a good co-candidate to run for the position of Vice *Jefe de Gobierno*, as Gabriela Michetti was. Already a member of the legislature of Buenos Aires but with a low level of public exposure, she was able to compensate Macri's deficit with her public speaking allure. She was a woman capable of instilling empathy. Many votes were cast for her, even though she was a newbie in the world of politics too. The formula centered around the idea that both of them (Mauricio y Gabriela) could have been any of the *vecinos* of Buenos Aires, with the only difference that they had a plan for the future.

The main factors that helped to bring about change were the frustration of the failed commitment and the postponed action. This feeling contributed to the birth of the campaign slogan: "Buenos Aires will be good"<sup>48</sup>. They presented the city as an unsafe place and Macri's electoral discourse revolved around the concepts of "hope" and "future." In their discourses, they always used verbs in their potential form, thus entailing the possibility and desire for a better future. For instance: "It would be good if we began to serve better those who are sick in hospitals. It would be good not to be flooded every time it rains, because then we are drowning in a glass of water. It will be good Buenos Aires - BA will be good"<sup>49</sup> The need to take care of schools, hospitals, roads, etc. was also deeply empathize, and the conclusion was always the same "*Vote a Mauricio y Gabriela*".

The image of Mauricio Macri's face never appeared in any poster across the city. There were only simple messages and when his face did make an appearance it was always together with his fellow candidate Gabriela Michetti.

The PRO presented the elective act as a chance to star in the game of republican democracy and enforced the participation of the inhabitants of Buenos Aires. The goal was to build a convenient electoral positioning. In the words of Mauricio Macri: "To ask you for an opportunity would be too much, but to ask you to choose is to ask you to be free, to tell everyone what you think [...], to tell that you are tired [...], to put a vote of confidence in what you trust." The value of freedom stood above all other populist ones.

The statements given during the campaign resembled concrete proposals. What was stressed was Macri's experience as President of the Boca Juniors Football Club which under

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<sup>48</sup> Literally "Va a estar bueno Buenos Aires"

<sup>49</sup> Analisis campagna politica macri UBA relaciones publicas

his administration went from being a club with few resources with little to no international success with a big economic deficit to a real profit-oriented enterprise able to win local and international tournaments and with an extremely good reputation.

The principles that gained most of the focus were simple and did not depend purely on the government action but the acts and compromise of the citizens themselves. The goal was to create the idea of intimacy with the voters and among them too with sentences that evoked a desire for change. “It would be good to be good. It would be good to say good afternoon, even when they are not so good. It would be good to start saying good night, every night. Buenos Aires will be good”.

The very idea of neighborhood emerged as an active, general responsibility to be shared, in the service of the community balance and thrive. Macri called upon the idea of collaboration with the *vecinos* throughout the campaign. He showed himself as a leader committed to bringing about change but only with the help of his fellow citizens. “You and I equal change”<sup>50</sup>. The focus was always on the future and its possibilities, rather than in the past. He never negatively appraised any of his adversaries nor did he reply to any of the provocations cast against him.

The release of various spots during the months leading up to the elections focused in particular on the issues that affect every ordinary citizen and their up-to-then failed management. “Who uses the flooded streets? Everyone does. Who walks the broken sidewalks? All of us”<sup>51</sup>.

Macri represented the new, the one non-contaminated by the past, the one who would have been able to represent the youth and those sectors of the population tired of the traditional political reality.

What was determinant in ensuring the failure of Filmus and Telerman was the kind of support that they had from the current executive power, especially if we recall that the intervention of the President in the debate contributed to the rising of more tension.

After the first ballot, Nestor Kirchner named Macri, the candidate that had one the majority of votes but had not conquered the requested threshold of 50%, as “Mauricio que

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<sup>50</sup> *Vos + Yo = Cambio*, PRO political campaign for the 2007 elections in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.

<sup>51</sup> Lio V., Calzado M., Fernandez M., Crespo T., (2013). Politics and Security. Notes from the Political Campaigns run by Propuesta Republicana Party at Buenos Aires in 2007 and 2011. In *Ricerca in vetrina, Originalità e impatto della ricerca di dottorandi e dottori di ricerca* (pp. 477 - 486). Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli.

es Macri...” (“Mauricio who is a Macri”). The use of the argument *ad hominem* aimed at disregarding Macri by recalling his mercantilist past and the risk of giving a position such that of *Jefe de Gobierno* to a similar character. The use of Macri’s family name was used to shade light onto a discussed past, but it backfired and only resulted in the decline of the presidential image. Even though the past has to be taken into consideration and that possible charges of corruption should not be overlooked, citizens still felt like the President had crossed a line and that he had no business in matters related to the City of Buenos Aires. Mass media backed up this sentiment and thus sided against the President<sup>52</sup>.

The majority of voters chose Macri because they reckoned he could positively affect their daily lives and resolve their most urgent needs. He managed to build an appealing collective imagination which people believed he could deliver. He was somehow already projecting the public policies that he was determined to set into place once elected<sup>53</sup>.

Given the respectability of the other candidates, Macri’s victory can be considered as even greater. It was a battle among equals. Telerman fell into the trap and conducted a funny political campaign without any real content, depicting him too frivolous in the eyes of educated voters and too hard to grasp for the less educated one.

Filmus, as an intellectual with a coherent proposal, led a classical political campaign appreciated by progressist editors but with a style that according to the surveys had bored the majority of the people of Buenos Aires. He was also unable to capitalize Kirchner’s support which before the second ballot was not anymore such a trustworthy politician.

Macri managed to play his cards well by staying out of the polarization between Telerman and Filmus thus letting their common supporters be split into two factions, gaining the upper hand on both by a disturbing margin.

In 2011 there were already rumors running around that he would propose himself as the PRO’s candidate in the presidential elections against Cristina Kirchner, widow of the recently dead President, but he knew better. He knew he had to consolidate Buenos Aires as his fortress and complete his work before going for after the presidency.

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<sup>52</sup> Marafioti R., (2008). *De las falacias*. P. 109

<sup>53</sup> *Id.* p. 113

Hence, confident of the progress made during his first mandate, in the year 2011 he decided to run again for office, in the wake of continuity. He was determined and managed to win the seat of Chief of Government by a disturbing margin once again. It appeared that the citizens of Buenos Aires were rather content with the doings of his administration or that they were at least allowing him to try to bring about change to the City for the second time.

In the first round of the election, Macri took 47% of the vote, nearly 20 percentage points ahead of his nearest rival. In the run-off on 31 July 2011, the incumbent mayor won the support of nearly 65 percent of voters<sup>54</sup>. His final opponent was once again Daniel Filmus.

The political campaign of the PRO party in 2011 was carried out so well both regarding political communication and of electoral marketing that Campaign & Elections - one of the leading magazine in the field – referred to it as the best political campaign of the year across all Iberoamerica<sup>55</sup>. As in 2007, the head of the campaign was his trusted friend and colleague Horacio Rodríguez Larreta.

Their strategy was to address its opponent regarding the main difference between the PRO and the FPV: the efficacy and the technical rationality behind the defense of the interests of the citizens of Buenos Aires<sup>56</sup>. The main slogans of the campaign - “*Juntos venimos Bien*”<sup>57</sup> and “*Vos sos bienvenido*”<sup>58</sup> - recalled the success of an administration which had already been in place for four years. The idea of togetherness of the first campaign was still redundant, and the idea to overcome the gap between candidates and the electorate remained strong, expressing itself through claims such as “*Somos vecinos*”<sup>59</sup> and “*La Ciudad nos une*”<sup>60</sup>. The figure of the common citizen - the *vecino* - was still pivotal to Macri’s political discourse. A citizenship that encompassed a variety of people: the youth, the women, the elderly, the children and the members of the PRO. People with new ideas willing to go on together with their leader. The PRO stressed the idea that the relationship between government and people must be built daily; together with the liberal concepts of pluralism,

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<sup>54</sup> Fuente resultados electorales

<sup>55</sup> PRO Argentina. “*Macri 2011*”: *la mejor campaña política de Iberoamérica*. August 23rd 2012. Available at: <http://pro.com.ar/blog/2012/08/23/macri-2011-la-mejor-campana-politica-de-iberoamerica/>

<sup>56</sup> Calzado M., Fernández M., Lio V. *Ciudad segura*. p.22

<sup>57</sup> Translation “Together we are working well”.

<sup>58</sup> Translation “You are welcome”.

<sup>59</sup> Translation: “We are neighbors”.

<sup>60</sup> Translation: “The City unites us”.



morality, honesty, order typically deemed as absent in the national government of Cristina Kirchner.

The PRO presented its administration as one who was once again rooted in dialogue, collaboration, and solidarity. Macri was not only talking to citizens through spots. Not at all. He would sign *compromisos* of government with them at specific events which were then broadcasted on the most important media<sup>61</sup>. He would constantly surround himself with people and commit himself to the fact that children would be able to enjoy parks more, to promote local cultural activities, to make the system of consultancy reservation in hospitals better and most importantly to the increase of security across the City. The focus on this issue of security was ever present. Safety meant management and efficacy.

The images brought about by the campaign often showed people of different age reunited in different contexts across the city, like the entrance of a building where they found themselves talking. It was an overall reminder of a positive environment.

All these tactics proved worthy, and he became once again Chief of Government. After a light reshuffling of his staff and their respective assignments, he was able to keep on doing what he started in 2007.

In the span of his second mandate, Macri achieved a copious list of things, from new traffic and road solutions to new housing initiatives to the improvements in the field of public education, just to name a few.

Through the so-called “*Plan de Seguridad*,” CCTV security cameras were installed throughout many public places in the City<sup>62</sup>, namely public parks and squares, malls and points of access to the City. The aim was that of “*Recuperar la Ciudad para los vecinos*”<sup>63</sup> and to live in a City that would protect and take care of its own citizens. Especially for those more vulnerable: mothers with their children, lovers, and older adults often visiting public squares.

Another success of the first Macri administration that he repeatedly emphasized was the attainment of the lowest ever registered child mortality rate. He was also extremely proud in underlining that his government had also achieved great things in the field of education,

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<sup>61</sup> For example: Turnos telefónicos en hospitales, otro compromiso de campaña de Mauricio Macri available at: [https://youtu.be/Bc1rPDT-p\\_w](https://youtu.be/Bc1rPDT-p_w)

<sup>62</sup> Calzado M., Fernández M., Lio V. *Ciudad segura*. p. 28

<sup>63</sup> Translation: Restore the city for the neighbors.

such as the addition of English as a compulsory subject from the very first year of elementary school. Together with the installation of Internet in 98% of the schools in Buenos Aires, claiming that the future lays in an education modeled according to the job market.

However, the policies on which this thesis will focus the most regard health, security, culture, the environment and most of all the focus on technology and the birth of the Open Government initiative, “*Gobierno Abierto*.” All these new measures enacted by Mauricio Macri’s government still play a key role in the Larreta administration. They are being recalibrated and broadened as we speak, in the spirit of continuity and in that of a having true idea of what the City will be able to look like ten years from now. A Smart City and a true pioneer in the field of urban public policies.

Determined to address the issue of inequality in the City - most notably between the North and the South - through a coordinated action with the Banco de la Ciudad, the whole Government of the City moved to the *barrio* of Parque Patricios in 2012 to strengthen its presence on the ground. The building was designed and built by Norman Foster and it’s the first in Latin America to receive the international certification for Leadership in Energy and Environmental design<sup>64</sup>.

The underlying idea was - and still is - to integrate the poorest areas of the City by injecting into them a great number of workers so that new commercial activities would arise and thus foster the development of entire neighborhoods. Deciding to move the Ministry of Education of Buenos Aires, which roughly accounts for 1.400 employees, into the heart of the Villa 31 within the next served to spike a new trend and to inspire private companies and enterprises to do the very same. The Inter-American Bank for Development has recently decided to do the same. After signing up an agreement with the Municipality and the national government, they decided to move their HQs from the city center to the Villa 31, adding 160+ workers that would come into this neighborhood daily<sup>65</sup>.

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<sup>64</sup><http://www.fosterandpartners.com/projects/buenos-aires-ciudad-casa-de-gobierno/>

<sup>65</sup>Martínez D. Y., *El BID muda sus oficinas del microcentro a la Villa 31*. *www.lanacion.com.ar*. April 6th 2017. Available at: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/2005161-el-bid-muda-sus-oficinas-del-microcentro-a-la-villa-31>

Suffice to say that the City government is undoubtedly leading by example. So much that in 2015 Macri thought that the model he and his team had given life to in the could be exported and reproduced in the whole country<sup>66</sup>.

Once the decision to run in the presidential campaign in 2015 was taken, it was time to think about his legacy in the City of Buenos Aires; an heir that would help his campaign and keep on with the work that had already done. Never shy about what he wanted, Macri managed for his good friend and trusted colleague Horacio Rodríguez Larreta - also his former Chief of Staff - to become his successor as Chief of Government in the City of Buenos Aires.

He truly did not think he could have left the City in better hands. Horacio was the one who deserved it the most and that had a better understanding of the City as a whole. And that is what he said in a speech right after Larreta's victory: "I want to celebrate your victory but most of all I want to thank you because you are a hard worker who loves this city. The challenge is to achieve in 4 years what we did in 8. Let's not be afraid. We deserve better, and we can do better. Argentines need Argentines. Let's do it together."

Born in 1965, Larreta after attaining a degree in economics from the University of Buenos Aires a few years later he also obtained a Master's Degree in Business Administration a from Harvard University. After having held numerous executive positions at both the national and provincial level - always in the social field (pensions, social security, etc.) he later contributed to the creation of the party "*Compromiso para el Cambio*"<sup>67</sup> together with Mauricio Macri.

Head of the PRO's campaigns in 2005, 2007, and 2011 he always led Macri to victory.

In 2015, he won the primaries within his own party against Macri's former deputy Gabriela Michetti and thus became the lead candidate for the PRO together with Diego Santilli - former Minister of the Environment and Public Space - as his Deputy in the municipal elections. Their formula won with 51,6% of the votes after a close tie in the ballotage against Martin Lousteau. He is recognized by many as a manager who was and

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<sup>66</sup> Speech for Larreta: "This change cannot be stopped. If we managed to make the educational system better in the capital why not extending it so that everyone can have access to a better education? If we managed to create a model with the metropolitan police, we have to do it in all the provinces. We deserve to live better and we are going to do it together". Available at: <https://youtu.be/QoZuz6IChKk>

<sup>67</sup> Later evolved into PRO party

can conquer citizens through his deep technical knowledge, commitment to the City's development and his great listening capabilities<sup>68</sup>, while also being a tremendously good team player. His role as *Jefe de Gabinete* had allowed him to oversee all areas of governmental activities.

As the author of multiple books, he was mostly noted for his publication of the volume "*El País que queremos*." It was a concrete, detailed and integrated proposal of public policies designed to exponentially increase the opportunities for social mobility across Argentina and of a foundation of rights that would give meaning to the expression "social and political citizenship." The book does not present a summary or list of suggestions; rather it presents a series of concrete, consistent and viable programs from a macroeconomic perspective which were on their part elaborated by experts in the most notorious relevant areas of public policy.

The topics on which his campaign focused most were: security, healthcare, modernization, education, and transportation. The awaited merging of the police forces present in the City which had been stalled by President Kirchner's tactics since 2007, since polls indicated that the *vecinos* still perceived it as the city's greatest deficit<sup>69</sup>.

Regarding healthcare, the idea remained the same, to try and have a center for primary care at twenty minutes top from everyone's home, with emphasis on the west and center parts of the capital.

With regards to the issue of technology and internet connectivity, the idea he propelled was to duplicate the 360 points of access already in place in parks, squares, museums, hospitals, subway stations, schools, libraries, and theaters. Plus, one of the biggest goals became the widening of the work already set up in place by the O.G. initiative to triplicate the number of forms and procedures that people can request or complete remotely.

As for education, Larreta was clear in underlining the importance of compliance with international standards and the evaluation of results, teaching methods and management of the institutes.

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<sup>68</sup> Interview with María Alejandra Goldsack, Director of the ERSP of the CABA. May 4<sup>th</sup> 2017, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

<sup>69</sup> Tombino P., *Cinco prioridades de Larreta: qué plantea hacer en la ciudad el jefe de gobierno electo*. [www.lanacion.com.ar](http://www.lanacion.com.ar). July 26<sup>th</sup> 2015. Available at: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1813570-cinco-prioridades-de-larreta-que-planea-hacer-en-la-ciudad-el-jefe-de-gobierno-electo>

Lastly, regarding transportation, he promised he would strengthen the dialogue with the future President of Argentina to come up with better solutions for the whole city and its urban area, stressing the importance to continue working on the Metrobus lines across the City to benefit as many people as possible.

After months of campaigning Larreta managed to get to City Hall and started working right away by appointing his team in December 2015. Him and his Government are set on one core objective, making Buenos Aires into a leading, modern smart city ready to face the challenges of the 21st century, from the tackling of unemployment to the addressing of the global issue of climate change, and they plan on achieving that through a set of integrated policies.

#### **1.4 An administrative overlook: the assignment of competences**

No administrator can work freely and every decision that has to be taken falls under some kind of law or jurisdiction. The legal framework is the dome under which public policies are born and can be executed and the case of Buenos Aires is no different. For every act there is the need for compliance.

In 1994, the Constitutional Assembly (*Convencion Constituyente*) reformed the Constitution of the Republic of Argentina. Article 129 states that “The City of Buenos Aires shall have an autonomous system of government with power of legislation and jurisdiction, and the head of its government shall be directly elected by the people of the City. While the City of Buenos Aires is the Capital City of the Nation, a law shall guarantee the interests of the National State. According to the aforementioned provisions of this section, the National Congress shall convoke the inhabitants of the City of Buenos Aires so that the representatives that are to be elected for that purpose issue the Organizing Statute of their institutions”. Once the elections were held and the assembly formed, the Constitution of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires was finally issued on October 1st 1996. In the meantime, temporary provision fifteenth allowed for a period of transition between the old and the new regime<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>70</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Argentina of 1994, Temporary Provision number fifteen: Until the powers arising from the new regime of autonomy of the City of Buenos Aires are to be established, Congress shall exercise exclusive legislation over its territory, in the same terms applied until the enactment of this Constitution. The head of the government shall be elected during the year nineteen ninety-five. The law foreseen in Section 129, paragraphs second and third, shall be enacted within the term of two hundred and

This regime of autonomy and its characteristics were sanctioned by Law N°24.588 and by the Constitution of the C.ABA of 1996. In compliance with what had been set by the national Constitution of 1994<sup>71</sup>, these two sources establish a republican regime, respecting the typical division of power between the legislative power, the executive one, the judiciary<sup>72</sup> and, lastly, the *Comunas*<sup>73</sup>. These are “small” decentralized administrative units which have replaced the Centers of Management and Municipal Participation<sup>74</sup> since 2005, after the issue of Law 1.777 which organized the CABA in fifteen *Comunas*<sup>75</sup>.

Furthermore, the Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires in article 1 states that the City affirms its autonomy in all the aspects where the competence of the State does not exist or prevail.

The legislative power is represented by the Legislature of Buenos Aires - which is composed of 60 members - while the executive is represented by the Government and its Chief carries the name of *Jefe de Gobierno*. The judiciary power instead, is represented by the Tribunals, the Chambers and the Public Ministry<sup>76</sup>. It is tasked with the administration of justice within the City.

The Legislature of Buenos Aires works around two main axes: a normative one and a political one. In regard to its political responsibilities the areas of scope that are going to be taken in consideration are those related to the executive power and the relationship between

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seventy days as from the approval of this Constitution. Until the issue of the Organizing Statute, the appointment and removal of the judges of the City of Buenos Aires shall be ruled according to Sections 114 and 115 of this Constitution.

<sup>71</sup> Article 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of Argentina of 1994: “They determine their own local institutions and are governed by them. They elect their governors, legislators, and other provincial officers, without intervention of the federal government.” and Article 123 “Each province enacts its own Constitution as stated in Section 5, ensuring municipal autonomy and ruling its scope and content regarding the institutional, political, administrative, economic and financial aspects”.

<sup>72</sup> Supported and integrated by a Judiciary Council, the Ministry and Court of the City.

<sup>73</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Argentina of 1994 article 5: Each province shall enact its own constitution under the republican, representative system, in accordance with the principles, declarations, and guarantees of the National Constitution, ensuring its administration of justice, municipal regime, and elementary education. Under these conditions, the Federal Government shall guarantee each province the full exercise of its institutions.

<sup>74</sup> “*Centros de Gestión y Participación Comunal*”

<sup>75</sup> Annex 1

<sup>76</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Argentina of 1994 article 120: The Public Ministry is an independent body with functional autonomy and financial autarky, with the function of promoting the participation of justice for the defense of the legal character of the general interests of society, in coordination with the other authorities of the Republic. It is composed of an Attorney General of the Nation and a General Defender of the Nation, and such other members as the law may establish. Its members enjoy functional immunities and intangibility of remunerations.

the two correspondent institutions. For instance the sanctioning of Ley de Ministerio or the approval of the Urban Environmental Plan laid out by the Government<sup>77</sup>.

According to Article 71 of the Constitution of BA, the presidency of the Legislature lies in the hands of the Deputy Chief of Government of Buenos Aires who represents the Assembly, leads debates, has the power of legislative initiative and that votes in case of a draw. According to article 105 instead, the *Jefe de Gobierno* must open the ordinary sessions of the Legislature and summarize the general state of the administration.

In the City of Buenos Aires is notable that among others, those who can promote a legislative draft are the Chief and Deputy Chief of Government, the *Comunas* and also the Council for Strategic Planning<sup>78</sup>. Once there is the need for a new law those who present it must formalize the initiative in the written form and sign it, while respecting the required formalities in all cases. In order to begin its path a proposal must also be signed by a member of the assembly, regardless of who propelled it forward. Within the legislative commission the proposals are analyzed, further discussed. Later on they are presented in the plenary session.

According to article 63 of the Constitution the Legislature, the Executive or the *Comunas* can call for a public auditing session in order to further discuss themes which affect the public's interest. Depending on the matter under discussion the needed majority to approve a law vary from absolute (more than 50% of the votes), to simple (more positive votes than negative ones, without counting boycotts) or to qualified (either of two-thirds - namely 40 votes - or of three quarters - namely 45 votes).

The laws approved by the assembly are then forwarded to the Government for it to either promulgate, communicate or veto them. A law is usually promulgated through the issue of an ad hoc degree and attached to it the through text and their publication on the gazette. According to the Constitution, the executive power has the authority to prevent the approval of the law, may it be due to a particular article, a section or an expression<sup>79</sup>. In fact it can be either a partial veto or a complete one. In case of a partial veto it may be able to promulgate the text without the part that is deemed non approved, if and only if the Legislature approves the edited draft as it is.

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<sup>77</sup> Article 81, CABA Constitution.

<sup>78</sup> CoPE.

<sup>79</sup> Art. 86, Constitution of CABA.

With particular reference to the role of the Chief of Government, article 102 of the Constitution states that the “*Jefe de Gobierno* is tasked with the administration of the City of Buenos Aires, the general planning of the management and implementation of the law. He runs the public administration and ensures its highest efficacy and best return on the investment of public resources. He takes part in the legislative process in accordance with this Constitution, he has the power of legislative initiative, promulgates and publishes laws, and applies them impartially without altering their principles. He participates in the discussion of laws either directly or through one of his Ministries. He publishes decrees in the official bulletin of the City within thirty days of their emission, otherwise making it null”.

Due to this particular set of rules, the Government of Buenos Aires is able to have a lot of political power even in front of an assembly that does not fully support him and is thus able to work intensely on its agenda.

As mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph, as well as having a close relation with the Legislature, the executive power also needs to work collaboratively with different levels of government, both above and below it: the national government and the *Comunas*; respecting the repartition of competences<sup>80</sup> while also allowing for administrative decentralization.

To better understand the legal framework within which the Government of the City operates, we need to refer to article 121 of the Constitution of the Republic of Argentina, according to which “The provinces reserve to themselves all the powers not delegated to the Federal Government by this Constitution, as well as those powers expressly reserved to themselves by special pacts at the time of their incorporation.”

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<sup>80</sup> Article 125 of the Constitution of the Republic of Argentina of 1994: The provinces may enter into partial treaties for purposes of the administration of justice, of economic interests, and works of common benefit, with the knowledge of the Federal Congress; and may promote their industry, immigration, the construction of railways and navigable canals, the colonization of provincial-owned lands; the introduction and establishment of new industries, the imports of foreign capitals and the exploration of their rivers, by means of laws protecting these ends and with their own resources. The provinces and the City of Buenos Aires may continue with their own social security entities for civil servants and professionals; and may promote economic progress, human development, creation of jobs, education, science, knowledge and culture.



In order to analyze the the public policies enacted by the Government of the City, which will be further discussed in chapter two, having a clear idea of which matters are of exclusive competence of the CABA and which are shared with the Federal Government, is crucial.

Among the exclusive competences of the City of BA we find health-care, culture, social development and the maintenance of public spaces while the matters of shared competence are several more. In is the case of transportation, markets, education, public finances, agencies of development, waste management and security as reported in Table 1.

Table 1: Exclusive and shared competences between the GCBA and the Federal Government of Argentina<sup>81</sup>.

Field	Competence of the GCBA	Competence of the Federal State
Transportation	Metrobus, highways, <i>Subte</i> and Parametro, traffic monitoring, bike-sharing system, taxis	Colectivos, airports, long-distance buses, trains, port
Justice	Arbitrate, administrative, fiscal, criminal (violations, offence)	Civil, labor, family and commercial
Education	First, primary, secondary	Universities
Public Finances	Tax collection, private debt emission	Debt emission with the Multilateral Credit Organization
Agencies for Development	South Corporation <sup>82</sup> , Puerto Madero management at 50%, Acumar management at 33%	Madero management at 50%, Acumar management at 33% <sup>83</sup>
Waste management	Collection and listing, processing up to 50%	Processing up to 50%

<sup>81</sup>Title II on Provincial Governments, Constitution of the Republic of Argentina.

<sup>82</sup> “Corporacion del Sur”

<sup>83</sup> The remaining 33% is left to the Province of Buenos Aires

Security	Metropolitan police	PFA, Prefecture
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Knowing where accountability lies in terms of who is responsible for proposing and carrying out certain policies enables us to understand and eventually - hopefully - resolve any conflict of competence that may arise.

In the past few years the City of Buenos Aires witnessed and suffered from a perfect example of institutional fragmentation of responsibility in the transport sector. In the area of the G.BA the City has a special jurisdiction, since transport services that cross city boundaries are under the national one. In this context, 135 bus lines are under the rule of the State, 121 under the rule of the Province of Buenos Aires and barely 86 under the jurisdiction of the GCBA Plus, the metropolitan rail system is administered by the Federal Government, whereas the *Subte* has been managed by the City from 2012, after a series of heated debates between Macri and Kirchner. Since most responsibilities lie under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, a number of agencies with specific tasks has been set into place<sup>84</sup>.

For instance, the former Ministry of the Interior and Transport has been renamed Ministry of Transport only and is responsible for the development and the implementation of policies, the setting tariffs, the distribution of tariffs, the distribution of subsidies and the performance of public works, while the federal agency called CNRT is tasked - together with the local agency for the control of public services (Ente de la Ciudad para el Control de los Servicios Publicos) - with the monitoring of private operators in the City.

The network seems disconnected and thus unable to take advantage of the infrastructure already in place<sup>85</sup>.

However, seeing that at the present moment the GCBA, the Province of Buenos Aires and the Federal Government are all headed by members of the PRO (Macri, Larreta and Vidal) who have already worked together for years for the development of the provision of public transportation in the City it would be safe to assume that things are going to further develop.

As far as the theme of administrative top-down decentralization - hence of competences too - goes, as stated beforehand, the City of Buenos Aires is organized in 15 *Comunas* whose

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<sup>84</sup> Muzzini E., Eraso Puig B., Anapolsky S., Lonnerberg T., Mora V. *Leveraging*. P. 264

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

institution relates back to Law 1.777 of 2005. According to article 127 of the Constitution of Buenos Aires these are administrative units with a territorial scope whose geographical delimitation guarantees demographical equilibrium and takes into account urban, socio economic and cultural premises.

Between the constitutional reform of 1994, the approval of the Constitution of the CABA and of Law 1777 there was a span of approximately ten years and the first elections of the Junta were held only in 2008.

When the time came for the actual institution of these new administrative units a huge political debate took place in relations to how many they should have been. Some proposed one for each *barrio*, meaning approximately 50 new entities which then needed to be provided for, the PRO proposed 8 and still did even when they won the elections in 2007, arguing that this layout took a toll on the City's financial budget to cover for all these new functionaries<sup>86</sup>.

However, the system developed and now the Larreta's administration does make a straightforward use of this institutions, mainly because they are helping him to get more in contact with citizens from all *barrios* of the City.

The *Comunas* perform their functions of planning, execution and control over their respective spheres of competence, in a more or less shared way with the GCBA. The distribution of competences between these two levels of government is summarized by Table 2.

Even though it is possible for the GCBA to delegate more of its competences to the *Comunas*, it must do so in equal form to all of them.

Table 2: The distribution of competences between the Government of the City of Buenos Aires and the *Comunas*<sup>87</sup>.

Exclusive competence of the <i>Comunas</i>	Shared competences with the F.G.
Secondary road and public space maintenance (according to the budget)	Control and auditing over the right execution of the law concerning the correct

<sup>86</sup> Heras, Ana Inés, Córdova, Luciana y Burin David (2007, Julio-diciembre). Análisis de la participación en la transición hacia el gobierno por comunas de la ciudad de Buenos Aires. Estudios Políticos, 31, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad de Antioquia, 183-229

<sup>87</sup> Article 128 - Constitution of the CABA (2005).

	use of public spaces
Elaboration of a program and of the draft bill of the annual budget, with no right to impose new additional taxes	Decision and execution of public works, local projects. Provision of public services. Power of enforcing the law through the police force in the <i>Comuna</i>
Legislative initiative and the presenting of decree proposals to the Executive power	Evaluation of social needs and demands, participation in the design and/or execution of programs
Administration of its estate, according to the law	Participation in the planning and in the control over public services
	Administration of social policies and community programs which they are able to fund autonomously
	Implementation of a mediation-based system for conflict resolution
	Promoting, assisting and advising to local NGOs

These particular political and administrative entities serve many important purposes. As stated in Law 1777/art 3, they facilitate the work of the GCBA and ease the participation of citizens into the decision-making process while also providing control over public matters. They also aid the Government in quality and efficient service provision. And, most importantly, as it will be further discussed in chapter three, they perform their functions to fortify the consolidation of a culture of participative democracy, on which the administration of Macri, and Larreta in particular, have been strongly focusing on.

In addition, the *Comunas* play a fundamental role in the implementation of public policies because they intervene - to the extent that is accorded to them by the law - in the designing of policies related to health-care, education, the environment, housing, culture, sports, handicaps, youth etc. The *Junta Comunal* carries out this duty by requesting the advice of the correspondent areas of the GCBA as well as that of technical public institutions in order to provide services better<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>88</sup> Art. 26, Law n°1777 of the CABA (2005).

After having recalled the historical and political context that shaped both the country and the City of Buenos Aires, we focused on the rise of the PRO party, on the importance of Mauricio Macri's leadership and on the vision of the future that people such as him and the present Chief of Government Larreta had in mind for the City since the very beginning. Whereas in the last section we looked at the legal framework under which the GCBA governs the City in relation with the Federal State and the *Comunas*. All that has been explained until now serves the crucial purpose of allowing us to understand what the real operating range of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires really is and how it actually designs and implements local public policies.

## Chapter II

### The public policy cycle in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires

CONTENTS: 2.1 STRATEGIC PLANNING: A NEW, RESULT-ORIENTED ADMINISTRATION. - 2.2 THE BUDGET. WHERE DO PRIORITIES LIE? - 2.3 THE POLITICAL AGENDA FOR 2019: *COMPROMISOS DE GOBIERNO*; 2.3.1 SOCIAL INTEGRATION; 2.3.2 CREATIVITY; 2.3.3 ENJOYMENT AND LIVING TOGETHER; 2.3.4 HUMAN SCALE. - 2.4 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY. - 2.5 MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES AND SERVICE PROVISION.

#### 2.1 Strategic planning: a new, result-oriented administration

Apart from being the political and financial capital of the Republic of Argentina, the wholesomeness and complexity of a city such as Buenos Aires, with the challenges and opportunities it entails, calls for strategic management. Issues such as the environment, urban development, social and physical security, education in its broadest sense etc. must be addressed through comprehensive, integrated and multifocal public policies carried out by an active and deeply committed government. A government determined to respect the public interest with efficiency and equity, while also generating valuable solutions through the proper use of resources and allowing for democratic control over its doings.

This new paradigm of public administration, known as New Public Management, was first implemented in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the '80s<sup>89</sup>. This model represents a results-based management built on efficiency, efficacy and economic rationality and whose gravitational point is the person seen as a client more than a simple citizen<sup>90</sup>.

The Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires currently led by Horacio Rodríguez Larreta represents this kind of government, one that comprises techniques most typically pertaining to the private sector whose reform started with the first Macri

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<sup>89</sup> Pollitt C., Bouckaert G., (2000), *Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis – New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State*. (3<sup>rd</sup>edition). Oxford University Press. - Barzelay A., (2001). *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue*. University of California Press.

<sup>90</sup> De Angelis A., Vedia C. S., Guouman M., Lozada Castro P., Campos Rios M., Rossi H. *Haciendo Buenos Aires?* P.60

administration between 2008 and 2010. The GCBA is truly committed to have a public management approach based on the delivery of high-quality results, in fact, as it is defined by Nicolas Caputo (Chief of Cabinet of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Urban Development and Transport) as an organization where they cannot afford to have people who do not fulfill their respective tasks at their maximum capacity<sup>91</sup>.

Whoever analyzes the development of the Government of the City of Buenos Aires through the years will observe that in the last two decades it has been growing in magnitude, especially given the increasing complexity and quality of the services<sup>92</sup> it provides to the *vecinos* of the city. All the more reason to push forward a reform of the public sector.

The idea behind it was born on the fact - as stated by Diego Santilli - that “Macri is a man who seeks change in management. Hence, in people”<sup>93</sup>.

The restructuring of the GCBA was planned and carried out thanks to Dario Quiroga (as General Director of Organizational Structure of the GCBA), Andrés Ibarra (as Secretary of Human Resources of the GCBA) and Emilio Basavilbaso (as Deputy Secretary of Strategy and Development of Human Resources of the GCBA) from 2008 onward.

According to them, the GCBA, due to its old organizational model, was not ready for the growth and mixture of the new organizational cultures arising and was in need of restructuring. By 1996, also as a consequence of its transformation into the Autonomous City of BA, its structure was already outdated. Once they started working on the new layout of the organization, they realized that for more than thirteen years the *Gobierno de la Ciudad* had operated without an institutionalized form of government so that its processes, activities and functions were susceptible to different standards and criteria<sup>94</sup>.

In 2008 and 2009 every branch of the administration worked hard to come up with a set of management rules that for the City of Buenos Aires was truly unprecedented. The

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<sup>91</sup> Interview with Nicolas Caputo Chief of Cabinet of the Secretary of the Ministry of Urban Development and Transport held on May 10th 2017, Buenos Aires.

<sup>92</sup> As the assumption of responsibilities for Health and Education which started in 1993 and its transformation in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires back in 2006. Straface G., Maksymiuk C., Rotondo G., Vuotto L., (2010). *Estructuras Organizativas del Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. Régimen gerencial - Decreto 684/09*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Buenos Aires Ciudad.

<sup>93</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*.

<sup>94</sup> Straface G., Maksymiuk C., Rotondo G., Vuotto L. *Estructuras Organizativas*. Prologue.

apex of this administrative and cultural reform was the approval of various decrees between September 2009 and July 2010 instituting functional and organic structures. During that time, a first level of management below the General Director was instituted in every one of the Ministries. One of the main goals of the first Macri administration was to have an efficient and suitable management and administrative system in place by 2012.

The new Organizational Structure points to a modern, efficient and effective municipal model able to give valuable and immediate responses to the demands of society.

This new layout, summed with the incorporation of new technologies, was designed to reach a new public management model, one in which the implementation of public policies proposed by the executive power would devolve upon the administration's management team.

Designing and establishing such an organization was only the first step down a path that had to be taken in order to equip the city government with the ability to answer the demands of its citizens. A system which now allowed for the setting of objectives for each person entitled with a certain set of responsibilities for the very first time, thus enabling the evaluation of his or her performance and or the potentiality of their future career for those qualified enough to perform their tasks.

Once all decrees were approved and the new design ready to be implemented, they had to communicate to the whole GCBA how their work life was going to change.

According to the authors, the book "Estructuras Organizativas del Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires" - which featured the organization chart for each Ministry, responsibilities and objectives of each department etc. - was meant to be a clear and dynamic tool that would boost the detailed knowledge of the composition of the different areas of government and correspondent competencies, thus enhancing the understanding and control over the acts of the government.

We can state that the GCBA works in compliance with the "position-based model", defined by Laura Zuvanic<sup>95</sup> as an "open structure which features a clear distinction among the different positions of a public administration under the premise of selecting the best

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<sup>95</sup> Zuvanic L., (2016). *En busca del destino: hacia la profesionalización de la Alta Dirección Pública en América Latina*. Documento de Políticas Públicas / Análisis N°180. Buenos Aires, Argentina: CIPPEC.



person for each job”. In this context of renovated culture and responsible competition, the public servants grew into highly specialized employees and valuing the person for his or her work became the key to deliver better policies. For example, on an intranet portal reserved to public servants of the City, there is the possibility to nominate and vote someone as employee of the month in order to have this person’s story told and to encourage people to work better and better.

The GCBA takes Human Resources related themes seriously, in fact the management of Human Capital is handled as in many enterprises across the globe, thus implementing practices usually pertaining to the private sector within the public one. Apart from having access to various benefits and lotteries, the employees of the City are given the chance to visit sights and monuments in Buenos Aires, they have a football tournament organized for them etc. and the Government is also very keen on creating a sense of community and belonging for all employees. For instance, by sharing with them the principles behind big ideas such as the moving of entire government HQs to the South of the City, or the reaching of a new objectives by a branch of the administration.

Values in which the GBCA believes in, are transmitted to all employees across their workspace, thus that working for the GCBA becomes something to be proud of and that concurs to the creation of a healthy workplace<sup>96</sup> that further stimulates its employees to give their very best.

In the words of Enrique Avogadro (Director of Creative Industries and of the Metropolitan Center for Art of the GCBA), who even refers to himself as a former Peronist, what is valuable about this model of public management is the horizontality present, the daily contact, the formation of cross-cutting teams to deal with the multidimensionality of many issues, the weekly meetings with the Cabinet and the never-ending availability of the Chief and its functionaries. According to him “It is a work ethic based on facts and shared routines rather than on false promises and words. We share an enthusiasm which enables us to experiment”.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Proximity, austerity, time, team, creativity and innovation, humbleness.

<sup>97</sup> Peña M., Rozitchner A. (2013). *Volver a pensarlo todo*.

According to Macri instead, thanks to the new system, career-oriented employees started working better and being proud of getting things done, leaving aside laziness: “It was a really good change and it was the product of a team effort”.<sup>98</sup>

The goal that the GCBA wants to reach through the use of private management tools is to make the public administration more efficient and effective in order to implement successful public policies. The applied model of project management aims at reaching goals which have been previously set, where monitoring is useful to the decision-making process. In order to implement a result-oriented administration there must be the definition of common standards, rules and norms for all jurisdictions and areas of Government because its planning must be a joint venture.

At the moment, the GCBA is composed by eleven Ministries and five Secretariats all depending from the Chief of Government, although not all Secretariats are ranked the same. The General Secretariat for example ranks as high as a Ministry. This hierarchy was set in place through Law N° 4013, approved on December 10th, 2011, which modified the original setting laid out during the Macri I.

According to the official organizational chart of the GCBA, the Ministries that are now part of it are the following<sup>99</sup>:

- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Justice and Security
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Urban Development and Transport
- Ministry of Culture
- Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
- Ministry of Governance
- Ministry of Environment and Public Space
- Ministry of Modernization, Innovation and Technology

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<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> Annex 2, organizational chart of the GCBA.

While the Secretariats are the following<sup>100</sup>:

- General Secretariat and International Relations
- Legal and Technical Secretariat
- Media Secretariat
- Deputy Secretariat for Social Communication
- Deputy Secretariat for Community Management and Citizens Care

In order to provide high-quality services while also aiming at using resources efficiently, the GCBA relies on various management tools such as Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation System and Management Control while its administration works along two main axes, the short-term one (annual planning) and the long-term, as in the case of “Buenos Aires 2030” which will be further explained later.

The mission of the *Secretaría de Planificación Evaluación y Coordinación de Gestión* (SECPECG), which depends directly from the Executive Office of the Cabinet of Ministers, is tasked with generating a tracking system for projects and of evaluation of the results obtained by the public administration across the GCBA, while promoting the abiding of the principles of efficacy, opportunity, economic ratio, productivity and administrative simplification. In the Operational Planning objectives, targets and priority projects are laid out for the administration to implement. Afterwards, there is the thorough evaluation of said projects, while transversal projects are executed with the collaboration of the different competent Ministries.

The methodological premises that define the Annual Strategic Planning of the GCBA for designing policies revolve around three main questions:

- What is the current state of affairs?
- What do we want for the future?
- How can we reach these objectives?

The very first question requires to be answered through a detailed analysis of the initial situation which must then be followed by an in-depth analysis of the problem at hand [ndb

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<sup>100</sup> Annex 2, organizational chart of the GCBA.

needs assessment and problem recognition] and by a diagnosis of the political and institutional context in order to predict other stakeholders' possible positions on the matter.

Once the problem has been identified, what follows is a strategic view of the future whilst prioritizing the subsequent objectives. Once there is an idea of what the situation will have to look like the year after, it is time to determine which tools and actions are needed to comply with said objective. This "third" phase also features the assignment of responsibilities and resources.

As far as the actual planning is concerned, every Ministry, Secretariat and Agency of the City takes active part in this process, while the General Directorate for Strategic Planning works together with correspondent teams from each of the eleven jurisdictions.


Important as it is, the planning involves every Minister, Deputy Secretary, General Director and main consultants of the whole Government of the City.

The Annual Strategic Plan is carried out at the same time as the drafting and approval of the budget. One cannot exist without the other.

As far as the Strategic Plan for year Y goes, as explained in Graph 1, the first meeting with all jurisdictions takes place between May and June of year X. The elaboration of the Plan starts with this very meeting and must be completed by July. The following phase entails the presentation of the Operational Plan for year X, while also focusing on budget negotiations to allocate resources.

The drafting of the budget law must be sent to the Legislature of the City by September 30th (year X), whereas the deadline for making adjustments to the O.P. is set for the end of October. The presentation of the budgetary law in front of the Legislature is bound to happen between October and December while the consequent vote for its approval can be set between November and December 31<sup>st</sup>.

Illustration 1: Strategic Annual Planning process within the GCBA<sup>101</sup>.



With particular reference to the Monitoring and Evaluation System, once the Annual Planning has been designed what follows is a declaration of commitment to a high level-performance with impact indicators while taking into consideration the Citizen’s Charter and also respecting management indicators. The MES system must perform an integral evaluation of the City’s management according to two main components; the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of impact and management indicators which every Ministry sets for itself and the drafting of Commitment Charts identifying strategic products and services which must be provided by the Government to the Government (internally) or by the Government for the citizen (external), with high-quality standards.

This is the reason why the SEGM works closely with the Chiefs of Staff of each Ministry, pointing out a political and an operational liaison which they accompany throughout the process. In regard to the elaboration of the Commitment Chart<sup>102</sup>, the SEGM works closely

<sup>101</sup> Moccia F., *Un Modelo de Gestión Pública en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires*. I Siminatio Internacional de Gestión Estratégica en el Sector Público”. Lima, September 2014.

<sup>102</sup> They define your expected service, the aspects of this particular provision at which you want to get better and the elaboration of quality indicators through impact. These indicators become benchmarks.

with the General Directors of each Ministry in order to set out quality indicators such as: procedures, construction quality and service quality of customers according to each area<sup>103</sup>.

The annual assessment is then carried out according to the compliance with performance commitment and the Citizen's Charter. Once the evaluation is completed its data and conclusions serve to give back a feedback of the overall system. Once this monitoring cycle is completed its findings are used to give life to a new Strategic Annual Plan for the following year.

The elaboration of data comes for the Planning and Management phases from processes, programs and impact and impact goals, while information useful for the Annual Evaluation is obtained through processes, programs and a comparison between efficiency and operational expenditure. Corrections and adjustments are made according to impact indicators and variable remuneration. Every piece of information is public, of quality and available to citizens. Having high-quality information at disposal to take informed decisions aims at a quality leap in the public management of the City of Buenos Aires. Data and statistical inferences in fact play a fundamental role in the administration of the city<sup>104</sup>.

Within the SECPECG there are three subdivisions which are:

- DGPLE: General Directorate for Strategic Planning
- DGEGAS: General Directorate for the Evaluation of Expenditure
- DGCONTG: General Directorate for Management Control


The first one has to oversee the implementation of the Plan by the year while checking if the objectives are met. The second one instead, must assess results on a weekly base while the third one has to monitor progress based on the uses of financial resources monthly. The system relies on the GANIT technique to assess the state of the various projects, as shown in Image 2 and every project is developed around four core issues: objective, impact, challenges and limitations, and methodology. This particular approach to public management proved to be rather valuable and allowed for the GCBA to achieve some impressive results.

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<sup>103</sup> <https://mibuenosairesweb.gov.ar/node/3057>

<sup>104</sup> De Angelis A., Vedia C. S., Guouman M., Lozada Castro P., Campos Rios M., Rossi H. *Haciendo Buenos Aires?* p. 20

Illustration 2: Follow-up of projects within the GCBA<sup>105</sup>.



In addition, the DGPLE is formed by an interdisciplinary team that also gives training courses to all the offices and that with the use of this management tools that allows for the measurement of each office's performance, it wants to consolidate itself as a local and national reference. Training is performed accordingly to previous surveys among the various jurisdictions in order to determine in what they need training or which skills they need to master in order to carry out their tasks. They also organize breakfast sessions with the Chiefs of Staff in order to bring about strategic discussions. The idea is to help the Ministries incorporate evaluation within planning so that they are able to provide a higher-quality service to the user, might it be internal or external. The idea is to lessen the gap between the aimed quality and citizens' perception of it by using public resources wisely.

## 2.2 The budget. Where do priorities lie?

The establishment of clearly defined goals, output targets within the budget statement,

<sup>105</sup> Moccia F., *Un Modelo de Gestión Pública en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires*. I Siminaria Internacional de Gestión Estratégica en el Sector Público". Lima, September 2014.

and the application of cost-benefit analysis to political programs are useful tools facilitating the definition of long-term political priorities<sup>106</sup>. The budget of any institution or political entity is the pure expression of its vision for the future. Public financing is the tool that enables us to link policy, planning and budgeting all in one big integrated strategy. It is the mean for the allocation of resources for each and every policy or programme which is going to be carried out by the different Ministries throughout the year, in the case of annual budgeting, or over the years in case of a multi-year planning. It also allows for the transparent and efficient implementation of public policies and for the coming together of different levels of government, which in our case reveals the GCBA's ability to act upon its decisions. The amount of availability of financial resources is a crucial element for the public policy cycle. Indeed, without a clear idea of the significance of the financial assets that an institution will have at its disposal the coming year, there is no possibility nor for a straightforward nor trustworthy series of public policies.

Starting out from a need-assessment within the City of Buenos Aires, every year the Executive power prioritizes objectives that are translated into programs within the budget. The budget is public and shows the sources and the allocation of all public funds. The Government is tasked with the drafting proposal of the budget for each coming year, and as it was explained beforehand, it must send it to the Legislature by September 30<sup>th</sup> for it to be discussed and later approved.

Within the Legislature, the Financial and Budgetary Commission analyzes it, debates it and finally proposes adjustments for it to pass in the general assembly. Once approved, it becomes a proper law and the GCBA is the institution that must take care of its execution. The control over the management of the budget is fundamental and this is why auditing institutions such as Internal Auditing Units, the Court of Accounts and the Auditor's General Office were instituted. At the same time, according to the GCBA, it is important for the budget to be literally "open" to the general public in order to communicate how resources are invested and foster participation, in order to have yet another monitoring tool and to improve the level of public debate.

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<sup>106</sup> Fisher F., Miller G. J., Sidney M. S., (2007). *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis. Theory, Politics and Methods*. New York, (U.S.A.): CRC Press Taylor and Francis Group. P. 48



The 2017 budget was approved with Law N° 5.724 on December 1st, 2016 and following the objectives set out by the Action Plan of the GCBA for 2017-2019, it reflects the priorities of the Larreta administration for the coming years. It is interesting to notice that this particular document is the perfect example of what scholars refer to as “agenda-setting” which basically constitutes an argument to explain the choices made in the drafting of the budget.

As stated in the introduction of this very document, the main purpose of this Plan is to design long-range public policies both able to answer citizens’ demands and to contribute to the development of the City as a place of social harmony for millions of Argentines. The formulation of a long-term plan is said to be fundamental in order to reach the goal of the current administration which is to ensure that Buenos Aires becomes a City people can enjoy, which guarantees the integration of those more vulnerable and where starting from creativity and innovation everyone can express their potential. The GCBA clearly states that true public policies must be long-term ones in order for their results to actually have an impact. Changing course constantly is believed to have a null effect<sup>107</sup>.

The framework was designed strategically in order to make it an avant-garde City and a model for its peers. In order to achieve such paradigm there are certain core values that must permeate all acts of governance, namely proximity, humbleness, austerity, doing, creativity, teamwork and time value. Proximity because they want to be able to listen, accompany, empathize and ultimately be close to citizens. Humbleness because although the GCBA knows it doesn’t hold all the solutions, listening to people is imperative nonetheless. Austerity because the administration of someone else’s assets but be done soberly and with reasoning, valuing every resource available to its maximum. Doing because the ever-present feature of this Government is to favor facts over deeds. Creativity because having an open mind to observe and study allows for the finding of new solutions to old problems. Teamwork because big changes are achievable by teams, not individuals. Lastly, time value because every day is valuable and Government officials and employees must be aware that citizens and their needs cannot wait.

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<sup>107</sup> Gobierno de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, *Plan General de Acción de Gobierno 2017-2019*. December 2016.

The 2017-2019 Plan was designed along four main axes, which in turn feature more detailed strategies. These are enjoyment, human scale, social integration, creativity and innovation. Every one of these themes is a major framework for the specific policies enacted by the Government which will be analyzed in 2.3.

The revenues of the City of Buenos Aires derive from a variety of sources such as the Treasury of the City, its own resources, earmarked resources, transfers, internal transfers, and both domestic and external financing. As far as the Treasury is concerned, it encompasses the usual revenues deriving from taxes, fines, rates, etc. that can cover any kind of payment, whereas its own resources are those generated by the GCBA for the selling of goods and services (i.e. the payment of tickets for a show that will finance the expenses of a theatre). The earmarked resources, instead, are those levied exclusively for the attainment of a specific goal (i.e. donations).


As far as transfers and financing resources are concerned, these include resources deriving from transfers between different institutions of the GCBA, those deriving from debt securities and loans in the internal market, and credits granted by other countries, international organizations or banks of the tradable sector.

In 2016 the total sum of expenses executed by the GCBA amounted to 147 billion pesos (9.200.000 USD approximately) and those for 2017 are forecasted to be around 178 billion pesos (11.000.000 USD approximately) of which 33.112.820.079 ARS (2 billion USD approximately) in the form of capital expenditures and 145.693.937.612 ARS (9.000.000 USD approximately) in the form of current expenditures<sup>108</sup>. As for the available resources for 2017, the City has estimated that it will possess 172.631.356.774 ARS\$ (10.800.000.000 USD approximately). All the data presented from now on, refer to the 2016 budget. As shown in Table 3, the Municipal Treasury is the most conspicuous source of financial resources of the Municipality, amounting to 85% of the total budget, followed by external financing and transfers amounting both to 4,6%, earmarked resources amounting to 2,7%, own resources to 2% and lastly internal transfers and financing which amount to barely 1,3% combined.

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<sup>108</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/presupuestoabierto>

Figure 1: The financing of the GCBA<sup>109</sup>.




As shown in Figure 2, the allocation of financial resources featured in the 2016 budget not only highlights the areas of government on which the GCBA focuses more, namely education and healthcare, it also provides us with a panoramic view of the actual spending per each and every *Comuna* of the City.

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
<sup>109</sup>*Id.*

Figure 2: The allocation of resources for each institution of the GCBA<sup>110</sup>.



<sup>110</sup> *Id. ii*

Map 1: The allocation of financial resources across the 15 *Comunas* of the CABA<sup>111</sup>.




As it can be seen in Map 1, the proclaimed will of the GCBA to improve the living conditions and integration of the Southern part of the City is clearly reflected by the amount of expenditure concentrated in both *Comuna 4* and *Comuna 8*, with each of them being allocated approximately 250 million USD.

However clear, the previous charts do not fully make us understand what are the actual major expenses that the GCBA has to bare. These include all the actions destined to fulfil administrative, legislative, judicial, monitoring, informative and statistical tasks. As Figure 3 shows, the biggest expenses for the Government - as in many organizations - are those for the personnel, whether it provides permanent, temporary, or extra service. Plus, family allowances, social assistance, benefits packages, executive staffs, and fixed-term contracts.

<sup>111</sup> The high number of public works in the Comuna 1 is so due to the fact that here is where they have a wide impact over the general population, being the area where the majority of people commutes to everyday to go to work. Source: data.buenosaires.gob.ar

Figure 3: Expenditures of the GCBA<sup>112</sup>.



As for consumer goods, these include products such as paper and clothing items as well as construction materials while non-personnel services comprise things from the provision and maintenance of suitable infrastructures, to the financing of the propaganda of the GCBA which is actually tremendously high (57 million USD approximately).

With particular reference to use goods, these encompass construction expenses (76%), equipment, and items of various sorts including pieces of art.

With regards to transfers, these consist of all kinds of financial transactions destined to fund other economic agents, such as those to the private sector in order to finance current expenditures as for in the case of the granting of scholarships for students and researchers, while financial assets are financial flows that entail the recognition of a right in favor of the GCBA, such as in the case of short and long-term loans.


Lastly, the debt service related expenses incorporate all the expenses destined to cover the payment of interest rates and commissions relevant to the public debt of the City.

Overall, as shown in Figure 4, the services that constitutes most of the costs for the Government are respectively, the provision of social services, the provision of economic services and finally the provision of security services. Plus, government administration and

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/presupuestoabierto>

operations related to public debt, interests and expenditures. Social services include education, health-care, promotion and social action, housing, culture, drinkable water and work while the economic ones encompass urban maintenance, transportation, environment, industry and trade and tourism. As for the government administration, this consists of the judicial, legislative and financial ones, of the executive direction and of management control.

Figure 4: Areas of expenditure of the GCBA<sup>113</sup>.



The governments of Mauricio Macri and of Larreta have been often depicted as antisocial administrations, merely keen on doing the interests of the wealthiest people.

However, according to the data that we analyzed in this paragraph, it is clear that the idea behind this very allocation of resources respects is instead to comply with the principle of austerity to which the GCBA bases its actions upon as explained earlier. The idea in fact, is to not to waste resources, rather to invest them in a more efficient way where funding is most needed without giving way to casual subsidies or transfers.

The description of the result-oriented administration present in the City of Buenos Aires, of its adoption of a strategic approach to planning and of its allocation of budgetary

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<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

resources to the different areas of government enable us to understand why the deal made by Mayor Larreta with the citizens of Buenos Aires in February 2016, promising them he would achieve 35 detailed objectives within the end of its first mandate in 2019, is so important.

### **2.3 The political agenda for 2019: *compromisos de Gobierno***

If the setting of the agenda is ascribable to the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose public and elite attention, what is even more important in the City of Buenos Aires is to have citizens be able to witness their motive, context, means and results.

Only a few months after having been elected, Chief of Government Larreta presented to the *vecinos* of Buenos Aires an organic plan of 35 so-called *compromisos de Gobierno*, gathered along the same four axes upon which the drafting of the 2016 and 2017 budget was carried out (Social Integration, Creativity, Enjoyment, Human Scale). Earlier this year, 15 more were added so that now the GCBA has actually 50 formal agreements with the citizens of the Capital Federal that it must comply with before the end of its mandate in 2019<sup>114</sup>.

These agreements can be recalled as “formal” because they are not parts of an electoral programme, rather they are detailed policies whose progress is constantly measured and made available for the public on the GCBA’s websites. Indeed, when searching for a particular policy on this platform one can choose from different searching criteria, namely alphabetical order A-Z, category, deadline and progress status. In addition, every policy is presented as an answer to the Agenda on Sustainable Development issued by the United Nations. The more common ones are Obj. 3, 4, 11, and 8<sup>115</sup>.

This is yet another proof that the GCBA acts only according to careful planning and that every new public work, every new health-care related innovation etc. is taken forward only when they do know they have the necessary resources. In the following section, we

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<sup>114</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/compromisos>

<sup>115</sup> Goal 3: Good Health and Well-being; Goal 4: Quality Education; Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth; Goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, United Nations. Available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>



are going to enlist and analyze every public policy belonging to the agenda of the GCBA according to the category criteria.

Social integration has notoriously been one of Larreta's main preoccupations. He always stresses that he wants Buenos Aires to be about inclusion and better chances for those that have been left behind. The characteristic the PRO party as non-Peronist force is that it carries out policies through actual capabilities building, creation of opportunities and such, instead of only tackling poverty and despair with subsidies and net transfers. This is why the administration decided to focus on the urbanization of the *Villas*, on the requalification of entire neighborhoods and finally on women and children through integrated strategies.

### 2.3.1 Social integration

- *Improvement of housing and living conditions for 80.000 citizens living in precarious settlements.* Deadline: December 2019; Status in progress. In order to truly integrate the *Villas* and raise their status to that of *barrios*, the GCBA is pushing hard to have paved streets, access to water and electrical networks, dungeons and public green areas. These people represent one third of the overall population of precarious settlements and the idea is to have the others in the same conditions by 2023. This agreement is particularly heart-felt and the desire of the GCBA is that it will be carried out regardless of who is going to rule the CABA in 2019. As of May 2017, 2.300 families are already benefitting from these new arrangements.
- *Delocalization of the Ministry of Education of the GCBA in the Villa 31.* Deadline December 2019; Status 5%. In order for Buenos Aires to grow as a City it is compulsory that every citizen is given the same opportunities to live a better life. The project to integrate the Villa 31 into the *barrios* of the City includes the creation of an Educational Hub which will generate 2.920 new vacancies. This area will feature the new HQs of the Ministry of Education of the GCBA, two infant schools, two primary schools, one secondary school and a specific school part of the program "*Terminá la Secundaria*" which allows for college dropouts to attend class remotely and obtain the Bachelor's Degree they never obtained, regardless of where in Argentina they are living. The relocation of the Ministry and the creation of the Educational Hub will see thousands of people entering the area daily fostering the development of the 440+ jobs and trade that are expected. The project for

the Educational Hub María Elena Walsh was decided upon a contest of preliminary draft organized in collaboration with the Faculty of Architecture, Design and Urbanism of the University of Buenos Aires. The works are set to begin in June 2017 and to be completed by December 2019. In addition, since the GCBA is genuinely committed to improve the quality of life of the *villeros*, the former drug-trafficking point of the Villa 31 has been transformed into a Center for Employment and Business Development where people can now take courses, learn new skills, have access to a job board and receive customized support. Above all, the administration is already working on the alternative route of Highway Illia which at the present moment divides the Villa into two sections and has favored the birth of more and more of slums below it.

- *Delocalization of the Ministry of Human Development in the White Elephant compound.* Deadline: December 2019; status: in progress. Following the previous *compromiso*, the GCBA has recently decided to conduct the very same kind of operation with the MoHD in the Villa 15, also in the South of the City. Soil tests are already underway and the cleaning of the compound has already been completed in order to be able to start with the works as soon as possible.
- *Transformation of the Olympic Village in 1.200 housing units.* Deadline: December 2019; status 67%. In October 2018, the City of Buenos Aires will host the Youth Olympic Games. A milestone will be the finalization of the construction of the Village within the Parque de la Ciudad which will occupy fifty hectares. The idea behind it was born out of the example of Barcelona (Spain) which after the Games of 1992 converted the infrastructures that had been built for the Olympics. The project will feature thirty-one buildings with a total of 1.200 housing units which once the Games are over will be awarded to requesting families through affordable credits.
- *Creation of an Educational Hub in the Mataderos neighborhood.* Deadline: December 2019; status 4%. The Hub will consist of an initial and a primary school. Plus, a technical school with and a sports center. The Hub will be of 20.000 square meters and will help the integration of thousands of teens of the City.
- *Building of 30 new schools for under-three years old.* Deadline December 2019; status 15%. Every year of pre-schooling increases students' later performances as well as their collaboration, attention, effort, participation and discipline. From a financial perspective, investments in pre-schooling education is effective to push economic growth forward and

promotes development. Not only there is a decrease in the costs of repetition and defection, but also a sharp increase in the presence of women in the job market.

- *Extension of the school day for students between 11 and 14 years old.* Deadline December 2019; status 15%. With this particular policy, the GCBA aims to strengthen their educational capabilities and to generate a sense of belonging with the school, as a mean to foster their academic and emotive skills. Extending the school day allows to incorporate different learning tools and to benefit from alternative methods, more stimulant, in the context of a pedagogic approach that is related to academic contents. The project renovates the educational strategy through the addition of various classes among which theatre, music, media and sports which add the exercise of emotional skills such as companionship, creativity and tolerance. Plus, it stimulates a connection with the community and its areas (libraries, clubs, churches, etc.). In the next three years all children in primary school will have 3:15 hours more of class, three times per week, hence over 90 days more per year. All children enrolled in middle school will instead have 2.45 hours more of class, twice per week, which means a total sum of 45 days per year. In order to have all children participate in all aspects of the project, they are divided into two groups. Each of these undertakes an activity for 1.20 hours. Once they have completed the first activity the two groups switch and perform the other task, changing location too. The extended day is different between different schools and is bounded by particular academic contents which are being developed in each classroom. This initiative has already been extended to 30 primary schools and 12 middle ones.

- *Duplication of the percentage of students performing well in mathematics in higher grades of schooling.* Deadline: December 2019; status: 12%. Performance management of students is a powerful tool to improve the learning process as a whole. Evaluation allows for the understanding of which content or notion must be reinforced, in accordance with the specific needs of every school. As for mathematics, this particular subject allows for the development of indispensable skills for the modern knowledge-based society. This is why the GCBA is keen on having double the number of students with advance knowledge in the subject within the public system. The focus on mathematics is so due to the importance of it for everyday activities such as reasoning, logic thinking, critical thinking and problem solving. Doubling the percentage of students with such knowledge is a bet of the Government for a better public education in the City. Since 2011, the administration has been performing a final evaluation called FEBBA to students finishing their 7th year of

school, both in private and public structures. This assessment tests children in mathematics, language and literature. It is a test with a census purpose so part of the results is even available to the public, while all results are disclosed to the headmasters so that they can improve their students' future performances. In order to improve students' results the Ministry of Education of BA is pushing forward a series of detailed measures. 1) Improvement of the implementation of the FEPBA evaluation in every school of the City in order to identify advancement windows, design teachers' training days, analyze which academic experiences must receive more attention and other strategies of quality of education. 2) Implementation in every school of the *Boletín* of your school which makes available to every member of the educational community information relevant to the institutional programs. Together with the Bulletin there is also the distribution of the Toolbox, a serie of materials which help the analysis of this data together with groups of teachers. 3) Extension of the school day of 6th and 7th graders in order to strengthen their emotional skills. 4) Improvement of the training and professionalization of the boards of all public schools through training days at the Teachers' Academy.

- *Reduction of 20% in the high school dropout rate*<sup>116</sup>. Deadline: December 2019; status 13%. The City decided to make sure teens are given the support they need in order to guarantee their presence and academic performance across all school levels, hence helping them overcome vulnerability and social inequality by aiding them being completely integrated in the adult life. In order to reach the goal of 3000 less dropouts per year the administration decided to work around five core aspects. 1) Extension of the “Shared Project” program to the public middle school with the highest dropout rate in order to increase the level of attendance. 2) Strengthening and extension of the “Learn by Doing” program which offers educational practices to over 16 years old so that while they study they are also able to develop their interests within public organizations, NGOs and enterprises. The aim is to help students understand that their future working life requires they previously learn what is taught at school. 3) Implementation of an early warning system to detect reiterated absenteeism and abandon so that different support mechanisms can be put into place. In 2016, it was executed in 8 secondary school for a total of 5.645 students and in 2017 it will be extended to the 100% of the institutions through an automated system. 4) Extension of the program “Abilities-based CV” to all secondary public schools. 5) Implementation of

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
<sup>116</sup> In 2015 alone, 10.862 high school students dropped out.

the “Extended School Day” program to secondary school which will help with the retention of students.

- *Institution of a Women’s Center for every Comuna of the City (CIM), adding to the ones already existing.* Deadline: December 2019; status 40%. These centers were started in order to bring assistance to women in need, especially those that fall victim to gender-based violence. They are equipped with professionals trained in psychological support and free legal aid. In addition, the administration is already in contact with many NGOs that work with gender-based violence cases in order to provide even better assistance to those women in need.

- *Provision of 7 infant health check-ups within the first birthday for children with exclusively public insurance.* Deadline: December 2017; status 80%. When it comes down to health, early childhood is a fundamental period in a person’s life in order to identify possible diseases, fostering healthy habits etc. Additionally, suitable preventive health-care contributes to the decrease in child mortality rate, which as it was stated beforehand, it has been one of the City’s greatest conquests. In order to meet these expectations, the City is focusing on three main aspects: infrastructure, human resources and technology. In terms of physical resources, the City is working on building four more CeSACs (*Centro de Salud y Acción Comunitaria*) in the South of Buenos Aires while also restoring those already present together with hospitals. In terms of personnel, the GCBA has incorporated 80 new medical teams in the Southern part of the City in order to reach even more people in need. Each time comprises a GP, a pediatric and a nurse. Each team is deemed to cover up to 700 families. Regarding technology and innovation, the Government is making progress with the digitalization of the platforms used to make appointments by gathering them into a unique one. The idea is to achieve a more efficient management of both planned appointments and spontaneous requests, aiming to get up to 11.000 monthly visits per CeSAC. According to the data available, the GCBA has now completed 80% of this agreement, leaving only 20 teams to be incorporated.

Figure 5: Progress report over infant check-ups *compromiso*<sup>117</sup>.




- *Provision of a family doctor.* Deadline: December 2019; status: 80%. In order to guarantee universal, integral and suitable service without restriction there need to be more family doctors so that people with only public coverage can be receive the best possible customized care.
- *Electronic clinical records in every Health Centre.* December 2019; status: 95%. This initiative allows for the improvement of quality of care and prevention of diseases throughout all CeSACS. This kind of electronic record includes all the data of a patient in a clear, precise and detailed way with which health professionals can evaluate a person's condition comprehensively, while taking into account his or her family history and pharmaceutical habits too. The system is simple and safe to use. Patients are able to access their data directly online and to their medical records at all times from anywhere. It also serves in case of emergencies when there is no time to run tests or analysis for allergies and so on, contributing to the efficiency of the system
- *100% accessible street corners.* December 2019; status 58%. In order for the City to be enjoyed by everyone, neighborhoods must become as accessible as possible even to people

<sup>117</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/compromisos>

with disabilities or families with a stroller etc. It was estimated that 130.000+ citizens have difficulties when having to walk or to use stairs, hence eliminating architectural and urban barriers will increase consistently their quality of life. There is already a platform (App) called *BA Accessible* which allows to share accessible locations of the City. It features the possibility of an advanced search engine based on users' collaboration to identify sites with directions in braille, ramps or audio guides. The more people use it the more data will be available on the platform. The advising body in charge of raising awareness and help with the erasing of these barriers is the COPIDIS (Commission for the Full Participation and Inclusion of People with Disabilities). In order to have 100% accessible street corners by 2018, the GCBA must ensure the existence 16.625 ramps. *Comunas 5* and *6* are already 100% accessible (with 7.838 ramps). The Boca neighborhood (*Comuna 4*) is the only area where ramps there won't be the possibility to build ramps on every corner due to the height difference between the sidewalk and the road in some of them. Plus, it is a way of respecting a structural element which is part of the identity of the Boca. As shown in Image 8, on the website of the GCBA is possible to search for one specific address and see what is the percentage rate of accessibility in that specific area.

Map 2: geo-localization of progress made to reach 100% accessibility<sup>118</sup>.



### 2.3.2 Creativity

- *Reaching 1 million users of the MiBA App.* Deadline: December 2019; status: 40%. As already stated, the GCBA wants to provide new solutions to old problems. With this mobile App, they want to unify in a single platform every interaction, procedure or form, consultation with the Government and much more. In fact, this platform includes news, events and notifications which are set according to the user's preferences. It is a customized experience that allows for citizens to save time and have a better relationship with the City. The web version of the platform was born in September 2016 and it already allows all the following functions. 1) Reception and payment of fines; 2) control over one's payment of the ABL and gross income taxes; 3) arrangement for a doctor's appointment and check

<sup>118</sup> *Id.*



over the status of the request; 4) filling out of forms and procedures and check their status; 5) check over the events of the City of Buenos Aires; 6) access to the EcoBici bike sharing system to check for availability. By the end of 2017 they want to reach 1 million users.

Illustration 3: The MiBA App<sup>119</sup>.



- *Doubling the number of Wi-Fi hotspots in public areas.* Deadline: December 2019; status: 100%. These new 150 spots contribute to the attainment of an integrated, creative and connected urban reality to help both citizens and visitors. In terms of free public Wifi availability, Buenos Aires ranks third after New York City and Barcelona, gaining on Paris, Medellín and San Paulo. The areas providing connectivity include squares, bus and subway stations and together they already comply with 95% of the objective. The GCBA is also working on improving the grid capacity to offer an even better service to the users.
- *Open source system on public works.* Deadline: December 201; status: 50%. The Open Observatory on Urban Works is a platform whose aim is to increase transparency in the management of public works through the publication of data based on international standards while also providing information that keeps being updated. The platform is based on geolocalization and works can be searched according to categories such as contract

<sup>119</sup> *Id. ii*

value, progress, dates and deadlines, awarded contractors, *Comuna* of reference etc. It wants to foster citizens' participation, while also enhancing accountability and promoting a higher quality of service provision. In 2016 the GCBA started a process of standardization the data on public works based on the integration of information on public tenders, locations and progress. What followed was a classification listed accordingly to category and progress measures on updated and reliable data.

- *Predictive timetable for buses.* Deadline: December 2018; status in progress. This new system will provide information on the status of every bus line in the City for each stop in order to improve the quality and efficiency of the service. It will be possible thanks to the incorporation of technical equipment on board of each unit (10.000 in total).

- *Opening of new SMEs in only 10 days.* Deadline: December 2019; status 60%. Simplifying the creation of Small and Medium Enterprises will allow for more people to realize their dreams and will push forward creativity, innovation and economic growth across the City. Front desk services and files will be transformed in digital formats, becoming so easy that the processing of the applications will in turn result faster. According to this new rule, the citizen is able to present all the required documents only once and not in many different units as it was before. The pertaining information will be saved in an integrated platform which will save citizens time and further procedures. In addition, the GCBA instituted the very first customized personal assistance centers for SMEs within the Professional Council for Economics and the Argentine Confederation of ME. These centers provide free counselling to enterprises in the City while also allowing the subscription to the Registry of Employers, the Registry of Employees, the registry of industrial activities. Plus, they offer advice on labor law and recruitment of HR.

- *Digital training for children above 5 years old.* Deadline: December 2019; status 40%. The GCBA is working hard to ensure that children acquire a certain set of digital skills from an early age. Since the culture of the digital age has indeed become a part of the overall teaching and learning process the educational institutions in Buenos Aires must adhere to this standard. Back in 2010 the Ministry of Education of Buenos Aires formulated the Integral Plan for Digital Education (IPED) which points to encourage the learning of those competences necessary to the inclusion of all children within this new social paradigm. The pedagogical approach specifically refers to children of this very age. The successful outcome of this *compromiso* will be possible through three main operations. 1) Comprehensive provision of equipment, connectivity and technical support to the teachers,

including the allocation of 5.000 netbooks following the Sarmiento Plan (of which 2.000 have already been distributed); 2) Provision of technical equipment for the Teachers' Academy and digital training within the "Teachers of the Future" program, together with the improvement and continuity of the IPED; 3) Incorporation of 350 mobile digital classrooms. 3.100 of them have already undergone training.

- *100% trained teachers in digital technologies.* Deadline: December 2019; status 5%. The project requires the training of teachers of initial, primary and secondary schools for the development and implementation of comprehensive strategies encompassing technology and innovative educational approaches. In order to train other, they must receive some training themselves which is organized around four core principles. 1) Development of workshops, virtual/face-to-face trainings and mentoring on the integration of digital technologies within different educational practices and frameworks; 2) Assistance with the integration of technical equipment and digital resources; 3) Incorporation of equipment, connectivity and technical assistance; 4) Improvement and strengthening of the IPED; 5) Incorporation of digital ateliers and mobile digital classrooms.

- *15.000 youth trained for "Tomorrow's Jobs".* Deadline: December 2019; status 17%. Since more and more professional areas require technological expertise the GCBA is willing to ensure that its citizens are ready for the challenges posed by the labor market. Since 85% of enterprises plan to develop their business through innovation and that 28% of these will have to expand their human resources - for an overall demand of 7000 people in the IT sector per year - in order to do that, the City has decided to focus its resources on the development technical profiles. The strategy focuses around three main axes such as training in disruptive technologies, 3D printing and the Arduino platform. 1) The CMDlab - the laboratory of digital production of the Metropolitan Drawing Center - offers the chance to draw and realize projects using innovative technologies, working collaboratively and online. In 2016 the Center offered courses in Design Thinking, Project Management and Digital Culture, training more than 1.000 youth participating in the "Meet Science" program and more than 1.000 citizens in computer skills, 2) The objective of the 3D modeling program is that students learn how to use Blender, a software specifically designed for 3D images (from compositions, to lightening, to rendering and basic principles of animation), while the 3D printing module points to the acquisition of a technical know-how of a 3D printer; 3) The module on robotics focuses on motors and sensors, while the Arduino software module focuses on open sourcing and coding.

- *Integration of 100.000 adults in the digital world.* Deadline: December 2017; status 29%. Technologies must not become a divide between different generations. This project ensures that adults become accustomed to new technologies and have access to digital devices. On August 3<sup>rd</sup> 2016, the GCBA launched the +Simple platform, designed especially for adults that are required to use digital tools in their daily life. Reading the news, talking to friends and families, sharing experiences will become easier and more fun. The platform is organized in eight sections, namely news, health, social network, my things, entertainment, culture, procedures and learning. More than 280.000 people have already subscribed to the program (28.000 in the first 48 hours; 18% between 60-64 years-old, 27% between 65-69 years-old, 24% between 70-74 years-old, 15% between 75-79 years-old and 17% over 80 years old. 70% of subscribers were women). 20.000 tablets were already freely distributed among adults in the City and soft loans were pushed forward in order to help reach the goal of 100.000 integrated adults. The Digital Classrooms of the City are becoming meeting points to exchange and learn new skills and practices and the mobile ones are reaching out to the whole City (whose map is available on the GCBA website). These are places where people can go and learn how to use a computer and or surf the net.

### 2.3.3 Enjoyment and Living together

- *5000 more policemen in the streets.* Deadline: December 2019; status in progress. As of the end of 2016, 1000 cops have already been added to the Metropolitan Police force of Buenos Aires and now the challenge is to add 4000 more by December 2019. These include brand new members of the police but also those that leave their desk-duty in the precincts. The Metropolitan Police is a professional force equipped with the best technology and with a strong dedication to public service.

- *10.000 new security cameras on buses, subways and streets.* Deadline: December 2019; status in progress. The use of technology is essential for crime prevention. The cameras will be placed in strategic locations in order to guarantee a higher level of security for passengers and citizens.


- *Accessible online crime map.* Deadline: December 2017; status: 50%. The issue of reliable statistics is essential for the design of effective public policies in the field of security. Such quantity of data allows for the GCBA to perform a true impact assessment over its own policies and responses. This crime map helps citizen in being more aware of the actions

pushed forward by the GCBA and is officially part of the Information Management System of Public Security. In order to make it available to the general public the administration is developing a centralized system of complaints that will feed the information directly to the map. The consolidation of the reliability of resources together with the modernization and computerization of all precincts are also fundamental steps towards a higher quality in security services. Plus, the seven new plates checkpoints across the City allow to control live cars coming into the City.

- *Decrease of 30% in mortality rate due to road accidents.* Deadline: December 2019; status in progress. The GCBA's priority is to protect pedestrians, bikers and drivers by improving urban cohabitation and road behavior in order to promote sustainable mobility. This is why the Larreta administration gave way to the first Road Safety Plan ever in the City, an extensive plan based on dialogue and collaboration between the institutions and the *vecinos* of Buenos Aires. The plan establishes five in which the GCBA must intervene, namely infrastructure, control, education, information and participation. Public spaces are being redesigned to prioritize pedestrians and sustainable transportation while efficient controls are performed through technology and the presence of traffic officers. For instance, the Microcentro and other areas have been rendered off-limits to massive traffic and near the Metrobus San Martín and the Pacific Centre of Transportation road crossing have been rearranged while technical checks are being increased both to sanction whomever puts the environment and others at risk because they fail to comply with security standards which cause up to 5% of accidents. As far as education is concerned, awareness campaigns and programs are being carried out throughout the City to address children, adults, and bus drivers. These campaigns focus especially on alcohol and drugs, the use of seatbelts, lights and helmets (19.000 people covered in 2016). Additionally, the collection of data through the Observatory on Road Safety has become a reliable source of intel on the actual traffic situation in the City up to the point where in 2015 a map of accidents on which to enact true evidence-based policies was created and made available to the public as in Image 10. Lastly, participation is enhanced through the help of civil society and employers. The GCBA, within the framework "Friends of Sustainable Mobility", has now reached over 800+ partners that favor sustainable transportation such as companies, banks, restaurants, hotels, embassies, shops and enterprises. They offer secure parking for bicycles, corporate bike sharing, bathrooms with showers and lockers, discounts and incentives for purchases of bikes and accessories, recreational activities, internal communication and events to raise

awareness on the benefits of this kind of transportation while also improving their CSR reputation and promoting healthy and economic habits.

Map 3: map of road accidents in Buenos Aires<sup>120</sup>.



- *Renovation of 12 Sports Centers and renovation of 4 parks.* Deadline: December 2019; status 63%. The aim is to increase the offer of sports and physical activities for as many people as possible. At the beginning of 2016 the City recorded the presence of 120.000 people in Sports Centers per week and the idea is to strongly increase these number by 2019. Public works are being conducted in the Centers of Pomar, Onega, Costa Rica, Colegiales, Santojanni, Dorrego, Avellaneda, Parque Patricios, Pereyra, Don Pepe, Chacabuco and Martín Fierro. The renovating process consists of the improvement of infrastructures, equipment, gas and water supply etc. The GCBA is also working with

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<sup>120</sup> *Id. iii*

associations and clubs in order to expand the offer for the *vecinos*. Additionally, a sports court, bike lanes, public pools will be added to each of the four great parks of Roca, Sarmiento, Manuel Belgrano and Golf club of Palermo. These works will also include the requalification of the Racetrack of the City in order to make Buenos Aires even more attractive for international competitions and tourism.

- *Doubling the amount of daily waste recycling. Deadline:* December 2019; status 18%. The GCBA established the goal of getting to 800 tons of recycling per day by 2019, right now the daily amount is of 400 tons. In order to meet this goal, the Larreta administration inaugurated, within the Recycling Center, the first Waste Management Facility (equipped with MRF technology) of the City in the Villa Soldati neighborhood where it is possible to treat 10 tons of waste per hour. It also features a PET treatment plant with a 2000 kilos capacity per hour, a trimmers treatment plant and a waste incinerator. Here is where 30% of residues is dealt with. Separation of waste has improved greatly and so has awareness. Apart from being better at treating waste, this technology also allows for a better quality of recycled materials such as paper, plastic and glass. In addition to this, there are eight Green Centers across the City working as waste separation and logistical points. Recollection is also based on a door-to-door system for buildings with managers and those such as hotels, supermarket etc. and on green campaigns for all those without a manager, smaller retailers and private homes. Plus, the City will have 300 green points (91 are already in place) so that citizens will have a close site where to dump their residues. As for education, thanks to the Green Schools program, every child contributes to waste separation through the 94.803 double bins present. From 2010 students recuperated 1741 tons of recyclable materials, while 498 school gardens were born and 39 schools were equipped with renewable energy sources.

- *23 new kilometers of water works. Deadline:* December 2019; status: 10%. Since the problem of flooding is embedded within the City's layout, this kind of public works are trying to ensure that less and less people suffer due to these phenomena. By the end of 2017 there will be 5.3 kilometers more of ducts, including the second emissary of the Vega Canal and the expansion of the rain water network Ramal Caaguazú. These operations will be sided by the development of a Hydro Meteorological System of Observation, Control and Alert for the ex-ante prevention of flooding.

- *Public lighting powered by LED columns. Deadline:* December 2019; status: 74%. This technology allows for a more sustainable and efficient system whose installation can save

up to 50% of power and reduce maintenance costs by 30% while also lasting longer (100.000 hours) and increasing the level of urban safety. With approximately 126.000 lights, emissions will thus decrease from 78.000 to 54.865 tons of CO2 per year. Plus, these LED powered lights can be controlled remotely from a platform able to detect failures and arrange possible interventions and adjustments. Overall, this sort of public investment shows a really good cost-ratio relation in terms of cost-effectiveness. In order to meet 100% coverage by the end of 2019 there need to be 60.000 more units. *Comunas 3, 6 and 6* are already completely equipped with LEDs and within 2017 *Comunas 7, 10, 11 and 15* will be too.

- *Registry Office branch in every Comuna.* Deadline: December 2017; Status: 60%. The aim of the initiative is to have parents obtain their children's birth certificates within a day in their own *Comuna*. *Comunas 1,4 ,6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14* already have their own branch. Now it also possible to request the certificate online and have it delivered in the same way or by mail or at the local office.

- *Citizens' participation in 200 works and projects.* Deadline: December 2017; Status 76%. Public participation is essential to achieve good results and this is why the GCBA is committed to a policy of dialogue and openness. Since the *vecinos* are those that know their neighborhood best, the idea is that citizens be able to influence the decision-making process. Information and communication technologies are suitable tools to ensure it happens and help create a more integrated community. Government initiatives are advertised on social media and 56 have already been voted via phone, email, SMS, Twitter and Facebook or in person and 59 are underway. Usually the process follows this scheme. 1) First meeting; 2) online voting; 3) second meeting; 4) follow-up through direct visit; 5) inauguration. Of all the projects 32% of them regard innovation, 25% culture, 13% sports, 11% healthy life, 10% transportation and 10% pets and animals.

#### 2.3.4 Human Scale

- *8 new Metrobus lanes.* Deadline December 2019; Status 70%. The Metrobus is a system of transportation based on dedicated lanes which even with small investments allows for the spread of an efficient network of buses. Trips are shorter and stations are equipped for people with reduced mobility, families with strollers and pregnant women.



The new corridors will benefit 635.000 passengers and their connection with the other urban transport corridors will extend the network to 103.2 km. Out of the 8 new corridors 3 are being built within CABA and the other 5 in the G.BA 1) The Metrobus Av. San Martin will feature 12 stations across 5.8 km, linking the Northwest area of Av. General Paz with the Center, the Juan B. Justo Metrobus and the Urquiza railway. 2) The Metrobus Norte has already been extended by 2.5 km and contributed to the renovation of the Belgrano, Colegiales and Palermo neighborhoods, linking Av. General Paz with the Metrobus Juan B. Justo. On average, a person now saves 8 hours per month when travelling. 3) The Metrobus del Bajo which dwell for 2.9 km on Av. Leandro Alem and Paseo Colon, benefitting 300.000 people per day and improving the connection between the North and the South, with 29 bus lines and a 45% reduction in travel time. Its routes will be adapted to the pre-existing trees, protecting the environment and renovating old areas. It was inaugurated on June 7<sup>th</sup> 2017. These projects will be complemented by the construction of 5 transportation corridors by the Government of the Province of Buenos Aires in coordination with the GCBA and with the support of the Central Government. 1) The Metrobus La Matanza - inaugurated on May 5th, 2017 - with 17 stations across 16 kilometers of extension and 20 bus lines. On average, each bus ride has been reduced by 12 minutes. It will also be connected with the Belgrano South railway through a Transportation Hub. 2) The Metrobus Oeste; 3) The Metrobus Ruta 8 and two more than are still under study.

- *Subte every 3 minutes during rush hour.* Deadline December 2016; Status 70%. In 2016 lines B, C and D managed to have a train every 3 minutes during rush hour and these are the lines along which 70% of passengers' travel. In April 2017 line A and H also managed to have a train every 3 minutes and how feature 100% of coaches with air-conditioning. To meet this objective the notification system as well as infrastructures are being renovated and coaches are being added. This so-called "Communication Based Train Control" system has already been installed on the H line and is being added to the C line. This technology allows for the communication between train formations, granting maximum closeness between them and ensuring the highest possible degree of safety in order to reduce waiting times.

- *200 Ecobici stations.* Deadline December 2017; Status 82%. Buenos Aires ranks among the first 15 cities in the world that most use this kind of transportation and its bike sharing system counts 220.000 subscribers and features 150 operative stations, 177 km of

bike lanes and 1.800 units, available 24/7 all year long. The aim is to add 2.000 units and 34km more to the network. To use it one can either use the *En Todo estas vos* card, the mobile app or make a call to the dedicated number. Stated record, 7.866 trips per day.

- *250 km of bike lanes and 400 Ecobici stations.* Deadline December 2019; Status 74%. Stations are being added in strategic locations linking them with public transportation. On the GCBA it is also possible to calculate how much less CO2 a person produces when cycling.

- *25 new level crossings.* Deadline December 2019; Status: 15%. The substitution of crossings with barriers with low level crossings will benefit 385.000 people crossing these by car every day and almost 550.000 doing the same by train, increasing their frequencies. This solution also increases security and allows for more fluid circulation, while also featuring crossings, ramps and stairs for pedestrians and people with reduced mobility and pumping stations and conducts against flooding. The San Martin, Congreso and Av. Beiro ones have already been inaugurated and soon the Av. Balbin and Av. Nazca ones will be too. In some of them there are also separate lanes for heavy tracks and normal cargos.

- *Paseo del Bajo.* Deadline December 2019; Status: 15%. This enormous project will connect the Illia Highway with the Buenos Aires - La Plata one. With 7,1 km, it will allow for 25.000 car and 10.000 trucks and minivans to travel better. Trucks and mini buses are expected to decrease their travel time from 45-60 minutes to only 15. Overall, the project will also feature 60.000 square meters of green areas. Due to both environmental and visional sustainability, the open trench option was chosen. Trucks and buses will be able to go underground without being stopped by traffic lights or crossings entering directly in the Port of Buenos Aires and in the Bus Terminal of Retiro. Acoustic pollution and CO2 emissions will reduce greatly. The project is being carried out under the oversight of the Ministry of Urban Development and Transport and is being executed by the national enterprise AUSA and the Puerto Madero Corporation.

- *5 new pedestrian-friendly areas.* Deadline December 2019; Status 15%. These areas will foresee stricter speed limits and better walking conditions (i.e. leveling out of roads and sidewalks, improved public lighting, Ecobici stations, benches, flowerbeds, etc.) making them new meeting points, following the previous examples of the Microcentro which covers approximately 80 blocks. Among these new intervention areas there are Caballito, Once, Tribunales, Retiro and the Casco Historico.

- *Urban Campus in Houssay Square.* Deadline December 2019; Status 12%. The Houssay Square, close to the biggest college buildings in the City, in 2016 was equipped with new LEDs, Wi-Fi connectivity and playgrounds which concurred to the building of the Campus BA. Now the idea is to improve the recreational, cultural and gastronomic offer for the citizens and students in the area by creating an innovation, talent and creativity hub in the first floor of the underground Houssay parking with open patios and natural light, called *Campus Urbano*. This will extend its opening times and differentiate its services.

- *Potholes sealing within 15 days.* Deadline December 2016; Status 100%. Holes concur to accidents and more danger. In order to address citizens' demands faster, the GCBA focused on receiving complaints in a more organic way and on its logistics to resolve the different situations thanks to a platform dedicated to this very issue together with others concerning lighting, tress, abandoned cars and so on. They also incorporated 5 trucks dedicated to potholes with last-minute technologies that allow for a reparation to only last 20 minutes. This triples one truck's capacity and increases production.

- *Removal of abandoned car within 15 days.* Deadline December 2017; Status 63%. Starting from the identification of an abandoned vehicle, inspectors try to contact the owner. From this moment forward, if it is not confiscated, is removed and sent to a dedicated facility for it to be scrapped. Before scrapping them, vehicles undergo decontamination, meaning that batteries, gas tubes and other elements are removed and treated separately. In order to file a complaint citizens can either go to one of the municipal offices in their *Comuna*, call the number 147 or submit it online through the integrated platform we described in the previous paragraph. The GCBA is enlisting new officers, improving the level of coordination between the different institutions and simplifying administrative procedures. Profits deriving from the selling of these components are donated to the Garrahan Foundation which runs a hospital for children.

- *One Health Center within a 15 minutes transfer.* Deadline December 2017; Status 50%. These centers carry out activities related to pupil health, addictions, diabetes and maternal and child protection among others. They also include hospitals, CeSACs, Neighborhood Medical Centers (CMB) and Health Stations - mobile or not - that are being developed in the less covered areas of the City.

- *Development of 20 open air commercial areas.* Deadline December 2017; Status 5%. Every commercial area implies sidewalks renovations, expansion of pedestrian areas, signposting, new public lighting etc. The CCCAs that will be completed by the end of 2017 are the ones

of Boedo, Av. Entre Rios y Callao, Monte Castro, Avellaneda, Gaona, Lope de Vega, Rivadavia, Almirante Brown, Corrientes (3), Lavalle, Suarez, Nazca, Montes de Oca, Melincué, Pueyrredon and Varela.

- *Public space: 110 new green hectares.* Deadline December 2019; Status 2%. The Green Plan features more than 30 projects for a total amount of 160 hectares of public space, of which 110 green. Green areas are necessary to help people live a healthy life where people can perform all sort of activities. Plus, they help reduce temperatures, carbon dioxide and help with the water absorption. The GCBA already inaugurated Constituyentes Square (Villa Pueyrredon), Plaza Republica Federativa de Brasil (Recoleta), Plaza Monroe (Villa Urquiza), Elcano Park (Chacarita) and Plaza de la Ciencias (Palermo) apart from the 30 more projects that will be completed in the near future.

- *12 new squares.* Deadline December 2019; Status 43%. These squares will favor recreational activities, pedestrians and sustainable mobility in specific neighborhoods, linking their design and layout with the pre-existing environment. For instance, the 65.00 square meters one connecting the Congressional Center with the Law Faculty building benefits 30.000 students and workers while the Science Park was built with this particular focus due to its closeness with the Scientific and Technological Pole.

- *2 new green areas in Once.* Deadline December 2019; Status 12%. The two projects of *Parque de la Estacion* and *Manzana 66* will add 25.000 square meters to the Once neighborhood. The first one will be placed in the abandoned lands adjoining the train stations. Not only there will be the addition of new spaces, but also the restoration of the old storehouses within the covered sites which do not have any use for the development of cultural, educational and recreational activities. It will also allow for an improved connection where now there are train tracks. On its turn, the *Manzana 66* project will feature 8.500 square meters. Citizens participated in the design of both projects. These two projects are included in the wider restoration of the Once neighborhood aimed at making it more ordered and safe. The Transportation Hub has been already inaugurated and allows for the connection between the *Subte* lines H and A, the actual train station and approximately 30 bus lines. The plan revolves around three axes: the valuing of the urban landscape, with the undergrounding of cables, the redesign of public space, which will feature more trees and infrastructure and, lastly, pedestrian priority.

The complexity of carrying out such diverse projects lies heavily on the GCBA. In fact, in order to actually implement public policies, hence for service provision, the Government either relies on private companies it manages them directly.

#### **2.4 Policy implementation: lessons for public procurement and service delivery**

The decision on a specific course of action and the adoption of a program does not guarantee that the action on the ground will strictly follow policy makers' aims and objectives. The stage of execution or enforcement of a policy by the responsible institutions and organizations that are often, but not always, part of the public sector, is referred to as implementation. Service delivery is linked to policy design and, most importantly, to policy implementation. Providing services strategically favors the implementation of a more coherent and comprehensive policy. The question then is how to ensure the best development of a certain policy design into a concrete plan of actions capable of guaranteeing ongoing review and performance management. Implementation can and does lead to reformulation of policies, or to other outcomes than expected, or even to outright failure. This gap of implementation was attributed to different causes, for example to a lack of conditions necessary for successful implementation such as control and monitoring. Service delivery and procurement in fact are so important because, more often than not, they represent the variables for the more or less successful implementation of a certain program and only a successful implementation can lead to the desired outcome.

Policy implementation here is considered as the accomplishment of objectives through the planning and programming of operations. In the City of Buenos Aires implementation happens on two levels, the government one and the citizens' one; both actors contribute to the overall provision of public services.

Public administration exists to solve people's problems and public sector leaders around the world face a common set of challenges if their services are to meet the increased expectations of their 'customers' – both citizens and businesses, which in our case are external service providers. One common challenge faced by every organization is how to service its customers better. The public sector is no exception. Traditionally, it has been seen as a passive vehicle for executing social policy mandated by legislation. Increasingly, however, accustomed to enhanced service delivery from the private sector, citizens/businesses view the public sector as another provider of 'services' – services for

which they pay taxes. To address this, the public sector must find ways of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its service delivery. This means providing value for money by improving quality of service (accessibility for all and satisfactory customer experiences and outcomes), and reducing the costs involved in providing those services.

Buenos Aires is a complex city with a lot of old infrastructure which generates an additional demand in terms of maintenance and cleaning operations. Because the City of Buenos Aires is a member of the Global Lead City Network on Sustainable Procurement, committed to drive a transition to sustainable consumption and production by implementing sustainable and innovation procurement, the GCBA has been working on the inclusion of sustainability criteria and practices in public procurement processes since 2012 (Macri II) through a flexible and progressive implementation strategy, which unfolds in actions such as 1) the awareness and training of purchasers and supply chain; 2) the drafting of sustainability recommendations and guidelines and its internal and external disseminations for them to be available to the general public; 3) the inclusion of sustainability standards in the specification documents for procurements, with ongoing collaboration and sharing of criteria at international, national and local level with both public and private bodies.

The General Administration of Purchases and Procurements (DGCyC) is the governing body for the Goods and Services Purchasing and Procurement System of the City of Buenos Aires. It is tasked with the promotion, leadership, coordination and monitoring of public actions aimed at achieving an efficient, effective and transparent performance of the Procurement System, subject to the principles of free competition, equal treatment, transparency, reasonableness, electronic means and sustainability, among others. It also possesses an electronic transaction system for government procurements called “BAC” (*Buenos Aires Compras*) which represents a paradigm shift in the management of acquisitions and procurements in the whole LATAM region, providing transparency and cooperating for the widest dissemination of good practices. This system is used by all executive branches of the GCBA and is really innovative. For instance, in its section on the GCBA’s website, providers can easily sign up to the BAC to compete for biddings, having access to the related legislation, while also staying informed on the status of their processes and respective payments. The administration has also developed a mobile app from which registered providers receive notifications regarding opening biddings, the solicitation of documents, preliminary awards and contractual documents.

The city's intent - as stated by the highest decision-making level of government - is to exploit its market potential for promoting and implementing policies that strengthen society's sustainable development as a whole. This particular Procurement System enhances other public responsibility policies, such as the optimization of energy efficiency standards, the reduction and improvement of waste management and even responsible paper consumption. Purchasing sustainable goods and services is done not only with an environmentalist perspective but also with a socioeconomic one, related to labor conditions, equal opportunities, integration of people with disabilities, respect of human rights and so on<sup>121</sup>.

On the one hand, as far as internal engagement goes, the GCBA has changed its way of managing public expenditure by promoting more innovative methods that stimulate the participation of different sectors and enable the use and feedback of skills and experiences. The implementation strategy has been gradual and flexible, with progressive objectives but with the continuous aim of increasing the number of providers of sustainable goods and services.

Since understanding, more than just knowledge, allows a true commitment, the DGCyC constantly works on raising awareness and training both personnel and leaders of different acquisition operative units in regard to sustainable procurement through work meeting with experts, online and onsite training courses, videoconferences, etc.

On the other hand, as far as external engagement goes, the GCBA has been conducting a strategy focused on regular informative meetings with suppliers thus establishing a two-way communicative relationship that allows to agree on some threshold of sustainability, together with an instruction manual on sustainable government procurement available on the electronic trading platform of the GCBA's website.

Back in 2015, the DGCyC also became a founding member of the Sustainable BA Network that gathers GCBA's bodies working in fields such as innovation, social inclusion, tourism, environmental impact, employment etc. into a system to hold meetings with other stakeholders, namely suppliers, NGOs, chambers of commerce, citizens and universities, thus enabling the realization of comprehensive actions that contribute to the development of a wholly sustainable society.

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<sup>121</sup> Global lead City Network on Sustainable Procurement, *City of Buenos Aires. Sustainable Procurement Profile*. 2016. Available at: [http://gln-on-sp.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Buenos\\_Aires/City\\_of\\_Buenos\\_Aires\\_GLCN\\_on\\_SP\\_Profile.pdf](http://gln-on-sp.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Buenos_Aires/City_of_Buenos_Aires_GLCN_on_SP_Profile.pdf)

In order to set a valuable example, the GCBA purchases materials, electronic devices, paper and computer equipment sustainably. As for materials and devices, the aim is to reduce energy consumption to redirect it where is most needed and to reduce pollution, while also fostering innovation in the design and production of better energy efficiency devices that rely on the use of renewable energies. As requested in the procurement specification sheets, it is compulsory to buy goods and services that are more energy-efficient according to their labeling. With respect to paper, the adoption of an electronic government management model has forced a deep internal cultural change. The need for greater transparency, efficiency and effectiveness is an opportunity to make more responsible decisions on the amounts of paper the GCBA consumes. Even in this regard, the specification sheets foreseen that printing paper derive from sugar cane making process or have a FSC or PEFC certification.

In terms of computer equipment, it must adhere to durability, waste management, energy consumption and other standards. In fact, in the specification sheet it is clearly stated that computers must show a written warranty about the supply of basic spare components (batteries, power supplies and keyboards), energy star certification for monitors and expandable memory slots. The administration has included sustainability criteria in procurement processes also related to lighting (low level consumption bulbs), scanners, office furniture, stationery supplies, graphic arts and woods for underpinning activities etc.

As far as the actual purchase works, the PAC simplifies and promotes competition, provides updated information that allows the implementation of better strategic planning, reduced administrative and operatives costs and deadlines maximizing efficiency and effectiveness, while facilitating monitoring and auditing processes also through the free access to information by the public. Master agreements are the means that allow the implementation of sustainability recommendations and criteria while incorporating them progressively.

Once the procurement process is in place, the DG CyC must keep track of its progress. It collects information from a variety of sources (i.e. suppliers registrations) but its main one is certainly the electronic trading platform thanks to which it is possible to evaluate the impact of different supplier selection processes, contracting procedures, the object purchased, the responsible for the purchase, the period of time during which the bidding will be assigned and so on.



Overall, the main achievements of this system of SSP have been the production of Recommendation Guidelines for purchaser of the System, the coordination with civil society, the training of 400+ purchasers and the issuing of Framework Agreements.

The lack of coordination and management expertise or tools leads to the gap between policy design and policy implementation.

The City of Buenos Aires is responsible for approximately 700.000 objects that must be maintained (450.000 trees, 125,000 lights, 54,000 sidewalks, 30,000 drains, and 27,000 roads). Most of urban landscape-related interventions belong to the Ministry of Environment and Public Space. Administering all these services is often done under the attentive scrutiny of citizens which demand most of these interventions. Whether a water company needs to tear up a street to lay new piping, or an electric company needs to cut back trees around electrical wires it is the Ministry's job to ensure that it is done appropriately with the right permits which must be requested and obtained before work commences. Every year, the Ministry receive up to 190.000 complaints to investigate a certain situation, 150.000 contractor hired to perform the work and roughly 150.000 detected upon inspection.

Before 2010 (Macri I), the 3.000 employees of the Ministry did not have the chance to regulate their work through an integrated system and thus communicate specifications to those in charge of fixing whatever problem arose. To perform their respective tasks, employees used programs such as Microsoft Word, Excel and Access which did not allow the true integration of data, greatly affecting planning and maintenance decisions. All contracts were paper-based and there was no real follow-up on the progress or status of each intervention. The GCBA was not able to answer citizens neither efficiently nor effectively. There were no real administrative processes or execution protocols in place and without any quality assessments, due payments to provider took five plus months to go through (now it takes a maximum of thirty days). The GCBA started implementing an assortment of SAP solutions to help them organize citizens' complaints.

SAP is a German-owned company that is deemed one of the best software provider in the world which allows the streamline of administrative tasks. The administration realized

that in order to provide more efficient and effective operations it needed to update its sector's IT systems<sup>122</sup>.

They decided to use SAP technologies because they wanted to be able to analyze quality, deadlines and execution step by step, thus obtaining a more direct control over interventions and more transparency in the reports. Before that, it was almost impossible to obtain information in a fast and reliable way.

Needless to say it was a high-risk project. Before doing anything the Ministry spent a whole year studying and identifying various core processes that had to be improved in order to deliver better solutions. The Ministry chose Deloitte Consulting as its partners to identify and implement a flexible and scalable IT system capable of supporting its many simultaneous operations, coordination between its departments, and most importantly to move to a preventive planning rather than being based on a merely reactive approach. Deloitte suggested the GCBA implemented a three-phase approach consisting of the implementation of a customized SAP ERP platform fitting the Ministry's operations, similar to those of an industrial plant, to integrate data coming from different departments.

The first phase of the project focused on the permit process for roadway and sidewalk construction. The changes made in this phase completely automated the previously paper-based permit process, allowed for smooth integration to contractor information in non-SAP back-end systems. In order to handle integration with contractor information, this phase of the project required a dual implementation of SAP Customer Relationship Management (SAP CRM). They focused on these areas first because they perceived them as their biggest weakness.

The second phase involved an integrated maintenance system to manage service requests received at the call center regarding incidents concerning sidewalks, streets, parks, and trees, as well as responses to these claims. The ERP functionality was customized to handle work order management and preventive maintenance, and the material management functionality for the purchase management aspects. Thanks to this new functionality, departments can now generate their own work orders and also manage purchase orders and contracts. Because the SAP ERP system is linked to a CRM system built in house for claims,

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<sup>122</sup> <https://www.sap.com/latinamerica/index.html>

departments can communicate with the residents who led the claims more accurately and quickly through an automated process.

The third phase instead, expanded the system even more to include the three departments in charge of lighting, sewer systems, and shelters. It implied a rollout of the warehouse management functionality of SAP ERP to coordinate the handling of equipment the ministry must take care of, plus the implementation of 1) SAP NetWeaver Process Integration (SAP NetWeaver PI) as the application to tie everything together; 2) SAP NetWeaver Business Warehouse (SAP NetWeaver BW) to consolidate data, and 3) SAP Mobility Platform to deliver applications to workers in the field<sup>123</sup>.

Thanks to these features, the administration has built over 30 smart dashboards that take data from SAP technologies and allow for real-time analysis of this information. Approximately 15 dashboards measure the ministry's budget is being allocated to contractors and the rest furnish reliable data on the status of submitted service claims and how the Ministry is resolving them. Departments are able to actually count how many interventions they have completed over a certain period of time and how many are still to be resolved. Having the ability to foresee interventions is also very useful when estimating required investments. The implementation of SAP technology drastically changed the way the GCBA used to work, and this change keeps growing as more and more people adopt its functions. In in March 2012 the Ministry merely resolved 100 claims, in 2013 the number raised exponentially to 1.400.

If before the ditching of the paper-based system most people had stopped filing complaints because they were basically sure nobody was going to take not of it, the SAP technology allowed for the improvement of the claims-entry process which can now receive phone calls but also online requests whose progress can be followed in real time. Citizens can keep track of the work order, date, contractor, etc. Bottlenecks can be quickly identified and resources shifted to address specific needs.

Every notification must be resolved within a certain amount of time and contractors must comply with the specific deadline or they would be subject to a fine applied directly with the SAP system. In addition, when the paper-based system was in place, most work

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<sup>123</sup> City Government of Buenos Aires: Illuminating the City in a More Sustainable Way: <https://youtu.be/IMesTdGm0XI>

were not related to citizens' complaints, rather they were based on the contractor's interests.

Another issue that had to be addressed was the cultural one. Since management and public servants needed to change their mindset and customs, the GCBA decided to invest 40% of their SAP investment on training over 800 users so they could learn how to use the new system.

In the words of many of its functionaries the administration that they found in place in 2007 was obsolete and processes were not clearly defined, apart from being long and unnecessarily complicated. The modernization of the whole process was focused on processes and systems and was put in place because it was aiming to make the decision-making process a better and more informed one. SAP allows the GCBA to take real-time informed decisions.

CRM is used for claim management while the ERP functions as the main maintenance platform which is also useful to control the contracts. Instead, BW is used to perform analytics<sup>124</sup>. In 2013 the GCBA completed all the maintenance logistic cycle operations and in 2014 the management cycle ones. Acquiring technologies and information systems is the only way to organize internal processes and be more closely connected with residents especially because the city is indeed being run while taking into account the participation of citizens which was something that was not being done before. The SAP platform registers an average of 8.000 works done per month and its implementation has more than doubled the Ministry's productivity, in terms of planning municipal maintenance and repairs. In 2013 heavy rains flooded parts of the capital and almost a hundred people died in the region. Flooding has historically been an issue in the City of Buenos Aires, due to its aging infrastructure, a draining channels clogged by garbage and a dense population but this particular event marked a true tipping point. The administration was determined to ensure something like that did not happen again. Thanks to SAP technologies, the GCBA installed a system to collect and analyze data from sensors, weather reports, garbage collectors and citizens. The sensor measure the direction, speed and level of water in sewage drains. This data is fed to the cloud and automatically sets off an alarm if flooding occurs in real-time which is extremely important especially in contexts of urban emergency when


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<sup>124</sup> Deloitte Global SAP Practice: Buenos Aires Client Engagement: <https://youtu.be/BACxUZkjZxU>

countermeasures must be taken promptly. In 2014, when it rained more than ever before, the administration was warned in time and was able to react. Jammed drainage sewers were cleared and flooding water was relocated to collecting ponds.

With this system citizens can make their complaints through social media and the administration records them through a SAP HANA dashboard which replaces many manual tasks with remote and automated systems able to predict potential issues and developing solutions before they even occur<sup>125</sup>.

Illustration 4: SAP HANA Platform.



This software is also connected to the sensors located in public spaces and processes data in real-time, while matching them with work plans and maintenance schedules as in the case of water pumps or cleaning schedules for the various ducts running through the city. The software also manages to include complaints made via social network (i.e. Twitter). The responsible department plans a solution, executes it and then posts a picture showing the issue was resolved within 96 hours only. The dashboard is a fundamental tool for planning interventions and measuring citizens' levels of satisfaction. Future projects are about developing a smart city and replicating what we do in public spaces in other areas of government, such as transportation, security, education and healthcare.

The biggest responsibility of the GCBA is that the city is able to adapt to new situations related to climate change and changes in habits. and this is why the administration is pushing forward a series of initiatives to have a Green City. The installation of LED

<sup>125</sup> City Government of Buenos Aires: Effectively Simplifying the Citizen Complaint Process with SAP: [https://youtu.be/k4OHK\\_zybV0](https://youtu.be/k4OHK_zybV0)

powered lights allowed for a great reduction in energy consumption, the delivery of a more efficient lighting service and reduce maintenance costs. The first thing the GCBA did was replacing 91.000 lights, a project that was carried out by logging the work plans into the SAP ERP platform. This system was essential to have control over the remaining stocks and the installation speed while getting contractors' paperworks in a timely manner. Every light has an antenna that communicates with the central system. SAP HANA is integrated to this central system so we can link the public lighting teller management system to work orders and dashboards. The Ministry is able to have a clearer idea about what is going on whenever there is a power outage, vandalism or one of the lights breaks. In fact, residents' satisfaction with public lighting has improved considerably.

## **2.5 Monitoring and evaluation of public policies and service provision**

Policy-making is supposed to contribute to problem solving or at least to the reduction of the problem load. During the evaluation stage of the policy cycle, these intended outcomes of policies move into the center of attention.

Finally, we look at the evaluation of policies and service provision. Evaluation is about assessing how a policy or operational function was carried out and to which effects it has led, namely renovation, adjustments and even penalties or termination. But, it is not only associated with the final stage in the policy cycle that either ends with the termination of the policy or its redesign based on modified problem perception and agenda-setting; instead, the perspective is applied to the whole policy-making process and from different perspectives in terms of timing (ex ante, ex post).

Evaluating public policies has four main advantages:

- Better understanding and learning over public policies that allow public servants to make better decisions
- Guarantee transparent processes and spread of information, contributing to overall public transparency
- Improvement of accountability mechanisms
- Feedback useful to the improvement of future plans

The GCBA features many evaluation bodies. As stated above, each Head of Ministry is sided by an Internal Auditing Unit tasked with the evaluation and follow up of the activities carried out by each Executive Branch. This units examine in a comprehensive way if the

tasks are being performed according to the cost-effectiveness and efficiency criteria. They measure the adequacy of policies and if they are complying with the legal framework in place.

Furthermore, they elaborate budgetary guidelines and their impact over management and the reaching of objectives. They also issue reports on the performed tasks, their results and insight recommendations while also monitoring the execution, adequacy and implementation of laws and processes of internal auditing. In sum, these units verify that Ministries are implementing policies respectfully of the law and of efficiency standards which is the first step into assessing the rightfulness of the acts of government, even before evaluating the outputs and outcomes of whatever programme.

As far as actual programme evaluation is concerned, within the Executive Office of the Cabinet we find the Programme Evaluation Unit. It is an entity tasked with assisting the GCBA along all phases of the policy cycle in order to ensure the highest quality of public interventions, assessing their impacts and developing best practices able to advance public policies.

During the needs assessment phase, the UDEP helps each branch identify and analyze the scope of the problem and possible areas of intervention so to define a clear objective that the programme will point to.

When dealing with program design instead, this unit helps Executive Branches develop their own specific “Theory of Change” and build indicators that will allow to monitor your program first and evaluate it later. They also focus on innovative approaches such as Nudging and Design Thinking, which can prove valuable to the design of a specific action. Until a few years ago, the classical elaboration of public policies had been based on the Homo Economicus, a rational human being that makes decision based on perfect information, knowing and maximizing its preferences according to methodical calculus.

However, since rationality opens the way to emotions, impulses, etc. far from our intentions, administrations and scholars alike started noticing that the gap between the target of public policies and the real individual leads to the proliferation of inefficient regulations, not helping people overcome their cognitive biases, leaving them prey of misleads in fields such as healthcare, economy, education and so on. This is way Behavioral Economics started to flank classical public policies (prohibitions, fines, incentives) with new form of interventions which alter the way in which solutions are presented to citizens

without diminishing their available choices nor forcing them to do something compulsorily. Rather, it is about nudging the individual towards a more benefitting behavior or attitude which will be rationally internalized and later done automatically without perceiving it as a burden nor obligation<sup>126</sup>. The GCBA supports this approach and this is why they started implementing it across different areas of government. For instance, the Ministry of Environment and Public Space installed bins for cigarettes which feature the question “Who is the best football player?” in order to encourage people to throw them there instead that on sidewalks by somehow stating their opinion. This initiative was firstly implemented by the administration of the City of London and has proved valuable in reducing cigarettes dumping.

Moreover, once in the implementation phase, the UdEP helps the administration with resource management, program monitoring and intermediate assessments which contribute to the overall analysis of the adequacy of a program.

Plus, once the program is concluded, this department performs an impact and or outcome evaluation which will allow the administration to understand the true effects of its actions over the desired target, while drawing useful lessons and good practices.


Finally, whatever the stage of the policy, the UdEP can foster strategic collaboration as a liaison with other areas of government or institutions while also providing the methodological tools needed for policy design, policy implementation and impact assessment.

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<sup>126</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/jefaturadegabinete/evaluaciondeprogramas/nudge>



Illustration 5: The role of the UdeP<sup>127</sup>.



Every report issued by the UdeP is published on the correspondent Ministry's page on the GCBA's website and is available for consultation, in order to follow up on the principles of open government and engagement which will be further discussed in chapter 3.

In recent years, there has been an increasing demand to evaluate the impact of programs and policies in the public service. The reason for this trend revolves around the need for public administrations to deliver efficient services. Organizations, including the ones in the public sector, are faced with uncertainty in a constantly changing environment and need to learn from previous examples what is most suitable to improve service delivery.

<sup>127</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/jefaturadegabinete/evaluaciondeprogramas>

Frontline service delivery monitoring assesses the capacity for effective and efficient public service delivery of a wide range of actors.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines performance as “the accomplishment, execution, carrying out, and working out of anything ordered or undertaken”. This refers to outputs/outcomes (accomplishment) but also states that performance is about *doing the work* as well as about the *results achieved*.

Thus, performance management is concerned with satisfying the needs and expectations of all the organization’s stakeholders and indeed the public in its entirety which in the case of the GCBA are the citizens of Buenos Aires.

In sum, the GCBA and the 15 *Comunas* of Buenos Aires must provide the delivery of high-quality services in compliance with pre-set standards. In order for the administration to keep track that citizens receive what they deserve since they pay taxes and contributions, article 138 of the CABA Constitution instituted the Ente Unico Regulador de Servicios Públicos de la Ciudad (known as Ente de la Ciudad or ERPS) within the scope of the Executive Power whose work is regulated by Article 2 of Law 210 CABA.

It is a juridical person, autarkic, which is also functionally independent and entitled to take legal action; its board is political and reflects the composition of the legislative assembly. Also, its president is proposed by the Chief of Government. It exercises monitoring, tracking and safekeeping over the quality of service provided by the centralized and decentralized administrations or by third parties as well as the tracking of those services whose monitoring is shared with other levels of jurisdiction (i.e. consumers protection). Apart from these functions though the objective of the ERPS is improving the quality of public services. The categories of public services that the ERSP has jurisdiction over are:

- a. Public transportation and passengers, including the *Subte*
- b. Public lighting and light signaling
- c. Urban hygiene (including waste management)
- d. Control over licensed parking lots
- e. Metered parking
- f. Maintenance of toll-roads
- g. Transport, treatment, storage and final disposal of pathological and dangerous residues
- h. Cable television
- i. Data transmission

- j. Public services whose provision exceeds the city's territory without colliding with other jurisdictions
- k. System of licensed photographic records of road infringement
- l. School transport services
- m. Public service of taxi

This institution plays the crucial role of verifying the compliance with laws and regulations in all the aforementioned cases. It ensures that providers respect security, health, hygiene, quality, continuity and regularity standards. It protects the consumers, informing them of their rights through educational campaigns starting from when they are young about their rights. It monitors the implementation of contracts, licenses and permits, and authorization. It also analyzes the base of tariff regimes while also valuing an information system that allows for the performance management of service providers through surveys. It also ensures that no monopoly or anti-competitive measures are enacted while being the recipient of citizens' complaints against a certain provider and the institution is in charge of applying sanctions.

The Ente must also perform technical controls over the status of local transportation units and distribution networks in order to preserve environmental and security standards. In this regard, it works closely with the Attorney General's office in order to push forward its juridical actions. In addition, it can require whatever information it might want from providers that is necessary to verify their compliance.

It assists the Executive Power - when requested - with the issuing of evidence-based opinions in the phase of policy design or in that of managing, signing and negotiating contracts in order to help the GCBA make the best and most effective decisions. Every year in fact, the Ente sends to both to the Executive and Legislative branches a report that summarizes the previous year's activities, together with suggestions on the inclusion of other actions concerning public service as well as on any other measure which can benefit the general public<sup>128</sup>.

However, monitoring public service delivery is not only a task for the institutions. Citizens have their part to play. Knowing their rights and obligations they can contribute

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<sup>128</sup> Interview with María Alejandra Goldsack, Director of the ERSP of the CABA. May 4<sup>th</sup> 2017, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

to the daily improvement of their own quality of life. In fact, this institution promotes the active participation of citizens.

In the case of deficiencies or malfunctioning, citizens can file in complaints, claims or queries. Complaints occur when the application to the Ente is perpetrated due to acts that presumably constitute an infringement while a claim comes about whenever a user perceives a wrong in the process of service delivery. Queries instead refer to the information that a citizen seeks to obtain in relation to a certain service provision. These can be advanced via phone, Twitter, Facebook or directly to the competent *Comuna*.

Knowing that improvement can only derive from the collaboration between the citizens, the providers and the administration, in order to foster even more participation, the ECSP issued - online and on paper - an updated version of the "User's Manual" that for each category of services under its jurisdiction summarizes everything useful to the user. Every section features in fact a general introduction of the company or agency providing the service with its respective legislative references and a resume of the institution's competences over it while highlighting other institutions' controlling tasks when there are. What follows are provider's obligations in regard to the provision of the service in question and useful information for the user while at the end of its section there is a guideline explaining how to push forward a certain a certain complaint or claim and when they are applicable. Service providers on their part must see their relationship with customers as a partnership that begins with service design and carries through the entire service delivery cycle.

Illustration 6.1: Information for every service provided<sup>129</sup>.

### Estacionamiento Medido (Tickeadoras)

La función del estacionamiento medido es ordenar el tránsito en las zonas del micro y macro centro de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (ver mapa pág. 20), y ampliación de los espacios de estacionamiento tarifado, y así permitir la rotación de vehículos estacionados en la vía pública y mejorar la circulación. Actualmente el estacionamiento tarifado funciona mediante 144 máquinas tickeadoras, que operan de lunes a viernes de 8 a 21 hs. y los sábados de 8 a 13 hs. Los domingos los espacios son gratuitos.

#### Competencias del Ente

- Intervenir ante la Denuncia de un usuario que viene lesionado un derecho o interés legalmente tutelado y procurar que cese su lesión o desconocimiento, producido a través de una acción o bien de una omisión de cualquiera de los sujetos del conflicto.
- Aplicar una sanción al prestador del servicio debido al incumplimiento de una norma general o contractual.
- Ordenar la reparación material del perjuicio de los usuarios, mediante el reconocimiento de una indemnización por daños y perjuicios, cuando su vehículo sufriera daños durante el acarreo o en la playa de estacionamiento.

#### Obligaciones del prestador

- Colocar y mantener la señalización horizontal (pintura amarilla, cajones azules y dársenas) y vertical (carteles con las indicaciones sobre estacionamiento medido, o prohibido y/o permitido estacionar).
- Mantener las máquinas tickeadoras funcionando correctamente.
- Cuidar en no dañar el vehículo cuando es acarreado por la grúa.
- Contar con cartelería que indique los derechos de los usuarios y teléfonos del Ente de la Ciudad en la playa de acarreo.
- Contar con Libro de Quejas en playa de acarreo a disposición del usuario, foliado y rotulado por el GCABA.
- En caso de que se hubiere producido un daño en el vehículo, la empresa concesionaria deberá hacerse cargo, debiendo contar con un seguro de responsabilidad civil.

Illustration 6.2: Information for every service provided<sup>130</sup>.

### Estacionamiento Medido (Tickeadoras)

#### Información útil

##### ¿Cómo utilizar correctamente las máquinas tickeadoras?

- Seguir las instrucciones indicadas en el frente de cada tickeadora: introducir las monedas o cospeles de estacionamiento medido, comprobar los datos en la pantalla, pulsar el botón que emite el ticket, retirar el ticket y depositarlo en el interior del vehículo, en un lugar visible.
- Retirar el vehículo inmediatamente después de concluido el tiempo contratado.
- En caso de inconveniente con la máquina utilizada, no dejar el vehículo estacionado y comunicarse con el Ente a fin de poder realizar la denuncia correspondiente.

- Dentro del área de estacionamiento tarifado, todo vehículo sin ticket de estacionamiento o con el plazo de estacionamiento vencido será pasible de ser removido. La recuperación del vehículo se realiza ante las empresas SEC (zona sur) y STO (zona norte) durante las 24 hrs. Todos los días del año.
- Respecto al acarreo de vehículos infractores, cabe aclarar que entre Viamonte (incluida) hacia el Norte de la CABA, corresponde a la empresa STO y la dirección para retirar el vehículo es la playa de estacionamiento de infractores ubicada en Eduardo J. Couture y Francisco Romero.
- Entre Viamonte (excluida) hasta Av. Rivadavia (incluida) corresponde a la empresa SEC y el lugar para retirar el vehículo es la playa subterránea ubicada en Carlos Pellegrini y Sarmiento.
- Desde la Av. Rivadavia (excluida) hacia el sur de la CABA también corresponde a la empresa SEC, el lugar para retirar el vehículo es la playa de estacionamiento para infractores ubicada debajo de la Autopista 9 de Julio, entre Av. Juan de Garay y Bernardo de Irigoyen.

#### Empresas concesionarias de este servicio en la actualidad:

**Dakota S.A.:** Av. Leandro N. Alem 896 7° piso (C1001AAQ) - Buenos Aires. Tel.: 4333 2241. Fax: 4334-0381. E-mail: rr@dakota.com.ar

**STO Grúas Zona Norte:** Tel: 0800-333-5464 / 4806-9556 / 48074522.

**BRD S.A.I.C.F.I.:** Av. Corrientes 1145, Piso 1º - Buenos Aires. Tel.: 0810-222-7736. E-mail: recepcion@brd.com.ar


**SEC Grúas Zona Sur:** Tel: 4302-5083/84.

<sup>129</sup> Ente de Control de Servicios Públicos de la Ciudad, *Manual del usuario*. 2016.

<sup>130</sup> *Id.*

In order to really provide the general public with as much information as possible, for each category the Manual lists the name and contacts of every licensed firm that provides that particular service allowing for even more accountability, which is being strengthened by the preliminary elaboration of quality indexes ranking which are the best providers for each service category.

Map 4: public lighting service and service providers in CABA<sup>131</sup>.



Interestingly, the ERSP is working closely with NGOs in order to increase the level of inclusion of people with disabilities within the scope of access to public services.

Overall, in line with their monitoring function, both the UdEP and the ERSP highly contribute to the development of better public policies, providing an added value with their assessments, surveys and field studies to the decision-making progress within the GCBA., thus helping the Chief of Government and his task-force to govern through data and not assumptions.

<sup>131</sup> *Id. ii*

## Chapter III

### Towards a Modern City: fostering active citizenship

CONTENTS: 3.1 THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION. – 3.2 THE GOBIERNO ABIERTO INITIATIVE. – 3.3 PROXIMITY. – 3.4 WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? BUENOS AIRES 2030.

#### 3.1 The process of Modernization

The first Macri administration had managed to plant the seed of change in the City of Buenos Aires. His reelection in 2011 served as an opportunity to push forward policies and measures revolving around innovation and technology as means to improve citizens' lives and deliver better services across different sectors.

The journey towards modernization had to include interventions first and foremost in government and governance, in infrastructure and human capital.

The GCBA needed to equip both the public sector and civil society with the tools to bring about this real revolution in the way that the people of Buenos Aires thought about government. This instruments encompass the birth of the Ministry of Modernization and the spread of the BA Wifi network across the city and of city Apps, electronic government, the Open Government initiative. Together with projects to involve citizens in the decision-making process (i.e. *BA Elige*), as well as projects to educate citizens to respect the environment or else. All in the scope of empowering people and fostering an active kind of citizenship within the city, contributing to the development of human capital.

Macri and his entourage wanted Buenos Aires to become a City integrated with its surroundings, using technology as a bridge to get closer to residents and visitors alike and thus generating new contexts that would promote a participative, integrative and inclusive City. Inclusion, transparency, and participation are in fact the leading principles of the GCBA's administration. The question then is what is a Modern City according to the administrators of Buenos Aires, what their vision for the city really is about. According to them, a Modern City takes into account six big components, namely the economy, government, society, the quality of life, mobility and the environment and each one of them encompasses in its turn more specific elements. The economics aspect focuses on opportunities, productivity, and global connectivity, while government refers to online services, infrastructure and open government. As far as the society of a Modern City is

concerned, it entails education, integration, and creativity, while the quality of life is founded on security, health-care, culture and personal well-being. In regards to mobility, a Modern City must feature multimodal access to transportation, technological infrastructure, and efficient transport while the environmental aspect must be grounded on smart buildings, resource management and urban planning. It is about continuous development.

The very first step of this journey was the creation of the Ministry of Modernization in December 2011, based on the same objective of every other novelty introduced during Macri I and Macri II, delivering services of higher quality and providing better care to citizens for Buenos Aires to become a Modern City. The Ministry was created to design, promote, and coordinate both transformation and modernization policies across the different areas of government together with its correspondent regulation, incorporating new processes and technologies while supporting the continuous training of Human Capital. The most interesting thing is that once Macri won the presidential elections in 2015, one of his first official resolutions was to create the national Ministry of Modernization. He understood the importance that this comprehensive and integrated innovation policy had had for the modernization of the public administration of Buenos Aires, so he wanted to replicate its success on a wider scale, Argentina as a whole.

The administrative structure foresees the hierarchizing of public employment, promoting growth within the administration while carrying out analysis and planning of provision of the required equipment across all areas of government, especially in those providing services to citizens directly. Among the new measures enacted to manage Human Capital better, the GCBA pushed forward the integration of 70 Young Professionals during 2012 and 2013, enhancing the importance of modernizing the overall mindset of the administration and through people. Above all, the GCBA advocated the development of a real administrative modernization that would positively affect the life of the inhabitants of BA, such as the birth of electronic government practices.

Before 2007 in fact, every form or procedure could be edited without any trace nor record, sheets were lost around and there was not even a registry of signatures. There was a complete lack of control over administrative acts. Between a mere re-arrangement of the related framework and a disruptive revolution, the GCBA opted for the latter. The highest ranking officials of the Legal and Technical Secretariat presented this radical proposal to



Macri which granted its approval without questions, and his unmoving support proved very valuable. After these meetings to Spain to study what had happened in Madrid, Barcelona and Malaga they ended up opting for the right system, which was both of quality and within the budget constraint.

Starting in 2009, the GCBA managed to shift paradigm from a paper-based administration to having all operative procedures and forms in a digital format which could be operated remotely already in 2013. These include from birth and death certificates to more complex ones regarding contracts and public procurement. This particular form of e-government encouraged the incorporation of citizens within the procedural process, new habits, more agility and a wider control over operations and transparency, focusing on residents' needs first. At the time, a fundamental role was played by then Chief of Cabinet Larreta, liaison among all Ministries. In spite of the support of the highest ranking officials though, the question is still how the GCBA managed to change a whole administration.

First came the training of human resources - since one cannot change an organization without changing its people's mindset first, then came the improvement of processes and finally the incorporation of technology. Electronic government, thanks to its innovative and creative institutionalized processes and with a team of committed individuals as its responsible, had three main consequences over the attainment of the status of "Modern City": sustainability, more efficiency, and saving of time. Among these, sustainability is especially important if we consider that up to 2009 there was a production of over 15 million documents per year, generating, even more, paper sheets, considering that every procedure is at least 2-3 pages long.


Furthermore, this digital revolution led to other significant changes in paradigms typical of public organizations. It resulted in a more consistent standardization of processes and workflows while readjusting personnel and roles within the structure since vertical hierarchy gave way to a more horizontal and decentralized approach. It also allowed for even old paper-based documents to be transformed into digital ones, thus integrating them with the whole system. But most of all, it allowed for the collection and stocking of a vast quantity of data - in an easier format than ever before - which are being more and more used to help the GCBA take informed decisions.

However, putting all this effort into the creation of an e-government would have been useless had the GCBA not focused its attention on providing the population of Buenos

Aires with more digital smart tools. A transversal factor was needed in order to the digital culture. In fact, for instance, various touch-based totems started being set up across the city to facilitate the fruition of information and data even while not at home and some units were adapted to the needs of people in wheelchairs with even an incorporated emergency phone. Always concerning infrastructure, the MoM is working with other areas of the GCBA on the restoration of the Planetarium and on the requalification of the Ecopark which will become an innovation hub where technology will be combined with the focus on environmental practices.

But the most excellent result was the expansion of a free Wifi network which in 2013 accounted for 160 points of access and now, in 2017, features more than 300. This massive network includes access points in hospitals and CeSACs, libraries, municipal buildings, public areas, parks and squares, subway stations, metrobus stations, museums and the Microcentro area. Many would probably argue that having an internet connection as spread as this is not something a government should prioritize, but as of now, having internet access - as stated by the UN (Obj. 9) - is now a universal right. Especially in Argentina, where phone pre-paid plans and phone-bills charge high amounts to have an internet connection which is not even that fast the fact that the GCBA took it upon itself to favor even lower-income people to have the same possibilities to have access to it is yet another indication of their citizen-centered approach.

Map 5: BA Wifi network<sup>132</sup>.



Besides, to make citizens' lives better, the GCBA developed a huge variety of mobile Apps that provide information on a variety of topics.


- *BA Cómo llegar*: this App recommends you the best route from point A to point B according to the amount of time or number of change in transportation needed. It includes all form of public transports, car usage or walking. This App accounted for already 1.400.000 subscribers in May 2016.

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/compromisos>

- *BA Ecobici*: this App allows you to check the availability of bikes in each bike-sharing station across the City to pick it up or devolve it and to reserve it through your credentials while also keeping track of your travels. It accounts for more than 150.000 users.
- *BA Móvil*: this App gives information about traffic in the city and allows to filter it according to one's chosen type of transportation. It accounts for 360.000+ downloads.
- *BA Subte*: it lets you see in real-time the status of the subway lines. It accounts for more than 200.000 downloads.
- *BA Wifi*: it localizes wifi connections across the city on a map. One can perform a search by *Comuna*, a point of interest or specific location. It accounts for more than 130.000 downloads.
- *BA Denuncia Vial*: it allows to file in complaints regarding road infringements. One can take a picture and send it through the app, which will, in turn, be sent to the competent department for analysis and possible emission of a fine. It accounts for more than 60.000 subscribers.
- *BA Cultural* (40.000 downloads): it contains the Cultural Agenda of the city, with details on performances, venues, artists and so on. It has more than 40.000 users.
- *BA 147*: it allows to file in complaints, add photos, leave comments and follow-up on the status of your claims. It counts more than 34.000 downloads.
- *BA Turismo* (20.000 downloads): it contains details on cultural and sporty events, hotels, restaurants in the city. It accounts for more than 20.000 users.
- *BAFICI* (12.000 downloads): it contains information over the schedule of the International Independent Film Festival of Buenos Aires; it features 12.000+ downloads.
- *Noches BA*: the App works as a schedule for a particular Night promoted by the GCBA's Ministry of Culture, such as the "Night of Museums." Every event is divided into speakers and buildings which are listed according to one's distance from that point.
- *BA Medios*: is integrates the city's media, such as the City's television (Canal de la Ciudad) and radio channels (2x4, Radio Ciudad) together with a link to all the YouTube Channels of the GCBA.

- *BA Ferias*: it enlists all the farmers' markets of the city with details on available products and correspondent prices.
- *BA Vacunación*: as shown in Image 81728, it features a map of immunization centers across the city and, as shown in Image 2738, it records all the vaccines someone already has, when it was taken and when renewals are due. it can also allow for one App to register more than one profile, since it was conceived for families.

Illustration 7: BA Vacunación App<sup>133</sup>.



- *BA Accesible*: it features a map with details over the accessibility of bars, restaurants, museums, theaters, parks, banks, government buildings, hotels. It works thanks to users' participation and allows to point out if there are 14 different types of supports for people with reduced capabilities. These include ramps and elevators, suitable bathrooms, Braille signs and magnetic loops, audio-sensors, etc.
- *BA CoPS*: it allows to check one's medical charts, book an appointment and receive notifications and reminders for yourself and other members of your family.

<sup>133</sup> *Id.*

- *BA Proveedores*: this app allows providers of public services to consult and administer their bills and earning documents from mobile devices. With this app one can also 1) digitally send to the General Accounts Division (DGC) its bills from the app and follow-up on their progress, 2) digitally sign documents of specific categories, while being able to download information in regards to one's applications.
- *MiBA*: it is a customized platform where you can choose which services you want it to feature, that allows you to follow-up on the status of your forms and to receive notifications either via mobile or the web.

The future development of the MiBA App will be to include other apps such as BA CoPS, BA Ferias and others where with a single log-in one can have access to all kinds of procedures and information. Since citizens often feel like the government is one big entity, and not as the coming together of different areas, thanks to MiBA, the GCBA is working on being perceived as one institution only. It will become the door to a digital citizen profile, which will reflect on the one hand "How the City is seen" from the people's point of view, and on the other hand "How the city feels". Data will come from sensors that measure traffic, environmental impact, traffic-lights timing, cameras and GPS sensors on buses. This objective will be harder to achieve in those areas concerning citizen service but they are confident they will get it done<sup>134</sup>.

In conclusion, it can be drawn that in the City of Buenos Aires the incorporation of technology serves three central purposes: 1) improving the quality of public service; 2) improving the quality of management; 3) promoting the decision-making process basing it more and more on data.

### **3.2 The *Gobierno Abierto* initiative**

Open Government Data policies proactively provide people with data in reusable formats for them to use and reuse in the way they prefer. Since the early 90s, more than 80 countries have adopted laws and decrees to regulate the access to administrative information and this topic has been increasingly gaining momentum. Open government reforms have the potential to improve existing services and unlock the ideas, knowledge,

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<sup>134</sup> Interview with Matías Zubiría Mansilla, General Director of the Smart City and Open Government projects of the GCBA. May 11<sup>th</sup> 2017, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

and capacity for new solutions to societal challenges. As explained in the Guidance for developing OGP commitments issued by the Open Government Partnership Initiative, of which the City of Buenos Aires is a member, Open public service reforms can be applied to various stages of the policy cycle; for example:

- Priority identification and agenda setting: i.e. commitment to developing mechanisms that bring citizen voice into decisions to prioritize issues and/or allocate resources (e.g. participatory budgeting).
- Policy making and service design: i.e. duties that bring citizen voice into policy processes related to public services and/or involve citizens in the design of services
- Co-commissioning and co-production: i.e. responsibilities that involve citizens in making commissioning decisions and/or directly delivering public services
- Monitoring and accountability: i.e. commitments that involve citizens in assessing public service performance and holding providers to account for their delivery

The added value of good open government reforms is their potential to improve the governance and performance of public services and empower citizens, civil society, and other groups to take collective action to achieve social outcomes.

On the one hand, open government brings about benefits to citizens, since they rely on public service as critical tools to their individual's wellbeing and life chances, strengthening the prosperity of societies. On the other hand, open government benefits administrations too. In terms of civil contract, OG practices prove to be meaningful and of impact, deepening public trust, considering the better delivery of services and information shapes people's trust in and expectations of government. It also promotes good governance by giving the public its rightful access to information on the budget, contracts, production and provision.

Moreover, it strengthens accountability by supplementing conventional approaches and at the same time provides new insights, since giving space for citizens to inform policy makers and service providers of their needs, choices and expectations can result in better and/or lower cost services. Overall, OG fosters constructive engagement from multiple fronts. Because, successful social outcomes require citizens to take action in their pursuit and development can only come from collective efforts, support of citizens, public servants and politicians demonstrates invaluable to govern in a more informed, direct and constructive manner.

However, the issue covering how to develop public service commitments does not end with the mere publication of data. That is only one piece of the puzzle. Engagement must be sought through multi-stakeholder process, with the active involvement of citizens and civil society. The best changes in fact, are those based on multiple sources of expertise, including existing service provision, resident priorities, contextual factors, public service systems, open government reform, and governance and accountability systems. Open civil service reforms cannot survive in isolation; they depend on civic space, administrative capacity to respond to citizens demands, and civil society capacity to mobilize citizens and to network effectively, both within civil and political society.

To analyze the first steps of the Open Government Data policy in the City of Buenos Aires, one cannot overlook the role of policy entrepreneurs, within and outside the public administration, in the implementation of innovative ideas. Policy entrepreneurs can be described as individuals (or small teams) who can draw attention to public policy issues and innovative solutions. They are those able to identify and use "windows of opportunity" to promote changes in policy environments to achieve more desirable outcomes. In the case of the OGD policy in Buenos Aires, these early advocates for change can be found in the public sector.

During Macri's first term, some ideas about the use and disclosure of Open Government Data caught the attention of a small group of actors who were working in the local Executive branch, in particular, Rudi Borrman and Daniel Abadie. By the late 2008 and early 2009, some actors working for civil society organizations, or in their individual capacity, also started to draw their attention to the topic. Although the projects were not necessarily related to the use of data coming from the City of Buenos Aires, the stream of ideas that was generated around 2009 helped to create the Open Government Data policy in BA. In the federal Congress, around 2010, there were actors who came from the same political party as the City's Chief of Government, that had a close relationship with several players from the executive branch who also helped to introduce the OGD topic in the regional agenda.

In early 2011, those previously mentioned policy entrepreneurs, traveled to the US to observe how teams in the cities of San Francisco and New York were working on issues related to the concept of openness applied to local governments. This communication and exchange of ideas with other cities, along with the support within the administration, helped



the promotion of OGD in the policy agenda to face the second term of Mauricio Macri. The main element towards the first steps of its implementation was to get the most relevant person in the organization to embrace the project. Even though pushing forward innovation in government structures might sound difficult to achieve, as Rudi Borrmann stated many times before, it is in the end only a matter of politics that requires strong will and commitment. Without the support of the highest ranks, it becomes very tough to convince a whole organization, especially in government where innovation is sometimes not embraced by many of its members. Indeed, they did have the full support of the Mayor. However, they still needed to convince all the agencies.

To get that extensive support, they created a network of innovators inside the government and provided them with spaces to interact. One of these was Govcamp, an event for people that work in and around government with no predefined agenda, and usually organized using ‘open space’ methods in which participants introduce themselves briefly and the sessions are proposed and agreed upon at the start of the day. Having them meet, built a sense of innovation and community inside the organization.

The beginning of Macri II opened an even wider window of opportunity to launch the OGD policy in the City of Buenos Aires. There were several modifications in his administration, such as the birth of the Ministry of Modernization which would house the future Office of Information and Open Government.

At the beginning of 2012, with the signing of the Open Government Decree (156/2012), together with the creation of a specific Unit to implement the project, the policy entrepreneurs managed to attain - and so did the General Directorate of Information and Open Government - the formal political support they were looking for. Then they surrounded themselves with a team of young professionals with diverse backgrounds (i.e. political scientists, journalists, and developers).

The Decree 156/2012 established the basis for the design and development of the Open Data portal aimed to “*facilitate the search, discovery and access to those public datasets, which help to promote transparency, encourage participation and collaboration of citizens in government affairs, and also to encourage innovation and social, economic and cultural development in the area of the City of Buenos Aires*”; while the Resolution 190-MMGC/2012, outlined that the Ministry of Modernization would be in charge of setting the “*guidelines, procedures and protocols regarding the mechanism by*

*which datasets are provided by the different areas of government to the General Directorate of Information and Open Government and published through Buenos Aires Data platform for possible reuse by citizens".*

One of the main features of the city's Open Government Data policy is the decentralized nature of the responsibilities towards the disclosure and ownership of government data since it belongs to each agency which is responsible for authorizing the release of the data they produce. The Directorate of Information and Open Government instead, is responsible for defining the technical standards for publication of the data shared by each of the information- producing agencies.

With the legislative framework in place, it was now time to create a community deeply engaged in open government practices. The GCBA embarked on this journey following the three-phases strategy (initial, intermediate and advanced) suggested by the OGP<sup>135</sup>.

#### 1. *Initial*

First of all, one must publish and promote information on the public services people are entitled to, explain to the public their rights and obligations as users, inform them about the provision and access to services, establish mechanisms for feedback and complaint and disaggregate service commitments to the lowest level. Afterward, a government must publish information on budgets and resources received by public service providers, enabling the flow of public sources for the provision of public goods or services to be tracked from origin to destination. This very action leads to an increased public influence over decisions on resource allocation, together with the enhancement of public trust and confidence in the integrity of government authorities and public acceptance of inevitable trade-offs, making elected officials and civil servants act more responsibly since their decisions are open to public scrutiny. Also, it allows for citizen and CSOs to contribute to policy-making and budgeting processes. Everything related to performance data and feedback about residents satisfaction with public services must be made public. Some key benefits of this approach are the generation of direct feedback for service providers, the increase in awareness of rights and entitlements amongst

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<sup>135</sup>Hughes T., Scott K., Maassen P., (2013). *Improving Public Services: Guidance for development of OGP commitments*. Open Government Partnership. Available at: <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/resources/improving-public-services-guidance-developing-ogp-commitments>

community members and the empowerment to hold governments and service providers accountable. Stakeholder Surveys are a, in fact, valuable tools to increase an organization's understanding of the knowledge, attitudes, and opinions of their users.

## 2. *Intermediate*

Government must engage citizens and civil society in defining service provision standards and in the assessment and oversight of public service delivery. Creating serious and practical opportunities for citizen involvement can provide a huge untapped reservoir of knowledge and good will, align incentives effectively and create greater trust, all of which are essential to solving service delivery challenges. New technologies and decreasing costs of communication are enabling unprecedented avenues for information sharing and demand-driven, contingent collaboration. Working with citizens and civil society groups helps to identify the areas of public service delivery that matters most to them, and any areas of concern. Evidence shows that public participation can result in public service delivery models that are not only cost-effective but also more directly responsive to the requirements of service users. The state has a key role in defining outcomes, setting standards for public services and ensuring that all public service users can access the services they are entitled to. The government must also establish feedback mechanisms for public services since they help to identify areas of public concern and dissatisfaction and improving service efficiency and effectiveness. Feedback can also be a source of innovative ideas for the improvement of services.

## 3. *Advanced*

In the third phase, Government must engage citizens in allocating public service budgets. Involving taxpayers to make budget decisions on public services is a different and participatory way to manage public money, and to engage people in addressing local needs. Being involved in budget decisions directly empowers communities by enabling them to have a clear and measurable influence over the budget decisions that affect their lives (i.e. what happens to them, their families and their communities). This practice can help individuals feel greater connections to each other and to their communities, resulting in positive health and life outcomes. It can also help instill a sense of ownership, trust and reciprocity within communities, in regards to assets and goods which will be in consequence be more taken care of.

In the case of Participatory Budgets or other participatory initiatives, citizens have the opportunity to identify projects or spending priorities; community representatives and experts work together with community members to discuss and learn more about the proposals that are put forward. A public vote on which proposals to fund is undertaken and what follows is the implementation of the top proposals (given their certified viability).

The history of open government policies and practices in the City of Buenos Aires has been following the aforementioned guidelines. Starting from the publication of public data during Macri I, up to the Buenos Aires 2020 experiment and the implementation of the *BA Elige* initiative during the Larreta administration which will be further analyzed in the following sections.

Initially, the team from the Directorate General of Information and Open Government, in order to establish the basis for the implementation of the OGD policy, focused on three main areas of impact: Accountability and control, Inclusion and Innovation. They knew that the disclosure of this type of information could empower citizens so they focused on Inclusion, assisting other agencies within the public sector to improve their internal and external information flows. Innovation instead, was emphasized as the promoter of information as a valuable asset to society and the public sector itself, since the publication of open data also allows innovators to use the data to create new products with social or economic value, or both.

To start, they decided to divide the implementation of this new OG policy into two key areas: the first focused on the technical aspects of publishing open data (Open Data), while the other focused on creating a community of users and contributors (Content Management).

On the one hand, the Data Generation area was tasked with setting the standards for the production, maintenance, and storage of the data. Its main product was and is the Open Data platform. This platform called “Buenos Aires Data” is a single catalog of information already available on different platforms on the GCBA’s website in a format that can be read and downloaded by any computer. Applications are built around it and other events and

activities of the Office of Information and Open Government were created to make sense of it.

The platform was built, like many other platforms of this type in the world, implementing CKAN, an open source data management system. In early 2013, to face some of the obstacles they encountered during their first year, the team decided to implement CKAN's newest version, CKAN 2.0. Carried out by their own "in-house" programmers. (The developers working in the Office of Information and Open Government were in charge of customizing and deploying the platform, as well as other initiatives involving programming skills.)

This new version allows: 1) provide programmatic access to the data in order to simplify their use by third parties or for any "in-house" designed application; 2) reflect the products developed by the community as well as the events, or any other project, organized by the General Directorate to build a greater community; 3) reach a wider audience by providing visualization tools and data analysis accessible for any audience. By mid-2013, Buenos Aires presents more than 70 available datasets in the Open Data platform. These sets grouped a number of individual databases as well as providing the same dataset in different formats. To have this information flowing, the city started organizing hackathons, meetings where programmers connect with public officials, specialists and members of civil society (re-users), and to have public administrator participate in this kind of events organized by other institutions and even the media. The GCBA is already working on an integrated platform which will automatically host all data from the different areas of Government in order to speed processes and make use of even more data.

On the other hand, the Content Management area was deemed responsible for building capacity within each agencies of the local government. The key to the development not only of open government practices but also OG culture was making sure that different areas of the GCBA actually used this data. Administering through data, taking informed decisions and foreseeing scenarios demonstrate the importance of using digitalized data in modern systems. The GCBA had to show - and generate - interest within the Government and do the same to the same towards society, so that they would start understanding the potentiality of open data and use them as a helpful tool. The first phase of the GCBA's strategy was in fact to use intermediaries that transform information and data into something meaningful and understandable for the general public, going further than technical expertise.

This area also focuses on building relationships with the community to help them use and demand data. The latest is an important part of their work as greater demand for government data also gives the Directorate of Information and Open Government more bargaining power with other agencies to demand greater amounts of data to be published via the OGD portal. What the GCBA wants to push forward next is the development of actual contents on the data of open government. The idea is to communicate a certain public policy through data.

Regarding the data-licensing framework, the Information and Open Government team first decided not to use a pre-existing scheme but to develop its own policy. The licensing terms aimed at reflecting the idea that a dataset is open if anyone is free to use, reuse and redistribute it, subject only to share same attribution and requirements. To reach the community around Open Government in Buenos Aires, Open Government acts as a "mediator" between the two principal components of this policy: agencies and civil society actors<sup>136</sup>.

The events organized by the General Directorate of Information and Open Government aimed at approaching civil society actors to use the published data, but also to encourage public officials to learn new ways to solve public-interest problems. Some of these events, since the beginning of the Open Data policy in Buenos Aires in early 2012 were a) The *BAHackaton*, repeated in 2013, which in its first edition brought together developers, designers, entrepreneurs and government officials to work on the development of mobile applications. While in the second one, it aimed at solving public-interest problems, which were introduced before the event so that greater sustainability of the products and the teams developed at the event could be guaranteed. b) BAApps, which consisted of a contest organized in to create applications based on the use of public data from the City of Buenos Aires from a variety of topics, such as education, transit, culture, and security, among others. c) GobCamp Buenos Aires, an informal meeting between public official and a broad range of civil society actors. This meeting was designed following an “*unconference*” structure: small talks or sessions created by participants regarding problems of the City<sup>137</sup>.

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<sup>136</sup> Rudi Borrmann, Director of the Open Government Initiative: <https://youtu.be/ujlNe5Oth7I>

<sup>137</sup> Fumega S., (2014). *City of Buenos Aires Open Government Data initiative*. Open Data Research Network.

Early in 2013, the Government Laboratory was born. It is a physical space in the Information and Open Government office created to host meetings, every day of the year, among public officials, developers, NGOs members, academics, and other actors. They aim at helping those actors to work collaboratively to solve public-interest problems to benefit all the to benefit all inhabitant of the city. This space is fundamental for the Office to achieve their goal of creating a greater demand for data and to strengthen the community around them.

Barely six years after the birth of the Buenos Aires's website, one of the most flexible and modern in the whole world, the GCBA decided to open it to for the world to see and use. The software is of public domain and can be used by any city, province or State. The GCBA strongly believes that the world evolves in the collaborative creation of softwares, by sharing experiences and not reinventing the wheel every day. The General Directorate for Electronic Government of the GCBA (DGCOBE) developed BAdistro, thought so every government can easily download it and install it. BAdistro is an installation profile by Drupal composed by different pre-designed modules so that every administration can have access to core functions. Based on their experience with buenosaires.gob.ar, and seeing the results that are interacting with citizens and the needs of the various areas of government, they decided to start contributing to the Drupal community by sharing their experience as a collaborative and decentralized administration. BAdistro 1.0 contains an easily adaptable layout, carrousel features, shortcuts, alert option, lists, links to social network and many more options.

In the case of the City of Buenos Aires, the theory of change behind all OG-related activities revolves around three main outcomes: empowered citizens, improvement of service delivery, and innovation.

In my opinion, over the years the GCBA, thanks to this push-pull strategy of publishing data while creating the demand in the community for further disclosures, managed to spread the culture of openness. Citizens are now accustomed to a highly responsive, inclusive and proactive government. A Government which values their contribution within decision-making processes and the policy cycle. Buenos Aires 2020 (2009) and *BA Elige* (2017) are in fact clear demonstrations of this trend and its development.

*Compromiso Buenos Aires 2020* was a participative process of dialogue between the GCBA and CSOs. Its objective was to generate a framework for a long-term discourse, which would go beyond sectoral views and would allow to understanding common challenges and budget constraints ahead. Solving structural problems in complex cities requires an improvement in the response capacity of the State, the private sector and civil society. The call was opened by the GCBA with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), regional and global leader for what concerns participatory initiatives and citizens involvement. 700 representatives of CSOs took part in the project. The first objective was to collect knowledge on the social and physical debt of the city and over the resources in place to resolve them. The second aim was to reach a higher level of understanding in regards to the need for spaces dedicated to social dialogue and the third one was to agree on some possible lines of action for the future. This very experiment was the first step towards deeper citizens participation in government matters, which was even more institutionalized thanks to the creation of the BA *Participación Ciudadana* project.

### 3.3 Proximity and participation

BA PC includes every initiative regarding citizens and the GCBA, either based on works or *barrios*. Among these, we find the Meeting with the Neighbors Initiative (*Reunion con los vecinos*), the Open Precincts Initiative (*Comisariás abiertas*), the *BA Elige* program (literally “Buenos Aires chooses”), and the many sectoral ones which basically serve as informal surveys (transportation, healthcare, culture, innovation, etc.) which will be further discussed in the following section.

*BA Elige* is a project that promotes an evolution of citizens participation, so that through different stages there is the development of different proposals to improve *barrios*, *Comunas* and the city as a whole. It is a tool through which everyone can make their ideas come true. Every citizen can advance his or her proposals and vote that of someone else. The budget for these projects was set at 500.000 million pesos within the 2018 budget. The GCBA will take on the winning proposals and these will be included in the 2018 plan which will be executed starting January 2018<sup>138</sup>.

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<sup>138</sup> <https://baelige.buenosaires.gob.ar>



When a citizen wants to propose a new project, he can log-in into the *BA Elige* platform or visit one of the many *BA Elige*'s offices across the city to have his data registered. In April 2017, people were given the chance to file in their ideas, even if they were not even residents of BA. One could submit as many proposals as he wanted. The only limitation was that every proposal had to be advanced for a single *Comuna*.

In May 2017, citizens had the chance to support up to ten plans each. The number of votes of each proposal will contribute to a ranking of projects which will also be the order for their analysis. In only one month, more than 22.000 proposals were advanced and the most voted ones reached up to 2000+ votes. Between June and July 2017 each competent department of the GCBA will have to analyze in the order above as many proposals as possible. During this phase, the proposals respecting validity, viability, and legality will be defined and an estimated budget will be drafted for their implementation. Those who do not comply with these criteria or that exceed costs will be excluded. At the end of this review, all proposals will be published, regardless of their validity, with their respective reports and score. The approved ones will be converted into projects and will pass the next voting phase.

From August 21st to September 17th, every person above 16 years old, resident within the City of BA, will be able to vote for one *Comuna* only, even if it's not the one he or she resides in. Once the *Comuna* is selected, one will be able to vote more proposals until the financial resources finish. One can even choose to cast only one vote. The projects that one chooses will be saved on his profile and will be up for erasing until the end of the voting phase. The definitive result of this process will be the one deriving from this last voting session. The projects will be grouped per *Comuna*, according to the votes they received, bearing in mind not to exceed the given budget.

Apart from being an additional opportunity for citizens to express their desires and share their ideas with the government to see them implemented, the GCBA will use all this data and proposals as an informal survey to identify critical issues that must be tackled. Among the most voted, there are in fact proposals related to the *Subte* as well as those related to sports centers and the renovation of public space. Out of all the project of the BA PC, the *BA Elige* program is the one that most resembles the proper policy cycle.

Similarly, throughout the year, the GCBA also arranges for people to share their ideas about ongoing projects (i.e. the renovation of a green area) to incorporate them in the works

and in the case of infrastructural ones, to have them sign up to visit the construction site together with the Chief.

The other programs of BA PC instead, resemble a less formalized approach. They revolve around the creation of a dialogue between the institutions of the GCBA and the citizens. These meetings, health stations, waste management points, etc. serve to involve citizens in rather small but important matters for someone's to share these decisions.

A program that has been gaining more and more attention and that some define as a real "admirable initiative" is the Meeting with Neighbors program. Chief of Government Larreta, together with Diego Santilli and depending on the occasion other high-ranking officials of the GCBA, has been meeting regularly with the citizens of Buenos Aires in *Comunas* based encounters. Twice if not three times per week people can register to attend these meetings to discuss directly with the *Jefe de Gobierno* various matters regarding their *Comuna* of residence. This way of engaging citizens allows to jump all intermediate levels of bureaucracy so that inhabitants can file in their complaints, talk about their concern and projects for their *barrio* with the assurance that their request will be answered, if not resolved. He is gaining people's respect by exerting the principle of proximity. He is reaching out to citizens by underlining the fundamental idea that their opinion matters and that changes can only come from the collaboration between one and the other.

A similar program has been implemented regarding security in the city. The "Open Precincts" (*Comisarias Cercanas*) initiative aims at connecting the citizens of a particular area directly with the local police force of that same area, discussing matters related to road safety, drug-dealing, lack of public lighting, etc. The idea is to co-create a security policy for each *barrio* that takes into consideration the actual needs of each community, starting with the urbanistic layout. Each meeting is attended by the Jefe as well as some other member of the GCBA, ensuring a wholly detailed oversight of the government. Even though these meetings might not be attended by hundreds of people, they are indeed starting to build more trust among citizens in respect to the administration of the city.

Regarding themes not related to a particular community or *Comuna*, BA PC also organizes meetings with the *vecinos* in different parts of the city on a specific topic and with different guests that may or not may not accompany the Chief. Issues differ from sexual diversity to merchants to pregnant women and so on. They aim at creating an insightful

dialogue between members of the GCBA, listening to one another and attaining experts' feedback.

However, Ministries must be up for the task too<sup>139</sup>. The Meetings with the Ministries initiative in fact, are carried out weekly to discuss issues with the population of a certain *Comuna* usually to promote either a particular behavior (i.e. safe driving). This program includes the Ministries of Security, Education, Environment and Public Space and Modernization and aims at listening to people's demands to improve different situations across the city.

Also, the Jefe meets people also individually through the "Breakfast with the Mayor." People can sign up to meet the Chief of Government to get to know him and exchange experiences and stories. Meetings happen either at one's home or in a place of their choosing. Meetings can also feature small groupings of people.

Furthermore, the BA PC initiative is responsible for the organization of various meetings and talks on different themes such as healthy life, transportation, culture, sports, culture, pets, and innovation.

As far as the topic of healthy life goes, these talks are organized at the mobile Health Stations across the city. Each talk focuses on a specific aspect of the issue. In this case, they revolve around the weekly diet people should be on or on labeling rules on product, teaching people how to live a healthier and safer life.

Regarding transportation, the GCBA involves citizens in important matters such as the decision over the *Subte's* schedule up to the choice of the name of new bus and subway stations or if a street should be a one-way one or not. Recently, Chief of Government Larreta launched a survey among people to decide whether wanted to extend the *Subte's* schedule at night, thus delaying its departure in the early morning or to keep it the same. People voted online and were also consulted via phone. This experiment led to the decision to change the schedule and have the *Subte* stay open later at night.

As far as culture is concerned, citizens are called upon continuous votes and opinions regarding many different matters. They can express which graffiti they want to decorate their *barrio*, which movie from last year's edition they want to see again at the BAFICI, etc. Citizens are also often called upon participating in lotteries to win entrances provided by

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<sup>139</sup> <http://bapc.buenosaires.gob.ar>

the GCBA to Festivals and great events around Buenos Aires, promoting more and more participation. The same processes occur with sports. People are asked which new dance style should be included in a Festival, which is going to be the next training of the Buenos Aires Running Team. Through this particular project, the GCBA is promoting community building, transcending neighborhoods and focusing on people's health habits. Votes came in via Facebook, Twitter, email and SMS.

The GCBA is also trying to promote community building and a sense of belonging to the city through the focus on voluntary work. Many youth and adults often look for opportunities to use their spare time to dedicate themselves to volunteering, which is something usually done by CSOs or NGOs. The Government of the city allows one to be part of various important causes. Citizens can sign up to campaign for the prevention of the dengue, to help with the environmental restoration over different park and spaces of the city, to become school tutors for children, to help with the city's call center or with door-to-door informative sessions on government initiatives. Also, people can also volunteer with older adults as in the case of the distribution of tables foreseen by the + Simple Plan or by sharing and spreading information on government initiatives via social networks. Volunteers also take part in charity projects or in tourism. They are reunited at the end of every year and thanked for the added value they were able to bring to the city.

Seeing the importance that pets play for families in Buenos Aires (1.500.000 animals), the GCBA organizes for dog shelters to be mobile and present during the weekend in some of the main squares and parks of the city, so that families can adopt them without having to go through all the trouble of getting to them. The Government also organizes talks and informative session on animal care.

Finally, concerning innovation, the GCBA is pushing forward the inclusion of citizens in decisions such as the decision over the new logo of the Planetarium, whether to increase the fine for parking infringements over sidewalks and ramps and so on. They are focusing their energy on making citizens part of the GCBA's decision that do indeed affect their daily lives. Even within this area, the Government is arranging lotteries for people to experience the city in a different way. For instance, the GCBA gave twelve couples the chance to marry within the Colon Theater, which is a first. Or else, for two years in a row they set up a lottery to have 80 (2016) and 81 (2017) people go up the Obelisk monument, which is usually always closed to the public. Involving citizens in this particular way is

fostering a growing sense of belonging to the city through the privileged discovery of its history and monuments.

Even the *Gobierno Abierto* initiative is subjected to the demands of the people. In fact, they are those who decide which information should be published first on the OP portal. After a session of 21.000+ votes, 43,3% of citizens decided that the first data available should be those regarding public servants' sworn statements, followed by data on public procurement and the budget.

All the people involved in the initiatives above are creating a strong and stable network of engaged citizens willing to co-participate in government decisions and in helping out whatever way they can because the GCBA foresees spaces for them to express their volunteering desires and offering their contributions.

Apart from involving citizens in the decision-making process and in the execution of some of these projects, the GCBA is also determined in educating citizens through public policies. They understand that without people's support and cultural acceptance of certain themes such as waste management or health-care the government will be forced to always assume a dispositive approach rather than becoming a facilitator for people to do what they have adapted to. Capillary distributing the GCBA's institutions across the city, outside typical government buildings, and having these mobile stations get close to citizens reflect the intent of the Government to take care of citizens. Without forcing the population to come to the government, rather being the ones to take the first step.

At the same time, citizens care also revolves around setting up innovative opportunities for them, according to the needs of the jobs market or else, such as promoting culture and integration through training and learning courses.

*Estaciones Saludables*: as far as health-care is concerned, there are forty stable and temporary stations spread in strategic places around the city, namely parks, squares, *Subte* stations, etc. These stations focus on the promotion of healthy habits and on the prevention of illnesses where paramedic offer basic services such as weight, size, glucose levels, and blood pressure check-ups. In ten of these health points they offer additional services such as advice on nutrition, the organization of physical activities for adults and children (i.e. yoga), but also mind-games for elderly people useful to foster a sense of community among

citizens. Also, representatives from the stations often attend conferences, fairs, and cultural events to get the word out on the work they are doing in the capital, together with carrying out lots of campaigns on international health days. In addition, the ES have been offering free flu shots so that risks groups can have access to prevention more easily<sup>140</sup>.

This particular initiative is paired with the educational program *Mi Escuela Saludable* which is carried out in 176 schools where there is a high rate of obesity. They distribute informational materials, organize workshops, etc.

*Puntos Verdes*: across the capital, there are different “Green Points.” These function as special point for separate waste collection to recycle. In the normal ones, people can bring glass, metal, plastic, paper, tetrapack, paper, styrofoam, and used vegetable oil whereas in the Special Green Points one can also bring small electro domestics, IT and communicational appliances. To dump WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive), people can also rely on a Mobile Green Point on a minivan that stops at the various Green Points across the city throughout the week.

Moreover, there are also Green Point Compactors able to receive plastic, paper, carton, metal, styrofoam and organic waste too. Their capacity is about 570 liters and they are built with a sustainable structure of steel and recycled plastic, paired with a solar panel that aliments an internal battery. This battery feeds the sensors that alert the central system ones the bin is full for waste to be collected.

Then, we find Internal Green Points and Public Highway Green Points (*Puntos Verdes Via Publica*). The former are cans with a 350 liters capacity usually placed in municipal HQs, supermarkets, public buildings, etc. They are available for use as long as the building where they are placed stays open. The latter instead, are rectangular structures of a 200 liters capacity with a monitor on top. These ones are available for use 24/7.

Finally, we find Assisted Green Points (*Puntos Verdes con Atención*) which consist of former containers placed in parks and squares all over the city. Here people can both go to dump their waste but, most importantly, to get informed. Thanks to the officers working there most of the week, one can learn about the importance of waste management and recycling and how the process is carried out by the GCBA. They are being installed in more

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<sup>140</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/desarrollosaludable/estaciones-saludables>

and more places and people are starting to get more concerned about environmental issues<sup>141</sup>.

Photo 1: Punto Verde.



However, the GCBA is aware that the biggest problem families and individual face are the possibility of being unemployed or not having the right tools to be a competitive asset on the job market. This is why the Larreta administration is keen on ensuring that social gaps be lessened by government programs.

The GCBA in fact, besides having its personal job portal, offers both online and onsite training programs. They are designed for various categories ranging from first-time sales assistance to stretcher-bearers. The aim of the “Training to Work” program (*Capacitaciones para el Empleo*), is to bring the community closer to the job market through the issuing of free scholarships for up to two-hundred free courses leading to personal, labor and professional development. The courses included in the program pertaining to Event Management, Marketing, PRs, Languages, Logistics and Distribution, Journalism, Administration, Leadership, HRs, IT, Security and Hygiene, and Leadership and

<sup>141</sup> <http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/ciudadverde/separacion/donde/puntos-verdes>

Hospitality. Nonetheless, there is also a huge variety of programs aiming to foster manual labor skills too.

As far as online courses go instead, together with Edu24online, the GCBA offers the chance to strengthen one's IT skills to learn how to operate Excel sheets and derive graphic descriptions. The Ministry of Education also offers free language courses open to everyone all year long.

*InvestBA.* The Agency for Investment and Foreign Trade of the City organizes training sessions on how to develop one's business abroad. Entrepreneurs recall how they were able to export their commercial activities abroad and make their companies international. The objective of this program is to ensure that Argentine talents can breach strategic international markets.

It must be pointed out though that the most important program being pushed forward by the GCBA is the "Side by Side" one (*Codo a Codo*). According to the Ministry of Modernization, the current demand of the Argentine job for IT-related jobs is of 10.000 per year and it keeps growing. *Codo a Codo* is a training project in computer programming designed for all those with a Bachelor's Degree. The program aims at providing people with the right tools for the technological labor market. It foresees 364 total hours, to be distributed along ten months. Classes are held for 3 hours twice per week at different times and are based on Java technology. The first edition featured 3.500 students but the GCBA is determined to reach 5000 soon. The fact that a Government is able to realize how much potential the IT-sector really represents and that youth must be taught how to handle technology properly in order to have competitive advantage - especially on the international market. *Codo a Codo* is yet another measure put into place expressing the GCBA' desire to be close to citizens and provide them with as many tools and knowledge as possible to reach a higher level of human capital development.

### **3.4 What does the future hold? Buenos Aires 2030.**

As stated in Chapter 2, the GCBA not only foresees annual Operational Plans, rather the government vision is always a long-term one. At the beginning of Macri II, the GCBA



realized that any public policy they wanted to implement had to be included in a multi focal strategy. Without careful planning, any measure can backfire and have unwanted or even opposite impacts compared to the ones initially planned, as in the case of possible gentrification deriving from requalification. In 2013, the Buenos Aires 2030 project was ready to start under the patronage of the Executive Office of the Cabinet through the Under Secretariat for Planning and Management Control, with the collaboration of the COPE, the *Comunas*' Chiefs, the Ministries and employees of the GCBA, experts, neighborhood associations, and neighbors too. Buenos Aires 2030 is a long-term policy vision for Buenos Aires organized along four different phases, a diagnostic analysis, benchmarking, participation and planning.

*Diagnosis.* The interdisciplinary teams of the USPMC performed a study on the history characteristics, social, demographic and economic indicators of the City to attain a proper assessment of the initial situation. Contemporarily, the EOC carried out workshops with the Ministries and functionaries of the GBCA to define:

- 1) Which values should be lasting and included in the long-term plan
- 2) Which macro areas should be addressed
- 3) A brief description of these initiatives
- 4) The main viability requirements and timeline to comply with these objectives
- 5) Evaluation standards and criteria to measure the status of each

This analysis focused on traffic, health, education, economics, the environment and public space. This report outlined the priorities that had to be in the Buenos Aires 2030 program.

*Benchmarking.* After having outlined the priorities of Buenos Aires 2030, the USPMC carried out a benchmark study to understand how other cities in the world had envisioned their future. They analyzed long-term plans from Ireland, Australia, the U.S., Brazil, Spain, Ecuador, Colombia among others. The objectives of this work were to understand which had been the key elements of their success, their objectives to carry out their plans and how they complied with them. Comparisons also included transversal themes that these cities had focused on such as social equity, mobility, etc. In the end, it was drawn that Buenos

Aires has similar characteristics to Chicago (U.S.), Sao Paolo (Brazil) and Barcelona (Spain). Their plans were used as valuable examples.

*Participation.* Since the idea was for Buenos Aires 2030 to be an inclusive project, the program started to include various proposals submitted via different channels, digital as well as physical. First of all, the process was open to Ministries of the GCBA for them to share their opinions, while also involving the COPE. In May, the employees of the GCBA also took part in the participative project through a platform, submitting more than 1200 ideas. Participation was open to the citizens of Buenos Aires too. Consultations were also performed in neighborhoods, universities and schools. Workshops were organized in every *Comuna* and overall, more than 3930 proposals were summed. In May 2015, entrepreneurs were involved thanks to the BA Camp initiative. In total, more than 5328 were received and lots of them ended up being part of the Buenos Aires 2030 plan.

*Planning.* The decision-making process had to lead to a clear policy which would help implement the plan over the years. The Plan was designed according to axes, strategies, programs, and initiatives. The objective was to attain an innovative, sustainable, barrier less and also environmental friendly city.

As a managerial tool, the Plan contributed to improve economic competitiveness, social cohesion, environmental sustainability, and innovative capacity. At the same time, it served to strengthen relationships within actors, institutions, control and participation mechanisms. The Plan identified three main frameworks within which to design and implement public policies, as those discussed above in 2.3.

- 1) *Equitable and sustainable development:* institutional management; sustained growth; metropolitan development; urban development and gender equality.
- 2) *The city as a factor of social integration:* equal opportunities; environmental awareness; inclusive spaces and cultural heritage.
- 3) *Platform of access to affordable, inclusive housing:* access to housing, credit programs, rent programs and service infrastructure.

According to this plan and to the needs of Buenos Aires to keep growing as a Modern City, the capital will have to face certain challenges. Some of them are already being addressed through innovative solutions.

*Innovation district policies Capitalize on higher education institutions to boost human capital and innovation.* Aware of the lack of retention of more trained engineers to support innovation and growth, they are following along with their plan of incentives for IT enterprises and startups. It is a slow ongoing process but it is indeed starting to pay off. For instance, the GCBA just signed a contract with the consultancy firm Accenture for it to open a branch in the Parque Patricios neighborhood, bringing four thousand workers in the area. The GCBA is proud that a leading enterprise such as this will be moving to the neighborhood because it will help foster economic development. Furthermore, the attractiveness of Buenos Aires and Argentina is gaining momentum so the efforts of the GCBA will be to pursue area-based regeneration strategies to develop the knowledge economy that is now lacking.

Since placing innovation at the center of economic development district policies, the City of Buenos Aires created four economic development districts dedicated to technology, audiovisual, arts, and design. These sectors were selected by the city based on their potential to promote the generation of high value-added jobs and exports. Through its policy of establishing economic development districts, the City of Buenos Aires aims to achieve the dual objective of regenerating distressed areas through public and private investments and real estate development and promoting the growth of strategic sectors, such as ICT, the audiovisual industry, arts, design, and tourism. (300-308)

However, the city needs should encourage even more innovation and promote their links with regional and global markets to expand the districts' customer base, which is currently mostly a national one. The priority is to attract international customers. The technology businesses within the district primarily serve back-office functions for private and government clients within Argentina.

Building on the success of the Technology District, the city is ready to develop second-generation district policies that refocus public interventions from facilitating the development of clusters to promoting innovation in consolidated clusters. Proposed actions include (a) developing entrepreneurship programs targeting primarily entrepreneurs in sectors aligned with the economic development districts to complement existing city-wide entrepreneurship programs and maximize the economic impact of the districts; (b) strengthening the existing efforts to support technology start-ups with potential for

international expansion; and (c) promoting an enabling environment to attract private accelerators and incubators. Currently, the government of the City of Buenos Aires has two incubators: IncuBA, for design start-ups, and Baitec, for technology start-ups. Both are in the city's Design District.

*The City of Buenos Aires' Economic Development Districts: The Case of the Technology District.*

Urban regeneration in Buenos Aires has been focusing on abandoned factory site, a declining shopping area, or a slum, or to target an area with economic growth potential.

The Technology District is located in Parque Patricios in the southern part of the City of Buenos Aires, which is a former industrial area with abandoned factories and warehouses. Established by Law No. 2.971 of 2008, the district is a center for the promotion and development of ICT, innovation, and knowledge. Aside from private companies, participating entities include educational institutions, such as the Buenos Aires Technology Institute, the University of Salvador, and CAECE University (*Centro de Altos Estudios en Ciencias Exactas*), as well as nongovernmental organizations that aim to promote socially inclusive economic development and urban regeneration.

The benefits for firms located in the district are tax and fee exemptions or deferrals, subsidies, preferential credit lines, and training programs. The training program focuses on human resources development, such as a bilingual literacy and technology pilot plan in public schools located in the Technology District, as well as programs revolving around the participating universities.

Private companies, mainly SMEs, cited three main motivations for establishing themselves in the Technology District: (a) knowledge spillovers, (b) proximity to clients and suppliers, and (c) the advantage of surrounding infrastructure and amenities. A smaller number of these firms expressed that their willingness to relocate was motivated mainly by financial benefits, including lower land prices and tax exemptions.

The City of Buenos Aires decided to invest in improving public areas, safety, and transportation. Thanks to those investments, companies located in the district can now benefit from better accessibility, amenities, and infrastructure, among other advantages.

According to estimates by the City of Buenos Aires, by 2015, the Technology District had received public-private investments in the amount of US\$270 million and had 200 resident firms employing more than 11,000 people (Government of the City of Buenos

Aires 2015). About 95 percent of the resident companies established in the district or in the process of establishing residence are locally owned companies, 82 percent are SMEs, and more than 50 percent are involved in software production. The city government HQs moved to the area in 2016.

One of the challenges of the Technology District is the possible relocation of firms from other city neighborhoods rather than the creation of new firms. A second challenge is the increasing cost of residential and commercial land.

The main incentives for firms to relocate to an economic development district are the externalities associated with clustering of firms as well as public amenities and infrastructure, rather than financial incentives. Second, a successful government policy establishing districts requires the active participation of the private sector and knowledge institutions, including universities, in defining priorities and managing the initiatives.

*The Case of the Art District.* The Arts District, in the neighborhoods of La Boca, San Telmo, and Barracas, was established in 2012 to promote art as an economic activity and attract private investment in the tourism sector. Another District, the Design District, was founded in 2014 in the neighborhood of Barracas to improve the city's international competitiveness in the design sector. The intention behind the district-based approach followed the idea that entrepreneurial closeness would ease communication due to geographical proximity and face-to-face relations so to build mutual trust based on shared language, culture, and values. As in the case of other districts, the idea is to attain a certain rooting of both the companies offering design-related activities and those demanding it, promoting design as a competitive tool in manufacturing production.

A series of policies to promote innovation are being developed in the City of Buenos Aires, including targeted initiatives in economic development districts where production strategies have been encouraged. For instance, the City of Buenos Aires has established two incubators to promote innovation: IncuBA, for design start-ups, and Baitec, for technology start-ups.

*Expand and improve metropolitan Buenos Aires' public transport network to hold the diseconomies of urbanization in check.* The performance of an agglomeration the size of metropolitan Buenos Aires largely depends on the quality of its public transport system. The paradigm of the

'90s focusing on privately owned cars has come to an end. Although the metropolitan area is extending public transport network that comprises different modes of transport, the system requires substantial investments. Seeing that it will indeed reduce traffic in eleven key points of the city and will be safer for everyone, there has been much emphasis on the need to elevate the San Martín train and connect two of the main train stations of the city above ground. It will reduce traffic in eleven key points of the city and it will be safer for everyone<sup>142</sup>.

Given that the rail system in metropolitan Buenos Aires is a high-capacity mass transit system, it has great potential to improve urban mobility from peri-urban areas to the city core; the railway system has a 600 km capacity, ten times more than the *Subte* system (57 km approximately). However, the former only transports 1.4 million people per day, whereas the latter averagely carries 1.2 million. Both networks are undergoing expansion, but since 1 million cars each day enter the area of CABA connecting the rail stations of Retiro (North), Once (Center) and Constitución (South) will be the true key to unlocking the traffic caused by automobiles in the city. Also, it will greatly contribute to environmental sustainability, while becoming a cheaper and faster option than driving. In fact, connecting these rail stations will allow for northern commuters to get directly to the Southern station and vice versa, lowering the average time of travel and most importantly preventing someone from having to change means of transport more than once. The integration of tariffs for metropolitan Buenos Aires will be an important step in making the metropolitan area more inclusive for the poor living in peri-urban areas, who often need to take more than one mode of transport as part of their daily trips. The SUBE smart card service has eliminated the need to collect, count, and transport cash payments for each trip, and with users' transactional information, it provides better information to plan the system and monitor operators.

Because underpasses and other corridors of mass transit systems - as the Metrobus - can increase speed and allow for better frequencies, the city should continue with the development of these networks where rail does not exist, and extend them to the whole metropolitan area, as it was done in La Matanza. Having the federal, provincial, and city governments united is helping take upon huge political commitments and financing

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<sup>142</sup> Muzzini E., Eraso Puig B., Anapolsky S., Lonnerberg T., Mora V., (2017). *Leveraging the potential of Argentine Cities*. Washington D.C., United States of America: The World Bank Group. P. 381

agreements to enhance public transport in metropolitan Buenos Aires, in large part through the recently created Metropolitan Transport Agency.

*Develop a metropolitan area-wide economic development strategy and investment plan.* In the next few years, thanks to the revolutions in transportation that are already shaping a new city, Buenos Aires will be able to increase the competitiveness of its peri-urban areas and take full advantage of agglomeration economies. The city will have to combine the pursuit of economic growth and sustainable development with equitable social inclusion<sup>143</sup>.

Overall, leveraging the potential of the City of Buenos Aires requires and will require an integrated strategy capable of connecting neighborhoods and neighbors through public space and through the provision of high-quality sustainable public services, pairing public works, investments, and infrastructures with correspondent incentives and policies.

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<sup>143</sup> Interview with Nicolás Caputo, Chief of Cabinet of the Secretariat of Transportation of the GCBA. May 11<sup>th</sup> 2017, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

## Conclusions

In the first chapter, we discussed the abandonment of Buenos Aires in the '50s due to the lack of a regulatory plan, which contributed to its random development. Apart from infrastructural failures though, until 2007 Buenos Aires was missing someone who knew how to manage the delivery of public services properly. Mauricio Macri is going to be remembered as the man who changed Buenos Aires forever. His reorganization of the overall GCBA's structure enabled the administration to thrive like never before and it started to deliver high-quality results which could be continuously advertised.

One of the main conclusions I derived from this study is that the successful delivery of public services and the accurate implementation of public policies was the cause of a virtuous circle within the GCBA. Once employees witnessed the value of their contribution, they started to perform better and better. The ability of the highest ranks of the organization was to bring a revolution in HR management and in having the City's employees identify their values with those of the GCBA.

In the central section, it was explained how the GCBA designs and implements Operational Plans. The fact that the OP follows the same timeline as that of the budget is indeed telling. With no coverage, there is no allocation of resources; lowering possible corruption or noncompliance with deadlines. By analyzing all the *compromisos* set out by *Jefe Larreta* and his team, it is clear that the most important feature of the public policy cycle in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires is the fact that there is indeed an combined vision of the City, not one, nor five, but ten years from now. The perspective has been reversed. If before administration planned their activities starting from the present and then going forward, the GCBA has been doing the opposite. Firstly they envision Buenos Aires in 2030 and then they go behind until they reach the present. As a consequence, policies are carried out only if they do happen to be long-term ones. Meeting with citizens, advertising government policies, pushing hard on issues such as the environment, but most of all offering them a platform to check the statutes of the *compromisos* has led to the sharing a dream for the future. A strategy encouraged by the government but supported by citizens.

Furthermore, from the investigation of M&E we can draw that even in this case citizens are the main protagonists at making sure that others – providers or fellow *vecinos* – comply with



the rules. The chance to be answered is not going unnoticed. The right to the city has become a pivotal one; it is not only a collective matter, rather a personal one too. By having citizens help the GCBA through complaints and suggestions, the government has managed to communicate that institutions alone are not able to tackle nor identify every single problem.

In the last chapter, we took into account a different kind of participation which goes even further. Thanks to projects as *BA Elige*, the GCBA attained more than one result. By involving citizens in the decision-making process over what happens in their *Comuna*, the GCBA has been able to stimulate a wider sense of belonging and responsibility. However, proximity did the trick. Whether physically, or digitally the GCBA is ever present in the life of the inhabitants of Buenos Aires and its efforts are slowly being repaid. In Buenos Aires, listening to people and valuing them is proving successful.

Given the preconditions of resource management, detailed long-term planning and proximity, the GCBA managed to develop the classical policy cycle model into a modern administrative tool able to foster citizens' participation. In the last ten years, the GCBA has been able to install a bimodal approach to policy design, which features both a high level of openness towards the public and highly demanding internal management standards.

In the span of three administrations, the Municipality of Buenos Aires managed to provide an added value to each phase of the policy cycle leading up to the system currently in place.

Needs assessments and ex-ante analyses are always performed through the use of a tremendous amount of data. Before deciding upon anything, the GCBA commissions as many statistical reports as it deems necessary. This trend results in the possibility of actually discussing proposals when setting the agenda to decide which issue should be prioritized. Since there is tight control over expenditure, either the GCBA takes a highly informed decision, or it does not take it at all since no resource is to go to waste.

During the setting of the agenda, the GCBA has developed the capacity to include stakeholders' opinions and concurrent visions. As in the case of Buenos Aires 2020, this high level of openness, both internal and external, leads to citizens and employees having a saying about the so-called *compromisos de Gobierno*.

Regarding policy design, the development of operational plans is always very detailed and based on the principle of viability up to the lowest level of where it will have to be

implemented. Besides, designing a particular policy is never about creating just one program or project. It is about designing a set of integrated measures which only together will lead to the desired outcomes. Moreover, the moment of policy design includes the design of indicators and standards that must be equally respected.

When dealing with the implementation phase, the GCBA has been able to set up a stringent set of monitoring measures over the management of activities and the provision of public services. Every functionary, employee or consultant for that matter, know what their deadlines are and that the work of others depends on theirs. Also, through the use of technology the GCBA can collect data almost all the time, so that assessment become weekly if not daily.

The result of this interesting experiment between the GCBA and its citizens is that in Buenos Aires there is now a more active and conscious participation of citizens to issues concerning them. As well as a more informed and demanding citizen. People are encouraged to take action and be co-responsible for taking care of Buenos Aires. The GCBA has become a vector for the development of human potential.

By nudging people to act in a certain way (i.e. throwing away cigarettes in a proper can), the GCBA is managing to share with citizens its future urban utopia.


To conclude, given the institutional capacity of the GCBA and its incredibly fertile population, we can state that these transversal change within the policy cycle which opened the doors of governance to everyone, will allow for Buenos Aires to become a more sustainable, equitable, diverse, integrated and accessible city. I also believe that this type of urban development will lead to an even greater human empowerment.

## Annexes

Annex I: *Comunas* of Buenos Aires.

- Comuna 1: Retiro, San Nicolás, Puerto Madero, San Telmo, Montserrat y Constitución.
- Comuna 2: Recoleta.
- Comuna 3: San Cristóbal y Balvanera.
- Comuna 4: Boca, Barracas, Parque Patricios y Nueva Pompeya.
- Comuna 5: Almagro y Boedo.
- Comuna 6: Caballito.
- Comuna 7: Flores y Parque Chacabuco.
- Comuna 8: Villa Soldati, Villa Riachuelo y Villa Lugano.
- Comuna 9: Parque Avellaneda, Liniers y Mataderos.
- Comuna 10: Villa Real, Monte Castro, Versalles, Floresta, Vélez Sarsfield y Villa Luro.
- Comuna 11: Villa Gral. Mitre, Villa Devoto, Villa del Parque y Villa Santa Rita.
- Comuna 12: Coghlan, Saavedra, Villa Urquiza y Villa Pueyrredón. Comuna 13: Belgrano, Núñez y Colegiales.
- Comuna 14: Palermo.
- Comuna 15: Chacarita, Villa Crespo, Paternal, Villa Ortúzar y Agronomía.

Annex II: Organizational Chart of the GCBA.



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## Abstract

According to multiple sources, in the next few years, the world's population will continue to be more and more urbanized, fleeing the countryside and small villages, opting for highly densely populated areas.

The city of Buenos Aires features one of the biggest metropolitan areas in the world surrounding it, and every day its actual population of 3 million people doubles due to the 3 million commuters coming to the capital to work daily.

Such complex, diverse and dynamic cities cannot rely on chaos anymore. Sustainability, integration, and inclusion must be the guiding principles of modern urban development because stressful situations call for integrated solutions implemented by competent and committed professionals. Local governments in most cases have the direct responsibility to provide most of the public services, and the quality of provision has become a crucial variable in relations to the phase of implementation of public policies and residents' satisfaction. The Government of the City of Buenos Aires features both personnel with know-how and strategic management practices able to deliver high-quality result, while maintaining a relationship with the citizens as a customer and a taxpayer too.

This dissertation revolves around the study of the public policies enacted by the Government of the City of Buenos Aires and the internal processes leading to their design, implementation, and evaluation from 2007 onwards. Led by members of the PRO ever since, the administration of the Argentine capital has been planning its work strategically, according to a long-term vision for which they seek citizens' blessing. Indeed, the government vision for a more equitable, accessible, inclusive and sustainable city is the axis around which every policy, program or project has been rotating for the past ten years.

However, one cannot understand the revolutionary scope of the PRO without knowing what the historical and political context in which the country and the city were in before the 2007 municipal elections was like. Argentina, in fact, had been ruled for years by many populists and members of the military. However, the two most sacred names were, and still are, for many those of Juan Domingo Perón and Cristina Kirchner. They were both known for trying to resolve economic issues through two primary financial tools: net transfers and subsidies. The State paid for the rest but did not address real problems.

Mauricio Macri and his team could not have been more different.

The PRO constituted a new political class coming from the private sector that wanted to restore the country through a knowledge-based approach. The analysis of the political campaigns of 2007, 2011, and 2015 serve to demonstrate that Macri and Larreta's electoral proposals were already well-developed policies that they had been working on for years through multiple think tanks.

Within the first chapter, I also focused my attention on the legal framework that characterizes CABA and the assignment of competences between the City and the Federal Government. It helps us put things into perspective and understand what the scope of the GCBA really is in terms of policy making.

The second chapter of the dissertation deals instead with the themes related to the actual policy making process: human and financial resources first of all and the public policy cycle model enacted by the GCBA, together with the innovation they brought to each stage.

Once in office, Macri realized that the organizational structure of the GCBA had to be updated and that the culture of employees had to change. He reorganized the overall GCBA's structure enabling the administration to thrive like never before and it started delivering high-quality results which could be continuously advertised.

One of the main conclusions I derived from this study is that the successful delivery of public services and the accurate implementation of public policies was the cause of a virtuous circle within the GCBA. Once employees witnessed the value of their contribution, they started to perform better and better. The ability of the highest ranks of the organization was to bring a revolution in HR management and in having the City's employees identify their values with those of the GCBA. Besides, the GCBA manages HR much like a private enterprise, organizing football tournaments and providing them with discounts, among other things. Working for the GCBA was now something to be proud of.

However, one cannot analyze policy without having an idea of how resources are allocated to the different areas of government. The emphasis on the drafting of the budget goes hand-in-hand with the drafting of the Operational Plan for each year. With no coverage, there is no allocation of resources; lowering possible corruption or noncompliance with deadlines.

In this section, it is stressed how important strategic planning, needs assessments and ex-ante cost-benefit analysis is for the GCBA. In particular, it focuses on those *compromisos* belonging to the 2019 Agenda, ranging from education to waste management, and how the GCBA is implementing them. It also considers important technological innovation and sustainable practices carried out by the administration. Among these, the use of SAP-connected sensors to tackle flooding, power cuts, and the reception of citizens' complaints is somewhat groundbreaking. Finally, this section explores the many M&E practices of various actors, emphasizing the importance of feedback and follow-up on government projects.

The most important aspect I have identified concerning the phase of policy design is that no policy is isolated. Every project is part of a bigger program, and they do not reach their maximum capacity if the other does not either. There is indeed a vision of the City not one, nor five, but ten years from now. The perspective has been reversed. If before the administration planned its activities starting from the present and then going forward, in recent years, the GCBA has been doing the opposite. Firstly, they envision Buenos Aires in 2030 and then they crawl back until they reach the present. As a consequence, policies are carried out only if they do happen to be long-term ones. Besides, no plan is undertaken without careful data consideration. The GCBA commissions a high quantity of statistical reports and is currently trying to implement a shared platform to reunite de data of every division under the same roof. Every strategy keen on improving someone's condition foresees complementary policies aimed at ensuring that this person – or social group – will be able to withstand future adversities autonomously. For instance, providing children with personal laptops to go to school would be highly unproductive, were teachers not to be trained to use digital supports to teach. Hence, the GCBA is focusing on empowering people through the development of human capital, so to let talents express freely and valuing their contribution to the development of Buenos Aires as a whole.

However, one cannot aim to reach Buenos Aires 2030 objectives alone. Meeting with citizens, advertising government policies, pushing hard on issues such as the environment, but most of all offering them a platform to check the statutes of the *compromisos* has led to the sharing a dream for the future. A strategy encouraged by the government but supported by citizens. As above the vision of the GBCA was supported by its employees.

The third chapter instead, starts out with the process of Modernization that led to revolutionary innovations within the city's public administration, such as the birth of electronic government and many city mobile Apps for public services. Also, this section offers an insight over the Open Government initiative born during Macri I and its spillover effects over government transparency and accountability. Open Government practices and the principle of civic participation merged into various programs (i.e. BA Elige) pushed forward by the GCBA to encourage citizens to take part in the decision-making progress and to integrate their proposals in the long-term plans.

Lastly, the chapter also contains an overview of the future challenges ahead for Buenos Aires and how the GCBA is already facing them.

What has emerged from my research is that through demanding management tools (GANTT), careful planning, rigorous control of expenditures (*austeridad*) and finally, technology (SAP HANA), the GCBA is able to shape Buenos Aires in a valid Modern City.

The focuses on infrastructure and sustainable service provision make it a city which will be soon both integrated and enjoyable. Because the GCBA's main goal is to have a city so beautiful that people will not want to stay indoors, rather they will be waiting to go outside and enjoy common public spaces to gather.

Given the preconditions of resource management, detailed long-term planning and proximity, the GCBA managed to develop the classical policy cycle model into a modern administrative tool able to foster citizens' participation. In the last ten years, the GCBA has been able to install a bimodal approach to policy design, which features both a high level of openness towards the public and highly demanding internal management standards.

In the span of three administrations, the Municipality of Buenos Aires managed to provide an added value to each phase of the policy cycle leading up to the system currently in place.

When dealing with the implementation phase, the GCBA has been able to set up a stringent set of monitoring measures over the management of activities and the provision of public services. Every functionary, employee or consultant for that matter, know what their deadlines are and that the work of others depends on theirs. Also, through the use of



technology the GCBA can collect data almost all the time, so that assessment become weekly if not daily.

The result of this interesting experiment between the GCBA and its citizens is that in Buenos Aires there is now a more active and conscious participation of citizens to issues concerning them. As well as a more informed and demanding citizen. People are encouraged to take action and be co-responsible for taking care of Buenos Aires. The GCBA has become a vector for the development of human potential.

By nudging people to act in a certain way (i.e. throwing away cigarettes in a proper can), the GCBA is managing to share with citizens its future urban utopia.

To conclude, given the institutional capacity of the GCBA and its incredibly fertile population, we can state that these transversal change within the policy cycle which opened the doors of governance to everyone, will allow for Buenos Aires to become a more sustainable, equitable, diverse, integrated and accessible city. I also believe that this type of urban development will lead to an even greater human empowerment.