

LUISS



Department of
Political Science

Chair of Political Science

The “business turn” of organized crime: the case of Italian criminal organizations

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Academic Year 2018/2019

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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of organized crime on the Italian ground is considered to be the legacy of a long-lasting history of territorial fragmentation, which, even formally concluded at the end of *Risorgimento* with the Unification of Italy in 1861, has brought about a deep divergence between the North and the South of Italy for political, socio-economic concerns. Evidence is provided by the study conducted by Robert Putnam on the birth, functioning and the evolution of Italian regional institutions officially founded in 1970, which has demonstrated how a physical division of political communities has contributed to shape contrasting intersubjective perspectives and sets of behavior within the Italian society. In the 14th century, Renaissance was flourishing in the North of Italy where the primordial embryo of self-government was established and the most prominent figures were prone to concede political equality aimed at building a community based on the Machiavellian notion of “civic virtue” (Putnam, 1993). Associationism became the key element for the society to function properly and people understood the importance of working together in order to achieve mutual results, thereupon transmitting this awareness to the newcomers. Meanwhile, in the South the landowners were concerned at maintaining a pyramidal structure of the society via vertical and hierarchical relations, reluctant to share their power. As a result, the complex social architecture built upon interpersonal relations, customs and culture went far from being unique, homogeneous and universally equal throughout the whole Italian soil, as much as the political institutions established to govern and direct the life of citizens. To this purpose, the application of the model of political systems proposed by David Easton to the Italian case is functional to understand how differently structured is the interaction between governors and governed according to the macro-region considered (Easton, 1967). Hence, following the conclusion made by Putnam in his book *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, where civil society has successfully consolidated, the system is supposed to function efficiently because of the convergence between the demand of the governed, and the supply provided by the institutions. In a different scenario, the public sphere does not consider the government as the most efficient supplier of services, protection and security, such that another entity, which is not legitimated but required, enters the system instead, also known under the name of Mafia (Gambetta, 1996). Thus, Mafia established as a parallel supplier to the needs of the population and the higher the demand, the higher the supply and the power acquired. In the South, the use of violence became instrumental to empower the organized crime and strengthen social control, from extortions, the earliest and primal source of wealth of Mafia organizations, to the murder of members of opposed clans during a *faida* to claim the absolute authority on a territory. At the same time, the presence of

an entity deliberately using violence has increasingly threatened the “monopoly of the use of violence”, in Weberian words, recognized to the state as such (Weber, 1919). As a matter of fact, Max Weber identifies legitimate violence as the first and foremost peculiar mean of the state. In view of this, the intrinsic relationship identified is essential to understand how the power is allocated within a political community and why, since it is the prospect of the Hobbesian “state of nature” that is to be avoided by legitimating only one higher authority to exercise this power. As a consequence, the force used by the state is not deliberate but legally authorized by the governed. Conversely, as mentioned before, the use of force performed by Mafia is illegal because it lacks formal legitimacy by the population. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice that while missing the legal connotation to operate, Mafia organizations advance because of the wide, tacit public consensus, meaning the acknowledgment of a large spectrum of people to the use of “hard-way” methods of organized crime instead of relying on who is truly and legally appointed to provide the supply to the public demand. To this extent, Mafia represents the ultimate political racketeer in comparison with the state for the extraction of resources, the use of violence and the provision of services at a price.

However, this is not all Mafia is. In fact, it perfectly suits the economic profile of a Big Business as well, so much so that experts sometimes use the word “Mafia S.p.a.” by referring to a joint-stock company, in relation to the business turn and progressive economic colonization put into effect (Tilly et al. 1985; Calderoni, 2014). It is the case that, the phenomenon of Italian Criminal organizations is no longer circumscribed to the territory where they are rooted in, but it has gradually followed a logic path of expansion throughout non-traditional areas with the foundation of subsidiary branches. This dissertation will develop on the basis of these assumptions, focusing on the nexus between mafia industrialization and the related mobility towards non-original areas, for the economic side, in the field of the mafia, is often overlooked compared to the counterpart of protection racket and the exercise of violence.

It is to underline that, the process of territorial occupation of virgin areas was not aimed at exporting the old-fashioned *modus operandi*, rather at re-structuring what was, and still is, the traditional idea of Mafia of Southern regions into a more sophisticated, expert and, in a way more civilized profit-oriented entity in the North. By observing the phenomenon, it emerges that the progressive professionalization does not reflect a mere policy of adaptation to a new environment, but it is strictly instrumental to economic purposes, meaning to the accumulation of capital, expansion and management of the resources extracted (Scognamiglio, 2015). Following this reasoning, it can be assumed that the process of transplantation was necessary to criminal organizations to survive. To make profit and grow, the capital accumulated had to be reinvested and then allocated, but first it needed to be “cleaned” and translated into legal proceeds through the so-called “money laundering”.

Hence, the industrial poles in Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto became the target for a successful Mafia proliferation because, notwithstanding the solid civic education and a full estrangement and denial of the reality of organized crime, the capitalist facet of the Northern culture remains the strongest variable to consider, which at times aligned the interests of legal businesses with those of criminal subjects. As a matter of fact, the industrialization of Mafia has been built through the gradual construction of a capillary network of a number of *uomini-cerniera* also known under the name of *colletti bianchi* who put their expertise at the service of criminal organizations for extra-profit. The research proceeds as follows. In the first chapter I will describe the dynamics driving the Mafia penetration of 'Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra in the territories of Northern Italy, identified as strangers to the mafia phenomenon.

In the second chapter, I will draw on the literature on Mafia movement to study a theoretical model describing a specific pattern of behavior; in particular I will focus on professor Campana's theory of "functional diversification".

In the third chapter, I will analyze a set of data related to the assets seized from Mafia organizations on a national scale in light of the thesis this dissertation aims to support, that is the reconfiguration of organized crime in a purely economic key in relation to their arrival in new territories.

HISTORICAL DIGRESSION OF MAFIA COLONIZATION OF NORTHERN TERRITORIES

1.1 Introduction


In this chapter, I will chronologically map the mafia infiltration into non-traditional areas, proceeding from the first official settlement to the present days, with a major focus on criminal organizations from Calabria and Sicilia. Along with the entrepreneurial evolution of 'Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra, I will report the legislative and legal progress as well, considering legislative acts, processes and "blitzes", meaning those anti-mafia provisions taken by the legal counterpart, the state, to tackle with the economic side of the Mafia phenomenon. The historical excursus I am going to expose will be the point of departure of my research, with the purpose to draw on the Italian case to design a paradigm of generalized patterns of behavior.

1.2 Landing in the North

The colonization of Northern Italy officially began during the 50's when, among the thousands of peasants migrating to industrialized regions because of the failure of the agrarian reform applied in 1950, there were the heads of Cosa Nostra, the Sicilian mafia, and 'Ndrangheta from Calabria. It dates back to 1954 when Giacomo Zagari, established first at Galliate Lombardo (VA) and then at Buguggiate (VA), setting the seeds for the inevitable landing of 'Ndrangheta (Branchi and Venturini, 2017). Shortly after the birth of his son Antonio, who further on will repent the criminal activities committed to become a justice collaborator, Giacomo moved all his family to the North. There, he started to weave a web of contacts with his fellow-migrants, arrived in Lombardy for the economic boom, which consolidated with the coming of 'Ndrangheta summits to the North due to the law 1423/1956 on forced resettlement (*soggiorno obbligato*) towards potentially dangerous people (*persone pericolose per la sicurezza e la pubblica moralità*) (Dalla Chiesa 2017; Perrotta, 2004). At that time, Mafiosi could not be the specific target of a judiciary indictment since neither Mafia nor the act of being part of a Mafia association was legislatively considered as criminal offence, with the direct consequence that Mafia did not exist for the rule of law yet. Hence, during those years the only instrument that could be used to contrast organized crime was to attack Mafiosi for the single infractions made. Two years later in 1958, Joe Adonis pioneered Lombardy while importing the criminal parasitism of Cosa Nostra. His real name of baptism was Giuseppe Doto, son of a humble

family moved to New York to seek their fortune when the child was only five months old. Then Giuseppe grew up “*bello come un Adone*”, such that he acquired the appellative of “Joe Adonis”, with which he will be recognized for the rest of his life, and he was educated in the name of legality (Portanova, Rossi and Stefanoni, 2011). He started to work first as a shoeshine and then as a bookmaker, unaware of what Mafia was. Then, he entered the world of illicit bets and in few years climbed the criminal hierarchy of Cosa Nostra in the United States of America, primary tightening a relationship of deep trust with the powerful boss Frank Costello, and subsequently with Lucky Luciano, Al Capone, Vito Genovese and Albert Anastasia. In 1954, he was indicted by US authorities and expelled from the new continent, consequently forced to repatriate in 1956. Once in Italy, Joe met his fellow business-partner Lucky Luciano to discuss about how to reproduce the business model of organized crime successfully developed in America. The summit held in Palermo in 1957 between Cosa Nostra bosses, from the US and Italy as well, was decisive to determine a strategy for the economic colonization of Northern Italy, which Joe Adonis would have managed and supervised starting from 1958. Hence, Adonis settled in Milan, charged to run the whole international drug trafficking and gem smuggling recently opened, which made the industrial capital city the main conjunction for the illicit trade (Portanova, Rossi and Stefanoni, 2011). For what concerns ‘Ndrangheta, Zagari started his new domination from the origins, meaning through the construction of a reputation that should have preceded him. He had a clear business-growth plan in mind which, if followed, would have made ‘Ndrangheta one of the biggest Business in Italy and worldwide. He began with extortions, the field he was considered to master the most because of his extraordinary cunning and shrewdness. Zagari used to pretend to be a powerful person who was in the position to safeguard the interests of the extorted people and help them with the extortionists, while in the meantime he was the principal ordering the blackmail. Thus, he was recognized by the victims as a mediator, without even imagining that he was the same to extract their own resources (Ciconte, 2000). It is to be said that even though the analysis conducted on the Mafia infiltration into the legal economy is focused on the region of Lombardy -because of the particular fruitfulness of the territory on which large advantage was taken by the concerning criminal organizations- the presence of the latter extends over a broader area of influence. Actually, ‘Ndrangheta alone is active in an intense re-investment and money-laundering dynamic in Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Toscana through a complex pattern of frontmen (*prestanomi*), meaning subjects to whom a certain company is legally registered, while leaving the entire management and profit to criminal bosses. Yet, a major presence has been achieved by the Mafia Calabrese in the regions of Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Umbria and Lombardy, the main core of ‘Ndrangheta network hosting 25 *locali*.

Figure 1. ‘Ndrangheta presence in Lombardy



Source: *Il Rapporto Mafia e Impresa: Il caso della 'Ndrangheta nell'economia Lombarda*, 2017, pp. 7

A *locale* is a criminal group composed by 25 members and directed by a head and a vice together with an accountant managing the common fund called “Bacilletta”. Every *locale*, or detached *ndrina*, is strictly related to a city in Calabria acting as the headquarters, and so submitting its subsidiary branch to the major orders (Branchi and Venturini 2017). In 1962, in Bollate (MI) one of the first *locali* was founded, affiliated to the criminal groups from the cities of Guardavalle (CZ) and Rosarno in Calabria (RC) (Branchi and Venturini 2017; Dalla Chiesa, 2014).

1.3 Institution of Forced Resettlement

In 1965 the Italian legislation made the decisive step in the field of the *soggiorno obbligato*, unconsciously speeding up the prospect of criminal economic colonization of the North. The law 575/1965 was intended to extend the applicability of the personal prevention measures provided for by law 1423/1956 to the subjects specifically suspected of belonging to mafia associations. The purpose was to damage their prestige and to sever the relationship of sovereignty with the territory of belonging, such that, out of the criminal network, the Mafioso would not have been able to reproduce the old habits and customs in the new area. However, this law together with the anti-mafia legislation then in force was barely sufficient to tackle the phenomenon and, for this reason, it showed significant limits. First of all, it was not possible to prosecute Mafia as an association because there was no legislative instrument properly aimed to, and this legislative gap favored, once again, the escape of Mafiosi from a number of convictions through general acquittals for lack of evidence. For instance, consider the case of Tommaso Buscetta who was acquitted on the 22nd of December 1968 by the Court of Assizes of Catanzaro for insufficient evidence from the charge of criminal association. (Mantovano, 1999). Secondly, we must underline the exclusion of the economic facet from the criminal charges. The need to attack criminal organizations in their economic-financial component emerged, through acts aimed at seizing and confiscating illegally obtained assets, connected to the exercise of criminal activities, the laundering of dirty money and the reuse of illicit proceeds. This legislative tool will be subsequently introduced with the Rognoni-La Torre law in 1982.

1.4 The business of kidnappings

The penetration of Northern Italian territories marked a turning point on the 18th of December 1972, when the season of mafia kidnappings began. The first victim was the son of a well-known entrepreneur, Pietro Torrielli Junior, who would have been released two months later, after a ransom payment of one billion and five hundred million lire – approximately 800,000 euros. It was Cosa Nostra which kicked off the spring of this new business, even though, later on it indeed revealed to be counterproductive and would thereupon determine the retreat of Sicilian Mafia, favoring its counterpart from Calabria who carried out the business of kidnappings with great success. Grounding on these assumptions, when referring to 'Ndrangheta it is only correct to admit that "*La mafia non è arrivata, si è insediata*", meaning that the phenomenon has strongly colonized the territory, as famously reported by Nicola Gratteri, added prosecutor to the procure of the Republic of Reggio

Calabria, in the daily journal “Gazzetta di Reggio” (Cagnan, 2015). As a matter of fact, neither the thickening of judicial provisions in the season of kidnappings nor the emergence of a considerable number of *pentiti* (lit., repented) such as Antonio Zagari who denounced the illegal activities performed by his family in its entirety – the two parents and nine siblings – were sufficient to upset the organization of Mafia Calabrese (Ciconte, 2000). Moreover, the business drawn by the seizures was well-seen both by the immigrants from Calabria to the North, and those still living in the native region close to the “headquarters” of ‘Ndrangheta. Indeed, to ensure the success of the strategic plan, the proceeds obtained from the seizures were distributed throughout the dense network of contacts to strengthen social control. Another part of the profits was sent to the South and was invested in the building sector in Calabria. After all, the largest percentage was to serve the primary purpose of kidnappings, that is, the purchase of large consignments of drug to invest in the drug trafficking, and the purchase of materials to participate in public procurements (Ciconte, 2000). Following this conclusion, it is evident that for ‘Ndrangheta the seizures were instrumental and strictly functional to the realization of the economic targets planned by the organization, while Cosa Nostra began and quickly abandoned this activity conducted with a much less organized effort.

1.5 Dell’Utri Case: Negotiations between Berlusconi and Cosa Nostra

Yet, Cosa Nostra succeeded in leaving an evident and distinct sign of its presence in the Northern territories which can be exemplified by what *L’Espresso* reported as “*il caso Dell’Utri*” (Biondani, 2018). Marcello Dell’Utri has been a faithful collaborator and a right-hand man of the former Premier Silvio Berlusconi since they were both students at the Università Statale di Milano in the 50’s, where they first met. Dell’Utri approached Cosa Nostra in 1970 at the Athletic Club Bacigalupo of Palermo, the Sport club he had recently founded (Caruso, 2012). There, he made the acquaintance of Gaetano Cinà and, in particular, of Vittorio Mangano, the one who would become the central figure in the evolution of this case. By the time at which the season of kidnappings started in Northern Italy, Berlusconi was at the beginning of his entrepreneurial career. He was also a young husband and father of two children. Fearing for the security of his family, Berlusconi decided to exploit the contacts he had in his favor. He was well aware about the dangerous relationship that his faithful Dell’Utri had made with the Sicilian Mafia, the same which had started the business of abductions, such that he concluded that he had to prevent the evil by recalling to the devil himself. It was for this purpose that Dell’Utri was contacted by Berlusconi in 1974 to be assumed as Private secretary and, shortly after, he revealed the plan he had in mind (Guarino, 2010). Some months later, Villa Casati at Arcore hosted

an important meeting of smack dealing. According to what has been admitted by Francesco di Carlo, a Mafioso-turned-state-witness from Cosa Nostra, at that meeting it took part the most powerful heads of that time, such as Mimmo Teresi, Stefano Bontade and Tanino Cinà together with the landlord Silvio Berlusconi and Marcello Dell'Utri, acting as contractual mediator (Botta, 2013). “Milano oggi è preoccupante perché succedono rapimenti” explained the future Prime Minister trying to express the worrisome situation in which the plurality of people was living, and beginning the discussion for the guaranty pact he was looking at. Bontade welcomed the request by proposing the introduction of a member of the Sicilian organization at Villa Casati which would have guaranteed a full protection of the family. The man the boss meant was Vittorio Mangano, an affiliate to Cosa Nostra as well as trusted acquaintance of Dell’Utri. Thus, it began the permanence of the well-known "groom" at Arcore, where Mangano registered his residence and domicile. The protection agreement provided initially for the half-yearly payment of 25 million lire – approximately 13,000 euros - which subsequently doubled as a result of some fluctuations within the criminal organization, and returned to the acknowledged price under the direction of Salvatore Riina. This money had been illegally moved from Berlusconi to Dell’Utri and Cinà in complete secrecy, and then sent to Palermo for two decades, up until 1992 (Biondani, 2018).

1.6 Anti-mafia policies and the Rognoni- La Torre law

For the first ten years, from 1974 to 1983, there had been registered 103 cases of seizure (Dalla Chiesa, 2017). In the meantime, the State strengthened the policy measures to tackle with the phenomenon by blocking and freezing the accounts of the families of those kidnapped, such that they would be unable to pay the ransom. The first instance of this kind dates back 1976, as reported by the newspaper *la Repubblica*, and it was established by the judge Ferdinando Pomarici regarding the seizure of the assets held by entrepreneur Carlo Alberghini (*la Repubblica*, 1997). This precedent would have then taken the shape of a law decree named after “*Nuove norme in materia di sequestri di persona a scopo di estorsione*”, which entered into force on the 15th of March 1991. If on the one hand, this provision prevented a number of families from paying to receive their relatives alive, on the other hand, it was aimed at discouraging the thirst of illicit capital of the organized crime and so, at stopping the business. Moreover, the means of investigation at the disposal of the police were enhanced, and the foreseen punishment for the aforementioned crime was intensified (*Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 1991; Dalla Chiesa, 2017). The major progress in the field of anti-mafia legislation was made on the 3rd of September 1982, when the government headed by Prime Minister Spadolini passed

the first law which introduced in the Italian criminal code art. 416-bis, the one that officially recognized Mafia association as a crime and provided for the confiscation of assets of illicit origin. The law 646 took the name of the deputy Pio La Torre and the Minister of Internal Affairs Virginio Rognoni, who proposed the bill, even though the deputy could not witness the related enforcement because the two bosses of Cosa Nostra, Riina and Provenzano, precautionarily ordered his murder (Giangrande, 2018). The season of seizures ended on the 4th of September 1998 with the release of Alessandra Sgarella by 'Ndrangheta (Ciconte, 2000).

1.7 The drug trafficking and the “Operazione San Valentino”

As mentioned before, while the drug trafficking in the North conducted by Cosa Nostra had already started in the 50's, the criminal association from Calabria decided to finance this business with the capital accumulated from the season of kidnappings. The underworld of 'Ndrangheta began to invest the illicit income from the first kidnappings, with which the organization bought large batches of cocaine and entered into business with the Colombian mafia, more precisely with the Medellin cartel. The cocaine acquisitions by 'Ndrangheta from Medellin were supervised by two mediators, respectively affiliated with the Italian and the Colombian Mafia. Michelangelo Timpani had the responsibility to ascertain and guarantee to Medellin that the payment had been made, while Jorge Juan Cardenas Palacio had to organize the shipment (Ciconte, 2000). The illicit proceeds obtained from the market built upon the drug dealing were promptly cleaned by a dense network of professionals, also known as “white-collars” who worked on money-laundering through debt collection, the purchase of companies in economic distress and the participation as investors in other ones, the procurement of the contracts, and the control of public auctions and public tenders. The criminal activity of money laundering officially entered the Italian penal code as art. 648 bis on the 19th of October 1930, and then modified and abrogated several times during the following years. In force of this law provision, in the night between February 14th and 15th 1983, the Cosa Nostra of white-collars in Milan suffered the heaviest blow from the judicial police since 1974, which will go down in history under the name of “Operazione San Valentino” (Dalla Chiesa, 2017). That night, 37 people were arrested and a hundred arrest warrants were sent to people charged with mafia association, following the application of Rognoni-La Torre law, and with charges from drug trafficking to money laundering (Dalla Chiesa et al., 2011). Among the names of arrested people those of Luigi Monti and Antonio Virgilio stood out, those who *la Repubblica* would then define as the most important “mafia entrepreneurs” (Ravelli, 1984a). The majority of those arrested were clients

of the Banca Rasini, with which Silvio Berlusconi himself was found to have connections, and which revealed to be instrumental to the money laundering activity (Pinotti and Gümpel, 2011; Pilato, 2009). This “blitz” was the product of a long inquiry started on the 25th of June 1980 with a first failed attempt of a raid by the authorities, followed by a 200-page report by the Milan prosecutor's office famously recognized as 0500/C.A.S. Criminalpol issued on the 13th of April 1981. This report is the product of years of deep investigation on “how the tentacles of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra had lengthened to lick the Duomo, to involve white-collar workers, to pollute the economy of «moral capital»” as it was written on the pages of *la Repubblica*, and it was thanks to the 0500/C.A.S. that “*Operazione San Valentino*” was possible (Ravelli, 1984a). This operation triggered what William French Smith, the US Attorney General at the time defined as “the biggest operation of the century against the organized crime”. As a matter of fact, it set in motion the police force on a more international spectrum, resulting in 24 arrests in the US, 3 in Spain and 2 in Switzerland; all of them were affiliates to Cosa Nostra. It was found out that in just five years Cosa Nostra used to gain 1.65 billion in narcodollars, partly sent to the Handless Bank in Zurich, whose shipment was under the supervision of Adriano Corti and Franco Della Torre, those arrested in the Swiss territory (Ravelli, 1984b).

1.8 The “Operazione San Martino”

On the 12th of November 1983, the first page of the daily journal *Avanti!*, founded by the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), read “*Improvviso blitz antimafia nei quattro casinò nazionali*”, referring to San Remo, Venezia, Campione and Saint Vincent, witnessing the second biggest anti-mafia operation conducted by the Milan’s public prosecutor office and remembered as “*Operazione San Martino*”, started the day before. The blitz counted almost 2,000 men respectively from the Guardia di Finanza, the police and the Carabinieri, who executed the arrest of 17 affiliates to Cosa Nostra and the emission of 19 warrants. Suspects on the cash funds of the gambling business, which the newspaper *l’Unità* described with the word “black”, had been already underlined in the report presented to the Regional Congress of PCI in Valle d’Aosta the previous year, and the urgency to end “*la rete di prestasoldi a usura che attorno al Casinò è cresciuta*” was emphasized, meaning the vicious circle around money-lenders and usury, with reference to Saint Vincent. Before the “blitz”, a number of hypothesis on the specific methods of money laundering were elaborated: from the use of chips to “clean” money, through the organization of fake matches to bet on, to the purchase and sale of stakes packages held by the managerial companies (Boccardo and Betti, 1983a-b). The aforementioned newspaper also

reported that the major parties active in Valle D'Aosta, such as Union Valdôtaine and Democrazia Cristiana conceived the casino as a political instrument for patronage. Meanwhile in San Remo, the Municipal Council was dissolved on charges of corruption concerning the public tender organized to adjudicate the management of the casino (Avanti! 1983). From these conclusions, it can be argued that it was not difficult for Cosa Nostra to penetrate the dimension of the casinos, an attractive target for money laundering also considering the political contacts it would guaranteed, of which the organization could have taken advantage.

1.9 The end of “soggiorno obbligato” in non-traditional areas

In 1987, the Regional Council of Veneto proposed to the Senate to radically edit the law concerning the forced resettlement as a result of the disappointing and negative outcome it yielded, which was the birth and the strengthening of the Mafia phenomenon on the territory rather than its eradication as intended when the bill was first presented. The norm needed to be modified by circumscribing the *soggiorno obbligato* to the areas of origin by excluding any other region of Italy but the one the subject was resident. This proposal was well welcomed by the Parliament for two reasons. First, the forced resettlement was unsuccessful in cutting down any standing relationship between the condemned Mafioso and his land of origin because of the technological progress which was rapidly enhancing the means of communications through time. Secondly, the direct and centralized control of the headquarters of the organized crime by the police force would have been easier to maintain, since the traditional area was the same as the one of force resettlement, thus without the need of a capillary supervision, spread around Italy. This prospect was translated into law n. 327 and law n. 330, respectively entered into force on the 24th and 25th of August 1988 (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 1988a-b). However, abolishing the instrument which these criminal organizations long disposed of to proliferate and colonize the Northern territories of Italy would not prove sufficient to uproot what Mafia had built so far. As mentioned before, the organized crime was able to flourish in non-traditional territories because it met a public demand, rather than the denial of its presence, and people had started to understand the strength and the competitive advantages it was bringing. As it can be read in the report realized by Libera, the anti-mafia association, “L’impresa mafiosa cambia il volto alle aziende e alle società offrendo servizi illegali e velocizzando quelli legali attraverso relazioni, protezioni, scoraggiamento della concorrenza, pacificazione sindacale, prestazioni professionali e investimento di capitali illeciti” (Coordinamento di Libera Milano e Provincia, 2018). In other words, all of a sudden, legal businesses were offered new and fruitful

alternatives such that they could not find any better option. If entering into business with Mafia means finally making profits for loss-making business or receiving loans by credit institutions, the illegal protection becomes more attractive than the legal one. Moreover, it must be considered the cost of legality, normally due in economy, which makes more and more challenging for companies to balance out costs and revenues. In this light, it is the emulation with the consequent adoption of the Mafia *modus operandi* making use of illicit mechanisms – such as underpaid labor, low-quality materials, fiscal dumping, all allowing lower prices – to guarantee competitiveness and wealth (Unioncamere, 2013).

1.10 The Maxiprocesso and the murder of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino

The judiciary war against the business turn of organized crime continued and evolved when the prosecutor Giovanni Falcone created a special anti-mafia institution famously known under the acronym “DIA”, which stands for Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, under the authority granted by law Decree issued on the 29th of October 1991 (Roberts, 2018; Pilato, 2009). Falcone, together with Paolo Borsellino, Giuseppe di Lello and Leonardo Guarnotta were part of the famous "*antimafia pool*", created by Rocco Chinnici in 1979, so that the fight against the mafia could benefit from a jurist and expert contribution. Among the many successes achieved in decoding important links between organized crime and the financial, business and political dimension, the major one is doubtless the *Maxiprocesso*, the result of years of investigation and studies on Mafia activities, plans and movements conducted by the pool. The *Maxiprocesso*, started in 1986 and ended in conjunction with the establishment of the DIA by Falcone, was held in Palermo towards Cosa Nostra, and it is remembered for having caused a devastating blow for the organized crime with more than 400 defendants and 200 lawyers and made the lead by Salvatore Riina tremble (Bontà, 2016 ; Giangrande, 2018). Through the eyes of Cosa Nostra, this event represented a latent defeat in favor of the legal counterpart, the state, which re-appropriated its intrinsic right of monopoly on violence and governance. The ruling class had undermined the headquarters of the Mafia complex, which is in other words the brain of the whole enterprise, consequently affecting the entire criminal network of Cosa Nostra distributed throughout Italy, given that it is precisely from Sicily that orders were given and communicated to each subsidiary operating-base. Hence, the *Maxiprocesso* was the catalyst for the strategy of terror which put in place a series of massacres aimed at striking not only the Italian political and judicial branch, but the nation as a whole. On the 12th of March 1992 the DC sicilian politician Salvo Lima, who had not honored his promises

with Cosa Nostra, was killed. Lima was supposed to help in the maxi-process, to guarantee the impunity of a number of Cosa Nostra bosses, but in the end, the Court of Cassation did confirm the convictions (Giangrande, 2018). Then, it was the turn of Giovanni Falcone, whose judicial and political background was mainly marked by the commitment in the fight against Mafia. His murder, due on the 23th of May 1992, was planned in outstanding detail by placing 400 kg of explosive mixture in 13 trash cans, hidden in a drainage tunnel under the A29 motorway, which was made blow up exactly when Falcone and his security detail crossed the Capaci junction (Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia, 1993). This tragic event, where Giovanni Falcone lost his life along with his wife and some police officers, was named “Strage di Capaci”. On the 19th July it was the time of “La Strage di Via D’Amelio” which targeted Paolo Borsellino, the judge who alongside Falcone, Giuseppe Di Lello and Leonardo Guarnotta had acted as prosecutor in the Pool Antimafia (Giangrande, 2018). The season of the massacres triggered an endless mechanism of arrests and trials for Cosa Nostra who had to move back and resize the range of action of the organization.

1.11 The secession pushes from the North

Meanwhile, the empire built on by ‘Ndrangheta was flourishing, taking advantage of the recent defeats of the Sicilian rival. In January 1996, the prefecture of Milan declared that the ‘Ndrangheta was at that moment the most dangerous criminal association in Lombardy both from the point of view of the capillary diffusion on the territory counting 60 *locali*, and of the numerical consistency – being composed of 2,000 affiliates only considering the Northern areas (Ciconte, 2000). The business conducted in the North was so profitable that the local *locali* felt the power to increase. However, according to the *‘ndranghetista* policy, they had to submit to the orders coming from the parental *‘ndrine* located in Calabria. The centralization of the authority was a key principle on which the functioning of the entire organization was based, as well as the project of colonization of non-traditional areas, in the name of which the murder of two affiliates whose names worth it to be mentioned was ordered: Carmelo Novella and Rocco Cristello. The two victims were *‘ndranghetisti* residing in Lombardy who had in mind a project of secession from the motherland. Novella headed 15 ‘Ndrangheta branches and when in spring 2008 the *locale* of Giussano was baptized, which would have been submitted under the city of Guardavalle in Calabria, he stood against this relationship of dependence. In this framework, the bosses of Guardavalle themselves decided to proceed with the execution of the traitors on the 4th of July 2008. In a cafe in San Vittore Olona, the boss Antonino Belnome, a future justice collaborator, and his vice Michael Panajia killed Novella (Crippa, 2012).

However, the murder of Novella was not sufficient to stop the secession struggle. Some months later, on the 20th of January of the following year, the boss of the *locale* of Rho claimed the power accumulated in the North by strongly remarking the independence from the motherland. Then, the famous summit held in the Circolo Arci of Paderno Dugnano entitled to Falcone and Borsellino followed, where the discussion revolved around the internal feud that was corroding 'Ndrangheta to the marrow. With the purpose to put an end to the secession "movement", in that occasion the bosses agreed on the establishment of a figure called "Mastrogenerale" who would have acted as referee on the whole territory of Lombardy (Milosa, 2010). The meeting did not go unnoticed since every single word was shot and recorded by the investigators through the bugs hidden in the room. This event broke havoc the maxi-blitz named after "*Operazione Infinito*" in 2010 which brought about the arrest of 170 people during the following year (Branchi and Venturini 2010). In 2013, the judges of the Court of Appeal of Milan confirmed the conviction for the aforementioned people, for a total of a thousand years of punishment in prison (Redazione Monzato, 2013).

1.12 The business of vote-buying and the 'Ndrangheta radicalized network outside Lombardy

The considerable size of these numbers testifies the strong presence of the 'Ndrangheta in the North as perfectly integrated. The *Operazione Infinito* alone managed to dismantle 18 *locali* with the consequent seizure of 1,186 assets in the region of Lombardy (Coordinamento Libera di Milano, 2018). Moreover, it is to be said that the intensification of colonial phenomenon had been strongly favored by the legislative decree no. 267/2000 on the dislocation of powers, meaning a bureaucratic decentralization that, at the time of the above-mentioned Operation (2010), had been marking the office of mayors and local governors with direct election for almost ten years. This legislative turning point gave the Mafia the chance to contaminate the democratic system in the municipal micro-cosmos by exploiting the candidates' thirst of power for their own benefit. These assumptions describe the Crespi case. In 2012, the "*Operazione Grillo parlante*" took place, thanks to which a dense electoral buying-and-selling system emerged (Coordinamento Libera di Milano, 2018). In particular, it was shed a light on the candidacy of Domenico Zambetti in the regional elections of Lombardy in 2010. On trial, the spokesperson of the clan Giuseppe D'Agostino and others under accusation of external competition with mafia association, including Ambrogio Crespi, brother of Luigi Crespi, known as the spin doctor of Silvio Berlusconi (Rocca, 2018). The investigation carried out reveals a real electoral business, such that the 'Ndrangheta would have provided former commissioner Zambetti with a total of 4,000 votes at a price of 200,000 euros. The charge made against Crespi is that he

contributed to supplying more than half of the alleged votes bought from 'Ndrangheta, when, for real, as it will later emerge from consequent inquiries, Zambetti obtained only a hundred of preferences and nothing more in the district of origin of Crespi (Milosa, 2012). Accusations of corruption and vote exchange by 'Ndrangheta also eroded the region of Valle D'Aosta. On January 25th 2019, *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, an Italian newspaper reported the Prettico Case concerning Mafia infiltration in the local administration, thus compromising the credibility of Nicola Prettico (Municipal councilor of Aosta), Marco Sorbara (Regional councilor) and Monica Carcea (Councilor of Finance of Aosta)(Giambartolomei, 2019 ; Governo valdostano, 2019). As it can be understood, the colonization continues and prospers still nowadays and even more recent example is the maxi-operation "Carminus" coordinated by the DDA of Turin which saw the participation of 400 soldiers of the Central Service of organized Crime Investigation of the Financial Police and the Provincial Command of Turin. In this case it is not the political-matrix business that leads the investigations as much as the seizure of assets worth 40 million euros of illicit origin (ANSA, 2019 ; La Repubblica, 2019)

1.13 Conclusion

On the basis of the historical and chronological excursus of the penetration of the Mafia subject into non-traditional areas, it is possible to trace back the growth plan that the studied Mafia organizations have followed in their project of industrialization and economic evolution. Therefore, my research is aimed at deepening the phenomenon of organized crime in its entrepreneurial side through the analysis of the Italian case in a comparative study of related criminal organizations on an international scale, with the scope of spotting a pattern of behavior.

SCIENTIFIC THEORIZATIONS ON THE BUSINESS-ORIENTED MAFIA MOVEMENT

2.1 Introduction

The historical excursus on the Italian case provided in the first chapter is functional to show that, despite the strong radicalization of the Mafia phenomenon in the territories where it originally took root for a conjecture of economic, political and cultural variables, Mafia-like organized crime can effectively infiltrate into new contexts, even those displaying a high level of social capital and interpersonal trust. Evidence is reported by the failure of the law on forced resettlement which, building upon Putnam reasoning, was meant to transplant convicted Mafiosi into an environment assumed to be impenetrable to any criminal activity, considering the variables of civic culture, respect for legality, and cooperation as prerequisites for the success of the policy under scrutiny. To understand the underlying mechanisms of the process of Mafia movement and the role that these organizations assume in the new domains, a more in-depth analysis is required by investigating the factors driving the phenomenon. To this purpose, in this chapter I will extend the study to a broader spectrum of criminal organizations, so that substantive empirical evidence can strengthen the argument this dissertation proposes to support. Having regard the study I have made for the case of Yakuza (Japanese organized crime), the Russian Mafia and the Colombian Mafia, I will sustain that the phenomenon of extending to non-traditional territories by Mafia organizations follows a precise canon which acquires an economic connotation.

In *The New Geography of Mafia Activity: The case of Northern Italian Region*, Moro and Villa have proven that the so-called business incentives are at best to influence the development of Mafia expansion plans, although a number of different variables can first trigger the transplantation. They have elaborated two typologies of factors at play, namely push factors and pull factors (Moro and Villa, 2016).

2.2 The Push factors

The push factors are forces bringing the organized crime out of its context of origin and they can be unintentional, such as Mafia feuds, law enforcement and generalized migration patterns, or either intentional - as it happened for the Yakuza whose case will be discussed later in the chapter - regarding the search for resources, investments or market-related opportunities. For what concerns

migration waves such as the ones from the South to the North of Italy during the 50's for the failure of the agrarian reform, it is to be specified that even though often cited by the press and scholars, the theory according to which the presence of large number of migrants from regions where the mafia phenomenon is pervasive inevitably increases the probability of having criminals transplanted as well is too simplistic in nature (Branchi and Venturini, 2017 ; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014). As a result, it is also reductive to affirm that the presence of Mafiosi from Mafia territories is a sufficient condition to permit criminal organizations to settle, since other decisive factors are to be considered. As regards law enforcement, the case of Georgian *vory-v-zakone* – literally meaning “Thieves-in-law” – perfectly suits the typology. It concerns a Mafia-like organization which took its origins in Georgia in the Soviet Gulag of 30's and whose bosses were forced to flee the country for the brutal repression put in place against corruption and crime, a primordial form of anti-mafia policy initiated by at the time of Stalinism and which holds still today, even in softer conditions (Slade, 2011) . Similarly, in Taiwan there were enacted provisions against this type of organizations, consequently favoring their transplantation from Taiwan to China, thus producing the same spill-over effect caused by the law of *soggiorno obbligato* in Italy from 1956 to 1988 (Varese, 2011b). Among the push determinants causing the movement of Mafiosi, it is not to exclude the attempt to escape Mafia wars. It is the case of the boss of Solntesevskaya - the Russian mob hub in Rome - who in the 90's left his country to break away from an internal Mafia feud and afterwards, given the network of contacts kept with his fellow-affiliates in Moscow, managed to set up a new branch in Italy which revealed to be precious for the transfer of dirty money. By the way, the Italian banks were found to having greatly facilitated this criminal activity (Varese, 2013).

2.3 The Pull factors

While all the factors listed above are complementary to their counterpart, the pull factors attract Mafia-like organizations to a particular setting, thus describing an intentional move. The strongest variable to consider as a pull factor is whether the economic texture of a given area can be easily penetrated. In this light, the decision-making process that leads the Mafioso to consider a given territory is akin to the rational balance of costs and benefits that entrepreneurs usually make in evaluating an important opportunity, always considering the ultimate goal of profit and capital growth (Moro and Villa, 2016). As Moro and Villa observe, the organized crime is especially attracted by places where to widen their economic clout through the investment of excessive liquidity and money laundering. In line with this reasoning, there is the reflection posed by Arlacchi in *La Mafia*

Imprenditrice which depicts the Mafia boss, at head of his organization, following the entrepreneurial canons as any industrialist would do. As a matter of fact, the Mafia transplanted in non-traditional territories does not coincide with the traditional form of Mafia, rather it assumes a different configuration of Mafia that Arlacchi would define as entrepreneur: *la mafia imprenditrice* (Arlacchi, 2007). The expansion towards new areas of interest goes along with the entry of Mafia into a new dimension, that of economic competition. Thus, the Mafioso becomes an entrepreneur because his move is linked to a capitalist calculation such that the original values and *modus operandi* are reshaped according to the new objective. The act of migrating is not aimed at establishing illegal governance and social control as much as in the territories of origin, where the protection racket is functional to its political primacy as a supplier of services over the state, rather it is finalized at trading and reinvestment of criminal revenues in legal ventures (Campana, 2011). Thus, the mafia effectively becomes an ideal-type of business, which is in other words an economic unit taking part at the market-based system but which, unlike normal companies legally founded, enjoys particular competitive advantages deriving from its illicit origin and *modus operandi*. Among them, Arlacchi identifies the discouragement of competition through intimidatory actions which nevertheless increase Mafia coercive power, wage compression exploiting unregulated workforce, and, most of all, the availability of financial resources coming from the criminal activities that need to be poured into the circuit of legal business operations (Arlacchi, 2007). In this regard, it is extremely important that the receiving area is the most favorable to easily invest large amounts of money by passing unnoticed in order to clean up illicit proceeds and invest them again to generate profit, this time legally. In the upcoming sections, I will review and discuss the most important pull factors highlighted by previous literature to study the economic developments of organized crime.

2.3.1 The presence of “porous” sectors and vulnerable market conditions

In order to carry out the business turn, the Mafia entrepreneur pays particular attention to the presence of certain economic sectors such as the construction sector, the transport sector, and the hospitality sector, whose characteristics facilitate Mafia penetration (Moro and Villa, 2016). The ones just mentioned are defined as “porous” sectors in the economy, meaning that they do not dispose of sufficient safeguards to avoid outsiders to enter. This peculiarity makes these sectors the perfect target for penetration since Mafiosi can take advantage on the low-entry barriers. Moreover, the vulnerability of these markets stems from the small size of the trading enterprises involved, and as Varese observed in *Mafias on the Move: How to Organize Crime Conquers New Territories* “it is

easy to control a construction sector populated by thirty players than one populated by three hundred” (Varese, 2011a). Actually, while it is true that the more the given market is wide, the more Mafiosi can carry out and bolster their activities – even enjoying the possibility to make diversified investment portfolios without drawing attention from the police force – it is also true that a small-scale economic environment displays a relatively low level of complexity in its functioning, thus a limited level of information asymmetry as well. It is also interesting for a Mafioso to look at markets that do not require skilled workforce so that labor can be easily hired, even illegally, and so deprived from any bargaining power and consequently subjected to what I reported above as wage compression. Even more relevant are the non-export-oriented markets with low product differentiation or either booming markets. These cases are particularly attractive because the presence of Mafia may be demanded by entrepreneurs themselves through the exercise of cartels enforcement with the purpose of circumnavigating competition and thus facilitating profit for all participants, without running the risk of retaliations. Demand for Mafia interference can also be developed when newcomers may threaten the economic stability of the incumbents while entering the market, so that the organized crime is required to discourage the outsiders to enter in, usually happening at a market boom (Moro & Villa, 2016; Varese, 2011b). For example, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was the catalyst for the business expansion of Italian Mafia on the German soil. The economic condition of former German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR) under the control of the Soviet Union had to be improved, given the latent disparity with its counterpart, the Western Germany. To foster homogeneity and economic unification between the two areas, it was established a market economy in the Eastern Germany, then it followed the Schengen Agreements entered into force in 1992 which would have created a border-free zone in view of a European configuration of internal market (Urwin, 1995; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014). The Italian Mafia organizations looked favorably on this combination of events which proved to be propitious for an economic advantageous and effortless infiltration. On the other hand, in the case of export-oriented market, with the exception of drug trafficking and any kind of illicit smuggling, Mafia organizations cannot easily infiltrate, neither are they required by the economic agents in the market because, given the distance dividing the contracting parties upon which exercising coercive power, Mafiosi cannot be effective in helping exporters (Varese, 2011b).

2.3.2 Absence of Anti-mafia legislation

Furthermore, a context may result appealing for the absence of anti-mafia legislation such as, in the case of an international migration, the absence of an international law under which the receiving state has to extradite individuals charged with mafia-related crimes. This variable turned to be decisive in the strategic plans of the La Torre clan, a criminal group of affiliates to Camorra, the organized crime from the region of Campania. The clan strategically chose Scotland as a colonial destination to expand its activities, as it was potentially functional to their interests due to the vibrant economy and the absence of anti-mafia legislation (Campana, 2011a-b). Hence, the city of Aberdeen became an international branch of Camorra, with the same ease with which a subsidiary branch of a multinational company is founded. The Aberdeen hub was set up for the clear and unique function of money laundering. The dirty money was employed in the purchase of legal ventures in the construction sector, in the real estate and in the food and catering sector. It is important to mention that in Scotland the Camorra clan never exercised protection racket. Differently from what used to be in Mondragone, their city of origin, the business was confined to the investment in the legal market (Campana, 2011a-b).

2.3.3 Strategic localized areas and the presence of “uomini-cerniera”

Conversely, the “opening” of the Amsterdam hub by the same clan was instrumental for other types of criminal activity such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting money. Actually, the Dutch capital lent itself perfectly to this role given its specific features. Being located in a nerve center, it showed the potential to become the main hub abroad for drug trafficking. Furthermore, the La Torre clan was well aware that in Amsterdam they could find professionals, such as criminal brokers, willing to work for the underworld who could manage the economic-financial side of the business, an emblematic pull factor which ultimately influenced the decision to move. This allowed the construction of a cocaine network that covered Venezuela, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands, structuring a worldwide traffic (Campana, 2011a-b). Similarly, the marketing of forged banknotes was conducted by initially acquiring the counterfeit money in Campania, the region of origin of the clan, and then pushing it to the criminal market in Netherlands. The business of La Torre clan started in the 80’s and after thirty years still flourishes so much that, at the beginning of 2013, the press reported that a sum equal 19,400 of forged euro banknotes was circulating within the Dutch borders (Gowling, 2013). Meanwhile, the Camorra group used to exploit some Italian cities within their criminal

network of contacts, such as Terni in Umbria, whenever it needed “apparently” legal bank accounts. Obviously, these financial poles remained precarious, in the sense that they were targeted to be limited for that scope, which was the provision of checks and credit cards (Campana, 2011a-b).

2.4 The theory of functional diversification

The strategy put in place by the criminal organization, consisting in the internationalization of the many activities making up the production line of the corporate crime, has been called by Campana as “functional diversification” (Campana, 2011b). In the case of Camorra, every pole was meant to focus on a particular phase: Aberdeen was the hub for investments in legal markets, Amsterdam was the hub for those in the illegal one and Terni functioned as delivering pole for the means used to run the whole system. To understand properly the concept of functional diversification it is fundamental to observe that none of these cities, functioning as subsidiary branches, witnessed the use of violence. As a matter of fact, the criminal group limited the exercise of protection racket through violent means to Mondragone, which is the headquarters of its criminal industry and whose orders any functional operating base has to submit to. The theory elaborated by Campana seems to explain successfully the progression of mafia-like organizations in the colonization process through the detailed analysis of the circumstances which brought a given criminal group to move abroad or to non-traditional territories within their own country, and the activities performed as well. I find this concept overarching and exhaustive for the empirical evidence of the movement mechanisms upon which it has been structured and on the basis of which Campana attributes an economic connotation to the Mafia expansion. Hence, when moving, Mafia-like organizations do not transplant original activities, they rather operate on a business plan aimed at creating instrumental poles to industrialize their organizations. From this line of reasoning, it is straightforward concluding that the role of Mafiosi changes across territories accordingly to the task performed. However, it is appropriate to analyze the mechanisms underpinning the functional diversification, meaning the grounds which this strategy builds upon, to deepen the understanding of Campana’s argument.

2.5 The bifocal approach of Mafia: Governance and Trade

As Campana observes in *Eavesdropping on the Mob: the functional diversification of Mafia activities across territories*, when settling in non-original territories Mafiosi do not resort to the use of force and violent threats – as they usually do in the territory of origin – because the purpose linked to its presence drastically differs (Campana, 2011b). The birth, and not the arrival, of Mafia phenomenon is tied up to a legal vacuum, that concerns the political authority charged by the responsibility to provide safeguards and protection to people and being accountable to them (Gambetta, 1996). As a result, where local institutions did not manage to supply effectively the services needed, it developed an alternative form of governance which was able to make up for the general deficiency (Campana, 2011b). Thus, the *modus operandi* employed by Mafia in these territories is functional to govern and compete with its legal counterpart, which is the state, by threatening the Weberian notion of the monopoly of violence. The organized crime is interested in maintaining the primacy as a supplier of protection which confers to Mafia the power to manipulate the society at will and exercise social control. Yet, there is no incentive to extend governance where the cost of violence could be higher, considering a stable, solid but above all functional governmental performance that provides the population with the security needed. Thus, when it comes to non-traditional territories the Mafia boss displays a different approach, not only to suit a different area of influence but also in relation to the main purpose driving the movement (Campana, 2011b). In this light, the figure of the criminal head can be identified with the Schumpeterian notion of the innovator, generally attributed to the entrepreneur for the *modus operandi* and *intelligendi* enacted. The Mafioso is recognized as an innovator because he is called to innovate both his mindset and the codes of conduct upon which the criminal organization operates, towards a more capitalist-oriented inclination, in the name of an effective business turn. On these grounds, criminal agents of this type invade both the legal and the illegal economy by following the logic of accumulation, which is indeed tied up to the necessary process of money-laundering, considering that the increase of illicit capital is directly proportional to the risk of being indicted by the law enforcement agencies. Analyzing the Mafia expansion, I would find useful to scan the process in the following phases in order to structure an identified pattern from the Italian paradigm, which is potentially applicable to the general category of organized crime:

1. Selection of the target territory after having carefully studied the profit potential from the area under scrutiny;

2. The movement properly defined, which concerns a certain number of affiliates and is not aimed at transplanting the nucleus;
3. The gradual rooting on the new area through the construction of a dense network of contacts which is heterogeneously made by migrants coming from the territories of origin, local population and *uomini-cerniera* (linkage men). As mentioned in the first chapter, the said subjects are those local “entrepreneurs, lawyers, bank men that allow the mob to enter the local economic society” in the words of Ciconte (Barabino and Destefanis, 2015).

Considering therefore both intentional and unintentional logics of the migratory phenomenon (pull and push factors) in relation to criminal configurations, the choice of the precise location where to settle reflects a strategy of exploitation of resources, such that the mafia franchise can be associated with a colonizing motive (Campana, 2011a-b). What follows is a careful analysis of three case-studies of non-Italian mobs that I have found emblematic to represent the said theory. The subjects that I have chosen to put under scrutiny are the Yakuza (Japanese Mafia), the Russian Mafia and the Colombian Cartels. Each study focuses on the internationalization of these criminal organizations, moving towards non-traditional lands.

2.6 Case Study no. 1: Yakuza – The Japanese Mafia

As just explained, the Yakuza is a Mafia-like configuration of Japanese origin. It first developed in the historical era of Tokugawa (1600-1867) which promoted a progressive centralization of power with consequent geographical unification of the Japanese nation, previously divided into fiefdoms of possession of the samurai. The criminal organization in Japan was born precisely with the Japanese knights (samurai), who, deprived of their land rights, gave birth to the underworld which is nowadays recognized under the name of Yakuza. Following a pattern common to the Italian model of mafia, the primordial activity of the Yakuza is the business of protection (Gambetta, 1996). Thanks to a widespread and centralized organizational structure headed by a boss, Kumi-Cho, Yakuza exercised, and still exercises, a territorial control from Kyoto to Kobe with other major hotspots spread throughout the country, such as Tokyo (Abadinsky, 2010). The case of Yakuza is especially interesting to deepen since the role of the state is literally supplanted by this criminal organization which is more effective in the control and protection of the people, but, most of all, in keeping the stability of the national order, so much so that many believe Yakuza responsible for the low crime rate reported in Japan. In the 1950s, together with the economic boom the Japanese country was

experiencing, Yakuza began its process of industrialization abroad, creating a global network that included almost entirely the Eurasian, American and Oceanic continents (Abadinsky, 2010). In this project of economic colonization, it is worth mentioning that particular attention was paid by Yakuza leadership in selecting target-areas where Japanese communities were present. As Kaplan and Dubro (2003) explain in the book *Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld*, grounding on their studies on the movement and expansion of the nipponic organized crime, one of the variables considered by the bosses was the presence of ethnic communities tied to homeland due to dense migratory waves. From a criminal standpoint, it is an interesting variable to look at when planning to create an effective criminal network in non-original territories. For example, by hosting 750,000 Japanese migrants, Brazil seemed to be an attractive target for criminal expansionism, such that in the city of Liberdade, under the jurisdiction of Sao Paulo, one of the main subsidiary branches of the organization was founded (Dubro and Kaplan, 2003). By following the theory of functional diversification, the protection racket was confined to the territory of origin, while the extra-territorial operating poles serving to conduct profit-oriented activities such as investments, both legal and illegal in nature, and money-laundering. Evidence is given by the capture of Hitoshi Tanabe, one of the bosses of the Yakuza, reported on the 9th of March 1994 by the Brazilian law-enforcement authorities in Londrina (Upi Archives, 1994). The Japanese head had been wanted in his homeland and, to escape from law enforcement, he left the country. Even though the driving incentive to flee from Japan was unintentional, Tanabe chose the place where to best accomplish his interests. He moved to the Brazilian soil where he managed to set the seeds for an international drug trafficking from Sao Paulo to the Japanese region of Shizuoka. In 1993, the cocaine network put in place by Tanabe was brought to light by the Brazilian Federal Police and a year later the Japanese Mafioso was arrested. Unfortunately, the capture of Tanabe was not sufficient to disrupt the criminal activity of the Yakuza in Brazil, so much so that in 2003, the Japanese mob was found responsible for a considerable human trafficking which specifically included illegal immigration and slave trade. (Costa, 2006). The thirst for capital brought Yakuza to consider Europe as well for the establishment of subsidiary branches. Germany was targeted to clean money through the acquisition of mainly trading companies specialized in the export of luxury cars, whereas the United Kingdom, London in particular, was an appealing landing spot for the presence of a plethora of Japanese brokers and bankers. In particular, one of the Yakuza clan called Rondan Doyukai played an emblematic role in penetrating the European economy, by investing large sums of money in three respectable European companies in the Netherlands and France, such as Rotterdamsch Beleggings Consortium, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, and Compagnie Financiere de Paris et des Pays Bas (PARIBAS). Meanwhile Paris became the major pole for fine art smuggling and money-laundering,

such that in 1992 the Yakuza branch on the French soil was found to have cleaned 75 million dollars during six years through the purchase of luxury goods (Dubro and Kaplan, 2003). For what concerns the market of stolen paintings, it is worth mentioning the name of Shuinichi Fujikuma, the Yakuza boss who in 1985, even from jail, managed to arrange a robbery in the Marmottan Museum of Paris thanks to which the famous impressionist masterpiece of Monet, *Impression, Soleil Levant*, together with other 8 paintings ended up in the hands of the Japanese mafia for a total value of 12 million dollars (Bussi, 2010; Monet and Russell, 2014).

This case shows how the move of this particular kind of mob has been triggered by both unintentional factors, such as the willingness to escape law proceedings, and intentional ones, namely an insatiable thirst of money which has then driven and designed the expansion, if not even the globalization of Yakuza economic interests. Yet, even from the very first case analyzed, it is evident how the mob has no concerns with projects related to the governance of the land they are going to affect. Rather, special importance is given to the choice of the territory where to land, which must necessarily accomplish the profit-oriented goal that the mob has planned.

2.7 Case-study no. 2: The Russian Mafia

The Russian organized crime corresponding to the name of Mafia was born in the years of the famous "Perestroika" when, under the Gorbachev government, an opening policy called "Glasnost" was launched aimed at dismantling what remained of the Soviet totalitarianism. To this end, the new policies implemented provided the recognition of social, political and economic freedoms. Russian citizens acquired the full status of a citizen, which had been denied for a long time. On the economic side, a market price according to the dynamics of the economy was established, hence based on free trade and no longer controlled by the government. Politically speaking, greater participation was granted in political life, as well as freedom of expression, and therefore to dissent. Unfortunately, those who had long lived under the Soviet regime did not succeed in managing the new freedoms in a completely effective way. As it happens, it is thanks to these concessions that organized crime took root and grew without controls. It developed quickly and became known under the name of Mafia, a well-structured crime network, specialized in the protection racket, mainly addressing the bourgeois industrial class' needs. The criminal entrepreneurial development, as noted earlier in this chapter, foresees territorial expansion towards non-traditional areas, and this theory applies for the Russian mob as well, mostly across foreign borders. More precisely, it is the Solntsevskaya, a Russian Mafia-like subgroup that brought into being one of the biggest criminal managements of weapons and drug

trafficking on the global scale, complemented by money laundering operations. Following the analysis made by the professor Bagley (2001) on the geopolitical economic colonization conducted by the Russian organized crime in *Globalization and Transnational Organized Crime: The Russian Mafia in Latin American and the Caribbean*, it seems that the business turn coincided with the penetration of three geographical macro-areas, each of which brought a considerable advantage to the franchising operation of the organized crime under scrutiny:

- The first target-area coincides with the countries emerging from the dismantle of the Soviet Union. Being new to the status of independence, they still enjoyed special relations with Russia through the KGB, which, through corruption, represented the first fundamental element for the establishment of the criminal network that Russian Mafia was looking for. In addition, these states provided for useful connections with Europe on the one hand, and Central Asia on the other (Bagley, 2001; Galeotti, 2004);
- The second macro-area analyzed by Bagley identifies some key Asian hubs such as the cities of Shanghai and Macao with their peripheral areas in China, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Korea. The attention on the Asian continent was due to the presence of Russian contacts on the areas that, if exploited, would have created interesting links for the black market. Despite the strategic calculation made on business projects by the Russian Mafia, the Chinese affair turned out to be inconclusive and disappointing. Indeed, it is important to underline that the commercial network established by the organized crime in Russia was not limited to its contacts in the Asian territory, but also involved the partnership with other criminal organizations such as the Chinese “triads” which, due to mistrust, showed reluctance from the very beginning towards a complete openness to a sincere cooperation with the Russian bosses (Bagley, 2001; Galeotti, 2004);
- In light of the failure of the expansion plan in the East, in the 1990s the Russian Mafia shifted its interest towards an area that would have further favored a criminal infiltration into the economic texture –the West. The Western world has always represented a particularly fruitful economic pole both for honest people and criminals. For the latter, this is even more the case when the territory under analysis is known for lacking a strong effective political and institutional component, thus facilitating a context of social disorder. Labeled under the heading of "weak states", the Caribbean and the Latin America translate into the perfect union between an inadequate and corrupted governmental entity added to a reported lack of control

and monitoring of banking activities. Moreover, by implementing austerity policies to facilitate the entry of the Caribbean and the South-American countries into the global market, these areas had witnessed an exponential resizing of the state interference in the economic dimension. By virtue of the aforementioned variables, the Russian organized crime had willingly considered the possibility of establishing an ancillary operational base in these non-original territories to enjoy the related benefits (Bagley, 2001). Thus, for the Russian Mafia as well as for the Yakuza, South America became the nerve center for drug trafficking and money laundering. There, cocaine is still manufactured and then shipped by air or sea to Russia, Europe and the United States, where it is locally distributed. The main focuses are Tijuana / Baja and California / San Diego, which, due to their position, serve as a transport link to US territory (Bagley, 2001; Galeotti, 2004).


Once again, the case of the Russian Mafia tells us how the functionality of the presence of the mob changes according to the place where it is found to be, since the purpose tied up to the territory is different. The branches founded by the Russian Mafia in the three macro-areas identified by Bagley but, most of all, the economic use that they served depict the image of the criminal business turn that I was looking for.

2.8 Case-study no. 3: The Colombian Mafia

Similarly, by analyzing the case of Colombian Mafia, empirical evidence suggests the existence of a precise pattern of behavior which corroborates the model of functional diversification. However, for what concerns the industrial dimension, instead of opting for a multi-faceted and purely sectorial economic penetration, the Colombian criminal organizations favored the specialization on drug trafficking, thus acquiring the name of *narcos*, in accordance with the predominant activity they carried out. In this particular case, the major role is played by the so-called “cartels”, which, according to Howard Abadinsky’s (2010) study, developed as true enterprises built on a complex production system. The realization of cocaine follows the taylorist model of the assembly-line on international scale, such that each phase of the production process takes place in a different country. The *modus operandi* of the Colombian Mafia best emerges in the way in which the Medellin Cartel operates, under the control of the “jefe de jefes” Pablo Escobar (Abadinsky, 2010). The target-area for sales was the United States, while the operational bases for processing the product were located in Peru and Bolivia – in particular, the laboratories were set up in the middle of the Amazon rainforest so as to keep it from prying eyes. As the cartel accumulated capital, Escobar aimed to invest in its business

in order to enhance it, increase it and innovate it. It is worth mentioning that the structural model of a hierarchical, capillary and centralized functioning that made the criminal strategy of the Medellin Cartel infallible was replicated by other Colombian Mafias, such as the Cali Cartel. This similarity allowed professor Abadinsky to build up a model for drug trafficking organizations. What sets Colombian cartels apart from other criminal drug trafficking organizations is the attention to details. The functionality of the empire set up by the Colombians lies in the progressive segmentation of the business complex. It develops in 5 fundamental phases which are: manufacturing, transportation, distribution, finance, and security. They are conducted under the careful discretion of three fundamental structural components, namely the Colombian headquarters, the regional directors and the cells (Figure 2). The Colombian headquarters gives orders, which are transmitted according to the "wireless phone" method to all ranks of the organization. The orders first reach the designates, whose directives, transmitted by mobile phone, e-mail or fax, are submitted to the regional directors. Each regional director is assigned a region beyond the Colombian border where the organization operates through its branches. Each region includes several cells whose minimum size equals to ten members coordinated by a head. Every cell is functional to a precise purpose, be it distribution, money laundering, storage or transport. Moreover, crucially, any cell-associate is completely unaware of which activities are performed by whom in the other cells (Abadinsky, 2010).

Figure 2. Compartmentalization of the Colombian Drug Organization



Source: H. Abadinsky (2010) *Organized Crime*, pp. 166

However, in accordance with the theory of functional diversification which this dissertation aims to support, the Colombian organized crime, specifically referring to the case of the Medellin Cartel, persisted in renewing the pattern of behavior already observed on the Russian Mafia, Yakuza and Italian Mafia: the consolidation of protection racket in the territories of origin. The Colombian instance is especially relevant for best exemplifying the notion of “monopoly of violence” first proposed by Max Weber. It is the case that Colombian *narcos* are known for performing a considerable level of violence which even overcomes the standard criminal parameters, also due to the joint effort of paramilitary groups. The Medellin Cartel indeed, during the 80’s, mobilized to strengthen a criminal network centralized to Medellin and spread all over Colombia for purposes of security and protection against any threat, so that the organization managed to gain control on 300 groups of common criminals – not affiliated to the Cartel itself. Moreover, when the security of a member of the Ochoa family, a clan affiliated to the Medellin Cartel, was under threat, the criminal organization opted for the creation of an instrument to deploy violence: the MAS (*Muerte a Secuestradores*). This dates back 1981 when Marta Nieves was kidnapped by the M-19, a left-wing revolutionary group which asked 1 million dollars for her to be released. This was the catalyst for the establishment of the MAS which took action by eradicating any suspected of being involved in the kidnapping of the Ochoa's sister (Abadinsky, 2010).

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter I have exposed an overview of the organized crime migratory phenomenon towards non-traditional territories, analyzing the relative cause-effect relationship. Drawing on the scientific literature about studies on Mafia movement, I have supported the theoretical paradigm, first proposed by Campana (2011a-b), known as functional diversification. To show the merits of this theory I have deeply analyzed the path made by Camorra, and three non-Italian cases of the phenomenon under scrutiny, the Yakuza, the Russian and the Colombian Mafia, in relation to the above-mentioned theory. Empirical evidence suggested that migration actually coincides with a business turn of the organized crime, in view of the fact that the latter, when in non-traditional areas, does not propose as an alternative to its legal counterpart – the state – through the use of violence, rather it exploits the new territory for purely economic reasons geared to profit. As it can be evinced by observing Camorra and the three case studies reported above, considering that the mafia organization may be pushed to move given due to force-majeure determinants, it is important to emphasize that the mafioso still

tends to seek an economic gain in the act of moving elsewhere, and this is evident from the strategic evaluation made before selecting a target-area.

In the next chapter, then, I will confer to my final dissertation a scientific evidence-based footprint through a careful study on the material gathered on the mob expansion throughout all over Italy. Precisely, I will focus on a set of datas concerning those assets of economic use which has been sized to Camorra, Cosa Nostra e 'Ndrangheta since the 1980s. On the basis of the considerations made in this chapter, I would then be able to test the said assumptions with real numbers, so as to further corroborate the thesis that I have sustained so far.

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION: ASSETS SEIZED TO MAFIA

3.1 Introduction

On the basis of the chronological excursus of the mafia penetration in Northern Italy, a case examined as an example of criminal colonization of non-traditional areas, it has been possible to hypothesize an economic-oriented criminal expansion. In the second chapter, direct evidence has been given regarding the phenomenon through the axonometric and scientific cross-section of multiple criminal dynamics on an international scale; in particular, I have had an insight into the evolution of criminal enterprises such as the Japanese Mafia aka Yakuza , the Russian and Colombian Mafias (more precisely linked to drug trafficking cartels) and the Camorra. The question to which this dissertation aims to answer is whether, in the shift to non-traditional areas, the Mafia subject assumes a behavioral profile which is different from the one adopted and maintained in the territories of origin. The historical chronology of the penetration of Mafia organizations in Northern Italy, specifically of Sicily and Calabria, and the scientific analysis of the real phenomenon, widening the margin of investigation to an international perspective, suggest a correlation between the colonizing variable and the economic one. In this regard, the third chapter is built on a careful examination of a dataset of assets confiscated from the Mafia at the national level from the 1980s to today. The analysis is divided into decades, in such a way as to obtain a more detailed crescendo of the phenomenon in proportion to the referred geolocation. The objective is to demonstrate that the Mafia has not only emerged from traditional boundaries, but has gradually moved and strengthened the economic facet to new areas, which correspond to non-traditional areas in the study of the dataset that will follow. The source from which I gathered the data is Open Re.G.I.O., an online platform created and managed by the National Agency for the Administration of Seized and Confiscated Assets for Organized Crime (ANBSC). The portal is divided into two sections: a public one whose data can be freely consulted by the public, and a reserved section through which the assets are assigned, so that only the competent institutions can access them. The purpose of this service is to inform and sensitize the Italian population to the Mafia phenomenon through a clear picture that effectively shows the ongoing Mafia grip on the national territory.

3.2 The dataset gathered on seized assets

The data that I have chosen to analyse from Open Re.G.I.O. cover a lapse of time equal to four decades, from the 1980s (we recall that in 1982 the Rognoni-La Torre law was issued by consequently legalizing the process of confiscation of the Mafia assets), up to the present day, part of the last decade of the 2010s. I have classified the geographical areas under study as “Traditional” and “Non-traditional”, so as to clearly detect the path undergone by Mafia organizations. The first category includes the regions of origin of the criminal organizations of 'Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra, the ones studied in the first chapter, and Camorra in the second one. The category of non-traditional areas covers all the other Italian regions instead. Since the focus of my research is the business turn of organized crime, I have chosen to aim attention at those assets that can lend themselves to economic use. As for the type of confiscated assets, it stood out between goods of general nature and companies.

Goods of general nature with possible economic use include the following categories:

- **Ground:** Agricultural land, Land with rural building, Undefined land, Building land;
- **Real estate unit for commercial and industrial use:** Warehouse, Local and storage, Shop and / or shop, Laboratory for arts and crafts, Stable and / or stables, Industrial building, Building / Sports hall, Other, Undefined;
- **Real estate unit for accommodation and collective uses:** Hotel, Pension, Nursing Home, Hospital, Mill, Credit institution, exchange and insurance, Outbuilding and special business needs, Undefined unit;
- **Other real estate unit:** Building under indivisible construction.

Comprising all the four decades under scrutiny, the aforementioned categories make up 5,315 seized goods of general nature labelled for being potentially used for economic ends against 7,220 non-economic ones and 318 classified as undefined, and so, excluded from the computation. This third category includes those goods whose definition, as uncertain, did not allow me to establish with certainty the purpose of their use.

What follows sums up the dataset related to the goods of general nature in its entirety.

Table 1. Absolute and relative frequencies of seized goods by type (economic, non-economic and undefined)

	1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s		
General Goods	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined
Traditional	420	407	24	1574	2798	68	1605	1840	102	431	383	57
Non-Traditional	15	32	1	412	771	9	655	1402	30	203	358	27
Total	435	439	25	1986	3569	77	2260	3242	132	634	741	84
Traditional	96,60%	92,70%		79,30%	78,40%		71%	56,80%		68%	51,70%	
Non-Traditional	3,40%	7,30%		20,70%	21,60%		29%	43,20%		32%	48,30%	

The companies, on the other hand, have all been classified under the heading of economic use, belonging to them by nature. The data comprises companies of persons (simple company, general partnership and limited partnership), joint stock companies (joint stock company, limited liability company), cooperative societies (cooperative society, co-operative limited liability company), consortium companies (Consortium), individual companies and finally associations. Companies seized from the mafia cover a wide variety of sectors, such as:

- Agriculture, hunting and forestry;
- Fishing, fish farming and related services;
- Buildings;
- Transportation, storage and communications;
- Wholesale-retail trade, vehicle repair, personal property, home;
- Hotels and restaurants;
- Financial activities;
- Real estate, rental, IT, research, business services;
- Other public, social and personal services;
- Mining extraction;
- Health and social assistance;
- Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water;
- Manufacturing activities;
- Other;

As we will see later, the sectoral nature of the confiscated companies is relevant to outline the profile (governance vs. trading) that Mafia assumes respectively in the two macro-regions concerned, namely the traditional and non-traditional ones. In particular, we expect that the sectoral incidence relative to the primary sector, index of a backward economy, is more concentrated in the territories of origin where the Mafia interest is mainly aimed at the function of governing, through the protection racket and use of violence, threatening the legitimacy of its legal counterpart, the state. On the contrary, in the colonized regions we expect a convergence of investments in those sectors that best lend themselves to the capitalist facet, meaning profit and recycling-oriented, given the purpose that the Mafia pursues in these territories. It is also expected that, based on the number and type of confiscated goods and companies, the Mafia will show a progressive shift of its economic-entrepreneurial activity from the territories of origin to the non-traditional ones, increasingly distinguishing, through a gradual process, the nature of their activities based on the place where they are carried out.

What follows sums up the dataset related to the goods of general nature in its entirety.

Table 2. Absolute and relative frequencies of seized companies by geographical area


	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Companies	27	186	320	78
Traditional	4	105	165	35
Non-Traditional				
Total	31	291	485	113
Traditional	87,10%	63,90%	66%	69%
Non-Traditional	12,90%	26,10%	34%	31%

The analysis will proceed as follows: first of all, it will be statistically analysed the frequency related to the seizure of goods of general nature for economic use and companies taken in an aggregate manner all over the four decades, from the 1980s to the present days. Following, the study of the two subjects considered individually, always focusing on the economic purpose of the confiscated good as the lowest common denominator. Finally, an insight into the development of the sectoral distribution of the seized companies over the four decades, so that to infer a potential strategical path undergone by Mafia organizations in following their logic of business expansion.

3.3. Descriptive statistics of seized companies and goods for economic scope: the aggregate trend

In the first decade, that is starting from the 1980s, it is possible to notice how the colonizing phenomenon is still at the beginning of what, as we shall see, will in effect be an economic transplantation. As we can infer from the graph below (Figure 3), the territories of origin initially affirm their hegemonic position both from the point of view of governance and of trading, appropriating almost 96 percent of goods for economic use.

Figure 3 – Overall relative frequencies of goods and companies, traditional v. non-traditional areas



On the other hand, the colonized territories are only moving the first steps for what concerns the investments in the legal market, such as the purchase of limited liability companies in the case of companies, or real estate units for commercial and industrial use, and building plots in the case of goods; as well as in the illegal drug trafficking market. In 1983, among the very first 466 assets to be confiscated as a result of art. 416-bis, 20 of them are found to be in non-traditional areas, but all set in Lombardy. The trend in support of the thesis that this dissertation aims to sustain clearly emerges between the first and the second decade. As a matter of fact, from the two thematic maps below related to the assets seized in the first decade (Figure 4) and in the second one (Figure 5), it stands

out a decline in the Mafia industrial activity concerning the original territories in favour of non-traditional areas during the 90's. It is in these years that the mafia macro-area *par excellence* loses its confiscation primacy, moving 20% of its investments in the new lands. In this second decade, the mafia companies committed themselves to making their own coffers profitable with ransoms obtained from the seizure season. The mafia money thus acquires a different connotation, it is accumulated and invested to accumulate even more and reinvest it again so as to feed a criminal fund that was to constitute the backbone of all the mafia industrial activity gradually forming.

Figure 4 – Map of assets seized in the 1980s





Figure 5 – Map of assets seized in the 1990s



As for the third decade, the 2000s, the trend progresses uniformly, albeit marginally compared to the previous timespan. In these years, 1/3 of the mafia industry known as Mafia S.p.a. flourishes outside the territorial boundary and the criminal move keeps on going also in the last decade, at the same time as today. The trend followed by the Mafia economic strategy persists in favour of the thesis that I intend to support. However, the slowdowns that characterize the current time leave room for interesting hypotheses about the confiscation activity, also concerning the geolocation of the Mafia economy. For example, looking at the data, it cannot be excluded that, according to an extremely

gradual process, the colonized territories will constitute the new frontier of criminal entrepreneurship in the near future, thus limiting the traditional areas to the sole activity of governance. It is important to underline that the percentage decline in the Mafia motherland does not describe a real decrease in absolute terms. In fact, the assets confiscated in aggregate form in the three traditional regions of Sicily, Calabria and Campania amounted to 447 in the first decade, before growing to 1,760 in the second one and reaching its peak with 1,925 in the 2000s. The following maps show a comparison between the assets seized up to 1990s (Figure 6) and up to 2010s (Figure 7), structured upon the purpose to present even more clearly how the trend affirms its direction, even less strongly.

Figure 6 – Map of assets seized up to the 1990s





Figure 7 – Map of assets seized up to the 2010s



This growth is indeed accompanied, always in absolute value, to a growth of confiscations in the colonized territories, which in this way, shapes the percentage in a clear and distinct way, such that every change has a specular feedback in the counterpart macro-region. What follows is the structured analysis of the incidence in relation to seized companies and goods for economic purposes considered in an aggregate manner.


Table 3. Absolute and relative frequencies of seized assets (economic, non-economic and undefined)

	1980s			1990s			2000s			2010s		
Assets	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined	Eco	Non Eco	Undefined
Traditional	447	407	24	1760	2798	68	1925	1840	102	509	383	57
Non-Traditional	19	32	1	517	771	9	820	1402	30	238	358	27
Total	466	439	25	2277	3569	77	2745	3242	132	747	741	84
Traditional	95,90%	92,70%		77,30%	78,40%		70%	56,80%		68%	51,70%	
Non-Traditional	4,10%	7,30%		22,70%	21,60%		30%	43,20%		32%	48,30%	

3.3.1 Descriptive statistics of seized goods for economic scope

On the other hand, it is curious to note that the trend changes once the subjects under scrutiny are divided, that means, by analysing separately the seizure-incidence of goods of general nature for economic use and companies. For what concerns the goods of general nature, confiscation develops similarly to the aggregate trend, if not even slightly more marked. For real, it is precisely the tendency shown by goods to constitute the dominant frequency which then emerges from the aggregate analysis, hiding the peculiar trend of the companies which develops differently and will be later exposed. This is given by the numerical superiority of the sample of goods of general nature for economic use which amounts to a total of 5,340 goods against 934 total companies over all the four decades.

Figure 8 - Relative incidence of seized economic goods over the four decades, traditional v. non-traditional areas



The graph above shows a real displacement of the criminal economic activity through the course of time. After the setbacks suffered in the first years of the Rognoni-La Torre law and subsequent anti-mafia legislation, it seems that for every asset confiscated in the territories of origin, the mafia has conquered as many of them outside the traditional borders. For this reason, we can infer from the dataset analysed that there is substantial truth in the theories drawn by the scientific literature exposed in the previous chapter, testifying a colonial expansion in an economic mold. Evidence of the change in the geo-distribution of investments for what concerns this category of assets is given by the maps that follow, thanks to thematic representation of the goods of general nature for economic scope seized first in the 1980s (Figure 9) compared to the ones seized in the current decade (Figure 10).

Figure 9. Map of economic goods seized in the 1980s






Figure 10. Map of economic goods seized in the 2010s



3.3.2. Descriptive statistics of companies

Unlike the attitude emerged so far, the confiscation trend that characterizes companies shows a completely opposite trend, thus representing an interesting point for reflection. As can be seen by looking at the graph below (Figure 11), in the first two decades the trend of the subject under review follows the aggregated one. The data clearly show us that in the 80's the economic variable had already strongly impacted the Mafia expansion to the point of already enjoying 13% of activities in extraneous territories. In the second decade, following the above models, industrial investments in the colonized areas reach almost 40%, a percentage that even in the last few days, respectively, we observed in the previous charts. In fact, the trend that the companies show, remembering that they are all classified as assets for economic use, appears even sharper and stronger than the previous ones.

Figure 11. Relative frequencies of seized Companies over the four decades, traditional v. non-traditional areas



However, once reached its peak, it would seem that, from the 90's onwards, Mafia has upset its business growth plan, re-orienting its investments towards the lands of origin, always considering the hypothesis that there may have been more actual investments in non-traditional regions, which have nevertheless gone unnoticed, thus escaping the judiciary authorities. Evidence suggests that, in the third decade, the confiscation trend grows in the mother country of the Mafia to abandon the fruitful colonized lands, performing this attitude until today. To the end of displaying this curious anomaly, I have compared the geo-distribution of companies seized in the first decade (Figure 12) with a prospect of companies seized up to the 2000s (Figure 13).

Figure 12. Map of companies seized in the 1980s





Figure 13. Map of companies seized up to the 2000s



Once again, it would be interesting to analyse the phenomenon over the years to come, so as to better understand the extent of such fluctuations. For the moment, I have considered emblematic to have an insight into the sectors of specialization of the companies seized from the Mafia, in such a way as to have a more precise framework on the strategic moves made by the criminal organizations with the aim of producing and recycling money, but also circumventing the risk of being discovered in the conduct of one's business crime. We recall that the phenomenon this dissertation proposes to analyse is the progressive industrialization of Mafia groups which intensifies with the colonial process. This concern in no way excludes the presence or the continuity of a criminal economic activity in the territories of origin. Indeed, it is precisely in the motherland that the Mafia entity develops first to replace an absent political authority and later to accumulate dirty capital. This thesis suggests rather an enlargement as well as strengthening of the economic activity *per se* that finds its maximum realization in new areas, industrial poles purposely studied by the Mafia as targets to be hit. Considering the anomaly that the overlying trend presents, it is interesting to investigate, as previously mentioned, whether this is the potential result of a sectorial strategy developed by organized crime after the growing peak of confiscations in non-traditional areas recorded in the first decades. In fact, there are more or less risky areas to be detected in the judiciary which, as we will see later, are appealing to the Mafia's thirst for profit.


3.4 Analysis of seized companies by type

In the following pages, the spotlight will be placed on the incidence of the industrial sectors which the companies confiscated from Mafia belong to during the last forty years, studying a national scale. The percentages constructed on the analysis of the dataset are relative to the frequency of each industrial category with respect to the sample of the total companies seized in a given decade and in a given area (traditional or non-traditional). The aim is to trace the entrepreneurial path followed by the Mafia in order to understand the reasons driving the investments.

3.4.1 Frequencies of investments in companies by type in the 1980s


As regards traditional territories, more than half of the confiscated companies belongs to the construction sector. The second most diffused activity is that of the transports as much as the one of social and personal public services and, above all, of the retail trade and hotel sector. The activities that are registered with the least investments are rather agricultural, real estate and manufacturing ones. The study made on these first data makes evident that even the primary sector shows, it is not so strong, since most of the investments are poured into the construction sector of which the Mafia holds the reins through the corrupt system of public tenders.

Figure 14. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in traditional territories (1980s)



On the other hand, for non-traditional territories, as much as 75% of companies are in the real estate sector, while 25% are in construction. In recent years, no other sector has been touched by the mob in virgin areas. Conversely, if it is the case, the authorities do not know it yet.


Figure 15. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in non-traditional territories (1980s)



3.4.2. Frequencies of investments in companies by type in the 1990s

In this second decade, the absolute number of companies grows exponentially. For the traditional areas, the construction sector remains the predominant one (42%), although slightly decreasing, selling 20% of the investments to the wholesale sector. In addition, it can be observed that the few sectors present in the first decade marginally fall, so as to allow the sectoral expansion of the Mafia grip to a wider radius. In the 90's the mafia has come to exert a *tout court* control, not only for governance but also in economic terms. In addition to extortion activities, the proceeds flow from every industrial field, covering all 14 sectors under analysis. The category of fishing, fish farming and related activities, the financial activities, health and social assistance, production and distribution of electricity, gas and water are therefore added, and the "Other" category also appears, including those companies that are not precisely framed because of mixed nature. ‘


Figure 16. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in traditional territories (1990s)



Compared to the 80's, in this decade the proportion of companies confiscated between the two macro-geographical areas drops significantly from 7: 1 to 2: 1, an extremely evident change from the percentages favouring a relative growth in the colonized territories. In this period, even in the non-traditional territories, there seems to be a kind of strategic diversification in the investment portfolio. However, in these regions the hiding of criminal activities, as can be seen from the statistics, was not very successful. It is important to stress that it is precisely the confiscation variable that hijacks the investment plan. The prospect of a huge profit is in fact a necessary but not sufficient condition to invest capital in one sector rather than another. The Mafia aims to reduce the risk of confiscation and seizure of the assets of the organization, and it is precisely for this reason that the target that goes for the most is characterized by corporate laws that facilitate recycling. Whether it is an emerging sector, poorly regulated or whose legislation is constantly evolving, it will certainly be preferred to others subject to strong regulation and / or controls. Thus, the growth recorded in non-traditional territories may be the result of a lack of attention by the Mafia subject in being cautious enough to perform such activities, or alternatively to a choice of fallacious investments. In fact, there is a substantial decrease in the previously dominant sector, namely the real estate sector that plunges to 31,1 %, in favour of the first positive signs registered in transportation, storage and communications, financial activities,

other public , social and personal services, health and social assistance, "Other" but above all the trading sector, that from zero comes to touch a fifth of the mafia financial job. It is opportune to consider that in the non-traditional areas the mob does not, unlike it usually does in the South, detain the power necessary to facilitate relations with the administrations, or to guarantee easy access to political representation and thus to public procurement. As a result, those sectors that in the South result to be "attractive" for the way to access them, which is entirely protected against risks given the network of corruption used to make screen, are not as effective as those built in the territories of origin. On the other hand, the Mafia in these areas, as has already been stated, did not come to govern, but to trade. Therefore, the inclusion of those sectors such as public services, transport and health in the portfolio of mafia investments in non-traditional areas is highly risky.


Figure 17. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in non-traditional territories (1990s)



3.4.3. Frequencies of investments in companies by type in the 2000s


At the beginning of the 90's the trend already proven in the aggregate statistical incidence reached its peak. However, as can be seen from the graph above, from that point on the trend proceeds in the opposite direction. Despite not affirming itself in a marked way, the percentage of confiscated companies actually continues to increase in the traditional areas, finding less and less losses in the entrepreneurial sphere in the regions not of origin. For this reason, I think it is appropriate to have an insight into the economic activities that the mafia has mostly affected in this third decade, namely the 2000s. In traditional areas the largest number of confiscated companies persists in the construction sector even if increasingly in decline, approaching the 30 percent. The trading sector also declined slightly but lost the second place in the mob financial target-list, which is occupied rather by the "Other" category with 78 companies, open to 24.6%. In addition to this, there has been growth, even insignificant, in agriculture, hunting and forestry, transportation, storage and communications, hotels and restaurants, real estate and production and distribution of electricity, gas and water. So, the Mafia strategy now aims, on the one hand, to strengthen a part of a primary economy that does not require particular professional skills or technological innovation. Traditional or low-tech activities are in fact favoured by criminal organizations, as they guarantee high profit margins without requiring high research and development costs. Considering that in these areas the primary objective is the control of the territory, priority is given to activities strongly linked to the territory and with a widespread distribution (tourism sector, catering, or large-scale distribution), able to guarantee visibility to the Mafia organizations and allow influence the local economy. On the other hand, even the sector of public procurement (transport) and subsidies (production of renewable energy with wind and photovoltaic plants, or non-renewable one) favours criminal organizations in controlling the territory, considering that, through the management of subcontracting and of supplies, they are able to offer or deny work to certain companies, thus controlling certain sectors of the legal economy.

Figure 18. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in traditional territories (2000s)



As for the regions included in the colonized macro-area, we see how the investments completely change direction. The category of wholesale conquers the hegemonic position in the range of recycling, constituting it alone 1/3 of the investments. In return, there is a strong percentage reduction in real estate activity that previously dominated the industrial field, in buildings that fall by 10%, and in the hotel industry. This progressive decrease, however, allowed a further diversification of portfolios that allowed the mob to extend its grip on 11 of the 14 sectors studied.

Figure 19. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in non-traditional territories (2000s)




3.4.4. Frequencies of investments in companies by type in the 2010s

As previously anticipated by the graph including the entire trend that extends over the four decades, nowadays the number of companies confiscated in the mother territories continues to grow, albeit very slowly, mirroring a decline in its geographical counterpart. However, recent data show a progressive depression in the diversification of industrial activities. The target types on which the mafia focus within the original boundaries are reduced to the following, ordered by increasing incidence:

- Manufacturing, Transport and Fishing equal to 1.3 percent;
- The primary agricultural sector at 2.5 percent;
- Wholesale trade with a small 6.3 percent;
- Other public and social services at 7.6 percent;
- 8.9 percent hotel industry;
- Constructions that persist in the proportion corresponding to the previous decade, equal to 27.8 percent;
- The "Other" category which alone accounts for almost half of the investments equal to 43 percent;


Figure 20. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in traditional territories (2010s)



In addition to a frightening reduction in the scope of confiscations, the mob seems to have abandoned its business in 5 of 14 industrial sectors, reconstructing an economic plan similar to that of the 80's. In fact, compared to the initial figures that constituted the starting point of our scientific

inquiry, the number of company confiscations in these lands has now doubled, while maintaining, at the end of the day, the influence on half of the existing industrial activities that also correspond to the most profitable sectors for the primary and local economy. Similar to the case just analysed, even in non-traditional areas there is a prominent reduction of the Mafia industrial activity, which is now only devoted to the construction, commercial, tourism, real estate, public and social services sectors and "Other" which here too gets 45.6 percent of the investments. Each data related to other sectors is equal to zero.

Figure 21. Frequencies of seized companies by type of industrial sector in non-traditional territories (2010s)



We can see how the mob chooses to keep alive only some of the vast range of activities confiscated in previous decades. It can also be deduced that the sectoral impact varies according to the territory chosen. In fact, in the colonized areas the agricultural, transport, fishing or manufacturing sectors are going to extinguish, while, as we have seen, they remain standing in the other geographical section. In their place, rather, in this set of regions, investments in the real estate industry persist and, even if slightly decreased, trade remains a predominant constant in the investment strategy. Part of the latter

remains the construction sector, although in the time frame analysed, it never covered the same importance received in the territories of origin.

CONCLUSION

What I proposed to investigate in the elaboration of my final dissertation is the behavioral nature of the Mafia subject in non-traditional areas. I started my research from the "how", that is, asking myself how the Mafia bosses had arrived in the north in the 50's; to this end, I looked for the key reasons that catalyzed colonization. As we saw in the first chapter, I discovered that, hidden between the thousands of southern migrants in the North due to the failure of agricultural reforms, there were also the leaders among the most powerful *'ndrine* and Mafia clans, obliged to migrate under the law of forced resettlement. With unpleasant surprise but also curiosity, I have discovered that the abovementioned law turned to be a failure. It was meant to eradicate an evil that alone contains all the flaws of our country: corruption, violence, extortion, blackmail, money and silence. Nonetheless, it worked in the opposite direction, triggering if not even speeding the idea of criminal colonization. What could the mob have ever done in an area where nobody knew it and could fear it? Mafia had been obliged to move, but it knew how to take advantage on this obligation. Important figures of these criminal organizations like Joe Adonis and Giacomo Zagari began to familiarize themselves with the territory and with the villagers, both native and immigrants from their own lands of origin. They manage to weave an inter-relational network which, in due time, became a weapon to be used against the same state that made them bend the knee, or better, that believed in the success of the legislative weapon. However, deepening my research on the mob-related events in the north, I noticed that the intentions of the "colonizers" were not clear. We know for sure that the Mafia was born to compensate for the lack of a political authority incapable of providing for the welfare as well as for the provision of services to its citizens, bearing in mind the very concept of "accountability". It is no coincidence that the Mafia phenomenon originated and grew up in the southern areas where the political elite, or rather the king, was in fact a myth, a legend that no one had ever seen since, although those territories where under his jurisdiction, he did not exercise the territorial control in first person. In light of this, it seems unusual that the Mafia could have been successfully imported in regions historically known for their strong social capital, civic sense and cohesion in the political community. As a matter of fact, I understood that the reasons for the success of Mafia colonization should not be sought by studying a political variable, but an economic one. The mob was not interested in performing a function of governance in the North, or at least not directly, since the real interests were around the use of illicit proceeds. The patrimony of Mafia accumulated in the traditional areas had in fact reached exponential dimensions such that it could no longer go unnoticed and the organizations needed new sectors and new economic entities on which to invest in order to cancel their dirty provenance. The North was and still is an industrial center that offered many opportunities to those

who had a flair for business and even more to those who had assets available to be spent, thus excluding the need to resort to loans or mortgages. Hence, once established properly in the new lands, the Mafias began to invest in lands (building plots, agricultural ones or for indefinite use), in buildings and in companies (many of them through dummies). Part of the game were accountants, bankers, financial experts and lawyers who offered their expertise for black profit. In this way, the mob in the north started to do business, and not just to recycle. Once the recycling mechanisms were understood, the criminal organizations went further and started illegal activities such as drug trafficking, which in Milan reached an international dimension for the neuralgic position, the marketing of the precious and, no less important, the seizures. The seizures have indeed played a fundamental role in the business turn of Mafia. We recall that the "compensation" accumulated from the families of the victims was specifically spent in the reconstruction of numerous buildings in Calabria in order to maintain if not nourish the social consensus where the mob has usurped the political primacy of the state. Analyzing the steps taken by Cosa Nostra and the "Ndrangheta, I understood how the economic facet took on more and more meaning in the criminal behavior patterns identified in the new lands. However, as we well know, despite the historical evidence of the criminal path of the two Calabrian and Sicilian organizations, it is not possible to construct a thesis that is objectively true and that therefore responds to my initial hypothesis. In this regard, I decided to compare my results with non-Italian subjects considered as Mafias as well by the scientific literature in this field. I therefore analyzed criminal organizations in states whose historical context at the time of the Mafia birth was initially unknown to me. Hence, I had to investigate whether the economic, political and social conditions at the time of the formation of these organizations were as close as possible to those in which we saw the development of Cosa Nostra and "Ndrangheta, so as to consider the international crime as a kind of control group for research purposes. Comparing the cases of Yakuza (Japanese mafia), Russian Mafia and Colombian Mafia I identified significant contexts of political fragility which were similar to the ones favouring the development of Italian mafias, such as the unification of the feuds in Japan, the years of the famous "perestroika" in Russia and a climate of tension for the guerrillas in Colombia studded with M-19, a radical left-wing insurgency group and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) that already questioned the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence, in Weberian terms. Later, I studied the internationalization of these criminal groups, which also landed on non-traditional territories even beyond the national border. By adopting a broader perspective, I understood the existence of a plurality of factors such that Mafias around the world move, occupy and colonize new territories. In the field of scientific research these are defined as push and pull factors. Among the push factors I have detected the migratory waves, such as a higher probability that there is a criminal subject in the multitude of migrants during

migratory waves; the implementation of law enforcement policies (as in the case of the Georgian mob exiled in Russia, or of the more famous forced resettlement); the Mafia wars due to which, for example, the boss of a well-known Russian organization like Solntsevskaya moved to Italy to escape the ongoing feuds, thus foiling the decapitation of his own clan. In addition to these, we must consider the attraction factors as well, be them the most attractive aspects of a territory that make it a potential target in the Mafia strategic expansion plan, considering the case in which the migration is not forced by external factors but intentional. In support of my thesis, the primary variable that is essential to what we have defined as "business turn" is the presence of a particularly "porous" economic fabric, not excessively controlled or protected by anti-mafia laws and including sectors of easy penetration. In light of this, I would say that this precise Mafia calculation is an indication of a purely economic purpose and, not directly projected to the governing function, but of trading. This line of reasoning has been clearly explained by Campana in his theory of "functional diversification", which supports the specificity of the function of the Mafia poles in a given territory. This leads us to consider the increasingly concrete hypothesis that the mob changes its *modus operandi* depending on where it is found to be, and therefore, of the functionality that its presence assumes. This logical construct takes shape from the analysis of empirical evidence, ie case studies such as those mentioned above that through a careful analysis allow the elaboration of a paradigm that, although refutable and not universally true, nonetheless describes a behavioural pattern that is repeated. On these grounds, the profile of criminal organizations takes on two distinct conformations: the political Mafia and the entrepreneur Mafia. The political Mafia is by definition the first real form of mob, a non-state entity that gradually gains total coverage of the regions of origin, spreading like wildfire and maintaining a centralized "government". This structure allowed the effective procurement of protection rackets, wear and violence. On the other hand, the entrepreneur Mafia, as we know, was born and had grown patchily in the form of subsidiary branches of the organization's brain, which is preserved in its entirety in the territories of origin - remember Carmelo Novella's foiled attempt to make the branches in the North independent from the *crimine* ('Ndrangheta headquarters) in Calabria. The foundation of the secondary offices was specific and functional to trading, which, unlike a governance project, does not require neither a centralized organization nor a hierarchical one. The branch is in fact an economic one charged with carrying out the orders given by the headquarters in the mother country, strengthening its capitalist imprint. With the aim of giving further empirical truth to the theory on which my thesis is based, I used a dataset provided by Open Re.G.I.O. on the frequency of assets confiscated throughout Italy since the 1980s when the Rognoni-La Torre law was issued, up to nowadays, hence covering four decades. The study of the dataset has been addressed in the third chapter from which I have drawn the following conclusions. The Mafia phenomenon has shown a

growing "diversification" of investments from areas of origin to colonized ones, particularly for real estate and territorial assets. Overall, the trend is evident in all four decades, clearly emerging between the 80's and 90's and then continuing, even if only marginally, to the present day. The results represent an interesting spectrum to be explored through the study of the phenomenon in the years to come, raising a dual hypothesis such that the tendency for Mafia seizures could persist, even if progressing gradually, or be completely extinguished, considering the progressive decline of goods seized throughout the nation in absolute terms. For what concerns companies alone the trend has indeed taken an interesting turn since the 1990s, reversing the direction. This translates into a percentage increase in industrial activities confiscated in traditional territories, with a consequent proportional decrease in the same in the colonized areas. Given the unexpected result, I decided to have an insight into the sectors of the said industrial activities, in order to reconstruct a potential investment strategy that would have explained the anomaly of the aforementioned trend. From the analysis carried out, it emerged that the choice to invest in certain sectors have had to do with the success, or with failure in other cases, of the Mafia penetration in the economic fabric. In particular it is important to emphasize that the industrial plan of criminal organizations differs according to the territory in which it is actually implemented. Nonetheless, there is a constant to be considered in both areas of interest (traditional and otherwise), namely that the Mafia subject makes his decisions in order to maximize profits and minimize risks. When the investment comes to life in the area of origin it has as its ultimate goal the strengthening of social consensus, which is why the Mafias will concentrate mostly on sectors that do not need skilled labor such as agriculture and construction in such a way to be able to increase the level of local employment. Moreover, where the control of the territory is well established, the mob is strong in corrupting the competent administration and infiltrating those "screen" sectors which, regulated by the public administration and therefore by public procurement, reduce competition, such as infrastructure, public services and transport. On the contrary, in non-traditional areas where the Mafioso undertakes to pursue a purely capitalist and prestigious project, the sectorial distribution of investments differs. Given the inferiority of power exercised over the territory, the mob concentrates less on the "screen" ones and more on those with widespread distribution, possibility of recycling and moderate business risk such as the tourism sector, catering, the real estate sector and large-scale retail trade. In conclusion, I think that the phenomenon I aimed to study in the process of writing this dissertation deserves more attention than it is currently receiving. Understanding how Mafia moves, the way in which it behaves and why may be a precious starting point to design effective policies of contrast. Also, I find valuable the contribution that convicted Mafiosi can make to help the public authorities to have an insight in this criminal dimension and the mechanisms regulating the whole organizations. All things considered,

even though there is still much to do and even more to improve in dealing with the phenomenon of organized crime, I am grateful to those men like Pio La Torre, Virginio Rognoni, Franco Borsellino and Giovanni Falcone who stood up to defend our country while knowing the costs for proposing and implementing anti-mafia legislation to start this war. At the same time, I also appreciate the effort of those scholars who have committed themselves to study Mafia and shed a light on what many people still consider as a myth.

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RIASSUNTO

Introduzione

La criminalità organizzata a stampo mafioso è stata, ed è ad oggi, un fenomeno attivo sia nel panorama politico che in quello economico della nostra nazione. È interessante notare come nonostante l'entità mafiosa non giovi di presupposti legali per operare, essa riesca comunque a sussistere conquistando il tacito consenso del pubblico che la pone in essenza e la alimenta; il riconoscimento da parte di un ampio spettro di elettori dell'approvvigionamento di servizi alternativi esercitati dalla criminalità organizzata ha soppiantato la naturale predilezione ad appellarsi alle autorità legittimamente elette. In quest'ottica, la mafia concorre con lo stato per esercitare autorità politica, attivandosi nell'estrazione di risorse, nell'uso della violenza e nel fornire servizi ad un prezzo competitivo. Tuttavia, sarebbe estremamente riduttivo definire il fenomeno mafioso nella fattispecie politica senza considerare in modo alcuno il suo lato "capitalista", il quale, secondo la mia ricerca, si è sviluppato in concomitanza ad un'altra variabile, ossia l'espansione territoriale su luoghi vergini alla contaminazione mafiosa. Di particolare interesse è perciò il nesso tra la progressiva industrializzazione della mafia e la mobilità verso aree non tradizionali, descrivendo un piano di crescita in queste nuove terre in cui vengono fondate filiali sussidiarie.

Digressione storica della colonizzazione mafiosa del Nord Italia

Ciò che mi sono proposta di indagare nella redazione della mia tesi finale è la natura comportamentale del soggetto mafioso in queste aree a lui sconosciute, nuove e, per l'appunto, da me definite come non-tradizionali. Ho ripercorso le tappe principali della migrazione mafiosa nella mia nazione, la nazione madre della mafia come la conosciamo oggi, per poi scoprire che ogni stato ha saputo produrre a modo suo la propria forma di criminalità organizzata. Ho iniziato la mia ricerca chiedendomi cosa avesse portato la mafia al nord negli anni '50, periodo nel quale si documentano le prime tracce dei boss calabresi e siciliani nei territori che ho analizzato. Alla luce di questi presupposti, ho ricercato le motivazioni cardini che hanno catalizzato la colonizzazione. Come si evince nel primo capitolo, ho scoperto che, mimetizzati tra le migliaia di meridionali migranti al nord a causa del fallimento delle riforme agricole, si nascondevano i leader delle più potenti 'ndrine e cosche mafiose. L'esodo criminale scaturiva come conseguenza diretta dell'istituzione del soggiorno

obbligato, corrispondente alla legge 1423 emanata in Italia nel 1956, la quale innescò un meccanismo di migrazione coatta dei soggetti mafiosi per eccellenza in ambienti a loro del tutto estranei. Nonostante fosse stata concepita con lo scopo di estirpare un male che da solo racchiudeva ogni falla del nostro paese, che si parli di corruzione, violenza, estorsioni, ricatti, denaro sporco ed omertà, il provvedimento legislativo fallì producendo conseguenze disastrose che sussistono ai giorni nostri. Nei fatti, l'ostacolo posto dalla legislazione costituì per le organizzazioni criminali il trampolino di lancio per svoltare su nuovi fronti. Avviene così, Joe Adonis (Cosa Nostra) e Giacomo Zagari ('Ndrangheta) iniziano a familiarizzare con il territorio e con i compaesani, sia nativi che immigrati dalle loro stesse terre d'origine nel meridione. Essi riescono a tessere un *network* di conoscenze che al momento giusto diventa un'arma da utilizzare contro lo stesso stato che li ha messi in ginocchio, o meglio, che credeva di averli messi in ginocchio lontano da casa. Tuttavia, le intenzioni che pilotavano l'idea di riprodurre la mafia al nord non erano chiare. Sappiamo per certo che la mafia nasce per sopperire la mancanza di un'autorità politica incapace di provvedere al benessere nonché all'approvvigionamento di servizi verso i suoi cittadini, facendo fede al concetto stesso di *accountability*. Non a caso il fenomeno mafioso nasce e cresce nelle aree meridionali poiché, sebbene formalmente governate dall'autorità reale vigente, non erano amministrate né controllate in forma diretta, permettendo così ai proprietari terrieri di costruire un micro-cosmo gerarchico non-autorizzato. Alla luce di ciò risulta difficile credere che la mafia sia riuscita a riprodursi e fiorire in regioni ad essa estranee e storicamente esemplari per la presenza di un forte capitale sociale, senso civico e coesione nella comunità politica. Precisamente, ho capito che le ragioni del successo della colonizzazione mafiosa non possono essere estrapolate studiando una variabile politica, bensì economica. Alla mafia non interessava svolgere una funzione di *governance* al nord, o almeno non direttamente, in quanto i veri interessi si aggiravano attorno all'impiego dei proventi illeciti. Il patrimonio mafioso accumulato nelle terre madri aveva di fatto raggiunto dimensioni esponenziali, tali che non sarebbero facilmente sfuggite all'attenzione del potere giudiziario; le organizzazioni necessitavano nuovi settori ma soprattutto nuove entità economiche su cui investire per cancellarne la provenienza illecita. Il nord era (ed è ancora) un polo industriale che offriva molte opportunità a chi aveva fiuto per gli affari e ancora di più a chi aveva un ingente patrimonio a disposizione da impiegare. Pertanto, una volta stabiliti a dovere nelle nuove terre, le mafie iniziarono ad investire in terreni (edificabili e non, agricoli o ad uso indefinito), in immobili e in imprese (molte delle quali tramite prestanome). Parte del gioco erano commercialisti, banchieri, esperti in materia finanziaria e avvocati, i quali mettevano a disposizione le proprie competenze fungendo da articolazione viva tra il tessuto socio-economico preesistente e la rete mafiosa, garantendo così un *surplus* alla loro mensilità. La mafia al nord inizia a fare affari, e non solo per riciclare. Una volta compresi i


meccanicismi di riciclaggio, le organizzazioni criminali si spingono oltre ed avviano attività illegali quali il traffico di droga, che a Milano, snodo nevralgico, raggiunge la dimensione internazionale, lo smercio di preziosi e, non meno importante i sequestri, i quali hanno invero giocato un ruolo fondamentale nel *business turn* mafioso. Contestualmente alla migrazione mafiosa si assiste ad uno sviluppo della variabile economica la quale si arricchisce di significato nei *patterns* comportamentali criminali nelle aree d'approdo del soggiorno obbligato, tanto da trasferire l'attività prettamente economica in questi territori. Tuttavia, come ben sappiamo, nonostante l'evidenza storica del percorso criminale delle organizzazioni calabrese e siciliana, non è possibile costruire una tesi che sia oggettivamente vera e che risponda quindi alla mia ipotesi di partenza. A questo proposito, ho deciso di confrontare il caso studio italiano con degli altri che inquadrassero soggetti non-italiani, comunque definiti come mafie nella letteratura scientifica.

Elaborazione di costrutti teoretici sulla migrazione mafiosa di matrice economica

Non conoscendo ancora il contesto storico né le condizioni economiche e socio-politiche al momento della formazione di queste organizzazioni, ho indagato per scoprire se tali presupposti fossero quanto più affini agli stessi che hanno favorito lo sviluppo di Cosa Nostra e 'Ndrangheta. Comparando i casi di Yakuza (mafia giapponese), Mafia Russa e Colombiana ho preso coscienza delle conseguenze devastanti che possono derivare da un contesto di fragilità politica particolarmente rilevante come, per esempio, l'unificazione dei feudi in Giappone, gli anni della famosa "perestroika" in Russia e un clima di tensione per la guerriglia in Colombia costellata da M-19, un gruppo insurrezionale radicale di sinistra e le FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) che già mettevano in discussione il legittimo monopolio dell'uso della violenza di Weberiana memoria. Successivamente ho studiato il processo di internazionalizzazione di questi gruppi criminali, anch'essi approdati su dei territori non-tradizionali, principalmente oltre il confine nazionale. Adottando una prospettiva più ampia, ho compreso l'esistenza di una pluralità di fattori tali per cui le mafie di tutto il mondo si spostano, occupano nuovi territori e li colonizzano. Nell'ambito della ricerca scientifica questi sono definiti come *push and pull factors*, ossia fattori di spinta ed attrazione. Tra i fattori di spinta ho individuato le ondate migratorie, studiando una probabilità più elevata che vi sia un soggetto criminale nella moltitudine di migranti rispetto ad un contesto ordinario; l'implementazione di politiche di contrasto (come nel caso della mafia georgiana costretta al confino in Russia, o del più noto soggiorno obbligato); le guerre di mafia, più comunemente definite con il nome di faide, a causa delle quali, per esempio, il boss di una nota organizzazione russa come la Solntsevskaya si è

trasferito in Italia per sfuggirne, sventando così la decapitazione del proprio clan. In più, a questi sopraelencati, si aggiungono i fattori di attrazione, ossia gli aspetti più appetibili di un territorio che lo rendono un potenziale target nel piano strategico di espansione mafiosa, considerando il caso in cui la migrazione non sia forzata da fattori esterni ma intenzionale. In supporto alla mia tesi, la variabile precipua che fa gioco-forza a quello che abbiamo definito come *business turn* è la presenza di un tessuto economico particolarmente “poroso”, non eccessivamente controllato o protetto da leggi antimafia e comprendente settori di facile penetrazione. In virtù di ciò, è facile intuire come il cespite analizzato, studiato e calcolato nel computo mafioso sia indice di uno scopo prettamente economico e, non direttamente proiettato alla funzione di *governance*, bensì di *trading*. Emblematico è quindi il principio logico di *functional diversification*, su cui si fonda la celebre teoria di Campana (2011), la quale sostiene un principio di specificità della funzione dei poli mafiosi in aree d’origine e non. Questo porta a considerare l’ipotesi sempre più concreta che la mafia cangi nel suo *modus operandi* a seconda di dove si viene a trovare, e quindi, della funzionalità che la sua presenza assume. Questo costrutto razionale prende forma dall’analisi di un’evidenza empirica riportata da casi studio come quelli sopracitati, grazie ai quali è permessa l’elaborazione di un paradigma che, sebbene confutabile e non universalmente vero, descrive un *pattern* comportamentale che si ripete. Seguendo il medesimo ragionamento, la mafia come entità assume due distinte conformazioni: la mafia politica e la mafia imprenditrice. La mafia politica è per antonomasia la prima vera e propria forma di mafia, un’entità non-stato che via via conquista una copertura totale delle regioni di origine, espandendosi a macchia d’olio e mantenendo un “governo” centralizzato. Tale struttura permette l’approvvigionamento efficace di *racket* di protezione, usura ed esercizio della violenza. Al contrario, la mafia imprenditrice progredisce a macchia di leopardo sotto forma di rami sussidiari al cervello dell’organizzazione, il quale viene preservato nella sua interezza nei territori d’origine - si ricordi lo sventato tentativo di Carmelo Novella di rendere le locali al nord indipendenti dal “crimine” (sede principale della ‘Ndrangheta) in Calabria. Tali premesse si riassumono nella mappa sottostante la quale traccia l’espansione mafiosa dagli anni ’80 ad oggi.

Figura 1. Cartina tematica dell'espansione mafiosa dalla prima decade (1980s) ad oggi (2010s)




La fondazione delle sedi secondarie è specifica e funzionale al *trading*, il quale, a differenza di un progetto di *governance*, non necessita né di un'organizzazione centralizzata fisicamente presente nel nuovo territorio, né di una gerarchia interna di particolare spessore. Il *branch* è a tutti gli effetti un *branch* economico incaricato di eseguire gli ordini impartiti dal quartier generale nella madre patria potenziando la sua impronta capitalista.

Osservazione e analisi di dati raccolti sui beni confiscati alla mafia

Con il proposito di conferire ulteriore veridicità empirica alla teoria su cui verte la ricerca della mia tesi, ho estrapolato dalla piattaforma di Open Re.G.I.O. un insieme di dati relativi alla frequenza di beni confiscati in tutta Italia dagli anni '80, quando venne emanata la legge Rognoni-La Torre (1982) sulla confisca dei beni, fino ai giorni nostri, per un complesso di quattro decenni. Lo studio del *dataset* da cui ho tratto le seguenti conclusioni è stato affrontato nel terzo capitolo. Il fenomeno mafioso ha


mostrato un crescente “dirottamento” degli investimenti dalle aree d’origine verso quelle colonizzate, in modo particolare per i beni immobiliari ed i beni territoriali. In linea complessiva, il *trend* si evidenzia nell’arco di tutte e quattro le decadi, emergendo in modo evidente tra gli anni ‘80 e ‘90 per poi proseguire, anche se in modo marginale, fino ai giorni nostri. I risultati rappresentano uno spettro interessante da approfondire attraverso lo studio del fenomeno negli anni avvenire, sollevando una duplice ipotesi secondo cui la tendenza di confisca mafiosa potrebbe persistere, sebbene procedendo gradualmente, oppure estinguersi del tutto, considerato il calo progressivo in valore assoluto dei beni confiscati in tutta la nazione. Per quanto riguarda le aziende, invece, studiate individualmente, la tendenza assume una piega interessante dagli anni ‘90, invertendo la direzione. Ciò si traduce in un aumento percentuale delle attività industriali confiscate nei territori tradizionali, con conseguente diminuzione proporzionale delle stesse nelle aree colonizzate. Data la particolarità del risultato, ho indagato sui settori delle attività industriali confiscate, al fine di ricostruire una probabile strategia di investimenti che esplicasse l’anomalia della tendenza sopracitata. Dall’analisi effettuata è emerso che determinati settori hanno fatto leva sul successo, o in base ai casi l’insuccesso, della penetrazione mafiosa nel tessuto economico. In particolar modo è importante sottolineare che il piano industriale delle organizzazioni criminali si distingue in base al territorio dove viene effettivamente messo in atto. Tuttavia, in entrambe le aree d’interesse (tradizionali e non) il soggetto mafioso compie le sue decisioni al fine di massimizzare i profitti e minimizzare i rischi. Quando l’investimento prende vita nell’area d’origine ha come scopo ultimo il potenziamento del consenso sociale, ragion per cui le mafie si concentreranno per lo più su settori che non necessitano di manodopera esperta, come quello agricolo e delle costruzioni, in modo tale da poter maggiorare il livello di occupazione locale. Inoltre, dove il controllo del territorio è ben radicato la mafia è forte nel corrompere l’amministrazione competente ed infiltrarsi in quei settori “schermo” che, regolati dalla pubblica amministrazione e quindi da appalti pubblici, riducono la concorrenza, come per esempio le infrastrutture, i servizi pubblici e i trasporti. Ciò si evince dal grafico sottostante, il quale riporta la distribuzione percentuale degli investimenti mafiosi nei diversi settori industriali effettuati nell’economia dei territori tradizionali negli anni ‘90, decade in cui si registra l’inversione del *trend* principale.

Figura 2. Distribuzione degli investimenti per aree industriali registrati nei territori tradizionali nella seconda decade (1990s)



Al contrario, nelle aree non tradizionali dove il soggetto mafioso si impegna a perseguire un progetto prettamente capitalista e di prestigio le aree industriali maggiormente quotate non sono quelle di “schermo”, data l’inferiorità di potere esercitato sul territorio, bensì quelle con distribuzione capillare, possibilità di riciclaggio e moderato rischio d’impresa come il settore del turismo, della ristorazione, il settore immobiliare ed il commercio con grande distribuzione. Non a caso, nel grafico che segue quest’ultimi coprono il 66,1 % degli investimenti totali in aziende site nelle regioni colonizzate negli anni ’90.

Figura 3. Distribuzione degli investimenti per aree industriali registrati nei territori non-tradizionali nella seconda decade (1990s)



Conclusione

In conclusione, l'espansione territoriale mafiosa, sia di soggetti italiani che non, costituisce una svolta nella concezione tradizionale della mafia. Alla luce del fenomeno coloniale criminale ritengo che le autorità competenti dei paesi interessati debbano concentrarsi maggiormente sull'elaborazione di nuove politiche di contrasto, ridisegnate sul profilo di una mafia imprenditrice che assorbe ogni *benefit* del tessuto economico che penetra. Sulla base di uno studio attento del fenomeno è altresì possibile delineare dei provvedimenti restrittivi di natura comportamentale (misure cautelari personali) e di natura patrimoniale (misure cautelari reali) affinché il soggetto mafioso sia ostacolato nel suo piano di crescita industriale illecito.

