UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES

&

UNIVERSITY LUISS GUIDO CARLI

Department of Political Science

Understanding Statebuilding in Iraq through the Coalition Provisional Autority Orders

presented by

VLEMINCKX, Stan (638932)

In the framework of

Master Thesis- Double Degree in International Relation (120 ECTS)

Supervisor: Corrao, Francesca Maria

Co-supervisor: Magrassi, Carlo

Academic Year 2018-2019

Table of Contents

Introduction

In 2003, under President George W Bush, a military coalition led by the USA invaded Iraq. The goal of this coalition was to put an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. The war lasted from the 20th of March until the 1st of May and ended in an overall military success for the coalition. After deposing Saddam Hussein's Regime, the coalition decided to put into place the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), de facto an occupation government, with its affirmed aim being to put in place a new democratic government, following the theme of the name given to the invasion: operation Iraqi freedom.

This government, even though it qualified itself as a coalition authority, was led mainly by American personnel appointed by Washington which reported to the US government instead of reporting to an International Organization[1]. This was both a consequence of US behavior in ignoring UN recommendations before and during the invasion, as well as the US's own dislike of having to allow international oversight[2].

There has been some confusion regarding to the juridical status of the CPA, with arguments being made that the CPA is an International Agency rather than a Government Entity: the US army legal services have argued that the CPA is not a federal agency, but rather "a multi-national coalition that exercises powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq"[3], citing UN Security Resolution 1483 (2003) as justification. The Army legal service further compared the CPA to NATO's Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Croatia (SFOR) to justify its status as an International Organization. This comparison does not hold however, as the SFOR fell under the authority of NATO, an International Organization, and had been explicitly authorized by the UN[4]. In contrast, the responsibility for post-war control over Iraq was first assigned to the US Department of Defense, while the reconstruction was to be handled by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)[5].

---

[1] DOBBINS, James, « Occupying Iraq: A Short History of the CPA" in *Survival*, 2009, 51:3, p 134

[2] *Ibid,* p 132

[3] HALCHIN, L. Elaine, *The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics and Institutional Authorities*, Report for Congress, Washington D.C., 2005, p 10

[4] UNITED NATIONS, Resolution S/RES/1088, 1966

[5] HALCHIN, L. Elaine, *op.cit*, p 2

Both these decisions where supported by the National Security Presidential Directive 24. Later in 2003, President George Bush would appoint Paul Bremer special envoy and civil administrator and senior leader of the coalition[6], who would report to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld[7]. In May 2003, Donald Rumsfeld then appointed Bremer as head of the CPA, with the CPA taking over the role of the OHRA[8]. As this entire process proves, the administration of Iraq was not handled by an International entity, but by an agency established by the US Department of Defense. Despite its name, and the presence of at least one important non-American employee in Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the CPA can hardly be considered an International Organization. Even the justification of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 is less relevant than that of the SFOR, as resolution 1483 merely recognized, but did not establish the CPA[9].

While its exact status remains difficult to pin down[10], the CPA can therefore best be analyzed as a US government entity for the purposes of this paper. This means decisions taken by the CPA should be analyzed primarily as designed to fulfill goals set out by the US government, and not necessarily as aimed at answering Inputs from the Iraqi population, as would be the case in David Easton's Traditional "Black Box" model, where the political system's "outputs" (policies) are a reaction to the "inputs" (demands and support) generated by the environment of the political system[11]. While Easton's model is still valid in our case, the inputs are no longer issued from the "internal" environment, that is to say those directly affected by its decisions, but rather from an "external" environment (the US government) which is not directly affected by policies taken by the political system. While there has been backlash to US actions in Iraq, this cannot be considered a reaction to CPA outputs, but rather a reaction to US outputs which became CPA inputs, meaning those backlashes where inherent to the US's own Political System.

This in turn means decisions and actions of the CPA should be analyzed from a US perspective, and analyzed from the standpoint that their actions followed US priorities and served US interests. While this does not necessarily mean policies of the CPA were aimed at

---

[6] *Ibidem*

[7] WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Names Envoy to Iraq," May 6, 2003

[8] HALCHIN, L. Elaine, *op.cit*, p 3

[9] *Ibid,* p 9

[10] *Ibid*, p 39

[11] EASTON, David, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life,* Wiley, New York, 1965, p 65

damaging Iraq or its inhabitants, it does mean that they should not be analyzed only or even primarily in regard to the benefit the Iraqi population obtained from them, but rather in regard to the benefit the US government drew from them.

The first question we need to answer must thus be: What were the US's goals, which it tried to pursue through the CPA? Among the main Statements of operation Iraqi freedom, we can find that the eight main goals formulated By Donald Rumsfeld were to end the regime of Saddam Hussein, to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, capture and drive out terrorists, collect intelligence on terrorist networks, collect intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, secure Iraq's oil fields and resources for the Iraqi people and finally, "to create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government that is not a threat to its neighbors"[12]. As the CPA was intended as a civil rather than military organization, it is mainly on the two last goals that its impact can be evaluated. The last goals especially holds an important role, both because of its general ambiguity which means it left large margins of interpretation regarding as to how the conditions for a representative government were to be defined and implemented, and its association with the "bringing Democracy to Iraq" narrative which was central in Bush's justification of operation Iraqi Freedom[13].

In this paper, I will therefore mainly focus on answering the question of how, through its orders and regulations, the CPA tried to implement its vision of this transition, and what it considered to be elements needed for this transition, or more simply "How do the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority reflect the goals of Statebuilding in Iraq?".

---

[12] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD news, "Rumsfeld lists Operation Iraqi Freedom aims, objectives", U.S. department of Defense Website, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29253, last consulted online 04/03/2019

[13] SANTOS, Maria Helena de Castro, TEIXEIRA, Ulysses Tavares, "The essential role of democracy in the Bush Doctrine: the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan*", Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.56: n.2, 2013, p131

CHAPTER I

1. State of the Art

1.1 The realist school

In their analysis of international relations, realist and neo-realist approaches have traditionally put emphasis on concepts like anarchy in international relations, the importance of National Interest and the security dilemma[14]. While the rhetoric of George W. Bush's government emphasized the risk that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction could pose to the US in the hands of Al-Qaeda, and that the act of going to war without UN consensus can be seen as a violation of UN art 2§3 and art 2§4 which fits within the principle of anarchy in international relations, realist scholars have been quick to distance themselves from the Iraq war. In fact, the 26th of September 2002, an advertisement was published in the New York Times titled "War with Iraq is not in America's National Interest", which was signed by 33 scholars of international relations, several of them prominent realists.

It cannot simply be assumed however that realist thinking did not influence the Iraq war. As Deudney and Ikenberry point out, there are several aspects to the realist school and they identify three tenants as particularly important for understanding the origins of the Iraq War[15]: "equilibrium" realism, "hegemonic" realism and "interdependence" realism.

"Equilibrium" realism affirms that security arises from a distributed configuration of power, and that its efforts by a single State to become a dominant power which will lead to tensions[16]. This paradigm can be seen as one that emphasizes the "security dilemma" in international relations. This dilemma consists of the idea that, from a realist perspective, a State's first interest is to improve its security. To do this, it will need to strengthen its military capacities. In doing so, it increases the threat it presents to other States, who will also seek to improve their security by strengthening their own military capacities, leading to a vicious circle where one State's security leads to other State's insecurity[17]. This system's stability is therefore based on no single State being perceived as a threat by others.

---

[14] TELÒ, Mario, *Relations Internationales. Une perspective Européenne*, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2013, p51

[15] DEUDNEY, Daniel; IKENBERRY, G. John, « Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War », *Survival*, 59 :4, 2017, p10

[16] *Ibidem*

[17] TELÒ, Mario, *op. cit.*, p51

"Hegemony" affirms that it's the existence of a dominant, or hegemonic power, which stabilizes the international system, by imposing rules and a system which are beneficent for peace. This system was initially theorized by thinkers such as Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindelberger, with the later identifying the lack of a hegemonic "stabilizer" as the reason for the eruption of 1929 crisis[18]. Within this system, it's the rise of a new power and/or the decline of the current hegemonic power which can lead to tensions, as the system stability is lost.

Finally, "Interdependence" affirms that high levels of security interdependence make international anarchy perilous and suggests that effective government will and should consolidate at larger scales[19]. This point of the authors may seem strange, as transnationalism and complex interdependence are traditionally seen as criticisms of realist and neo-realist schools[20], and it is hard to see how the idea of interdependence can coexist with that of international anarchy, which is one of the key elements of the realist school[21]. However, realist thinkers such as Carr and Hobbes had already pointed out reasons why the realist school would have to consider problems of interdependence[22], with Carr especially considering that in realist theory, Nation-States that cannot be considered great powers would be forced to abandon parts of their sovereignty as they had been rendered military obsolete[23]. Deudney and Ikenberry build upon previous works of Hans Morgenthau and John Herz[24] to develop their idea that the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was analyzed by the US administration through the scope of interdependence realism, where the threat posed by WMDs was not one that could be effectively deterred or protected against, and which hence justified a preventive war[25], or as Ron Suskind phrased Cheney's 1 percent doctrine:: "if there was even a 1 percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction – and there has been a small probability of such an occurrence for some time – the United States must now act as if it were a certainty"[26].

The realist school cannot explain the Iraq invasion and subsequent Statebuilding efforts,

---

[18] TELÒ, Mario, *op. cit.*, p105

[19] DEUDNEY, Daniel; IKENBERRY, G. John, *op.cit.*, p10

[20] TELÒ, Mario, *op.cit*, pp 100-101

[21] *Ibid*, p51

[22] DEUDNEY, Daniel; IKENBERRY, G. John, *op.cit.*, p19

[23] CARR, Edward H., *La Crise de vingt ans 1919-1939 Une introduction à l'Étude des relations internationales*, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2015, p 308

[24] DEUDNEY, Daniel; IKENBERRY, G. John, *op.cit.*, p19

[25] *Ibid,* p 21

[26] *Ibidem*

as it cannot explain how it would have been in the US's national interest to invade Iraq in the first place. However, schools of thought within the realist school did influence decisionmakers and should be considered in regard to the ideas they hold of international relations, most notably in regard to the role (and lack thereof) of International Organizations.

<u>1.2 The liberal school</u>

The liberal school's approach of international relations has traditionally emphasized the idea of cooperation between States. This cooperation also goes through International Organizations and international frameworks[27], which as we have seen previously have been almost completely ignored in the context of the Iraq invasion, with the term "coalition of the willing" being little more than a tool to legitimize a unilateral invasion, as the forces it consisted of were almost exclusively American [28]. Furthermore, the liberal school just like the realist school has failed to explain why the US specifically targeted Iraq, and not another member of the so called "Rogue States"[29].

However, the liberal school of international relations has also been the one to legitimize "humanitarian interventionism". This concept was used to justify military intervention as a reaction to the internal dealings of another State, primarily if said State was violating human rights[30]. The United States in particular have often been quick to mobilize the principle of "responsibility to protect", and similar ideas which consider that States have a right to intervene militarily in the name of human rights[31]. As Nicholas Kitchen and Michael Cox point out, this mentality reached its peak after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when

> "it was thought that the universal availability of capitalist prosperity would lead inexorably to stability, peace and the dominance of those liberal values of self-determination and non-interference that were so inseparable from the economic doctrine. Yet the history of the Cold War did not really support such an optimistic

---

[27] LIEBERFELD, Daniel, "Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War" in *International Journal of Peace Studies,* Volume 10, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2005, p6

[28] KITCHEN, Nicholas, COX, Michael, "Just Another Liberal War? Western Interventionism and the Iraq War" in *Beyond Iraq: the future of World Order,* World Scientific, London, 2012, p 70

[29] LIEBERFELD, Daniel, *op.cit,* p 7

[30] FRYE, Alton, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2000, pp3-4

[31] KITCHEN, Nicholas, COX, Michael, *op.cit*, p 73

conclusion. Far from economic liberalism going hand-in-hand with liberal politics, the United States was forced on several occasions to choose between unelected modernizing elites and democratic governments with less pro-capitalist sentiments and had tended to back the capitalists. Realists would not have expected any different, of course, but the peaceful end of the Cold War had plunged realism into a crisis of confidence, and the new world order had promised that such unpalatable compromising of liberal principles would be a thing of the past. With the shackles of the Cold War's overriding imperatives thrown off, liberal internationalism could not only be true to its principles, it could do so with the backing of the world's unassailable superpower, which could harness its unipolar moment to establish an enduring liberal peace. The American revolution could be made universal."[32]

Two points are of special importance in this paragraph: The unipolar moment and the link between Western interventionism and the promotion of capitalism.

Firstly, the special condition of the unipolar moment, which is described in Kaplan's theory of international systems as an international system which is organized around one State which has risen above the rest in terms of power[33]: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a period of time when the United States were the sole remaining superpower, and as such had no real check in International Politics. This, combined with the ideas of American exceptionalism – a set of ideas which emphasized among others the USA's special history and attributed it with a special role, as a model for others to follow[34]- led to a strengthening of the belief in a new world order, with the United States at its head. One of the most notable examples of this school of thought was found in Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History and the Last Man", which defended the idea that the Western liberal Democracy marked the end of history, defending the superiority of this model over all others.

Secondly, the link between US interventionism and capitalism or, more exactly, liberal economic policies. This was most marked during the Cold War with US interventions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, Chile from 1963 until 1973, Nicaragua in 1979 and more, with the common denominator for these interventions being the global fight against

---

[32] *Ibid,* p75

[33] TELO, Mario, *op.cit., p62*

[34] PIRNUTA, Oana-Andreea, "American Exceptionalism", *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, November 2017, Volume 8, p 122

communism in the frame of the Cold War. However, even after the end of the Cold War, American Interventionism remained a method to promote capitalism and free-market economy. John Morrissey, by analyzing the history of the US Central Command since its foundation in 1983, was able to point out how through interventionist tactics the US ensured its access to commercial markets in the Middle-East[35], but also used its military presence to further trade agreements, or in the case of the Iraq War directly liberalized the economy[36].

The liberal school is therefore not sufficient to explain the reasons behind the Iraq War, or the reasons why Statebuilding in Iraq failed. The liberal school can however help us understand the mindset that contributed to the war, and how it affected Statebuilding in Iraq.

2   Theoretical   approach: Foreign   Policy   Analysis

For the purpose of this paper, we will analyze the effort of State building in Iraq from a Foreign Policy Analysis approach, more specifically using decisional process theory.

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is characterized by a focus on the actors of international relations, the literal "decisionmakers", as FPA sees international relations as grounded in human decision making, as individuals or in group[37]. As such, FPA can be seen as sub or a-systemic, insisting more on analyzing interactions than on consistent rules of a system[38]. FPA pays more attention to internal politics of a country and how they affect its stance on the international field, as well as to the sociological aspects of governments and administrations than traditional systemic approaches[39].

In this regard, FPA seems more adequate when it comes to understanding decisions that could not be understood from a rational point of view than systemic theories, as these consider States to be rational actors. As we saw previously, neither the realist nor the liberal school could give a satisfying answer to the question of why the US invaded Iraq, with realist scholars not considering it in the US's national interest to invade Iraq, and the liberal school's principle of humanitarian intervention not sufficient to explain why this was applied specifically to Iraq and

---

[35] MORRISSEY, John, "US Central Command and liberal imperial reach: 'Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century'", *The Geographical Journal*, 2016, 182(1), p 22

[36] *Ibid*, p23

[37] ALDEN, Chris, ARAN, Amnon, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New approaches*, Routledge, London, 2017, p4

[38] TELÒ, Mario, *op.cit.*, p 141

[39] ALDEN, Chris, ARAN, Amnon, *op.cit.,* p5

not another State. In being systemic, both these schools are limited when it comes to analyzing an event which can be considered as falling outside of their standard systems. In this regard, FPA has a considerable edge as it refuses to consider States as rational, instead putting the focus on individuals within the State and their influence on the State's decisions[40].

As we have repeatedly pointed out both systemic schools' failure to explain why the US specifically invaded Iraq and not another State, our own approach should be expected to answer this question in order to be justified. For this reason, we have chosen to base our analysis on decisional process theory.

2.1 Decisional process theory

Decisional process theory is a system which was first theorized by Graham Allison in his analysis of the Cuban missile Crisis. It revolves around the theorization of three conceptual models of decision making in the making of foreign policy[41].

The first model, named Rational Policy Model, sees the State as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, with one set of goals and a single unitary opinion, echoing the idea of national interest as described in systemic theories. Likewise, the decisions taken by the government follow a rational choice process with as an aim to best defend the national security and interests[42]. It can be seen as grounded in the Realist school, as it follows the same core principles of Governments as actors with a rational-choice based approach which seeks to maximize returns, as well as seeing Government action built upon a unique set of priorities, the national interest, as opposed to partisan or personal priorities.

The second model, the Organizational Process Model, sees governments not as unitary actors, but as a constellation of loosely allied organizations under the direction of one head of government, with the different organizations being tasked with specific issues. This model considers the structure of separate branches of government administration, and subdivisions within those branches when studying how decisions are being taken regarding foreign policy. Goals are defined by a set of constraints put upon the divisions, such as its budget, resources, demands and expectations, with the division trying within the realm of their constraints to

---

[40] *Ibid,* p7

[41] ALLISON, Graham T, « Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis ». *American Political Science Review*, volume 63, no 3, September 1969, p707

[42] *Ibid,* p 694

resolve issues presented to it. Competition can exist between the different branches of Government, per example for reasons related to questions of jurisdiction[43]. Decisions are taken through a combination of standard operating procedures established within the divisions and subdivisions but are influenced by decisions taken at the top level of government insofar as these respond to non-standard situations[44].

Finally, the third model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model again does not see the government as a unitary actor but emphasizes the individual role of the actors that compose and of interorganizational politics, as the different divisions bargain for influence and impact. This goes through the top-level executives of the different divisions, as well as those who can influence their decisions, such as their staff members, journalists, lobbyists or others who could influence their decision-making. Decisions are taken based upon personal priorities, which are linked of course to the office of the decisionmakers, but also personal issues, beliefs or stakes, and are subject to bargaining and arguing between the actors. These decisions produced by States are not only an answer to the problem, but an outcome of the negotiations that have taken place in order to accommodate the different players[45].

---

[43] *Ibid,* p 705

[44] *Ibid,* p 702

[45] *Ibid,* p710

The following table gives a short summary of all three models in relation to each other:

The Paradigm	Model I	Model II	Model III
	National government — Black box labelled. . . . — Notional state / Generic state / Identified state / Personified state	National government — Leaders A B C D E F G — What actually occurs / Range of choice / Structure of situation / Innovation	National government — A B / z r / y y / C D E / n t z / x y r / F p r — Players in positions (A–F) / Goals, interests, stakes, and stands (n–z) / Power / Action-channels
Basic unit of analysis	Governmental action as choice	Governmental action as organizational output	Governmental action as political resultant
Organizing concepts	Unified National Actor. The Problem — Action as Rational Choice — Goals and Objectives — Options — Consequences — Choice	Organizational actors. Factored problems and fractioned power. Organizational missions. Operational objectives, special capacities, and culture. Action as organizational output — Objectives–compliance — Sequential attention to objectives — Standard operating procedures — Programmes and repertoires — Uncertainty avoidance — Problem-directed search — Organizational learning and change — Central coordination and control. Decisions of government leaders	Players in positions. Factors shape players' perceptions, preferences, stands — Parochial priorities and perceptions — Goals and interests — Stakes and stands — Deadlines and faces of issues. Power. What is the game? — Action-channels — Rules of the game — Action as political resultant
Dominant inference pattern	Action = value maximizing means toward state's ends	Action (in short run) = output close to existing output. Action (in longer run) = output conditioned by organization view of tasks, capacities, programmes, repertoires, and routines	Governmental action = resultant of bargaining
General propositions	Increased perceived costs = action less likely. Decreased perceived costs = action more likely	Existing organized capabilities influence government choice. Organizational priorities shape organizational implementation — Special capacities and cultural beliefs — Conflicting goals addressed sequentially. Implementation reflects previously established routines. SOPs, programmes, and repertoires. Leaders neglect administrative feasibility at their peril. Limited flexibility and incremental change. Long-range planning. Imperialism. Directed change	Political resultants. Action and intention. Problems and solutions. Where you stand depends on where you sit. Chiefs and Indians. The 51-49 principle. International and intranational relations. Misexpectation, miscommunication, reticence, and styles of play

[46]

When considering the failure of US Statebuilding in Iraq, we tend to observe the lack of coherence in the Strategy it pursued. The fact alone that Paul Bremer replaced Jay Garner just three weeks after his appointment indicates either that there was miscommunication between different decisionmakers, hinting that there was no strategy in US Statebuilding, or that different Strategies were being implemented at the same time that did not follow the same objective, and therefore collided. As Jay Garner himself pointed out in an interview given to the US's Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)'s program "Frontline", from the beginning of operation Iraqi freedom there seemed to be issues of communication between the Department of Defense, Jay Gardner and himself. These included early indications of Iranian influenced

---

[46] SMITH, Steve, HADFIELD, Amelia, DUNNE, Tim (eds), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2012, p278

Shia "infiltration" in the Iraqi infrastructure which were ignored[47], the drafting of postwar plans which were not communicated with the OHRA, which was supposed to be in charge of the postwar situation in Iraq[48], and most importantly the imposing of CPA order number 1 against the advice of Garner and other experts[49]. This lack of coherence indicates that the model of the State as a rational policy model cannot apply to the case of the occupation of Iraq, as such behavior does not follow the rationale of the state as a monolithic actor. Rather, it points to internal dissensions which we would expect from models 2 and 3, which seek to understand the articulations around these dissensions. To understand whether we find ourselves in a model closer to either a type 2 or 3 situation, we will look at two events: the appointment of Paul Bremer, and the execution of CPA order 1.

As stated above, the appointment of Paul Bremer as Jay Garner's replacement was unexpected, taking place barely one month after the latter's arrival in Baghdad, and without him having been previously informed of the Department of Defense's decision[50]. This appointment had been made at President Bush's discretion without Senate confirmation contrary to standard procedures for US Ambassadors[51]. This decision was already hard to understand when looking at the difference in experience: Garner had previous experience in Iraq, having worked in the Kurdish region after the first Gulf War, while Bremer had no previous experience in the middle East or Statebuilding[52]. More importantly, after a private conversation with Bush, Bremer convinced Bush that despite previous plans, Bremer would not be accompanied by Zalmay Khalizad. This decision was taken without consulting with Secretary of State Powell or National Security advisor Rice, with the former observing that

---

[47] PBS, *Frontline: Interview: Lt.Gen. Jay Garner,* pbs.org,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html, last consulted online

30/04/2019

[48] *Ibidem*

[49] *Ibidem*

[50] *Ibidem*

[51] HALCHIN, Elaine L, *The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics and*

Institutional Authorities, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC, 2006, p3

[52] GORDON, Michael, TRAINOR, Bernard E., "After invasion, Point Man for Iraq was shunted", *The New*

York Times, March 2006

decisions taken this way, without consultation or deliberation were "typical" under the Bush administration[53].

CPA order 1 on the De-Ba'athification of Iraqi society was the first order to be issued by the CPA under Gardner. As evidenced by its title, its aim was to regulate the participation of members of Saddam's Baath party in active political life, but also their involvement in Iraq's administration and public life, as evidenced by article 3 which states that "individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions shall be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Ba`ath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct and risk to security". While article 2 of CPA order 1 was aimed specifically at high-level members of the party, article 3 was also applicable to all party members, even those not considered active members.

The negative consequences of De-Ba'athification on stability in Iraq were dual: for one, they removed from public life several of Iraq's highest civil servants and the bulk of the administration, at a time when the US where trying to establish a new Iraqi administration. Secondly, Baathists and ex-soldiers who were the main losers of the end of Saddam's Regime would prove instrumental to the insurgencies of the early occupation period, which had profound effects on the socioeconomic development of Iraq, but also ramped up the resentment of the occupation forces[54]. In turn, this led to more active counterinsurgency actions from the US soldiers, which strengthened resentment of the Iraqi population towards the occupation forces again[55]. It is hard to see the logic behind such a move, which resembled but went even further than the Denazification of West Germany after the second World War, an event where the Allies had followed a much more moderate approach, especially after realizing that the reasons for party membership in public functions was often motivated by the need for job safety and promotion opportunities[56]. In fact, many experts from the OHRA and CIA advised against this method as they considered it counterproductive, but Bremer insisted the orders came from

---

[53] PFIFFNER, James P. "US Blunders in Iraq: De-Ba'athification and Disbanding the Army", *Intelligence and National Security,* 2010, Vol 25(1), p 77

[54] DAWISHA, Adeed, *Iraq: A Political history from Independence to Occupation*, Princeton University Press, 2009, Princeton, p245

[55] *Ibidem*

[56] LAWRENCE, Howard E. "Lessons Learned from Denazification and de-Ba'athification", *Strategy Research Project*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, 2007, p2-3

above and he had no choice but enforce them[57]. Again, this policy was elaborated without consultation or debate, but was imposed by the President's office[58].

From these two cases, we can see a pattern which points us more towards a model 3 than model 2 approach. Whereas model 2 sees policy-making as the result of deliberations at the administrative level, with routines and common practices as reference points, the early days in Iraq show a situation where the advice of the administration and experts is ignored, and where decisions are imposed from above at the political level. At the political level again, there is no sign of unity, as some members, most notably Colin Powell, are excluded from the decision-making process, and decisions are taken based upon individual meeting between the President and others rather than group decisions.

Taking this model for our approach, there are three groups of actors I would like to focus on: First, the US government which set out the goals in Iraq and which constitutes the "leaders" in regard to Allison's third Model. Second, the CPA, as the actor who produced the US policy relative to Statebuilding In Iraq which we will build our analysis on. Finally, the Iraqi Governing Council, as an Organism which was established by the CPA to represent Iraqi interests during the occupation.

Our goal will be to analyze the main elements of their decision-making and the policies they produced to try and understand what their aims could have been in the post-war phase in Iraq. For this we will look primarily at the legislation produced by the CPA which can be divided in three subcategories:

-       CPA Orders: The most produced type of legislation (100 orders issued in total). Described by the CPA as binding orders or directives, they can be considered as the primary source of policy issued by the CPA.

-       CPA Regulations: Described by the CPA as the instruments to define the institutions and authorities created by the CPA.

-       CPA Memoranda: Expansions on Orders or Regulations which created or adjusted procedures to Orders and Regulations.

Further, we will draw on documents issued by the US administration, as well as news articles and biographies to understand the mentality of the actors in crafting their policy.

---

[57] PBS, *op. cit.*

[58] PFIFFNER, James, *op.cit.*, p 79

CHAPTER II: Analysis: The Actor's goals in Iraq

1 THE US GOVERNMENT

Within the US government, three decision-makers stand out:

First and foremost, President George W. Bush. As President, the power of decision-making and policymaking in the cadre of foreign policy ultimately came down to him, as came the responsibility of setting goals and naming members of the cabinet. Secondly, Vice-President Dick Cheney, and Minister of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Both men were strongly connected professionally, with Cheney having been Rumsfeld's assistant from 1969 to 1970. From 1970 until 1976 both worked for the Nixon -and subsequent Ford – administrations. Cheney would go on to become George Bush senior's minister of defense from 1989-1993, overseeing the first Gulf War and operation Desert Storm, during which the US had its first military confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Oddly enough, Dick Cheney on that occasion justified not going into Iraq and deposing Hussein, citing concerns about being bogged down in Iraq. In his own words:

> "Because if we'd gone to Baghdad, we would have been all alone. There wouldn't have been anybody else with us. There would have been a U.S. occupation of Iraq. None of the Arab forces that were willing to fight with us in Kuwait were willing to invade Iraq. Once you got to Iraq and took it over, took down Saddam Hussein's government, then what are you going to put in its place? That's a very volatile part of the world, and if you take down the central government of Iraq, you could very easily end up seeing pieces of Iraq fly off (…) it's a quagmire."[59]

After the Bush Sr. administration, Cheney went to serve as CEO for Halliburton from 1995 until 2000, after which he ran as candidate for Vice-President alongside Bush Jr.

The Bush Jr. administration saw him reunite with Rumsfeld who was appointed as Minister of Defense, after having spent most of his time since 1977 working in the private sector, mainly as CEO of G.D. Searle & Co (1977-85), CEO of General Instrument Corp (1990-93) and chairman of the board of Gillead Sciences (1997-2001). In parallel, Rumsfeld kept working for the US administration for specific cases, notably as special envoy to the middle East in 1983 under Ronald Reagan, at which time he also met with Saddam Hussein, and as Chairman to the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States in 1998.

---

[59] C-SPAN, *interview with Dick Cheney,* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9YuD9kYK9I

This Commission notably found a threat to the USA in Iraq's capacity to acquire ballistic missiles, in contrast to the CIA which at the time saw no such risk[60].

As we can see from this, both men had far more political experience than Bush, whose only previous political mandate had been as Governor of Texas from 1994-2000 before becoming president. Their experience would prove valuable in influencing the President's decisions. Further than these three men however, there are three ideological aspects we can identify as having played an important role in the US government's decision to go to war: These are the influence of the neoconservative elements of the US Government, the influence of neoliberal elements of the US Government and the "securitization" of public discourse after 9/11.

1.1-The influence of Neoconservativism

It can be hard to define a specific "neoconservative" thought or belief. Neoconservatives in general do not necessarily espouse a specific policy, but instead a specific political philosophy, one that is almost militantly pro-American. According to Irving Kristol, one of the thinkers most closely associated with neoconservativism: "Patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment"[61].

Additionally, the term "neoconservative" is pejorative in origin. According to political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset:

Neoconservatism, both as an ideological term and as political grouping, is one of the most misunderstood concepts in the politics lexicon. The reason is simple. The word has never referred to a set of doctrines to which a given group of adherents subscribed. Rather, it was invented as an invidious label to undermine political opponents, most of whom have been unhappy with being so described[62]

---

[60] CHITTARANJAN, Kalpana, "The Rumsfeld commission report and US missile threat perception", *Strategic Analysis*, 22(12),1999, p 1958

[61] KRISTOL, Irving, "The Neoconservative Persuasion", in SELTZER, Irwin, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004, p36

[62] LIPSET, Seymour Martin, "Neoconservativism: Myth and Reality", *Society,* 29, 1988

Nonetheless, George W. Bush's administration is often described as a case example of neoconservatism in foreign relations[63]. The set of ideas embraced to justify this can best be resumed as follows:

- The United States are now the sole remaining superpower, a hegemon in international relations, and this position should be conserved. This was illustrated in Bush's graduation speech at West Point in June 2002, where he stated that "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge—thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace." This echoes the statement by William Kristol and Robert Kagan that "American Hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and International Order", which they expressed in their opinion piece "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy", a piece which can be seen as one of the pillars upon which modern neo-conservative ideology was built[64].

- The United States should defend and promote Democracy around the World. This principle, which was reflected in the case of the Iraq war through the rhetoric of "Bringing Democracy to Iraq" or even just the name "Operation Iraqi Freedom", finds its source in the reaction of the neoconservatives of the 1970 to what they describe as "the drifting of liberalism in international relations", that is to say the politics of appeasement in the 1970s[65]. Neoconservatives in response came to call for a hard line against the USSR and emphasized the defense and promotion of democracy around the world, in a move that saw neoconservatives strongly associate themselves with Reaganism[66]. Progressively, this idea of promotion of democracy embraced the idea of violence as a necessary means to a justified end, distancing neoconservatives from their traditionally liberal roots[67].

---

[63] SCHIDT, Brian C, WILLIAMS, Michael C, « The Bush doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives versus Realists, *Security Studies,* 17(2), 2008, p 192

[64] BOURGOIS, Pierre, "Retour sur le Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) et le « moment néoconservateur » post-guerre froide », *Politique Américaine*, 2(31), 2018, p179

[65] *Ibid,* p177

[66] *Ibid*, 178

[67] *Ibidem*

- These two previous ideas also shaped the Neoconservative acceptance of "preventive warfare" in the post-cold war period. Neoconservativism, which had long defined itself through the opposition of the US and URSS models saw the unipolar moment as the beginning of a unipolar era of American benevolent hegemony[68], which would require the United States, to "maintain peace and security in Europe, Asia and the middle East"[69], with prevention being deemed preferable to reaction.

- International oversight is not in the US's interest. In an opinion piece for "Foreign Policy", Max Boot expressed among other principles, the neoconservative disregard for international oversight[70]. While not endorsing unilateralism, Boot does make the case that multilateralism is a cost that the US has to pay to facilitate its global leadership, but heavily criticizes multilateral organizations, calling President Woodrow Wilson "naïve" for believing in the League of Nations or United Nation's capacity of promoting the US's ideals, and rejecting the idea of the United Nations having a veto over US actions in international affairs. This once again echoes the idea that the US should rule as a benevolent hegemon, and that the principles defended by the US are right and just. In this context, International oversight cannot be accepted as it would lessen the US's ability to spread these principles and would limit the US's hegemonic role. Neoconservative ideology might not encourage pure and constant unilateralism *per se*, but is convinced that US interests represent universal interests, and in such an optic do not require majority support. Allies are treated not like equals, but as assistants in US enterprises, and are expected to fall in line, not question or oppose US policy[71].

An illustration of this stance during the Iraq War was how US officials reacted to France's opposition to the war. France claimed the war to be premature, and demanded more time be given to UN weapon inspectors. As a reaction to this,

---

[68] *Ibid,* p181

[69] PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, Statement of Principles, 1997

[70] BOOT, Max, « Think again : Neocons », *Foreign Policy,* 140, February 2004
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/think-again-neocons/ last consulted online 28/07/2019

[71] SCHMIDT, Brian C, WILLIAMS, Michael C., "The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists", Security Studies, 17:2, 2008, p 199

congressman and then chairman of the Committee on House Administration Bob Ney directed the cafeterias of the House to rename French fries and French toast "freedom fries", and "freedom toast", upon a proposal of his colleague Walter Jones. Jones cited his motivation to be the opposition between "France's self-serving politics of passive aggression" and US troop's "deep love they have for the freedom of this nation, and their desire to fight for those who are oppressed overseas"[72]. While this move was not politically relevant, and may be seen at best as benign and at worst as childish, it is a good illustration of several tenants of neoconservative rhetoric: US military intervention serves a righteous cause, the US does not need international oversight and US allies should not question this approach.

- On a lesser note, but nonetheless notable is the association between neoconservatism and free market capitalism. For one it is important to remember that neoconservatives did emerge from the liberal side of American politics and were not opposed to liberal economic policies. If anything, neoconservatives defined themselves as the moral opposite to the Soviet Union[73], which also meant embracing capitalism, a defining American Value according to Irving Kristol [74]. Even though Kristol and traditional neoconservatives never went as far as Neoliberals in their defense of open market and free-trade[75], the promotion of political and economic freedom were named in the same sentence when in their "Project for the New American Century", they exposed their goals for the US's future foreign policy[76], with Kristol also stating that "Neoconservatism is inclined to the belief that a predominantly market economy is a necessary if not sufficient precondition for a liberal society. It also sees a market economy as favorable to economic growth.

---

[72] CCN, « House Cafeterias change names for "french" fries and "french" toast, https://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/ last consulted online 28/07/ 2019

[73] BOURGEOIS, Pierre, *op.cit,* p 179

[74] KRISTOL, Irving, *Neoconservativism, the Autobiography of an idea*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995, p 258

[75] HEYWOOD, Andrew, "Retour sur le Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) et le « moment néoconservateur » post-guerre froide », *Politique Américaine*, 2(31), 2018, p45

[76] PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, Statement of Principles, 1997

Neoconservatives believe in the importance of economic growth because they see economic growth as indispensable for social and political stability".[77]

The influence of the neoconservative school within the Bush Administration can be seen only from looking at the list of signatories of the Project for the New American Century's Statement of principles. Of the 25 signatories of the PNAC's Statement of principles, ten worked for the Bush administration. Most notable among those 25 were Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld as well as Richard Perle and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the latter being best known for his association with the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-99 fiscal years, nicknamed "Wolfowitz Doctrine", which has been seen as a key inspiration for the "Bush Doctrine" in Iraq[78].

Neoconservatives had since the 1990s been obsessed with Iraq, or more exactly with Saddam Hussein's regime, based upon the belief that the United States should have pushed for Baghdad and toppled Hussein in 1991[79]. The fact that this had not happened after the first Gulf War reflected a more realist approach of the first Gulf War by the administration of Bush Sr. Once Saddam's army had been beaten and the war had been won, the US no longer saw an interest in going further, as the costs would no longer have been justified by the gains[80]. For Neoconservatives however, this was a missed opportunity to go into Iraq and install a democratic government, which according to them would have been beneficial for stability in the region as a whole[81]. Open letters were written first to US President Clinton in 1998, stating that "the only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction"[82], as they felt the politics of containment of the time were slowly eroding. Instead of this, they called for the goals of in the short-term removing Saddam Hussein from power, and in the long-term removing Saddam Hussein's

---

[77] KRISTOL, Irving, *Reflexions of a Neoconservative,* Basic Books, New York, 1983, p76

[78] GADDIS, John Lewis, "Grand Strategy of Transformation", F*oreign Policy*, (133), 2002

[79] BOURGOIS, Pierre, *op.cit.,* p 182

[80] PBS, « Frontline : The Gulf War », pbs.org, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html last consulted online the 21/07/2019

[81] BOURGOIS, Pierre, *op.cit.,* p 182

[82] KRISTOL, William *et.al.*, « Letter to President Clinton on Iraq", *Project for the New American Century,* January 1998

Baathist regime from power, and that these two goals should become the aim of US foreign diplomacy[83] .

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President Bush in an address to the nation announced that the US had been targeted due to being "the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining", and announcing they were now "at war with terrorism"[84]. This rhetoric was echoed in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* for 2002, which contained several neoconservative policy points. Among the list of commitments were:

- "Defending liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere"[85]

- "Fighting a war against terrorist of global reach […] making no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them"[86]

- "Direct and continuous action […] against any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors"[87]

- "We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country"[88]

- An entire page dedicated to "Rogue States" (among which Iraq) who "reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which its stands"[89], and against whom the act of preventive warfare was specifically defended.[90]

The National Security Strategy of the United States of 2002, which came to be known under the moniker "Bush Doctrine" could surely be seen as an almost literal transposition of

---

[83] *Ibidem*

[84] BUSH, George W., « Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks", Miller Center
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-11-2001-address-nation-terrorist-attacks (last consulted online the 21/07/2019)

[85] WHITE HOUSE, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,*
White House, Washington DC, 2002, p3

[86] *Ibid,* p5

[87] *Ibidem*

[88] *Ibidem*

[89] *Ibid,* p 14

[90] *Ibid,* p 15

neoconservative ideology and ideals into policy. Even though individual authors are not mentioned, the text strongly echoes the 1992 *Defense planning guidance*, a policy draft elaborated by the Defense Department of the Bush Sr. administration, then led by Dick Cheney, with strong contributions by Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby and Zalmay Khalizad[91], who all worked for the subsequent Bush Jr. administration. All of these men were signatories of PNAC's Statement of Principles.

To sum up, the influence of the Neoconservative school upon the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq is undisputed, and cannot be reduced to a single member of cabinet, as several members of the top staff of the Departments of Defense and of State as well as the vice-president were established neoconservatives, and this was reflected in the policies developed by the White House. This mindset helps us to understand several aspects of the war in Iraq.

Most importantly, the often proclaimed goal of bringing democracy to Iraq was not a justification or a side objective, but was seen (at least initially) by several members of the administration as an essential goal of the operation, and was part of the mentality of the individuals who composed the US Government even before the 11 September attacks, or even the formation of the government. The preemptive nature of this war, the interference in domestic affairs it represented and the unilateral nature of the act which violated several aspects of international law may have shocked several observers, but all of this was justified from a neoconservative point of view[92]. That this was accepted domestically can even be seen as a defining aspect of American foreign policy, as defended by Anu Bradford and Eric A. Posner who see this type of behavior as a defining feature of US foreign policy, justifying the denomination of "American Exceptionalism"[93].

1.2-Economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq

Along with political reform, the occupation of Iraq was also aimed at modifying the existing economic model of Iraq. This made sense from a Western perspective, with the model of liberal democracies strongly emphasizing the link between democracy and market economic

---

[91] MCHARGUE, Ryan Patrick, *Neoconservativism and Iraq*, Florida State University, Florida, 2005, p 82

[92] BOURGEOIS, Pierre, *op.cit,* p181

[93] BRADFORD, Anu; POSNER, Eric, "Universal Exceptionalism in International Law", *Harvard International Law Journal*, 52, Winter 2011, p41

order with little government interference[94]. This stood opposed to the Iraqi economy under Saddam Hussein, which had been characterized by central economic planning and an emphasis on State-Owned enterprises[95] as well as a nationalized petroleum sector.

Securing Iraq's oil fields had been a priority and was one of the eight goals of operation Iraqi Freedom named by Donald Rumsfeld, which made sense considering the importance both of oil as a strategic resource and of the abundance of Iraq's oil fields[96]. However, several voices at the time suggested that the invasion of Iraq was motivated by the US's desire of controlling access to Iraq's oil reserves. This view was supported by an open letter of the PNAC sent to President Clinton in 1998 and signed among others by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, which stated that

> "It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction (…) a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard (…) The only acceptable strategy is (…) to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy"

As we saw in the previous chapter, Neoconservatives had also emphasized the role of liberal market policies to enable democracies, which can be linked with the history of neoconservatives as politically liberal, as well as the way in which neoconservatives constructed their view of America as the political and moral opposite to the USSR[97]. The emphasis placed upon free market policies in the US's foreign policy however can be more closely associated with neoliberalism, even though both schools of thought were inextricably linked through the presidency of Ronald Reagan, as could be seen in Kristol and Kagan's article "Towards a Neo-Reaganite foreign policy"[98]. The influence of neoliberalism on America's foreign policy can be seen among others in the Washington consensus, which encourages

---

[94] HEYWOOD, Andrew, *op.cit.,* p 25

[95] SANFORD, E. Jonathan, *Iraq's Economy: Past, Present and Future*, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC, 2003, p 4

[96] KUMINS, Laurens, *Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production and Potential Revenues*, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC, 2005, pp 1-2

[97] BOURGEOIS, Pierre, *op.cit,* p 183

[98] KRISTOL, William, KAGAN, Robert, "Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs,* 75(4), 1996, p 27-28

liberalization as a condition for foreign aid[99], or the deployment of US troops in advanced positions so as to be able to play a role as "Guardians of the Gulf"[100] in order to ensure "Stability in this volatile region [which is] key to the free flow of oil and other commerce essential to the world economy" (CENTCOM 2005)[101].

The importance of economic liberalization in America's Foreign Policy was also made evident in the 2002 National Security Strategy, of which the sixth chapter was dedicated to "Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade". It is telling of the association that was made between neoliberalism and neoconservatism that a document supposed to outline the USA's defense strategy would also insist upon internationally promoting policies such as low marginal tax rates, pro-business legal, regulatory and fiscal policies and free trade, while also promoting the influx of foreign capital in emerging markets[102]. Again, and as in the case of our previous chapter, the guiding line seems to be that of an international system defended by the US that should be encouraged – or imposed – upon other countries, with little consideration for other State's preferences or regional specificities, pushed by a conviction that the US perspective is the correct one.

Finally, the foreign policy of the United States in the middle East cannot be understood without understanding the importance of oil to the US and world economy as well as its importance as a military resource. To understand the importance of that resource, one needs to look no further than the 1973 and 1979 oil crises which dramatically reduced the availability of petrol to the western world, and prompted Jimmy Carter to declare in his 1980 state of the Union address to declare that "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States"[103]. In fact, ever since the CIA orchestrated a coup overthrow of Iran's prime minister Mohamed Mosaddeq as a reaction to his project to nationalize Iran's oil reserves, American foreign policy in the middle East has been aimed at enforcing a safe flow of oil from the region to US markets, as well as keeping governments with a friendly attitude towards the United States in power[104].

---

[99] ROBERTS, Susan *et al.*, "Neoliberal Geopolitics", *Antipode*, 35(5), 2004, p 887

[100] MORRISSEY, John, *op.cit.*, p 21

[101] *Ibidem*

[102] WHITE HOUSE, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,*

White House, Washington DC, 2002, p 17-18

[103] CARTER, Jimmy, "Third State of the Union Address", January 1980

[104] Several books such as *The International relations of the Persian Gulf* (Gause, 2010) or *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II* (Gardner, 2009) Give a detailed

This attitude should encourage us to take a more critical look at the US's handling of Iraq's oil reserves, and the emphasis placed upon liberalizing the oil market. Thinking for example about the "Oil for Food" program, which the US had pushed the UN for, using this approach we could paraphrase Charles Tilly who compared War Making and State Making to Organized crime[105] and make the comparison of a humanitarian operation as blackmail, by moving our focus away from the stated concern for the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi population[106], and instead focusing on how this affected the "free flow of oil".

While this does not mean that the Iraq war was a war for oil, integrating Iraq's economy and most importantly Iraq's oil reserves in the global economic system can certainly be seen as a goal of war in the Clausewitzian sense of the term, as the act of violence of the Iraq war ultimately served to transform Iraq's economy in the way specified prior to the invasion in the 2002 National Security Strategy, while at the same time the aim of securing the flow of oil and propagating liberal economic principles should be understood in a wider scope than just that of Bush's Presidency.

1.3- Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

When we try to understand how the US came to start Iraq War, the first event that comes to mind are the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon. Few events have been so marking in recent American history, and can be considered to represent a turning point, both in political and cultural terms as "9/11". This is a moment which can be identified as the starting point of the "War on Terror", and which has marked a turning point in international relations, with questions of migration, integration, security and multiculturalism and how they relate to international terrorism now becoming ever-present. While 9/11 was most certainly a defining historical moment, it has also become so defining because of the importance given to it by the Bush administration. This was visible both in the quantity of the term "terrorism" and affiliated terms in discourses given by the President in the

---

overview of "oil diplomacy", both from a historic and current point of view. For a brief recapitulation of US policy regarding securitization of oil from the Middle East, see JONES, Toby Craig, "America, oil, and war in the Middle East", *Journal of American History,* 99(1), 2012

[105] TILLY, Charles, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" in EVANS, Peter *et al.*, *Bringing the State Back in*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p169

[106] UNITED NATIONS, Security Council Resolution 986, 1995

years following the attacks, but more importantly in their "quality", with a strong use of hyperboles to describe the acts committed, as well as language that centered around the exceptionality and time-marking nature of the acts committed[107], while also emphasizing the rhetoric of "them" against "us", thereby effectively polarizing the discourse[108] in a Manichean fashion which goes not without reminding us of the way Neoconservatives have constructed their ideology around a moral Good/Evil axis[109]. A good illustration of this was Bush's statement on the 21 September 2001 that "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.". This Statement rhetorically served to turn the terrorist attacks on the US into a universal war between "Good" The US and those that would support them, and "Evil" The terrorists, and those that support them, but also all those who would not align themselves with the US, following the logic of "if you're not with us, then you're against us"[110].

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States dedicated it's third chapter to the US's new foreign policy to tackle terrorism. In this chapter, the US pointed out the specific challenge of fighting "global terrorism", as it would be fought "on many fronts, against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time", and that progress in this battle would come through the constant accumulation of successes, "some seen, some unseen". The phrasing of these sentences leaves much to imagination, as the war "on many fronts" once again strongly implies that the nature of this war will require American intervention wherever needed in the world, under the guise of its benevolent hegemony. Further, by recognizing that this would require an extended period of time, there was also a liberation of the temporal aspect of military operations. The fact that successes could also be "seen or unseen" meant that there would be little possibility for external observers to effectively measure whether progress was being made. As the policy on the war on global terrorism thus removed from itself the limitations of time, space and immediate observable results, the "war on terror" can be seen more as an act of police than one of military affairs, with the goal being not something tangible such as the elimination of an individual or a group, the occupation of a zone or the modification of a border. Rather it becomes a permanent effort aimed at an abstract goal, which in the case

---

[107] BARTOLUCCI, Valentina, "Terrorism rhetoric under the Bush Administration: Discourses and effects", *Journal of Language and Politics*, 11(4), 2012, p 567

[108] *Ibidem*

[109] MCHARGUE, Ryan Patrick, *op.cit.*, p71

[110] BARTOLUCCI, Valentina, *op.cit.,* p571

of the war on terrorism implies fighting both the terrorists and the system of beliefs which they draw upon. It is this "de-differentiation"[111] of the realms of military and police action in Iraq which led Caroline Holmqvist to refer to the war in Iraq, and more generally to the war on terror as a "perpetual policing war"[112], that is to say a war which follows not military but policy objectives, and as such can not end as there "is no end in policy"[113]. In the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the author identifies the criminalization of the opposing party – the "Taliban terrorists"- as one which served two purposes: first, it disrupts the legitimacy of the opponent, who will never be considered as an equal, or a party with whom one can negotiate[114]. By doing this, the Liberal intervention is turned from a war into a humanitarian act, affirming the legitimacy of what would otherwise be considered an invasion violating article 2§4 of the UN Charter. Secondly, by turning the enemy into a criminal organization, it becomes more of an abstract concept than a military foe[115], which removes the temporality from the military intervention, as the war becomes an effort of policing, turning the military action into a humanitarian effort accompanied by State-Building[116]. From this perspective, the war on terror in Iraq can be seen as a State-building effort, as the making of policy followed a logic which should not be perceived as limited in time, something which can also be seen in the 2002 National security Strategy, where the US commits itself to "supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world" and pledges that "where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and our allies can provide"[117]. Through this framing, the war on terror provides justification for the invasion of Iraq, as well as justification for a drawn-out presence of the US and interference in internal affairs. In fact, according to David Keen who also identifies the war on terror as a perpetual type of war, the war is perpetual because it's

---

[111] BALZAQ, Thierry, Tugba BASARAN, Didier BIGO, Emmanuel-Pierre GUITTET and Christian OLSSON. "Security Practices." *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Blackwell Publishing, Copenhagen, 2010, p5

[112] HOLMQVIST, Caroline, *Policing Wars: On Military Intervention in the Twenty-First Century,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014, p 36

[113] *Ibidem*

[114] *Ibid,* p30

[115] *Ibid,* p56

[116] *Ibid,* p107

[117] WHITE HOUSE, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* White House, Washington DC, 2002, pp 6-7

functions are also it's ends, with the war on terror's justification of fighting the spread of terrorism serving an end of modifying the economic and political landscape of Iraq[118]. From this perspective, the war on terror was not a goal, but a rationale for war in Iraq, serving to implement the political and economic changes which were described in the two previous subchapters. This view is further supported by the lack of evidence that tied Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime to support of terrorist activities, despite the CIA's counterterrorism Center's aggressive search for connections between the terrorist attacks of 11 September and Iraq[119]. US intelligence reports indicated that the relation between Iraq and Al-Qaeda resembled that of "two independent actors trying to exploit each other", and reports of Iraqi ties with Al-Qaeda were often considered questionable in terms of reliability[120].

Despite this, much emphasis was placed upon the role of Iraqi-ties with Al-Qaeda by the US administration. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks Undersecretary for Policy of Defense Douglas Feith established a "Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group" (PCTEG) in his office which, contrary to CIA reports, would describe a strong link between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, ignoring the comments on the reliability of sources relied upon for these assertions[121]. At this point, a rift appeared in the threat evolution of possible Iraqi ties to terrorist organizations between the PCTEG on one hand which considered there were strong indications of existing ties, and the CIA on the other hand which considered the reliability of the sources relied upon questionable, or even declared some of the evidence upon which the PCTEG built its case as erroneous[122]. This was meaningful insofar as that the PCTEG was not only a branch of the US Administration, but that Douglas Feith had already been a proponent of the ousting of Saddam Hussein before joining the Bush administration[123], and that the PCTEG was connected to several other members of the Bush administration as well as Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, who all had expressed their desire for regime change in Iraq prior to 9/11[124].

---

[118] HOLMQVIST, Catherine, *op.cit.* p36

[119] GAUSE, Gregory F., *The International relations of the Persian Gulf*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p 243

[120] *Ibidem*

[121] *Ibid*, p244

[122] *Ibidem*

[123] *Ibid,* p243

[124] RISEN, James, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence", *the New York Times,* April 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/28/us/how-pair-s-finding-on-terror-led-to-clash-on-shaping-intelligence.html last consulted online the 23/07/2019

The PCTEG can thus truly be seen as a political entity which sought to reinterpret intelligence in order to support preexisting goals for US intervention in Iraq, in a move which would subsequently be labeled as "alternative" intelligence[125].

This use of terrorism as justification for war can also be recognized in the US administration's rhetoric regarding the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the Hussein administration. This was not a new issue, as the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq had been internationally condemned, and that in the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait war the UN had already passed Security Council Resolution 687 which required Iraq to destroy all its WMD. In the aftermath of 9/11 however, the question of WMD use by terrorists became politically relevant, something which can again be attributed to the Bush administration's use of language in preestablishing links between Iraq and WMD. This was visible for example following a strain of anthrax attacks in the US in the aftermath of 9/11. These were quickly linked to Iraq by US officials and Administration members,[126] before the ties made were rebutted barely two weeks later[127], indicative of the willingness there was in associating Iraq with terrorist attacks on the US using WMD. Dick Cheney in this instance exacerbated the threat posed to the US by biological weapons by reporting to Bush that the US was essentially defenseless against a biological weapons assault[128]. Cheney's insistence on the threat posed by third countries supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations would later be summed up in a sentence attributed to him by Ron Suskind:

> "If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It's not about our analysis ... It's about our response."

---

[125] LANDAY, Jonathan S., "Pentagon office produced 'alternative' intelligence on Iraq", *McClatchy Newspapers,* February 2007, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/special-reports/iraq-intelligence/article24461020.html last consulted online the 23/07/2019

[126] ROSE, David, Ed VULLIAMY, " Iraq 'behind US anthrax' outbreaks", *The Guardian*, 14 October 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/14/terrorism.afghanistan6 last consulted online 27/07/2009

[127] THE WASHINGTON TIMES, « No proof of Iraqi contamination", *The Washington Times*, 29 October 2001 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/oct/29/20011029-030543-6024r/ last consulted online 27/07/2019

[128] GAUSE, Gregory F., *op.cit.*, p 226

According to Gregory Gause,

> those within the Bush Administration recognized the centrality of 9/11 to changing the course of Iraq policy. In background interviews in different media outlets, "senior administration officials" highlighted the point that "Without September 11, we never would have been able to put Iraq at the top of the agenda. It was only then that this president was willing to worry about the unthinkable – that the next attack could be with weapons of mass destruction supplied by Saddam Hussein.", "The most important thing is that the president's position changed after 9/11." George Tenet, the CIA director, held the same view. Jack Straw, the British Foreign Minister, came to the same conclusion in a memo to British Prime Minister Tony Blair on March 25, 2002: "If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq…Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially that of the US), the world having witnessed on September 11 just what determined evil people can these days perpetrate."[129]

Bush would later join this rhetoric, with his 2002 State of the Union speech which would see the description of Iraq as a rogue state, member of what he would call an "axis of evil", and stating that Iraq had plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade[130]. The 2002 National Security Strategy would place strong emphasis on these "Rogue States", and their ties to "global terrorism" and the spread of WMD.

The destruction of WMD was one of the eight goals stated by Donald Rumsfeld. Not only have these weapons of mass destruction never been found, and has the provided evidence of their existence been proven to be fake[131], but according to an interview given by Paul Wolfowitz in 2003:

---

[129] *Ibid*, p 227

[130] *Ibidem*

[131] THE GUARDIAN, "Curveball: How US was duped by Iraqi fantasist looking to topple Saddam", https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/15/curveball-iraqi-fantasist-cia-saddam last consulted online the 28/07/2019

"The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason".

While both neoconservative thinkers and the 2002 National Security Strategy strongly played upon the threat posed by WMD, we cannot see the destruction of WMD as a goal of war but, just like the war on terror, as a means to an end in setting the rationale for the war, but also as a mean to means, as the war on terror served as a key justification in the drawn-out American presence in Iraq and the State-Building efforts in Iraq. In this use of a discourse centered around danger and threats to the American public, we can recognize what Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde describe as "Securitization" of an issue, that is to say presenting an issue as an element of threat and thereby justifying taking extreme measures and removing it from the normal bounds of political procedure [132]. In the case of Iraq, the constant repetition of accusations that Iraq was trying to acquire or had acquired materials needed for the development of weapons of mass destruction, even when those accusations were highly disputed by experts[133], served to build a threat against the US. Simultaneously, the framing of Iraq as a "rogue State" and part of an "Axis of evil" strengthened the treat, while also removing the possibility for a diplomatic solution, as a State defined as "Rogue" could not be understood as a trustworthy counterpart in negotiations. We can therefore see the logic of the discourse held by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld among others as serving the de-politization of the War in Iraq and justifying extreme measures in fighting this threat.

To sum up, fighting Terrorism and the Destruction of Weapons of Mass Destruction cannot and should not be seen as goals of the war in Iraq, despite them being on the official list of goals set out by Donald Rumsfeld. Rather, they were justifications for intervention, and later justifications for State-Building efforts in Iraq.

1.4- Conclusion

---

[132] BUZAN, Barry, DE WILDE, Jaap, WAEVER, Ole, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, p23

[133] WILSON, Valerie Plame, WILSON, Joe, "How the Bush Administration sold the war-and we bought it", *the Guardian*, 2013 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/27/bush-administration-sold-iraq-war last consulted online the 10/12/2019

From what we have seen, the invasion of Iraq was structured around two main goals set out by the Bush administration: Regime change in Iraq and opening the Iraqi economy to the global market economy.

Both goals predated 9/11 or even the Bush administration, with the principle of pushing for an open global economy having been part of US policy for several decades now[134]. In this regard, we could consider it as being part of a "routine" for American foreign policy bureaucracy to push for a global market economy, which would therefore fall under the second of Allison's decisional process models, as the pushing for a global capitalist and free market system can be considered to have been a constant in US foreign policy since the Cold War at the latest[135]. The goal of imposing regime change however was not a routine, or at least not in the sense it was understood by the neoliberals in the Bush administration, that is to say spreading democracy to spread peace. While previous military interventions of the US typically put economic considerations above political ones[136], the motivations for the war in Iraq seem to have been neoconservative first, and neoliberal second. Even though both schools of thought have become strongly interwoven following the Reagan administration years, the focus of neoconservatives ultimately remained promoting democracy abroad in an aggressive pursuit of the theory of democratic peace[137].

Several key members of the Bush administration such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith had been vocal supporters of intervention and regime change in Iraq prior to their appointment in the Bush administration, and their role in government proved instrumental in building the case for intervention in Iraq. The 9/11 attacks provided an ideal context and justification for war, but the war on terrorism cannot be considered as more than a justification and a tool, as the goals it had set were too vague to be considered objectives of the war in Iraq but enabled the State-building efforts that would change Iraq's political and economic models.

From this perspective, the decision to intervene in Iraq was primarily motivated by ideological motivations within the US government, with members of the administration

---

[134] MORRISSEY, John, *op.cit.*, p 16

[135] JONES, Toby Craig, "America, oil, and war in the Middle East", *Journal of American History,* 99(1), 2012, p210

[136] KITCHEN, Nicholas, COX, Michael, *op.cit*, p 73

[137] FIALA, Andrew, "The Democratic Peace Myth: From Hiroshima to Baghdad", *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 68(1), 2009, p86

falsifying or "reinterpreting" evidence to serve their purposes and push through actions against the advice of public institutions. This perspective, while not incompatible with Allison's organizational process model leans more towards the Bureaucratic Politics model, wherein individuals and their priorities rather than divisions of the State apparatus tend to influence decision-making.

2-THE CPA'S EFFORTS

With the goals and underlying motivations of the invasion of Iraq now defined, the question is how the CPA pursued said goals, and how this reflected the political objectives of the US Administration. To understand this, we will see how System-change and State-building took place, by analyzing relevant CPA orders to as well as relevant documents regarding the CPA administration and its decision making.

2.1-Regime change

As we have already seen, one of the eight goals formulated by Donald Rumsfeld in Iraq was to "create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government that is not a threat to its neighbors"[138]. The goal of "bringing democracy to Iraq" had also been often stressed by Bush himself and provided a key narrative and justification for intervention[139]. Both these Statements can be understood from the "regime change" perspective of the operations in Iraq, which we had previously identified as being the main goal of the invasion of Iraq. The problem of this goal is that it is far too vague for any analysis, as "regime change" could encompass anything from the replacement of a number of key officials to a complete overhaul of the political system of Iraq. In our case, it seems as if apart from removing Saddam and "bringing democracy to Iraq"- without much detail as to the what kind of democracy, and how this transition was to be achieved – there was a marked absence of stated short term goals in

---

[138] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD news, "Rumsfeld lists Operation Iraqi Freedom aims, objectives", U.S. department of Defense Website, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29253, last consulted online 28/07/2019

[139] SANTOS, Maria Helena de Castro, TEIXEIRA, Ulysses Tavares, *op.cit,* p136

terms of policies to lead to these changes[140]. It is therefore through analyzing the CPA's orders that we can get a picture of what kind of State the US was trying to build in Iraq.

The first and most profound changes to the Iraqi system were the De-Ba'athification of Iraq and the dissolution of the military, paramilitary and regime-affiliated entities of Iraq through CPA orders 1 and 2 respectively. These moves can both be understood as a "beheading" of the previous system, by excluding the elite under Saddam Hussein from power. However, the De-Ba'athification of Iraqi society also meant that civil servants affiliated with the Baath party were to be interviewed for "possible affiliation with the Baath party" and would be removed from their employment if found full members of the Ba'ath party[141]. The CPA however quickly rescinded the authority for De-Ba'athification from itself and turned it over instead to the Iraqi Governing Council through CPA Memorandum 7.

The negative consequences of De-Ba'athification on the stability of the region and reconstruction were dual: for one, they removed from public life several of Iraq's highest civil servants and the bulk of the administration, at a time when the US where trying to establish a new Iraqi administration. Secondly, Baathists and ex-soldiers who were the main losers of the end of Saddam's Regime would prove instrumental to the insurgencies of the early occupation period. These insurgencies had profound effects on the socioeconomic development of Iraq, but also ramped up the resentment of the occupation forces, as the hostility of their environment negatively affected trust-relations between occupation troops and the Iraqi population[142]. In turn, this led to more active counterinsurgency actions from the US soldiers, which strengthened resentment of the Iraqi population towards the occupation forces again[143].

It is hard to see the logic behind a move such as De-Ba'athification, which resembled but went even further than the Denazification of West Germany after the second World War, an event where the Allies had followed a much more moderate approach, especially after realizing that the reasons for party membership in public functions were often motivated by the need for job safety and promotion opportunities[144]. In fact, many experts from the OHRA and CIA had advised against this method as they considered it counterproductive, but Bremer

---

[140] DOBBINS, James, *et.al*, *Occupying Iraq. A History of the Coalition provisional Authority*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2009, p31

[141] CPA ORDER 1, Section 2 § 3, 2003

[142] DAWISHA, Adeed, *op.cit*, p245

[143] *Ibidem*

[144] LAWRENCE, Howard E. *op.cit*, p2-3

insisted the orders came from above and he had no choice but enforce them[145]. Both of these policies were thus implemented against the advice of experts, due to political pressure "from above".

While this seems to indicate that the De-Ba'athification was of high importance to the US administration, there seemed to be no desire to oversee this process, as the responsibility was passed over to the Iraqi governing council soon afterwards. In a letter Paul Bremer sent to Donald Rumsfeld, he stated that "De-Ba'athification is now an Iraqi process", and that CPA personnel would now immediately stop its involvement in the process[146]. It can be considered quite surprising that the CPA which had previously been so committed to push for a profound De-Ba'athification of Iraqi society did not seem to want to oversee that process and instead chose to delegate this to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).

When looking at the process of decision making in the case of De-Ba'athification of Iraq, there is evidence that the State Department had been pushing for a "soft" De-Ba'athification, which would have concerned itself mainly with purging the top echelons of the Iraqi administration as well as criminals. This soft approach was more adequate from the State Department's point of view, following the conclusions of a study which had focused on the US's past experiences in Reconstruction, mainly the case of Germany post-1945[147]. While the CIA supported this approach, the Department of Defense which directly oversaw the CPA opted for the more severe course, which was ultimately implemented, under influence of the Iraqi National Congress[148], which as stated earlier already had established ties with Douglas Feith and the Department of Defense. The Iraqi National Congress led by Ahmad Chalabi consisted mainly of Iraqi exiles, was particularly hostile to the Ba'ath party and Saddam Hussein, and

---

[145] PBS, *Frontline: Interview: Lt.Gen. Jay Garner,* pbs.org,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html, last consulted online 30/07/2019

[146] BREMER, Paul III, "Letter from the CPA to Donald Rumsfeld, December 9 2003"
http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/2848/2003-12-09%20from%20Coalition%20Provisional%20Authority%20re%20De-Ba'athification-%20an%20Iraqi%20Process%20with%20Attachments.pdf#search=%22Bremer%20Debaathification%20council%22 Last consulted online 04/08/2019

[147] ZEREN, Aysegul K., "From De-Nazification of Germany to De-Ba'athification of Iraq", *Political Science Quarterly*, 132(2), 2017, pp271-272

[148] *Ibidem*

had been a vocal supporter of US intervention in Iraq since it's foundation in 1992[149]. In 2003, Chalabi was part of the Iraqi Governing Council, a body of 25 Iraqi who, while still submitted to CPA, had an advisory role to the CPA and some limited powers, as well as (most importantly) playing an important role in the preparation of the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law[150].

Chalabi as a member of the ICG was also appointed head of the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission, which gave him important powers in determining how the De-Ba'athification would take place, and how suspects would be treated. From interviews made by Aysegul Zeren in the aftermath of the Iraqi occupation, it appears that Chalabi followed a hard line in pursuing alleged Baathists, and that the decisions of his commissions offered little options to appeal judgments and little transparency as to how the commission took its decisions, which made the denunciation of supposed Baathists as well as corruption of commission officials common practices[151]. It is not hard to imagine how this would fuel resentment from the Iraqi population, as this type of procedure lead to unpredictability and insecurity for the civilian population, at a time when the US was promoting itself as a "liberator" of Iraq.

Why exactly did the Departments of State and of Defense reach such dissimilar conclusions as to what approach to adopt? As we stated earlier, there was a rift between the Department of State led by Colin Powel and the Department of Defense led by Donald Rumsfeld regarding the level of intensity of De-Ba'athification. This disagreement was quite characteristically of the Bush administration, as there were reports of the strained relationship between the departments of State, Defense and the National Security Council, in particular due to the situation on Iraq[152].

As far back as when Jay Garner was selecting the staff for OHRA, Donald Rumsfeld had vetoed several of his candidates who were issued from the State Department to the intense displeasure of Colin Powel, who according to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley was "enraged beyond anything that anyone had seen before" by these acts[153]. Donald Rumsfeld also restricted information flow from the CPA to US-agencies not under his responsibility, and even confronted Bremer when the later directly reported to President Bush

---

[149]CHALABI, Ahmad, "Is There Life After Saddam? An Interview with the Iraqi National Congress Chairman Ahmad Chalabi", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 27(1), 2003, pp20-23

[150] DIAMOND, Larry J. "Lessons from Iraq", *Journal of Democracy*, 16(1), 2005, pp-10-11

[151] ZEREN, Aysegul, *op.cit.*, p276

[152] DOBBINS, James, *op.cit,* p29

[153] *Ibid,* p5

on some occasions, instead of going exclusively through him[154]. This lockdown on information was reinforced even further when Rumsfeld forbade direct communication of information between the CPA and the State Department[155]. While this ban was informally circumvented, this hampered interagency communication frustrated several members of the US administration[156].

This modus operandi was something that had already been identified as an issue with Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defense. Since his appointment as Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld had had several fallings-out with his own administration: This went on the one hand for interagency communication, where Rumsfeld resorted to acts such as forbidding note-taking or withholding information packets from other members of the administration such as Condoleezza Rice[157], who would then have a hard time to structure her own office's policy around information supplied by the Department of Defense[158]. This refusal to share information seems to have even been enforced to same level at the level of his own bureaucracy, with his deputy Paul Wolfowitz allegedly having had on occasions to phone his State Department counterpart Richard Armitage to obtain information of what was discussed in Principals Committee meetings, as Powel would brief Armitage, but Rumsfeld refused to do the same for Wolfowitz[159].

Rumsfeld's inter-agency approach was further characterized by efforts to shut other departments out of the policy making process, with him trying to avoid decision-making in debates or meetings, instead preferring to go directly to the President and trying to influence him in private meetings[160]. This approach seems to indicate that Rumsfeld shared a similar concept of decision making at Governmental level as the one Allison described in his Bureaucratic Politics model, where State decisions are taken following negotiations between political actors[161]. Rumsfeld however found a method to avoid the negotiations aspect of this method of decision making by going straight to the main decision make -the President – and

---

[154] *Ibid,* p16

[155] *Ibid,* p18

[156] *Ibidem*

[157] DYSON, Stephen B., "« Stuff happens »: Donald Rumsfeld and the Iraq War", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5(1), 2009, p 333

[158] *Ibidem*

[159] *Ibid,* p 334

[160] *Ibidem*

[161] ALLISON, Graham, *op.cit*., p709

directly trying to influence him, while at the same time avoiding Stages which might have proven more susceptible to provoke decisions based on compromise such as meetings with other members of government. In this, his high level of previous experience in Government Affairs and Foreign Policy may have proven useful. As Assistant Secretary of State Kim Holmes put it:

> "It is true that he (George Bush Jr.) was a novice in foreign policy, and he had around him figures like Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, who had been around for decades. So, they knew a lot more about the issues than he did. That in itself is not a problem. What becomes a problem is when they are all fighting, and disagreeing, and you don't have an independent base of knowledge that enables you to be able to choose between them, to stop the fighting and make a decision that sticks. I saw it, everywhere, constantly."[162]

In effect, Bush who had little previous experience as a politician and none at Federal level or regarding Foreign Affairs would become highly reliant upon the likes of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell, who all had been working at the highest levels of Government since the nineties. This was combined with Bush's delegating "hand's off" mode of governing, where much liberty and little oversight was given to administration members[163]. This would have helped Rumsfeld in imposing himself and his ideas as the official line of government. As to why Powell was not able to oppose this, or even to attempt and establish a similar connection with the President directly, of the reasons we can identify is the very strong link that existed between Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney which we mentioned earlier.

Cheney's Vice-Presidency has been seen by several observers as the most-powerful Vice-Presidency in recent times[164], with him enjoying the modifications of the office which had been implemented since Jimmy Carter's term that had made Vice-Presidents more important actors of the US administration. These modifications included a regular lunch with the President, easy access to the Oval Office, the right to attend every meeting the President attended and access to documents sent to the President among others[165]. Additionally, Cheney

---

[162] *Ibid,* p332

[163] *Ibid,* p334

[164] GOLDSTEIN, Joel K., "The Contemporary Presidency: Cheney, Vice Presidential Power and the War on Terror", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 40(1), 2010, p 115

[165] *Ibid,* p105

enjoyed a very strong personal relation with President Bush who placed a high level of trust and responsibility upon him, giving Cheney an important capacity for agenda-setting in the White House[166]. With the leadership style of Bush, who largely delegated operational authority and seemed to have little interest in personally overseeing and understanding the detailed issues at hand for his administration, the field was free for Cheney to take a more substantial and conductive role within the administration[167]. This even extended to influencing Bush in situations where the later needed advice regarding decision-taking[168].

The personal link between Cheney and Rumsfeld was already apparent from the fact that it was in no small part due to Cheney's influence that Rumsfeld was appointed as Secretary of Defense, as he was part of a large group of associates and relationships of Cheney that were placed within the White House administration during the Presidential Transition, which was entirely overseen by Cheney[169]. In that context, Rumsfeld enjoyed a privileged position to influence Bush's decision-making, as his connection with Cheney gave him an easy way to access Bush that Powell did not have. Considering that neither Powell nor Rumsfeld enjoyed similar levels of trust or closeness with Bush, and keeping in mind the importance of Cheney's influence on Bush, the role of Rumsfeld's connection to Cheney can be seen as essential in ensuring the advantage the Department of Defense enjoyed over the Department of State in promoting its position on managing the situation in post-war Iraq, while Bush's hands off delegating off tasks meant that once the Department of Defense had established its authority over the post-war situation in Iraq it could act in a rather autonomous fashion, as there would be little oversight from the President's office.

While Donald Rumsfeld seemed to enjoy this autonomy, his department in contrast was characterized by an emphasis on hierarchy and intense micromanagement, evidenced through his handling of the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton whom he suspected of uncertain loyalty due to him having served under the Clinton Administration[170], and whose replacement Richard Myers would be described by Thomas Ricks as "the best kind of uniformed yes-man" -a man who would not do anything to question Rumsfeld's authority-, as well as Rumsfeld's practice of using high amounts of "snowflake" memos, asking abstract

---

[166] *Ibid,* p108

[167] *Ibidem*

[168] *Ibidem*

[169] *Ibid,* p109

[170] DYSON, Stephen B., *op.cit,* p336

questions to his staffers while at the same time seeming to lack interest in the response[171]. The motivation for this seemed to be a desire to be acknowledged as being in control, with this acknowledgement being his main subject of interest, having little concern for what people did other than that[172]. This desire to be in charge further fueled Rumsfeld's conflict with the Department of State, as he seemed to see the "Future of Iraq" planning project which the State Department had commissioned as well as the appointment of members of the DoS to the OHRA by Garner (which Rumsfeld would subsequently veto) as encroachments upon his jurisdiction,[173] which would lead directly to a "lack of planning for the postwar and the squandering of the nation-building and area expertise contained within the U.S. foreign policy system"[174].

While this seems to indicate that Rumsfeld sabotaged the post-war process in Iraq for personal reasons linked to ego-related issues, it is important to note that Rumsfeld also did not want for the US to engage itself in a long drawn out State building effort, and that he had been committed to invest as few resources as possible into the operations in Iraq since the beginning, considering that the main goal of the US in his opinion should be the decapitation of Saddam's regime followed by a quick withdrawal of US troops, while letting the Iraqis form their own democracy[175]. His interest in State-building and post-war reconstruction was minimal[176]. In that regard, Rumsfeld can be considered as having a differing perspective from the Iraq War than that which was defended by the Neoconservatives, who were intent on transforming Iraq's political system, and were therefore more supportive of a long-term presence and more influence in regard to the type of transformation that was to be archived through the war.

Rumsfeld's approach was also motivated by - and at the same time justified – the desire to deploy as little troops as possible. This principle led to a downscaling of the forces from an originally planned 400 000 to ultimately only 100 000 troops being deployed in Iraq, as the "Rumsfeld Doctrine" as it came to be known encouraged limited amounts of troops on the ground, supplemented by "technological superiority" through high technology assets such as

---

[171] *Ibid*, p337

[172] *Ibidem*

[173] *Ibid,* p338

[174] *Ibidem*

[175] *Ibid,* p 339

[176] *Ibid,* p341

precision guided munitions and military aircraft[177]. Here again, a sharp contrast can be made between Rumsfeld and Powell, as the latter's "Powell Doctrine" which had been applied during the first Gulf War and insisted on massive ground troop deployments to overpower the enemy, with insistence on the importance of public support and the recourse to military force as a last resort option[178].

Both these Doctrines can be seen as almost caricatural illustrations of the way in which both saw the way in which the US must wage its conflicts:

Powell's approach can be seen to draw upon the experience of the Vietnam War from a rather realist view: The war ended in defeat because the US fought a war without fully committing itself, as it was fought for ill-defined goals. This drew out the conflict and exacerbated losses, which contributed to a loss of public support[179]. The Powell doctrine's aim was to correct these perceived mistakes, with the first Gulf War providing the perfect case to validate these points. In effect, Powell advocated for an all or nothing approach, which was perfectly in line with the traditional realist school of thought where military intervention is justified by the defense of national interest. As from a realist perspective this national interest is clearly defined and the State is a rational and unitary actor[180], there cannot be a limited response as soon as the national interest is threatened.

The Rumsfeld Doctrine on the other hand seems to go in another direction, by insisting on limited troop deployments and technological superiority, which would limit loses by limiting exposure to enemy forces. This can be seen as an effort to overpower the enemy in a short period of time without exposing one's own troops. Just like Powell's, this doctrine can be seen as a reaction to the Vietnam War, but follows a different logic to achieve the opposite conclusion. The rationale behind the Rumsfeld doctrine's limited deployments being to limit troop exposure and thereby losses, which would negatively sway public opinion, while being able to undertake military operations which do not require as strong a consensus as dictated by the Powell Doctrine. It therefore enables the US to evade the all-or-nothing dichotomy, as instead of relying on public opinion like the Powell Doctrine it can simply evade public opinion.

---

[177] MOUSTAKIS, Fotios; CHAUDHURI, Rudra, "The Rumsfeld Doctrine and the Cost of US unilateralism: lessons learned", *Defense Studies*, 7(3), 2007, p362

[178] MONTEN, Jonathan, BENNET, Andrew, "Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990-91 Gulf War", *Security Studies*, 19(3), 2010, p 503

[179] *Ibidem*

[180] TELÒ, Mario, *op.cit.*, p51

While arguments can be made for and against both Doctrines, the Rumsfeld Doctrine's incompatibility with Post-conflict operations became apparent as soon as the US had to transition from military to policy responsibilities, as the later requires direct contact with the population thus increasing exposure and by removing the cadre of military confrontation, eliminating the factor of technological superiority[181]. The issue in Iraq was that the Department of Defense had tailored its approach to Rumsfeld's wishes and priorities including his almost obsessive fixation on reducing troop numbers[182], thereby neglecting the wishes of Bush and the Neoconservative approach which was to transform the State. The Rumsfeld doctrine's fixation on limiting the amount of human resources deployed can even be seen in the CPA's problems of understaffing ever since its inception[183]. While this could initially have been explained by underestimation of the task at hand, the CPA reported that even in January 2004, eight months after its establishment, it suffered of being manned only at 56% of what it required in terms of personnel[184], with regional headquarters barely meeting 10% of staffing requirement[185].

The issues of loyalty which Donald Rumsfeld had had with Hugh Shelton seemed to also mirror themselves in the way the Defense Department hired personnel for the CPA: After some news articles containing critical interviews with former CPA members were published, new employees for the CPA would be vetted on basis of party affiliation by the Department of Defense's White House Liaison office, in what would be described as "A political saliva test"[186], with one of the most important qualifications for candidates being "whether the individual was a good Republican"[187]

The responsibility for this incoherence can be seen as shared between both parties: On the one hand, Rumsfeld took a monolithic approach to the situation in Iraq, refusing to cooperate with the other Departments and imposing his view of how the situation should be handled, thereby ignoring the wider context and goals of the War, thereby building an approach which was not suited to the goals expressed by the administration. On the other hand, Bush and Cheney did nothing to ensure that the Department of Defense followed the line of the administration and coordinated with the other Departments, and even provided Rumsfeld the

---

[181] *Ibid,* p366

[182] *Ibid,* p364

[183] DOBBINS, James *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p75

[184] *Ibid*, p245

[185] *Ibid,* p246

[186] *Ibid*, p 248

[187] *Ibidem*

capacity to isolate his Department from the others and the authority to implement the policies he defended without considering how these would affect the post-war situation in Iraq or adapting the administration's goals to this. In effect this led to the USA engaging itself upon the post-conflict approach defended by Donald Rumsfeld despite this being at odds with the goals pursued by the US government and following the Rumsfeld Doctrine until the troop surge in Iraq in January 2007, a few months after Rumsfeld's solicited resignation[188]. The rapid succession of both these events can be seen as a consequence of the divergence that existed between Rumsfeld's Department of Defense and the US government. The fact however that they came only in 2006 means that the first years of the Iraq occupation where marked by this internal tension and lack of clear strategy.

In the same principle of changing the structure of the State, we can note CPA Order 15, which affected the Iraqi Justice system by establishing the Judicial Review Committee, calling upon the "political interference and corruption over the years of Iraqi Ba'ath Party Rule" and "the obligation on the CPA to restore and maintain order and the right of the CPA to take measures […] to promote the rule of law" to justify its implementation of the Judicial Review Committee[189]. This committee's role was to investigate the "suitability" of Judges and Prosecutors to hold offices, as well as removal and appointment of said officeholders in function of their suitability, staying in line with CPA articles 1 and 2 in serving as tools to transform the Iraqi elite and administration. Notably, as specified by section 3 of CPA Order 15, these investigations were to be performed by 3 Iraqi and 3 International members, which were all to be appointed by Paul Bremer, thereby ensuring American control over the Iraqi judiciary system. This political involvement can also be seen in CPA orders 7 and 13. While the former of these two served mainly to align the Iraqi penal code with CPA Regulations (section 1) and enforce penal immunity for Iraqis having supported the Coalition forces (section 3 § 3)[190]; CPA Order 13 Established a new Iraqi Criminal Court and just as would later be the case with Order 15 gave the Administrator large prerogatives when it came to appointing and removing Judges (Section 5, §1 and 2)[191]. In effect these three orders gave the US a solid base to decide who would become a part of the leaders of the Judicial Branch of Iraq.

---

[188] DYSON, Stephen B., *op.cit,* p342

[189] CPA, Order 15, 23 June 2003

[190] CPA, Order7, 9 June 2003

[191] CPA, Order 13, 22 May 2004

Just as with the De-Ba'athification and the disbanding of the military, these orders can be seen as an attempt to transform the top members of the Iraqi State, a move that has been called "decapitation thesis" by Toby Dodge[192]. This thesis supported the idea that while the Saddam government and regime were in control of the country, they had no strong hold on power in Iraq and that in effect it would be sufficient to replace the existing elites without modifying the institutions of Iraq to end the dictatorship. This thesis was strongly promoted by the head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), Ahmed Chalabi[193]. Despite Chalabi having left Iraq in 1956, and the INC's lack of credible identified sources for these assertations, the idea of a "decapitation thesis" suited the planners of the War[194]. A decapitation of the Iraqi State followed by replacement and a quick turnover to a new ruling elite would require limited presence of the US army, both in time and in resources, material and personal. As seen previously, this was exactly the kind of deployment that Donald Rumsfeld wished and advocated, with his style of management leaving no room for alternative approaches. As such, the decapitation thesis presented a rationale justifying the Rumsfeld doctrine when invading Iraq. Ahmed Chalabi was in effect preaching to the choir: the decapitation thesis, which would prove to be completely inadequate, became the cornerstone of American pre-war planning[195].

In a Clausewitzian fashion, Caroline Holmqvist recognizes the existence in War of a *Zweck*, the political purpose of a War, and a *Ziel,* the objectives through which the purpose is achieved. In this lecture of War, it is capital that the *Ziel* be subordinate to the *Zweck*, as the objectives must be so structured that they lead the realization of the purpose[196]. Holmqvist identifies the confusion of *Zweck* and *Ziel* as one of the elements of the War in Iraq leading to the overall sense of a lack of direction, with the toppling of Saddam Hussein moving from a *Zweck* to a *Ziel* as the US re-changed its goals during the campaign from toppling Saddam Hussein to rebuilding a new State[197]. In the case of the CPA and more generally the post-conflict situation in Iraq, not only there was a lack of a clearly indicated *Zweck* which made the elaboration of a *Ziel* impossible according to Holmqvist[198]; the *Ziel* of the Rumsfeld Doctrine

---

[192] DODGE, Toby, « Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to State collapse", *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 2005, p711

[193] *Ibidem*

[194] *Ibidem*

[195] *Ibid,* p712

[196] HOLMQVIST, Caroline, *op.cit*, p47

[197] *Ibidem*

[198] *Ibidem*

would come to dictate the *Zweck* of the decapitation thesis, in a reversal of the idea that the method should be adapted to the goals. In the case of reforming the Iraqi State, it is the idea of having to limit the number of troops and resource investment which came to dictate the way in which the CPA would pursue its goal.

From these cases we can draw a few conclusions. For one, when it came to changing the Iraqi State, the CPA was torn between the doctrine of its direct supervisor, Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defense, which wanted a short intervention with as few resources expended as possible, and the rhetoric of the Administration which aimed for an important level of transformation of the Iraqi State. The attempt to satisfy both these demands through a replacement of the top-level of Iraqi government failed, as this approach failed to take into consideration the specificities of Iraq and was selected mainly to satisfy the conditions set by the Rumsfeld doctrine. Simultaneously, the tensions between Rumsfeld's department of Defense and Powell's Department of State primarily, as well as Rumsfeld's general negative attitude in regard to inter-agency operations put a strain on the coordination of the US's efforts, which reflected itself in the OHRA and then the CPA's issues when it came to the work on the field. This was again particularly the case in regard to staffing issues, where departments of the US government other than the Department of Defense showed little willingness in responding to the CPA's personnel request, as the CPA was seen as a "Department of Defense project"[199].

When applying the lens of Allison's conceptual models to this process, these events seem to strongly conform to the Bureaucratic Politics Model, with policy a result of political infighting or "bargaining" as Allison puts it[200], with the role of agencies reduced to serving the interests of the Organization's leaders. The different courses pursued by the Departments of State and Defense which could ordinarily have been understood as a bureaucratic squabble regarding questions of jurisdiction in a way understandable through the Organizational Process Model[201] were here extremely politicized and tied to the tensions between Rumsfeld and Powell[202]. Through this perspective, the fact that the policies pursued by the CPA did not present a solution to the specific problems faced by Iraq but corresponded to the ideas advanced by Rumsfeld makes full sense, as it is exactly this point that Allison makes when explaining his Bureaucratic Politics Model: Policy is not a solution to a problem, but results from compromise,

---

[199] DOBBINS, James *et al., op.cit.*, p249

[200] ALLISON, Graham, *op.cit*, p707

[201] *Ibid*, p702

[202] DOBBINS, James, *op.cit,* p5

coalition, competition and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue[203].

As such, we can conclude that while the efforts of changing the Iraqi State were initially following a set strategy, this strategy proved ineffective as it was not adapted to the goals set and responded more to political demands than to operative demands. With the *Zweck* of "regime change" never properly defined and subject to modification over time, and by the Rumsfeld Doctrine's self-imposed restrictions leading to the *Zweck* being submitted to the *Ziel*, we can even state that there was no strategy insofar as there was no goal.

2.2 – Economic changes

As we stated earlier, integrating Iraq into the global economic system and securing access to its oil reserves were key elements of the US's intervention. This can be seen as consequent both of a longer-term planning of the US's foreign policy around ensuring access to the Middle-East's oil reserves[204], as well as the strong association that was made by neo-conservatives and the Bush Administration between liberal democracies and liberal economy prior to the invasion[205]. In that regard the goals of the US were arguably clearer when it came to the envisioned changes of the Iraqi economy than to those of the Iraqi State, namely to integrate the Iraqi economy into the global economic system and ensure the "free flow" of oil out of Iraq[206].

In modifying Iraq's economy, an important element which we did not evaluate during our previous chapter on transforming the Iraqi State is that of the state-enterprise system which had previously existed under Saddam. In 2005, at the Rebuild Iraq conference, a speaker for the US Department of State would state that the problems facing the reconstruction of Iraq were linked to the inheritance of the "tyranny of Saddam's planned economy", with the transition from a "command economy to a modern economy" being deemed the only possible

---

[203] ALLISON, Graham, *op.cit.*, p708

[204] MORRISSEY, John, *op.cit.*, p 21

[205] WHITE HOUSE, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,*
White House, Washington DC, 2002, p 17-18

[206] MORRISSEY, John, *op.cit.*, p 212

solution to the reconstruction of Iraq[207]. To achieve this transformation, several CPA Orders were implemented.

CPA Order 39 (later amended through Order 46) or the Order on Foreign investment was created to "replace all existing foreign investment law"[208] . Among its purposes, it lists the aim to safeguard "the general welfare and interests of the Iraqi people through the protection of the rights and property of foreign investors in Iraq"[209], a sentence which can appear confusing. After all, there is no clear link between the rights and property of foreign investors and the welfare of Iraqis in general. This sentence in fact illustrates the neo-liberal spirit of the order: Neo-liberal thought emphasizes the role of the free market when it comes to creating efficient systems, arguing that the market will provide the best possible answer to problems (or demands)[210]. This logic also justifies the Privatization of the Public sector, following the logic of then House Majority Speaker Dick Armey's saying "The Market is rational; the government's dumb"[211].

Through Order 39, Foreign investors were to be allowed to pursue full ownership of previously Iraqi State-owned assets as well as banks mines and factories. Further, it decreed that over 200 state-owned enterprises (among which electricity, telecommunication and pharmaceutical industries) would be dismantled[212]. CPA Order 51 would later add to this by imposing the same procedure of deregulation to the Iraqi State Company for Water Transport. The sale of Iraqi enterprises was eventually not completed, as there was reason to believe such a move would have violated article 55 of the 1907 Hague regulations which asserts that occupying States will be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary's of the occupied country's assets. The modifications intended by Orders 39 and 51 would have been in breach of relevant International Law, a fact both the CPA and the British Government (*de jure* a member of the Coalition) were made aware of quite early into the occupation[213]. Even though they were ultimately not enforced (this was left over to future Iraqi governments[214]), the fact

---

[207] WHYTE, Dave, "the crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in occupied Iraq", *The British Journal of Criminology,* 47(2), 2007, p 180

[208] CPA, Order 39, §3.1, 19 September 2003

[209] *Ibidem*, §2

[210] PIETERSE, Jan N., "Neoliberal Empire", *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21(3), 2004, pp123-124

[211] *Ibid,* p124

[212] WHYTE, David, *op.cit.*, p181

[213] INNES, John, "US and UK Action in post-war Iraq May be Illegal," *The Scotsman*, May 22, 2003

[214] WHYTE, David, *op.cit.*, p181

that these orders were issued ties well with the Neoliberal and Neoconservative influences we had identified within the US administration prior to the invasion of Iraq. While Neoliberals in particular (but also Neoconservatives, albeit to a lesser degree) defended the idea that free market policies, privatization of the public sector and deregulation of the economy provided the best levels of welfare and interests to society in a more efficient and satisfying manner than was possible for a government[215], the Neoconservative support for interventionism and disdain for international oversight we identified as key tenants of neoconservativism in international relations in our first part were required to implement the policies advocated by neoliberals into place in Iraq. If we go back to the Clausewitzian principles described by Carolin Holmqvist, we could say that in Iraq the *Zweck* of Neoliberalism was pursued through the *Ziel* of Neoconservativism. This link between Neoliberalism and Neoconservative interventionism, of which Iraq was not the first example in the history of US foreign policy is one of the factors which has prompted Jan Nederveen Pietersen to describe the US as a "Neoliberal Empire", imposing neoliberalism around the globe through a combination of "soft" economic and "hard" military power[216].

While the case of economic transformation in Iraq can be considered special due to the intensity of coercion used, the level of means invested and the context both as a post-9/11 operation and an operation of the G.W. Bush Administration – one which pushed neoliberalism in the USA to new heights -[217], it is thus not unique in its nature. Rather, it is an extreme case of the economic tenant of US foreign policy, one which can be seen as reminiscent of Rosa Luxemburg's statement that "capitalism invades the non-capitalist world"[218].

The aim of this paper is not to offer a Marxist perspective of the War in Iraq, and that to do so at this point would harm the structural cohesion of this work. Hence, we will not elaborate excessively upon this view. The fact however that Rosa Luxemburg already made this association between imperialism and spreading capitalism in 1913 is something which we shall evaluate further in our study of the transformation of Iraq's economy. Further, the fact that the US have frequently used military, paramilitary and institutional means as tools to further

---

[215]HEYWOOD, Andrew, *op.cit.*, p50

[216] PIETERSEN, Jan N., *op.cit*, p 123

[217] *Ibid,* p124

[218] LEE, George, "Rosa Luxemburg and the Impact of Imperialism", *The Economic Journal*, 81(324), 1971, p847

capitalism on a global level for a substantial period of time[219]means that we should see the transformation of Iraq's economy not as an exception but as part of a whole. Following Allison's theory of conceptual models, we could thereby see it as conform to the Organizational Process Theory, with the transformation of foreign economic systems part of a "Standard operating Procedure"[220] of the US administration.

While Orders 39 and 51 concerned themselves with the privatization of the Iraqi public sector, Order 12 brutally brought Iraq into the global market by removing all tariffs, customs duties, import taxes, licensing fees, surcharges for goods entering or leaving Iraq and "all other trade restrictions that may apply to such goods", with the CPA proclaiming it would not collect any such fees for goods entering or leaving Iraq by any method[221]. This was tempered by some prohibitions on Iraqi exports (mainly foodstuffs, but also several Manufactured goods and animals) as well as restrictions on imports of personal vehicles and prohibitions on imports which could have military use and media contrary to public norms[222].

Additionally, Orders 54 (Trade Liberalization Policy), 81 (Patent, Industrial Design, Undisclosed Information, Integrated Circuits and Plant Variety) and 83 (Amendment to the Copyright Law) all took steps to align Iraq with WTO rules and standards. For example, Order 54 Section 4 introduced the "international practice" definition of the 1994 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to establish customs; Order 81 consisted of almost 80 modifications to the 1970 Iraqi Patents and Industrial Designs Laws and Regulations which the perambulatory clauses of the Order explicitly linked to "the interest of the Iraqi Governing Council for Iraq to become a full member in the international trading system, known as the World Trade Organization"[223] ; finally, Order 83 similarly amended Iraq's Copyright Law "to Ensure that the Iraqi copyright law meets current internationally-recognized standards of protection, and to incorporate the modern standards of the World Trade Organization into Iraqi Law"[224]. These Orders can thus all be understood as efforts to simplify free trade between Iraq and the rest of the World, through bringing Iraq to the same level of standards as the rest of the WTO members.

---

[219] See page 22

[220] ALLISON, Graham, *op.cit.*, p700

[221] CPA, Order 12, §1, 7 June 2003

[222] *Ibid*, §2

[223] CPA, Order 81, 26 April 2004

[224] CPA, Order 83, §1, 29 April 2004

The idea of imposing such a standard on an occupied nation raises some issues in regard to International Law. The occupying Coalition cannot after all be considered a voice representative of the Iraqi population, and the idea that a foreign power would be able to force another power to pursue a certain form of International Policy can be considered a violation of Sovereignty at least. As the legality of such a move is not what concerns us most however, we will be more concerned by the intentions and consequences that can be linked to this participation in WTO rules. Something we can easily identify as a motivation for the imposition of WTO standards on Iraq is that this simplifies trade, as it means foreign investors do not have to acquire specific knowledge regarding Iraqi Law, and that the standard operating procedures for trade between WTO members do not require to be modified when good are exported to or imported from Iraq. This simplification however obscures that these rules tend to favor industrialized nations, especially when it comes to patent and copyright laws[225] which were both singled out by the CPA through Orders 81 and 83. In fact, in the words of Ruth Gana:

> "Given the history of the international intellectual property system, the notion that either the pre- or post-TRIPS multilateral system is based upon consensus is still a myth as far as developing countries are concerned. Those countries that will feel the brunt of its provisions include both the African countries that remain on the periphery of the international market and the emerging economies in Asia whose markets are attractive to foreign investors from the developed countries.... [T]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of economic ostracism, what could not be accomplished through negotiations independent of the international economic framework.... Copyright and patent laws will continue to extract exorbitant costs from developing countries in exchange for access to literary works, computer programs or other technology.... Given the values reflected in the current intellectual property system, values which are deemed "universal" yet are clearly not, there is no assurance that the current framework will benefit developing countries in any significant way."[226]

While the case of Iraq is one where the notion of consensus in accepting WTO standards is even more absent than in Ruth Gana's description (or at least that was the case when the CPA

---

[225] AOKI, Keith, "Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-so-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 6(1), 1998, p17

[226] *Ibid,* p21

imposed them), the fact is that these WTO standards are of particular interest to developed countries, where copyrights and patents have historically originated from[227]. This is again evidenced both by developed countries traditionally championing this kind of anticompetitive policies[228] as well as the lobbying efforts made by the industries of these developed countries to push their Governments to support this type of policies[229]. As such, we can safely state that these policies were not responses to Iraqi priorities, but that they were part of US priorities and routines, as the WTO system is inextricably linked to the defense of free trade the US traditionally emphasized[230], with the Bush Administration being specifically driven by free-market promotion abroad, as we can see in its 2002 Defense Strategy[231]. From these points, we can conclude that the aim of Orders 12, 54, 81 and 83 was to simplify foreign access to the Iraqi market. The restrictions imposed upon Iraqi exports do not make sense within a system that would promote free trade as a generally positive system, as these restrictions unlike the restrictions on imports are not motivated by reasons of security, and in fact mention no reason at all as for why their export should be limited or prohibited, which comforts us in the idea that the main goal was access to the Iraqi market. While the Bush administration can be described as particularly favorable to free trade and neoliberalism in general[232], it is not exceptional in its promotion of free trade, which we can see as a standard operating procedure of the US administration.

Internally Finally, CPA Orders 18, 20, 40, 43, 74, 93 and 94 enforced a set of monetary and banking reforms, while orders 37 and 30 respectively lowered taxes (to a maximum rate of 15%[233]) and deregulated the wage system and the labor market for public employees[234], policies which once again can be seen as signs of a markedly neoliberal inspiration. While all these policies do prove that the logic behind rebuilding Iraq's economy was definitely neoliberal, this cannot in essence be judged as either "good" or "bad". While it does certainly indicate ideological influences in the Statebuilding effort, there is no clear indication to be found

---

[227] *Ibid,* p19

[228] *Ibid,* p22

[229] *Ibid*, p23

[230] *Ibid,* p27

[231] WHITE HOUSE, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* White House, Washington DC, 2002, p17

[232] PIETERSEN, Jan N., *op.cit*, p 123

[233] CPA, Order 37, §4, 19 September

[234] WHYTE, Dave., *op cit.* p182

evidencing that the CPA or the US government intended for these policies to be disadvantageous to Iraq's development, even if that turned out to be the case. In practice however, the events that would follow would evidence that the CPA's actions evidence at best gross negligence and at worst organized plunder.

The first consequence of Order 12, which removed all trade barriers, was the dumping of products on the Iraqi market, in a way that would gravely damage Iraq's industry. Estimates by the leader of the Iraqi contractors' Federation state that as a consequence of Order 12, at least 25 000 Iraqi businessmen were put out of business[235]. Simultaneously, the CPA privileged foreign imports even when those were more expensive than identical goods produced in Iraq[236] and did nothing to counter the deterioration of Iraq's refinery capacity[237], which led to the nation with the world's second largest oil reserves to require gasoline imports in the range of $60 million per month[238].

The way Iraq's reconstruction was set up also largely benefited US corporations. This was set through a series of practices we can see as legal but unfair, such as banning non-coalition countries from competing for reconstruction contracts, as well as imposing US federal Acquisitions regulations, US technical terminology and the obligation to fill in paperwork for the attribution of reconstruction contracts in English[239]. Additionally, we can distinguish a set of conditions described by Whyte which are both unfair and illegal, and which lead Whyte to talk of a system that encouraged corruption[240], such as non-competitive contracts (which was the case for 73% of all contracts worth more than $5 million[241]), or competitive contracts being short-tendered, that is to say giving advance notice to some companies for outstanding bids, with Iraqi companies most often being left with very short delays to fill in their bids for public contracts[242]. These public contracts, which through these mechanisms overwhelmingly were assigned to American firms also came with award-fees, that were to be issued if performances exceeded contractual requirements. From a 2005 audit by the Special Inspector General for Iraq

---

[235] *Ibidem*

[236] *Ibidem*

[237] *Ibid*, p183

[238] KUMMINS, Laurens, *op.cit.,* p4

[239] CHWASTIAK, Michele, «Profiting from destruction: The Iraq reconstruction, auditing and the management of fraud », *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 24, 2013, p36

[240] WHYTE, Dave*, op.cit.*, p187

[241] *Ibidem*

[242] *Ibidem*

Reconstruction (SIGIR), it emerged that these award fees were issued with little regard for the fulfilling of requirements: of a set of 18 contracts examined worth a total of almost $7 billion with an addition of a potential of $300 million in award fees, SIGIR found significant failures for all of them in regard to the award fee-process[243].

In addition, SIGIR documented several cases of overcharging, in some instances recording companies overcharging the CPA by more than 5 000%[244]. The case of the Anham LLC contract is one which proves particularly shocking: A contract for $300 million was issued in 2007 by the Defense department to Anham LLC to operate and maintain two warehouse and distribution facilities. A SIGIR audit found that the Defense Contract Management Agency recommend approval of Anham's purchasing system, despite identifying significant gaps in their documentation, and that the Defense Department's review of invoices and Anham's cost-estimating system proved to be flawed[245]. The SIGIR audit then questioned 40% of the costs billed, with 5 components in particular having been "egregiously" overcharged, in a range from 2 355% to 12 666%[246]. Despite this, Anham was retained as a contractor by the CPA, holding over $3,9 billion worth of contracts in 2011[247]. This case was by no means exceptional, with CPA officials reportedly demanding important bribes to secure contracts, and bribery being required even to just bid for contracts[248]. SIGIR's final report identified more than $1,6 billion in potential savings[249], a figure that a 2011 report from the commission on Wartime Contracting would frame at about $60bn[250].

It would have been one thing for the CPA to be this wasteful with US resources. The largest parts of the costs however were drawn from Iraqi resources. The initial funding for the "Development Fund for Iraq" from which the CPA would pay reconstruction contracts consisted of the more than $20 billion from the sales of Iraqi gas and oil under the UN Oil for Food Program, a share that would over time grow to over $146 billion, and which in SIGIR's own terms were "not managed particularly well, either by the CPA or it's successors". The fact

[243] SIGIR, SIGIR 05-017, 25 October 2005

[244] SIGIR, *Learning From Iraq*, March 2013, p36

[245] *Ibidem*

[246] *Ibidem*

[247] *Ibidem*

[248] WHYTE, Dave*, op.cit.*, p188

[249] SIGIR, *Learning From Iraq*, March 2013, p36

[250] FIFIELD, Anna, "Contractors reap $138bn from Iraq War", *The Financial Times*, 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/7f435f04-8c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0 last consulted online 15/01/2020

that money from an under-developed country which had just suffered an unjustified invasion would be gifted to leading companies from the invading Nation under the guise of reconstruction can be seen as a particularly vicious example of neocolonialism at the beginning of the 21st century (The second largest tranche was however paid by the US).

As these developments show, there can hardly be talk of "free-market" liberalism in Iraq. Instead, there was a haven for corruption and a form of organized racket by both the CPA and its contractors. Both due to the sheer amount of contracts issued this way and the number of companies and agents involved[251], the idea that this development was due to neglect, human flaws or a few "rotten apples" in the CPA is not believable. The creation of a system which so radically promoted a US monopoly on contracts and enabled corruption to the point we described above must be seen as a goal of the CPA's rule in Iraq, a position which is defended by Whyte[252], and supported by the fact that even with the levels of corruption described only a few cases were brought to court, with no major contractors convicted for massive contract failures[253].

This last event was something which the CPA was complicit of, as CPA Order 17 gave contractors a wide range of judicial immunity from the Iraqi legal process[254]. Even the SIGIR audits, which could be considered from an external point of view as serving as an independent evaluation of CPA measures in Iraq ultimately served to defend the CPA's actions by minimizing the systemic aspects of fraud and corruption[255], presenting corporate fraud as waste[256], shifting blame for the situation to the war[257] and generally distorting the narrative of corporate malfeasance in Iraq[258], while also shifting responsibility to the incumbent Obama administration to correct the "mistakes" of the Bush administration in its 2009 report, as the Obama administration was expected to "learn from mistakes"[259].

---

[251] WHYTE, Dave, *op.cit.*, p187

[252] *Ibid,* p191

[253] CHWASTIAK, Michele, *op.cit.,* p33

[254] CPA, Order 17, §2(1) and §4(2)

[255] *Ibid,* p39

[256] *Ibidem*

[257] *Ibid*, p40

[258] *Ibid,* p41

[259] *Ibid,* p38

The question of who carries responsibility for the transformation of Iraq's economic system is not an easy one. While Paul Bremer was vocal in his support for neoliberal policies[260], the outline for the neoliberal reform of Iraq was already laid out in a joint USAID/US Treasury document prior to the invasion[261], with the Departments of State and of Defense also involved and with no clear lines regarding the agencies responsibility or hierarchy[262]. These elements of poor interagency management and lack of transparency are something we had previously already identified as an important element of the Bush Administration[263], with Bush's delegating "hand's off" mode of management[264] a key element facilitating agency isolation - Which could be associated with the neoliberal belief in the superior reactive capacity of companies compared to governments, as it seemed to emulate the principles of a chairman setting a course and delegating tasks, rather than that of a President personally involving himself with finer details of his policy[265], unless it was just Bush's lack of experience as a politician showing, which led him to resort to a leadership style he was more familiar with[266].

Even when considering our earlier statement that imposing neoliberal rules abroad was a standard operating procedure in the USA's foreign policy and administration, the individuals of the Bush administration certainly influenced the way in which contracts were attributed. Several of the biggest contractors in Iraq had close ties to members of the Bush administration. Most notably of course, Dick Cheney was the former CEO of Halliburton, whose subsidiary Kellog Brown and Root was awarded over $39,5 billion dollars in federal contracts -more than half of the worth the top 10 contracting firms secured-[267]while Donald Rumsfeld had close connections with Bechtel's board member and former CEO George Schultz and Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao served on Parsons Corp.'s board of directors[268]. Additionally, we can recognize the impact of the Rumsfeld doctrine once again when it comes to human resources. As SIGIR acknowledged, the Bush Administration did not hire sufficient contract and program

---

[260] LOONEY, Robert, "The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's Economic Transition", *Middle East Journal*, 57(4), 2003, p574

[261] *Ibid* p575

[262] CHWASTIAK, Michele, *op.cit.,* p38

[263] See page 36

[264] GOLDSTEIN, Joel K., *op.cit.,* p108

[265] *Ibidem*

[266] See page 14

[267] FIFIELD, Anna, *op.cit.*

[268] CHWASTIAK, Michele, *op.cit.,* p36

management personnel to handle the workload that would have to be handled in Iraq[269]. This echoes the points we made in the previous chapter regarding Rumsfeld's obsession with reducing the US's human resources investment in Iraq, as well as the Pentagon and Department of Defense's inability to prepare for a situation that would exceed the level of difficulty they had anticipated, something we have also linked to the Rumsfeld Doctrine.

Finally, the CPA's inability to correctly asses the needs or demands of Iraq's population which we had previously linked to putting the *Ziel* before the *Zweck* was something that could be seen again in Iraq's reconstruction, as the Iraqi governments subsequent to the period of CPA rule have refused to accept the responsibility for several of the reconstruction projects as they did not see the point of these investments[270].

When compared to the CPA efforts to modify the Iraqi State, the efforts aimed at modifying the economy appear to have been far more effective, despite the level of disregard for international law they entailed[271]. This makes sense for one as there was consensus in regard to the goal of bringing liberal economic policies to Iraq. Unlike in the case of regime change, there was no similar level of tension between the Rumsfeld and Powell doctrines. The goals of free trade and economic liberalism were clearly established and followed pre-existing trends in American foreign policy, which meant that unlike in the case of regime change the administration had clear goals as well as standard operating procedures to resort to achieve these goals. *Ziel* and *Zweck* were thus present and properly hierarchized. Similarly, we should not think of the corruption and fraud which we could observe in the reconstruction process as mistakes that would be consequences of errors in planning, or individual crimes that can be observed in all types of democracies and economies.

In light of the scale of corruption, the way corruption and fraud were facilitated by CPA procedures and the fact that neither the SIGIR audits nor trials led to a structural change to combat these flaws, we could draw two possible conclusions. Either these occurrences evidenced extreme levels of incompetence, an overall inability to assess flaws and learn from mistakes and an agency composed nearly entirely of corrupt individuals. Or, that this system of organized racket and plundering was in fact what the CPA wanted to establish. We believe the second option to be the more realistic one.

---

[269] *Ibid*, p40

[270] *Ibid*, p38

[271] WYTHE, Dave, *op.cit.*, p191

As a consequence of this, we can say that when it comes to economic changes in Iraq, the CPA had a plan and was able to impose it. The fact that this plan is a pure case of neocolonialism and a war crime [272] did not seem to trouble the CPA, reflecting the neoconservative disdain for international oversight, and prompting us to state once again that the imposition of neoliberalism in Iraq required the tool of neoconservativism to be implementable.

2.3 Other Orders

When we evaluated the motives for the US invasion of Iraq, we identified three main axes: the neoconservative influence which motivated regime change in Iraq, the neoliberal influence which motivated economic changes in Iraq and a third motive which we could name the "threat perception" motive. This last motive was the process of how the idea of Iraq as a threat to US security was constructed in a way that justified intervention as a measure of preventive self-defense. As we already stated in chapter 1.3, this motive was mostly fabricated using false evidence and sources of questionable reliability. The question of addressing these issues proved difficult when the production of the decried weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological and chemical- proved to be virtually nonexistent[273]. The only orders that can be understood as addressing Iraq's WMD production programs are Order 24 "Ministry of Science and Technology" and Order 75 "Realignment of military industrial companies". Other than this, the only program specifically targeting Iraq's WMD program administered by the CPA was The WMD Personnel Redirection Program which was aimed at reorienting WMD research personnel in civil research. It can be seen as having suffered from the disinformation around Iraq's WMD as well, as the number of scientists concerned by this program was never correctly established[274]. As such, it is not possible to assess the CPA's efforts in addressing questions regarding weapons of mass destruction, as there is just too little to evaluate.

---

[272] *Ibid.,* p 192

[273] KESSLER, Glenn, "The Iraq War and WMDs: An intelligence failure or White House spin?", *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/22/iraq-war-wmds-an-intelligence-failure-or-white-house-spin/ last consulted online the 20/01/2020

[274] ROSTON, Michael, "Redirection of WMD Scientist in Iraq and Libya: A Status Report", *Russian-American Nuclear Security Council*, 2004, p4

Of the 100 CPA Orders issued, the ones that do not fall under either of the two axes we have discussed at length can be categorized as follows:

- Orders aimed at establishing Ministry's (Orders 24, 32, 33, 44, 50, 60, 67, 68): These orders can be understood as part of the regime change axis, as they established the setup of the Iraqi Interim Government which would take over after the CPA would transition sovereignty back to Iraq. As they were in general rather vague, they can mainly be seen as "secondary" Orders, serving to cement "primary" Orders which more directly asserted CPA principles onto the Iraqi State. This can be seen for example in the section on Personnel and Administration of Orders 44 (Ministry of Environment) and 50 (Ministry of Displacement and Migration) which explicitly referred to the hiring of employees having to be consistent with CPA Order 1 (De-Baathification) and had to be conform with the salary structure applicable to government employees (Order 30). For this reason, we abstained from considering them as part of the CPA's efforts regarding regime change.

- Orders 14 "Prohibited Media activity" and 19 "Freedom of Assembly": Both of these orders had too wide an application to be included in only one category. The goal of both these orders can be understood as freedom-limiting orders, aimed at legalizing political oppression. These Orders fit within what Chwastiak calls "illegal laws" in Iraq, that is to say the Orders imposing neoliberalism on Iraq without respect for Iraq's sovereignty[275], but also served in preventing political opposition to the CPA's projects as a whole. Both these Orders prevented political mobilization in the form of critical media, political demonstrating or political assembly which had no CPA approval. These orders are however not something that can be considered unique to Iraq, as laws regulating freedom of expression in this form are common and can be considered part of the State's monopoly on violence as described by Max Weber and reiterated in Charles Tilly's description of Statebuilding[276]. The imposition of these Orders by a foreign power claiming to bring "freedom" and "democracy" can be considered critically. Especially the way CPA Order 19 presents the prohibition on freedom of assembly under Saddam Hussein's regime as "inconsistent with Iraq's human rights obligations" before justifying the CPA's prohibition on freedom of assembly as "necessary to protect

---

[275] CHWASTIAK, Michelle, *op.cit.*, p35

[276] TILLY, Charles, *op.cit.*, pp 174-175

public health, welfare and safety"[277] is Orwellian in its use of language as a tool to construct reality, something which was prevalent in the rhetoric used around Iraq and the "rogue States" in general[278]. Nonetheless, the limitations on freedom that these Orders represent can be considered as common on an international level, with all States limiting individual freedom to a certain extent. For these reasons, we did not consider these Orders in our analysis.

-    Situation specific Orders: These were Orders so specific to individual cases that we did not consider them as part of a Strategy, but rather responses to individual situations, and therefore did not include them in our analysis. Examples are Orders 8 (Traveling Abroad for Academic Purposes), 29 (Amendment to Law of Estate Lease) or 41 (Notification of Criminal Offenses). While these Orders affected Iraqi society, they did not do so to a level comparable to the Orders previously analyzed. As they are generally administrative amendments to pre-existing laws, we can consider them as standard operating procedures of an Administration in responding to a routine problem to remain within Allison's models. Since we did not consider them in detail however, we will refrain from any general conclusions.

-    Finally, the last category of Orders we will discuss in some more detail are what we could call the "turnover" Orders, which managed the transition of power from CPA to Iraqi Interim Government. These consist of Orders 92, 96, 97 and 100. Order 92 established the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, which had the main goal of organizing, overseeing and implementing all elections set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law. Orders 96 and 97 regulated the lines along which the election for the National assembly would take place, and how the Electoral Commission would decide whether or not to approve political parties or candidates for the elections. In Order 97's Section 4 d) and e) we can see the final legal efforts of the CPA to vet the candidates for the National Assembly, who if elected would be able to draft Iraq's new Constitution by requiring the candidates to abide by all Laws and Regulations in Iraq, which included the previously mentioned orders 14 and 19, meaning Iraqis who had been to openly critical of the CPA could be sidelined. While it is understandable that the CPA would want to keep Iraqis too

---

[277] CPA, Order 19, §1(1), 9 July 2003

[278] BARTOLUCCI, Valentina, *op.cit*, p571

critical of the occupation or supporters of Saddam's regime out of government, it is again notable that the CPA went much further in this than had comparatively been the case in Germany after World War 2, where several citizens who had been tied to the National Socialist Party went on to serve as members of Parliament[279].

Finally, Order 100 concerned itself with the transition of CPA Orders, Regulations and Memoranda into Iraqi law after the transition of sovereignty from CPA to Iraqi interim government would take place. While these Orders are certainly part of a Statebuilding effort, just like the Orders regarding the ministries they can be seen mainly as secondary Orders, cementing already existing ones. Further, as they signal the end of CPA rule, including them in an analysis focused on the tenure of the CPA would not be very conclusive, as they do not contain any provisions affecting Iraq that cannot be found in prior Orders.

2.4. Conclusion

In looking at the CPA's Orders and their context in Iraq, there are a few elements which stand out:

First, the importance of ideology over planning: In the cases of De-Baathification, the imposition of free trade and the application of the decapitation thesis to the Iraqi State, we often found that expert advice was ignored or that there was simply not enough assessment of the situation on the field before programs were deployed. We can attribute this to the importance which was given to organizational paradigms. Donald Rumsfeld's insistence on reducing the numbers of troops deployed put a set of constraints on the CPA and the Ministry of Defense, which led them to favor policies that they believed could be implemented with their limited number of troops. This failed to take into account whether these approaches would address the issues present in Iraq, and thereby complicated post-conflict operations in Iraq more than should have been the case. In the same manner, the De-Baathification of Iraq failed to take criticism into consideration and was imposed against advice from the OHRA and the CIA, with the approach reflecting a jurisdiction victory of Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defense over Collin Powel's Department of State. The imposition of neoliberalist policies also took no account of the State of Iraq's economy, but we can consider this as planned.

---

[279] Most famously Walter Scheel, the Fourth President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Secondly, the goals of the CPA were mainly to open Iraq's economy to the international system. While the Orders regarding Statebuilding lack an identifiable end goal, the Orders regarding the transformation of Iraq's economy followed a much more identifiable logic and were very effective in setting up a system aimed at exploiting Iraq's resources. We can attribute this to better planning, as the liberalization of Iraq's economy predated Iraq's invasion[280] and that liberalizing foreign economies is a standard operating procedure of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the importance of the individuals in the Bush Administration cannot be ignored as Bush's management style facilitated this process, while the strong support he and core members of his cabinet showed for neoliberalism simplified the imposition of neoliberal rules in Iraq.

Finally, in the CPA's two main lines of conduct, destroying the previous structures of administration and opening the Iraqi economy to the global economy – Which in practice meant the US, and to a lesser degree the British economy- we can recognize a traditional neocolonial pattern, and one that fits Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of the role of war and imperialism as a vector for capitalism. The idea of the CPA as a neo-colonial institution is also made by Dave Whyte[281].

In seeing the CPA as an organization with a clear neo-colonial purpose, we can move away from the principle that the policy it produced was not adequate as it did not provide a response to local problems. Rather, following this perspective would let us see the policy produced by the CPA as unconcerned with Iraqi issues, and serving mainly the purpose of enriching the US, or it this case US companies. If seen as such, the legislation produced by the CPA could be considered as following a clear objective and would render the disregard for the Iraqi situation comprehensible, as addressing these would not have been a goal of the CPA. If this were the case however, we would have to reassess our first statement regarding the lack of planning of the CPA. We can phrase our conclusions regarding the CPA's efforts as follows: Either the CPA acted in accordance with the goals the US had stated but failed to produce functional policies which had the reconstruction of Iraq in mind. By building its policies on ideological principles, it neglected to consider the situation of Iraq, and instead set up a system which was detrimental for Iraq and beneficial for foreign companies. Or the CPA's efforts in destroying the structures of the Iraqi State and modifying the economic system of Iraq were from the beginning aimed at setting up a system to exploit Iraq's resources and profit US private

---

[280] CHWASTIAK, Michelle, *op.cit.,* p35

[281] WHYTE, Dave*, op.cit.*, p191

industries. From the evidence of our analysis, we believe the second hypothesis to be the correct one.

3- THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL: Iraqi influence or window dressing?

In analyzing the CPA's tenure in Iraq, there is one group which we have so far mentioned a few times, but not yet discussed in more detail: The Iraqi Governing Council.

The Iraqi Governing Council was established through CPA Regulation 6 as the Iraqi interim administration during the CPA tenure, in following of UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which supported the creation of such an institution. Regulation 6 described the council as "representatives of the Iraqi Council, [responsible for] ensuring that the Iraqi people's interests are represented in both the interim administration and in determining the means of establishing an internationally recognized representative government"[282]. It's role in relation to the CPA was described in section 2 of the Regulation as a consultative body to the CPA, with whom the IGC would coordinate on all matter involving the temporary governance of Iraq. This included the authorities of the Governing Council itself.

The establishment of the IGC can be described as chaotic at best : during the planning of the post-war situation in Iraq, tensions we already discussed between the State and Defense departments led to a disagreement over how the US occupation of Iraq should best be implemented: as a formal occupation in the mode of the occupation of Germany or Japan, or a quick handover to an indigenous regime in the mode of the invasion of Afghanistan[283]. These models can again be seen as reflecting respectively the Powell and Rumsfeld doctrines, with the former requiring extended and substantial US presence, while the second (which came to be the one employed) did not require extended US presence. Even within the framework of the first model however, the State Department's "Future of Iraq Project" (a project which assembled a large group of Iraqi exiles to identify various issues that would arise in post-invasion Iraq[284]) the principle of setting up a transitional Iraqi government was presented[285].

---

[282] CPA, Regulation number 6, 13 July 2003

[283] DOBBINS, James, *et.al*, *Occupying Iraq. A History of the Coalition provisional Authority*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2009, p36

[284] *Ibidem*

[285] *Ibid,* p37

The 10th of March 2003, 9 days before the invasion of Iraq, President Bush would approve the Defense Department's proposal to establish an Iraqi Interim Authority "as soon as possible after liberation"[286]. This task would be taken over initially by Jay Garner's OHRA, who stated his plan to hold elections for a transitional government within 90 days of his arrival in Iraq[287]. Garner and the OHRA's replacement by Bremer and the CPA changed this however, as the plans for a transitional Iraqi government were put on ice[288]. The idea of elections was also scrapped, as the CPA wished to have more control over the creation of the interim government[289], which was justified by Donald Rumsfeld's argument that the US needed to lay a foundation for self-government in Iraq, as Iraq was not deemed ready for elections[290]. Rumsfeld justified this by a fear for a tyranny of the majority in case of immediate elections[291], while the CPA also explicitly voiced concerns about the consequences local elections would have on its ability to govern[292]. That being said, post-conflict experts also advised against rushing into elections, drawing upon the experience of nation-building in the 1990s and specifically the case of early national elections in Bosnia which had empowered ultranationalist parties[293].

Instead of an elected government, Bremer decided to expand upon the group of Iraqi exiles which formed the "leadership council" that had emerged from the conferences of opposition groups set up by OHRA in preparation of the elections. This group, which also included Ahmad Chalabi whom we have mentioned a few times already consisted of seven men, of whom two were Kurdish, two were secular Shi'ites, two were religious Shi'ites and one was a secular Sunni[294]. The decision to expand this group, a task which would be undertaken by the CPA was justified by the desire to have a council more representative of Iraq's population[295], but this can also be seen as an effort to introduce members which the CPA

---

[286] *Ibid,* p38

[287] *Ibidem*

[288] *Ibid*, p40

[289] *Ibidem*

[290] *Ibid,* p42

[291] *Ibid,* p40

[292] *Ibid,* p44

[293] *Ibid*, p43

[294] *Ibid*, p44

[295] *Ibidem*

approved of. After all, several members of the council had ties to Iran[296], and the two religious Shi'ite members in particular led Iranian-linked religious parties which the CPA considered threats to regional stability[297]. Whatever the reasoning, the manner in which Paul Bremer almost unilaterally appointed the members of the IGC was not well received by the Iraqi Civil Society and stood in contrast to Bremer's description of the IGC as "the most representative body in Iraq's history"[298].

The role Paul Bremer foresaw for the IGC was that of an advisory body which would name interim ministers for the CPA to work with and which would offer advice to the CPA in regard to the political process[299]. Even though limited, this is the only substantial influence Iraqis would have on the process of building the new Iraqi State. As such, it is worth the effort to take a closer look in the relation that existed between the ICG and the CPA, to see whether the ICG really impacted the way the CPA took its decisions, or whether the ICG was mainly an act of window-dressing, to give a form of legitimacy to the CPA.

A subject which we have not mentioned before is that of Iraq's three main socio-ethnic groups: the Shi'ite or Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. Iraq's population is predominantly formed of Shi'ite Arabs (close to 59%), with Sunni Arabs and Kurds each representing about 18% of the population, and several minorities (Turkmen, Yezidis, Christians and more) representing about 5% of Iraq's population [300]. While the CPA's orders did not pay much attention to this subject, in establishing the IGC the CPA strongly emphasized the need for accurate ethnic representation[301]. The 25 members would consist of 13 Shias, five Sunnis, five Kurds and one Ottoman and one Christian[302].

This displeased some Iraqi observers, as they complained that this kind sectarianism had never been as central a part of Iraqi politics before[303]. While it is true that ethnic and religious

---

[296] *Ibid,* p40

[297] *Ibid,* p43

[298] DODGE, Toby, « Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to State collapse", *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 2005, p715

[299] DOBBINS, James, *et.al, op.cit.*, p 44

[300] CIA World factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html, last consulted online 22/01/2020

[301] DODGE, Toby, "Iraq's new ruling elite", *Soundings*, 41, 2009, p95

[302] *Ibidem*

[303] *Ibidem*

differences have been an important factor of Iraqi society ever since the country's creation[304], these ethnic divisions had pre-2003 always been submitted to the preeminence of national unity[305]. Even if several regimes (not least that of Saddam Hussein) did favor one ethnic group over the others, the supremacy of the Iraqi Nation over individual groups was never put into question and ethnocentrism never became an avowed aspect of public policy[306]. This would no longer be the case in post-Saddam Iraq under the CPA's authority[307]. The reason for this can be attributed to the influence of the INC and the two Kurdish Parties (Kurdish Democratic Party or KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK)[308].

Both these groups had been instrumental to the preparation of operation Iraqi freedom. As we already saw, the Iraqi National Congress representing the Iraqi exiles in the US had been influential in regard to De-Baathification policy[309] and in justifying the decapitation thesis. Additionally, the lack of knowledge of Iraq meant the Coalition became increasingly reliant on advice from the Iraqi exiles[310]. The Kurds meanwhile provided a humanitarian justification for intervention in light of Saddam Hussein's repression and use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds[311], while the US also considered the Iraqi Kurds' support essential for any operation aimed at toppling the Iraqi regime[312].

While the Kurdish leadership was opposed to Saddam and the centralized nature of Iraq's regime[313], it was also cautious in aligning itself with the US, as previous occasions had left a feeling of unreliability on part of the US[314]. The hope of the Kurdish leadership was that this intervention would provide them with a less centralized structure of Iraq, if not

---

[304] DAWISHA, Adeed, "The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian preferences and State performance in Historical perspective*", The Middle East Journal*, 62(2) ,2008, p219

[305] *Ibid*, p221

[306] *Ibidem*

[307] *Ibid,* p 222

[308] DODGE, Toby, « Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to State collapse", *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 2005, p712

[309] See page 36

[310] DODGE, Toby, *op.cit,* p712

[311] SHAREEF, Mohammed, *The United States, Iraq and the Kurds*: *Shock, awe and aftermath*, Routledge, New York, 2014, p156

[312] *Ibid,* p157

[313] *Ibidem*

[314] *Ibidem*

independence. While independence was unacceptable for the US, it gave indications that it would support a federal structure in Iraq[315]. In this regard however we need to note that while the Department of Defense and President Bush hinted at -but never outright promised- a federal structure in Iraq's future, the Department of State had deliberately avoided to voice support for federalism due to Turkish sensitivities in regard to Kurdish nationalism[316], a sign again of the US's poor inter-agency coordination.

While we can see the Kurdish support for federalism to originate mainly from ethnic-nationalist considerations, the exile's support for federalism seems to originate more from their experience in exile than Iraqi realities. As Ariel Ahram notes, the exiles were never able to form a unified political community and overcome ideological and sectarian cleavages in opposing Saddam Hussein[317]. This would lead the exiles to also become promotors of a federal model for Iraq on the basis of a sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias[318]. Toby Dodge identifies the IGC's deployment on this basis as a factor which in turn encouraged sectarian dynamics in Iraqi politics[319]. While the federal model of the IGC can therefore be seen as flawed, it is understandable that the CPA chose to follow this model, as its main source of information -the Iraqi exiles- defended this model's validity. Similarly, Kurdish support for the CPA was reliant on the promise of a federal model of government for Iraq.

The CPA's relation with the Kurds would however prove inconsistent over time, as the US's promise for more federalism would gradually evolve towards a promotion of more central government by the CPA[320]. As the US's need for Kurdish support diminished, so did the attention the US gave to Kurdish demands. This would culminate 2004 during the drafting of Iraq's provisional constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law. At that time, Bremer informed the Kurdish leadership that the White House wanted to eliminate the mention of Kurdish as an official language of Iraq[321]. Additionally, the structure of Iraq's Federalism would be built around not around the Kurdish, Shia and Sunni regions as the Kurds had expected, but

---

[315] *Ibidem*

[316] *Ibidem*

[317] AHRAM, Ariel I., "Returning Exiles to Iraqi Politics", *Middle East Review of International Affairs,* 9(1), 2005, p75

[318] DODGE, Toby, *op.cit,* p719

[319] *Ibidem*

[320] SHAREEF, Mohammed, *op.cit.*, p163

[321] *Ibid*, p164

around 18 Governorates, and the Kurdish militia, the Peshmerga, would be disbanded[322]. Kurdish objections were met with Bremer's threatening to sever the "special" US-Kurdish relations should the Kurdish leadership block these modifications. According to Mohammed Shareef, the introduction of the 18 governorates in particular seemed an attempt of the US to go back from the ethnic division of Iraq in favor of a more geographic model of federalism[323].

In this process we can distinguish a similar lack of planning as the one we had identified in our previous chapter on the CPA's policy regarding State change. The idea of the structure of the IGC was not developed based upon a plan but was based on the demands of two specific groups who could be seen as having substantial impact on US policy. The first (the exiles) because they were one of the few sources of information the US could draw upon in structuring it's policy for post-conflict Iraq, the second (the Kurds) because their importance to the success of operation Iraqi freedom, as well as the general need the US would have for the Kurds as a group that would support the US in its replacement of the previous Iraqi regime[324].The fact that the structure of the IGC was based upon the proposals of Iraqi groups could be seen as a willingness of the US to let Iraqis develop their own system. However, this was more a case of the US letting its closest allies guide the process according to their own priorities. Later, as US interests came to collide with those of members of the IGC, the CPA reversed back to imposing its own priorities onto the IGC[325].

The lack of power of the ICG was all too apparent when it came to the economic transformation of Iraq as well. As James Dobbins *et al.* describe in their book on the CPA's history, the IGC was from the beginning opposed to the privatization of State-owned enterprises the CPA wanted to implement[326]. According to Ahmed Chalabi, this privatization would create social and political problems and strengthen the accusations that the CPA and IGC were stripping Iraq of its assets, a public perception the IGC did not want to facilitate[327].

While the CPA continued to develop its plan's for privatization, most notably through the publication of order 39, it ultimately did not implement this policy. There is some unclarity in regard as to why the CPA did not push through the privatization of State-owned enterprises

---

[322] *Ibidem*

[323] *Ibidem*

[324] *Ibid,* p163

[325] MANNING, Carrie, "Political Elites and Democratic State-building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq", Democratization, 13(5), 2006, p730

[326] DOBBINS, James, *et.al, op.cit.*, p 226

[327] *Ibidem*

in Iraq: while Dobbins *et all.* state that the CPA continued to plan these changes but did not implement them due to these concerns and the rising levels of violence in Iraq at the time[328], Whyte points out that order 39 by which the CPA prepared this privatization was in clear breach of international law and that the CPA was aware of this[329]. According to Whyte, it is this factor which led the CPA to handing over the responsibility for the implementation of this program to a subsequent Iraqi government. While both of these Statements are postulations, we should note that Order 51 which was published almost a month after Order 39 also promoted the privatization of an Iraqi State-owned enterprise. This would lead us to believe that IGC complaints were not taken as seriously as Dobbin *et al*. state.

This view can be confirmed as well in observing handling of the reduction of governmental subsidies by the CPA, more precisely the case of the UN food baskets issued in the cadre of the Oil-for-food program[330]. Bremer and the CPA were adamant that these food-baskets were to be monetized instead, as this would present a more market-friendly policy[331]. As the CPA moved forward with this program however, it realized that the logistical implications of this plan were far above its capacities, as they required opening over three million new bank accounts and distributing $400 million per month to the Iraqi population[332]. Due to the crucial nature of these food baskets to Iraqi households, CPA economic advisors also warned of the negative consequences for public order that would arise if this system did not function properly[333]. Due to these concerns, Bremer eventually abandoned the program, only informing the interim Iraqi ministers (issued from the IGC) concerned by this policy some days afterwards through one of his assistants[334]. The fact that these ministers had been operating and preparing policy in accordance with the CPA's plans, only to be summarily informed that the CPA would after all not pursue these plans evidences the hierarchy that existed between both groups.

Bremer would later justify this pullback as due to weak support from Iraqi leadership[335], failing to mention that the CPA had proven unable to properly evaluate the logistics this change

---

[328] *Ibid*, p227

[329] WHYTE, Dave, *op.cit.*, p 182

[330] DOBBINS, James, *et.al, op.cit.*, p 220

[331] *Ibid*, p221

[332] *Ibid,* p221

[333] *Ibidem*

[334] *Ibidem*

[335] *Ibid*, p223

of policy would have required. In this, we can see how the IGC could be used as a cover-up for failures of the CPA. This again leads us to doubt that the IGC's complaints were a decisive factor in the non-implementation of order 39.

From these elements, we can only see the IGC as an accessory to the CPA, as its role during the occupation was rather limited in terms of decision-making, and the CPA would not feel bound to its advice. It is true that the IGC did not help its credibility as a source of authority, as it was never able to formulate a coherent formula for political transition[336], and was unable to establish itself as a body which Iraqis felt represented by[337]. This could however hardly be helped, as the IGC's formation along ethnic and sectarian bases promoted division, while the lack of power held by members of the IGC did not favor their disposition[338]. Both of these elements were consequences of the way in which the IGC was set up by the CPA, which makes its criticism of the ICG appear all the more oblivious to its own responsibility in that regard. It is noteworthy that the CPA would later promote the same members of the ICG previously described as "feckless" and incapable of reaching out to the Iraqi population to take up ministerial posts in the Interim Government of Iraq after handing over sovereignty in 2004[339]. This again shows us how little attention the CPA ultimately paid to the IGC and the transition of power in Iraq.

In conclusion, while the IGC and its members would play a key role in the Transition of Power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government, and that several of its members would become central political figures under the new Iraqi Republic, it's role in influencing the CPA's policy was of no relevance.

The process of formation of the IGC further evidences the lack of planning made prior to the invasion in regard as to how the US envisioned the eight goal formulated by Donald Rumsfeld, "to create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government that is not a threat to its neighbors"[340]. Finally, the "primordialisation"[341] of sectarianism in

---

[336] MANNING, Carrie, *op.cit*, p730

[337] DODGE, Toby, "Iraq's new ruling elite", *Soundings*, 41, 2009, p93

[338] MANNING, Carrie, *op.cit*, p730

[339] DODGE, Toby, « Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to State collapse", *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 2005, p718

[340] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD news, "Rumsfeld lists Operation Iraqi Freedom aims, objectives", U.S. department of Defense Website, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29253, last consulted online 04/03/2019

[341] DODGE, Toby, *op.cit*, p719

Iraqi politics by the CPA through the IGC can be understood as a key element of the internal conflicts which affect Iraq to this day, and a consequence of this lack of planning.

Conclusion

We started this paper with the question: "How do the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority reflect the Goals of Statebuilding in Iraq?". To answer this question, we decided to look at the elements which led the Unites States of America to engage themselves into the war and subsequent occupation of Iraq, and to see how the acts of the CPA reflected the goals of US Statebuilding. To analyze how these goals were constructed, and how they were reflected in the acts of the CPA, we used Graham Allison's decisional process theory, focusing on how individual elements shaped the US's goals and strategy.

Our hypothesis is the following: Building a new Iraqi State was not a goal of the United States in Iraq, or at least it was not one of its priorities. The primary objective of Statebuilding in Iraq was the economic liberalization of Iraq and its integration in the global economy to the benefit of US private companies.

While the Iraq War was justified mainly through the mobilization of humanitarian arguments and a rhetoric which emphasized the principle of "bringing democracy to Iraq", the CPA's post conflict operations in regard to Statebuilding were chaotic, followed a logic which privileged the means over the ends, and at no point identified a clear goal to pursue to implement Iraq's democratic transition. In contrast, the CPA's Orders regarding Iraq's economic transformation followed clear objectives of liberalizing international trade and privatizing the Iraqi economy. This application of neoliberal principles on Iraq was also combined with a set of rules and an environment set up by the CPA which heavily favored US companies, turning the occupation of Iraq into a neocolonial exploitation of Iraq's resources to the benefit of private US firms.

To come to this conclusion, we first looked at how the US government had come to justify the intervention in Iraq, and how individuals influenced this decision. In doing this, we first singled out the influence of neoconservative politicians, who defended the legitimacy of intervening abroad to spread democracy and "American values", and who came to occupy key positions in the US government under George W. Bush. Secondly, we identified the goal of promoting neoliberalism and the free flow of oil in the world as a standard operating procedures of the US's foreign policy as defined by Allison's second model of decision-making, while also noting the link that existed between neoconservatives and the promotion of free-market capitalism and the Bush administration's support of these neoliberal policies. Finally, in looking at the link between the war on terror and Iraq, we noted the way in which the Bush

administration was able to build upon the fear of the American public in the post 9/11 context by emphasizing the threat that came from Iraq, by associating Saddam Hussein's regime with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and biochemical threats to justify military intervention.

In our second chapter, we then analyzed how the CPA Orders related to the motivations of intervention we previously identified, that is to say modifying the Iraqi State and modifying the Iraqi economy. In our analysis of the CPA's Orders regarding the modification of the Iraqi State, we noted that they reflected the tensions that existed between the US Department of Defense and Department of State, while identifying the central role of Donald Rumsfeld and Collin Powel in this regard. Further we identified a lack of clarity in the US Statebuilding effort, due to how doctrinal factors came to dictate how the regime transition was to take place, without regard for the question of whether these approaches were adequate to the situation in Iraq, as well as to the lack of a clear idea of what it was the US tried to achieve in transforming the Iraqi State . This led us to state that there was no strategy in the CPA's Statebuilding effort. We came to the same conclusion in our analysis of the Iraqi Governing Council, the body supposed to represent Iraqi's which the CPA had set up and which would prepare the transition of sovereignty from the CPA to Iraq.

In our Analysis of the Orders relating to the changes of Iraq's economy, we identified that the Orders followed the logic of neoliberalisation of the economy, promotion of free trade and free flow of oil which we had in our previous chapter identified as standard operating procedures of US foreign policy. In this, we recognized that the transformation of Iraq's economy followed an identifiable process and was aimed at identifiable goals, two things we did not find in regard to the CPA's efforts of Statebuilding. Additionally, we established that this transformation of Iraq's economy was reliant on the destruction of the Iraqi State.

Through this analysis, we were able to identify factors of both of Allison's non-rational State Actor models in the crafting of the transformation of the Iraqi State under the CPA. While we did identify the principle of standard operating procedures central to Allison's second model in the policy regarding the transformation of Iraq's economy, our Analysis overwhelmingly identified the policies in Iraq as consequences of political bargaining as identified in Allison's third Model, be it in the way how Donald Rumsfeld's doctrine influenced the manner in which the "decapitation thesis" came to be the cornerstone of regime transition, the way in which bartering between the CPA, the Kurds and the Iraqi exiles led to the model of Iraqi federalism, or in how the management styles of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld led to the Department of Defense isolating itself in crafting the post-conflict policy of the US in Iraq.

While some critics of Allison's Models have argued that the third Model is so complex that it ultimately "explains nothing" due to analysis of too many variables[342], we believe that this versatility was ultimately more adequate for the analysis of a situation as chaotic as the occupation of Iraq, were the routines and agencies that the second Model focusses on tend to be absent. We do note however that this Model has its limitations, insofar as we can never fully understand the psychology behind the decisions of an actor. This was the case for example when we could not determine whether Bush's managerial style was due to his belief in the superiority of private over public management, or just due to his habit of the later[343] or an entirely different factor.

Nonetheless, in our analysis we noticed a significant difference with Allison's analysis of the Cuba Crisis: While in all three of Allison's Models, all paths ultimately led to President Kennedy, our analysis highlighted George W. Bush's absence in the decision-making process, as President Bush preferred to delegate than to concern himself directly with the details of policymaking. In doing so, George W. Bush facilitated the poor interagency coordination of his administration. We can see this as one of the factors that promoted the politics of model three in his administration, as the different Departments of government were not submitted to a form of hierarchy that would have promoted a form of standardized organizational procedures. It would be interesting to see whether similar forms of weak leadership play a role in the political bureaucratization of decision-making in other cases of international relations.

Finally, a last aspect of the occupation of Iraq which we did not go further into is the idea of the occupation of Iraq as a political laboratory. As we stated on a few occasions, the Occupation of Iraq was one where ideology rather than governance directed policy. We saw this in the imposition of the Rumsfeld Doctrine as a framework for post-conflict operations, the promotion of neoliberal ideas during occupation and the neoconservative justification for unilateral intervention and Statebuilding. From this perspective, we can see the Occupation of Iraq not just as a Statebuilding operation, but also as a testing field for paradigms of American foreign policy at a moment in time when the 21st century was seen as the one which would be the century of the unipolar moment.

---

[342] BENDOR, Jonathan, HAMMOND, Thomas H., "Rethinking Allison's Models", *The American Political Science Review*, 86(2), 1992, p318

[343] See page 56

<u>Bibliography</u>

SCIENTIFIC SOURCES

Scientific Books

ALDEN, Chris, ARAN, Amnon, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New approaches*, Routledge, London, 2017

BALZAQ, Thierry, Tugba BASARAN, Didier BIGO, Emmanuel-Pierre GUITTET and Christian OLSSON, "Security Practices" in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, Copenhagen, 2010

BUZAN, Barry, DE WILDE, Jaap, WEAVER, Ole, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998

CARR, Edward H., *La Crise de vingt ans 1919-1939 Une introduction à l'Étude des relations internationales,* Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2015

DAWISHA, Adeed, *Iraq: A Political history from Independence to Occupation*, Princeton University Press, 2009, Princeton

DOBBINS, James, et.al, *Occupying Iraq. A History of the Coalition provisional Authority*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2009

EASTON, David, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life,* Wiley, New York, 1965

GAUSE, Gregory F., *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010

HEYWOOD, Andrew, *Political Ideologies*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014

HOLMQVIST, Caroline, *Policing Wars: On Military Intervention in the Twenty-First Century,* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014

KITCHEN, Nicholas, COX, Michael, "Just Another Liberal War? Western Interventionism and the Iraq War" in *Beyond Iraq: the future of World Order,* World Scientific, London, 2012

KRISTOL, Irving, "The Neoconservative Persuasion", in SELTZER, Irwin, *The Neocon Reader*, Grove Press, New York, 2004

KRISTOL, Irving, *Neoconservativism, the Autobiography of an idea*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995

KRISTOL, Irving, *Reflexions of a Neoconservative,* Basic Books, New York, 1983

MCHARGUE, Ryan Patrick, *Neoconservativism and Iraq*, Florida State University, Florida, 2005

SHAREEF, Mohammed, *The United States, Iraq and the Kurds*: *Shock, awe and aftermath*, Routledge, New York, 2014

SMITH, Steve, HADFIELD, Amelia, DUNNE, Tim (eds), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012

TELÒ, Mario, *Relations Internationales. Une perspective Européenne*, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2013

TILLY, Charles, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" in EVANS, Peter *et al.*, *Bringing the State Back in*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985

Scientific Articles

AHRAM, Ariel I., "Returning Exiles to Iraqi Politics", *Middle East Review of International Affairs,* 9(1), 2005

ALLISON, Graham T, « Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis ». *American Political Science* Review, volume 63, no 3, September 1969

AOKI, Keith, "Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-so-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 6(1), 1998

BARTOLUCCI, Valentina, "Terrorism rhetoric under the Bush Administration: Discourses and effects", *Journal of Language and Politics*, 11(4), 2012

BENDOR, Jonathan, HAMMOND, Thomas H., "Rethinking Allison's Models", *The American Political Science Review*, 86(2), 1992

BOURGOIS, Pierre, "Retour sur le Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) et le « moment néoconservateur » post-guerre froide », *Politique Américaine*, 2(31), 2018

BRADFORD, Anu; POSNER, Eric, "Universal Exceptionalism in International Law", *Harvard International Law Journal*, 52, Winter 2011

CHITTARANJAN, Kalpana, "The Rumsfeld commission report and US missile threat perception", *Strategic Analysis*, 22(12),1999, p 1958

CHWASTIAK, Michele, «Profiting from destruction: The Iraq reconstruction, auditing and the management of fraud », *Critical Perspectives on Accounting,* 24, 2013

DAWISHA, Adeed, "The Unraveling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian preferences and State performance in Historical perspective*", The Middle East Journal*, 62(2) ,2008

DEUDNEY, Daniel; IKENBERRY, G. John, « Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War », *Survival*, 59(4), 2017

DIAMOND, Larry J. "Lessons from Iraq", *Journal of Democracy*, 16(1), 2005

DOBBINS, James, « Occupying Iraq: A Short History of the CPA" in *Survival*, 51(3), 2009

DODGE, Toby, « Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to State collapse", *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 2005

DODGE, Toby, "Iraq's new ruling elite", *Soundings*, 41, 2009

DYSON, Stephen B., "« Stuff happens »: Donald Rumsfeld and the Iraq War", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5(1), 2009

FIALA, Andrew, "The Democratic Peace Myth: From Hiroshima to Baghdad", *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 68(1), 2009

GOLDSTEIN, Joel K., "The Contemporary Presidency: Cheney, Vice Presidential Power and the War on Terror", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 40(1), 2010

HALCHIN, L. Elaine, "The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics and Institutional Authorities", *CRS Report for Congress*, Washington D.C., 2005

JONES, Toby Craig, "America, oil, and war in the Middle East", *Journal of American History,* 99(1), 2012

KUMINS, Laurens, "Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production and Potential Revenues", *CRS Report for Congress*, Washington DC, 2005

LAWRENCE, Howard E. "Lessons Learned from Denazification and de-Ba'athification", *Strategy Research Project*, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, 2007

LEE, George, "Rosa Luxemburg and the Impact of Imperialism", *The Economic Journal*, 81(324), 1971

LIEBERFELD, Daniel, "Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War", *International Journal of Peace Studies,* 10(2), Autumn/Winter 2005

LIPSET, Seymour Martin, "Neoconservativism: Myth and Reality", *Society*, 29, 1988

LOONEY, Robert, "The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's Economic Transition", *Middle East Journal*, 57(4), 2003

MONTEN, Jonathan, BENNET, Andrew, "Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990-91 Gulf War", *Security Studies*, 19(3), 2010

MORRISSEY, John, "US Central Command and liberal imperial reach: 'Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century'", *The Geographical Journal*, 2016, 182(1)

MOUSTAKIS, Fotios; CHAUDHURI, Rudra, "The Rumsfeld Doctrine and the Cost of US unilateralism: lessons learned", *Defense Studies*, 7(3), 2007

PFIFFNER, James P. "US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army", *Intelligence and National Security,* 2010, Vol 25(1)

PIRNUTA, Oana-Andreea, "American Exceptionalism", *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, November 2017, Volume 8

ROBERTS, Susan *et al.*, "Neoliberal Geopolitics", *Antipode*, 35(5), 2004

SANTOS, Maria Helena de Castro, TEIXEIRA, Ulysses Tavares, "The essential role of democracy in the Bush Doctrine: the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan*", Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, vol.56: n.2, 2013

SANFORD, E. Jonathan, "Iraq's Economy: Past, Present and Future", *CRS Report for Congress*, Washington DC, 2003

SCHMIDT, Brian C, WILLIAMS, Michael C, "The Bush doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives versus Realists", *Security Studies,* 17(2), 2008

WHYTE, Dave, "the crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in occupied Iraq", *The British Journal of Criminology*, 47(2), 2007

ZEREN, Aysegul K., "From De-Nazification of Germany to De-Baathification of Iraq", *Political Science Quarterly*, 132(2), 2017

Official Documents

BUSH, George W., « Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks", Miller Center https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-11-2001-address-nation-terrorist-attacks (last consulted online the 21/07/2019)

BREMER, Paul III, "Letter from the CPA to Donald Rumsfeld", December 9 2003 http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/2848/2003-12-09%20from%20Coalition%20Provisional%20Authority%20re%20De-Baathification-%20an%20Iraqi%20Process%20with%20Attachments.pdf#search=%22Bremer%20Debaathification%20council%22 Last consulted online 04/08/2019

CARTER, Jimmy, "Third State of the Union Address", January 1980 https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-23-1980-state-union-address (last consulted online the 24/07/2019)

CPA, Order 1, 16 May 2003

CPA, Order 2, 23 August 2003

CPA, Order 3, 31 December 2003

CPA, Order 4, 25 May 2003

CPA, Order 5, 25 May 2003

CPA, Order 6, 8 June 2003

CPA, Order 7, 9 June 2003

CPA, Order 9, 27 June 2004

CPA, Order 10, 5 June 2004

CPA, Order 12, 7 June 2003

CPA, Order 13, 22 May 2004

CPA, Order 14, 10 June 2003

CPA, Order 15, 23 June 2003

CPA, Order 16, 4 June 2004

CPA, Order 17, 27 June 2004

CPA, Order 18, 7 July 2003

CPA, Order 19, 9 July 2003

CPA, Order 20 14 July 2003

CPA, Order 21, 5 August 2003

CPA, Order 22, 20 August 2003

CPA, Order 23, 20 August 2003

CPA, Order 24, 24 August 2003

CPA, Order 25, 3 September 2003

CPA, Order 26, 24 August 2003

CPA, Order 27, 4 September 2003

CPA, Order 28, 3 September 2003

CPA, Order 29, 7 September 2003

CPA, Order 31, 10 September 2003

CPA, Order 34, 13 September 2003

CPA, Order 35, 18 September 2003

CPA, Order 36, 3 October 2003

CPA, Order 37, 19 September 2003

CPA, Order 38, 4 April 2004

CPA, Order 39, 20 December 2003

CPA, Order 40, 19 September 2003

CPA, Order 41, 19 September 2003

CPA, Order 42, 21 March 2004

CPA, Order 45, 23 February 2004

CPA, Order 46, 20 December 2003

CPA, Order 47, 4 April 2004

CPA, Order 48, 10 December 2003

CPA, Order 49, 20 February 2004

CPA, Order 50, 11 January 2004

CPA, Order 51, 14 January 2004

CPA, Order 54, 4 April 2004

CPA, Order 55, 28 January 2004

CPA, Order 56, 6 March 2004

CPA, Order 57, 10 February 2004

CPA, Order 58, 10 February 2004

CPA, Order 59, 1 June 2004

CPA, Order 61, 28 June 2004

CPA, Order 62, 28 June 2004

CPA, Order 64, 5 March 2004

CPA, Order 65, 20 March 2004

CPA, Order 66, 20 March 2004

CPA, Order 67, 21 March 2004

CPA, Order 68, 4 April 2004

CPA, Order 69, 1 April 2004

CPA, Order 70, 4 April 2004

CPA, Order 71, 6 April 2004

CPA, Order 72, 15 June 2004

CPA, Order 73, 25 April 2004

CPA, Order 74, 19 April 2004

CPA, Order 75, 20 April 2004

CPA, Order 76, 28 May 2004

CPA, Order 77, 25 April 2004

CPA, Order 78, 20 April 2004

CPA, Order 79, 19 June 2004

CPA, Order 84, 30 April 2004

CPA, Order 87, 16 May 2004

CPA, Order 90, 29 May 2004

CPA, Order 91, 7 June 2004

CPA, Order 92, 31 May 2004

CPA, Order 93, 3 June 2004

CPA, Order 94, 7 June 2004

CPA, Order 96, 15 June 2004

CPA, Order 97, 15 June 2004

CPA, Order 98, 27 June 2004

CPA, Order 99, 27 June 2004

CPA, Order 100, 28 June 2004

PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, Statement of Principles, 1997

ROSTON, Michael, "Redirection of WMD Scientist in Iraq and Libya: A Status Report", *Russian-American Nuclear Security Council*, 2004

SIGIR, SIGIR 05-017, 25 October 2005

SIGIR, *Learning from Iraq*, March 2013

UNITED NATIONS, Security Council Resolution 986, 1995

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD news, "Rumsfeld lists Operation Iraqi Freedom aims, objectives", U.S. department of Defense Website, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29253, last consulted online 04/03/2019

WHITE HOUSE, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* White House, Washington DC, 2002

WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Names Envoy to Iraq," May 6, 2003

Newspaper articles

BOOT, Max, « Think again : Neocons », *Foreign Policy,* 140, February 2004 https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/think-again-neocons/ last consulted online 28/07/2019

CCN, « House Cafeterias change names for "french" fries and "french" toast, https://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/ last consulted online 28/07/2019

C-SPAN, *interview with Dick Cheney,* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9YuD9kYK9I

CHALABI, Ahmad, "Is There Life After Saddam? An Interview with the Iraqi National Congress Chairman Ahmad Chalabi", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 27(1), 2003

CHULOV, Martin; PIDD Helen, "Curveball: How US was duped by Iraqi fantasist looking to topple Saddam", *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/15/curveball-iraqi-fantasist-cia-saddam last consulted online the 1/08/2019

FIFIELD, Anna, "Contractors reap $138bn from Iraq War", *The Financial Times*, 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/7f435f04-8c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0

PBS, *Frontline: Interview: Lt.Gen. Jay Garner,* pbs.org, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html, last consulted online 30/04/2019

PBS, « Frontline : The Gulf War », pbs.org, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_a.html last consulted online the 21/07/2019

GADDIS, John Lewis, "Grand Strategy of Transformation", F*oreign Policy*, (133), 2002

GORDON, Michael, TRAINOR, Bernard E., "After invasion, Point Man for Iraq was shunted", *The New York Times*, March 2006

INNES, John, "US and UK Action in post-war Iraq May be Illegal," *The Scotsman*, May 22, 2003

KRISTOL, William, KAGAN, Robert, "Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs,* 75(4), 1996

KRISTOL, William *et.al.*, « Letter to President Clinton on Iraq", *Project for the New American Century,* January 1998

LANDAY, Jonathan S., "Pentagon office produced 'alternative' intelligence on Iraq", *McClatchy Newspapers,* February 2007, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/special-reports/iraq-intelligence/article24461020.html last consulted online the 23/07/2019

RISEN, James, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence", *the New York Times,* April 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/28/us/how-pair-s-finding-on-terror-led-to-clash-on-shaping-intelligence.html last consulted online the 23/07/2019

ROSE, David, Ed VULLIAMY, " Iraq 'behind US anthrax' outbreaks", *The Guardian*, 14 October 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/14/terrorism.afghanistan6 last consulted online 27/07/2009

THE WASHINGTON TIMES, « No proof of Iraqi contamination", *The Washington Times*, 29 October 2001 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/oct/29/20011029-030543-6024r/ last consulted online 27/07/2019

WILSON, Valerie Plame, WILSON, Joe, "How the Bush Administration sold the war-and we bought it", *the Guardian*, 2013 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/27/bush-administration-sold-iraq-war last consulted online the 10/12/2019

Règlement sur le plagiat

Jury du Département de science politique

Adopté le 6 septembre 2016

Considérant que le plagiat est une faute inacceptable sur les plans juridique, éthique et intellectuel ;

Conscient que tolérer le plagiat porterait atteinte à l'ensemble des corps étudiants, scientifiques et académiques en minant la réputation de l'institution et en mettant en péril le maintien de certaines approches pédagogiques;

Notant que les étudiants sont sensibilisés aux questions d'intégrité intellectuelle dès leur première année d'étude universitaire et que le site web des Bibliothèques de l'ULB indique clairement comment éviter le plagiat : (www.bib.ulb.ac.be/fr/aide/eviter-le-plagiat/index.html)

Rappelant que le plagiat ne se limite pas à l'emprunt d'un texte dans son intégralité sans emploi des guillemets ou sans mention de la référence bibliographique complète, mais se rapporte également à l'emprunt de données brutes, de texte traduit librement, ou d'idées paraphrasées sans que la référence complète ne soit clairement indiquée ;

Convenant qu'aucune justification, telle que des considérations médicales, l'absence d'antécédents disciplinaires ou le niveau d'étude, ne peut constituer un facteur atténuant.

Prenant note de l'article XI.165 du Code de droit économique, de l'article 66 du *Règlement général des études* du 3 juillet 2006, du *Règlement de discipline relatif aux étudiants* du 5 octobre 1970, et de l'article 54 du *Règlement facultaire relatif à l'organisation des examens* du 9 décembre 2004;

Le Jury du Département de science politique recommande formellement d'attribuer au minimum aux étudiants qui commettent une faute de plagiat avérée la note de 0 pour l'ensemble du cours en question, sans possibilité de reprise en seconde session. Cette recommandation ne présage pas de la sanction finalement proposée au jury par le Doyen en fonction des détails relatifs au cas de plagiat qui lui a été transmis.

I Stan VLEMINCKX, confirm having read this regulation and certify that I have not committed plagiarism for this research.

Done in (location) Leipzig, GERMANY

Date: 06/02/2020

Signature of the student _____

<u>Summary</u>

In 2003, under President George W Bush, a military coalition led by the USA invaded Iraq. The goal of this coalition was to put an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. The war lasted from the 20th of March until the 1st of May and ended in an overall military success for the coalition. After deposing Saddam Hussein's Regime, the coalition decided to put into place the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a *de facto* occupation government, with its affirmed aim being to put in place a new democratic government, following the theme of the name given to the invasion: operation Iraqi freedom.

This government, even though it qualified itself as a coalition authority, was led mainly by American personnel appointed by Washington which reported to the US government instead of reporting to an International Organization[344]. This was both a consequence of US behavior in ignoring UN recommendations before and during the invasion, as well as the US's own dislike of having to allow international oversight[345].

While its exact status remains difficult to pin down[346], the CPA can best be analyzed as a US government entity, which is what we did in this paper. This means decisions taken by the CPA should be analyzed primarily as designed to fulfill goals set out by the US government, and not necessarily as aimed at answering Inputs from the Iraqi population, as would be the case in David Easton's Traditional "Black Box" model, where the political system's "outputs" (policies) are a reaction to the "inputs" (demands and support) generated by the environment of the political system[347].

The aim of this Master thesis was to answer the question "How do the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority reflect the goals of Statebuilding in Iraq?". This question was identified after noting the general ambiguity in goal formulated by Donald Rumsfeld for the US to "create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government that is not a threat to its neighbors", without specifying what this entailed.

In our State of the Art, we started by looking at how traditional schools of International Relations have approached the case of the War in Iraq. We noted that the realist school cannot

---

[344] DOBBINS, James, « Occupying Iraq: A Short History of the CPA" in *Survival*, 2009, 51:3, p 134

[345] *Ibid,* p 132

[346] *Ibid*, p 39

[347] EASTON, David, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life,* Wiley, New York, 1965, p 65

explain the Iraq invasion and subsequent Statebuilding efforts, as it cannot explain how it would have been in the US's national interest to invade Iraq in the first place. However, schools of thought within the realist school did influence US decisionmakers and should be considered in regard to the ideas they hold of international relations, most notably in regard to the role (and lack thereof) of International Organizations. We further noted that the liberal school is also not sufficient to explain the reasons behind the Iraq War, or the reasons why Statebuilding in Iraq failed, but that it could also help us understand the mindset that contributed to the war, and how this affected Statebuilding in Iraq.

In our analysis, we decided to rely on a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach, which can be seen as can be seen as sub or a-systemic, insisting more on analyzing interactions than on consistent rules of a system. FPA pays more attention to internal politics of a country and how they affect its stance on the international field, as well as to the sociological aspects of governments and administrations than traditional systemic approaches. Specifically, we opted for Decisional process theory, a system first theorized by Graham Allison in his analysis of the Cuban missile Crisis. It revolves around the theorization of three conceptual models of decision making in the making of foreign policy.

The first model sees the State as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, with one set of goals and a single unitary opinion, echoing the idea of national interest as described in systemic theories. Likewise, the decisions taken by the government follow a rational choice process with as an aim to best defend the national security and interests. The second model sees governments not as unitary actors, but as a constellation of loosely allied organizations under the direction of one head of government, with the different organizations being tasked with specific issues. The third model again does not see the government as a unitary actor but emphasizes the individual role of the actors that compose and of interorganizational politics, as the different divisions bargain for influence and impact.

We stated that the lack of coherence observed in the US's Statebuilding operation was indicative that the rational-policy model cannot apply to the case of the occupation of Iraq, as such behavior does not follow the rationale of the state as a monolithic actor. Rather, it points to internal dissensions which we would expect from models 2 and 3. We further decided to focus ourselves on the third model's approach, as the early days in Iraq showed a situation where the advice of the administration and experts are ignored, and where decisions were imposed from above. At the political level, there was no sign of unity, as some members, most notably Colin Powell, were excluded from the decision-making process, and decisions were

taken based upon individual meeting between the President and others rather than group decisions.

Taking this model for our approach, we focused mainly on three groups of actors: First, the US government which set out the goals in Iraq and which constitutes the "leaders" in regard to Allison's third Model. Second, the CPA, as the actor who produced the US policy relative to Statebuilding In Iraq which we built our analysis on. Finally, the Iraqi Governing Council, as an organism which was established by the CPA to represent Iraqi interests during the occupation.

Our goal was to analyze the main elements of their decision-making and the policies they produced to try and understand what their aims could have been in the post-war phase in Iraq. For this we looked primarily at the legislation produced by the CPA which can be divided in three subcategories: CPA Orders, CPA Regulations and CPA Memoranda, with the CPA Orders as the primary source of policy and the source we decided to focus on.

Within the US Government, we identified three main Actors in regard to establishing the goals of the US in Iraq:

- President George W. Bush, since as President, the power of decision-making and policymaking in the cadre of foreign policy ultimately came down to him, as came the responsibility of setting goals and naming members of the cabinet.

- Vice-President Dick Cheney, due to his relation both to Bush and Donald Rumsfeld and his very influential vice-presidency, which has been described by some commentators as "the most powerful vice-presidency in recent times"[348]

- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, whose department directly supervised the CPA, and whose decisions would strongly affect how the post-conflict operations of the USA were structured.

Further, we identified three ideological aspects carried by individuals within the Bush Administration which influenced how decisions were taken:

First, the neoconservative influence. George W. Bush's administration is often described as a case example of neoconservatism in foreign relations[349]. The set of ideas

---

[348] GOLDSTEIN, Joel K., "The Contemporary Presidency: Cheney, Vice Presidential Power and the War on Terror", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 40(1), 2010, p 115

[349] SCHIDT, Brian C, WILLIAMS, Michael C, « The Bush doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives versus Realists, *Security Studies,* 17(2), 2008, p 192

embraced to justify this can best be resumed as follows: The United States are the sole remaining superpower and should aim to conserve that position. The United States should defend an promote Democracy and "American Values" (including capitalism) around the World. The use of preventive warfare to these ends is justified. International oversight is not in the US's interest.

The influence of the neoconservative school within the Bush Administration can be seen only from looking at the list of signatories of the neoconservative "Project for the New American Century's" Statement of principles. Of the 25 signatories of the PNAC's Statement of principles, ten worked for the Bush administration, most notably Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz.

Neoconservatives had since the 1990s been obsessed with Iraq, or more exactly with Saddam Hussein's regime, based upon the belief that the United States should have pushed for Baghdad and toppled Hussein in 1991[350]. For Neoconservatives, the US's refusal to invade Iraq during the first Gulf War was a missed opportunity to go into Iraq and install a democratic government, which according to them would have been beneficial for stability in the region as a whole[351]. Under the George W. Bush administration, prominent neoconservatives were promoted to high positions and were able to bring this influence with them in the drafting of the US foreign policy.

Along with political reform, the occupation of Iraq was also aimed at modifying the existing economic model of Iraq. This made sense from a Western perspective, with the model of liberal democracies strongly emphasizing the link between democracy and market economic order with little government interference[352]. This stood opposed to the Iraqi economy under Saddam Hussein, which had been characterized by central economic planning and an emphasis on State-Owned enterprises[353] as well as a nationalized petroleum sector. Securing Iraq's oil fields had been a priority and was one of the eight goals of operation Iraqi Freedom named by Donald Rumsfeld. Neoconservatives had also emphasized the role of liberal market policies to

---

[350] BOURGOIS, Pierre, "Retour sur le Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) et le « moment néoconservateur » post-guerre froide », *Politique Américaine*, 2(31), 2018, p 182

[351] BOURGOIS, Pierre, *op.cit.,* p 182

[352] HEYWOOD, Andrew, "Retour sur le Project for the New American Century (1997-2006) et le « moment néoconservateur » post-guerre froide », *Politique Américaine*, 2(31), 2018, p 25

[353] SANFORD, E. Jonathan, *Iraq's Economy: Past, Present and Future*, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC, 2003, p 4

enable democracies, which can be linked with the history of neoconservatives as politically liberal, as well as the way in which neoconservatives constructed their view of America as the political and moral opposite to the USSR[354].The emphasis placed upon free market policies in the US's foreign policy however can be more closely associated with neoliberalism, even though both schools of thought were inextricably linked through the presidency of Ronald Reagan.

Ever since the CIA orchestrated a coup overthrow of Iran's prime minister Mohamed Mosaddeq as a reaction to his project to nationalize Iran's oil reserves, American foreign policy in the middle East has been aimed at enforcing a safe flow of oil from the region to US markets, as well as keeping governments with a friendly attitude towards the United States in power[355]. This attitude encouraged us to take a more critical look at the US's handling of Iraq's oil reserves, and the emphasis placed upon liberalizing the oil market. While this does not mean that the Iraq war was a war for oil, integrating Iraq's economy and most importantly Iraq's oil reserves in the global economic system could certainly be seen as a goal of war in the Clausewitzian sense of the term, as the act of violence of the Iraq war ultimately served to transform Iraq's economy in the way specified prior to the invasion.

Finally, we stated that the rhetoric of fighting Terrorism and the Destruction of Weapons of Mass Destruction cannot and should not be seen as goals of the war in Iraq, despite them being on the official list of goals set out by Donald Rumsfeld. Rather, they were justifications for intervention, and later justifications for State-Building efforts in Iraq. We supported this through an analysis of the "Securitization" of these issues, that is to say presenting an issue as an element of threat and thereby justifying taking extreme measures and removing it from the normal bounds of political procedure[356]. In the case of Iraq, the constant repetition of accusations that Saddam Hussein's regime was trying to acquire or had acquired materials needed for the development of weapons of mass destruction, even when those accusations were

---

[354] BOURGEOIS, Pierre, *op.cit,* p 183

[355] Several books such as *The International relations of the Persian Gulf* (Gause, 2010) or *Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World War II* (Gardner, 2009) Give a detailed overview of "oil diplomacy", both from a historic and current point of view. For a brief recapitulation of US policy regarding securitization of oil from the Middle East, see JONES, Toby Craig, "America, oil, and war in the Middle East", *Journal of American History,* 99(1), 2012

[356] BUZAN, Barry, DE WILDE, Jaap, WAEVER, Ole, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998, p23

highly disputed by experts[357], served to build a threat against the US. Simultaneously, the framing of Iraq as a "rogue State" and part of an "Axis of evil" strengthened the treat, while also removing the possibility for a diplomatic solution, as a State defined as "Rogue" could not be understood as a trustworthy counterpart in negotiations.

We then turned to the main part of our analysis, the study of the CPA's Orders. We identified two main types of Orders, Orders aimed at changing the State and Orders aimed at changing the economy.

When it came to changing the Iraqi State, we found that the CPA was torn between the doctrine of its direct supervisor, Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defense, which wanted a short intervention with as few resources expended as possible, and the rhetoric of the Bush Administration which aimed for an important level of transformation of the Iraqi State. The attempt to satisfy both these demands through a replacement of the top-level of Iraqi government failed, as this approach failed to take into consideration the specificities of Iraq and was selected mainly to satisfy the conditions set by the Rumsfeld doctrine. Simultaneously, the tensions between Rumsfeld's department of Defense and Powell's Department of State primarily, as well as Rumsfeld's general negative attitude in regard to inter-agency operations put a strain on the coordination of the US's efforts, which reflected itself in the OHRA and then the CPA's issues when it came to the work on the field. This was again particularly the case in regard to staffing issues, where departments of the US government other than the Department of Defense showed little willingness in responding to the CPA's personnel request, as the CPA was seen as a "Department of Defense project"[358].

When applying the lens of Allison's conceptual models to this process, these events seem to strongly conform to the Bureaucratic Politics Model, with policy a result of political infighting or "bargaining" as Allison puts it[359], with the role of agencies reduced to serving the interests of the Organization's leaders. The different courses pursued by the Departments of State and Defense which could ordinarily have been understood as a bureaucratic squabble

---

[357] WILSON, Valerie Plame, WILSON, Joe, "How the Bush Administration sold the war-and we bought it", *the Guardian*, 2013 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/27/bush-administration-sold-iraq-war last consulted online the 10/12/2019

[358] DOBBINS, James *et al., Occupying Iraq. A History of the Coalition provisional Authority*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2009, p249

[359] ALLISON, Graham, « Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis ». *American Political Science Review*, volume 63, no 3, September 1969, p707

regarding questions of jurisdiction in a way understandable through the Organizational Process Model[360] were here extremely politicized and tied to the tensions between Rumsfeld and Powell[361]. Through this perspective, the fact that the policies pursued by the CPA did not present a solution to the specific problems faced by Iraq but corresponded to the ideas advanced by Rumsfeld makes full sense, as it is exactly this point that Allison makes when explaining his Bureaucratic Politics Model: Policy is not a solution to a problem, but results from compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue[362].

As such, we concluded that there was no strategy in regard to Statebuilding, as there was no goal in the first place.

In our analysis of the Orders aimed at changing the Iraqi economy, we noted that compared to the CPA efforts to modify the Iraqi State, the efforts aimed at modifying the economy appear to have been far more effective, despite the level of disregard for international law they entailed[363]. This makes sense for one as there was consensus in regard to the goal of bringing liberal economic policies to Iraq. Unlike in the case of regime change, there was no similar level of tension between the Rumsfeld and Powell doctrines. The goals of free trade and economic liberalism were clearly established and followed pre-existing trends in American foreign policy, which meant that unlike in the case of regime change the administration had clear goals as well as standard operating procedures to resort to achieve these goals. *Ziel* and *Zweck* as defined by Carolin Holmqvist were thus present and properly hierarchized. Similarly, we should not think of the corruption and fraud which we could observe in the reconstruction process as mistakes that would be consequences of errors in planning, or individual crimes that can be observed in all types of democracies and economies. In light of the scale of corruption, the way corruption and fraud were facilitated by CPA procedures and the fact that neither the SIGIR audits nor trials led to a structural change to combat these flaws, we could draw two possible conclusions. Either these occurrences evidenced extreme levels of incompetence, an overall inability to assess flaws and learn from mistakes and an agency composed nearly entirely of corrupt individuals. Or, that this system of organized racket and plundering was in

---

[360] *Ibid*, p702

[361] DOBBINS, James, *op.cit,* p5

[362] ALLISON, Graham, *op.cit.*, p708

[363] WHYTE, Dave, "the crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in occupied Iraq", *The British Journal of Criminology,* 47(2), 2007,p191

fact what the CPA wanted to establish. We believe the second option to be the more realistic one.

As a consequence of this, we can say that when it comes to economic changes in Iraq, the CPA had a plan and was able to impose it. The fact that this plan is a pure case of neocolonialism and a war crime [364] did not seem to trouble the CPA, reflecting the neoconservative disdain for international oversight, and prompting us to state again that the imposition of neoliberalism in Iraq required the tool of neoconservativism to be implementable

We concluded our analysis with the following observations: First, the importance of ideology over planning: In the cases of De-Baathification, the imposition of free trade and the application of the decapitation thesis to the Iraqi State, we often found that expert advice was ignored or that there was simply not enough assessment of the situation on the field before programs were deployed. We can attribute this to the importance which was given to organizational paradigms. Donald Rumsfeld's insistence on reducing the numbers of troops deployed put a set of constraints on the CPA and the Ministry of Defense, which led them to favor policies that they believed could be implemented with their limited number of troops. This failed to take into account whether these approaches would address the issues present in Iraq, and thereby complicated post-conflict operations in Iraq more than should have been the case. In the same manner, the De-Baathification of Iraq failed to take criticism into consideration and was imposed against advice from the OHRA and the CIA, with the approach reflecting a jurisdiction victory of Donald Rumsfeld's Department of Defense over Collin Powel's Department of State. The imposition of neoliberalist policies also took no account of the State of Iraq's economy, but we can consider this as planned.

Secondly, the goals of the CPA were mainly to open Iraq's economy to the international system. While the Orders regarding Statebuilding lack an identifiable end goal, the Orders regarding the transformation of Iraq's economy followed a much more identifiable logic and were very effective in setting up a system aimed at exploiting Iraq's resources. We can attribute this to better planning, as the liberalization of Iraq's economy predated Iraq's invasion[365] and that liberalizing foreign economies is a standard operating procedure of US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the importance of the individuals in the Bush Administration cannot be ignored as Bush's management style facilitated this process, while the strong support he and core

---

[364] *Ibid.,* p 192

[365] CHWASTIAK, Michelle, «Profiting from destruction: The Iraq reconstruction, auditing and the management of fraud », *Critical Perspectives on Accounting,* 24, 2013., p35

members of his cabinet showed for neoliberalism simplified the imposition of neoliberal rules in Iraq.

Finally, in the CPA's two main lines of conduct, destroying the previous structures of administration and opening the Iraqi economy to the global economy – Which in practice meant the US, and to a lesser degree the British economy- we can recognize a traditional neocolonial pattern, and one that fits Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of the role of war and imperialism as a vector for capitalism.

In seeing the CPA as an organization with a clear neo-colonial purpose, we can move away from the principle that the policy it produced was not adequate as it did not provide a response to local problems. Rather, following this perspective would let us see the policy produced by the CPA as unconcerned with Iraqi issues, and serving mainly the purpose of enriching the US, or it this case US companies. If seen as such, the legislation produced by the CPA could be considered as following a clear objective and would render the disregard for the Iraqi situation comprehensible, as addressing these would not have been a goal of the CPA. If this were the case however, we would have to reassess our first statement regarding the lack of planning of the CPA. We can phrase our conclusions regarding the CPA's efforts as follows: Either the CPA acted in accordance with the goals the US had stated but failed to produce functional policies which had the reconstruction of Iraq in mind. By building its policies on ideological principles, it neglected to consider the situation of Iraq, and instead set up a system which was detrimental for Iraq and beneficial for foreign companies. Or the CPA's efforts in destroying the structures of the Iraqi State and modifying the economic system of Iraq were from the beginning aimed at setting up a system to exploit Iraq's resources and profit US private industries. From the evidence of our analysis, we believe the second hypothesis to be the correct one.

We ended our actor analysis with an evaluation of the Iraqi Governing Council, which was established through CPA Regulation 6 as the Iraqi interim administration during the CPA tenure. Even though limited, this is the only substantial influence Iraqis would have on the process of building the new Iraqi State. As such, it is worth the effort to take a closer look in the relation that existed between the ICG and the CPA, to see whether the ICG really impacted the way the CPA took its decisions, or whether the ICG was mainly an act of window-dressing, to give a form of legitimacy to the CPA. We found that we can only see the IGC as an accessory to the CPA, as its role during the occupation was rather limited in terms of decision-making, and the CPA would not feel bound to its advice. It is true that the IGC did not help its credibility

as a source of authority, as it was never able to formulate a coherent formula for political transition[366], and was unable to establish itself as a body which Iraqis felt represented by[367]. This could however hardly be helped, as the IGC's formation along ethnic and sectarian bases promoted division, while the lack of power held by members of the IGC did not favor their disposition[368]. Both of these elements were consequences of the way in which the IGC was set up by the CPA, which makes its criticism of the ICG appear all the more oblivious to its own responsibility in that regard. It is noteworthy that the CPA would later promote the same members of the ICG previously described as "feckless" and incapable of reaching out to the Iraqi population to take up ministerial posts in the Interim Government of Iraq after handing over sovereignty in 2004[369]. This again shows us how little attention the CPA ultimately paid to the IGC and the transition of power in Iraq.

In conclusion, while the IGC and its members would play a key role in the Transition of Power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government, and that several of its members would become central political figures under the new Iraqi Republic, it's role in influencing the CPA's policy was of no relevance.

The process of formation of the IGC further evidences the lack of planning made prior to the invasion in regard as to how the US envisioned the eight goal formulated by Donald Rumsfeld, "to create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government that is not a threat to its neighbors"[370]. Finally, the "primordialisation"[371] of sectarianism in Iraqi politics by the CPA through the IGC can be understood as a key element of the internal conflicts which affect Iraq to this day, and a consequence of this lack of planning.

In answering the question "How do the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority reflect the Goals of Statebuilding in Iraq?", we formulated the following hypothesis as our answer: Building a new Iraqi State was not a goal of the United States in Iraq, or at least it was

---

[366] MANNING, Carrie, "Political Elites and Democratic State-building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq", Democratization, 13(5), 2006, p730

[367] DODGE, Toby, "Iraq's new ruling elite", *Soundings*, 41, 2009, p93

[368] MANNING, Carrie, *op.cit*, p730

[369] DODGE, Toby, « Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to State collapse", *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 2005, p718

[370] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD news, "Rumsfeld lists Operation Iraqi Freedom aims, objectives", U.S. department of Defense Website, 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29253, last consulted online 04/03/2019

[371] DODGE, Toby, *op.cit*, p719

not one of its priorities. The primary objective of Statebuilding in Iraq was the economic liberalization of Iraq and its integration in the global economy to the benefit of US private companies.

While the Iraq War was justified mainly through the mobilization of humanitarian arguments and a rhetoric which emphasized the principle of "bringing democracy to Iraq", the CPA's post conflict operations in regard to Statebuilding were chaotic, followed a logic which privileged the means over the ends, and at no point identified a clear goal to pursue to implement Iraq's democratic transition. In contrast, the CPA's Orders regarding Iraq's economic transformation followed clear objectives of liberalizing international trade and privatizing the Iraqi economy. This application of neoliberal principles on Iraq was also combined with a set of rules and an environment set up by the CPA which heavily favored US companies, turning the occupation of Iraq into a neocolonial exploitation of Iraq's resources to the benefit of private US firms.

While some critics of Allison's Models have argued that the third Model is so complex that it ultimately "explains nothing" due to analysis of too many variables[372], we believe that this versatility was ultimately more adequate for the analysis of a situation as chaotic as the occupation of Iraq, were the routines and agencies that the second Model focusses on tend to be absent. We do note however that this Model has its limitations, insofar as we can never fully understand the psychology behind the decisions of an actor. This was the case for example when we could not determine whether Bush's managerial style was due to his belief in the superiority of private over public management, or just due to his habit of the later or an entirely different factor.

Nonetheless, in our analysis we noticed a significant difference with Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile Crisis: While in all three of Allison's Models, all paths ultimately led to President Kennedy, our analysis highlighted George W. Bush's absence in the decision-making process, as President Bush preferred to delegate than to concern himself directly with the details of policymaking. In doing so, George W. Bush facilitated the poor interagency coordination of his administration. We can see this as one of the factors that promoted the politics of model three in his administration, as the different Departments of government were not submitted to a form of hierarchy that would have promoted a form of standardized organizational procedures.

---

[372] BENDOR, Jonathan, HAMMOND, Thomas H., "Rethinking Allison's Models", *The American Political Science Review*, 86(2), 1992, p318

It would be interesting to see whether similar forms of weak leadership play a role in the political bureaucratization of decision-making in other cases of international relations.

Finally, a last aspect of the occupation of Iraq which we did not go further into is the idea of the occupation of Iraq as a political laboratory. As we stated on a few occasions, the Occupation of Iraq was one where ideology rather than governance directed policy. We saw this in the imposition of the Rumsfeld Doctrine as a framework for post-conflict operations, the promotion of neoliberal ideas during occupation and the neoconservative justification for unilateral intervention and Statebuilding. From this perspective, we can see the Occupation of Iraq not just as a Statebuilding operation, but also as a testing field for paradigms of American foreign policy at a moment in time when the 21st century was seen as the one which would be the century of the unipolar moment.