Contemporary Populist Phenomena in the West

Corrado Radford Torsello
Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli
Professor Lorenzo Di Sio

June 19, 2018
Conrad.torsello13@gmail.com
Abstract

The objective of this paper is to define populism and to understand how it is changing contemporary western democracies. Different kinds of populisms have entered the scene, and this document has the purpose to identify the common denominators and differences between these “alternative” parties. This paper also analyses the political environments in which populism rises and investigates the attributes of the structures that facilitate the electoral increase. Finally, it will analyze four case studies from different countries and political systems and consider how each framed different political solutions for the problems of the respective countries. The political actors considered are Donald Trump in the U.S.A, 5 Star Movement in Italy, Front National in France and SYRIZA in Greece. All of these have different political programs, ranging from the far-right to the far-left, but nonetheless are considered populist phenomena. This paper will help explain why.
# Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 2

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5

Chapter One: CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULISM ......................................................... 7

What is Populism .................................................................................................................. 7

Anti-Pluralism ...................................................................................................................... 8

A Cross-Cutting Phenomenon ........................................................................................... 10

Leadership ........................................................................................................................... 11

The Role of the Media & Communication Styles .......................................................... 13

Illiberal Democracies ......................................................................................................... 14

Chapter Two: THE ORIGINS OF POPULISM .................................................................. 17

Catalysts and Context ......................................................................................................... 17

Theories of Populism ........................................................................................................... 17

Criticisms of the Theories .................................................................................................. 20

A General Theory of Populism .......................................................................................... 22

Chapter Three: CONTEMPORARY POPULIST ACTORS .............................................. 23

Italy: 5 Star Movement ....................................................................................................... 23

Background .......................................................................................................................... 23

Populist Features and Rhetoric .......................................................................................... 24

“Direct-Democracy” Platform Rousseau .......................................................................... 25

Political Program ................................................................................................................. 26

U.S.A.: Donald Trump ....................................................................................................... 27
Electoral Campaign 2016........................................................................................................27

Is Trump a Populist disguised as a Republican? .................................................................27

2-Party populist anomaly - Mutation of the Grand Old Party (GOP).........................29

Trump’s rhetoric and campaign promises - before and after election .......................30

France: Front National .........................................................................................................30

Background.........................................................................................................................30

Radical-right wing populism model..................................................................................31

Anti-European propaganda.................................................................................................32

Context in which it rose ......................................................................................................32

Greece: SYRIZA....................................................................................................................33

Background and history ....................................................................................................33

An Inclusive Progressive Populism .....................................................................................34

SUMMARY & CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................37

References............................................................................................................................39
INTRODUCTION

Contemporary politics in the west have been characterized by a new wave of populism. Alternative parties are challenging the existing status quo in different ways, offering different cultural and economic views that are increasingly appealing to the electorate. In some countries such as France, Hungary and the U.S these new movements bait voters with xenophobic and protectionist solutions and rhetoric. While others, such as SYRIZA in Greece and South-American parties, put forth left-wing inclusionary solutions to their issues. Even if the differences between these parties are evident, they are all labelled as populist. This paper seeks to define the common features that unite them under the “populist” label while showing that every party is different and stems from a different political context.

Different solutions have emerged in different countries from different parties. Labelling them all as populist is reductive and too simplistic to comprehend the tectonic shifts taking place around the globe. While the solutions may vary, the 2008 crisis and the political detachment from established parties and institutions, both nationally and internationally, are common features in the countries most affected by these “new” movements. The common denominators show us, that the source of populism is the same, dissatisfaction and mistrust towards existing politicians who have increasingly distanced themselves from the “people” and no longer have credibility as defenders of the common good. They have not grasped the changes that were occurring in their countries and regions or responded effectively to the needs of a working class that has been increasingly left out from the globalization process championed by established parties since the end of WWII. These factors coupled with a technological revolution that provides few opportunities for the lesser educated serve to ferment the unrest that historically has been the perfect breeding ground for populist movements. It is up to the “alternative” movements to keep presenting themselves as outsiders and agents of change to keep increasing their voters, while it is the
task of established parties to change their political discourse in a way that is appealing to citizens and addresses their needs.

The first chapter will define what populism is and outline its main features using Mudde’s definition as the foundation for the main theoretical framework. He defines populism as a discourse that contrasts the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite. The second chapter will compare different theories on what causes populism, and what are the key variables in western environments that allowed such movements to flourish and prosper while comparing them with South-American movements. The third chapter will examine four different country cases and highlight the varieties of populist manifestations in the west and how established parties are reacting to these. The case studies analysed are: The Italian 5 Star Movement, the French Front National, the Greek SYRIZA and Trumpism in the U.S.A. These case studies were chosen specifically because they are ontologically different between one another and demonstrate the differences among different populist parties.
What is Populism

What is populism? The most accredited definition is the one by Mudde: “Populism is an ideology that considers society ultimately separated in two homogenous and antagonist groups,” the pure people” Vs “the corrupt elite” and which argues politics should be an expression of the popular will. (Mudde 2017) Populism is not a full ideology such as socialism or liberalism but a thin ideology that can be filled with ideas from both the left or the right. According to Mudde it has two characteristics: It is people-centered and anti-elitist.

What are the main features of Populism? Frequently, simplistic solutions that do not require notions of macro-economics, international relations or principles of governance are proposed for complex problems such as unemployment and immigration. During the 1980’s the French populist party Front National put up posters saying, “Two million French unemployed is two million immigrants too many”. This kind of slogan infers a simple equation to a very complicated problem such as unemployment. The immediate solution is appealing to masses because it is simple and, in some way, credible (Immigrants steal your jobs and if they weren’t here French people would have those jobs). Another good example could be the 5 Star Movement proposal for a citizenship salary. The idea they would give 780 euros just for being an Italian citizen appealed especially to Southern Italy where unemployment is high. Trump’s wall, against the problem of immigration. Easy solutions are appealing to the uneducated and the losers of globalization as described by Betz and Kriesi. (Kriesi 2006).

Another attribute of populist rhetoric is to focus blame for problems on the administration that is formed by the “immoral and corrupt” elite, or on minorities who “steal our jobs and destroy our culture”. For this reason, populism doesn’t hold the same appeal for
the voters of main liberal parties as it does for those who feel abandoned by the institutions. They claim exclusive representation for the “real people” and assert that their contenders are immoral and corrupt. Through this claim populists dismiss the requirement for plurality embedded in democracy and is necessary for its good functioning. Implied is the claim that only some of the “people” are the “real people” while the others are not. After the Brexit referendum Nigel Farage proclaimed “This is a victory for the real people” ignoring the fact that 48% of British citizens voted against the UK’s exit from the EU. Typically, populist propaganda excludes significant parts of the population denying them the status of “true” or “real” people. Their moral high ground of representation is based on an arbitrary standard that distinguishes between who is moral and immoral or pure or impure, between “us” and “them” (Muller 2016). Some right-wing populists create dichotomies based on race or religion, accusing the “elite” of defending “them” instead of “us”. Other parties such as SYRIZA in Greece and the 5 Star Movement in Italy base their moral claim of by attacking the corrupt and clientelist elite. Another example could be the “V days” of Beppe Grillo, where “Vaffanculo tutti” (everybody f%ck-off) was the main slogan at rallies sending a strong message that the ruling elite should resign and so that they could represent the people. Furthermore, the claim to represent the “true” people can explain their difficulty to accuse of foul-play and accept election results when unfavorable.

After losing the 2012 election, Victor Orban protested “the nation can’t be at the opposition”. Reacting on losses in the primaries, Donald Trump accused his opponents of fraud and repeated ad infinitum “the whole system is rigged”.

Anti-Pluralism

Frequently, there is reluctance to accept responsibility for failing to capture a wider portion of the electorate than their adversaries and attempt to fault the institutions for the
outcome. The difference between a democratic and a populist representative, is that the democrat thinks that people don’t accept a political claim because they are foolable but accepts this in name of plurality and respects the peaceful passage of power. The populists often cast doubt on the legitimacy of their adversaries’ positions and authority or on the good-functioning of the system, e.g. “rigged elections”. (Muller 2016).

Another feature of populism is the attempt to show that that their leaders are men of the people “just like us” even when it does not correspond to reality as in the case of Donald Trump. By definition, leaders are un-common. One leads the many. They possess characteristics that compel others to look towards them for guidance and representation. Traditionally, leaders try to distinguish themselves from the “people” by demonstrating some extra-ordinary positive capacity. However, many populist leaders standout with aggressive rhetoric and their capacity to evoke mankind’s more base emotions such as rage and envy (Muller, 2016).

Populists don’t escape the representative process of elections by which the winner gets voted in to office. If all men were really considered to be equal, lotteries rather than elections would be used to fill posts. Elections have an “aristocratic” principle embedded and hold that some are worthier than others to govern. Some populist leaders are active participants of the elite they hate and rant against, Viktor Orban and Matteo Salvini have spent their adult lives in parliament, de facto making them members of the same governing class they criticize.

Populists try to discredit and eliminate the mediators between the electorate and its leaders. Marine Le Pen’s, Donald Trump and Beppe Grillo have created direct contact with their supporters. They initiate constant attacks against the media and other interpreters. Grillo has a personal blog from which the 5 Star Movement was born, Donald Trump has his twitter account while Front National has different alternative far right blogs that work as
satellites to transmit populist right propaganda. Direct representation then becomes a flagstone of populist parties. This also grants the leaders stricter control on party members. Power is centralized as in the case of M5S and FN, in which party leaders can expel any member of parliament who disagrees with the leader or doesn’t follow the strict party rules. Leaders in populist parties often apply double standards for different members of parliament according to how important they are for the party, think of the numerous ambiguous expulsions that happened in the 5 Star Movement.

**A Cross-Cutting Phenomenon**

There exist many different types of populism with different transversal political agendas whose spectrum ranges from “right” wing to “left” wing programs. This supports the point of view that “Populism” is a political attitude more than a real political “philosophy”. For this reason, finding a definition for all populist phenomena is very difficult. However, we can describe common features that distinguish them from other political movements. (Hawkins 2017)

First, populists make a clear distinction between us and them: “Us”, the real people, those abandoned by the institutions, and “them”, the corrupt elite that gets rich and empowered on the shoulders of the less fortunate. On this claim they find their legitimacy, the moral belief that they fight for the “true” people and that they will do anything to save them from the “bad and “corrupt” elite is the basic principle that justifies all populist acts and words (Mudde 2017). The division is a fundamental process because it puts them in a position of outsider with respect to the difficulties the nation is suffering that are caused inevitably by the existing ruling class, “the elite”. Another common characteristic to all populisms is the lack of acceptance of plurality as a fundamental feature of democracy. Through the claim that they are the only ones to represent the people, the “true” people, they
implicitly are saying that any other form of representation is a fraud or does not really count because they are immoral and don’t have the right to represent the population. The lack of plurality is not based on politics or what is the “best” way to administrate the state, but on their claim of being the only moral representatives in the state excludes everyone else from being fit for government. Nevertheless, populists even while claiming their moral exclusivity they accept the game of democracy and the mechanisms through which it functions. The question then becomes, do they accept democracy only when in opposition or even while in government? This effectively changes from actor to actor. For example, in Turkey with Racep Tayip Erdogan there has been an increasing centralization of power through various changes in the constitution. These incremental changes undermine the fundamentally democratic principle of division of power in his favor. Despite a strong anti-elitist and anti-EU electoral campaign, Greece’s prime minister Alexis Tsipras adapted to the rules and institutions Greece agreed upon once in power. It can be observed that while governing, populists act in different ways ranging from effectively being absorbed in the system and becoming new elite, to attempting the establishment of an authoritarian regime.

**Leadership**

One of the main strengths of populist rhetoric is the capability of their leaders to appear as one of the common “people”. They employ a vocabulary with words that are easy to understand and their speeches focus on arousing emotions rather than describing programs or policies. This kind of rhetoric puts leaders and electorate on the same level and creates the impression that their frustrations are understood and together the *band of brothers* will fight the injustice together. This sense of “he is one of us” make populist leaders more forgivable than the “corrupt elite”. For example, Donald Trump’s misogynist “…just grab them by the …” did not stop him from getting elected, because many accepted the explanation and also discarded the comment as “locker-room talk”. Another important feature of populist rhetoric
is its capability of getting away with lies and fake news. The amount of imprecise and unfounded information they divulgate during their electoral campaign is higher compared to other parties. Trump’s daily deceit demonstrates disregard for the truth, the 5 Star Movement’s claims on chemtrails and, Front National’s speculation on the number of immigrants that will “invade” France in the future are only a few examples of deliberately misleading the public. The more interesting point is that the electorate does not penalize their leaders for the lies and appear to be as indifferent about the deceit as they are about the rational aspects of civil discourse (Muller 2017). The strong sense of belonging to a tribe or clan makes populist leaders less targetable and more forgivable after a mistake. Given the positive results of this kind of rhetoric all over the western world, it is worth pondering whether it is the political language that is re-shaping the electorate or the electorate that is shaping the language.

Hannah Arendt distinguished between the ‘masses’ and ‘the people’ in her *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). The latter wish to see their views and wishes to make a difference; the former hate the society which they feel has marginalized and excluded them. Unless a leader emerges to direct their anger and put it to work for longer than the space of a riot, the masses are mere collocations of individuals. In the second 1958 edition of her book, she observes that the feelings of being superfluous and isolated which are characteristic of individual members of the mass, makes them ripe for harvesting by demagogues for totalitarian causes. They can be of any or all classes; the *mass* is not a class phenomenon. The key is political alienation and the disengagement from the society’s political and economic life, until circumstances make the individuals in question throw themselves into the mind of the crowd in their anger or despair. (Arendt 1958)

Italy’s Partito Democratico suffered defeat against the 5 Star Movement and Lega Nord in the national elections last March. Their analysis of the defeat concluded that the
main campaign mistake was that it was too focused on technical issues while ignoring voters’ emotions. Populists fill the gap that established parties created between them and electors through a simple lexicon and emotional discourse. This allows them a privilege that older politicians did not have, such as the liberty to give imprecise information and eliminating traditional presidential decorum. Contemporary populists manage to transform their mistakes into assets by making them more “human”, easier to empathize with, identify with and, ultimately forgive.

The Role of the Media & Communication Styles

Further, Populist style regimes antagonize the media while acting as though they were the media’s victim. They repeatedly accuse it to be an instrument for the “elite” propaganda. Trump started his attacks during the campaign and has only intensified them. This attitude towards the media aims to discredit the media’s credibility and usurp their role as impartial guardians of truth, free speech and democracy. It also has another effect, the one of impacting the mindset of the populist electorate. If their leader continuously delegitimizes the media, they will start doing it too and they will start believing that the media is only an instrument for the “corrupt” and “evil” elite to manipulate masses.

Undermining the integrity of critical press is damaging to a functioning democracy and is one of the first moves of aspiring tyrants. When the media criticizes populists on their programs or political stance, their supporters perceive it as an un-fair attack from the elite. The old slogan, many enemies much honor then reinforces a position. Paradoxically the media’s attacks on populist convince supporters that they are doing a good job and that they are frightening their enemy. In the dialogue “us” vs “them” populists tend to consider the media as adversaries.
Even if some populists lack some of the main values of liberal democracies such as pluralism, the importance of media and political forces or cosmopolitanism, they accept the political game and its mechanisms. They accept democratic elections and the system through which governments are created even if they criticize all the actors that are within it. As Schumpeter claimed in his book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, Democracy is not a set of values to which someone must adhere, such as liberalism, but a way of governance and way power is transferred, neutral from moral values (Schumpeter 1942). Adhering to the democratic mechanisms but disdaining liberal values, doesn’t mean being undemocratic, it just means being illiberal. For this reason, many scholars categorized populist movements as illiberal democratic. Branding themselves as illiberal democrats they are accepted in the democratic system even if they are not liberal. Erdogan called himself a “conservative democrat”, Orban in an ambiguous speech in 2014 talked about creating an illiberal state and during a more recent refugee crisis he said, “the era of liberal bla-bla is finished”. But it is important to keep in mind that not all those who claim to be illiberal democracies are democracies at all. If a government such as Erdogan’s prevents opposition assembly and freedom of speech, it undermines the basic and necessary features to a functioning democracy. This type of governments can’t be considered a democracy at all.

**Illiberal Democracies**

There is a fundamental difference between anti-liberalism understood as an opposing set of values to free-trade, cosmopolitanism and globalization compared to anti-liberalism as opposing the basic values of democracies, such as the separation of powers, pluralism and free press. The former is a critique to a political program, while the latter is a critique to democracy. Populists tend to adopt both, they make an embedded critique of pluralism by claiming that they are the only ones morally acceptable to represent the “people, they
constantly criticize the press as tool of the “elite” from which they adopt an opposite political stance often favoring nationalism and protectionism over cosmopolitanism and free-trade. If critiques of populism brand them as “illiberal democracies” they are strengthened. They get to keep the democratic feature that allows them to be credible to the electorate and to the institutions, while representing an alternative to liberal ideology. Leveraging the “us” Vs “them” dichotomy, they manage to become an alternative to “established” parties, ideologies and super-national alliances e.g. E.U. They accuse them of being responsible for the economic crisis, unemployment and, of being agents of unchallenged capitalism and its distributional effects. Populists can then present themselves as the last resistance and alternative in Europe of traditional values and national sovereignty against a hegemonic liberal ideology that seeks to destroy national culture. Differences must be made between illiberal democracies and states that have undertaken an authoritarian path. Viktor Orban’s Hungary and Morawiecki’s Poland can be considered illiberal democracies, because even if they are against a liberal program they respect democratic institutions. To the contrary, Erdogan for example does not. He cannot be considered a democrat at all. Illiberal democrats therefore manage to comply to the democratic rules and to become an alternative to liberalism. Liberal institutions and parties risk appearing as representatives of the winners, of the educated and of the cosmopolites leaving behind all the others thus increasing cultural tension and moral division between them and the “people”. The resulting void creates the perfect vacuum for populist idea to exploit and fill.

The anti-pluralist claim that they alone serve the interest of the people serves them in antagonizing the ruling elite, that is “far from the real problems”. Such claims to represent the popular will is also why they are so attractive to voters, because they don’t claim to represent a political ideology, but they represent the people, independently from their ideology. They represent the Americans, the Italians or, the French not an ideology or
principal. One of the main critiques liberals make is that the boundaries on which you decide who is the “people” should be decided through democratic dialogue and not on arbitrarily dictated moral ground. Those within a populist movement deny those who don’t adhere the status of “people” and if brought to an extreme also of “citizen”. It is implied in populist rhetoric that they represent the people and anyone who challenges them is often belittled and ridiculed publicly (Muller 2017). While earlier antagonists of liberalism criticized it for its emphasis on capitalism and free trade, they did not do it based on minorities’ rights.
Chapter Two: THE ORIGINS OF POPULISM

Catalysts and Context

The contemporary globalizing process opened new scenarios in the national and transnational structure. Even though institutional platforms such as the EU and UN have developed, the political arena where the main decisions and discussions are tackled remains the nation state. In this perspective the increasing mobilization of people, capital and goods between countries resulting from the denationalization of markets and borders, generated new groups of “winners” and “losers” (Kriesi 2006). The winners of the new system are qualified workers, cosmopolitan citizens and, entrepreneurs in sectors open to other countries. The losers are entrepreneurs in closed sectors of the market, unskilled/unspecialized workers and, citizens that have a strong sense of nationalism. The winners have been represented by the “establishment” parties that managed to keep a tight grip on politics until the 2008 crisis. Since then, political detachment and distrust towards the main parties has increased. The deepening division among the electorate created new political potential that has been exploited by “new” political parties that claim to represent and defend the interests of the “the people”, the losers of this process. Political arenas all over the world have been hit by emergent populist movements that manage to win the votes of millions. This second chapter will analyze some ways these “new” parties have managed to elevate themselves from simple movements or marginal parties and position themselves as major actors in the political arenas around the globe.

Theories of Populism

There are numerous theories as to how and why populist movements simultaneously emerged around the globe and why so many people are adhering to movements and following leaders that wish to destroy or transform established political systems. Most of the manifestations are nationalist and oriented towards the right. The exceptions in Europe are
Greece and Spain and their respective parties SYRIZA and Podemos are inspired by left wing south American figures such as Chavez and Morales. Despite their different political orientation, they share much discourse with their rightest counterparts. Their rhetoric and propaganda are frequently Anti-EU, anti-austerity, anti-elitist with an emphasis on national sovereignty.

Among the theories on why populism rises in certain periods, among the most persuading is the one developed by Kirk and Hawkins. They start their analysis on Durkheim’s mass society theory and on Downs’ economic approach, until they arrive to an exhausting explanation on why populist movements find more fertile ground in certain conditions. Durkheim’s mass society theory claims that society is based on solidarity between individuals arguing that certain values form a “collective consciousness” that works as a moral glue to keep individuals together. Industrialization restructured the established division of labor and how individual interact with each other. They changed from small familiar and community centered social units (i.e. family and church) to more macro ones (i.e. factories and institutions) that are less cohesive (Durkheim 2017).

During this transition society is characterized by what Durkheim calls “anomie”. Anomie is the feeling that individuals have during structural changes in the labor system where one labor structure passes to another without having influence in the transition. This process makes individuals feel powerless, under-represented and anonymous. They seek a sense of belonging and identity in groups and movements that acknowledge their disenfranchisement. Populist phenomena adopt a transversal ideology that put “the people” at the center of its rhetoric and emphasize the distance between them and the “evil” elite. They hold the elite responsible for reducing them to misery and leaving them powerless.

Charismatic leaders are fundamental in the process and are the political supply to a political demand. They give the people’s frustration a voice and a face, charismatic leaders
provide a common identity. This transition happens during periods of great change in the labor structure, Durkheim used modernization as an example.

Globalization prompted another period of change in labor structures with many left behind in the process and feeling alienated. The “new” parties, articulated their common grievances and amplified a voice that they felt could better represent their interests. Betz developed his theory based of globalization on how recent populist parties are rising to power. Globalization is encouraged by central parties, both left and right. Since the 1970’s, the mainstream political parties have proposed increasingly similar political agendas. These programs encourage globalization and are under-pinned by the liberal agenda. The globalization process left many marginalized. The “losers” of globalization are left without political representation and turn to populist parties that claim to represent them and to do their interests against the corrupt status quo and their weak undemocratic institutions, such as the EU.

Both the Betz and the Hawkins theories are based on the premise that populist parties are a response to a void in the electoral space created by a changing electorate and an unresponsive party system (Hawkins 2017). Victor Orban in an interview said established parties are leaving too little political space and few choices for citizens who don’t feel represented and resort to new leaders.

“In Western Europe, the center Right ... and the center Left have taken turns at the helm of Europe for the past 50 to 60 years. But increasingly, they have offered the same programs and thus a diminishing arena of political choice. The leaders of Europe always seem to emerge from the same elite, the same general frame of mind, the same schools, and the same institutions that rear generation after generation of politicians to this day. They take turns implementing the same policies. Now that their assurance has been called into question by [Europe’s] economic meltdown, however, an economic crisis has quickly turned into the crisis of the elite.” (Orban 2017)
Since the end of World War 2, in the aftermath of the greatest war mankind had ever seen, and a fresh memory of fascism, European countries embraced liberalism and the US as the new hegemon in the western world. Embracing liberalism and free trade increasingly diminished the political spectrum from which citizens could decide. Western governments were comprised mainly of liberal “center-right” or “center-left” political actors who implemented liberal policies and left little space for alternatives.

Other interesting factors that can explain the rise of populists in a system are the institutional frameworks they find themselves in. Proportional systems with low thresholds to get into parliament usually benefit populist and “new” parties. Majoritarian electoral systems make it harder for them to meet the higher threshold. Also, Populists tend to benefit from issues important to the electorate but not addressed by main parties, such as immigration.

While it is much harder for them to emerge when established parties have similar political positions to theirs, a good example could be the UKIP and the Conservative party in England. The UKIP pushed for Brexit but did not advance much afterwards because the Conservative party was already so right wing that it already exploited the potential on that side of the political spectrum.

Criticisms of the Theories

Both Durkheim and Betz’s work was important in defining the origin of populism and both theories have their strengths and weaknesses. Durkheim managed to focus on the emotional role that political identity plays in the life of each citizens and how these react to changing patterns in the social structure. While Downs/Betz’s argument focuses on the material concerns of citizens and how this influence their party choice. Critiques such as Mazzoleni argue that while Durkheim’s mass society theory offered a good explanation for older waves of populism it doesn’t grasp the latest developments in Europe or the United States because they are not subject to modernization (Hawkins 2017). Perhaps Mazzoleni
underestimated the huge impact on the labor force (and not only) the shock waves of globalization have had on the western world, and how these changes created anomie between individuals in a given society diverting them towards new form of political identities.

Downs’ approach is criticized for its geographical bias. While in Europe the theory regarding electoral structure holds. For example, UKIP was incapable to gain momentum in England’s "first-past-the-post" (FPTP) even after Brexit and FN in France had a breakthrough in the political scope only when they briefly changed the electoral system from majoritarian to proportional in 1986. Although the theory reflects events in Europe, it doesn’t hold true in Southern and Central America where populists won in majoritarian systems that were hostile to them. This might have been made possible by the wide spread level of corruption that citizens were exposed to daily from their representatives. Such victories indicate that electoral structures don’t matter as much when there is major support for “challenger” parties and an extremely corrupt system as in the case of Chavez and Morales.

The biggest critique, however, made about both Durkheim and Downs’ approaches is their incapacity of dealing with populist ideas. The discourse about the struggling people and the “corrupt” elite is a message that is appreciated by voters who feel the need to be represented by more “people centered” politicians. “People do not support populist forces merely because the discourse fulfils a certain social function or coincides with other ideologies” (Hawkins 2017). Many studies show that even if populists in different geographical areas have different political programs, their rhetoric against political elites is similar, from Le Pen to Tsipras, from Di Maio to Chavez. Studies also show that the success of populist actors is related to the decline of liberal democracies.
A General Theory of Populism

A more general theory is the one adopted by Kirk and Hawkins that acknowledges that populism is presented as a certain type of ideas. Even if they are broadly shared they are not like traditional ideologies, and for this reason they coexist together. Populism is a set of attitudes, more a style of political discourse than a list of political issues. Kirk and Hawkins hold that populism must be activated by certain events, material conditions and linguistic cues present in a country.

What are the conditions that activate populism? Populists affirm that the people have been frauded by the “corrupt elite”, this means that they activate when policy failures can be traced back to structural malfunctions in traditional politics. There are various degrees to which populism can activate, with different results depending on the political and moral structures. There seems to be a direct correlation between the perception of corruption in traditional governments and the populist reaction. For example, there was a stronger reaction in South-America than in Europe. In Europe, political elites collude or omit issues from the agenda but activate populist parties that have less power than their south American counterparts.

Populism then requires a suitable environment it can rise from, but is that enough? The average citizen often doesn’t understand why crisis happen or which politicians are corrupt. Conflicting new sources make it hard to interpret the political sphere and all its implications. Charismatic leaders have a fundamental function at this stage, they design a framework for the people to interpret, they create a dichotomy between the people and the “elite” and propose an alternative structure to the existing one, an alternative easier to understand. An ideational theory of populism gives a general picture of how it rises because it acknowledges all the differences we can find in different populist actors without ever losing the fil rouge that connects them all.
Chapter Three: CONTEMPORARY POPULIST ACTORS

New manifestations of populism have entered traditional politics all over the western block and are a true menace to existing national and international institutional structures and alliances. This chapter analyses four countries where the phenomenon has been strong and looks at the existing conditions that allowed such a rise. Italy, USA, France and, Greece were provided cases to interpret different, if not opposite political programs that were characterized by a common rhetoric.

Italy: 5 Star Movement

Background

In 2009, a new party called MoVimento Cinque Stelle (5 Star Movement or M5S) entered the Italian political arena. The party was founded by comedian Beppe Grillo and entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio. The movement started in 2005 when the popular comedian proposed meetups all over Italy to discuss about local and national politics on his blog. The meetups gained momentum and supporters started communicating with local civic lists that supported direct democracy. Beppe Grillo’s influence increased over time and on the 24th of June 2008 he organized his first “Vaffanculo Day” (fuck off day) with the objective of presenting to the parliament a law of popular initiative that would stop convicts from being elected in parliament and a max of two legislatures for each parliamentarian. The initiative gathered more than 300,000 signatures, much more than the 50,000 needed to propose a popular initiative law to the parliament. On the wave of the success obtained in 2008 he organized his 2nd “V day” and obtained a huge success from it. Grillo continued working on local politics and kept bringing people together under the name “Friends of Beppe Grillo” until 2009. At that time, he met Gianroberto Casaleggio and on September 9, 2009, Grillo and Casaleggio
announced the birth of the 5 Star Movement political party. From 2009 to 2012 the party participated in numerous local and regional elections obtaining important victories both regionally and locally. They managed to get 14.9% of votes in Sicily and mayors in cities such as Parma. For the first time 2013, the 5 Star Movement participated in national elections. They decided the parliamentary lists through an online platform called Rousseau and were criticized by other parties regarding the transparency of the algorithms of the online system and the fact that Casaleggio Associati S.R.L (a private company of one of the two founders of the “movement”) was managing it. In their first national election they won 25.5% of votes in the House of Representatives and 23.7% of votes in the Senate. Luigi Di Maio, now a leader of the Movement, was 26 years old and the youngest MP ever to be elected Vice President of the House. In the European elections of 2014 they won 21.15% of votes and entered the parliamentary group with Nigel Farage in what would be the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) (Biorgio 2017). By 2018 the 5 Star Movement won the municipal elections in Turin, Rome and regional elections in Sicily. In the national elections of 2018, the 5 Star Movement won 32% of votes and became Italy’s number one party. At the time of this writing their leader Luigi Di Maio is trying to form a government with the other Italian populist leader Matteo Salvini who leads the Northern League. In only 9 years from their foundation and 5 years from their first national election they established themselves as the largest single party in Italy and managed to put mayors in major cities throughout the country.

**Populist Features and Rhetoric**

Is the 5 Star Movement a populist party? Seen through the lens of Mudde’s theory, yes they are. Their rhetoric and their success have been based on their capacity to create a clear distinction between the “Italian people” and the corrupt caste (the Italian Elite) (Biorgio 2017). Through aggressive rhetoric, 5 Star MP’s have antagonized the existing political class,
elevating themselves as the only moral rampart of the Republic. Their typical rhetoric can be exemplified by an attack that the MP Di Battista launched on the former prime minister Matteo Renzi: “I spent the last week in Taranto without security, listening to the problems of the people and trying to find real solutions, while you and your people Mr. Prime Minister closed yourselves in your rooms and decided the interests of the banks and of the European Union. You are distant from the people, you don’t know the people anymore” (Di Battista 2016). Through this kind of interventions, it is evident how the 5 Star MPs try to identify themselves as the “people” or as their heroes while emphasizing the distance between the ruling elite from the citizens.

“Direct-Democracy” Platform Rousseau

Direct democracy and their rallies in the piazzas are the main tools through which the 5 Star Movement got closer to the citizens. The Movement was one of the first parties in Europe to use the internet as a platform for what they call “direct democracy”. They launched the platform in 2016, and through its members of the party can vote for their representatives, discuss legislation and, organize meetups. Citizens feel involved through Rousseau and have a feeling that they can make their voice heard (Biorcio 2017).

The platform has received criticism. First it is managed entirely by “Casaleggio Associati”, a private marketing firm owned by Davide Casaleggio, son of Gianroberto Casaleggio, founder of the movement that died shortly after the launch of Rousseau. Legally, Davide is the only president, treasurer and administrator of the digital platform even if nobody voted him in. He has received more than 500,000 euros in donations from the 5 Star Members but is not obliged to account for how the funds are spent. The opposition parties claim that Rousseau is undemocratic, opaque with how they spend the money and vulnerable to hacker attacks.
The other method they use to get to the “people” is through mass rallies all over Italy that are streamed on their Facebook pages thus generating exponential exposure to their messaging. Their ability to be constant presently on social networks, particularly Facebook, enabled them to reach a big portion of the electorate that gets news almost exclusively through this platform and generating an echo-chamber that actively engages an increasingly broader network of Italians. A recent video of the political leader Luigi Di Maio, where he attacks the Italian president of the republic, had 6,000,000 views and was present on 12,000,000 Italian homepages.

**Political Program**

In conclusion, the answer the initial question, “Is the 5 Star Movement populist?”, is affirmative. Mudde’s definition perfectly fits the 5 Star Movement by antagonizing the established parties and claiming to represent the Italian People. But, what is their political program? Can it be considered left or right wing? The leaders of the party claim to have overcome the right-left wing dichotomy and claim they spearhead a new breed of politics where policies of both spheres must be used to ensure the interest of the Italian people. Their program proposes policies such as basic income for all Italian citizens, a policy normally considered leftist. However, at the same time they are euro-sceptics and have a tough stand on immigration, both positions that are traditionally rightist. Their ability to be so transversal is their greatest strength and has enabled them to gather voters from the right and disillusioned voters from the left. Because of Italy’s prolonged negative economic situation, their populist rhetoric has proven to be a great weapon against other parties. Their strategy was so effective that in the March 2018 elections defined them as the country’s first party in Italy with 32%.
Electoral Campaign 2016

Possibly the most important populist actor we could consider in contemporary history is Donald Trump. He won the American presidency against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections. The United States’ hegemony in the West has been unchallenged since the end of WWII. Through consensus and coercion, as Gramsci’s theory would explain, they created institutions that allowed the U.S.A. to remain dominant in international institutions such as N.A.T.O, the U.N, the World Bank and the IMF. Trump’s election has great repercussions all over the globe, because during his electoral campaign he talked about defunding the same institutions that solidified the U.S.A.’s role as protagonist. Trump presented himself as anti-elitist working man’s billionaire nationally and a peer and friendly pal internationally.

Trumps attacks on the existing American political class has been vicious for years. He cast doubt on Obama’s U.S. birth regularly engages in bully-like name calling his opponents and critics i.e. Crooked Hilary and this last week called the ex-FBI director James Comey “scum”. He declared that he would defund the U.N. in his acceptance speech at the Republican national convention: “The most important difference between our plan and that of our opponents, is that our plan will put America First. Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo. As long as we are led by politicians who will not put America First, then we can be assured that other nations will not treat America with respect. This will all change in 2017. The American People will come first once again.” (Trump 2016)

Is Trump a Populist disguised as a Republican?

Can Trump be considered a populist? Friedman and Mudde after analyzing Trump’s 2016 electoral campaign think that he started as a non-populist and then evolved into one during the campaign. Initially in his electoral campaign Trump had only one of the two elements that characterize populism, the aggressive rhetoric against the corrupt elite by
“draining the swamp”, while he was missing on the claim “to represent the popular will” (Mudde 2017). If we analyze Trump’s early speeches, he presented himself as the only one capable of solving the American people’s problems, and not as vehicle of the popular will. Over time his speeches became increasingly more populist. Friedman considers the turning point towards populism, his speech at the National Republican convention where he claimed to be the “only one capable of fixing the broken system in Washington while promising to serve the forgotten men and women of the country.” By Inauguration Day, the process towards populism was complete: “January 20th 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again”. In his presidential candidate announcement speech, Trump used versions of the word “I” 256 times. In his inaugural address, he used those words 3 times. (Friedman 2017).

Trump’s rhetoric changed drastically, from selling himself as the only one capable of saving the nation to selling “himself as vehicle of the people”. He created affinity with the disgruntled and then leveraged and amplified discontent. He unequivocally placed the whole blame on previous presidential administrations ignoring the legislative majority held by his own party. On every occasion, he created nostalgia for another time when unskilled labor did not have to compete globally. This new way of engaging with the electorate enabled his supporters to feel part of something bigger than Trump, to feel part of a change in American politics where the abandoned people of American society were at the center and not at margins of society. How did a millionaire such as Donald Trump manage to empathize with the “people” even if he was from a completely different social class? Mudde says: “He doesn’t argue, ‘I am as rich as you.’ What he argues is, ‘I have the same values as you. I’m also part of the pure people.’” (Mudde 2017). His capacity to sell in himself as the savior of lost “American values” and the only one capable of “making America great again” is where his leadership finds claims to legitimacy. Any critique to his work is presented as an attempt
of the “corrupt elite” to discredit him. Although he continuously attacks the media and the institutions as tools used by the established ruling class to demean him, many scholars such as Mudde were convinced, that once in office he would moderate his rhetoric and radical positions (Mudde 2017). After more than a year and a half in office we see that this is not the case and that Trump addresses almost everything negative that happens to his administration, such as the Muller investigation, as a witch-hunt and an unfair attack to his presidency by the “corrupt elite”.

2-Party populist anomaly - Mutation of the Grand Old Party (GOP)

The anomaly of Donald Trump that makes him hard to compare with other successful radical-right wing populist phenomena in the west is the U.S.A.’s two party structure. As we noticed earlier with Down’s economic theory, contemporary populist parties in western democracies are more successful in proportional systems than in majoritarian ones. While in South-America populists won any institutional framework, in Europe majoritarian systems, such as England, managed to limit the populist phenomena. Interestingly, in the United States in 2016 two of the three main runners were considered populist (Trump and Sanders). What are the structural conditions that enable such actors to have such an influence in the American political framework? The 2008 recession was one of the main factors to undermine the established system’s legitimacy and accelerated exaggerated inequality between the upper and lower income levels of society. This in turn created political potential for new ideas and actors to propose appealing alternatives to the “people” of the United States. Trump managed to exploit the anger of the working class through aggressive rhetoric, connecting with the rage of the people and presenting himself as the only one capable of bringing the popular will to the White House even if he did not have any public administration or political experience.
Trump’s rhetoric and campaign promises - before and after election

The global effects of Trump’s presidency have yet to be seen and being an unprecedented event in history it is hard to predict its consequences. Some of the policies Trump proposed during his electoral campaign have been blocked by congress and the courts both at the federal and state levels. The travel bans and the repeal of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) are examples. Others such as the intention to defund many of the United Nations programs, leave the Paris and Iran treaties and put up trade tariffs on its allies have been successfully enacted. How much of the national and international establishment will Trump deconstruct and disrupt in the medium-term is yet to be seen. His powers are more than enough to destabilize the system, given that he has a majority in both houses of Congress through the 2018 mid-term elections in November. It seems unlikely at this point that his fellow Republicans and other major actors will manage to tame his unpredictable character. Will his political opponents be able to create a credible political framework, appealing to the lower classes that feel abandoned from the representatives and the elites, without dismissing these as “populist” or “ignorant”? Will there be a “new” political class capable to adapt to the changing necessities of the American citizens without betraying historical American values such as tolerance and integration?

France: Front National

Background

Front National (FN) is without doubt the most emblematic radical-right wing populist party in contemporary Europe. The FN was officially founded on October 5, 1972 by the union of small movements of the extreme right. The party remained marginal in the first elections in which it participated through the early 80’s when the French working class was hit by a crisis and the suburbs saw an exponential increase in the influx of immigrants. The first significant victory for the party came in 1984, when they managed to win 10,4% at the
European elections. FN kept growing under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen at the expense of the traditional parties such as the Socialist and CDF. In 2002 FN scored a major success with 16.9% at the general elections and entered the second turn. Radical declarations from Jean-Marie Le Pen such as those negating the holocaust and speeches about making Algeria a French colony again made the consensus for the party decline to the worst results since 1972 (4.3% at 2007 national elections). The negative results imposed a change in leadership and Marine Le Pen, daughter of Jean-Marie, was voted in as the new leader. She decided to adopt far less radical positions than her father and abandoned the anti-Semitic and fascist rhetoric while challenging anyone who called her an extremist. Furthermore, while moderating the party, making it more credible to the electorate, Le Pen shaped the new political dichotomy. In an interview she said: “The division is not between right and left anymore, but between globalist and patriots”. She embraced the role of nationalist-populist and through a nostalgic rhetoric she aimed to form tougher immigration policy and a return to national sovereignty. Through her charisma she managed to create a direct relationship with the working class and propose herself as the only alternative capable of understanding the necessities of workers abandoned by the traditional parties. This kind of rhetoric granted her a place in the second turn in the general elections.

**Radical-right wing populism model**

Front National was one of the first far-right parties to use a populist rhetoric in Europe. Jean-Marie first and Marine later used immigration issues to their advantage. During the rise of immigration in France in the 1980’s, the central parties ignored the issue while FN brought it to the center of its political propaganda. Adopting an “Ethno-nationalist” message, Le Pen, managed to create in the mind of the voters, a division between the “real” France on one hand and a “legal” one, with its institutions, on the other (Rydgren 2007). The latter has been framed as a negation of the “real” France and as the cause of degeneration. For them,
the rights of an individual are secondary and subordinate to those of the nation. The “people” must maintain purity. For this reason, they are avid supporters of the jus sanguinis law that permits only people with French parents to obtain citizenship. They are against “automatic” naturalization of foreigners. The concept of “purity” of the French citizens one of the main pillars of their “propaganda”. For Front National the French culture must be defended from the political, economic and cultural openness that liberalism has imposed. They propose a system of welfare only for French citizens, asking for “national-preference” in the labor and the housing market for ethnic French citizens while discriminating against immigrants and non-ethnic French citizens (Rydgren 2007). “The French first” has been the historical party slogan and on which the Le Pen family based all its political strategy.

**Anti-European propaganda**

The FN is also against the European Institution, seen as a “super-national” monster that is eroding French culture, through its liberal framework, and through the erosion of national sovereignty. As Marine Le Pen said during her presidential debate with Emanuel Macron in 2017: "I'm a European. I want to save Europe from the EU, which is killing it." (Le Pen 2017) The Front National wants to offer an alternative to traditional parties and their concept of Europe and of national sovereignty. Leveraging unemployment and immigration, Le Pen appeals to the fear of workers losing their jobs and their national identity. She proposes a different kind of France, one free from the globalist “corrupt” elite that poses the “people”, the “pure” French people, at the center of the political debate. While immigrants are depicted as parasites of the welfare system and criminals, that steal jobs from the French.

**Context in which it rose**

With the end of political loyalty to parties in the early 1980’s, through ferocious attacks on the elite and by concentrating on the issues of the “people”, Le Pen managed to create a breakthrough in French politics. But was it primarily those attacks that allowed him
to win? While today France has a majoritarian electoral system, in 1984 there has been a brief change to a proportional system. As set forth with Down’s theory, it is easier for populist, and outsider parties in general, to flourish in proportional systems. The breakthrough happened under the latter, but FN was skilled in maintaining consensus over time. FN was the only serious alternative to the established parties until the arrival of En Marche. The fact that, right wing populism, was rooted in French politics for so much time, obtaining continuously notable electoral results since the 1980’s, implies that social tension and dissatisfaction in the country have been high for some time. It shouldn’t be reassuring that when the FN manages to arrive to the second turn, the other parties unite against it. France is a country with a long history of strong nationalism and certain sentiments such as xenophobia and protectionism are latent. This is the second economy in the EU and a change towards a far-right anti-EU government is possible, what would happen if the country that lived with the values of “libertè, égalitè, fraternitè!” started negating those rights to all “non-pure” French people?

Greece: SYRIZA

Background and history

SYRIZA is one of only two left-wing populist parties in Europe which differentiates it from the other cases covered. Although it adheres to Mudde’s definition and divides the political “spectrum” in two different blocks, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, it offers a different approach as compared to its right-wing counterparts. Inspired by South-American populism, it divides the political spectrum in the “corrupt elite” and the “people”, but espouses the progressive views and values that characterize left-wing parties.

What is the context that facilitated the rise of Greek populism? Greece is no stranger to populism after having lived under a dictatorship for 7 years (1967-1974). Populist phenomena of every kind have sprouted in the political spectrum. By the early 1980’s the
scene was dominated by PASOK. The party advocated for the non-privileged demanding more social justice, popular sovereignty and independence from the E.U. The party managed to hold a tight grip on politics until the 90’s when the leader Papandreou decided to change the party’s direction and adopt anti-populist positions. The party embraced neo-liberal values and changed its rhetoric coinciding with the economic crisis that was hitting the country. This political vacuum was filled by the right-wing populist party LAOS, but the situation changed in the early years of this millennium. The following years were characterized by economic austerity and continuous demands from the international institutions including the ECB, IMF and, EU to dismantle Greece’s social system. These factors when compounded by the 2008 global financial crisis resulted in eroded consensus of the parties that should have implemented the austerity policies. PASOK, the leader of the political scene passed from 43% in 2009 to 12.28% in 2012 (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).

In this scenario SYRIZA, a radical left party was emerging. The party was led by the young charismatic Alexander Tsipras who managed to mobilize all those voters who did not trust the political elite and had betrayed the “people” by implementing austerity measures that had brought the country to its knees. Many were marginalized and felt excluded from the political process perceived it as the only opportunity for survival. The party managed to pass from 4.6% in 2009 to 26.89% in 2012 enabling them to form a government.

**An Inclusive Progressive Populism**

SYRIZA is a rarity in contemporary European politics, and it is fundamental to understand why. While it maintains the populist dichotomy between the “corrupt” elite and the “pure” people it offers completely different solutions than the other case studies we analysed. “Victory for the left, victory for the people”, “Do not corrupt the mandate of the people” are only some of SYRIZA’s slogans. Even if Tsipras centralizes the role of the “people” to be considered a populist he must antagonize it against the established governing
force. The main electoral slogan in the 2012 elections was: “They decided without us, we’re moving on without them”. This slogan, along with other similar ones aimed to capture popular sentiments of frustration and anger against the harsh austerity measures; (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) At the same time it offers a “new” alternative to believe in. Another slogan was “It is us or them: together we can overthrow them”. Through this kind of rhetoric, Tsipras actively called the people to action and managed to unite its political enemies in one big block, “them”. SYRIZA then can definitely be considered populist according to Mudde, it antagonizes the existing corrupt “elite” in favour of the abandoned “people”. But who are the “people” that Tsipras is appealing to? In his words:

“every democratic citizen. All those that until 2009 have been fighting and voting for PASOK. [...] the common conservative voter that gasps under the Memorandum. [...] We are [also] addressing the leftists and the communists [...] Only the establishment [...] is profiting from the divisions in the Left, not our people [...] Finally, we are addressing the men and the women, the youth, all those that cannot make up their mind, that are still puzzled over their vote, those who believe that the elections have nothing to do with them, and we say: Do not let the others speak in your place”. (Tsipras 2012)

Tsipras response to this query was a clear call to action for anyone that had been hit by austerity measures or in any way by the crisis. They succeed homogenizing the “people” in a unifying process, by adopting inclusive positions that put all the different people in a same reactionary movement towards a common cause.

Unlike Trump and the Front National, SYRIZA adopts an inclusive policy stance, promoting integration and equal-rights for immigrants and LGBTQ rights. Instead of iterating the old divide and conquer strategy defining the people in an exclusionary way, Tsipras moved towards radical inclusion appealing to people of every race and sexual orientation. For
this reason, SYRIZA refuses the label of populist. It doesn’t want to be compared to the extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Here is another main difference with its counterparts, both FN and 5 Star Movement embrace the label, even if the latter is not an extreme right-wing party.

Greece offers a different model of populism, an inclusive alternative to the exclusionary model proposed by the far-right wing parties all over Europe. The latter is becoming the common and accepted view of the “new” parties, and leftist-populist parties in Greece and Spain show the world that there is a third way between established, main stream parties and xenophobic alternatives. This new model based on political types such as Chavez and Morales, fights the establishment and seeks to change the known structure for a more inclusive and socially fair system.

The case studies indicate how different types of populisms have risen from different political contexts. It is important to have the analytical tools to understand these differences. Even between right-wing populists there are major differences. For example Trump and Le Pen have the same right-wing cultural and social views but have a completely different perspectives on economics. Trump advocates for less governmental intervention, deregulation and lower taxes to fuel investment. Contrarily, Le Pen promotes a stronger social system for the French working class. SYRIZA unlike the other mentioned political actors, promotes inclusiveness and a stronger social system, both for immigrants and Greeks, regarding itself as a progressive rather than a populist force.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

The political range of populist forces is wide and stems from the extreme left to the extreme right, with many differences in between. Mudde’s definition of populism is enough to tie these parties in one big bundle but doesn’t grasp the differences we find between them. These forces are increasing at the polls all over the western block. The complexity resulting from globalization is proving more than many voters can ponder and more than liberal democracies can manage. The wave of populist manifestations is proving to be the only alternative to the ruling class. They are able to articulate simple slogans and solutions that appeal to voters that don’t understand nor have an appetite for complex political structures or political and economic theories. Victor Orban in Hungary, the 5 Star Movement and the Lega Nord in Italy, Trump in the USA, FPO in Austria, Le Pen in France, SYRIZA in Greece and, Morawiecki in Poland are only some of the populist forces gaining legitimacy and electorate.

This paper analyses Italy, France, Greece and the U.S.A. because each of them has a different background and proposes different political solutions. This means that even if they are different, the source of their success is the same. Each of them offers an alternative to the established political reality. Central and liberal parties have lost credibility and seem to be paralyzed as these new social forces conquer the scene.

Can the traditional parties manage to counter-attack? Are the benefits of liberal democracies still worth defending or is the threat even widely perceived? This depends on their capacity to change their rhetoric and to appeal to the emotions of the people and not only to their reason. It is important that they restructure their way of communicating and of empathizing with the people, concentrating more on their needs and less on technical issues. An entire class of politicians needs to wake from the state of collective denial and stop dismissing the alternative forces as populist and incompetent. A strong dose of humility is needed to understand what necessities they have been ignoring. National and international
systems are undergoing seismic like shocks and if main-stream parties don’t want to see everything built since the end of WW2 dismantled, they must do some critical reflection, clean house, change their political discourse and their attitude towards alternative parties and globalization in general. The attitude towards international institutions and free-trade must change too, if they don’t want to see the smouldering rage of the left-outs of the globalizing process incinerate the positive fruits of modern liberal democracies.
References


Durkheim, E. (1897) *Suicide*. Roma: BUR


Friedman, U. (2017) *What is a populist. And is Trump one?* Washington: The Atlantic


Le Pen (2017) Addresses her rival to the presidency Emanuel Macron during a debate.


