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Chair: Geopolitical Scenarios and Political Risk

**CITY DIPLOMACY: THE NEW ROLE OF CITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**

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ACADEMIC YEAR 2018 / 2019

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INTRODUCTION

The idea to examine the dimensions of cities derives from two coincident courses I followed last year at University. One of them, “Urban Law”, made me aware of the potentialities held by cities for their being constantly in contact with citizens. The other course, “Geopolitical Scenario and Political Risk” helped me instead to understand the new role cities can play in international relations. Thus, I tried to unify those two inputs by using two fictional instruments: a magnifying glass to discover the internal functioning of urban areas, and a telescope to explore all those transnational initiatives pursued by cities in their attempts to get peoples closer. The results are shown in this paper, which aspires to give a clear understanding of how internal and external projections of cities go hand in hand. Indeed, as we will see later, the accepted definition of city diplomacy refers to this capacity of cities to reflect outside its internal needs.

In literature, city diplomacy is a field substantially new and virgin, as since the establishment of the Westphalian order, diplomacy has been the dominion of nation-States. Cities did not play a strong role in international relations, and whether it occurred, they did it in place of the State they belonged, representing national interests. However, the phenomenon known under the name of “globalization” transformed the international framework, shaping it in an unprecedented way: the traditional borders of Nation-States, as well as the traditional diplomatic establishment, faded, giving more room to non-State actors such as NGOs, influential economic operators, private actors and, among all, cities.

This paper wants to demonstrate that the whole traditional diplomatic establishment – thus, the actors involved, the rules applied and the framing knowledges – fell apart, creating a new and intricately world of networks, where private and public actors play at the same game level, where interests are shared and where the multiple level of links cast a shadow over the previously prominent role of the State. Indeed, the State is becoming increasingly unreceptive to all the stimulus derived from the multi-laddered world of our times. This is undeniably a challenge for the State, but also an opportunity for the city, which is gradually imposing itself in the global picture, as it has the best

receptors to catch all the inputs and produce a concrete action. In our view, cities are going through a double process of evolution: on the one hand, they are increasingly exposed to international relations due to those features this essay takes carefully in exam; on the other, it is strengthening the local decision-making process thanks to the greater involvement of citizens. Citizens indeed, are the ultimate atoms of the city, and each of them can act as both private or public actor, both consumer and producer, both subject to the law and creator of the law. The ambiguity of citizens is the very essence of the strength of cities. Indeed, citizens always deal with the microlevel governance of the city, as national rules are applied through local tools and local services are granted by cities' arms. The outcome is a multiskilled entity which works as a mediator between the world and citizens. If few years ago the role of mediator was played only by the State, nowadays is also played by the city. And consequently, being the city in direct contact with "ambiguous citizens", it reacts strongly and differently to the international stimulus which stepped through the national filter.

The paper attempts to explain the diplomacy of cities by exploring the preferred instruments, modalities and fields of application, as well as the issues that sometimes constraints urban initiatives: in facts, the evolutionary process of cities meets many problematic aspects, especially when they clash with the State institutions, in cases where cities' actions are in contrast with the State's obligations or rules. Moreover, city diplomacy is following various paths of development, going from the more formal structure of city networks to very symbolic bilateral relationships of friendship. There are then some fields where city diplomacy can actually work better than others: above all, cities' involvement in measures to arrest climate change consequences, their efforts in making the city-life more sustainable and more based on resource sharing, but also their involvement in initiatives of conflict resolution.

Thus, even though there is not abundant bibliography on the topic, it is clear that there are numerous technical aspects to be taken into account in order to have a wide and realistic view of the potentialities held by cities in representing themselves in a national and international scale.

In the end, the paper does not miss the opportunity to focus the attention on two Italian cities that have been particularly active in diplomacy: Rome and Florence. Taking advantage of three interviews done with people engaged in those cities' management, the essay will apply the knowledges acquired in the analyses of their initiatives of

diplomacy. In the case of Rome, I interviewed the previous Mayor of Rome (2001-2007) Walter Veltroni and his Diplomatic Councillor Marco Baccin; accordingly, I examined only diplomatic activities pursued in those years. In the case of Florence instead, I interviewed the current Diplomatic Councillor of the city Laura Carpini, who explained her vision of city diplomacy and all initiatives in which Florence is currently involved.

FIRST CHAPTER

New diplomacy, new actors: how cities became relevant in the international sphere

1.1 Diplomacy throughout history

It is very hard to date back the documented start of diplomacy, as its characteristic elements evolved throughout the history. Thus, as incipit of this paper, we can take as valid the statement of the English diplomat Harold Wilson when, trying to give a date of birth to diplomacy, said :”Diplomacy is neither the invention nor the pastime of some particular political system, but it is an essential element in any reasonable relation between man and man and between nation and nation”¹.

Since the ancient times, human beings, regrouped into villages, cities, Kingdoms and Empires have had the necessity to establish some relationships with the external environment. Whatever was the type of organization they gave to their settlement in a place, they needed to maintain good relationships with the surrounding hierarchical groups of people. There are many evidences that they used figures educated to the art of speech, to protocols, to affability: ambassadors. They used to report messages from the institutions they represented (village, city, Kingdom or Empire) in times of peace as well as in times of war. The Greek *polis*, the Roman and Byzantine Empire and the Imperial China used to send emissaries when they needed to demand for an armistice. The first embryonal form of organized diplomacy was established during the ancient Greek times, when the city-state granted a sort of “immunity” from the private law to the emissary; even though this rule was not codified, it was collectively accepted and became a custom. Since the VI century B.C., the Greeks begun to choose their ambassadors among the most able orators and lawyers, as they had to persuade the foreign authority to act in accordance with their principal’s interests. Romans as well used diplomacy to keep contacts with sovereign “states” allied with or subjected to Rome, but it was deployed only starting from the republican ages and throughout all the Imperial period.

¹ Nicolson, H., “*Diplomacy*”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Later, the Byzantine institutionalized the protocol to receive ambassadors, the practice to deliver references and the ratification of treaties. Their inviolability was extended to their person and their residence, if there was reciprocity of treatment. The Byzantine also introduced the practice of monitoring the internal situation of the countries where the emissaries were sent, with the consequence that the quality of those figures could not be limited to good speaking, but also, they had to be careful observers. Gradually, the figure of diplomat turned to be professional: all the treaties stipulated in this epoch were prepared together with those experts of the “international relations”. The Church too adopted the pontifical diplomacy since the IV century A.D, and until the last decades of the Middle Age, the diplomatic system remained unaltered. Only by the 15th and 16th century, the Italian Principalities contributed to change the model of diplomacy, introducing a new unscrupulous way of thinking: in order to keep the balance of power between dominions, permanent diplomatic missions were sent with the duty of representing their country’s interests by cheating and lying, very often by working as spies in foreign countries. Italy of that period was the major contributor to diplomacy, thanks to influential figures as Machiavelli and Guicciardini, and soon this new model of diplomacy spread all over the European continent.

However, in the changeable balance of power of the European chessboard of the XVII century, new Nation-States manifested the will to build a system, acknowledged by all sovereigns, to manage international relations. The pioneer of the international law, the philosopher and jurist Hugo Grotius, elaborated such norms to regulate the conduct of States in their reciprocal relationship and he made them public in the first peace of international law: *De Jure belli ac pacis* (1625). The first half of the XVII century was marked by the birth of the modern diplomacy, due to the Westphalia Peace, 1648. The agreement put in writing two fundamental and very actual concepts, that are “national sovereignty” and “territorial integrity”. With them, the *raison d’État* (reason of state) was re-affirmed as justification of State’s actions in the international sphere, together with the principle of no subjection to external norms and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each State.² Thus, in the new set of the Westphalian order, the diplomatic activity was shaped so as to be submitted to a formal

² Luis Caamaño Aramburu, “*La eficacia del multilateralismo en las relaciones internacionales*”, 87/2014, ieee.es, 2014, p.6.

code of behaviour, reciprocally accepted. The practice to dispatch emissaries abroad for permanent diplomatic missions was reinforced, along with the establishment of the first set of institutions devoted to the relationship with foreign States. At that time, ambassadors used to be rich nobles because only they could afford to live abroad despite the low retribution. It is undeniable that those principles, along with the idea of equality between States, represented a florid ground where multilateralism could implant its roots. However, at that time neither the actors, nor the structures had the characteristics to respect such norms, as showed by the weakness of the then-alliances.

Only in 1815, year of the famous Vienna Congress, diplomats and experts of international relations could act in a sort of multilateral context, with the typical limitation of that particular historical period. The introduction of two new principles was the main theoretical contribution of such congress: the monarchical “principle of legitimacy” and the “balance of power”. In that occasion, the balance of power between France, England, Russia, Prussia and Austria was granted through two alliances (the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance) which already embodied the contemporaneous rule which established that international problems, affecting multiple States, must be solved collectively by the most powerful nations. Diplomacy by conference replaced the old diplomatic dogma of secrecy. What still missed, was a formal and permanent institutional structure to supervise whether States’ actions complied with the arranged international obligations.³ Nevertheless, it was too early for Nation-States to renounce in full to their reason of State and the most influential persons of that time were still anchored to the glorious past of their nations. What happened in the first quarter of XX century demonstrated that this version of multilateralism, not reinforced with a structure of monitoring *super partes*, was not complete.

Indeed, with the outbreak of the First World War, the diplomatic apparatus was discredited as European relations, built on those principles previously named, had bitterly failed to avoid the massacre of million soldiers. A new powerful country – United States of America - not attached to the past and very oriented toward the future⁴, pushed for the creation of the League of Nations (later, Society of Nations). This was a body which granted reciprocal political and territorial independence to all States,

³ Luis Caamaño Aramburu, *La eficacia del multilateralismo en las relaciones internacionales*”, 87/2014, ieee.es, 2014, p 7.

⁴ Ibidem, p.8.

regardless their dimensions. The League of Nations was the first very instrument of coordination between States aiming at achieving the perpetual peace through the use of dialogue and negotiation. For the first time external observers such as experts, political scientists and journalists could take part to the international meetings and could stand as witnesses of those peaceful norms enlisted with the famous Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points. But perpetual peace was a utopia, and the ideals of independence of States, together with the desire of vengeance against Germany – expressed by the Paris agreement of 1919 - posed the basis for the ferocious Second World War, due to the spread of nationalism and totalitarianism all over the European continent. In the meanwhile, nations in the Indian region were steadily fighting for their independence, followed by the south American countries and, after the Second World War, by the African nations. Those movement of independence in the colonies took easily advantage of the weakness of the old continent and contributed to downgrade the European position in the world. Moreover, those new countries adapted soon to the new geopolitical set, which contraposed the two non-European winners of the war: United State and Soviet Union.

Thus, the world split up in two parts, concurrent in any field: military equipment and army, technological development, system of State, economic outcomes and lifestyles. The ideological conflict was injected within diplomacy, reinforcing the habit of giving public explanations for the international conduct of the State. The Churchill-named “Iron Curtain” stood up for more than 40 years and influenced deeply the way States used to do diplomacy, because “westphalianism” was substituted by bipolarism. In the revised preface of his book *Diplomacy: Dialogue Between States*, Adam Watson blame himself to have stressed too much emphasis on the genuine independence of States throughout the year of bipolarism, correcting his aim in the subsequent book *The Limits of Independence*. The Cold War on the one hand strengthened multilateralism among the countries belonging to the same bloc, as one can see looking at the relationships between NATO nations; on the other, it reinforced the habit to pursue bilateral relations based on military power, with the existing threat of the atomic bomb. In such framework, States were the only trustable and influential entities that could engage in diplomacy, as they had under control the military apparatus, the economic and financial resources and the people educated to negotiate in the international arena.

When the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War ended, international relations changed once again, and it took few years for the new challenges of the world societies to show up. Those challenges, such as international terrorism, migration fluxes, financial crisis and global warming (due to the human-caused climate change) arrived together with the very modern flourishing of the globalization processes. Globalization came when the national societies entered in contact for the first time, when the private sector acquired more importance and pushed gradually to have more space of manoeuvre, disengaging from the control of the State. It occurred for many reasons which are not to be analysed in this paper, but it is enough to remind that the economic sphere of the national life became one of the priority among the national policies to be implemented, and it drove to the necessity to establish relationship of trade of various intensity (i.e. lowering trade taxes, or establishing free trade agreement or, in the hardest cases, custom union agreement). Newly freed forms of trade and commerce allowed private actors to achieve an unprecedented influence at the national and international level, but despite the advent of globalization and the rise of new international actors, States still were reluctant to share their diplomatic task with other entities; despite that, in the last decades, associations of States, NGOs and big corporations showed off overwhelmingly in international relations, imposing themselves as autonomous characters having their own interests, disconnected from those of the State. This is basically what distinguishes the bodies entitled to do diplomacy from the ones which cannot, that is the capacity to “engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to another”⁵. Cities are currently engaging in such diplomatic relations, demonstrating to matter in many fields of the international arena. Unfortunately, their ability and potentiality to do diplomacy has been poorly studied in the academic literature, thus we must start from the formal and technical acknowledgements we have on the classical diplomacy to, then, shift them at the city level and make a comparison between the two.

Next paragraph is devoted to the deepening of both common and codified rules of traditional state diplomacy, in order to explore the empty spaces and the flaws of this model.

⁵ Plujim, R. and Melissen J., “*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*”, Netherland Institute in International Relations, Clingendael, April 2017, p. 6.

1.2 State diplomacy: some features

As we have said in the first paragraph, traditional diplomacy was a competence detained exclusively by the official institutions for foreign affairs of the State, that are the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic service officials.⁶ Citing the emeritus professor G.R. Berridge, diplomacy was conceived as “ the behavioural relations between sovereign States through national and international officials”⁷. This was so due to the simplified world organization, where States were the only ones engaging in international relations, the only representants of the peoples.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 codified the rules of diplomacy. Article 3 indicates the functions of the permanent diplomatic missions, which include the following goals: representation of the State, protection of its citizens and its interests in the accrediting State, negotiation with the foreign government, elaboration of report on the internal activities of the foreign State, promotion of friendly relationship, incrementation of economic, cultural, political and scientific collaboration between the two countries.⁸ Just to specify the proper functioning of international relations, embassies, consulates and all diplomats spread into the planet could exercise a double diplomacy: the one based on bilateral relations (such as the relationship with the host State) and the multilateral one, in the wider context of UN or within regional organizations. Ambassadors and Consuls were expected to send to the principal State a regular report on the host State’s activities, and in case of hardening of the relation or in proper case of tension, the foreign ministers first and the Heads of State in few occasion used to meet in order to declare their position or to look for a negotiated solution. Only 30 years ago, no one could take advantage of modern facilities such as the shared information provided by a wide use of internet, so citizens and firms could count exclusively on embassies and State institutions to know what occurred abroad. Embassies, unlike today, were the “outpost” of diplomacy, and the Foreign Ministry was a sort of big eye keeping under control all the aspects of international relations. According to John Hugh Adam Watson, famous scholar of international relations,

⁶Popa I., “*Formal and significant mutations of traditional diplomacy*”, The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Faculty of International Business and Economics, 2016, p. 2.

⁷ Berridge G.R., Alan, J., “*A dictionary of diplomacy*”, 2nd ed. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, (2003).

⁸ Vienna Convention, 1961, Article 3.

traditional diplomacy had four goals: “information-gathering abroad; the analysis of such information by foreign ministries at home; developing policy based on that information; and, communicating such a policy”⁹. As expected, there was no space for non-state actors, because the diplomatic activity was fully covered by the State. In a sense, we could affirm that the primacy of the State in international relations went at the same pace as its wide authoritativeness in the eyes of citizens.

At this point, it is useful to see in details how diplomatic relations between states used to work in the past, in order to make a comparison with both the current state-diplomacy and the one pursued by the city, the latter remaining the focus of this paper.

Right after the Second World War, and throughout the years of the Cold War, States used to build their international profile on three main factors: military resources, economic resources and national reputation. Indeed, the military and economic resources were indispensable to command respect and inspire authoritativeness, because both elements were necessary to adopt weapons and to prepare the army. However, those two aspects were not enough to make their holder worthy to be accepted in the diplomatic process between States. National reputation was an extremely important element, because it signified “the presence or absence of international legitimacy to a certain nation”¹⁰. And citing Adam Watson, “legitimacy is the lubricating oil of an international system”¹¹.

Those elements served as glue in the construction of a relationship between two separated States, but this relationship could take several forms, depending on the intensity of the contact, on the interests at stake and on the topics covered. Just to give an explanatory comment, we could say that by looking at history without ingenuity, it is clear that diplomatic relationships based on the exchange of fundamental resources such as oil or military weapons was far more intense – but not necessary more durable – than relationships based on simple recognition of friendship.

However, using the words of the professor Ian Hurd in the paper “Law and practice of diplomacy” (2011), we can affirm that among the functions carried out by the State in doing diplomacy, the three most important are the pursuing of formal interaction

⁹ Watson J.H.A., “*Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*”, (1982) in Ashari, H., “*Diplomacy and Foreign Relations*”, Foreign Trade University, Hanoi, 2012, page 1.

¹⁰ Ashari, H., “*Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Foreign Trade University*”, Hanoi, 2012, p.1.

¹¹ Watson J.H.A., “*Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*” (1982, revised preface, Routledge, 2005, p. iix.

with other States over treaties and agreements, the announcement of public statement by spokespeople and the declaration of positions taken in international settings. Not only were those functions attributed to the only State, but they used to be fulfilled within the borders established by international law.¹² To open a bracket over the value of international law, intended as positive rule or, in alternative, as justification for State behaviour would mean to change the course of this investigation as well as this paragraph, which only wants to depict the general structure of diplomacy for comparative purposes. However, it is essential to understand that international law plays undoubtedly a crucial role in State diplomacy. Indeed, if on the one hand the acceptance of international rules can be apparently interpreted as a way to facilitate the establishment of peaceful relations between two or more actors, on the other it can also be reason for harsh disagreements of interpretation. Against the view of sovereigntists who believe that international law is only symbolic and nonbinding to states, we argue that in state diplomacy, in the way we are describing it in this paper, the compliance to international law is structurally different from noncompliance, as the last one is perceived as a tool of “diplomatic attack against opponents”¹³.

Going back to state diplomacy, we agree with Ian Hurd when he defines it as “social activity” because as well as all general conducts, actions of diplomacy need a reason to be done, a justification. In this case, those are public reasons, but they do not need to be explicated to the population. Diplomacy can be pursued secretly, continuing its aim to be public, and it can be performative even when the audience is restricted, or its response is absent. This concept has been defined by Nicolas Onuf as “performative sufficiency”.¹⁴ This point deserves to be analysed carefully, because it represents an evident distinction with the local approach of cities toward diplomacy. By saying that the actors who practice diplomacy do not care about the audience, we are saying in simple words that the purpose of those actors is not persuasion, nor agreement, nor socialization and learning; the final scope of diplomacy is the acknowledgement of the regulatory set up, the assurance about the laws that regulate the international sphere.

¹² Hurd I., “*Law and the practice of diplomacy*”, International Journal, Northwestern University, Summer 2011, page 581.

¹³ Ibidem, page 590.

¹⁴ Ibidem, page 584.

This scope responds to the necessity to reduce uncertainty, to predict other States' actions and to react to them rapidly.

As in all legal systems, when a well-reputed actor adopts a change in behaviour, this change is absorbed by the society and quite often it stands as precedent. The same happens with diplomacy and the way States pursue it, because every innovation on international relations acquire legitimacy once it is put in practice for the first time. This is the “productive element of diplomacy”, that is the production of “public, social and legal resources with which future state behaviour is understood, justified and argued over.”¹⁵ By accepting this element of diplomacy, we are also recognizing that diplomacy is an intelligent game between states that attempt to both pursue their purposes interpreting, but respecting, international rules and make moves so as to change those international rules. Ian Hurd captured the slight difference between the two strategy and their unbreakable interconnection in this sentence: “(...) diplomacy can be a source of change for international law as these references to the rules can shift their meaning”. Being diplomacy a social activity, those shifts are never fully controlled, because their acceptance in the international sphere depends on factors that go alone, such as the circumstances of the moment.

Another structural element of diplomacy is its range of action, which corresponds also to its definition; it is basically delimited by law on the one side, and by politics on the other. Said in other words, the boundaries of diplomacy are the international purposes of the State and the justification of those purposes in an external language. The awareness of that leads to the understanding that diplomacy is not a simple mean through which one or more states communicate among them, but it is the way each state position itself in the legal international setting, offering sometime a new language of law.

The question to be asked at this point is whether state diplomacy is structured to face the new world circumstances, and more specifically whether it is able to go beyond the increasing weakness of the state position in the international panorama.

In our view, state diplomacy continues to exist and to execute its duties of defence of its interest within the limits imposed by international rules, but it does so conjunctly with new international actors. At this point, we should provide some explanations about the

¹⁵ Hurd I., “*Law and the practice of diplomacy*”, International Journal, Northwestern University, Summer 2011, page 587.

changes in the international scenario which enlarged the space of diplomacy, allowing non state actors to be involved.

First of all, the technological development hit as a hurricane diplomats and experts of international relations, as they were deprived of one of their duties: collecting information and reporting them to their home country. Data acquisition was extremely simplified with the introduction of computers and software, helping the embassies and the institutional referents to base their analysis on trustable data. Then, the arrival of internet and its latest development opened the way to self-information, making the ambassador's report useless. Basically, new technologies in all fields pushed for a change in diplomacy by changing their scopes. Perhaps, citing again Adam Watson can help: "Modern methods of transports and communication, from the aircraft to the telephone, make it possible for those who take decisions to be in direct and continuous contact with one another. Thus, today, the principal function of resident embassies, namely negotiation on issues of high policy, seems to have radically declined."¹⁶ Thus, we can say that one reason of change was disconnected from the international geopolitical setting, but derived from the intrinsic human development in the field of technologies and discoveries.

Secondly, after the shift from the bipolar to the unipolar balance of power in the ninety, the world today is facing a new multipolar equilibrium, where previously developing states, among all China, are demonstrating to count in the dislocation of power. This issue is particularly interesting, because the way China achieved this international recognition is deeply related to the birth of new protagonists of international relations. Indeed, China is a productive giant and its exportations, much wider than its importation, transformed the country in a trustable and powerful ally as well as a dangerous and competitive enemy. This is reflected in the current behaviour adopted by United States, wanting to impose again a bipolar setting. Though, today there are many poles of power, everyone with its peculiarities: United States, Russia, China and Brazil, but also Saudi Arabia, Iran and other middle eastern countries currently involved in wars for military power.

China fits smoothly in a discourse over the development of diplomacy, because not only are States interested on – or threatened by – its activities (transnational boundary-

¹⁶ Watson J.H.A., "*Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*" (1982), revised preface, Routledge, 2005, p. ix.

crossing transactions,). Let us suppose that China was interested in establishing a commercial deal with a state belonging to the NATO alliance, while the number one of that alliance (the United States) is applying sanctions on China just to weaken its economy. This supposition appears extremely actual and veritable; certainly, members of the NATO alliance, in occasion of its 70th anniversary, will surely address the issue of how to approach the Chinese attempt to impose itself as an economic giant. In this context, not only are states attracted, but also private actors such as multinational and big companies. Money and investments are increasingly calling in the “boxing ring” all those new organisms that previously orbited out of the space devoted to state diplomacy, as money and investments can be achieved through channels not depending on State. That is so extended that anyone having an interest, or representing a part of the society, could take advantage of it. Cities float lightly on those waters, because they represent the private sector when it is mixed with the public one. By embodying both the private and the public sector in the same entity, cities are the ones experiencing the changes caused by decisions. And if cities are somehow disconnected from their countries, a tempting offer from an international agent (such as China, in our example) can result attractive for the formers but dangerous for the latter. This illustration shows quite precisely that the space of action of international relations has widened, and it seems to have occurred due to the strengthening of interests, starting from the economic ones, of non-state actors. The most impressive case is the strength of the European Union, an international organization which has gradually lost its intergovernmental character, acquiring some elements of supranationalism. The European Union behaves as a unitary entity in many fields of international relations through the institutions and personalities dealing with its “External Actions”, and it represents a compact body of more than 500.000 inhabitants¹⁷. Very likely, if the EU did not exist, countries like Germany or France would be much less influential than they actually are, because States all alone are strong, but not unbeatable.

The consequence of this discourse is simple and complex at the same: diplomats and agents of international relations begun to operate out of the “shell of the State”¹⁸, but within newly reconstructed borders as “state sovereignty (was) redefined in the face of

¹⁷ 512.6 million, Eurostat – Population on 1 January 2018.

¹⁸ Hocking B., *Contemporary European Foreign Policy, Diplomacy* (Chapter Five), Sage Publication Ltd, 2004, page 92.

globalising and regionalising pressures”¹⁹. In the modern era, diplomacy has evolved as it has gone from being a mean to defend the State from the outside world to be a boundary-spanning²⁰ activity.

To conclude this short paragraph, if we accept what Der Derain defines as “continuous shaping and reshaping of diplomacy”, we could now say that the process of development which has been experienced during these last decades is accurately described by Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan and Paul Sharp in the report “Futures for diplomacy. Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century”. This evolution has affected four aspects of diplomacy, that are in order: context and locations, actors and roles, rules and norms and communication patterns.




Figure 1, Evolution of diplomacy, inspired by “Futures of diplomacy, Integrative diplomacy in the 21st Century” by Hocking, Melissen, Riordan and Sharp.

1.3 The new role of cities

In this new evolved diplomacy, what do cities do? Cities have certainly taken advantage of the space left behind by states. Therefore, the spread of new international threats such as terrorism, climate change or mass migration, have harshly overwhelmed the state structures, which have shown to be incapable to deal with those issues. Moreover, the fragmentation of rules and norms has given a hand in terms of interpretative efforts, letting cities to fill such empty or unclear zones of regulation with local plans which very

¹⁹ Hocking B., *Contemporary European Foreign Policy, Diplomacy* (Chapter Five), Sage Publication Ltd, 2004, page 92.

²⁰ The term describes the role of someone/something linking the internal actors of an organization with the external sources of information (Tushman Michael in *Special Boundary Roles in the Innovation Process*).

often push humanity toward new development. Before going deeper in the discover of the city's involvement in diplomacy, it is important to remind that this paper is not attempting to say that states have lost in full their role in international relations; by contrast, it is trying to put light on the enlargement of these relations, while states still remain one of the bastion - not the unique - of diplomacy.

In 2014, the United Nations made public a report on world population which was very indicative of the weight of cities, considering that according to this report, by 2014 the 54% of the world population lived in urban areas. The 2014 revision of the World Urbanization Prospects evidenced that the urban inhabitants would grow steadily, in particular in India, China and Nigeria. On May 2018, the UN rectified the percentage, having it reached the 55%. However, this percentage reflects the highly urbanized region of the world (America, Latin America, Europe and Oceania) together with the mostly – rural ones (Asia and Africa). Generally speaking, the first movement of citizens toward urban centres was due to the shift of the economic system of the counties from being mostly agricultural to be industrial (and then, mostly based on the service sector). Basically, only those centres considered as attractive have grown in population, while some low-productive towns suffered a decline. This was due also to the deregulation of financial markets which transformed some known cities as New York, London and Tokyo in the perfect marketplaces where money could flow freely; it is understandable that money calls new investments and new activities, attracting, by consequence, workers. But that is not all: people who live in urban areas take advantage of facilitations that only proximity can offer. Banally, supermarkets, banks, hospitals, efficient public transport are collected within the borders of a city. This means that job is not the only reason for people to live in town, but other factors influence such a decision. Contemporary analysis on cities demonstrated that benefits descend from four characteristics: proximity, density, social diversity and dynamism of social changes.²¹ Cities host structures, institutions, entities, or more generally, places where people can share knowledges, ideas and information. Therefore, they are the *locus* where social relations take place, so they hide extraordinary potentialities: when cities achieve to turn simple and unorganized social relations into social engagement and cultural interchange, they also empower citizens. Citizens' empowerment is a recent process

²¹ Beall J., Adam D., “*Cities, Prosperity and Influence*”, British Council, 2017, page 5.

which is reinforcing even more the role of city, but it must be accompanied by the institutional support. If the private sector involves the public one, the city enjoys greater levels of efficiency. What is peculiar, is that by referring to city, we are referring to the ultimate atoms of it: individuals.

The private/public collaboration, which is variegated and can engage two, three or many different actors of the civil society, opens new ways of expression for citizens and new plans to tackle modern problems.

The fact that cities' inhabitants are subjected to a great number of stimulus along with the evidence that cities are the best places to accumulate goods and capitals, make them the outpost of innovation and development. This is the reason why cities are fundamental pieces for the future of the planet, especially when there are many issues which cannot be solved by states. Paradoxically, some items having an impact all over the world, require to be solved at some sub-national level. This paradox is the ultimate description of globalization, which has addressed bigger problems to smaller entities. However, globalization has played a double and controversial role when it has touched cities. Indeed, globalization has reduced distances by diminishing costs: transports of goods, people, capital, information became cheaper and it could pave the way for a downgrade of the weight of cities in the international framework. However, many of them were able to take advantage of globalization, by adapting their function in such ways that made them known as "world cities". According to some, cities are now even more important than states in the contemporary economic world, because this process of globalization has its origin and its lifeblood in the big and developed urban centres. Citing the famous sociologist Saskia Sassen, expert on globalization, such cities came up since the 1980s, and they are known with the name of "world cities" or "global cities". Urban centres belonging to these categories are the ones where there is concentration of capital and global service sector firms. Besides the already cited New York, London and Tokyo, there is Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Sydney and Hong Kong.²² Nowadays, global cities are even ranked by the "Global Cities Index"²³, which prepares the rank basing on five elements of globalization: business activity, human capital, information exchange, cultural experience, and political engagement.

²² Beall J., Adam D., "*Cities, Prosperity and Influence*", British Council, 2017, page 7.

²³ <http://globalsherpa.org/world-rankings/global-cities-index/>, accessed on 26/05/2019

Notwithstanding, as reported by the work of the Globalization and World Cities group (GaWC), today not only are big and highly income towns part of the hundred most globalized cities, but also middle or lower-income and medium or small-sized ones. Those ones, though they are not financial nodes, represent centres of production and consumption of services. Using the distinction made by Jo Beall and David Adam, we build three subcategories of globalized cities, that are the “established world cities” (NYC, London, Tokyo etc), the “emerging world cities” (i.e. Shanghai, Beijing, Istanbul, San Paulo, etc.) and “new world cities” (Barcelona, Berlin, Cape Town, etc).²⁴ This last subcategory is particularly peculiar because it contains urban centres which are very attractive, but for reasons not connected to the concentration of capitals and goods. They are mostly known for the well-functioning of their social services, for the good quality of life or for entertainment and tourism. The distinction above suggests that to count internationally, cities must be internationally renowned, whether it is for banks and money, whether for culture and popularity. It stands as similarity with state reputation: as for states, international legitimation, usually determined by the exercise of soft power, is an identification mark of international recognition.

Economic and soft power are the primary powers exercised by cities, being the military force under state control. Having already talked about the economic weight of global cities, let us focus on their soft power. A well-accepted definition of soft power is the one formulated by Joseph Nye in 1990 in his *Soft Power*: “it is understood as the ability of one actor to influence the perception and behaviour of another through attraction rather than through force and coercion”. Overlooking the critics over this definition and taking it as true, it is undeniable that cities have the innate propension to attract people, tourists, firms and money, so that they indirectly use soft power. The interesting issue is whether cities exercise soft power in accordance with their state’s interests or whether they use it due to their values, customs or ideas, when those are even in contrast with their nation-state. This intriguing point will be tackled later. For now, it is sufficient to underline that in both cases cities would be engaging in city diplomacy, which is effectively the focus of the paper. Urban centres emanate soft power in many ways, and each with its uniqueness. As a matter of fact, if we depict soft power as the expression of civil society in its totality, we are saying that people and institutions

²⁴ <http://globalsherpa.org/world-rankings/global-cities-index/>, accessed on 26/05/2019.

in their conjunction are the bodies from which descends the power. Those bodies usually belong to some fields – such as culture, education, commerce, etc. – and, depending on which one is the most prominent, the city will exercise one type of attraction rather than others.

From those first paragraphs we can guess how difficult can be to describe coherently and compressively all the abilities and features of the cities of the world. Perhaps, we should image them as little sprouts, growing under the sun light and fed by the rain. These sprouts can evolve in light green and short plants, or dark green and tall trees, but their shape and their leaves would variate depending on where they are growing or on how often they are sprinkled. But every plant, besides its genetic features, can generate new leaves if it is properly curate. Cities as well grow in some peculiar ways which made them singulars and different from all the others; but cities as well are inclined to generate new leaves, new expressions, new branches that make them bigger, stronger and more influent.

This thesis, keeping the metaphor, wants to bet on those new leaves of cities and on the consequent position they can have when dealing with international issues.

Next paragraph will conclude the chapter by defining with exactitude, whenever it is possible, the concept of city diplomacy and by making the proper distinction assessment.

1.4 City diplomacy

The basic definition of city diplomacy describes it as the combination of institutions and practice that allow urban centres to engage in relations with a third part – state or non-state actors - on an international level with the objective of representing their interests.²⁵ Some argue that this diplomacy has developed in parallel with the state one, and those define it as “paradiplomacy”²⁶. However, this frame tends to delimit with clarity the fields of action of both states and cities, as the two had decided previously their competences. This is actually not the case, as globalization has transformed national issues (such as defence) in international issues (such as the use of nuclear arms

²⁵ Pluijm R., Melissen J., “*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*”, Netherland Institute of International Relation, April 2017, page 6.

²⁶ Ibidem, page 9.

which is threatening not a single state, but all states of the planet) and has involved sub national actors in the resolution of international problems (such as global warming).

We recognize that since the Second World War the domestic and international domain are interconnected, so that instead of believing in an official diplomacy of states flanked by sub-national diplomacies off the record, we agree with Pluijm when he states that the current conditions look more like a “multi-layered diplomatic environment”²⁷.

Starting from this idea, it is acceptable to see the involvement of cities in international issues as a way to decentralize the management of the cases in point.

At this point, we should answer the question posed in the third paragraph concerning the freedom that cities enjoy in doing diplomacy and in using soft power. Undoubtedly, cities action can be part of nation-state international strategies in a scheme of complementarity with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It would be an example of controlled decentralization, where local entities are empowered in order to reinforce the state structure, to implement state provisions efficiently and to become part of their diplomatic toolkit²⁸. In this case, the state does not feel the city as a competitor or as an enemy, because they share the same interests. Nevertheless, it does not mean, in our view, that cities are in this way deprived of their competences to do diplomacy; in any case, they would enjoy a certain space of manoeuvre while implementing the national provision and they could be the mean through which the state conclude negotiations with external entities. Indeed, their capacity to engage in diplomacy lays on their structure as well. Cities possess representants, institutions and instruments that permit them to be the actor engaged in negotiations.

There are cases by contrast where city diplomacy develops freely, not guided by the State. Sometimes, it can be even in discordance with national strategies, causing disputes which are difficult to solve. This situation could be the result of the general downgrade of diplomats and ministries at the international level. As a matter of fact, States are still fundamental entities because, despite the internationalization of public life and the existence of regional supranational organizations, State remains the formal structure which represents people; citizenship is a distinctive mark for people, and it descends only from state institutions. However, what it is analysed here, is the

²⁷ Pluijm R., Melissen J., “*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*”, Netherland Institute of International Relation, April 2017, page 9.

²⁸ Beall J., Adam D., “*Cities, Prosperity and Influence*”, British Council, 2017, page 11.

downgrade of the structure that state devoted to international relations (so, to diplomacy). Under this perspective, cities engaging independently in diplomacy can be identified as one of the manifestations of the interference of general non-State actor (NGOs, multinational corporations, international organizations and, indeed, cities) in that traditional diplomacy composed by State delegates and diplomats. However, to be frank, we should recognize that the profession of diplomat is evolving and adapting to the new conditions. Indeed, many first and second secretaries, as well as the plenipotentiary ministries and ambassadors perform their profession as emissaries in foreign countries (usually to carry out typical bilateral obligations), as representant of their countries in international organizations (as for example at the seat of the European Union, in Brussels) and now, they also can be diplomatic advisors of cities. A third type of relation, which is perhaps the closest to reality, is in the middle between the two reported above: a sort of competitive cooperation, where cities and States work jointly in some cases and separately in some others.

The format that urban centres use to do diplomacy is practically the same as States, because it can be a two-sided or a multi-sided relation. The former is a process which involves two actors, where one of it is – or both are – a city ; bilateral relations such that may serve to generate benefits for one of the two parts, as it is the case of cooperation with a municipality in a developing country in need of assistance. In other cases, by contrast, bilateral relations are a way to achieve double profits: a good example could be the process of negotiation between one city and a multinational corporation to conclude an agreement of settlement for the headquarter of the latter. Otherwise, cities can engage in multiple relations involving more than one actor, as it is the case of the participation of towns in international networks devoted to cities. Just to report some networks, we could name C40 and UCLG. C40 is an international organization founded in 2015 with the aim of dealing with the consequences of climate change; the peculiarity is that this network has been created for cities, as it is composed by 90 of the world greatest cities (which represent more than the 25% of global GDP). Those cities involved in C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group are planning actions to reduce greenhouse gasses emissions. UCLG instead, is the largest organization of sub-national governments, considering that its members are spread over 140 countries. It was founded in 2004 to reinforce the role and influence of urban centres, to support the

innovative and democratic cities in their path toward proximity to its citizens and to advocate the values of democratic localism.

Another important factor to be taken in analysis is the person who goes abroad to represent the city or who welcomes emissaries from outside in the clothes of “representant” of the urban centre. This theme is particularly interesting because cities inhabitants are so numerous that emissaries should be different persons, depending on the interest at stake. In many cases they will be mayors²⁹ but they may be councillors, municipal civil servants or even leaders of citizen associations. Nonetheless, if citizens reunited in associations do not speak for the city in its totality, we may not refer to their international engagement as diplomacy of the city. Pluijm believes that diplomacy exercised by citizens should be distinguished from the one exercised by the official representants: the former might be denominated “citizen diplomacy”, as Paul Sharp explain in his “*Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats*”. In our view, the difference between the two could be not so sensitive, especially if one considers that there are nowadays many cases of co – governance, where the public sector is involved in private initiatives and address them to the whole municipality. To assess whether an activity is pursued through the process of co-governance, one should look at the mechanism of decision-making. If citizens - usually organized in associations - or other private entities, such as corporations or NGOs, or even some representatives of the public non- governmental society (as schools, libraries or universities) are involved in the decision, the initiative is put into practice thanks to a strategy of co-governance. To be so, their opinion and their vote must be taken into account when deciding what and how to organize the project. In this new paradigm, in the middle between public and private governance, not only will the outcome be addressed to citizens, but also the input. We could also depict it as a way through which city institutions empower the private sector by granting resources and power of decision.

However, the process described above cannot be found wherever, because cities are differently sensitized to co-governance. Once again, the lack of a unique and precise picture of the features of cities make classification hard and unreliable.

Now it is time to investigate which are the concrete instrument cities use to engage internationally with external actors. The amazing discovery is that many of those tools

²⁹ Pluijm R., Melissen J., “*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*”, Netherland Institute of International Relation, April 2017, page 11.

are not new, nor even unknown. Investments, tourism, economic promotion, place branding and events are in fact tools not directly devoted to diplomacy, but they work as they were; by contrast, policy exchange and cultural exchange are thought to be means apt to do diplomacy properly defined, whose primary task is to conclude negotiations and agreements. Let us focus more on those instruments.

Economic promotion, tourism and investments are very interconnected, and in some ways, one could consider tourism and investments as subcategories of economic promotion. Indeed, both of them are on the one hand sources of money and on the other impulses toward improvement of cities attractiveness. Nobody has the exclusivity over the economic promotion, both public and private institutions may take into practice measures that captivate people or investments. Civic and cultural institutions as well may achieve the same result, whether they behave as local institutions' arms or whether as separate entities. Thus, the "organic nature of cities"³⁰ allow many competing bodies to contribute all together to the improvement of the international profile of their city.

Among cities attracting investments, the most successful are the previously defined "New World Cities". Those cities, among which one can single out Amsterdam, Berlin or Copenhagen, have an advanced apparatus of promotion that pushed investors to bet on them. Those three cities are examples of well-studied marketing campaign that brought to the fame of their slogan: I Amsterdam, Be Berlin and Copenhagen. Citing Joan Baell, "the message is directed at the individual and the desire to pursue one's own interests"³¹. There are also more concrete reasons which make them the best place where to invest. Their finances are safe and their reputation concerning money management is renown internationally. Indeed, even though investors could be motivated to invest in a risky project to get higher interests, sound finances are always a stronger magnet for investments. It is evident that the image cities give toward the exterior can be also unconnected to the belonging nation-state. A comparison between two Italian cities could be useful: Milan, which is perceived as an efficient, modern and developed city, attracts investments, corporations and multinational, while Naples, despite its beauty, does not. Tourism is a huge category, having become the fourth

³⁰ Pluijm R., Melissen J., "*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*", Netherland Institute of International Relation, April 2017, page 13.

³¹ Ibidem.

world's major trade after fuels, chemicals and food³². Again, it is strongly influenced by the profile of cities: in this case, there are many factors that determine the tourists' choice to visit a certain city. First, people are attracted by historical heritage, culture and fashion; it explains why Italian and French cities are among the towns visited the most. Then, tourists are captured by lifestyle, social atmosphere, openness, tolerance and, more in general, liveability. Good cases are Spanish cities (especially Barcelona and Madrid, considered as the most cosmopolitan cities of Spain) and all urban centres of northern European countries. In the end, it is not forgettable the role played by technology and finance: New York, London and Hong Kong keep being the most desirable cities to go on holiday, because they usually represent the maximum aspiration of life: Wall Street has been the theatre of movies and books, always cited as the heart of global richness. However, it is remarkable that among the first 10 most visited cities of the world in 2017, 7 were settled in the Asian continent.³³

A new factor, very similar and close to tourism but intrinsically different, is the attraction of foreign students. Indeed, students' contribution goes well beyond the money they spend to rent a room or to pay public transports. Usually students build roots and affinity with the foreign country and it indirectly contributes to the enrichment of the place. Today, many cities have bet on education and universities as a strategy of city diplomacy. If they achieve to offer to foreign students an experience which goes beyond the university, but include them into the city's public life, those students are "likely to build a shared commonality of values and long-term relations"³⁴. Extremely controversial it is instead the urban organization of great events, such as the Olympic Games, the World Cups or the World Expos. Those events generate undoubtedly great exposure of the city, but it does not say anything about the type of exposure. Among the benefits, one can find the improvement of sectorial businesses, major public – private cooperation due to investments and partnerships and expansion of sectorial tourism. Those inputs inevitably lead to development, so there is good chance that the city will profit from hosting events. Nevertheless, events may also cause a loop of

³² Pluijm R., Melissen J., "*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*", Netherland Institute of International Relation, April 2017, page 15.

³³ World Economic Forum, 2017: www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/these-are-the-world-s-most-visited-cities/

³⁴ Pluijm R., Melissen J., "*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*", Netherland Institute of International Relation, April 2017, page 15.

indebtedness, with many side-effects. Indeed, there should be strict controls over the assignment of contracts for the construction of public projects, as far as these are appetizing opportunities to make money. Moreover, to host such events means also to have enough capacity and wealth in order to suffer some periods of expenses before gaining the returns. This explains why some mayors are reluctant to propose their city as seat of Olympic games. For example, Olympic Games in Athens costed to the city a bill that citizens are still paying today.

Then, cities employ two specific tools of diplomacy, that have more similarities with the instrument used by traditional diplomacy: policy exchange and cultural exchange. The former is something rooted in the post-wars period, when New York City and London began to engage in bilateral relations with emerging cities to cope with peace and prosperity. Certainly, in the last decades the forms of collaboration and cooperation between cities have expanded, so that city twinning represents today a weak example of collaboration. However, sister cities and twinning activities seems to be successful, especially when they foster collaboration between established cities and emerging market cities.³⁵ The last instrument used by cities to engage in international relations is cultural exchange. It is basically very similar to policy exchange, even though, in this case, the searched outcome is cultural more than economic; again, cities employ museums, artists and cultural institutions to acquire cultural enrichment and reinforcement of the external projection.

Now that we have explored the basis of traditional diplomacy, we have touched its flaws and e we have introduced the topic of city diplomacy, it is time to conclude the chapter by remembering once again that city diplomacy is an pretty unexplored phenomenon, which is visible only in some urban centres, usually the most developed. As a consequence, the analysis proposed here is necessarily focused on few cities, giving to the paper a vision that could be defined as “western”.

In the next paragraph, concrete examples of city diplomacy will be reported in order to broaden the knowledge on the topic.

³⁵ Beall J., Adam D., “Cities, Prosperity and Influence”, British Council, 2017, page 18.

SECOND CHAPTER

Technical Aspects of City Diplomacy

2.1 Legal spaces for cities

This first paragraph wants to focus on the type of initiatives deployed by cities involved in international relations, referring also to the constraints imposed by the legal set up where cities are inserted – both international and domestic.

Before enlisting the model of interaction between cities, it is useful to exploit the distinction elaborated by Joana Setzer, who divides those initiatives in two categories, that are *collaboration* and *coalition*.³⁶ The former are activities of collaborations between local governments with other sub-national, national or international entities. Those ones usually find an agreement among them and sign memorandums of understanding or take part to international networks in which they can learn the know-how and get access to information. The collaborative activities pursued by subnational actors, and more specifically by cities, do not constitute a danger or an obstacle for states, because they are pursued in sight of a common interest. By contrast, when cities are involved in initiatives of coalitions, they are basically pushing the national government or some international actors to focus on a particular theme, or to adopt a certain measure; in this case, their pressure can be expressed both domestically and internationally. Cities are indefinitely a chess piece of the game, and they use their powers to achieve their interests.

The distinction reported above is also compared by the same author with the theory of Keohane and Nye about the transnational behaviours, according to which the trans-governmental coordination and the trans-governmental coalition building are different due to the contrariety, in the second case, of subnational entities (in our case cities) against the belonging national structure. To give an explicatory figure, we can define the C40 network as an example of collaboration activity, while cities involved in

³⁶ Setzer J., “*Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate Action of Local and Regional Governments*”, *Transnational Environmental Law*, 4:2 (2015, Cambridge University Press, page 326.

lobbying international organizations or states, regrouped in a network or alone, are a case of coalition activities.

However, the new phenomenon of city diplomacy must face the issue of legality. Are cities allowed to pursue actions of diplomacy? Unlike the past, the birth and development of international or regional institutions - among them the UE, the ASIAN or the MERCOSUR - reduced even more the legal space where cities could behave. Obviously, their space of manoeuvre has always been determined primarily by provisions of national law, as well as by the item they treat and the position the state has upon it (whether it is congruent or not). But nowadays, along with the domestic limitations, international law stands as a new obstacle to city diplomacy, considering that international rules do not confer to cities any power to conclude agreements with legal value. Let us examine that aspect more in dept.

Despite international law has in many ways helped cities and non-state actors to count at the international level, it does not consider agreements with - or among - cities as having a binding character. The Vienna Convention of 1961, described in the first chapter as the core piece of law upon international relations management, does not regulate cases in which cities rather than states do diplomacy. This determines ambiguity around actions cities can carry out or not, as well as a sort of irreparable weakness which downgrades city diplomacy in face of state institutions. Legal basis is indeed required to strengthen those cities' initiatives having a transnational scope. To be honest, the UN made many steps forward by establishing UN agencies based on principles such as decentralization of powers or local self-government³⁷; As currently their pacts are not binding under international law, their provisions produce soft law. A piece of soft law is undoubtedly less effective than hard law in the short term, as it suggests or recommend, but it does not oblige the receptors to behave in a certain way. However, soft law is an extremely efficient instrument when it comes to model the debate and influence the framework of discussion. When two or more local governments sign a convention over some good practices, they produce a piece of soft law that very likely will spread the message, open the debate, sensitize the public and "infect" all societies interested on them. This is basically the process of law making in our era; for instance, according to Levit "law making in an era of globalization is a bottom-up

³⁷ Plujim, R. and Melissen J., "*City diplomacy: the expanding role of cities in International Politics*", Netherland Institute in International Relations, Clingendael, April 2017, p. 14.

process, 'a soft, unpredictably organic process that generates hard, legal results'³⁸. An inevitable reflection raises while talking about soft law. Indeed, soft law usually belongs to those international institutions, such as the UN, which is dedicated to face those transnational issues that cannot be solved at the national level. In the light of the new role played by cities in the global framework, we see how those topics need to be tackled through a dual strategy: on the one hand, international and well-recognized organizations attempt to suggest good practices to Nation-States by sending recommendations or by producing pieces of (soft) law; if it works, Nation-States will be pushed to legitimize those practice by law (hard law); on the other, cities do the same as international organizations, but through the involvement of citizens, who are directly connected with the local institutions. Cities behaviour, especially when they do diplomacy at the international level, has an impact on the local culture and function as a tool to spread the practice. By doing a simple comparison between the two kinds of soft law, that are the ones exercised by international organisations and by cities respectively, it results that they achieve a similar objective but through two distinct mechanisms: by emanating pieces of soft law, the UN generate a top-down process, with the aim of influencing Nation-States to comply with the suggested practice. Instead, the birth of city-networks in which practices, know-how and information flow freely, represents the empowerment of the local society - composed by both public and private sector - which manages to put in evidence its interests through a bottom-up process. Anyway, international boundaries are only a part of the limitations suffered by local entities in their way toward self-representation. Indeed, since the creation of nation states, cities were embedded within the state legal set up. Thus, cities are more or less free to act depending on the character of the state they belong to, on the legal treatment devoted to them by the national legislation and on many other factors all connected to the single specificities of the state. The first domestic restriction must evidently be the highest law of the country, that is the constitution. Obviously, countries possessing written and rigid constitutions have the possibility to expressly limit or devolve power to local governments, unlike common law states, that are strictly based on

³⁸ J.K. Levit, '*Lawmaking Bottom-up International: Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law*' (2007) 32 *Yale Journal of International Law*, pp. 393–420, at 395, in Setzer J., '*Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate Action of Local and Regional Governments*', *Transnational Environmental Law*, 4:2 (2015, Cambridge University Press, page 328.

interpretation and on the jurisprudence of constitutional courts. Basically, national constitutions can either recognize the city's international relations, either forbid them, and in the majority of cases, remain neutral.³⁹ Only few states permit expressly local governments (where local governments are not only cities, but also regions or autonomies) to do diplomacy: among them, France, Belgium and Argentina. Still, few countries explicitly forbid cities the exercise of international relations: the US does not allow cities or other local governments to enter into treaties⁴⁰ to preserve the unitary national position of the federal state in international relations. The most common case is the neutral position of the constitution, that occurs when legal rules determining cities' prerogatives of diplomacy are absent or extremely basic. Here, cities can take advantage of the vacuum of legislation to pursue its policies of international relations until the moment in which the state decides to limit them. Certainly, if cities invade fields that are exclusive competence of the nation-state, such as national security, defence, foreign affairs, or external borrowing⁴¹, it is reasonable to assume that their action will be challenged before the court. However, the argument employed by Setzer when she refers to the difficulty for the central state to monitor and restrict city's action is realistic: unlike other sub-national governments, cities are the last dowels of the hierarchical structure to which people address their issues, the closest one to citizens and the most variegated in terms of representants. Not only are cities numerous and hardly monitored by the state, but they can take "initiatives that do not always require formal legal arrangements"⁴². This can be interpreted as a benefit for cities, because they can work on the "alegal" spaces of the law. But at the same time, it represents uncertainty, and in some ways, it makes it impossible to similar cities to replicate perfectly policies pursued by other local entities.

Now that we have delimited the restricted space where cities can exercise diplomacy, in next paragraph will we will single out the range of activities in which cities engages while exercising their influence at the international level.

³⁹ Setzer J., "*Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate Action of Local and Regional Governments*", *Transnational Environmental Law*, 4:2 (2015, Cambridge University Press, page 329.

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

⁴¹ Ibidem, page 331.

⁴² Ibidem.

2.2 City-to-city cooperation vs city networks

Cities, as well as states, can engage in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy, depending on the kind of diplomatic model they use to establish relations with other entities. The two models of diplomacy are represented by city-to-city cooperation and city networks, respectively. Let us explore both.

Since the first engagement in international relations, modern cities used the cooperative model to strengthen their relations with national or foreign localities. City-to-city cooperation was a common strategy to “enhance a city’s international profile and global competitiveness”⁴³ through generating proximity between cities and facilitate the exchange of information, ideas, investments and, among all, people. Those ancestral bilateral relationships between cities belonged to several factors: mayoral or trade relationships, historical or demographic connections, common challenges or common faith.⁴⁴ In the past, twinning (or relationship between sister cities) was mostly aimed at express solidarity and reciprocity with friend cities, but throughout history, and with the end of the Cold War, this practice shifted its focus toward economic development. Economic development is pursued by the two engaged cities through processes of mutual understanding and friendship⁴⁵, touching a variety of themes and institutional and non-institutional actors. Twinning can signify to put into practice numerous and heterogenic initiatives and policies, such as the founts sharing, the transfer of knowledges, the sharing of responsibilities and leadership⁴⁶. However, despite the different forms it can take, twinning has its core in the concept of hospitality. Indeed, quoting Jayne, Hubbard and Del, “twinning involves rituals in which ‘Others’—typically from other nations—are welcomed, and encouraged to feel forms of emotional engagement, economic obligation and social integration with those who are doing the welcoming”.⁴⁷ There are hundred examples of city-to-city cooperation and many initiatives of sister cities involve young people and students, in sight of future reinforcement of the persistent links between the two localities. The objectives of this

⁴³ Jayne M., Hubbard P. and Bel D., “*Worlding a City, Twinning and Urban Theory*”, City, Vol. 15, NO. 1, February 2011, Routledge, page 25.

⁴⁴ <https://sistercities.org/about-us/what-is-a-sister-city-3/>, accessed 06/05/2019.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ <https://sistercities.org/about-us/what-is-a-sister-city-3/>, accessed 06/05/2019.

bilateral diplomacy between local governments are varied: assistance for the development of cities belonging to developing countries, as well as promotion of good practice, sharing of values as well as cultural, social or economic exchanges.

Formally speaking, we should make a distinction between “Friendship Cities” and “Sister Cities”, even though sometimes they have the same meaning. The latter is a broad-based and long-term partnership⁴⁸ which is turned into an official relationship through an agreement signed by the highest elected or appointed officials⁴⁹ of both local governments. An example of such an agreement is the twinning between the city of Rome and the city of Washington D.C, signed by the two mayors in 2013⁵⁰.




Figure 2, Sister City Agreement, Rome-Washington D.C., available at <https://os.dc.gov/>

The document above reports principles according to which both cities promise to collaborate in the economic, educational, social, environmental and cultural sphere. The model of “friendships cities” is, by contrast, less formal than twinning, and in some occasions, it is conceived as a previous stage of city “sisterhood”.

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰https://os.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/os/publication/attachments/ROME_DC_Sister_City_Agreement_English_0.pdf

However, city sisterhood and twinning models of partnership are extremely diverse, because they can involve citizens' decision with more or less intensity. If the above example showed the contract between the two "first citizens" of Rome and Washington, next example will illustrate more involvement, in terms of decision making, of both the private sector and the civil society. This case is perhaps the most cited case of city-to-city cooperation, that is the Sister Cities International (SCI)⁵¹. SCI is a no-partisan and no-profit organization founded in 1956 by the then-President of US Eisenhower; it regroups sister cities, sister counties and sister states of United States, but it accepts also sisterhood between USA and extra-continental cities. This organization fosters people-to-people exchanges and initiatives, in order to establish forms of peaceful relationships between the global actors. To be honest, we must remind that SCI structural organization has evolved throughout time, until the day it has taken the shape of a city-network. But what are exactly city networks?

If the practice of twinning has spread all over the world successfully and has brought economic and social improvements, the successive step made by towns led to the creation of networks, where not only cities, but also other non-state actors were included. The new focus has shifted from the importance of twinning to the importance of strategy and alliances.⁵² City networks have succeeded to go well beyond city-twinning achievement, as they include in the debate non-municipal actors as well as representants of the private sector. Networks are effectively giving to cities the international visibility they need to become the leading figures of globalization. Anyway, it must be clear that actions of networking do not turn to be automatically formal networks, when we conceive them as "institutionalized government structure"⁵³ capable to frame city-to city or city-to-city-to-another actor cooperation. Indeed, being compliant with the opinion of the scholar Michele Acuto, Professor of Global Urban Policies and Director of Connected Cities Lab, this thesis will define city networks as formalized organizations whose regular members are in major part cities marked by "reciprocal

⁵¹ <https://sistercities.org/>, accessed 06/05/2019

⁵² J. C. de Villiers, 'Success factors and the city-to-city partnership management process: from strategy to alliance capability', *Habitat International* 33: 2, 2009, pp. 149–56, in Acuto M., Rayner S., "City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?", *International Affairs* 92: 5, 2016, page 1157.

⁵³ Acuto M., Morissette M., "City Diplomacy: Towards More Strategic Networking? Learning with WHO *Healthy Cities*", *Global Policy* Volume 8. Issue 1. February 2017, page 15.

patterns of communication, policy making and exchange”⁵⁴. We do not take into account differences between municipalities and metropolitan areas, as the distinctive element of the category of “city” is the presence of the local government; this categorization is particularly useful because it determines which are the fundamental elements to separate proper networks – such as C40- from event-based initiatives, which are ad hoc networks whose life ends with the conclusion of the event, or from Conventions that miss regular meetings and members. Once cleared the formal and structured form they have, let us illustrate the phenomenon of city networks, by dividing them into groups depending on subjects, dimension, structure and outputs. According to Acuto and Morissette, there are at least 200 city-organizations which coincide with Auto’s definition of city network, and 170 of them have already been deeply studied by them. Firstly, networks may be organized in subnational, regional, national or international basis.⁵⁵ Among the 170 cases explored by Acuto and Morissette, the state-based networks are still the majority, representing the 49% of them: those arrangements are organized by the central state, as it is the case for the US Conference of Mayors. Regional networks, as well as international one, are increasing their fame: the former represents the 21% of the total cases, while the latter 29%. Eurocities and ULCG (United Cities and Local Government) are two examples of them, respectively. Those data show how important continue to be states in international relations: in the era of state decadence, Nation-States are still the first creator of city networks. That aspect deserves to be analysed properly, because it could mislead the reader: the fact that cities can be regrouped in networks created under state-pressure does not mean that International Relations still express the division between international and domestic domain. By contrast, this demonstrates that on the one hand cities still need the support of states to express all their potentialities of diplomacy; on the other, that some states are betting on cities and are willing to share with them the diplomatic power usually belonging to them. For what concerns the network composition, it is highly unsuggested to do a categorization, as there are so many hybrids city organizations that it would generate confusions. They are hybrids because they have internalized the new form of cooperation which is transforming traditional cities in something stronger and more

⁵⁴ Acuto M., Rayner S., “*City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?*”, *International Affairs* 92: 5, 2016, page 1150.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, page 1152.

inclusive: the public/private cooperation. Thus, the term “hybrid” does not refer only to their composition, but also to their governance, which is hybrid because shared between actors juridically different. For instance, an increasing percentage (30%) of networks are two-tiered, and more than the 15% are multi-tiered.⁵⁶ The fragmentation of governance is again the consequence of globalization, and it shows that the state model is increasingly obsolete and in need of replacement.




Figure 3, graph extracted from Acuto M., Rayner S., “City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?”, *International Affairs* 92: 5, 2016, page 1152.

Indeed, not only are there networks regrouping cities as well as networks gathering together also NGOs or private entities, but also their size is incredibly varied. For instance, size and scope are two interconnected aspects, as it could exist regional networks that serve as meeting point for cities of same regions, as it could be other examples of networks regrouping big cities of all over the world. However, categorization is also impeded by the fact that some networks do not provide the complete list of their members⁵⁷. Generally, Acuto and Rayner calculate that the average composition of the

⁵⁶ Acuto M., Rayner S., “City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?”, *International Affairs* 92: 5, 2016, page 1160.

⁵⁷ Acuto M., Rayner S., “City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?”, *International Affairs* 92: 5, 2016, page 1152.

170 analysed networks is 338 members, but it is undoubtedly a false figure, considering the difficulty of acquiring reliable data.⁵⁸

Similarly, cities can engage in networks facing a large list of topics, sometimes devoting the same network to different purposes. Thanks to the data elaboration effected by Acuto, Morissette and Tsouros, we can evaluate the evolution in networks' focus occurred during the last century. According to those data, the first organizations properly defined as city networks (dated back late XIX century) were mostly devoted to governance and representation, whose importance has grown up during the following decades; few of them were dedicated to other themes such as environment, development or economic. This trend reversed with the start of the new millennium⁵⁹: for instance, with the spread of scientific discoveries concerning human-caused climate change, cities found a new leading role, being them the spatial place where gas emissions achieve the top measurement. Along with networks facing environmental issues, many have been attracted by other new topics, such as gender issues, peacebuilding or poverty an inequality. Let us refer to the same study conducted by Acuto and Rayner to build up a graph reporting the percentage of networks divided for topic focus.




Figure 4, graph extracted from Acuto M., Rayner S., "City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?", *International Affairs* 92: 5, 2016, page 1154.

The above figure however is not recapitulatory, as some networks tackle different issues. Certainly, the overlapping of themes can obstacle the good functioning of both cities and

⁵⁸ Ibidem.

⁵⁹ Acuto M., Morissette M., "City Diplomacy: Towards More Strategic Networking? Learning with WHO *Healthy Cities*", *Global Policy* Volume 8. Issue 1. February 2017, page 18.

networks. Cities may be negatively affected because the coexistence of networks intensify the creation of “several parallel tracks”⁶⁰ which make it hard for cities to act freely, by imposing even stricter rules of behaviour. Therefore, the more the city participates to networks, the more its administrative structure is overloaded for reasons of communications, logistics and personnel. The organizational matter explains why those cities capable to make the difference in city networks, that are leading cities on the topics dealt with by the city-conventions, are generally well-organized and well-financed. Networks as well may be influenced by the surrounding landscape, because the similarities in goals could work as discriminant for selection: when their goals are similar as well as their members, it is reasonable that the most influent, visible and efficient will survive at the expense of the others. Nevertheless, many examples demonstrate that social “Darwinism”⁶¹ does not apply to all city-networks: if it was so, almost all networks devoted to climate change (almost 50 out of 170, according to Acuto) would have already disappeared; conversely, they still stand alive, while five of them are very visible actors and carried out more than 30 major events each only in 2014⁶². They are C40, Climate Change Alliance, UCLG, ULCI and World Mayor Council on Climate.

The last fundamental aspect we need to analyse is connected to the power exercised by cities while they do diplomacy through networks. As we have underlined in paragraph 2.1, cities produce pieces of soft law: they can take several forms. When cities meet in the network’s seat, they obviously use advertisement, promotion of the event through sponsorship and media announcements. However, beyond speeches and pictures, there is the writing and production of documents providing joint and concrete actions to be implemented by all members of the convention. By using again Acuto and Rayner data elaboration, we see that the 45% of networks produce regular reports, while the 38% of them do joint policies and the 37% share information.⁶³ They share information through newsletter, journals, magazines and by opening blogs and social media accounts⁶⁴.

⁶⁰Acuto M., Morissette M., “*City Diplomacy: Towards More Strategic Networking? Learning with WHO Healthy Cities*”, Global Policy Volume 8. Issue 1. February 2017, page 18.

⁶¹ Ibidem, page 19.

⁶² Ibidem.

⁶³ Acuto M., Rayner S., “*City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging (new) lock-ins?*”, International Affairs 92: 5, 2016, page 1162.

⁶⁴ Ibidem.

As we have done with twinning, it is useful to provide explanatory cases of city networks. Among the most important examples, impressive are the dimension and the goals set by C40 Cities. Next paragraph will be entirely devoted to it.

2.3 C40 Cities: history, structure, achievements and flows

C40 is a global network regrouping ninety-six large cities which share the purpose of fighting against climate change through the implementation of local initiatives that generate global impacts⁶⁵. The first idea of involving big cities in a network in order to propose a common position toward environment sustainability came to mind to the then-mayor of London Livingstone. In 2005, he reunited the representants of eighteen big cities from all over the world in order to discuss the topic of climate change and then, put in practice conjunctural actions to reduce gas emissions. The first outcome was an agreement - signed by all mayors of the engaged cities – on city-cooperation on a number of points, above all the construction of alliances to promote the use of climate-friendly technologies and the attempt to persuade market actors to shift their model of production toward environmental sustainability. One year later, Livingstone concluded a partnership with Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI), that became the network's delivering partner and added twenty-two more towns in the network list. Thus, C40 Cities took this name because of the number of its membership, which soon multiplied until it achieved the current number of members. In 2008, the former mayor of Toronto (Ms. Miller) took Livingstone's place for a couple of years, followed in 2010 by the NYC mayor Bloomberg. In late 2013, Rio de Janeiro mayor Paes took C40 chair for two years, to leave the place then to the current Chairwoman of the network, the mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo. Miss Hidalgo is the first woman leading the city network.

C40 Cities goals are several, because since its creation it expanded its scope of action thanks also to partnerships with other city-networks. For instance, at the C40 Mayors Summit in Johannesburg, Milan mayor Pisapia proposed the discussion above a "Urban Food Policy Pact", achieving to attract even the support of the UN General Secretary and

⁶⁵ Dan Koon-hong Chan, "*City diplomacy and glocal governance: revitalizing cosmopolitan democracy*", *The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 29:2, March 2016, page 146.

the engagement of some UN agencies.⁶⁶ What cities are doing is taking advantage of C40 to be a piece of the global governance. With the stipulation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, which C40 Cities network has energetically lobbied for, (even though the signature was allowed for Nation-States only), C40 cities committed to even more ambitious purposes to be achieved at the local level. As we have said before, environmental issues are extremely important to cities and must be tackled by them for many reasons. However, this is not the right paragraph to see in depth why cities are and must be the most involved actors when dealing with climate change, as we will focus on the case in the next chapter. For now, it is enough to say that C40 cities network provides help to its member cities by granting “technical assistance, facilitating peer-to-peer exchanges and sharing researches, knowledge management and communications”⁶⁷. It is extremely helpful for cities to take part to those global initiatives organized by the network: they resemble to the state international meetings or conventions, and they have the same title: summits. C40 network organizes City Mayors Summits every three years: until now, London, New York, Seoul, San Paulo, Johannesburg and Mexico City have hosted the Summit, and the next one, planned for October 2019, will take place in Copenhagen.

But how is it structured C40 network? The governance is spilt in four departments, each one having its function: at the top it places the chairman/woman, usually a very influential figure who gives the general stimulus to the group; then, the Board of Directors is composed by eight professionals handling different areas and representing distinct associations (such as Bloomberg Philanthropies or Clinton Foundation); the Steering Committee, currently composed by representants of seventeen cities belonging to the world area, “provides strategic direction and governance for C40’ in rotation”⁶⁸; the last one is the management department, made up of other eight professionals divided for competences.

C40 has four strategies to pursue its campaign against climate change, which are: (i) networks, (ii) programmes, (iii) researches and (iv) events. The sixteen active networks

⁶⁶ Dan Koon-hong Chan, “*City diplomacy and glocal governance: revitalizing cosmopolitan democracy*”, The European Journal of Social Science Research, 29:2, March 2016, page 150.

⁶⁷ C40 Fact Sheet, “Why Cities?”, 2015, PDF downloaded from the website <https://www.c40.org/>, accessed 08/05/2019).

⁶⁸ Dan Koon-hong Chan, “*City diplomacy and glocal governance: revitalizing cosmopolitan democracy*”, The European Journal of Social Science Research, 29:2, March 2016, page 147.

are devoted to five areas of intervention, that are “air quality”, “food, waste and water”, “energy and building”, “transportation and urban planning” and “innovation implementation”.⁶⁹ They work as platforms where leading cities can show up their improvements in the fields enlisted above and inspire other cities to follow their same pattern. As we will see later, one of the implicit characteristics of cities interacting internationally is their predisposition to experiment and “infect” the surrounding environment. This is made possible by the existence of platform where cities meet among them to share, discuss and learn things. Those networks are farther provided with experts and professionals of international relations to accompany cities in their path toward sustainable innovation. When the committed cities work together and behave through the organs of those platforms, they achieve huge results and become aware of their shared strength.

For what concerns the second category of initiatives, C40 has equipped its networks with programs focused on some strategic areas, in order to meet more efficiently city needs. Nowadays, eight program areas exist, among which “city finance”, “city intelligence” and “city diplomacy”.⁷⁰ In the end, events serve as vehicles to spread information and knowledges made public through the financing of researches. Open data provided by wide networks, numerous partnerships and numerous memberships make data-acquisition and data-exploitation possible and efficient.

Theoretically speaking, C40 could be defined as a horizontal network, where there is no disparity between cities where “peaceful and harmonious relationships (...) facilitate equal and inclusive participation”⁷¹. However, the different distribution of resources among the member cities could, intentionally or not, cause a major involvement of the most equipped localities in setting the agenda or in acting in favour of their interests and needs. As a matter of fact, some C40 cities are still struggling to get Internet access, which is discriminant to know, inform and learn in the current era. This phenomenon has been called “North-South inequality” by Sofie Bouteligier, who has investigated it.⁷² What emerges, is that in spite of the natural diversity in power of cities, and in spite of the over-representation of “best practices” deriving from the Northern cities, C40 board

⁶⁹ <https://www.c40.org/networks> , accessed 08/05/2019

⁷⁰ Ibidem.

⁷¹ ⁷¹ Dan Koon-hong Chan, “*City diplomacy and glocal governance: revitalizing cosmopolitan democracy*”, *The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 29:2, March 2016, page 144.

⁷² Ibidem, page 147.

has attempted to empower those cities representing the Southern part of the world. For instance, among the first fifteen cities that entered the network after 2014, all but one were from the South. Indeed, in an attempt to give numerical power to those less financed towns, other North American and European towns were impeded to join.

In conclusion, C40 Cities is one of many examples of network promoting values of environmental sustainability, and it is one of the most influent platforms whose scope is the strengthening of cities. By taking advantage of such new tools, cities are now embedded in the international atmosphere where barriers are teared down, allowing innovation to flow between all kinds of dwellers. This new openness generates a change which does not affect only external relations of those local governments, but it modifies also their internal features, provoking the set into motion of a second important mutative process: the internalization of the cooperative, horizontal mechanism of participation in decision making. This last aspect deserves to be taken into account when referring to the steps made by cities in the last decades, because the reinforcement of the role of city in the global frame goes along with the internal mutation of power between the actors involved in decision-making and “decision-receiving”.

2.4 City transition: from the external to the internal empowerment

At this point, one could increase the zoom on the city, in order to discover its internal machineries and intrinsic functioning, because its domestic features determine its interests as well as its necessities. Certainly, this field is incredibly wide, and to make an effort to categorize cities depending on their internal characteristics would be particularly laborious. However, it is indispensable to notice that urban structures, including both private and public structures, hide huge potentialities, which could be unveiled through the implementation of collaborative initiatives.

In order to define actors and outcomes of this cooperative relationship, we use the recent model thought and elaborated by Professors Iaione and Foster, in their attempt to publish a “Co-City Open Book” to monitor carefully the development of the new field of urban common studies.⁷³ The field focuses above all on exploring the constitutive

⁷³Co-city Protocol, www.commoncity.com, accessed 09/05/2019.

elements of urban centres, that are five souls: citizens (individuals), public authorities, private sectors (corporations and agencies), organized civil society (NGOs and associations) and knowledge institutions (schools and universities). Those souls have fluid boundaries, because an individual could belong to a private corporation and in the meantime, be active in an urban association. When active participation to the public urban life is incentivized, this fluidity amplifies the urban dwellers' voice, because as in our example, they will claim both their private and public interests. Still, people are the competitive advantage of cities in face of nation-states, because cities offer the only easy hub where citizens can meet and build urban coalitions to propose innovative solutions. There, it is possible to experiment, to apply new measures and to evaluate the outcomes in small-scale. Through the analysis of the cooperation (or non-cooperation) between the five sectors, the model identifies five variables to be taken into account, that are: co-governance, enabling state, pooling of social resources, experimentalism and tech-justice.⁷⁴ Those variables are applied to concrete case-study projects to evaluate the degree of collaboration between all city actors, no forgetting that they are part of an artificial and theoretical model used to design the potential shape of co-cities.

But let us go with order. The five souls or sectors described above are usually present in all cities; yet, it does not mean that they interact and collaborate wherever, because in most cases there is little relationship between them. However, in the last years, many cities from the most developed countries have pursued new strategies of urban action which were made possible due to their collaborative relationships; they fostered universities, associations, the community and private urban entities to work together, and to work together with the public sector (urban administration), in order to achieve common advantages. This has been defined by the researchers of Co-Cities platform as "principle of co-governance"⁷⁵. In this model, co-governance is intended as broad partnerships between different actors, implying a broad understanding of the concept of governance, which goes beyond the actual involvement of a public institution. The variable only evidences the interaction among two or more city subjects (NGOs, universities, community associations, etc.) occurred to implement a city initiative where citizens have actual decision-making power. By entrusting decision-making power to individuals, those city actors start an initiative of participatory democracy (also called,

⁷⁴ Co-city Protocol, www.commoncity.com, accessed 09/05/2019

⁷⁵ Iaione C., "*The right to the Co-City*", Italian Journal of Public Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1/2017, Page 113.

for instance, co-governance).⁷⁶ Its conceptualization, however, looks more like “diffused democracy” than “direct democracy”.⁷⁷ But how do cities incentivize their constituent parts to collaborate in sight of a democratization of the decision-making process? Unquestionably, part of the answer lays on people. If there is someone definable as “innovator”, he/she is expected to campaign for his/her idea involving people belonging to one or more souls; where the public administration is not included in the collaborative action for the city, it could anyway be neutral and allow those separated entities to collaborate for the proposal of a project that benefits some/all inhabitants. The absence of the public sphere in the project does not exclude the variable of collective governance, if it is met the condition according to which individuals benefiting from - or affected by - the project, are allowed to take part to the process of decision. Thus, according to the model of co-cities, an initiative can present the variable of collective governance regardless the involvement of the local government.

By contrast, local government behaviour is the specific focus of another variable used by Iaione, who takes into account the collaboration of urban administrative institutions in projects involving the community (here meant as a single category regrouping all souls of the city, but the public one); the variable – which Iaione names “enabling state” - measures the degree of public enabling of these processes of participatory democracy, which is sometimes determinant to accomplish the good implementation of a collaborative initiative. An exemplary case is the Habitat III awarded project called “Fideicomiso de la Tierra” (San Juan, Porto Rico), where degraded lands have been requalified and adapted to its communities’ needs; during fifteen years of struggling, the Community Land Trust Fideicomiso de la Tierra fought to regulate the land use through the collective ownership, and its accomplishments or failures in doing so depended also on the San Juan municipality behaviour, which has been contradictory.⁷⁸ As a matter of fact, the same enabling process may be applied to cities. As we have mentioned before, cities are always determined by domestic law. However, if in the first paragraph of this chapter we referred to the domestic constraints on cities external relations, now we focus on the internal constraints delimiting collaborative moves of

⁷⁶ Pateman C., “Participatory Democracy Revisited”, *Perspectives on Politics*, 2012, Vol. 10(1), page 7.

⁷⁷ Veltroni W., interview in annex, page 2

⁷⁸ For further information, Algoed L., Hernández Torrales M.E., Rodríguez Del Valle L., “*El Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Caño Martín Peña Instrumento Notable de Regularización de Suelo en Asentamientos Informales*”, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, June 2018.

local governments. If cities derive their capacity to pursue independent external relations from state devolution of a sort of diplomatic power (or state indifference in many cases), the potential degree of intrusion of urban governments in their communities' collective initiatives may depend on another kind of state devolution, which we designate as "decentralization". Thus, decentralization can be defined as "devolution of power that privileges local and inter-sectoral action units. These units draw upon citizens (both organized groups and individuals), elected representatives and those working for the municipal authority in diverse ways"⁷⁹. This definition apparently seems to fit also for depicting the process of collective governance through which city actors start initiatives of participative democracy. Nevertheless, quoting Patsias, "the linkages between democracy (understood as such) and decentralization are at the very least paradoxical"⁸⁰. Indeed, in the author's view, there is not a consequential connection between decentralization and democratization, and in some cases the former "may encourage participation only at the neighbourhood level or in a public-private partnership and thus fall short of the objectives of participatory democracy"⁸¹. So, the question to be asked concerns the conditions under which state decentralization can effectively boost collective participation. As decentralization is not the peculiar interest of this thesis, we will just add that those conditions have been intelligently rattled off by Fung and Wright, whose model will be taken as reference on this paper; it is based on three characteristics required to each form of participation and three institutional design features.⁸² For our purposes, what matters the most is the acknowledgement, which raises repetitively throughout the chapters as a reminder, that nation-states still play a fundamental role in coordinating with cities for the urban empowerment, not only on the international ground, but also on the domestic one.

Now that we have explored two variables explaining the relationship between the actors and the role of the government at the local and national level, we can move to the next variables. For reason of coherence, it is useful to consider two of them ("poolism" and

⁷⁹ Patsias C, Latendresse A., Bherer L., "Participatory Democracy, Decentralization and Local Governance: the Montreal Participatory Budget in the light of 'Empowered Participatory Governance'", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Volume 37.6 November 2013, page 2216.

⁸⁰ Ibidem, page 2215.

⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁸² For further information, A. Fung and E.O. Wright (eds.), "*Deepening democracy: institutional innovations in empowered participatory governance*", Verso, London.

tech-justice) as referring to the management of resources, energies and actions⁸³, while the last one (experimentalism) explains the degree of adaptability of the initiatives/projects in exam. Pooling means to use resources and energies to benefit the community in its whole. Basically, pooling is a practice which is discrediting the paradigm of *homo oeconomicus*, who is only interested in maximizing his advantages regardless the others; pooling is a way of thinking according to which people can accomplish better goals if they work together, using the available resources for the good of the community. In this way, not only are citizens pushed to work together in a spirit of participation (collective governance/participatory democracy), but they redistribute resources, and, by consequence, they reduce inequalities. Forms of poolism are sharing economy, collaborative economy, peer-to-peer approaches, and all that activities that “collectively owned or managed, democratically governed, do not extract value out of local economies but anchor jobs, respect human dignity and offer new forms of social security”⁸⁴. Among the characteristics of the practice, remarkable are the importance of human relations, reputation and trust they are based on, as well as the intensive use of digital technologies and data collection⁸⁵. Technology is, in fact, another variable of the Co-city model, because in modern times it can work as a tool to reduce inequalities and gaps between higher and lower-class people. Technological improvement is definitely an impressive key of interpretation of city development: as touched upon, Internet access and new systems to collect data, together with new media allowing the prompt access to information, transformed diplomacy and gave to cities and other non-state actors more influential positions in the global framework. The same happened within city borders, where people have profited of tech-improvements to put into practice democratic and sustainable initiatives.

In conclusion, we cannot miss the opportunity to deepen the fifth variable, which is particularly interesting for its connective role with the main focus of the paper, that is obviously the potential role of cities in shaping international relations. Experimentation is the second big advantage held by cities: after the first and most important strength, that is the “human capital”, experimentation represents the reason why cities always spread practices. Indeed, cities as hubs possess such a flexible structure which makes

⁸³ Iaione C., “*The right to the Co-City*”, Italian Journal of Public Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1/2017, page 80.

⁸⁴ Ibidem, page 129.

⁸⁵ Ibidem, page 127.

them almost invulnerable to wrong choices. Rephrasing, wherever they want to test a new strategy (economic, cultural, social or political) they can do so by circumscribing the implementation to a certain zone or neighbour and then, evaluate the results. If it does work, the experiment can be applied to all the city-areas, by adapting them to different circumstances. This process regards the domestic diffusion. However, it is also true for the international domain: cities are laboratory where innovations are experimented, tested and studied; but they are also links of the transnational chain through which knowledge flows and generate contagion effect, they are hubs that become trans-continental. It could be useful at this point to report a brief example of how contagion occurs at city level, spreading practices and giving inputs for new ideas. As we have seen, cities have become fundamental player in the fight for the reduction of gas emissions: cities are the perfect actors in this field because not only do gas emissions pollute the air, but they generate disadvantages for citizens due gridlocks, noise pollution and, more in general, stress. Thus, many local associations activated to propose new individual-transport solutions that respected the requirement of environmental sustainability, and many administrations have begun to look for green solutions by collaborating with private companies offering electric transport in an easy way; the most recent example is the spread of electric scooters in Europe and United State. French and Spanish cities have been the first market in Europe⁸⁶, but they have rapidly expanded their scope; in fact, Milan has promptly reacted to this initiative by settling electric scooters within the central streets, in a successful campaign that has realized more than 100.000 rides since November 2018.⁸⁷ Scooters introduction in cities viability is the example of a successful experiment, which in virtue of its achievement, is in process of replication in other European cities.

We decided to write this case on purpose, in order to use it as an opportunity to conclude the chapter with a clue of next one. *De facto*, city diplomacy has focused on some peculiar domains, and they deserve to be carefully explored.

⁸⁶Saviola L., aprile 2019, in https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2019-04-08/monopattini-e-hoverboard-pronto-decreto-italia-230mila-tavole-elettriche-vendute-2018-183110.shtml?refresh_ce=15/05/2019).

⁸⁷ Ibidem

THIRD CHAPTER

Important Thematic Areas for Cities

3.1 The leading role of cities in the fight against climate change

Until now, we have focused on the instruments used by cities to represent their interests in a context of diplomacy (see 1.4), and on the ways they actually do diplomacy (through bilateral or multilateral sets, see chapter 2); now, we need to look inside the fields where city diplomacy has grown and has achieved important results. We touched upon the preferred topics dealt with by city networks, and we saw that many of them are devoted to environmental sustainability in face of climate change. This chapter will dedicate one paragraph to this item, while the others will examine in depth two strategic fields which have traditionally belonged to nation-states: fight against inequality and peacebuilding. We will do so by referring also to the personal experience of the previous Mayor of Rome Walter Veltroni (2001-2008) and his Diplomatic Councillor Marco Baccin, who conceded a brief and inspiring interview in which they shared with us their reminds about certain occasions where Rome behaved impressively as an international actor.

Let us begin with cities' leading role in proposing and implementing concrete actions to fight climate change. The literature suggests that cities are "critical players in any attempt to implement national and international policy imperatives to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and have a significant role to play in climate protection in their own"⁸⁸. Why? Because cities have several links with the topic. First of all, cities are the main producers of gasses and materials polluting air, ground and water. Secondly, because they host the half of global population, so they will result to be the most affected by climate change consequences. Thirdly, because they are the ones entrusted by nation-states to physically implement mitigation and adaptation measures, due to their administrative powers and their direct relations with human, capital and material resources. According to the Stern Review analysis⁸⁹, cities are responsible for the 78%

⁸⁸ Betsill M. and Bulkeley H., "*Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program*", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, page 477.

⁸⁹ N. Stern, "*Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change*", Cambridge University Press, 2007.

of carbon emissions.⁹⁰ More in general, cities produce the biggest amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) because they are centres where economic activities are settled. They are also responsible for two thirds of energy consumption⁹¹, so they are expected to be the ones accountable for the reparation of damages. Indeed, cities can produce emissions in a variety of ways which are distinctive of each urban area. By comparing urban centres belonging to industrialized and developing countries (Bangkok and London, respectively), Croci discovered that the former's major contributor of GHG was the transport sector, while the latter was the "building sector – specifically the energy consumption"⁹². Moreover, climate, urban forms or, for instance, transportations are all points which influence the value of GHG emissions. Let see some of them. Urban forms count when it comes to emissions, because it is acknowledged that "denser cities tend to have lower per capita (...) emissions"⁹³ due to their lower energy consumption, as the World Development Report has confirmed in 2010.⁹⁴ This factor depends in turn on others cities peculiarities, such as urban structures, urban resources or the distance between the peripheral areas and the city centre. Indeed, if people from the suburbs demanded an increase in public transport to connect their areas to the centre, GHG car emissions would decrease, as public transports pollute much less than private transports (at least because more vehicles are left home). This example is superficial and does not take into account many other elements necessary to make a conclusive assessment; however, it gives an idea on how those urban forms can influence the level of city pollution. Energy and waste management are other important factors which have an impact on cities, being the former detected as the sector which contributes the most to GHG emissions from urban areas⁹⁵. Excluded from the energetic sector are those emissions which do not have energy use as primarily purpose, but they are attributed

⁹⁰ Setzer Joana, "Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate Action of Local and Regional Governments", *Transnational Environmental Law*, 4:2 (2015, Cambridge University Press, page 323.

⁹¹ Hoornweg D., Freire M., Lee M.J., Bhada-Tata P., and Yuen B., "Cities and Climate Change. Responding to an Urban Agenda", The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2011, page 4.

⁹² Ibidem, page 5.

⁹³ Ibidem, page 6.

⁹⁴ World Bank. 2010. "World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change". Washington, DC. World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4387>.

⁹⁵ Hoornweg D., Freire M., Lee M.J., Bhada-Tata P., and Yuen B., "Cities and Climate Change. Responding to an Urban Agenda", The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2011, page 30.

to industrial processes or product use, as well as agriculture and forestry. As far as we see from that information, cities control almost all the processes which have an effect on the health of our planet, and for this same reason Broto believes that they must hold a pivotal role in transnational climate change governance⁹⁶.

However, what impresses the most is that by addressing this huge and global issue, cities are also increasing their diplomatic power and they are doing so without imposing a fit-all practice: climate change is actually giving to all city actors (simple dwellers as well as organized communities or institutions of education, NGOs and private companies) the opportunity to play a role in climate change politics⁹⁷, in an impulse which is unique and unrepeatable; in fact, citizens know all peculiarities of their urban centre and, by consequence, they plan solutions which fit only for their cities. If city diplomacy conceived in its wide sense is pursued by - and benefit - the city as a whole (including governmental institutions), city diplomacy applied specifically to the field of environmental sustainability is reinforcing in particular one category of city actors: civil society. Just to give a theoretical perspective - which is useful also to add some more information about city-networks (see Chapter 2.2) - this focus on civil society is due to the new relevance given to those approaches that take into analysis actors other than states. More specifically, the approach labelled as “global civil society”⁹⁸ is the one pursued by scholars who shifted the focus of the analysis from the state, as they were interested in considering “the multiplicity of actors and institutions that influence the ways in which global environmental issues are addressed”⁹⁹. Civil society is indeed the most affected by the exchange of information and know-how through those channels offered by city networks, because in this new way of approaching global problems at the local level, people who are active part of the civil society are provided with the cognitive tools to interpret the issue and find autonomously some peculiar solutions. This is a matter of policy learning, that derives from the awareness that there are some issues that cannot be confronted by nation states, because they are global and, by consequence, they need to be solved at the global level. Climate change, especially when it is

⁹⁶ Broto V. C., “*Urban Governance and The Politics of Climate Change*”, World Development, 05/2017, Volume 93, page 11.

⁹⁷ Ibidem

⁹⁸ Betsill M. and Bulkeley H., “*Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program*”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, page 475.

⁹⁹ Ibidem.

approached through the use of transnational networks, gives to individuals – organized or not – both tools to find by themselves specific solutions of mitigation or adaptation, and hubs where they can share their experiences and discoveries by empowering their local governmental representatives in city-networks. Basically, by taking aspiration from Betsill and Bulkeley’s model based on the analysis of Cities for Climate Protection program¹⁰⁰, we believe that three changes are occurring in the policy learning process of cities: (i) the “localization” of global problems (translated in the famous maxim “think globally, act locally), (ii) the new interpretation of local issues as focal points for international relations and (iii) the legitimation of civil society in challenging the traditional state approach to global issues. Again, by applying the figure used by Betsill and Bulkeley in their paper “Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program” to our understanding of policy learning changes, we would display a process such as the following.




Figure 5, “Evolution of city policy learning”,

Thus, we see the role played by networks in “publicizing” local initiatives and local issues at the international level. The last spark from Betsill and Bulkeley’s work that deserves to be considered in this section concerns the reasons for cities to participate to those “environmental” networks. We have already said several times that city networks

¹⁰⁰ Betsill M. and Bulkeley H., “*Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program*”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, page 475.

hold an important value: they are means to vehicle information, know-how and experiences. However, the authors point out that “limited capacity to address climate protection locally is not primarily the result of an absence of information”¹⁰¹. What usually impedes cities to implement environmental measures, it is the lack of financial resources and the absence of powers to put them into practice. In fact, networks such as Cities for climate Protection (CCP), not only provide guidelines on sustainable behaviours all cities should respect, but they also redistribute resources to “weak” members in order to put them in the right condition to apply the recommended practices.

The recommended practices can belong to two categories: mitigation measures or adaptation ones. The former are actions that face directly the causes of climate change, while the latter work to deal with the consequences.¹⁰² In other words, adaptation initiatives attempt to reduce the socio-environmental vulnerability of urban areas, that risk to be overwhelmed by “predictable or non-predictable disturbances”¹⁰³, such as temperature rise or weather extremes, respectively. On the other hand, mitigation measures represent a real intervention to reduce the sources of climate change, in an effort to find a long-term solution. Indeed, another difference that separates the two kinds of intervention is their temporal scope. To adapt to climate change consequences means to propose several short-terms solutions to face such socio-environmental complications that are coming up all over the world (for instance, extreme drought, floods, water evaporation, species extinction, etc.). By contrast, mitigation measures want to change the way of exploitation of resources, or even resources in themselves, which signifies to invert the course of climate change process in the future. Despite their distinction, both of them are indispensable for people wellbeing in the short, medium and long-term, so they must be implemented in contemporaneity. Sometimes, those interventions carry out both functions, accomplishing both adaptative and mitigative purposes. Let us make an explanatory example, inspired by the paper “The interplay

¹⁰¹ Betsill M. and Bulkeley H., “*Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program*”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, page 489.

¹⁰² Diana Reckien et al, “*How are cities planning to respond to climate change? Assessment of local climate plans from 855 cities in the EU-28*”, *Journal of Cleaner Production* 191(2018), page 208.

¹⁰³ Pasimeni m. R., Valente D., Zurlini G., Petrosillo I., “*The interplay between urban mitigation and adaptation strategies to face climate change in two European countries*”, *Environmental Science and Policy* (2019), page 21.

between the urban mitigation and adaptation strategies to face climate change in two Europe countries” (Pasimeni *et al*, 2019). Initiatives to install green areas within the city are typical examples of adaptation measures, because in case of extreme rainfall, natural soil absorbs much more water than asphalt or cement; moreover, trees and plants work as natural cooler during hot seasons, having a tangible effect in terms of life quality. However, green areas installation is not only the attempt to adapt the city to climate change consequences: it is also a long-term intervention to mitigate climate change by acting directly on the source of the disturb. Indeed, green areas functions as “carbon sinks” to reduce carbon particles in the air we breathe.

It is for us very useful to know those practical efforts, because they are the most impressive evidences of city diplomacy, especially if we compare those efforts (and the given results) with what has been carried out until now by nation-states in the fight against climate change. This is even clearer when taking into account the most important “local” global movement, the Covenant of Mayors. It is a voluntary initiative started in 2008 among European cities, in the framework “of the Europe 2020 Climate and Energy Strategy”. In 2015, it converged with the “Mayors Adapt” – launched in the framework of the EU adaptation Strategy of 2014 – with the aim of helping cities to achieve mitigative and adaptive purposes in synergy: the merger gave birth to the new “Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy”¹⁰⁴, the biggest urban climate and energy initiative of the world¹⁰⁵. Two years ago (2017) the Covenant turned global, opening its shared objectives to cities from all continents. Among the other functions, Global Covenant establishes some steps that cities should do in order to put in practice a system of environmental measures of short and long-term period, to become resilient. Firstly, they are required to do an inventory of their emissions, which is propaedeutic to single out the goals of the Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plan (SECAP); once SECAP has been established, the last step is the monitoring of the progresses. Therefore, the result in this way obtained will be reported during the Convention, which is the preferred moment to individuate best practices. Best practices are then inserted in an open database, following a system of policy learning based on experimentation and

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/>, accessed on 18/05/2019

¹⁰⁵ Pasimeni m. R., Valente D., Zurlini G., Petrosillo I., “*The interplay between urban mitigation and adaptation strategies to face climate change in two European countries*”, Environmental Science and Policy (2019), page 21.

good example. Global Covenant is one out of tens city-networks devoted to environmental issues, even though it is one of the most renowned. Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) is, for instance, another strong network devoted to global environmental sustainability. In conclusion, environmentalism is the perfect field for city-networks to proliferate, because cities hold the right instruments to act and are directly affected by the issue. Cities have learnt to do diplomacy by influencing each other in the tackling of the issue, and they have done so by publicizing their role in international relations.

Now, it is the time to move to other fields where city diplomacy could really make a difference.

3.2 Cities and the fight against inequality

Going back in time until the first remembrance we have on human history, it teaches us that inequality is a human thing. It is identifiable at the global scale, because there are differences in wellbeing and life standard between continents; nowadays, the notion of “third world” does not refer anymore to America for being discovered in the XV century, but to certain countries of the African continent, for their scarce development in terms of technology, infrastructures and institutions as well as their dearth of essential goods. However, Africa is a good example to understand that inequality is a wide theme, observable also at smaller scales: within the African continent there are countries in much more advanced conditions, comparable with the high standard of Europe, Northern America and Oceania: South Africa, Tunisia, Algeria are some examples. The same old continent (Europe) experiences inequality within its borders, especially in terms of GDP per capita (e.g. Eastern European countries when compared with the Northern European countries). But increasing again the zoom, we see that even inside each country, there are deep unequal conditions, that embrace all terms of comparison. The more we zoom, the more evident are the fields where inequality stands. Thus, in an era in which more than the half of the world population lives in urban centres, cities are inevitably involved in the issue. Addressing the domestic inequality, for example through redistribution, is certainly a domestic issue, because being cities hubs where people live, work and meet, they cannot escape from dealing with

inequalities in all its facets. However, if the city is inserted in a context where local governments are in perpetual communication, as they are when they take part to city-networks, the issue supposedly has international references. Even though it seems just a domestic problem, which has no links with cities' external relations, inequality management at the local level is one of the policies through which cities may become popular in the world.

Let us explore the urban dimensions of inequality, that deserve to be distinguished from the national ones; then we will look at the urban responsibilities in causing inequality, as well as at the local possible answers to address it.

Above all, inequality is hardly conceptualizable, because any attempt to define it, risks ending up in a political debate, as it implies a certain acceptance of what the person considers a “just” and “unjust”. However, this section does not pretend to define what inequality is, but instead, it wants to understand in which forms inequalities is present in urban centres. Certainly, inequality has its roots in the distribution of power among individuals which shaper social relations. It does not derive only from the desire of a person to dominate over one other, but also from the very way society is organized.¹⁰⁶ A shared understanding perceives the way the society is organized as it was maintained by “specific forms of asymmetric power structures” which are in turn reinforced by “legal systems, institutionalized economic groups, education systems, etc.”¹⁰⁷. However, quoting Gyuris, “each context makes certain issues more visible than others”, and consequently urban inequalities are the result of “of local specificities of urban growth, institutional settings, academic and cultural traditions, etc.”¹⁰⁸ For this reason, efforts to reduce inequality at the national level can have contradictory results at the local one. For instance, redistributive policies at the national level may allow the country to be more equal, but at the municipal level it may result in the exodus of wealthy people in change of an influx of poor ones, causing a negative levelling: in this way, the city would have reduced the gap between social classes, but it would have done so having impoverished the city.

¹⁰⁶ Ferenc Gyuris, “*Urban Inequalities: approaches and narratives*”, in Ulrike Gerhard, Michael Hoelscher, And David Wilson, “*Inequalities in Creative Cities*”, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2017), page 43.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem, page 44.

To deepen this point, we can dwell on Shatkin's analysis over urban responsibilities; in his paper "Global cities of the South: emerging perspectives on growth and inequality", Shatkin underlines that inequalities at the local level may depend on the process of global cities development; specifically, he focuses on three given manifestation of inequality: (i) social inequality, (ii) uneven development and (iii) political inequality.¹⁰⁹ The author argues that the global cities approach, according to which all global cities follow a common model of development (the one generally experienced by Western cities) regardless their belonging to developed or developing countries, is wrong. By contrast, he believes that the uniqueness of each urban centre in terms of ideology, culture, social structures, but also in terms of resource collection, flows of ideas and money makes globalization incapable to create an evident and replicable path of urban development – or urban change. As Shatkin states, inequality in urban centres depends on political, spatial and social aspects. Precisely, thanks to an explanatory table, he explains that each manifestation of inequality (i, ii and iii) is influenced by a set of elements that can be regrouped in three categories: diversity in the global city experiences, historical perspective and actor-centred perspective.¹¹⁰ Thus, it means that also processes of urban change must be considered by taking into account those unique variables. Shatkin's point of view is very helpful for us, because it indicates that inequality is one important concern for cities; by reviewing her paper, we understand that inequalities are anchored to urban features, and that the way in which political, economic and social distinctions hits communities always depends on how cities are.

Having said that, we can focus on a couple of local approaches to reduce inequality. However, we want to introduce them by explaining why it is important from their perspective to address the topic on urban basis. As already said, analysts usually prefer to focus on the state governance, because politics and international relations are still under states' dominion. Nevertheless, analysis on "transformative social change"¹¹¹ must be addressed from a local point of view, because civil society plays a fundamental role in fostering participation to "improve relationship between citizens and the state,

¹⁰⁹ Shatkin G., "Global cities of the South: emerging perspectives on growth and inequality", *Cities*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2006).

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, page 7.

¹¹¹ Smith J., "Local Responses to Right-Wing Populism: Building Human Rights Cities", *Studies in Social Justice*, Vol.11, issue 2, page 351.

advocate for marginalized people and spread a culture of peace and social cohesion”¹¹². Moreover, “despite the ongoing polarization of wealth and power in global system”¹¹³, some cities have begun to use human rights lens to rethink local priorities. Taking as example the model of “human rights city” proposed by Oomen, Davis and Grigolo, we examine the approach pursued by those cities that comply with human rights standard provided by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Jackie Smith considers also another kind of human right city, using the People Decade Human Rights Learning (PDHRE) definition:

A Human Rights City is a city or a community where people of good will, in government, in organizations and in institutions, try and let a human rights framework guide the development of the life of the community. Equality and non-discrimination are basic values. Efforts are made to promote a holistic vision of human rights to overcome fear and impoverishment, a society that provides human security, access to food, clean water, housing, education, healthcare and work at liveable wages, sharing these resources with all citizens – not as a gift, but as a realization of human rights.¹¹⁴

Basically, human rights cities aim at changing city priorities, basing city choices – such as investments, urban planning initiatives, etc. – on the respect of human rights (including economic, social and cultural rights¹¹⁵). In her view, it is time to make two steps forwards: to shift the attention from the national attempts to reduce inequality to the local capacity to do so, and to prioritize communitarian needs in face of business ones. In a way, this call to human right cities looks like a constraint for capitalist logics which shape the policies of the city.

Speaking of capitalism, we may refer to the second approach, whose focus is the analysis of the spatial organization of the town to reduce inequality. Basically, much emphasis has been devoted to the role of urban planification in fighting disparities of life standard

¹¹² Smith J., “*Local Responses to Right-Wing Populism: Building Human Rights Cities*”, *Studies in Social Justice*, Vol.11, issue 2, page 351

¹¹³ Oomen B., Davis M. F., and Grigolo M., eds., “*Global Urban Justice: The Rise of Human Rights Cities*”. 2016. New York: Cambridge University Press. 336 pages, Review by Thomas Ehrlich Reifer, *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. 24 Issue 1, page 1.

¹¹⁴ PDHRE, “*Human Right Learnin, A people report*”, International Office, 2006, page 3.

¹¹⁵ Smith J., “*Local Responses to Right-Wing Populism: Building Human Rights Cities*”, *Studies in Social Justice*, Vol.11, issue 2, page 354.

within the same urban centre. Urbanists have achieved high popularity to be responsible for the planification of a city whose structures allow the distribution of services all over the city area; other than that, urbanists aim at improving the citizens' perception of the city in terms of safety, liveability, cleanness, and other evaluative dimensions¹¹⁶. Thus, urban planification is conceived as one of the approaches to address inequality issues. Nikhil Anand, in his paper on Mumbai case¹¹⁷, responds to this egalitarian urbanism by saying that urbanists should not set the goal of reducing inequality within urban borders. By contrast, they should work in harmony with those differences, aspiring to build an urban space where people can "live with their insurmountable differences"¹¹⁸. In his analysis over urban planning in Mumbai, one of the world most famous cities for inequality between people living in the very extended suburbs and people living in the centre of the town, he reported the opinion of the urbanist Richard Sennet, according to which "capitalism forms the context within which urban planners and administrators work, so the best they can do is to "live with" inequality"¹¹⁹. Anand does not agree with him in full, because it does not blame the economic paradigm to cause or perpetuate inequality. In fact, he underlines that even modern urbanist aspiring at installing an egalitarian social order, failed "to make space in marginal social and economic activities"¹²⁰. By contrast, they accidentally worsened the environment in which marginalized community lived by improving the conditions and causing the removing of poor people from the city. This is one aspect of gentrification: when requalification of unsafe areas is pursued without conditions under which the requalified area will be sold or managed, or more specifically without conditions that safeguard settlers' rights, the result will be very far from helping those marginalized communities living there. Logically, they will be forced to quit their home.

Thus, comparing the two approaches previously presented, we understand that local efforts to address inequality must be concentrated on people's rights and pursued with bottom-up approach. Again, when addressing issues at the local level, civil society

¹¹⁶ Philip Salesses, Katja Schechtner, César A. Hidalgo, " *The Collaborative Image of the City: Mapping the Inequality of Urban Perception*", Plos One, Vol. 8, Issue 7 (2013), page 1.

¹¹⁷ Anand N., " *Housing in the Urban Age: inequality and aspiration in Mumbai*", Antipode, Vol. 43 No. 5, 2011.

¹¹⁸ Sennet R., " *Urban inequality.*" Presented at Urban Age India Conference, Mumbai, 2 November 2007

¹¹⁹ Anand N., " *Housing in the Urban Age: inequality and aspiration in Mumbai*", Antipode, Vol. 43 No. 5, 2011, page 1768.

¹²⁰ Anand N., " *Housing in the Urban Age: inequality and aspiration in Mumbai*", Antipode, Vol. 43 No. 5, 2011, page 1768

acquire relevance; therefore, when civil society is provided with tools to make part of the decision-making process, it can propose solutions which respond to citizens interests, regardless their differences and their social and economic status. How can city provide those tools? It can do so by encouraging social contact, by making available its structures to create spaces of sharing and by mobilizing all its souls. This can be done by adapting urban behaviour to human right standards as well as planning urban spaces in a way that considers inequalities but does not modify them. This empowerment of civil society (that sounds as an internal democratization) must be framed in the more general context of modern diplomacy: cities are not anymore simple institutional arms of nation-state diplomacy and in support of it, but they become the almost autonomous framework within which local actors and civil society can move and represents their interests¹²¹.

Thus, inequality can be addressed at the local level, in a way which must fit all features of the given city. Now, we can move to another field where city diplomacy could be fruitful: it concerns the role that urban centres could play in solving local or even international conflict. We will do so in the next paragraph.

3.3 Cities and peacebuilding

Before examining cases in which cities behaved as independent actors to resolve a conflict using its structure and spaces, we should focus few moments on the peace-building definition. Indeed, peace-building or peace-making is undoubtedly a process, a sum of actions and behaviours which foster the creation of peaceful relations between two or more factions in a given place. In order to have a clear response to our question, we refer to United Nations Peacebuilding Funds¹²² definitions; the concept was introduced in 1992 by the previous UN Secretary-General Boutros, who in the “Agenda for Peace Report” defined peacebuilding as “actions to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”¹²³. That definition was then modified and enriched, until 2007, when the

¹²¹ Carpini L.. interview in annex, page 3.

¹²² <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund>, accessed on 20/05/2019

¹²³ A/47/277 – S/24111, para. 21., in <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund>, accessed 20/05/2019

Secretary-General's Policy Committee depicted peacebuilding as that set of measures whose aim was to reduce the risk of conflict by reinforcing all national instruments necessary to manage the conflict and to build the basis for a sustainable peace. Peacebuilding was conceived here as being adaptable to the country's conditions and based on a range of "prioritized, sequenced and narrow activities"¹²⁴ targeted for the achievement of the goals. Peacebuilding programs contemplate thus both planification and implementation of a set of actions. But who is the mind behind that planification and implementation? Easy to guess, the answer varies depending on cases: potentially, many entities could execute those functions, even though the traditional approach to diplomacy gives the first voice to nation-states. However, among the empowered actors, there could be cities. In order to deepen the theme, we will refer to Bollens' paper entitled "Urban Planning and Peace Building", where he focuses on the local dynamics and outcomes of efforts to reconstitute sub-state societies and cities, with the aim of discovering the in-the-ground dimensions of building-peace. Then, we will take in exam some city-networks targeted to encourage local peace and, in the end, we will mention two examples of cities engaged in peace building: Mostar, with its historical position of multi-ethnic zone, and Rome, which held the position of external negotiator during the Second Intifada.

First of all, when dealing with peacebuilding procedures, we must have in mind the political, economic and social context in which they need to be performed. The contemporary or recent history is sprinkled of examples of countries teared apart by ethical or religious divisions, as well as by political ones. Obviously, cities have represented in most cases the most important hubs to be conquered in the fight for supremacy, and they have dramatically suffered military strategies targeted at the physical destruction of its structures (buildings) and dwellers. Moreover, cities are the places where the antagonism between groups intensifies because they are (i) the focal points for nationalistic ethnic conflict¹²⁵ (as it is the case of Jerusalem or Belfast); in alternative, in cases such as post-colonialism,(ii) they do not contain the germs of the conflict, because those are state-issues, but they function as the chessboard where

¹²⁴ Decision of the Secretary-General, May 2007, in <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund>, accessed 20/05/2019

¹²⁵ Bollens S. A., "Urban Planning and Peace Building", *Progress in Planning* 66 (2006), page 69.

identity-claims spread violently “involving areas outside the urban zone”¹²⁶. However, cities can also possess key tools to foster a sustainable coexistence of antagonist groups once the conflict has come to an end (for instance, Beirut) or they may even develop functional strategies to calm the hostilities through “power-sharing governance and accommodation to (...) cultural and linguistic differences”¹²⁷ (Brussels is undoubtedly a good example). Basically, cities were in a good position to have an active role in peacebuilding since the past, but only recently they “assumed salience to those studying and seeking to resolve contemporary conflict”¹²⁸.

Indeed, according to Bollens, cities should play a role in conflict resolution because it is within their borders that negotiation over peace will take place. They are the governmental entity that will implement those initiatives necessary to install rule of law, democracy, tolerance between groups and fairness. Even though almost all cities possess these potentialities, it does not mean that all cities actually manage to control the peace-making processes. By contrast, quoting Bollens, “some cities in contested societies will play a peace-constitutive role, and others will not”. However, the author believes that it occurs not for cities incapacity in dealing with the conflict, but because political elites point to the “perceived latent power of cities to influence societal change”¹²⁹. By comparing city-actors with national political elites, we will see that there is also a difference in interests and goals: the latter’s goal is the negotiation between parts, that is the agreement among the elites representing the factions; unlike national peace-building pacts, local peacebuilding initiatives aim at constructing peaceful conditions on which antagonist groups can establish relationships of tolerance and coexistence in their daily interaction. As nationalist or ethnic or intergroup conflict lies in the city daily life, it is still at the micro-level (the local one) that practical strategies of conflict management can work. The new focus on micro-level conflict resolution, both in theoretical and practical terms, goes hand in hand with the decreasing role of nation-states in a globalizing context. The state territorial answer to all problems of human organization is insufficient to propose adaptable solutions, above all because nation-states lack the proximity factor, which is the very first characteristic of cities. Other

¹²⁶ Bollens S. A., “*Urban Planning and Peace Building*”, *Progress in Planning* 66 (2006), page 69.

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*, page 70.

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*, page 75.

than that, we should also take into account the only “apparent” state control of local dynamics. Let us explore this aspect more in depth: as we said in the previous chapters, cities are always constrained by domestic law – that stands as a framework of rules where the space of cities is limited. However, despite the influence that extra-urban forces exercise over cities, their “spatial, political and social dynamics”¹³⁰ are never fully under state control. This consideration expresses indirectly that city capacity to address issues of local group conflict could go to a different speed if compared with the state. Quoting again Bollens, “city may be an urban catalyst that anticipates and stimulates broader societal progress”¹³¹. At the same time, for similar reasons, cities could represent a burden or an obstacle to those attempts of peace-making pursued by nation-states or external actors. Basically, what the author wants to clarify in his paper is the evidence that, whatever is the case and whether they like or not, cities have structures and characteristics that shape inter-group relations. In fact, urban policies are recognized to be much more capable to cope with the complexity spatial and socio-psychological peculiarities of group antagonism: then, it will be up to policymakers to decide if taking advantage of those peculiarities to address the issue at the local level, or simply avoiding to exploit that opportunity.




Figure 6, Map of Nicosia, Varas Cocina C., “Subjective realities in divided Nicosia”, University College of London, 13 December 2017, in “<https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/dpublog/2017/12/13/subjective-realities-divided-nicosia-part-1/>”.

¹³⁰ Bollens S. A., “Urban Planning and Peace Building”, Progress in Planning 66 (2006), page 75.

¹³¹ Ibidem.

We could consider many cities in the guise of inter-group conflict solver: in Europe, there is still a standing wall which divides the same town in two parts, led by two antagonist ethnicities: Nicosia, Cyprus's capital, is still split in two, contended between Cypriots and Turkish.

Nevertheless, the list of cities like Nicosia, knelt down by ethnic or political divisions, is extremely long: Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Montreal and Mumbai are only few examples. In virtue of their proximity and participation features, they are somehow expected to make a difference in rebuilding the collective identity of their communities. At this point, in order to give a understandable example of peacebuilding initiatives pursued by local authorities, we could focus on the experiences of a previous Yugoslav town, for three main reasons: firstly, because it is a recent example of a city divided in ethnic groups and overwhelmed by an horrific war that took years to be concluded; secondly, because we can use for our own's ends the abundant literature on the topic; last, because this case is still "potential", as on its potential functioning depends also the democratic development of the whole country, even though throughout the last two decades its progresses have been few and slow.

The city we take briefly in exam is Mostar, a Bosnian town located in the Herzegovinian region, that for centuries represented the meeting point of different peoples - in recent history they were Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks. The local community was thus ethnically mixed. With the outbreak of the Bosnian war, the demographic composition of the city was reconfigured, as well as its urban shape. At the end of the hostilities (1994), the Eastern part of the city was populated by mostly Bosniak (98%, according to local NGOs), while Western Mostar was occupied by Croats (84%) and minorities of Bosniaks and Serbs. The local management of spaces had changed as well because the city centre was thought to be administered by the three peoples in equal parts, while the territory outside this central zone was divided in six municipalities (three Bosnian Croats and three Bosnian Muslims). "Still today" Bollens states "Mostar is a potential model for figuring out multinational governance"¹³² in the country, as it represented a small-scale experiment. And it seems to be for the author also a big "missed opportunity" because it resulted in accommodating "war-imposed ethnic territoriality"¹³³. In 2004, the new

¹³² Bollens S. A., "*Urban Planning and Peace Building*", *Progress in Planning* 66 (2006), page 115.

¹³³ *Ibidem*, page 116.

unification of the city was imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia, generating a potential input for political reforms not only at the local level, but also at the state one. In fact, the spatial and administrative change at the Mostar micro-level was perceived as a local remedy to the national division, that persisted throughout post-war period. Certainly, there is still a long way to go; but in spite of missed opportunities, Mostar holds the potentiality to anchor peace in its country by transposing its advances from the local to the national level. For sure, cities as Mostar, inserted into a transitional political framework toward democratization and peace, are “critical agents and outcomes in the development of multinational democracy”¹³⁴, because they are the laboratory where solutions are tested. In this case, urban planning played a constructive role in the peace-building process right after the conclusion of the conflict. The importance of urban planning in contested society has been analysed also by Jackie Smith in her paper “Local Responses to Right-Wing Populism: Building Human Rights Cities”. Firstly, she takes over the concept elaborated by Fetherston and defined as “transformative peacebuilding”¹³⁵. Transnational peacebuilding is an approach that perceives the conflict as a system (of institutions, rules and behaviours) that represents the status quo and to which people behaviours must adapt. The aim of the approach is to “alter the existing relationships of power so as to generate shared projects that support more equitable (...) social relations.”¹³⁶ Starting from this basis, Smith states that “mobilizing residents (of urban centres in a post-war phase) around claims to the right to housing or the right to water” could work as a way to oppose “shared assumptions about what it means to be human”¹³⁷ to market logic. This would lead to a sort of rupture to that system (of conflict) and to the consequent possible creation of a peaceful equilibrium between groups.

Not only do cities carry out policies that may be fundamental for the instauration of peace at the national level, but they also lobby for peace. They do so both as individuals and as agglomerations of cities. An impressive case of city struggling for peace is undoubtedly The Hague, in the Netherlands. Thank to be the host city of the

¹³⁴ Ibidem, page 119.

¹³⁵ Fetherston, A. B. (2000). “*Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding: A reconsideration of theoretical frameworks?*”. *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), page 208.

¹³⁶ Smith J., “*Local Responses to Right-Wing Populism: Building Human Rights Cities*”, *Studies in Social Justice*, Vol.11, issue 2, page 352.

¹³⁷ Ibidem.

International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) and, in the framework of the European Union, the host city of the Eurojust (for European Union judicial cooperation) and Europol (European Union agency for law enforcement cooperation), The Hague is “pursuing its international ambitions (...) by strengthening its image as the International City for Peace and Justice”¹³⁸. It started to build this profile of peace since the XVII century, when it used to host peace conferences, also because during the years The Hague wore the guise of neutral city. According to Decisio¹³⁹, in 2010 fifty-three organizations in three hundred were devoted to peace, security and justice, but this number increased up to about 25% in the following years¹⁴⁰. The city, more than any other city of the world, invested in international sector because the settlement of international organization in the region, and more in general, in the town, generated almost thirty thousand new jobs. The international organizations which capture the most the attention of international media, are those dedicated to peace and justice. In this case, we see how The Hague diplomacy is also based on reputation, thanks to the modern media which vehicle the image of the city all over the world. It managed to build a brand connected to its international vision and to its effort for peace, and, therefore, the last city brand recites “The Hague: International City of Peace and Justice”¹⁴¹. A very similar name has been attributed to one association of cities engaged in promoting peace, called in fact “International Cities of Peace” (ICP)¹⁴². Again, we see the importance of city-networks or city-organizations in amplifying cities’ voices and in functioning as diplomatic platform. The goal of ICP is the promotion of pace through the sharing of impartial information about projects, programs or experiments put in place by its members. Apart from ICP, there are many other city-networks addressing the issue, because in virtue of city-proximity to citizens, they are “privileged places for democratic innovation”¹⁴³.

¹³⁸ Meijers E. *et al*, “*City Profile: The Hague*”, *Cities* 41(2014), page 92.

¹³⁹ <https://decisio.nl/en/>, accessed 21/05/2019

¹⁴⁰ Meijers E. *et al*, “*City Profile: The Hague*”, *Cities* 41(2014), page 92.

¹⁴¹ Meijers E. *et al*, “*City Profile: The Hague*”, *Cities* 41(2014), page 97.

¹⁴² <http://www.internationalcitiesofpeace.org/cities-listing/>, accessed 21/05/2019

¹⁴³ Borja J., Castells M., “*Local and Global: The Management of Cities in the Information Age*”, Earthscan, London (1997), page 246.

In conclusion, cities could take over the state supremacy on peace-making initiatives when they are directly involved in a specific conflict (as in the example of the city of Mostar) and when they promote peaceful relations with their fame (e.g. The Hague) or by associating in national or transnational networks with other urban centres, communities, NGOs and states. But what about those cases in which cities alien to a given conflict intervene by acting as a mediator? Let us treat this topic in the next paragraph.

3.4 Cities and peacebuilding: Rome as mediator in the second Intifada

The topic of this short paragraph is intrinsically connected with the previous paragraph as well as with the next chapter. Nonetheless, the decision to divide it from the rest descends from the necessity to report some information about a given case of city peacebuilding – that is the focus of the previous paragraph - but extracted from some interviews (see annex) that will be the focus of the next chapter. Thus, in order to give a little anticipation without spoiling the last part of this paper, we decided to extrapolate one point tackled during the interviews to provide the reader with an impressive example of city-peacebuilding. To be more precise, the interviewed people were the former Mayor of Rome Walter Veltroni (2001 – 2008) and his diplomatic councillor Marco Baccin. Both of them shared with us their experience as Mayor and diplomat of the Italian capital, in a period in which that city was extremely opened to globalization and internationalization. In particular, they mentioned one very relevant case in the framework of peacebuilding, because it consisted in the initiative of Rome, or whoever in behalf of her, to take the guise of mediator among two conflicting foreign parts: Palestinians and Israelis.

The world was at that time observing overwhelmingly the terrible escalation of violence in Palestinian and Israeli territory for the Second Intifada (2000-2005), but no one dared to intervene after the failure of Oslo I Accords, which had raised many expectations. In this context, Rome represented an exception, because it was the scene of four meetings¹⁴⁴ among Abu Ala – the two-times prime minister of the Palestinian National

¹⁴⁴ Veronese P., “*A Roma, il vertice segreto per la pace in Medio Oriente*”, La Repubblica, 8 July 2002, in <http://www.repubblica.it/online/esteri/terrisei/terrisei/terrisei.html>

Authority – and Uri Savir, an Israeli diplomatic who owned his fame to the role of Oslo I Accords’ s negotiator. Thank to Veltroni’s words and using also some journalistic reports, it is possible to reconstruct briefly those events that unfortunately did not lead to a peaceful conclusion. In 2002, Shimon Peres, at that time the Israeli Foreign Ministry, demanded to Veltroni to behave as organizer and third part (mediator) during the talks among the representatives of the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples, provided that the negotiation remained secret. Talks took place in Rome, and they turned to be summed-up in an agreement, whose provisional name was “Rome Understanding”¹⁴⁵. In the last meeting among parts, the same Peres appeared to supervise the negotiation and endorse the content. According to the exclusive news published by “La Repubblica”, he stated that the day after he would have come back home having achieved the “maximum of the minimum, or the minimum of the maximum”¹⁴⁶. Among the other provisions, the agreement provided that the creation of a Palestinian State begun at the start of the new process of peace, not at the beginning.¹⁴⁷ However, when the conclusive text was signed by the Israeli Foreign Minister, and then sent to the Prime Minister Sharon and to the Defence Minister, there was a leak: some Israeli journalists made public the plan, which was reported deprived of some parts and poorly synthesized. The Prime Minister found himself in an awkward position and he was obliged to deny his consent to the agreement. This was the conclusion of a brave initiative where Rome exercised its diplomatic ability, in a field which was traditionally deputed to states. Those meetings were organized secretly, and revealed to the Italian Foreign Ministry only later, for two main reasons¹⁴⁸. Firstly, if they had been done publicly, it would have been even harder to accomplish the goal of making peace between the two communities (besides, it was expressly required to keep the secret); secondly, the decision was taken also for prudential reasons toward the Italian Foreign Ministry, that for obvious reasons would have preferred to maintain a neutral position on the facts and would have slowed down the process. However, Rome behaviour in that occasion is a meaningful example of an autonomous city-diplomacy in the field of peacebuilding: it acted autonomously and independently on the state guidelines of international relations. We know that this

¹⁴⁵ Veltroni w., interview, page 2.

¹⁴⁶ Veronese P., “*A Roma, il vertice segreto per la pace in Medio Oriente*”, La Repubblica, 8 July 2002, in <http://www.repubblica.it/online/esteri/terrisei/terrisei/terrisei.html>

¹⁴⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁸ Baccin M., interview, page 4.

initiative was one of many attempts made by the then-administration to project internationally the image of Rome as a city for peace and tolerance. In the last part of the thesis, other examples related to the city diplomatic initiatives of the will be taken in analysis.

Having said that, we can conclude the chapter by saying that there are other fields where city diplomacy has been exercised or could potentially be. However, we focused on the above three for their numerical relevance and their contempt. Now, we can move to the last chapter, which will deal with two Italian case studies. As previously referred, a relevant part of the information belongs to the personal experience of the interviewed figures.

FOURTH CHAPTER

Italian Cases: Rome and Florence

4.1 Rome: city diplomacy from 2001 to 2007

The following is the conclusive chapter of this paper, which aimed at giving a general understanding over the new role that cities acquired during the processes of globalization, which transformed the world in a proximate place. Certainly, globalization brought both pro and cons, but we owe to it this sense of proximity that spread throughout the world in the last decades. We understood indeed, that proximity is a peculiar urban advantage, a feature that transforms cities in new powerful international actors. For this reason, we explored the dynamics of urban external relations, focusing on *what* they use to do diplomacy (in other terms, their practical instruments), on *how* they do diplomacy (in other word, their forms of diplomacy) and *where* they are successful (that is, the fields where city diplomacy do or could work). It finally arrived the moment to reunite those spheres in a comprehensive image: we will take in exam the diplomatic activities of Rome from 2001 to 2007, when the city was under the mandate of the democrat Walter Veltroni, who made use of a professional of diplomacy, the previous Italian Ambassador in Cuba Marco Baccin. In the second paragraph instead, we will consider the external relations of another popular Italian city, Florence, since its Mayor Nardella decided to be assisted by the previous Italian Ambassador in Ghana, Laura Carpini.

Roma is a millennial city, with a century-old tradition of hub for dialogue and meeting of peoples, religions and cultures. It is the Italian capital, and in virtue of its institutional role, it has always been exposed to international visibility for institutional visits and for being the host place of tens of diplomatic missions. Other than that, Rome hosts the Vatican State as well as the most ancient Jewish Community and the European biggest Mosque. Besides its past, its international role is also the fruit of the personal interpretation of the first citizen, whose role is to administer the city. In virtue of these characteristics, we opted to take in exam a lapse of time of seven years – from

2001 to 2007 – which was particularly prosperous in terms of diplomatic activities. The then-Mayor Walter Veltroni was persuaded that Rome had a natural propensity to be an international city, so that the urban Public Administration had just to deploy its tools to indulge it. He reinforced Rome external relations by demanding to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a Diplomatic Councillor who could assist him in the management of Rome diplomacy. As Laura Carpini, diplomatic Councillor for the city of Florence, remembered during our interview, according to the D.P.R (Presidential decree) 18, only are Metropolitan cities allowed to ask for assistance of a national diplomat. Thus, Marco Baccin became Rome Councillor. Both Veltroni and Baccin were interviewed and justified the necessity to provide Rome with a department of about thirty persons that made directly part of the Mayor's cabinet : Veltroni, inspired by a Mayor of the Fifties, (La Pira, the then-Mayor of Florence) wanted to incentivize the international dimension of Rome. According to Veltroni, Rome deserved to be a model of international city, and accordingly, he needed a ministerial figure who could connect the external relations of the city with the national one. When Baccin was asked to give a definition of “city diplomacy” he described it as the “local government exercise of its international projection, that should be monitored so as not to cause problems of overlapping between local initiatives and national external relations”¹⁴⁹. Baccin was required thus not only to help the Mayor in highlighting Rome internationally, but he carried out also the function of connector between the two administrations. Before looking in depth at all initiatives implemented throughout those years, it is important to remind that Veltroni was aware of the advantages brought by globalization, especially the extremely reinforced role cities were provided with. However, he also understood that globalization had a human side, and that it could lead to the enrichment of few people at the expenses of the rest. Hence, he believed that it was necessary to affirm a human dimension of globalization, based on environmental, social sympathetic and sustainable principles. Thus, Veltroni and the Councillor Baccin implemented a strategy based on four - sometimes overlapping – pillars, that are (i) decentralised cooperation for the fight against famine and poverty, (ii) the engagement in initiatives of peace and dialogue, (iii) the collaboration between local governments in bilateral or multilateral initiatives and

¹⁴⁹ Baccin M., interview in annex, page 1.

(iv) activities framed in the context of the European integration¹⁵⁰. Let us take a look at each one.

Decentralized cooperation is a peculiar form of cooperation, where territories accomplish a function of connection between different communities and resources, through the valorisation of the social, cultural and business elements concerning the territorial dimension. This cooperation does not end with the reciprocal enrichment of those local governments engaged in it, but it requires the active involvement of citizens and their organizations. Generally speaking, new social actors emerge, organized on communitarian basis or on non-governmental organizations or on volunteering initiatives. In his interview, Veltroni described the involvement of civil society in the decision-making process of the city as “diffused democracy”.¹⁵¹ Before Veltroni ascended to Campidoglio¹⁵², Rome was extremely engaged in the field of decentralized cooperation because collaborations between the municipal administration and civil society were numerous; however, there was the exigence to create an institutionalized space where this collaboration could flourish. In this context, it was created the “City Committee for decentralized cooperation” (*Comitato Cittadino per la cooperazione decentrata*), founded in 1995, but formalized in 2002¹⁵³. The Committee was composed by representants of the municipal administration and by NGOs, Onlus, volunteering associations engaged for at least one year in the field of cooperation toward development. The work of the Committee was also open to the support of unions, public and private company, universities and research hubs, representatives of civil society, and institutions keen on the topic¹⁵⁴. In this seat, it occurred the elaboration of projects targeted at the international cooperation. With the knowledges learnt in the previous chapters, we recognize the importance devoted to civil society as well as the incredible development of this new way of cooperation between city actors which goes well beyond the previous public-private model (see chapter 2.4).

Among the activities promoted to foster decentralized cooperation, initiatives of solidarity in Latin America and Africa deserve to be cited. In Latina America, Rome

¹⁵⁰ Baccin M., “*Rapporto sulle attività svolte dal 1° gennaio 2005 al 13 luglio 2006 in qualità di Consigliere Diplomatico del Sindaco di Roma*”, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Segreteria Particolare della Viceministra On. Patrizia Satinelli, Rome, 05/01/2007.

¹⁵¹ Veltroni W., Interview in annex, page 2.

¹⁵² Campidoglio is one of the seven Roman Hills and it hosts the seat of the municipality.

¹⁵³ Delibera di Consiglio Comunale n. 144 del 17/10/2002, Prot. Serv. Deliberazioni n. 509/02.

¹⁵⁴ Ibidem.

promoted initiatives of solidarity for Argentinian and Uruguayan children during the deep economic crisis that hit both countries, and some projects in support of children living in Brazilian *favelas*. Nonetheless, Africa was the very continent where Roman cooperation was most evident: under Veltroni mandate, students of some Roman high schools were sent to three African countries (Ruanda, Mozambique and Malawi) as participants of programs to build schools and water wells. In their interviews, Veltroni and Baccin remembered proudly the organization of a big manifestation – in 2004, 2005 and 2007 - in the streets of Rome, where about 100.000 people marched for Africa.¹⁵⁵ In those occasions, Rome invited also Presidents of the Republic from African countries, with the aim of launching the image of Rome as a city of solidarity. The first time they set on a table to plan the first edition of *ItaliAfrica*, they did so in a sort of “impetus” of diplomatic autonomy.¹⁵⁶ The Diplomatic Councillor decided to be flexible in the interpretation of his role, and together with Veltroni, he made the first step; only later he reconnected the activity with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Baccin was conscious that getting out from the logic of ministerial control could generate frictions with the Minister. Indeed, in this occasion more than ever, his figure served as mediator and coordinator between the national and municipal administrations.

Another important reference is the “Glocalization Conference”, held for the first time on May 2002 and launched conjunctly by the municipality of Rome and the Glocal Forum¹⁵⁷. About forty Mayors from the world Metropolis met in Rome to discuss above cooperation projects, in collaboration with the World Bank. Among the project, particularly relevant was the one in favour of the agricultural development of the Rwandan capital (Kigali), and its suburbs, for the alimentary sustenance of its population – that had been decimated by slaughters and migrations. Rome-Kigali project (called PAPUK¹⁵⁸) was made possible also thanks to the collaboration of FAO and the General Direction for Cooperation and Development. All those activities acquired visibilities also due to Veltroni’s institutional voyages to those countries.

¹⁵⁵ Colombo E., “*ItaliAfrica, è partita la manifestazione: in centomila e colorati*”, Vita. 17 April 2004, in <http://www.vita.it/it/article/2004/04/17/italiafrica-e-partita-la-manifestazione-in-100mila-e-colorati/33077/> accessed on 28/05/2019.

¹⁵⁶Baccin M., interview in annex, page 2.

¹⁵⁷ Global Forum is an international organization in the field of city-to-city cooperation, created in 2001 to foster the role of local governments in the international governance.

¹⁵⁸ PAPUK was criticized by numerous Roman associations because the partner (Kigali) was guilty of many human rights violations. For this reason, it was not possible to operate with non-governmental and non-institutional realities.

In the end, Rome supported with financial aid many events organized by UN (such as World Food Summit or the United Nation Day), projects proposed by the City Committee for cooperation and a variety of activities realized in the field of multilateral cooperation (such as environmental plans of Medcities).

The second pillar instead, was characterized by Rome projection as “City of Peace”. Veltroni followed the path started by La Pira in the Fifties, when Florence took a position in the Vietnam War context¹⁵⁹. In Veltroni’s view, the fact that Rome had a millennial tradition of hospitality, tolerance and coexistence among different cultures, had to be exploited to vehicle a message that bucked the trend: in fact, the beginning of the new millennium was marked by new global threats, culminated with the Twin Towers collapse at the hands of Al Qaeda. In a general climate of fear and intolerance, Rome took a singular initiative right after the 11 September: a torchlight procession of solidarity was held from Campidoglio to Colosseum and few days later, all religious leaders were invited to Campidoglio for a public reunion that stood against extremism, in order to give a sign of hope and peace.¹⁶⁰ Impressive was the effort made by the Public Administration *capitolina* to promote peace in the Middle East. More specifically, we saw in chapter 3.4 the concrete attempt of Veltroni to behave as a mediator between Israeli and Palestinian representatives, and the almost achieved “Understanding” that took the name of Rome. Everything had started in virtue of a symbolical event that fostered the dialogue; in fact, Peres and Arafat’s Councillor, Mohamed Rashid, shook their hands in occasion of the “Time for Life” concert, organized by the local administration.¹⁶¹ However, Rome did more than that: it created a Roman Office in Jerusalem and formal missions were pursued by Franco La Torre¹⁶², who favoured all initiatives of dialogue between the two conflicting parts with the assistance of the “Italy Israel Rome Association” and the “National Italy-Palestine Association”. The idea was to contribute to the peacebuilding in the Middle East from a decentred perspective,

¹⁵⁹ Scia M., “*La Pira e la ricerca della Pace in Vietnam*”, *Il Politico*, Vol. 69 No.3 (2004)

¹⁶⁰ Veltroni W., interview in annex, page 1.

¹⁶¹ Diamanti D., “*L’agenda del millennio per le Nazioni Unite: gli obbiettivi per le amministrazioni locali e il caso di Roma*”, Luiss Guido Carli University, Department of Political Science, 2005/2006, page 146.

¹⁶² Franco La Torre is an Italian activist and environmentalist, expert on international cooperation and previous member of the Presidency of the anti-mafia association “Libera”.

while the Office was conceived as an instrument of support, rather than creation, to dialogue¹⁶³.

To launch the image of Rome as “city of peace”, the Mayor and his Diplomatic Councillor, with the help of “Gorbachev Foundation”, planned and put in place once a year the “Peace Nobel Prize Summit”, accompanied by the conferral of the Peace Prize of Rome to figures engaged in the humanitarian sector and in defence of human rights. For instance, in 2002 it was conferred to the Argentinian human right association “Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo”¹⁶⁴ whose goal was to find Argentinian children stolen and illegally adopted during the Argentinian dictatorship. In 2003 and 2004 the Prize was given to Ingrid Betancourt, one exponent of the Colombian green party who was kidnapped by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and to Pierantonio Costa, an Italian Consul known for his humanitarian help in Rwanda, respectively¹⁶⁵.

Those initiatives had not only an international eco, but they wanted to spread sentiments of tolerance and solidarity in the country as well. For this reason, Rome host the funerals of thirteen Somalian migrants drown in the sea, close to the Port of Lampedusa¹⁶⁶. Furthermore, Veltroni revealed that he obtained the consensus by the then-Pope Ratzinger and the then- UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan to use a Roman building as the seat for all religious confessions: it had to be called “United Religions”¹⁶⁷ and it was thought to be a symbol of tolerance and respect toward all confessions. However, the idea did not become true, because Veltroni mandate as Mayor ceased. “In the field of peace promotion” Baccin said, “Rome had a very recognized international role, as it shared its local experiences in several structures devoted to international dialogue of cities”¹⁶⁸: the third pillar.

The third pillar is made up of two categories: bilateral and multilateral relations. Rome bilateral activities are an integral part of Roman efforts toward international cooperation, and they covered several fields. Baccin explained clearly that the only

¹⁶³ Diamanti D., “*L’agenda del millennio per le Nazioni Unite: gli obbiettivi per le amministrazioni locali e il caso di Roma*”, Luiss Guido Carli University, Department of Political Science, 2005/2006, page 148.

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.abuelas.org.ar/> accessed on 29/05/2019

¹⁶⁵ Baccin M., “*Rapporto sulle attività svolte dal 1° gennaio 2003 l 31 dicembre 2004 in qualità di Consigliere Diplomatico del Sindaco di Roma*”, Comune di Roma, 18/01/2005.

¹⁶⁶ Mattone A., “*Roma piange gli immigrati morti, oggi funerale*”, La Repubblica, 23 October 2003 in <https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2003/10/24/roma-piange-gli-immigrati-morti-oggi-funerali.html>, accessed on 29/05/2019.

¹⁶⁷ Veltroni W., interview in annex, page 4.

¹⁶⁸ Baccin M., interview in annex, page 4.

institutional twinning which involved Rome was the one with Paris (a sort of “exclusive marriage” between the two towns): it dated back the Fifties and it stood as a sign of reconciliation after the experience of the Second World War. All the other bilateral pacts that Rome stipulated with foreign urban centres were Friendship Agreements: they were renewed with Buenos Aires, New York, Moscow and Beijing, or they were stipulated for the first time as it was for Athens, Bogotá, Tallinn, Madrid or Xian. In particular, there was an initiative to be implemented in Beijing that concerned the rehabilitation of a neighbourhood around the big lake of the city: the planning foresaw the transformation of the zone in a sort of Pekin “Trastevere”.¹⁶⁹ Unfortunately, the initiative was not completed. In sight of Rome’s bilateral relations, Mayor Veltroni effectuated many institutional missions to friend cities, some of them to promote peace and respect (as it was the case for his trip to Auschwitz, the “memory travel”).

However, Rome’s ace in the hole were its multilateral relations. As Laura Carpini stated in the interview, the first fifteen years of the new millennium were marked by the birth of tens of networks of local government devoted to a disparity of topics. Rome was at that time in pole position in all the most important networks, both at the European and global level. Just think that Rome took actively part to the merger process between the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the United Towns Organization (UTO), that gave birth to the largest organization of sub-national governments, UCLG. Moreover, Veltroni was UCLG Vice-President and president of its Millennium Goals Commission. Rome participated also to ICLEI, demonstrating its engagement in environmentalism; this same effort was still visible thanks to the role played by Rome as Presidency of Medcities, which is in turn vice-president of the Mediterranean Commission for the Sustainable Development in the framework of the Mediterranean Action Plan of UN. Medcities indeed, was a network composed by twenty-eight Mediterranean cities that provided some specific assistance plans concerning sustainable development. Many similar initiatives were pursued by Rome under the umbrella of the European Community and in sight of the European integration.

Before enlisting them, it is fundamental to remind that Rome was the host place of the signature of the institutive treaty of the European Community in 1957 (Treaty of Rome), so it had the responsibility to work for the well-functioning of the integration

¹⁶⁹ Baccin M., interview in annex, page 4.

process. Thus, it is easily understandable its participation to Eurocities, whose framework was useful to give strong impulses to the Euromed Group. Eurocities is a European network of cities targeted at assuring that local policies have European visibility, as well as fostering projects of cooperation between members and facilitating the access to communitarian funds. Still, the European framework is the context where Rome based its participation to the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) whose Mayor Veltroni was President; in the end, Rome was part of the Union of Capitals of the European Union (UCEU), as well as Cities Alliance and the Association of Cities and Regions for Recycling and sustainable Resource management (ACR+).¹⁷⁰ To cite one of many entities that the municipality encouraged in sight of the European integration, “Cantiere Europa ” Association was particularly successful, and it saw the involvement of three Roman Universities as well.

At this point, we can state that Rome’s diplomatic relations were dense and capillary, as it was well inserted in the communitarian context on the one side, in the global process of globalization on the other. However, in that period Rome pursued also softer policies to strengthen its international projection: museums remained open during the night, concerts doubled, and Rome created its own cinema festival: the Rome Cinema Festival. With Veltroni, Rome run for hosting the Olympic Games of 2020. Despite many opponents, in his interview the then-Mayor told us that Rome had the capacity to host the Game: firstly, because it had all sportive structures ready, so there would not have been the necessity to build them starting from zero; secondly, because any city that affirms its incapability to organize such a profitable event, is basically denouncing its inadequacy. But Rome, at that time, lived up to everything.¹⁷¹

Having said that, we must conclude by saying that the international recognition of Rome as one of the forefront European capitals was undeniable: not only for its efforts in the field of peace and solidarity, or neither for being member of many international networks; it was publicly recognized as a leader capital even by Time, that dedicate the one first page to the five best Mayors of Europe. Among them, there was Veltroni.

¹⁷⁰ Diamanti D., “*L’agenda del millennio per le Nazioni Unite: gli obbiettivi per le amministrazioni locali e il caso di Roma*”, Luiss Guido Carli University, Department of Political Science, 2005/2006, page 169.

¹⁷¹ Veltroni W., interview in annex, page 3.

4.2 Florence: activities of city diplomacy

Florence is another interesting city when it comes to analyse city diplomacy, because behind its renown history, its innumerable pieces of art and its culture, it hides its own pride and its unceasing desire of promoting its image internationally. Furthermore, this paragraph reports the information extracted by the current Diplomatic Councillor of the city, Laura Carpini, who shared with us her impression about Florence diplomacy. Above all, she cared about underlining two aspects: Florence's city diplomacy makes sense only if it is framed in the current geopolitical and technological context, which is the one marked by globalization; secondly, the city started from a very advantaged basis in terms of general international reputation. However, before exploring in depth Florence features of diplomacy, we must add that it was the first Italian city to put in practice city diplomacy in the Fifties with its famous Mayor La Pira: he gave a clear setting of diplomacy and he became the example to be followed for all his successors. Thus, let us begin with a brief analysis of how La Pira conceived city diplomacy, and his consequent promotion of Florence as "City of Peace". Later, we will see how Florence approached diplomacy during the last two years.

Giorgio La Pira, native of Sicily, was famous for his efforts to promote peace in the historical period marked by the contraposition between the Western block (NATO) and the Eastern one (Warsaw Pact). In 1951 he was elected Mayor of Florence for the first time, and he covered his mandate until 1956; in a second moment, he was re-elected for other five years (1961-1965). He was the first one who called in January 1952 all consular corps settled in Florene to entrust a message to their respective governments: he wanted to reunite cultural representants form all over the world to talk about the role of Christianity in the promotion of peace, in an effort toward the unification between peoples¹⁷². Thus, the first International Convention for Peace and Christian Community¹⁷³ took place in Florence, attended by representants of thirty-three states. Other editions were proposed throughout the years, until the last Convention, in 1956,

¹⁷² Zonova T., "*Il pensiero di due cristiani dell'Occidente sulle relazioni internazionali: Reinhold Niebuhr e Giorgio La Pira*", *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, Nuova Serie*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (312) (Ottobre - Dicembre 2011), page 574.

¹⁷³ <http://www.giorgiolapira.org/it/content/i-convegni-la-pace-e-la-civilta-cristiana>, accessed on 03/06/2019.

where sixty-one states and organizations (such as the Red Cross) sent their representatives. The themes touched were various, such as matters of international politics to theology.

Religion was the focal point of La Pira initiatives, as it is demonstrated by another international meeting organized in Florence a couple of years later (1958): “Mediterranean talks”¹⁷⁴. They aimed indeed at incentivizing religious dialogues between Christians, Hebrews and Muslims.

Another important initiative was held in the city in 1955, when La Pira invited Mayors from the world capitals, including Beijing, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw etc. The meeting served to spread the idea that cities were fundamental entities for being the spiritual and material heritage of past times, and by consequence, they deserved to be safeguarded from destruction. The idea was that “reigns end, cities remain”¹⁷⁵, and for this reason peace could not be imposed from the top: by contrast peace had to come from the city, from the bottom. In this sense, his “projects were in harmony with the recent-born concept of city diplomacy”¹⁷⁶.

Nevertheless, La Pira was especially known for his historic trip to Vietnam in 1965, when he met Ho Chi Minh. It resulted in an agreement on preliminary conditions according to which Hanoi accepted to start negotiations with the United States¹⁷⁷. Unfortunately, the war concluded only eight years later, because the agreement was not accepted by Americans. Anyhow, La Pira became the model of many other Italian Mayors, among all Veltroni and the current Mayor of Firenze Dario Nardella. Perhaps, in virtue of that, Nardella decided to provide his office with a Diplomatic Councillor of the Italian Foreign Minister: Laura Carpini.

When she was asked to give a definition of city diplomacy too, she explained us that in her view city diplomacy had two facets: the traditional city diplomacy, conceived as the local support to national international relations, and the modern conception of it, influenced by the complex relations of the current world. More precisely, in the past city diplomacy was expressed by the stipulation of twinning and friendship agreements with

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.giorgiolapira.org/it/content/i-colloqui-mediterranei>, accessed on 03/06/2019.

¹⁷⁵ La Pira G., “*Discorso di inaugurazione del Congresso della Federazione mondiale delle città unite*” (Leningrado, 1970, in <http://giorgiolapira.org/it/content/leningrado-1970>, accessed on 31/05/2019)

¹⁷⁶ Zonova T., “*Il pensiero di due cristiani dell'Occidente sulle relazioni internazionali: Reinhold Niebuhr e Giorgio La Pira*”, *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, Nuova Serie*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (312) (Ottobre - Dicembre 2011), page 575.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, page 576.

foreign cities¹⁷⁸. Those agreements began to be used as instruments to get different peoples closer, after the Second World War and throughout the Cold War. It was, in practical terms, a way on the one hand to establish relations between cities belonging to the two blocks, on the other, to foster the process of European integration of those cities belonging to countries that had applied for the entrance in the European Community or that had just entered. Nowadays, “city diplomacy is undoubtedly more complex and articulated, as it is reality”¹⁷⁹. This explains why the trend of stipulating twinning and friendship agreements is gradually decreasing, as well as why Florence has not concluded any other friendship agreement recently (despite its numerous friend cities). Furthermore, globalization filled many distances and multiplied the spaces of communication between cities; if previously local governments needed to resort to those agreements to establish any external relationship, today local governments simply offer the framework within which the city-system functions. Quoting Carpini, “city-system is made up of business communities, associations, universities that work conjunctly to promote investments and commercial exchanges”¹⁸⁰. This modern conception of diplomacy is the one adopted by Florence in the last years. Then, she explained that there was an intermediate phase, between 2005 and 2015, where Mayors used to meet and institutionalized those meetings through the creation of networks of cities: the topics, as we know, were disparate. However, in her view, time for networks seems to have come to an end. The sector of city networks is now inflated, because too many city-organizations are treating the same topics, causing overlapping and heterogeneity in action. Anyway, this does not mean that all city networks are useless. Indeed, Florence takes actively part to those networks that have maintained their value throughout the years: Eurocities, whose Florence has been vice-president since the 31st November 2018, ICLEI and Global Covenant for Mayors. It takes also part to the World Tourism Cities Federation¹⁸¹ and Major Cities of Europe¹⁸², and it is partner of Urban Agenda¹⁸³, launched in 2016 in Amsterdam as a multilevel work method that promote cooperation between states and local governments.

¹⁷⁸ Carpini L., interview in annex, page 1.

¹⁷⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁸⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁸¹ http://www.wta-web.org/eng/hymd_4014/yz/sjlycsllhh/, accessed on 31/05/2019.

¹⁸² <https://www.majorcities.eu/>, accessed on 31/05/2019.

¹⁸³ <https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/urban-agenda>, accessed on 31/05/2019.

The external projection of the city was reinforced when Carpini took the role of Diplomatic Councillors. It is important to notice that even though Metropolitan cities in Italy can make use of a diplomat of the Foreign Minister, nowadays only Florence has provided the municipality with such a figure.¹⁸⁴ Indeed, Carpini defined her role as “pilot experiment”¹⁸⁵. However, regardless the presence of a diplomat, local initiatives of external projections and diplomacy have to be in accordance and connection with the Foreign Affairs Minister. In fact, it is unthinkable that important cities such as Florence or Rome do not entertain international relations; however, those relations must be pursued correctly, in connection with the nation-state. Indeed, “politics and diplomacy” – Carpini stated – “are still dominion of nation states” and accordingly, in international relations one cannot say that “cities enjoy autonomy, but rather that they enjoy international exposition”¹⁸⁶. To do so, figures as Carpini make the administrative dialogue between cities and Ministers more fluid and operative and facilitate the achievement of the established goals of diplomacy thanks to their professionalism. For instance, in occasion of the organization of the first Conference of the European initiative “European Capitals Culture”¹⁸⁷ held in Florence the 5th and 6th of November 2018, Carpini tapped into her capacities of diplomat to maintain contacts with the European Commission.

Considering Florence’s initiatives of diplomacy, we wanted to know what made the city so active. Carpini gave us two important reasons that implement Florence’s fortune to be one of the most touristic places of Italy: mayors’ awareness of the importance to be publicly recognized as having an international power, and citizens’ pride of their city. Let see them more in depth. Florence is a very popular city, not only at the national level, but also at the international one. Its old town, shops around Arno river, its museum and pieces of art make Florence attractive by itself. Tourism could indeed represent a strong sector regardless the municipal efforts to attract tourists. However, “time goes for everyone”¹⁸⁸, and Florence cannot attribute its international strength only to its history. Indeed, mayors have achieved to invest continually on international

¹⁸⁴ In Italy there are fourteen Metropolitan Cities: Rome, Milan, Venice, Turin, Florence, Genoa, Bologna, Palermo, Bari, Catania, Naples, Messina, Reggio Calabria and Cagliari.

¹⁸⁵ Carpini L., interview in annex, page 3.

¹⁸⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁸⁷ https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/actions/capitals-culture_en, accessed on 31/05/2019.

¹⁸⁸ Carpini L., interview in annex, page 3.

projection, as they have always considered it as a priority. Indeed, there are at least eight people working in the International Relations Bureau and in the Ceremonial Office. The municipality worked especially hard to attract foreign investments, as the creation of “Consiglio Grandi Aziende”¹⁸⁹ (Concilium of Big Companies) demonstrates. In this seat, the Mayor reunites twice a year all multinationals settled in the territory to dialogue and understand if there are common issues to be solved; moreover, each investment is monitored by a proper team before, after and during the application of the investment. The idea is to make sure that each investment has a positive impact on the city. It is not a case that in the last ranking published by the economic newspaper “Il sole 24 ore”, Florence appears at the second position after Milan for attractiveness to foreign investments.¹⁹⁰

The second winning element is instead its population. Florentines have always been proud of their city and their strong sense of identity has defended Florence from the total loss of distinctiveness, which is one of the risks of globalization. However, this has not been transformed in closure toward the novelty: citizens have managed throughout years to enhance their heritage by innovating it, by recreating the Florentine style in the fashion sector, in restoration etc. Florentine way to defend its identity in all aspects of life created a brand. Carpini, in quality of Diplomatic Councillor, desired to legalize the brand, such as Amsterdam and New York did. The brand “systematization has already started, but there is still to formalize it by law”¹⁹¹ – she said. However, this strong traditionalism has not to be exclusive, but it must be ready to adapt and respond to external impulses. Certainly, the city is open to innovation thanks to its international exposition, which allowed it to know good practices and in turn, to share its ones. For example, Florence was able to respond to the smart city model thanks to the exchange of information and know-how made possible by international meeting of local governments and other non-governmental entities. Carpini cited one particular innovative event which underlines cities’ effort toward modernization: Barcelona Smart City Expo¹⁹² is an international mixed exhibition (in the sense that entities from both

¹⁸⁹ <http://www.cittametropolitana.fi.it/consiglio-delle-grandi-aziende-in-palazzo-medici-riccardi/>, accessed on 03/06/2019

¹⁹⁰ Machesini E., “*Città che attraggono investimenti? Firenze supera Roma e tallona Milano*”, 22/02/2019 <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/casa/2019-02-21/citta-che-attraggono-investimenti-firenze-supera-roma-e-tallona-milano-162233.shtml?uuid=ABWiyrWB>

¹⁹¹ Carpini L., interview in annex, page 3.

¹⁹² <http://www.smartcityexpo.com/en/home>, accessed on 03/06/2019

the public and private sector are invited) that represents properly the sense of being a smart city: local administrations meet with private companies to modernize and acquire new smart technologies, that are in turn thought and employed by the private sector. In few words, the way Florence defends its identity and its tradition, along with its openness toward innovation and modernization, is the method through which Florence exercise its international power.

Despite those advantages, Carpini believes that there is still the necessity to homogenize the external strategy of the city to better promote the territory: the creation of the “internationalization board” responds to this exigence. It is a sort of “control room”, led by the Mayor and by the Director of International Policies, where city actors such as representants of Confindustria, Confartigianato or Universities meet regularly (once a month) to identify a common strategy of international projection. The goal of the board is to elaborate a coordinated operative plan for Florentine institutional missions abroad in view of a rationalization and systematization of all actors composing the board, without missing the coordination with the central level (the state).

CONCLUSIONS

It is now time to draw conclusions. Undoubtedly, it is very hard to operationalize city diplomacy, as it is quite impossible to describe coherently and compressively all features of the cities of the world. However, this paper helps us to image them as little sprouts, that evolve depending on many domestic and external factors. As plants do, cities grow in some peculiar ways which make them singulars and different from all the others; and cities as well are inclined to generate new leaves, new expressions, new branches that make them bigger, stronger and more influent.

They have done so in international relations, becoming subjects of diplomacy since the day globalization stretched the space of international relations. Therefore, the spread of new international threats such as terrorism, climate change or mass migration, have harshly overwhelmed the State structures, which have shown to be incapable to deal with those issues. Moreover, the fragmentation of rules and norms has given a hand in terms of interpretative efforts, letting cities to fill such empty or unclear zones of regulation with local plans which very often push humanity toward new development. Cities have used their beneficial relation with individuals to vehicle their voice and their initiatives at the international level; they have put in place alternative channels of diplomacy that have not necessarily passed through the national tracks; they have proposed alternative solutions to new global challenges that are threatening humanity. They have basically assessed their capacity to stand as international subjects, despite the lack of international legal recognition and national constraints imposed on them.

We saw how their domestic instruments have been deployed to build their international reputation. Tourism, investments, attraction of foreign students, organization of great events, policy exchanges are only some of the tools analysed in the first chapter.

Then, we explored the preferred modalities to do diplomacy, splitting them in bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. We understood the strength expressed by city networks, that are hubs where good practices spread to make all cities improve their actions; but we also referred to the symbolic and sympathetic value represented by bilateral agreements between urban centres, often belonging to different continents, different culture and different rules.

In the third chapter, we examined those fields where international cities have achieved the best results thanks to their commitment; being the first creators of pollution as well as the first victims of climate change, cities have achieved impressive results in implementing adaptation and mitigation measures, demonstrating to have the right structures to properly address environmental issues. However, we also considered some attempts of city diplomacy in conflict resolution, which is a field traditionally pertaining to Nations. Being the physical places where usually conflicts take roots, cities have been particularly committed in proposing peaceful solutions, by opening hubs of dialogue, by planning their shape respecting territorial divisions or by employing egalitarian political choices, such as the egalitarian representation of ethnic groups in the elected body. Among the others, we also described some urban attempts to fight inequality and economic discrimination by shifting the focus from business to human rights.

In the end, we searched all those notions in the actual cases of Rome and Florence, showing that despite its difficult operationalization, city diplomacy has existed for decades and had improved throughout years.

The new international role of cities must anyhow be framed in a contest still dominated by Nations State. It is important to remind that this paper has not attempted to persuade the reader that States have lost in full their role in international relations; by contrast, it has tried to put light on the enlargement of these relations, while States still remain one of the bastion - not the unique - of diplomacy.

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Annex

Interview in Italian to Walter Veltroni, Mayor of Rome (2001-2008)

- *Come definirebbe lei il concetto di “city diplomacy”? si ricorda un evento o un momento in cui ha agito per l’interesse “internazionale” di Roma?*

V - Una città non è solamente un insieme di mattoni. È anche uno spirito, un senso, un’identità, una relazione con gli altri. Paradossalmente la stessa comunità se sollecitata ad avere sentimenti di apertura reagisce positivamente, se sollecitata a chiudersi in se stessa può reagire negativamente. Chi ha una responsabilità pubblica ha il compito di segnalare lo spirito della città che vuole amministrare. Quando sono diventato sindaco, mi sono detto che Roma, per sua natura (Roma come culla della civiltà, luogo di storia, luogo dove si è creata l’Europa) è una città universale. La mia idea era quindi di fare di Roma una città di Pace, rispondendo al modello di La Pira (sindaco di Firenze) che ha avuto un ruolo importante durante il conflitto in Vietnam. A settembre 2001, il 12 settembre – giorno successivo alla caduta delle torri gemelle - è stata organizzata a Roma una grande manifestazione in cui sono stati invitati i capi di tutte le confessioni religiose, poiché quando si stava per scatenare la guerra di civiltà, Roma voleva mandare il messaggio opposto, ovvero un messaggio di pace che puntava ad isolare gli estremisti.

Quando ci fu il rapimento delle due Simone, rapite in Iraq, sono andato personalmente alla Moschea ad incontrare l’Iman.

Nel tempo della globalizzazione non si può pensare che le città sia una monade; questo vale per tutti le città, anche per il più piccolo comune. Tutti i governi locali dovrebbero avere uno sguardo internazionale.

- *In occasione dell’Intervista al programma “Piazza Pulita” ha parlato di “società fluida”. Crede che si dovrebbe dare più spazio alla partecipazione cittadina nei processi decisionali che riguardano la città?*

V – Esiste un paradosso: c’era un tempo in cui si pensava che tutto fosse politica (dove per politica si intendevano i partiti), oggi si pensa che tutto sia democrazia diretta. Entrambe sono un’illusione! In questo tempo in cui la democrazia è messa in

discussione, se vuole sopravvivere deve moltiplicare i centri di partecipazione e decisione: non in luoghi virtuali, ma spazi fisici, quartiere per quartiere, scuola per scuola. Una città non si governa più dal Campidoglio o da palazzo Marino o dai municipi, ma si governa quando in caso di ristrutturazione di una scuola, lo si fa con la partecipazione e decisione dei genitori, professori e studenti. È un modello di sussidiarietà, di democrazia diffusa che è l'antidoto al rischio della "democrazia autoritaria" dentro la quale si fa strada un modello autoritario.

- *Durante la sua esperienza da sindaco, è riuscito a porre in essere iniziative di questo tipo, in cui i cittadini avevano accesso alla partecipazione e decisione nei progetti riguardanti la città, come l'esempio della scuola di cui sopra?*

V – sì, il Piano Regolatore, approvato a Roma per la prima volta dopo 100 anni. Per approvarlo noi abbiamo fatto alcune migliaia di incontri con associazioni di quartiere, Comitati, ecc., acquisendo le loro osservazioni, che sono poi diventate parte integrante del Piano Regolatore. Tornando alla tua tesi, io penso che un paese che abbia l'intelligenza complessiva delle cose (come citava Cardinal Martini) dovrebbe assegnare alle città dei ruoli di diplomazia, perché spesso le città sono più agili e meno impegnative degli stati. Ti faccio un esempio: a un certo punto Shimon Peres mi chiese di vedere Uri Savir, negoziatore degli accordi di Oslo (Israele e Palestina). Uri voleva organizzare un round di incontri tra palestinesi e israeliani a Roma, a condizione che rimanessero segreti. Corrispondendo a questa esigenza, organizzammo diversi incontri con Abu Ala (il numero due di Arafat) che portarono alla stesura dell'unico testo sottoscritto tra palestinesi e israeliani negli ultimi anni (l'accordo di Roma), che alla fine non fu acquisito dai palestinesi. Questi incontri e l'accordo sono rimasti segreti fino al giorno in cui si è deciso di renderli pubblici. Questo è un esempio di city diplomacy.

Un ulteriore esempio è l'organizzazione una specie di "G15" di Roma che riuniva i sindaci delle più grandi città al mondo, in cui si parlava del destino dell'umanità, si parlava di pratiche comuni, ci scambiavamo esperienze.

In occasione della morte a Lampedusa di molti clandestini, che nessuno voleva seppellire, venne organizzato al Campidoglio una manifestazione e i funerali solenni per i migranti.

- *Quindi l'obiettivo era anche quello di diffondere il sentimento di tolleranza...*

V- Esattamente. Abbiamo organizzati moltissime attività di solidarietà, come il corteo per l’Africa, il gemellaggio con tre paesi africani. Si è poi costituita un’associazione che si chiama Kanimambo, i cui ragazzi membri organizzavano la raccolta fondi e organizzavano i viaggi in Malawi, Mozambico e Ruanda.

- *Crede quindi che la realtà associativa romana fosse forte, come lo è tutt’ora? Forse manca la sua visibilità?*

V- Quello che manca è la scintilla, senza scintilla un motore non parte; manca l’elemento unificante. Io sono andato in Colombia per una manifestazione per la liberazione di Ingrid Betancourt, una esponente dei verdi in Colombia, rapita e sequestrata da anni dalla FARC. Io sono andato lì per manifestare nel nome di un personaggio non istituzionale, come anche sono andato a Porto Alegre per il vertice sui temi della globalizzazione, in Argentina. Erano però il contrario dei viaggi istituzionali: dormivo nei conventi al lato delle favelas...

- *So che lei propose Roma come sede ospitante dei Giochi Olimpici 2020. Quali erano i pro e i contro? E che caratteristiche deve avere una città per sopportare il peso di un tale evento e riuscire ad avere dei profitti?*

V – Pro infiniti, contro nessuno. Sinceramente, se una città pensa di non essere in grado di organizzare un evento come le Olimpiadi, in trasparenza, avendo per altro Roma gran parte delle strutture e avendo la possibilità di fare attività in posti come “la Basilica di Massenzio”...Insomma Roma avrebbe potuto organizzare il pugilato al Circo Massimo, per esempio. Roma avrebbe avuto un beneficio politico, d’immagine, d’infrastrutture, di prodotto interno lordo, di lavoro per i romani enorme. Se una città rinuncia a questa ambizione, sostanzialmente dichiara la sua inadeguatezza e Roma non è inadeguata in nulla. Io sono contrario alla campagna contro Roma. Non ci sarebbe stata nessuna controindicazione.

A questo proposito, volevo fare a Roma (e ne ho parlato con Papa Ratzinger e con il segretario generale dell’Onu) un palazzo che si chiamasse “Reunited Religions”, cioè un posto dove tutte le professioni religiose potessero avere uno spazio in comune.

- *È riuscito ad implementare alcuni step di tale iniziativa?*

V- Sono riuscito ad ottenere il consenso del vaticano e dell'ONU, poi ho finito il mio lavoro da sindaco.

- *Si è mai avvalso dell'aiuto di un consigliere diplomatico?*

V – Sì, ho avuto due consiglieri diplomatici che vengono dalla Farnesina, uno era Marco Baccin. Perché volevo fare di Roma quella città lì. Avevo bisogno di qualcuno che si occupasse a tempo pieno delle relazioni internazionali. Poi noi avevamo tantissime iniziative in giro per il mondo. Noi abbiamo fatto un ufficio della città di Roma a Gerusalemme, per il conflitto israelo-palestinese, come se fosse una sorta di Ambasciata della città. Questo perché le città sono più agili e meno impegnative, e un paese intelligente utilizza le città per questo.

- *La globalizzazione ha diffuso dei modelli di città che potrebbero rientrare in quattro categorie. Environmental sustainability, economic development, public spirit and well-being. In quale di queste quattro categorie potrebbe rientrare Roma?*

V – la mia Roma, la Roma potenziale, la vedo nella categoria dello spirito pubblico. Allora era una città molto aperta. Io ricordo una copertina di TIME con i cinque sindaci delle città che stavano cambiando l'Europa, all'avanguardia nella politica sociale e culturale.

Interview in Italian to Marco Baccin, Diplomatic Councillor of Rome (2001-2007)

- *Saprebbe darmi una definizione di city diplomacy?*

La diplomazia della città, e più in generale degli enti locali (regione e province), è l'esercizio della proiezione internazionale degli stessi. Dovrebbe essere teoricamente soggetta al monitoraggio e sottoposta a delle regole per evitare problemi di contrapposizione fra iniziative degli enti locali quella che è la politica estera del paese. In pratica però, le cose non sono sempre così lineari, perché la diplomazia della città è un concetto concreto, tanto che fanno diplomazia solo le grandi città. Tanto è vero, che in Italia è previsto che ci sia un consigliere diplomatico solo per le Città Metropolitane. Roma è un caso particolare, per la sua storia e la sua natura: ospita il Vaticano, le rappresentanze diplomatiche, la Moschea più grande d'Europa, una numerosa e antichissima collettività ebraica e oltretutto, come città e amministrazione, è coinvolta anche formalmente e istituzionalmente negli eventi internazionali: quando c'è, per esempio, una visita di stato da parte un presidente straniero, è prevista la visita in Campidoglio. Ha una serie di compiti e oneri assolutamente particolari.

- *Quando la legge domestica, come è il caso dell'Italia, non prevede che le città abbiano una propria politica estera semplicemente perché si ignora che le città possano avere tale capacità, si può ricorrere alla segretezza?*

La diplomazia della città non è solo legata alla natura oggettiva della stessa, ma ha anche un elemento soggettivo: per esempio, l'ex sindaco Veltroni era particolarmente attivo in questo ambito, poiché con lui c'è stata una fortissima accentuazione delle attività internazionali di Roma. Il consigliere diplomatico serviva e serve proprio a due cose: da un lato, assistere il sindaco nel suo ruolo di rappresentare la città all'estero, dall'altro svolgere una funzione di raccordo tra il comune e il ministero degli esteri (che è appunto la struttura deputata all'attuazione della politica estera del paese). Noi - io come consigliere e Veltroni come sindaco - abbiamo fatto qualche strappo alla regola, poiché avevamo molte idee da mettere in atto; io ho sicuramente usato una certa flessibilità nello svolgere la mia funzione di raccordo con il Ministero. Per esempio, un altro momento in cui abbiamo fatto un passo "un po' lungo", fu quando si organizzò per la prima volta la manifestazione "RomaAfrica" (che addirittura veniva chiamata

chiamavamo ItaliaAfrica). Era un convegno a cui invitammo anche i Presidenti della Repubblica africani. Il primo passo lo facemmo noi, poi ci riallacciammo al Ministero, ma ciò avvenne in un secondo momento. Tuttavia, se si entra fino in fondo nell'ottica di "sganciamento" dell'iniziativa dell'ente locale dal quadro istituzionale del paese, si può incorrere in alcuni problemi. Tuttavia, io ho sempre pensato che talvolta qualche "scossone" alla prassi brutta dell'amministrazione pubblica sia utile, perché gli eccessi di rigidità rischiano di trasformare le regole in una gabbia.

- *Dall'alto della sua esperienza, crede che ci sia una differenza tra rappresentare diplomaticamente una città o un paese?*

Sono articolazione diverse, ma che fanno parte dello stesso quadro generale. D'altra parte, il mestiere del diplomatico si articola in tante professioni (ci si occupa di cultura, politica, economia etc.) e la struttura del paese è una struttura articolata. Quando si fa l'Ambasciatore si rappresenta il Paese, mentre la diplomazia della città è un'articolazione più specifica della rappresentanza generale del paese.

Lavorare per una città è senza dubbio più flessibile, ma dipende molto dagli ambiti in cui ci si muove. Per quanto riguarda quelle iniziative di carattere più specificatamente diplomatico (quindi che rientrano nella proiezione internazionale della città, ma che non riguardano l'amministrazione cittadina) rispondono a delle logiche più snelle. La struttura che allora serviva ad attuare la proiezione internazionale della città era un dipartimento (unità organizzativa) che faceva parte del gabinetto del sindaco. Non era quindi staccata dalla struttura politica. Ovvio che, per altre iniziative, quando c'erano da spendere dei soldi o fare dei DD (determinazioni Dirigenziali), bisognava rispettare certe procedure dell'amministrazione comunale. Tuttavia, rispondendo direttamente al sindaco, l'unità organizzativa che si occupava della diplomazia cittadina era nettamente più agile delle altre unità.

In realtà, l'autonomia di cui ho goduto come consigliere diplomatica non era diversa da quella avuta in quanto ambasciatore, poiché la politica estera del nostro paese non è così precisamente definita. Raramente arrivano istruzioni precise da Roma, quindi è possibile interpretare i propri compiti e svolgere la funzione di Ambasciatore a seconda della sensibilità di ciascuno. La carriera diplomatica è molto gerarchizzata, ha dei gradi equivalenti ai gradi militari.

- *Dal 1975 (anno del suo ingresso nel mondo diplomatico) fino ad oggi, ha notato un'evoluzione della carriera della professione che va di pari passo con la riduzione del ruolo dello stato nel panorama internazionale?*

Certo, anche se la carriera diplomatica e il MAE sono un mondo un pochino a parte rispetto all'amministrazione statale.

Tradizionalmente, fino agli anni 70, quella diplomatica era una carriera piuttosto chiusa, riservata alla aristocrazia (nasce in questo modo). Vigevano una serie di leggi non scritte da "Ancien Régime". Poi l'Italia è cambiata alla fine degli anni 60, quindi negli anni 70 sono entrate persone che provenivano da formazioni diverse. Io avevo iniziato la carriera d'architetto, ma poi virai verso le scienze politiche, per poi tentare il concorso diplomatico. Vinto il concorso, entrai in questo mondo un po' strano, con cui avevo anche delle frizioni. Durante lo sviluppo della carriera l'ho rivalutata molto, poiché è un mestiere bello, che ti tiene sveglio, che ti permette di cambiare continuamente e ti dà l'opportunità di vivere per alcuni anni in un paese e conoscerne le dinamiche. Durante gli anni, questa élite da Ancien Régime si è conclusa, ma direi con rammarico. Erano infatti persone di grande livello culturale e professionale. D'altra parte, è anche peggiorata la posizione del Ministero degli esteri. Da un lato perché prima il diplomatico era l'unico che sapeva parlare una lingua straniera, mentre oggi fortunatamente tutte le amministrazioni si dotano persone capaci di affrontare riunioni e attività internazionali con interlocutori esteri. Questo è un aspetto positivo. Dall'altro lato però, c'è un fenomeno generale per cui tutta una serie di competenze si sono accentrate nella Presidenza del Consiglio. Si è ridimensionato, anche degradato, il ruolo del MAE, sia come strutture, sia come peso di coordinamento.

- *Si ricorda qualche step del tentativo di concludere le trattative nel 2002 a Roma, tra Palestinese e Israele?*

Partecipai, ma non completamente, a quei colloqui. La persona che si occupò direttamente fu Veltroni. Ci furono colloqui e molti contatti separati con entrambe le parti. I colloqui vennero fatti segreto per due motivi: i) rendere il colloquio pubblico avrebbe reso le cose molto più difficili e ii) per una questione prudenziale nei confronti del ministero degli esteri.

Lo ricordo come un momento di tensione, dovuto alla caratteristica dell'iniziativa, la sua segretezza e al rischio che supponeva. Avrebbe creato problemi sul fronte israeliano, palestinese e nei rapporti con il governo.

Nell'abbracciare questa iniziativa, Veltroni voleva potenziare ed evidenziare quella che secondo lui era una vocazione millenaria di Roma. Il suo era un disegno molto organico della diplomazia della città di Roma: le iniziative di allora sulla questione della pace, del dialogo interculturale e interreligioso erano un modo di sviluppare la proiezione naturale di Roma. Poi c'era tutta la parte della solidarietà internazionale, della cooperazione. Dato che si pensava che Roma fosse al suo interno una città solidale, allora anche la sua proiezione esterna doveva esserlo. Roma aveva un ruolo di pace abbastanza riconosciuto internazionalmente, poiché condivideva le sue esperienze locali nelle varie strutture di dialogo internazionale delle città: il più importante network di cui faceva parte era Città e Governi Locali Uniti (United Cities and Local Government, UCLG). Eravamo presidenti di Medcities (la rete di città che si affacciano sul mediterraneo) e facevamo parte di Eurocities. Roma aveva rapporti multilaterali in questi network locali. Con Medcities ci si occupava anche di questione ambientali, tanto che all'epoca AMA aveva messo in piedi il ciclo di raccolta e rifiuti urbani a Dakar.

Per quanto riguarda i rapporti bilaterali, Roma aveva un solo gemellaggio vero e proprio: con Parigi. Risale agli anni 50, ed era il segno della riconciliazione franco-italiana dopo la guerra (era un matrimonio esclusivo). Tutti gli altri patti romani con altri centri urbani si chiamavano Patti di Amicizia: con Pechino, Mosca, New York, Buenos Aires, etc.

A Pechino, accanto al grande lago situato al centro della città, c'era un quartiere degradato che si voleva trasformare in una sorta di Trastevere pechinese; si fece un progetto urbanistico di riqualificazione dal punto di vista residenziale, commerciale, turistico. Poi però non si concluse.

- *Venne aperto un ufficio per la pace di Roma a Gerusalemme?*

In realtà non era un ufficio fisico, se ne occupava in prima persona Franco La Torre, che periodicamente faceva delle missioni a Gerusalemme per incontrare degli esponenti palestinesi con la speranza di intavolare un dialogo circa la possibilità di collaborazione e di progredire verso qualche soluzione del problema di fondo.

Interview in Italian to Laura Carpini, Diplomatic Councillor of Florence (2017-2019)

- *Mi saprebbe dare una definizione di city diplomacy?*

La diplomazia della città “tradizionale” si estrinsecava con i gemellaggi, uno strumento nato dopo la Seconda Guerra Mondiale - soprattutto in Europa – per rispondere all’esigenza di avvicinare paesi e popolazioni diverse: in parte nel quadro dell’integrazione europea, poiché il gemellaggio tra città contemplava lo scambio di persone, scuole o studenti (soft policy); in parte per incentivare i rapporti fra i due blocchi, per avvicinare cioè le popolazioni oltre cortina. Successivamente, anche grazie alla visione del sindaco di Firenze La Pira (anni ’50), si è instaurata una sorta di “politica delle città” incentrata sul dialogo politico e sull’ avvicinamento tra popoli, in chiave pacifista. Questa era la *city diplomacy* tradizionale, intesa come supporto alla diplomazia del livello nazionale e tesa all’avvicinamento tra popoli.

Oggi, la *city diplomacy* è senza dubbio più articolata e complessa, così come lo è anche la realtà. Sono state colmate certe distanze, quindi la nozione ha assunto più sfaccettature e comprende più terreni d’azione. Direi che la parte del gemellaggio istituzionale sta venendo lentamente meno. Mentre una volta il livello istituzionale era l’unico attore e promotore della *city diplomacy*, oggi il sindaco e tutto il livello istituzionale sono solo la cornice che serve a dare impulso al sistema città: quest’ultimo è formato da associazioni, università, affari, comunità d’affari per la promozione degli investimenti e scambi commerciali. Così almeno è stata interpretata la diplomazia cittadina dalla città di Firenze.

C’è stata anche una fase intermedia, quella dei grandi incontri di sindaci che, almeno idealmente, prendevano ispirazione proprio dalle iniziative di La Pira. Tra il 2005-2015 sono sorti tantissimi city networks. Tuttavia, credo che questo fenomeno sia in via di declino, perché si è inflazionato troppo; il fattore novità, il potere d’attrazione dei networks, è andato a scemare: ci sono tante sovrapposizioni e spesso è difficile organizzare iniziative concrete. È vero però che alcuni rimangono forti, come ad esempio Eurocities (in ambito europeo), di cui Firenze è vicepresidente. Eurocities è chiaramente un network solido e con una membership completa. Se si fa parte dell’Europa e si vuole essere presente nei network di città europee, si deve iniziare da Eurocities, che è chiaramente il più importante. Ci sono poi “ICLEI”, dedicato alla sostenibilità delle

città, e il “Global Compact for Mayors”, una costola dei protocolli internazionali (Kyoto, Parigi) dedicati alle questioni ambientali. Molto originale - ma anche solido - è lo Smart City Expo, di Barcellona. Quest’ultimo è un esperimento interessante, perché sono stati in grado di costruire un’identità della smart city: non essendo più la città un polo di diplomazia tradizionale, tale Expo è stato realizzato come fosse una fiera mista, in cui partecipano le amministrazioni ma anche tante comunità d’affari. La smart city propone proprio la visione per cui l’amministrazione cerca soluzioni intelligenti attraverso nuovi strumenti tecnologici (semafori che comunicano tra di loro, l’illuminazione sistematica, etc.). In virtù di questo, l’amministrazione ha bisogno di avvalersi degli strumenti del settore privato.

Per concludere, direi che in passato la diplomazia della città aveva una fortissima valenza istituzionale, che doveva essere contestualizzata nel quadro della Guerra Fredda e degli inizi dell’integrazione europea. Oggi invece, risente molto delle necessità economiche, è più articolata e cerca di inglobare tanti attori. Dall’essere l’unico attore di diplomazia cittadina, l’amministrazione è divenuta promotrice di tutto il sistema città, con tutti gli attori che la compongono (Confindustria, Camera di Commercio, università etc.). Oggi inoltre, non c’è più bisogno di creare canali di comunicazione con un accordo istituzionale, poiché c’è più flessibilità e meno bisogno di superare ostacoli politici enormi. Per questo Firenze non ha più fatto gemellaggi, poiché le amministrazioni non hanno bisogno di essere l’unico attore, o l’attore predominante degli scambi tra città.

- *È difficile per il ministero degli esteri controllare le relazioni internazionali delle città?*

Bisogna fare delle distinzioni. In un paese democratico e libero, come l’Italia, il ministero non potrebbe avere il controllo completo delle iniziative delle città neanche se volesse. In altri paesi, come in Cina, il ministero degli esteri deve essere informato di ciascun passo di proiezione internazionale dei suoi enti locali. In Italia però, la difficoltà ministeriale di conoscere tutte le iniziative internazionali cittadine non è solo una questione di democrazia, ma anche di globalizzazione. Gli scambi internazionali tra città sono talmente tanti (poiché aperti e liberi) che il ministero non può averne sempre contezza. Tuttavia, deve esistere un coordinamento tra le due amministrazioni. Questo è il lavoro del consigliere diplomatico, che nel mio caso è stato un esperimento pilota: in

Italia la destinazione di un diplomatico in un ente locale è frutto di un accordo, perché c'è un interesse comune di entrambe le amministrazioni. L'interesse del Ministero degli Esteri è ovviamente quello di aiutare la città, ma in un modo che sia coordinato a livello nazionale. Perciò, manda un suo funzionario affinché lui/lei risponda sia alle esigenze della politica internazionale del sindaco, sia al ministero stesso.

- *Perciò Firenze ha una sua politica estera molto autonoma grazie al contesto di globalizzazione in cui è inserita?*

Firenze ha un'autonomia di azione diplomatica solo di fatto, poiché di diritto non ce l'ha. La diplomazia internazionale continua ad essere dominio degli stati, e da qui non si può sfuggire nemmeno oggi. Nel panorama della globalizzazione, più che di autonomia, le città godono di esposizione internazionale: sfruttano alcune relazioni internazionali che però di diritto appartengono allo stato. Tanto è che per legge ogni città che viaggi all'estero deve comunicarlo alla Presidenza del Consiglio e al Ministero.

Nello svolgere la mia funzione di Consigliere Diplomatico della città Metropolitana di Firenze, ho reso il raccordo tra Firenze e il Ministero più fluido e più operativo. Tuttavia, questo raccordo deve legalmente esistere, indipendentemente dalla presenza o meno di un Consigliere Diplomatico. È impossibile infatti pensare che una città non intrattenga rapporti internazionali, ma deve intrattenerli in modo corretto. Chi si dota di un Consigliere Diplomatico fa prima e fa meglio, per questo il Sindaco ha voluto avvalersi di una figura professionale come quella del consigliere diplomatico (oggi giorno, solo Firenze tra tutte le Città Metropolitane si è dotato di un Consigliere Diplomatico). A Firenze c'è un ufficio di relazioni internazionali al Comune in cui lavorano, contando anche l'ufficio del cerimoniale, almeno 7-8 persone. Il D.P.R. 18 prevede che solo le città metropolitane possano dotarsi di un consigliere diplomatico, poiché non si può pensare che il Ministero destini diplomatici in tutti i comuni italiani.

- *Ma secondo lei, perché Firenze ha una proiezione internazionale così forte? Che caratteristiche deve avere una città per avere tanto successo nelle sue iniziative diplomatiche?*

Innanzitutto, Firenze parte da una posizione avvantaggiata. Molti conoscono più Firenze che la Toscana, perché mediamente è conosciuta per la sua storia e cultura. Però il tempo passa per tutti, e per questo bisogna riconoscere alla città il merito di aver

capito che le relazioni internazionali non dovevano essere date per scontate. I vari sindaci avrebbero potuto fare meno sforzi per stimolare la proiezione estera di Firenze, perché la città avrebbe attratto persone allo stesso modo. Tuttavia, la visione di La Pira degli anni '50 è stata abbracciata da tutti i sindaci successivi. La Pira fu il primo a dare inizio ai primi incontri delle città nel dopoguerra, il primo ad aver messo in pratica la *city diplomacy*. Poi negli anni '90-2000 è esplosa la globalizzazione che ha rafforzato questa visione, ma rimane lui il primo promotore. Dopo di lui, nessun sindaco ha relegato le relazioni internazionali della città tra le linee non prioritarie.

Sicuramente Firenze deve molto anche al suo orgoglio cittadino, poiché la città non ha mai avuto la timidezza di proporsi all'estero. Tutti i sindaci hanno capito il prestigio di essere percepiti come un faro di civiltà. Poi il patrimonio culturale della città è stato trasformato in economia, e lo si ritrova nella moda, nel restauro, etc.

Non solo, ma ci sono almeno 42 università americane a Firenze, un'università francese, una cinese...

- *Quindi Firenze è un vero e proprio brand...*

Lo è, ed infatti il mio unico cruccio è quello di non essere riuscita a crear un *brand* brevettato con tutti i suoi crismi. Manca la sistematizzazione legalmente sancita di questo *brand*. Come nome il *brand* esiste, e nei fatti Firenze si è già mossa in questa direzione: nel 2017 è stato creato il Board di internazionalizzazione, una sorta di cabina di regia che si riunisce una volta al mese, è presieduta dal sindaco e dall'assessore delle politiche internazionali, e in cui partecipano Confindustria, Confartigianato, le Università e tutte le anime della città. La sistematizzazione è già in atto, ma avremmo bisogno di legalizzarla e fare come hanno fatto per esempio Amsterdam e New York, costruendo un *brand* legalmente riconosciuto. Ci stiamo però lavorando su.

Questo sindaco ha avuto più visione degli altri, ha avuto un approccio più sistematico. Lui come sindaco si è posizionato, poiché il primo profilo della città è il sindaco che si promuove a livello internazionale; nella governance globale di "ICLEI" rappresenta l'Europa; è vicepresidente di "Eurocities", ha organizzato il "Board di internazionalizzazione" e soprattutto ha fatto tanto per attirare gli investimenti. Oltre alla partecipazione ai network sopra citati, abbiamo anche creato un "Consiglio Grandi Aziende", in chiave di attrazione degli investimenti: due volte all'anno il sindaco riunisce tutte le multinazionali stanziate nel territorio per dialogare, capire se ci sono problemi

comuni e muoversi affinché la città possa attrarre più investimenti. Non solo, ma ciascun investimento è seguito da un team apposito prima, durante e dopo l'applicazione del progetto di investimento, per assicurarsi appunto che questo abbia un impatto positivo sulla città. Non è un caso che nell'ultima classifica del Sole 24 Ore Firenze appare come seconda città italiana per attrazione di investimenti stranieri, dopo Milano. Infine, il filone di diplomazia culturale internazionale è altrettanto attivo; per esempio, l'anno scorso abbiamo organizzato la Conferenza delle capitali della cultura europea in collaborazione con la Commissione Europea. Questo è proprio un caso in cui la presenza di un Consigliere Diplomatico è servita, poiché la facilità di rapportarsi con la Commissione europea è una caratteristica che solo una figura professionale della diplomazia detiene.

Come dicevo, la città non si è fermata al passato. È una città verde, sostenibile, smart e che approfitta delle nuove tecnologie. È riuscita a far rinascere il proprio patrimonio in un modo innovativo. Questo è avvenuto grazie alla sua apertura internazionale, perché l'essenza della cooperazione internazionale è proprio lo scambio di buone pratiche, che consente di apprendere e contemporaneamente far conoscere le proprie iniziative. Il senso identitario deve esserci comunque, perché una città non deve mai perdere la propria anima. Tuttavia, la difesa del senso identitario non deve trasformarsi in chiusura verso il nuovo o verso l'altro, perché altrimenti non c'è crescita né evoluzione. Il segreto di Firenze è proprio il senso identitario quasi medievale che la protegge dalla perdita totale d'identità, ma che è adeguatamente controllato così da permetterle l'apertura verso l'innovazione.

- *Lei che ha avuto una lunga carriera, crede che sia diverso lavorare per la diplomazia di un paese e lavorare per quella di una città?*

Certo. Cambia il livello in cui si lavora, il livello cittadino è senza dubbio più ristretto. In una città si lavora più sul territorio. Nel mio caso, volevo riuscire a coinvolgere tutti gli attori attivi nel territorio della Città Metropolitana e fargli capire che cosa fa il Ministero degli Esteri, soprattutto perché nel nostro e in tanti altri paesi, i territori non hanno contezza del Ministero degli Esteri. Questo perché l'Italia è poco internazionalizzata in modo capillare. Mediamente un tedesco è più esposto fin da piccolo al lavoro del suo Ministero degli Esteri.

- *Quello per la città è forse un lavoro più pratico?*

Certamente. Dal punto di vista del diplomatico puro, lavorare come consigliere diplomatico di una città è uno “scendere di livello”, perché le relazioni internazionali continuano ad essere in mano agli stati. Però questo non significa che le città siano poco rilevanti, poiché in un paese tutto si muove verso l'esterno e se il territorio non è internazionalizzato, lo sforzo di proiezione nazionale verso l'estero ottiene minori risultati.

Inoltre, per fare il consigliere diplomatico di una città bisogna essere originario di quel posto: non solo perché si conosce il territorio, ma anche perché le persone, i cittadini devono riconoscerti come uno di loro.

SUMMARY

City-diplomacy: the new role of cities in International Relations

This essay explores the dimensions of urban diplomacy, presenting it as a phenomenon poorly studied in literature, but rich of food for thought. It addresses the analysis by providing academic definitions and models along with descriptions of technical aspects, such as tools employed by cities, ways to maintain relations among them, and fields of application. At the end of the analysis, the paper reports the examination of diplomatic activities of two Italian cities, Rome and Florence.

In the first chapter, we started from giving a general idea of diplomacy. We remembered that diplomacy meant in a broad sense belonged to ancient times, because human beings have always had the necessity to maintain relations with the surrounding environment. The first embryonal form of organized diplomacy was established during the ancient Greek times, when the city-state granted of immunity from the private law to the emissary. Greeks began to choose their ambassadors among the most able orators and lawyers, as they had to persuade the foreign authority to act in accordance with their main interests. Romans as well used diplomacy to keep contacts with sovereign “states” allied with - or subjected to - Rome, and Byzantine institutionalized the protocol to receive ambassadors, the practice to deliver references and the ratification of treaties. The Byzantine also introduced the practice of monitoring the internal situation of the countries where the emissaries were sent, with the consequence that the quality of those figures could not be limited to good speaking, but they also had to be careful observers. Gradually, the figure of diplomat turned to be professional, and it was employed by the Church and Italian Principalities. The latter contributed to change the model of diplomacy, introducing a new unscrupulous way of thinking: in order to keep the balance of power between dominions, permanent diplomatic missions were sent with the duty of representing their country’s interests by cheating and lying, very often by working as spies in foreign countries. However, with the Westphalian Peace, new Nation-States manifested the will to build a system, acknowledged by all sovereigns, to manage international relations. The agreement introduced the concepts of “national sovereignty” and “territorial integrity”, taking as example the text *De Jure belli ac pacis*

of the philosopher and jurist Hugo Grotious. The first multilateral set was made possible by the Vienna Congress (1815), that introduced the “principle of legitimacy” and the “balance of power”. But without institutions apt to monitor international relations, multilateralism remained weak. By consequence, the two World Wars destroyed every hope and obliged States to create international organs that granted reciprocal political and territorial independence to all States. During the Cold War, diplomacy changed again, setting a new bipolar world based on military power. Only at the end of this era, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, modern times arrived, bringing with them globalization and modern threats. It is in this last context that city diplomacy found space to grow.

Nevertheless, city diplomacy cannot be fully understood if we do not give a general comprehension of how States do diplomacy. To eviscerate the most important features of diplomacy, we took as reference many scholars keen on the topic. Apart from its functions – that according to Ian Hurd are the pursuing of formal interaction with other States over treaties, the announcement of public statement by spokespeople and the declaration of positions taken in international settings – diplomacy pursued by States has the acknowledgement of the international rules and setting as its main goal. Defined as “performative sufficiency” by Nicholas Onuf, this aspect underlines that diplomacy, regardless the paradigm of international relation we choose, must confront with the international order. Accordingly, along with military and economic powers, a third fundamental element of diplomacy is “legitimacy”, that is the international recognition of a subject to be entrusted with “power” to have external relations. Legitimacy, defined by Adam Watson as “the lubricating oil of an international system”, is also the “productive element” of diplomacy, because when a new behaviour of diplomacy receives legitimation, it becomes by consequence part of the system, causing an evolution of it. The paper also refers to the range of action of diplomacy, that is delimited by politics and international rules, both very flexible and changeable borders. This first part of the chapter serves basically to give to the reader the basic knowledges to ask him/herself some questions: is state diplomacy well-structured to face the new world circumstances? Is it able to go beyond the increasing weakness of the state position in the international panorama? In order to answer those questions, the essay provides the reader with an understanding of modern state diplomacy limitations. First of all, the technological development hit diplomats and experts of international relations

as a hurricane, as they were deprived of one of their duties: collecting information and reporting them to their home country. Things that had always been separated, got closer in that climate of proximity brought by globalization. Secondly, the new multipolar equilibrium was to be considered in conjunction with the birth of new non-State actors, such as big companies, International Organizations, NGOs and local governments. In an era in which global problems are addressed at the local level, States meet new competitors of international relations. Diplomacy has indeed suffered an evolution under four aspects, according to Brian Hocking *et al*: context and locations, actors and roles, rules and norms and communication patterns.

Cities have taken advantage of this evolution, thanks to their flexible structure and their internal features. First of all, since 2014 cities have hosted the half of the world population, so their contribute to the world development in all fields cannot be unobserved; secondly, cities learnt that reputation and international recognition were strong tools, and their strongest weapons - unlike States disposal of military resources - were economic attractiveness and soft power. But the innovative point was that some cities begun to exercise their powers autonomously, representing themselves internationally regardless the approval of their State. Many described this process as “city diplomacy”. The most common definition of city diplomacy was phrased by Pluijijm, that described it as “combination of institutions and practice that allow urban centres to engage in relations with a third part – state or non-state actors on an international level with the objective of representing their interests”. This can actually occur as part of Nation-State’s international strategies in a scheme of complementarity with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or, by contrast, it may develop freely, not guided by the State. Sometimes, it can be even in discordance with national strategies, causing disputes which are difficult to solve. This situation could be the result of the general downgrade of diplomats and ministries at the international level.

Generally speaking, diplomacy pursued by cities takes hundreds of forms, as it is influenced by many distinctive elements. However, it has some elements in common with State’s one, as for example the distinction between multilateral or bilateral relations. The paper examines then the urban instruments that work to project the city internationally: economic promotion, tourism, investments, attraction of foreign students, organization of great events, policy exchanges and cultural exchanges. Some cities are known to have strengthened one of those tools, as London, Tokyo and New

York, famous for being financial hubs; they have been called “World Cities” , that, in Saskia Sassen’s opinion, are urban centres where there is concentration of capital and global service sector firms. Notwithstanding, as reported by the work of the Globalization and World Cities group (GaWC), today not only are big and highly income towns part of the hundred most globalized cities, but also middle or lower-income and medium or small-sized ones. Those ones, though they are not financial nodes, represent centres of production and consumption of services. Using the distinction made by Jo Beall and David Adam, we built three subcategories of globalized cities , that are the “established world cities” (NYC, London, Tokyo etc), the “emerging world cities” (i.e. Shanghai, Beijing, Istanbul, San Paulo, etc.) and “new world cities” (Barcelona, Berlin, Cape Town, etc). This last subcategory is peculiar because it contains urban centres which are mostly known for the well-functioning of their social services, for the good quality of life or for entertainment and tourism. It suggests that to count internationally, cities must have an international reputation.

The second chapter analysed some technical aspects of city diplomacy. First of all, it focused on the legal constraints imposed on cities when they do diplomacy. On the one hand they are limited by international law: despite international law has in many ways helped cities and non-state actors to count at the international level, it does not consider agreements with - or among - cities as having a binding character. The Vienna Convention of 1961 does not regulate cases in which cities rather than states do diplomacy. This determines ambiguity around actions cities can carry out or not, as well as a sort of irreparable weakness which downgrades city diplomacy in face of state institutions; legal basis is indeed required to strengthen those cities’ initiatives having a transnational scope. On the other hand, cities are constrained by their belonging State. Joana Setzer divides initiatives of city diplomacy in two categories, that are *collaboration* and *coalition*. The former does not represent an issue for Nation-States, unlike the latter. Accordingly, the essay examined the three circumstances that concern urban relations with its domestic environment: the hypothesis in which the domestic State does recognize to cities the capacity to engage in diplomatic activities (France); the case in which the State does not recognize this ability (United States); and the case in which domestic law does not refer to the topic (most cities).

Later, the paper took in exam city-bilateralism and multilateralism. City -to- city cooperation was a common strategy to “enhance a city’s international profile and global competitiveness” through generating proximity between cities and facilitating the exchange of information, ideas, investments and, among all, people. Those ancestral bilateral relationships between cities belonged to several factors: mayoral or trade relationships, historical or demographic connections, common challenges or common faith. There are hundred examples of city-to-city cooperation and many initiatives of sister cities involving young people and students, in sight of future reinforcement of the persistent links between the two localities. The objectives of this bilateral diplomacy between local governments are several: assistance for the development of cities belonging to developing countries, as well as promotion of good practice, sharing of values as well as cultural, social or economic exchanges. Formally speaking, city – to – city cooperation can take the form of “Friendship” or “Sisterhood”: the latter is a broad-based and long-term partnership which is turned into an official relationship through an agreement signed by the highest elected or appointed officials of both local governments; the former is, by contrast, less formal than twinning, and in some occasions, it is conceived as a previous stage of city sisterhood. If the practice of twinning has spread all over the world successfully, the successive step made by towns led to the creation of networks, where not only cities, but also other non-state actors were included. The paper took as reference Michele Acuto’s definition, which describes city-networks as “formalized organizations whose regular members are in major part cities marked by reciprocal patterns of communication, policy making and exchange”. There are at least 200 city-organizations which coincide with Acuto’s definition of city network: Acuto and Morissette studied 170 of them, finding the following distinctions: city-networks can be organized in subnational, regional, national or international basis; they are distinguished depending on their numerical dimensions and their composition, as well as their topics (we understood for example, that the preferred topics are those devoted to environment and energy); they may produce different types of results, from formal agreements to academic papers. The essay describes also the functioning and the functions undergone by one of the most important global city-networks: C40 City.

By taking advantage of such new tools, cities are now embedded in the international atmosphere where barriers are teared down, allowing innovation to flow between all kinds of dwellers. This new openness generates a change which does not only affect

external relations of those local governments, but it also modifies their internal features, provoking the set into motion of a second important mutative process: the internalization of the cooperative, horizontal mechanism of participation in decision making. Indeed, urban structures, including both private and public structures, hide huge potentialities, which could be unveiled through the implementation of collaborative initiatives. In order to define actors and outcomes of this cooperative relationship, the essay has based its analysis on the model thought and elaborated by Professors Iaione and Foster, generated to monitor carefully the development of the new field of urban common studies. The field focuses above all on exploring the constitutive elements of urban centres, that are five souls: citizens (individuals), public authorities, private sectors (corporations and agencies), organized civil society (NGOs and associations) and knowledge institutions (schools and universities). Those souls have fluid boundaries, because an individual could belong to a private corporation and in the meantime, be active in an urban association. When active participation to the public urban life is incentivized, this fluidity amplifies the urban dwellers' voice. Still, people are the competitive advantage of cities in face of Nation-States, because cities offer the only easy hub where citizens can meet and build urban coalitions to propose innovative solutions. The model assesses the degree of co-governance, here intended as broad partnerships between different actors, implying a wide understanding of the concept of governance, which goes beyond the actual involvement of a public institution. The assessment is made on the basis of five variables, that are collaborative governance, enabling State, pooling of resources, experimentalism and tech justice.

The third chapter explored the most important fields of application of city-diplomacy. Above all, cities hold a leading role in proposing and implementing concrete actions to fight climate change. The literature suggests that cities are “in any attempt to implement national and international policy imperatives to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and have a significant role to play in climate protection in their own” (Michele Betsill). This occurs because cities are the main producers of gasses and materials polluting the planet, they host the half of global population, so they also are the most affected by climate change consequences. According to the Stern Review analysis, cities are responsible for the 78% of carbon emissions. More in general, cities produce the biggest amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) because they are centres where

economic activities are settled. They are also responsible for two thirds of energy consumption, so they are expected to be the ones accountable for the reparation of damages.

Thus, by addressing this huge and global issue, cities are also increasing their diplomatic power: climate change is actually giving to all city actors (simple dwellers as well as organized communities or institutions of education, NGOs and private companies) the opportunity to play a role in climate change politics, in an impulse which is unique and unrepeatable; in fact, citizens know all peculiarities of their urban centre and, by consequence, they plan solutions which fit only for their cities. This must be framed in the context of policy learning evolution, which is due to the “localization” of global problems (translated in the famous maxim “think globally, act locally”), the interpretation of local issues as new focal points for international relations and the legitimation of civil society in challenging the traditional state approach to global issues. Furthermore, in order to fight climate change and protect the environment, cities used multilateral settings: many city-networks function as hubs of innovation and learning, as well as vehicles of financial aids to those cities incapable to finance environmental measures. Measures are several, but they have been divided in two categories by experts: mitigative and adaptative measures. The formers aim at facing the causes of climate change, while the latter work to deal with the consequences. The most known city-networks for climate change that are cited in the paper are: C40 Cities, Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy and Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI).

The second paragraph of the chapter referred by contrast to the potentiality held by cities to reduce inequality. At the microlevel, it is certainly the result “of local specificities of urban growth, institutional settings, academic and cultural traditions, etc.”, as Ferenc Gyuris, stated. Gavin Shatkin too underlines that inequalities at the local level may depend on the process of global cities development; specifically, he believes that the uniqueness of each urban centre in terms of ideology, culture, social structures, but also in terms of resource collection, flows of ideas and money makes globalization incapable to create an evident and replicable path of urban development – or urban change. With the use of an explanatory table, he explains that each manifestation of inequality is influenced by a set of elements that can be regrouped in three categories: diversity in the global city experiences, historical perspective and

actor-centred perspective. Once identified the dimensions of urban inequality, the paper considered a couple of urban approaches to address inequality: the approach based on the respect of human rights and the urban planification approach. Human rights cities aim at changing city priorities, basing city choices – such as investments, urban planning initiatives, etc. – on the respect of human rights (including economic, social and cultural rights). By contrast, much emphasis has been devoted to the role of urban planification in fighting disparities of life standard within the same urban centre. Urbanists have achieved high popularity to be responsible for the planification of a city whose structures allow the distribution of services all over the city area; other than that, urbanists aim at improving the citizens' perception of the city in terms of safety, liveability, cleanness, and other evaluative dimensions.

In the end, the last part of the chapter was devoted to peacebuilding initiatives pursued by cities. In this case too, the essay explained why urban centres are suitable entities to carry out this function, remembering that very often conflicts explode in cities because they are places where the antagonism between groups intensifies. However, cities can also possess key tools to foster a sustainable coexistence of antagonist groups once the conflict has come to an end (for instance, Beirut) or they may even develop functional strategies to calm the hostilities through power-sharing governance (Brussels). Basically, cities were in a good position to have an active role in peacebuilding since the past, but only recently they “assumed salience to those studying and seeking to resolve contemporary conflict” (Scott Bollens). Taking as example the city of Mostar, a Bosnian town located in the Herzegovinian region, the paper shew how cities can represent sometimes a sort of laboratory where solutions are tested. Not only do cities carry out policies that may be fundamental for the instauration of peace at the national level, but they also lobby for peace. They do so both as individuals and as agglomerations of cities. An impressive case of city struggling for peace is undoubtedly The Hague, in the Netherlands, while an example of multilateral attempt to promote peace is represented by International Cities for Peace (ICP). The chapter took also in exam a given initiative of peacebuilding pursued by Rome in 2002, under the mandate of the then-Mayor Walter Veltroni. The Mayor worked as mediator in a failed attempt of peacebuilding between Israel and Palestine, during the second Intifada. With the purpose of knowing his opinion, an interview to Veltroni has been conducted on the topic.

The last chapter of this essay referred to two Italian cities, Rome and Florence. The chapter responded to the exigence of composing a clear image of city-diplomacy made up of all its facets, eviscerated separately in the previous chapters. We chose to examine all diplomatic initiatives of Rome from 2001 to 2007, a lapse of time in which the city was governed by Walter Veltroni, while diplomacy was entrusted in the hands of the Diplomatic Councillor Marco Baccin. We interviewed both, in order to know their opinion about city diplomacy, and their personal experiences in the guise of persons in charge of the public life of the city.

In those years Rome fostered diplomatic activities as its Mayor was persuaded that its historical openness made of it a city of tolerance and solidarity. Roman strategy of diplomacy was based on four pillars: decentralised cooperation for the fight against famine and poverty, the engagement in initiatives of peace and dialogue, the collaboration between local governments in bilateral or multilateral initiatives and activities framed in the context of the European integration. Rome was extremely engaged in the field of decentralized cooperation because collaborations between the municipal administration and civil society were numerous; however, there was the exigence to create an institutionalized space where this collaboration could flourish. In this context, it was created the “City Committee for decentralized cooperation”. In this seat, it occurred the elaboration of projects targeted at the international cooperation. Furthermore, tens of initiatives of solidarity toward African and South American country were held in Rome, involving all city-actors.

Roman efforts for peace were evident as well. In Veltroni’s view, the fact that Rome had a millennial tradition of hospitality, tolerance and coexistence among different cultures, had to be exploited to vehicle a message that bucked the trend: in facts, marches for peace, concerts for peace, reunions with religious representatives were only some of the events organized by the municipality in those years.

For what concerns bilateral and multilateral relations, Rome demonstrated to have strong alliances that made it count internationally. Apart from friendship agreements with numerous cities all over the world (Beijing, Moscow, Buenos Aires, New York etc), Rome had a formal twinning with Paris, sign of reconciliation after the Second World War. In the multilateral sphere, Veltroni at that time was President of Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and Vice-President of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) ; Rome made part to ICLEI, Medicities, Eurocities and

many other important hubs of meeting between local governments, at the European and international level. In the end, Rome put in place many initiatives aiming at attracting people and tourists, in order to give international reputation to the city (such as concerts or museums by nights or the Festival of Cinema).

The second and last paragraph of this short chapter was devoted to Florence and to its initiatives of diplomacy. As well as for Rome, we used the testimony of the manager of its diplomacy, the current Diplomatic Councillor Laura Carpini. Being Florence the first Italian city to put in practice city diplomacy in the Fifties with its famous Mayor La Pira, this paragraph started with the description of La Pira initiatives. Later, using Carpini's words, we outlined Florence activities of diplomacy in two ways: on the one hand, the city attempted to transform its tradition and its "name" in a brand, so as to build an international reputation; on the other, the Mayor Nardella and his collaborators understood the importance of foreign investments in the city. Accordingly, they founded the "Council for Big Companies", the "Internationalization Bureau" and many other entities aiming at involving all city-actors in the concerted planning of Florence international projection.