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*Kurdistan, the invisible state, and its participatory  
processes.*

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## Abstract

This study will give an account of how Kurdistan developed in the participatory processes and how it uses political participation to give space to the general population. Political parties have a pivotal role in Kurdistan to organize people's claims and demands, and there is a possible "*partitocrazia*," created through inoperative institutions and especially from representative chambers. It also examines the relationship between approaches of public participation and effective deliberation; participation could occur through direct citizens participation or community representation with the help of civil society organizations, it is significant to pursue government institution to bring in more inputs and take public concern into considerations. No countries recognize Kurdistan as an official country, and it does not have representation in the United Nations and other international organizations. The expression is used to refer to the geographical and cultural regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The only identified government is in *Iraqi Kurdistan*, and his institutional form is the *Parliamentary* one. A long time ago, the Kingdom of Kurdistan existed, precisely in Iraq from 1922 to 1924, but a war broke out because of the Nationalist ambitions in Iraq in the 60s. Kurdistan area is amidst traditional and dynamic territories, with a vast number of social-human capital, as to improvement pointers. The properties of these social orders in an issue; for example, races are with the end goal that decisions are a chance and a route for them to rehearse political-social. In recent years, the guarantee of different presidential competitors, alongside the impact of the media and raising the degree of consciousness of the individuals of the district, has prompted a decrease in the interesting hole and individuals requesting their real requests from the legislature and regardless of the absence of security in the local and news sources of Muand will likewise be increasingly engaged with dispersing the political intensity of the nation. The need of this exploration is that it can prompt the proceeded with an open investment of the individuals of this region in the political structure and effectively dispose of the national and local dangers in the zone and give another picture of security by expanding the ingestion limits in the outskirts districts and tribesmen in Iran. In this way, utilizing a systematic spellbinding technique, attempting to address the fundamental inquiry of what elements influence political decision conduct in the region of Kurdistan. Public, political participation, and forms of governance are the critical factors for a country, and they ensure the participation of citizens in policies in the government. The role of public participation in Kurdistan is divided among the role of different actors in public; instead of listening to the public, the Kurdish government listens to the Political Parties and expertise, and citizens are not involved in the process of policies.

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*Chapter 1:*

*Introduction*

## Introduction

This thesis will give an account of the participatory process used in Kurdistan, studying how the countries handle their system with or without having a real state and a government. Besides, it analyzes how parties develop their platforms to create a relationship with the population and how they have influenced the evolution of politics and society in Kurdistan. The text will go deep into the discrepancies between the different areas, looking at how a country without government can exist and increase its position, managing different crises and attacks. In political participation and portrayal, various levels exist, both for people and networks. Generally apparent and broadly perceived, the office for parliament, the filling of government work, laces, and gathering administration or participation. At a subsequent level exists territorial legislative workplaces and neighborhood managerial bodies like region gatherings, city congregations, and city chambers. A third level would be middle person associations, for example, proficient and regular social gatherings or affiliations. The political viability in any of these three degrees of political action is especially identified with the political culture and political-regulatory arrangement of the nation in thought. The first category of public participation is breached and not considered by Kurdistan Regional Government; it assists them in marking plans to codify their judgment under the reflection of available information. The second category is "*Listen to the Public*," but advising the public is not enough to collect a positive outcome from government policies. In Kurdistan, the government does not tune to the public, but some policymakers in arrangement with political parties, more reflect the will of them than of citizens since the KRG does not listen and is not ready to be hearing the public concern as J. Jongerden (2019) understood. The third category is "*Engage in problem-solving*," public participation in the problem solving is essential for the fact that government listens to public concerns and people engaged in the policy decision, both sides can establish agreements to pursue common goals and team up to overcome malfunctions. The last category is "*Develop agreements*," where the government listens to public concerns and people engaged in the policy decision, both sides can establish agreements to pursue common goals and team up to overcome malfunctions.

Unfortunately, Kurdistan is not participatory because none of these categories approached by the KRG. During the last ten years, public involvement has increased, much activity and many state institutions have improved the way they engage and communicate with the public, as N. N. Abdullah (2016) said.

Public participation influences the outcome of public services; it, for example, increases the effectiveness of agricultural services. The KRG government spends millions of dollars on training and empowerment during the communicative service delivery program, and the government should use fewer funds for the training process instead empower citizens through voluntary works. Public participation takes time and effort, the

participatory process facilitates the flow of information between citizens and officials and improves services, as J. Jongerden (2019) said. The Kurdistan Region suffer from an unjust distribution of public budgets; the government provides more services to the upper-class people and officials, rather than for poor and disadvantaged people. In the Kurdistan Region, the total budget is mostly utilized for the projects in the cities, and the remaining budget is allocated to the urban areas, there is a huge gap between rural communities and urban residents. Corruption is another burden of public participation, and there is an elite that enriches themselves and enforces their agenda on the entire process, in Kurdistan, the KRG public commonly practices corruption.

In Authoritarian cultures, where local participation is no more than a shadow of the central government and where intermediary organizations are fragile, it is tough to consider all three levels of political activity in a balanced way. When a political party challenging the Status Quo is hand in hand with a cultural movement, local activities may evolve more easily, even if party organizational activities may lag due to restrictions in the system or deficits in the movement concerned. Continuous and ever-present participation at an individual level co-exist and overlaps with all three levels of political participation. The representative capacity and participatory ability of minorities generate many problems in most societies. Kurd's form of governance could not mature and foster. Unfortunately, Kurdish political movements developed their political programs only around the goal of state formation, with self-determination as the right based on which recognition as a people and state development was considered legitimate, as N. N. Abdullah (2016) showed. Two forms of government represent the two currents that Kurdish follow; the first is centered on political parties that form the KRG, from the tradition of the KDP and the PUK. These parties struggle for power within the proto-state, but at the same time, the constituent it. The second idea was created by different parties that took inspiration by Abdullah Öcalan; he was the leader of PKK. The main issue of this movement is the relationship between national recognition and state construction, and the recognition should take form as *self-organization* against the state, considered as non-state democracy. The national liberation movements emerged in the 1960s and 70s struggling in terms of anti-colonialism, the establishment of an independent state was its goal, this is what also happened in Kurdistan, but development and the political shift occurred within the broader Kurdish context. Abdullah Öcalan started to discern the state not as a goal but as a drawback on the road to freedom. A *proto-state-structured* KRG was born in Iraqi Kurdistan. While in Syrian Kurdistan, the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS), including Rojava but extending into non-Kurdish majority territory, was created based on a non-statist form of a societal organization referred to the term *democratic autonomy*, and *democratic-confederalism* as S. O' Grady and M. Berger (2019) affirm.

## **Background of the Study**

After WWI promises were made to the Kurdish people during treaty negotiations after the war, but they were not kept, the emerging state of Turkey was too strong and victorious British, and French were more interested in dividing the Ottoman empire territory between themselves than in securing Kurdish autonomy. The Treaty

of Lausanne was signed in 1923, establishing many of today's borders the Middle East, the prospects of a Kurdish state appeared to have vanished. The Kurd traditional homeland known as Kurdistan was split between Turkey, Iran, and Syria which was controlled by the French and Iraq controlled by the British, but Kurdish dreams of nationhood persisted, and nationalist movements and uprisings aimed at autonomy or trite independence flared in all four countries, none with any lasting success. The worst violence occurred in Iraq during a period of the Kurdish rebellion in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein's al-Anfal campaign involved the murder of some 100,000 Kurdish non-combatants, his forces erased hundreds of villages with poison gas. The real progress towards Kurdish statehood happened when a cease fire was accidental, a side effect of the first Gulf War in 1991 after Saddam's army was expelled from Kuwait. At first, America was unwilling to help the Kurds, but it was ashamed to protect them from future retaliation by Saddam. The US, along with Britain and France, established a no-fly zone in northern Iraq to keep the Iraqi military out. The Kurds took advantage of the new autonomy to build a state. They flew the Kurdish flag, and established a parliament, held elections, and educated their children in Kurdish instead of Arabic. Their project took another leap forward in 2003 when an American-led coalition toppled Saddam for good, the Americans did not invade Iraq to advance Kurdish independence, but that is what happened as the rest of Iraq descended into civil war Iraqi Kurdistan flourished, it was safe and was developing fast. In 2014 Iraqi Kurdistan, the so-called Islamic State, swept through much of Iraq, capturing the country's second-largest city Mosul and threatening Erbil killing men and boys, and enslaved thousands of women and girls. The Iraqi army fled, and the Kurds armed forces known as Peshmerga did not, for the Kurds; this underscored Iraq's weakened state and the threat still posed to their safety, the Kurds stand against Islamic State, also resulted in a wave of foreign support and the National Coalition battled the Islamic State in cooperation with Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Canada is one of the several nations that provided the Kurds with military aid and training, and this may present Iraq's Kurds with an opportunity to take their next steps towards nationhood, *Mas'ud Barzani*, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government makes no secret for his desire for Kurdish independence. He says he will hold a non-binding referendum, but numerous obstacles remain. Iraqi Kurdistan's neighbors are likely to oppose its independence, and its Western Allies are officially committed to Iraqi unity, Kurdish nationalists counter this by saying a unified Iraq exists only on maps. Iraq is collapsing the argument while they are creating a real country, are closer to realizing that goal and at any other time since the end of the Ottoman Empire, almost a century ago.

On the 25th of September 2017, a Referendum occurred in the Iraqi Kurdistan for *Independence*; the outcomes were not perceived from the Baghdad government. Exploiting the shortcoming of Baghdad's Central Government, and the worldwide challenge, the President of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan, Mas'ud Barzani, has instigated the Referendum for the freedom of Iraq. Constituent seats have additionally been set up in the areas involved by the Kurds because of the war on ISIS. However, it has never been perceived by the focal government in Baghdad.

At the global level, just the State of Israel has upheld the activity by Barzani, while the significant forces, for example, President Trump's USA, have announced themselves against the division of Iraq just before the vote.

The aftereffects of the surveying were 97% reacted YES, and 7.27% reacted NO. The outcome saw the prompt response from Kurdistan and Iraq, wild festivals emitted in Iranian Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional Government began making arrangements for state-building and future exchanges with Iraq before a revelation of autonomy for the Republic of Kurdistan would be given. Barzani made another "political authority" body to get ready for freedom; be that as it may, three Kurdish gatherings, including the PUK, would not go along with it. Barzani ventured down during time, in actuality in October 2017, he reported his expectations to step down as President of the Kurdistan Region after being in power for a long time. His bet of pushing through with the informal choice finished with the contested domains being recovered by Iraq and with the Kurdish state-building venture being left deserted. Star Barzani nonconformists broke into the structure across Iraqi Kurdistan and assaulted administrators and writers. Iraq's Supreme Federal Court decided that no Iraqi region was permitted to withdraw to safeguard the solidarity of Iraq. The KRG reported it would regard the Supreme Federal Court's decision, expressing that this choice must turn into a reason for beginning a comprehensive national exchange between (Kurdish experts in) Erbil and Baghdad to determine all debates.

Choice	Votes	%
✓ Yes	2,861,471	92.73
No	224,464	7.27
Valid votes	3,085,935	93.35
Invalid or blank votes	219,990	6.65
<b>Total votes</b>	<b>3,305,925</b>	<b>100.00</b>
Registered voters and turnout	4,581,255	72.16



## **Statement of the Problem**

In this thesis, we are going to analyze why the Kurdistan area finds itself in these problematic situations in the political and social sphere. The main problem of this study is the lack of public participation in the decision-making process and the government per se because a real state does not exist. Dissatisfaction is visible, the citizens and the Kurdish people, in general, do not feel represented by any kind of government. The most affected areas are, as is known, Turkey and Syria, illegitimate government decisions, and negative perception of government administrations can be seen as the pivotal points. The state does not let citizens make any decisions that concern them. The Kurdistan Region, the lack of participatory processes in decision making, has caused the misuse of revenue (UNDP, 2009, p.7). Ordinary people are not the only victims, but also the policymakers and the decision-making process exclude professionals and expertise. The issue of trust is mainly one of the significant obstacles of public participation in public sector organizations, citizens usually require transparency and participation in decisions, but public organizations distrust their citizens. It means that the community members and professionals are not usually welcomed by the government to exchange their ideas over public decisions. Parties have pivotal roles in every decision, and they are the strongest player in the participatory processes. The Kurdistan region in Iraq today can be called proto-state, while the Kurdistan region in Syria is quite different, with a self-identity, political system, and further aspirations toward a non-statist self-administration. Seeking after a principle that enlightened social orders have a state and that the foundation of a state would get a definitive acknowledgment of Kurd's current society, Kurdish political developments generally molded their political projects around the target of state arrangement, with self-assurance as the privilege based on which acknowledgment as a people and state-development was viewed as real. A type of self-government inside the bigger political unit named the state yet could likewise appear as the foundation of a state. While a necessary ideological differentiation between Kurdish ideological gatherings used to respect the state-structure it looked for after, the unmistakable character since the 2000s has become between the people who kept up the state-thought as extraordinary objective and the people who expelled it, attempting to verbalize a sort of non-state government. Two types of administration are connected inside the two flows of the Kurdish Movements: The first includes ideological groups, which are the foundation of the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) proto-state, rising out of the convention of the KDP. Notwithstanding the KDP itself, this custom incorporates the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK. A split away from the KDP built up in 1976, a break-path from the PUK established in 2009. While these gatherings are battling for power inside the independent domain, they likewise consist of it. The other movements are composed of the political parties that are associated with Abdullah Ocalan, and he was the leader of the PKK (Patiya Karkerên Kurdistan), today is the symbolic leader of the swarm of parties and organizations. The

acknowledgment of the privilege of self-government, ought not to appear as a state, it is contended, yet of self-association as an enabling component against the state. It alluded to as a 'non-state' and some of the time 'non-statist' popular government. It must be noticed that one of the most troublesome difficulties of talking about non-statist types of cultural association is the naturalization of the state in social and political ideas. On account of the Apoist development, this occasionally prompts incomprehension and absence of comprehension of its political viewpoint (Jongerden, 2016). Even though itself the result of socio-recorded procedures, the sound judgment see is that public activity is some way or another “normally” an actual existence inside states (Clastres, 1989), that these are inescapable, the pre-appointed results of cultural improvement (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2009; Clastres, 1989). This definitive agreement works like a scholarly limitation and an amazing hindrance against getting thoughts and practices from which another 'political engineering' may emerge and may prompt simple expulsion of new practices rather than genuine thought (Nimni, 2013, 6).

### **Scope of The Study**

This investigation was led to show the significance for a culture to have their space, to feel comfortable where they can have the ability to choose their destiny, they can settle on decisions associated with governmental issues and to the overseeing of their nation. Kurdistan never achieved nation-state status, and it is a non-governmental region and one of the largest stateless nations in the world. Around 3,000 towns have been cleared in the Southeast, and somewhere in the range of 3 million individuals have been dislodged. The area additionally experiences difficult issues, including relocation, quick urbanization, tranquilize use, prostitution, female suicide, an undereducated youthful populace (47 percent of Diyarbakır's populace is younger than 15), vagrancy, possess and joblessness. Injuries related to murders whose culprits are still everywhere and illicit captures, confinements, feelings, and torment have disturbed the social intuitive in the area.

Consequently, a recovery program that considers every one of these issues ought to be actualized. This thesis will focus on the real struggle especially of the Kurdish in Turkey and Syria, and it will also analyze Iraqi and Irani situation, taking them as an example and hoping for a change of the situation of the population. However, the primary goal is to resolve the grievances with the Turkish government through legitimate channels, but unfortunately, in history, these attempts were heavily suppressed. The pivotal role of the parties in the participatory processes, because of it, this study will analyze the reason for this centralization and why they want to not include the citizens in their decision. Then it will move into the grounds of mistreatment suffered by the Kurdish in Turkey and Syria. In the end, this study will try to find a solution for this invisible state through policies to allow people to get their political power and be part of decisional processes.

### **Chapter Summary**

The Kurdish area finds itself in different situations, but what must be highlighted is the non-participatory process that takes place in there. Kurds are the most crucial stateless minority on the hearth, with an expected 30 million Kurds in a geographic region, including regions in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Armenia. They

include 18% of the populace in Turkey and 15-20% in Iraq and are the third biggest ethnic gathering in the district after the Arabs and Persians. A predominantly Sunni Muslim people with their language and culture, most Kurds live in the, for the most part, touching regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Syria—a hilly locale of southwest Asia by and large known as Kurdistan (Land of the Kurds). Non-Arab minority populaces, Kurds are likewise a Linguistic minority, speakers of Kurdish, a subdivision of the Iranic part of the Indo-European group of dialects, which is similar to Persian. Present-day Kurdish partitions into two significant gatherings: 1) the Kurmanji gathering and, 2) the Gurani gathering. Many sub-lingos enhance these. The most mainstream vernacular is that of Kurmanji (or Kirmancha), spoken by around seventy-five percent of the Kurds today. Kurmanji secluded into North Kurmanji (likewise called Bahdinani, with around 15 million speakers in Turkey, Syria, and the previous Soviet Union) and South Kurmanji (additionally called Sorani, with around 6 million speakers in Iraq and Iran). The primary block to the development of 'Kurdistan,' actually significance Land of the Kurds, lies in the way that the Kurds have inside divisions that frequently arrive in a manner to bring together them. They come up short on any single brought together language (spoken or composed). Indeed, even on the grounds of religion, they do not involve a homogeneous class. Most of the Kurds are Sunni, be that as it may; one can likewise discover Kurds who are Alevis, Shi'a, or Christians. The Kurdish 'country' additionally would incorporate littler factions, for example, the Yazidis, just as Christian minorities like the Assyrian and the Syrian Orthodox. The Kurds have frequently requested thrown freedom with shifting degrees of correspondence just as enmity. The spotlight here would be on how the Issue of Kurdistan has been engaged and managed by the two neighboring conditions of West Asia—Iraq and Turkey. A short verifiable outline is appeared to comprehend the circumstance of Kurds today in these locales on the general footing.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been the most astounding accomplishment of the Kurds in the Middle East. At the point when the Iraqi armed force pulled back even with IS assaults in 2014, this accomplishment was helped by picking up true locale over contested zones characterized by Article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq. The essential objective of the submission for independence from Iraq in 2017 was for sure to extend the by right limits of the KRG through the Diyala, Nineveh, and Kirkuk territories in questioned zones. The outcome, in any case, has been a regionally limited just as strategically and militarily debilitated KRG. The destruction in contested territories is practically unsalvageable. KRG powers lost 40 percent of the domain it recently held. With Bagdad's military control of Kirkuk, the fare of 300,000 barrels of oil for each day from the KRG to Turkey concluded. In contested zones, the Iraqi government expelled Kurdish authorities from nearby regulatory posts and security-related positions. In the interim, just in the region of Kirkuk, 30,000 Kurds lost their homes. The KRG administration, which was perceived universally as the legiti-mate agent of the Kurds, was sus-pended, and the KRG needed to reconnect with Bagdad employing two separate political force areas, to be specific Arbil and Sulaimaniya.

At last, a year after the choice, political injury stays for the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish gatherings. According to a great many people in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG experience is finished; however, nobody recognizes what

comes straightaway. The feeble force sharing plan between the two noticeable Kurdish gatherings, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), has decayed; the former is going to be minimized in Baghdad while the latter is losing political ground in the KRG. Repercussions from the as of late held parliamentary decisions in Iraq and the parliamentary races in the KRG show that compromise is unlikely. The worldwide support that the Kurds in Iraq are looking for to recoup is constrained, the affirmation of the Kurds being "acceptable warriors."

In late decades, we have watched the development of Kurdistan as a political term, with a more noteworthy accentuation on the Kurdish country, in both talk and practice. Not at all like previously, for example, Turkish Kurds see themselves as Kurdi Bakuri (Kurds from northern Kurdistan) and Iraqi Kurds as Kurdi Basuri (Kurds from southern Kurdistan). The Kurdish individuals' political direction today is focused on the Kurdistan theater like never before. In like manner, the most well-known subject of the current Kurdish plan is the "solidarity of the Kurds," however not the political improvements in the nations where they dwell. Be that as it may, the Kurdish ideological groups' reactions to these recently rising expectations have been a long way from satisfactory. They could barely join during the battle against IS and, before long, were by and by caught in contentions. Right now, the loss of Kirkuk, specifically, after the choice in Iraqi Kurdistan on 16 October 2017, established a defining moment. Notwithstanding their gathering affiliations, most by far of Kurdish individuals blamed the Kurdish political entertainers for that disappointment, instead of the provincial and global on-screen characters. As per many, the primary purpose behind the disappointment was the absence of solidarity among the Kurdish gatherings.

*Chapter 2:*

*Kurdistan and its participatory process*

## **Introduction**

Participatory methodologies are a result of enduring communication between specialists, advancement laborers, government operators, and neighborhood populaces. The historical backdrop of participatory techniques being developed co-activity started in the late 1970s with the presentation of another exploration approach called "Quick Rural Appraisal" (RRA), which promptly got famous with chiefs being developed organizations. Expanding on close coordinated effort with neighborhood populaces, RRAs were intended to gather direct information from the nearby individuals about their view of their neighborhood surroundings and living conditions in rural regions. RRAs were typically directed as 1-3 days workshops with residents in the field and encouraged by little groups of RRA masters or specialists. RRA techniques were explicitly adjusted to react to neighborhood conditions. Accordingly, correspondence forms with uneducated people not used to correspondence in dynamic terms were painstakingly considered. Perception utilizing locally fathomable images, and instruments like mapping, charting, and positioning was presented. An impediment of RRA, be that as it may, was that it was extractive; the job of the nearby individuals was restricted to giving data, while the intensity of dynamic about the utilization of this data stayed in the hands of others. During the 1980s, NGOs working at grass-attaches level utilized RRA to think of further tweaked approaches called Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA).

PRAs utilize comparable techniques and instruments as RRA. However, the hidden way of thinking and reason changed. While RRAs target extricating data, regularly in a solitary occasion, PRAs were intended to follow more the people groups' interests and interests; PRA workshops were norm generally our aged by a group of prepared people and could take a few days (3-6). One of the most significant standards in PRA was the sharing of aftereffects of investigation, choices and arranging endeavors among the network individuals by open and open introduction during gatherings. PRAs firmly bolstered and encouraged the presentation of more interest responsive methods for overseeing advancement communication, and procedure arranged to reason. The last prompted consecutive utilizations of PRA occasions and helped develop. Therefore, it developed provincial individual abilities for breaking down their conditions of living, the possibilities of their issues too effectively settle on changes. PRA facilitators acknowledged increasingly more the job of students. These movements

towards familiar, intuitive, and every day was then reflected in the new wording of Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) in the mid-1990s. Since the start of the 1990s, expanded ideas of participatory processes and interaction have been created and condensed under the name participatory and integrated development (PID). To beat the easygoing use of participatory strategies to a great extent, PID tries to remember workshops and their outcomes for a more extensive, long haul edge of regulated exercises. PID implies offering help backing to local people (for example, towns, networks, intrigue gatherings, affiliations) on a responsive interest premise and helping them in getting their inclinations spoke to. For instance, getting grassroots level arranging and activity incorporated into a neighborhood and territorial arranging draws near. It prompts a progressively economical and better-coordinated method for improvement. Notwithstanding this vertical mix, PID likewise tries to upgrade flat joining, for example, the joint effort of various offices, segment associations, and various gatherings of partners inside an area.

Participatory processes seek to engage the local population and development process, and participatory development had taken different forms since it emerged in the 1970s when it was introduced as an essential part of the basic needs approach to development. Now and again, the collaboration includes open interest. In every collaboration mode, master information and experience must be gathered, common and handled, and drives in the long run to the ideal result of the participation – the arrangement of the errand. The coordinating organizers, chefs, and partners achieve various systems ordinarily, for instance, different repeating city arranging assignments, visionary participatory arranging forms, choices on the best way to disseminate reserves, site determination, casting a ballot undertaking, and some more. This methodology can profit from IT-support. Be that as it may, it is pivotal to follow certain means in the readiness of the particular procedure to increase the opportunity of progress. There is far from the current issue to an excellent arrangement, from the layout of the procedure plan that incorporates the meaning of the undertaking, naming the included gatherings, deciding the measure of time and assets. Utilizing the choice on the procedure structure and the organization of steps and techniques, deeply of the correspondence, and afterward up to the change of the arrangement into a dedicated setting. The blend of media and devices, the organizing of the fundamental programming frameworks, and on the web and location gatherings, not to overlook the significance of the balance and the goal assessment. It tells the best way to draw a procedure plan from the earliest starting point as far as possible. The introduced information was accomplished by assessment of different trial and certifiable procedures. It comprises of best practice encounters and cross-disciplinary research results. Various types/levels of cooperation share something for all intents and purpose: They all try to catch and expand on people group's information and point towards improving improvement support for individuals. The accomplishment of the most elevated levels of investment requires a fair approach structure and decentralization. The higher the degree of cooperation, the more space is given to individuals in dynamic. It is expanding levels of interest to advance nearby individuals as the primary on-screen characters and implementers of their improvement. This includes, be that as it may, that they acknowledge the obligations too. With expanding levels of cooperation, the job of outer operators moves increasingly more from on-screen

characters to facilitators. The higher the degree of cooperation, the more information, abilities, and limits are required by the neighborhood individuals. Interest is an iterative procedure that creates and happens over a noteworthy timeframe. The idea of cooperation cannot be created or executed medium-term or inside the course of one workshop.

Similarly, as a connection between various intrigue, bunches cannot change the medium-term. Interest is a procedure that requires persistence and duty from all. It is a procedure that requires mental fortitude to perceive and concede when things turn out badly. In the participatory procedure, it is critical to returning to understandings and choices intermittently to alter them for changes that may have happened in the individual circumstance or states of the different gatherings.

### **Kurdistan: An Overview**

There are about 32,000,000 Kurds who live in the Kurdish Region; they are the largest stateless people in the world. During the First World War Kurds aspired to establish a nation of their own and while insights in Sykes and Picot agreement (1916),



(source: <http://arabpress.eu/referendum-in-kurdistan/77775/>)

The Sykes-Picot Agreement officially the Asia Minor Agreement is a secret agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and France and the French Republic, which defined the respective spheres of influence in the Middle East after the loss of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, they decided without regard to Arab populations. The interests of Kurds were also neglected at the Paris peace conference, and president Wilson repudiated the Sykes-Picot agreement at any address. The Congress in the winter of 1918 saying that self-determination was a particular right and that people and nations should not be bartered from sovereign to sovereign as though they were a chattel in some great games forever, so the Kurds hope the Paris peace conference was being able to conquer their national aspirations. The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 establishes the whole panoply of new nation-states, it also created a Commission including British French and Italian diplomats to study autonomy arrangements for Kurds living in the territory of those four countries and that Commission concluded that within a year of the treaty, that Kurds should be given the right to submit a request to the League of Nations for independence. The dream of a Kurdistan seemed within reach, but for the war of liberation that was launched in the same time by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, his war of independence rejected the Treaty of Sevres, and the allies had been at war for many years they did not want an ongoing confrontation with Turkey. The Treaty of Sevres was ultimately repudiated and renegotiated, the Treaty of Lausanne was finalized in 1923 it did not mention anywhere in its text the word Kurdish or Kurdistan, it represented a blow to the Kurdish aspirations. In the 20th century the Kurds suffered terrible human rights abuses under the boot of the countries where they resided that lasted until the end of the century, those abuses were significant Kurds hope that they would have a unified state when they were sold out. Turkey launched a rebellion in 1925 that was a suppressed auditor adopted a series of laws called "*Turkification*," where the use of the Kurdish language was prohibited. British place names were denied, there was a resettlement law, and Kurds were relocated; there was a series of security measures launched against Kurdish rebels, which brought huge human suffering to the Kurdish population. Ultimately, as part of the decolonization movement, Kurds expressed their deep grievances through the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers Party, which was established in 1988, it initiated an armed struggle against Turkey, which resulted in the deaths of 30,000 people over several decades. At the same time, in Iraq, which became independent in 1932, the Kurds saw their aspirations deny.

Faisal was an "*Arabist*"; he believed in a Pan-Arab approach. The Kurds rebelled and launched the "*Mobad Republic*," which was immediately suppressed; unfortunately, many thousands of Kurds were killed. When Saddam Hussein on the Baathist came to power, they negotiated autonomy provisions, and these were merely in name only, they would never implement. The Kurds rebelled again, and many many thousands were killed, in 1980 ended up at war it was perceived in Baghdad that the Kurds were supporting Iran. The unfilled campaign was part of an effort to create a security buffer on the Iraq Iranian border and almost 200,000 people as a result of a policy in Syria there was a short movement which was a Kurdish independence movement. Many Kurds who fled from Turkey, when sheet side Pierron was put down ended up in Syria. They supported the overthrow of the Shah with the expectation that the new regime would give them greater autonomy and

rights, they were denied those rights, and in turn, they boycotted the constitutional convention, they were distrusted by Ayatollah Khomeini, Kurds mostly Sunnites and they were not seen as loyal to his regime. As a result, can be seen across the four states where Kurds reside rebellion movements that were launched the PKK in Turkey, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the PUK in Iraq, what has become Rojava (autonomy region of the Syrian territory), the PYD in Syria and the KDPI in Iran.

Kurds are factionalized, and there are deep divisions, but when they are under duress, they come together to defend their collective national interests.

By the end of the 20th century, we started to see a little bit of a turn in fortune, and the US established a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurds were able to govern their affairs. That experiment in grassroots democracy, which culminated in the transitional administrative law of 2004, inspired Kurds throughout the region to seek something similar to a federal arrangement where power was decentralized.

The Kurds have managed to find political expression or not at various points in history because they were fragmented between four countries, they never coalesce as a coherent Kurdish national movement in each of the four countries. There are Kurdish national movements, but they are divided by tribal affinity's and by language, various Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan enjoyed special privilege because of assistance that the US provided after the Gulf war, in other countries did not benefit in the same way, and there is still a systematic crackdown against Kurds in Syria by the Baathist regime of Assad. In Turkey, there was a resettlement policy, and several million Kurds were relocated villages, they were destroyed on mass Kurdish political, and cultural rights were systematically denied. One of the things that Bashar al Assad did very successfully was to manipulate the Kurds in Syria against their regimes in Iraq and Turkey, so the Kurds, unfortunately, have always been the victims of regional and great powers who hated Kurds. Against regimes the Algiers accord of 1975, essentially expelled Kurds from Iran and ended the Kurdish vision of a Mobad Republic, the Kurds until recently have never really coalesced as a group, and until recently because of a defining moment in this transition was the recent battle of Kobanî in Syria. It was a truly remarkable occurrence when Kurds, from the four countries, joined to defend Kobanî against the Islamic State fighters. It was occupied almost entirely by ISIS until the US launched airstrikes and decided to deliver weapons to the people's protection units, which is a part of the PYD. The leading Kurdish Syrian party, the PKK, which has strong loyalties with the PID, wanted to join the battle in Kobanî, so did page at the Kurdish militant group in Iran. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Peshmerga negotiated arrangement, where 1505 of their fighters transmitted through Turkey to join the battle, Kurds were from all four countries, essentially fighting together against the Islamic state.

The US had invested 13 billion dollars into a training equip program for the Iraqi army, and in 24 hours, the Iraqi garrisons in Mosel folded, they left to the Islamic state all of this state-of-the-art military equipment made in the USA. The Islamic State forces rushed South through the deserts of Al Anbar, and they got to within a Bird's Eye view of Baghdad, then Shiite militias came out to meet them to prevent the occupation of Samarra. There was an understanding that had been reached between Islamic state commanders and Masoud Barzani,

the curse and regional government that they would respectively leave each other alone without understanding were abrogated, when on the 8th of August, ISIS pivoted and attacked Iraqi Kurdistan.

The position of the Obama administration was to wait until Iraqis form the government of national unity before they responded to the ISIS, the president decided to launch airstrikes. The US delivered humanitarian supplies and airstrikes against the ISIS fighters in Sinjar, ultimately it was the PKK and the people's protection units that opened the humanitarian corridor, the second phase of this operation was humanitarian and its focus.

America's approach continued to evolve to a point where now it has emphasized retaking territory, Kurdish Peshmerga also launched a counteroffensive to regain territories in a region on the Syria Turkish Iraqi border. Peshmerga liberated Mount Sinjar and villages around it; all of this was happening at the same time as the US was getting involved in Kobani. ISIS was a real threat to Iraq and to Syria it controls 1/3 of Iraq's territory, they are half of the severe territory, there were 8 to 10,000,000 people who live in those territories under ISIS control. Kurdistan Region is divided into three governorates: Erbil, the administrative capital of Kurdistan Region, Sulaymaniyah, the cultural capital of Kurdistan, and Duhok. Recently, the parliament has approved the establishment of another governorate known as Halabja. The governorates alienated into some districts and then to sub-district (Kirmanj,2014, p. 155). The government provides a budget to each governorate, based on their population, to guarantee an equal distribution of income between citizens. The administrative body of Kurdistan is mainly divided into three prominent institutions, including Kurdistan Presidency, Kurdistan Parliament, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).


The government is practicing executive power based on the laws and regulations issued by the Kurdistan parliament. The KRG is also in charge of budget allocation, public policymaking, security, public services, investment, and managing natural resources (KRG,2012). The president of Kurdistan has the utmost executive authority and should be elected by the majority in the democratic election process every four years. The president is allowed to serve in his position for no more than two terms. The president of the Kurdistan region is accountable for authorizing military promotion, laws enacted by the legislature as well as the appointment of the prime minister. The parliament of the Kurdistan Region consists of 111 seats. Its role is discussing budget proposals and enacting new laws, and it is more effective after the emergence of the opposition Change Movement. In theory, the parliament plays a significant role in public financial management and seen as the bridge between executive power and citizens. They audit public policies and discuss public issues relates to people as well as administration. The parliament founded to issue new laws, promote accountability, pluralism, transparency, and representation. To be more representative, the parliament provided 11 seats to minority groups and quota for women who should not be less than 30 percent of the total seats (KRG 2012).

### **Public Participation and Participatory Processes**

The basis of good public participation is a public and open dialogue, free speech, and open elections. Across the world, we are losing democracy; trust in governments has decreased from 60% just ten years ago to less than 19% now. Transparency in Government is vital; there has to be Fiscal Accountability plus the politics

need great leaders in government, and there must be active civic engagement to have a better society and to reach public participation. The best way to have public participation is to treat the public as costumers, and they are entitled to see results, and they deserve respect from the government and the leaders. Primarily, public employees must be treated with respect, but so must we, as costumers. Bureaucrats should be evaluated based on how the costumers are treated. There has to be transparency in government, and citizens have to learn about government functions. Great Leaders in Government must analyze, figuring out what outcomes are desired and how to achieve them. Also, they must allocate a plan to concentrate scarce resources, like money, time, and people, and to focus them forward their highest and best uses, and away from areas of waste. Also, great leaders should align, influencing people to behave in a coordinated way, according to the plan, to achieve the desired outcomes. Citizens have the right to demand a sense of urgency; the government must respond quickly and efficiently. Government, through leaders, must lean into conflict. It means they must listen and consider people. If the government takes that side of responsibility, citizens must truly become active in government. Public Participation needs to spend more time nurturing the relationships locally, with other partner organizations. Thinking across health and social care, looking at the groups that can support activity going forward, certainly thinking more about asset-based community development, bringing some of the locality groups into thinking about what they have got in the community that can help improve health and support commissioners to deliver satisfactory services.

Participatory processes are methods employed applied to reach active participation by all members of a group in a decision-making process. Cooperation could happen through direct resident support or network portrayal with the assistance of common society associations. Open interest is additionally noteworthy to seek after government foundation to acquire more information sources and bring open worries into thought. In such circumstances, the degree of straightforwardness and productivity of undertakings would be vastly improved. Straightforwardness as interweaved segment of participatory planning (PB) depicted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2013) as the transparency of the government towards residents from every budgetary movement that happened previously, also present, what is to come. Thoroughly, the results of the financial exercises could be evaluated. The IMF code portrays open support in four distinct viewpoints which are related with residents, including free to government data, plainly characterizing official jobs what more, obligations, trustworthiness and clearness of data is, and both inside and remotely examining and assessing monetary strategy data (Folscher, 2010, p. 7).



Unfortunately, people in the area of Kurdistan never felt part of the society or part of the common good and being part of the public participation. Few people can claim to have been predicting today's events in the Middle East and North Africa. We must be careful about what we assume it may happen; next, we must approach development with humility. A country cannot have a successful development without good governance and the participation of citizens. Governments should publish information, that means an act of Freedom; they need to open up their budgets and procurement processes and sponsor forms of justice systems. Conflicts and wars have always been a challenge to the international community at both regional and international levels to find a durable solution. Through these challenges, we need to explore the mechanisms and ways by which we can solve these issues and these problems. A part of a solution can be to bring lasting peace and security to this volatile region of the middle east, to explore and try the regional integration or regionalism as a mechanism. There must be clear what the common interests are; what they need is to try to define and draw these lines in order to create a situation by which they can move towards regionalism and regional integration. It can be seen as impossible, but if somehow, they manage to create this situation, in which they can try to define those lines of common interests, they can do it. Then, they should understand what the obstacles of this process are, also categorize the obstacles into different categories, taking the European Community as a model. The outside factor has been playing a negative and destructive role for the

middle east, not helping the regions to collaborate. The best hope is to, at least, create an academic program and then encourage the politicians to follow and start to draw common interests between regions.

Numerous challenges limit the extent of resident participation, for example, disparity, instruction, and prevalence of elites. One issue of public participation is in the holes between social classes. This issue undermines the inspirations and effects of participation (Faguet, 2009). Imbalance negatively affects residents to take an interest in aggregate choices, participatory conversations, and collaboration between network individuals and arrangement producers (Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov, 2007). Different issues, for example, absence of instruction, budgetary assets, limit building, and data debilitate participatory planning process (Krishna, 2006; Fung and Wright, 2001). Little subtleties have given to comprehend how these constraints demoralize participatory planning. Likewise, it is not satisfactory whether these constraints could be applied to the nations that are new in utilizing participatory planning. It may be contended that every nation has a specific situation, and that expected to be viewed as when contemplating open investment out in the open planning process. In Kurdistan, open cooperation may require a few pre-conditions that have not been researched at this point. This investigation in the accompanying sections will check whether the conditions and conditions are diverse in Kurdistan. Debasement is another weight of open support, particularly in the planning procedure, what is more, it happens when elites influence coordinators of the PB to save their advantage.

In Kurdistan, the two rewards and defilement are generally polished by the KRG open executives, and the legislature is very much aware of that (Smail, 2013). This impediment partners to the absence of open interest in the KRG open spending plan. Notwithstanding, the elite's authority over participatory foundations could be killed if residents prepared and effectively take part all the while (Sheely, 2015). The achievement of generally speaking participatory projects relies upon a few different conditions that identified with the limit and eagerness of authorities and common society associations (Speer, 2012). The authorities in certain nations are progressively responsive towards residents and willing to tune in to their interests. In creating nations including Kurdistan Region, authorities typically apply unbending approaches where residents are not seen as an active participator in broad daylight arrangement choices. Likewise, community society association in those nations is inert and neglects to prepare residents. In this way, the holes to actualize participatory instruments of Kurdistan could be analyzed here as no extension set up among government and ordinary residents. Without that relationship, choice quality and open administrations will be unique. Researchers have distinguished that the impact furthermore, the size of common society association changes the viability of the choices (Abom, 2004; Eugren, 2008). The legislature must enact the job of metro society associations, what is more, enable residents (Speer, 2012).

To underscore the issue of control and elites, the "stepping stool of interest" was utilized by Arnstein (1969). The creator accepts that control of choice procedure is to extend elites' responsibility for the benefit of the more extensive network. Elites and intrigue bunches in numerous events undermine participatory choice procedure to keep up their advantage, especially when their advantage conflicts with the enthusiasm of a more

extensive network over spending inclinations (Sheely, 2015, p.251; Fung and Wright, 2003). In such participatory projects, choices mirror the enthusiasm of elites and intrigue bunches instead of residents (Shah, 2007). To defeat control, data ought to be spread (Arnstein, 1969; Durose and Rummery, 2006). To reinforce the connections among government and residents, they suggested data spread, resident's organization, and interview. Hickey (2002) proposed potential answers for a few participatory issues. He suggests the substitution of social parts of investment into political parts of interest. Such practice shifts social exercises into self-overseeing rehearse. This approach advances open interest, particularly to the minimized gatherings, and ensures common society commitment in choice related exercises, especially spending plan choices (Fung and Wright 2003). Hickey likewise proposed resident's strengthening by specialists to comprehend the reason for their cooperation and techniques to guarantee the useful results of their cooperation. He likewise included that approach creators ought to interface with residents to advance their status. Investment should be treated as a characteristic option to be practiced by anyone who needs to take an interest in the open policymaking process.

## **Information**

Data revelation and free access to information is a crucial rule of the vote based and genuine administration. It is an unavoidable requirement for improving open strategy choices, and invigorating resident's attention to by and large produce top-notch choices. This article found that the data gave by the legislature is fragmented, off base, inconvenient and difficult to reach. The finding underlines that the administration neglected to spread data on strategic goals. The investigation focused on that data on planning is progressively most loved by respondents. The information has become a valuable instrument to improve public policy and enhancing citizen participation in political, social, and financial activities. In a purely democratic system, citizens should be allowed to receive a different kind of information without any burden or censorship, and government information increases public confidence in government operations and the way that decision making originated. Jaeger and Bertot (2010) arguing that to be truly transparent, the government should allow its citizens to access all sorts of information. Citizens need to physically, intellectually, and socially access to public information (API) in order to be able to reach the contents and understand as well as sharing them among themselves. The API in Kurdistan is not well performed, and it seems to be an obstacle for the government to promote good governance. This thesis aims to extend government openness towards citizens. In terms of good government and openness, Kurdistan is still an infant, but citizens are struggling to pressure governments to be more liable towards citizens. The KRG Prime Minister Nechirvn Barzani in the launch of the government works to allow public access to government information to institutionalize government, preserve public interest, ensuring accountability and democratic representation (KRG,2009). Recently, the government has achieved some improvement in terms of transparency. For the first time, the Kurdistan parliament adopted the Right to Information Law No. (11) for 2013. The law provides a legal framework for government administrators and departments to provide necessary information to all citizens except for some

information that relates to national security. Citizens all guaranteed legal support to access and demand information of all types and forms held by a government institution without any burdens excluding the exceptions defined by law. The KRG is also in charge of budget allocation, public policymaking, security, public services, investment, and managing natural resources (KRG,2012).

The president of Kurdistan has the utmost executive authority and should be elected by the majority in the democratic election process every four years. The president is allowed to serve in his position for no more than two terms. The president of the Kurdistan region is accountable for authorizing military promotion, laws enacted by the legislature as well as the appointment of the prime minister. In theory, the parliament plays a significant role in public financial management and seen as the bridge between executive power and citizens. They audit public policies and discuss public issues relates to people as well as administration. The parliament founded to issue new laws, promote accountability, pluralism, transparency, and representation. To be more representative, the parliament provided 11 seats to minority groups and quota for women who should not be less than 30 percent of the total seats (KRG 2012).

### **Role of the Parties**

The political parties in Kurdistan manage the political system and the administration of the region. In late decades, we have watched the rise of Kurdistan as a political term, with a more prominent accentuation on the Kurdish country, in both talk and practice. Not at all like previously, for example, Turkish Kurds see themselves as Kurdi Bakuri (Kurds from northern Kurdistan) and Iraqi Kurds as Kurdi Basuri (Kurds from southern Kurdistan). The Kurdish individuals' political direction today is focused on the Kurdistan theater like never before. Appropriately, the most mainstream subject of the present Kurdish motivation is the "solidarity of the Kurds," yet not the political improvements in the nations where they live. Even though the Kurdistan area has been administered by the two decision parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in recent years, the two gatherings have always been unable to get serious about political contradiction and resistance groups totally. They of a complete combination of intensity have stayed only a fantasy. Notwithstanding, it is not this clench hand of the KDP and PUK that is driving the resistance groups to self-destruct; it is their disappointments. Compelling and extremist individuals from a few resistance groups have looked to present changes, yet these have to, a great extent is, en dismissed by the political tip-top in their gatherings, who control their media, financing, authoritative bases, and activities. This situation mirrors the absence of vision and solid authority, inside infighting, and refusal to change that are hampering the Kurdish restriction. While looking for such a representative, two names stick out: Masoud Barzani and Abdullah Öcalan. With Öcalan as of now in jail, Barzani has worldwide acknowledgment and remaining to introduce the Kurdish wants to the world. Be that as it may, this will not occur if the Kurds keep on battling among themselves. Barzani's past job as the leader of the Kurdistan Regional Government gave him a solid remaining in the global network, yet not in the Kurdistan Region. He is generally observed as the pioneer of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and is, in this manner, contradicted by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

(PUK), Gorran, the New Generation Movement, and other ideological groups. There is no firm principle that a pioneer must be the undisputed, unchallenged pioneer. At the point when we think about different models over the globe, this is not the situation in a large portion of the present vote-based systems. While Öcalan is likely the most loved of the Kurdish chiefs, he cannot increase a legitimate remaining from the world as most nations think of him as a fear-based oppressor. Notwithstanding the rightness of this conviction, he cannot, as of now, be relied upon to go to the United Nations and request a free Kurdish state. Öcalan's detainment does not mean remaining before the UN is unthinkable as Nelson Mandela was discharged from jail and inevitably turned into the pioneer of his country and his kin. Before the Kurds can start to conclude who will lead Kurdistan, there must be a Kurdistan. When a country turns into a reality, residents can begin to wade into controversy. The two most important parties are The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The Kurdish Democratic Party was established in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani in the brief Kurdish Mahabad Republic in Iran. Regardless of its development in Iran, the gathering turned out to be generally conspicuous in Iraqi Kurdistan, where Barzani's gathering got mainstream with the nearby populace. The gathering confronted significant crusades of constraint by the legislatures of Iraq under a few different administrations. The KDP occupied with fights against the Iraqi government for a considerable length of time. The KDP and its supporters are related to Kurdish patriotism and, for the most part, sit to one side of focus on the political range, partner with conventionalists and social preservationists. Masoud Barzani drives the gathering since 1979. The KDP is right now in alliance with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), framing the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG). Since 1991, the KDP has held the most seats of any gathering in the Kurdistan area's Parliament. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is one of the biggest ideological groups in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The gathering is one of the two accomplices in the present administering alliance, the other being the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The PUK has established after the end of a Kurdish upheaval in 1975 against the Iraqi system by a gathering of Kurdish scholarly people and political pioneers isolating from the predominant KDP party. The PUK's fundamental authors included Jalal Talabani, Nawshirwan Mustafa, Fuad Masum, Kamal Fuad, Adel Murad, and Abdulrazaq al Faili. The PUK was situated as a more left-inclining patriot bunch than the KDP, binding together social-popularity based and Marxist gatherings under an expansive standard, filling the force vacuum left in Northern Iraq after 1975. The association advanced a dream of Kurdish patriotism upheld through a system of popular social government and human rights. PUK Peshmerga powers battled the Iraqi tyranny from 1975 until 2003. Following the passing of long-lasting pioneer Jalal Talabani in 2017, the gathering has been driven by acting secretary-general, Kosrat Rasul Ali, a previous Peshmerga authority.

## Chapter Summary

The Kurdistan region includes four different countries; every area is different, and Kurds experience a different kind of life, the most democratic and developed country is the Iraqi Kurdistan. As we have seen, Iraqi Kurdistan has approved a law in 2013 on the right to access information as a law in the region of Kurdistan (Iraq). It enables people to exercise their right to accessing information with public and private institutions. Through this law, the public or private institution shall not reject providing the information in protection of an interest. It aims at ensures transparency and reorganize the correct information submission while confirming the citizens' rights in accessing such information. This ability to have access to information is part of the excellent exercise of public participation and good governance. Public Participation needs to start to be one of the critical factors of new policies; participatory processes involve the citizens into public governance and help to improve the development of new laws, regulations, and procedures based on global standards. To improve public participation, the four states should give more importance to the minority groups in their countries, as Kurds. Using technology and private sector resources can be a path to follow to increase the forms of public participation. In the last period, the governments of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are taking steps to improve reforms of public governance and to meet the needs of their citizens better. Nevertheless, governments in the regions should create improvements in public governance as a central element in their strategy to help stand up the Kurds and the other minorities present in these four states. The Kurds suffered as a result of a Baathist regime, their identity was denied, there were citizenship laws that were adopted and Kurds were denied citizenship rights they were not provided identification cards so 300,000 Kurds were essentially denied any privilege of employment or education and they could not marry or hold property. They joined with other opposition forces and putting forward the Damascus Declaration and in 2004 which is the root of the opposition in Syria today, but throughout the 20th century, Kurds in Syria suffered a terrible fate and the same can be said for Kurds in Iran, because of the launch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. Public Participation needs to be key to future policies to help Kurds have a voice in their homeland.

*Chapter 3:*

*Self-Administration and The Proto-State*

## **Introduction**

Kurds failed to achieve their nation-state, but in March 1991 in Iraqi Kurdistan upraised against the former Iraqi Regime. They could reach their self-rule region under the protection of the international community. For the first time in history, Kurds held a parliamentary election. The democratic process did not take so long. The power-sharing agreement between the two main political parties *Patriotic Union of Kurdistan* and the *Kurdistan Democratic Party*, fall apart, and the country experienced a bloody civil war for almost four years. In 1998, the PDK and the PUK signed the *Washington Agreement* to end up the civil war. The semi-independent Kurdistan is also known as Kurdistan Region or Southern Kurdistan, is located in the south of Turkey, north of Iraq. The Kurds have gone through difficult times; Kurds were unable to successfully rule and develop their country until American intervention to Iraq, which opened a door for Kurds to develop. The invasion of 2003, due to the exploration of natural resources and the opening up of the globe, the Kurds have moved to the new era, which helped them to develop their public administration system. The lack of revenue was an obstacle to the Kurds before 2002 to provide adequate services and projects to meet up general needs. In 2012, a fracturing of the central State in Syria gave rise to a system of self-government in this Kurdistan Region. Thus, in both southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan (Başur) and western (Syrian) Kurdistan (Rojava), the weakness of the central power enabled new entities to emerge. The aims of the Kurdish actors and the nature of the objects that appeared, however, differed significantly. The Kurdistan region in Iraq today can be considered a proto-state or statelet. In contrast, the Kurdistan region in Syria is quite different, with a self-identity, political system, and further aspirations toward a non-statist, confederated form of locally based self-administration. The Kurdistan Region is divided into three governorates; Erbil, the administrative capital of the region; Sulaymaniyah, the cultural capital of Kurdistan, and Duhok. Recently, the parliament has approved the establishment of another governorate know as Halabja.

## **Iraqi Kurdistan**

Erbil is the capital of the semiautonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, the Kurdistan regional governments the KRG held an independence referendum in 2017. The majority of Iraqi Kurds voted for the region to separate from the rest of Iraq. Still, their celebrations were short-lived, the KRG did not declare independence, but the Iraqi central governments penalized the Kurdish region economically. The Kurdistan regional government was founded in the early 1990s after years of conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi governments. Iraqi forces abandoned the Kurdish area in October 1991, and the semiautonomous KRG was set up a year later. In the context of the long history, the affiliation amid the Baghdad government and the Kurds, ae from mountain regions in the northern Middle East. The Kurds are the 4th largest ethnic group in the region today between 25 and 35 million Kurds live close to Turkey, Syrian, Iran, Iraq, and Armenia after

the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds, anticipated establishing their permanent State. Still, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 gave control of the Middle East to Turkey, Kurdish hopes of autonomy collapsed for several decades. Iraqi Kurdish willingness to autonomy was revived when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in the 14th of July revolution, in 1958 article three of the new constitution said that Arabs and Kurds are considered collaborators in this country, where the constitution will state their national rights under the Arab unity. Masoud Barzani, his father Mustaf, was a Kurdish nationalist leader who led the Iraqi Kurds in several conflicts, including the first Iraqi Kurdish war from 1961 to 1970. He then agreed with Prime Minister abdicating chasm that the Kurds need the possibility to have the autonomy. Still, at the end of the negotiations, in 1974, hostilities restarted in the second Iraqi Kurdish war. The situation between the two sides remained fractious because Massoud Barzani also aligned himself with neighbouring Iran in 1975. The Algerian president sponsored an agreement between Baghdad and Tehran, and he brought together the Shah of Iran, then Iraqi vice president Saddam Hussein. The agreement stopped the Iranian help for the Kurds in return for Iraq's relinquishing sovereignty. Over half of the shuttle Arab waterway in 1979, the Iranian revolution erupted overthrowing the Shah; it saw the end of the Boumediene sponsored agreement. A year later, the 8-year war began between Iraq and Iran Massoud Barzani's Democratic Party helped Iran and Saddam Hussein retaliated by kidnapping Kurdish men and boys in Erbil province. In the last days of the Iran Iraq war in 1988, the Kurdish city of Halabja suffered an attack using chemical weapons, killing between 2 1/2 and 5000 people, and injuring thousands. The attack was part of the Anfal genocide in opposition to the Kurdish people by president Saddam Hussein's Regime. The Iraqi High Criminal Court ruled the Hallamshire massacre, an act of genocide in March 2010. In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, leading to the first Gulf War, but was defeated by a coalition led by the United States. In 1991 some of Iraq's southern and northern provinces rose against the interim Iraqi government, and the coalition imposed no-fly zones, even in the Kurdish regions. The Iraqi Kurds gained from the overthrow of Saddam Hussain and gained autonomy in northern Iraq in 1991 under the United Nations. In 1992 there were Kurdish parliamentary and presidential elections, and the Kurdistan regional government the KRG was formed. In 2003 UUS-led coalition invaded Iraq and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and joined in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in a post-war referendum. The Iraqi constitution was approved, which recognized both the KRG and its parliament. A constitutional consensus on a referendum took place in the disputed areas in 2007, but this referendum has never taken place because of Baghdad. The 2003 US Invasion plunged Iraq into a period of chaotic political instability, which saw the emergence of a relatively new Mahdi Army, the group gained global prominence in early 2014. When it drove, the Iraqi government forced out of key cities in western Iraq and captured Mosul in the North. In April 2017 five months before the independence referendum took place, the Iraqi government with the support of international forces including the US, UK, France, Germany, and Turkey had launched a major military campaign in 2016 to retake Mosul from ISIL, in what became known as the battle of Mosul. Peshmerga forces entered the operation and fought alongside the Iraqi army the joint force defeated ISIL in July 2017, and the borders of the Kurdish region of northern Iraq were extended. The borders of the Kurdish Regions constantly

flow in line with Kurdish fortunes in the complexity of modern Iraqi politics. The Kurdistan regional government detained its independence referendum in September 2017. There are different Iraqi Kurdish political parties, and while they also provide self-determination, they often disagree on how best to achieve it. The two largest governing parties are the Kurdish Democratic Party KDP and the patriotic union of Kurdistan, the PUK. There is also the movement for change known as Goran and the Kurdistan Islamic Union. It was Masoud Barzani who had ultimately decided the referendum would go ahead and when. It is impossible to start to realize Iraqi Kurdish politics without first examining the differences between their main rival parties, the Kurdistan Democratic party the KDP. The KDP is led by Masoud Barzani, with the city of Erbil as its power base, this family always had power in the Kurdish issue for generations and continues to be important. Many continue to regard the father Mustafa as the founder of the Kurdish revolution, and posters of him are everywhere across the region. His son stood down as the KRG president after the referendum but is still the leader of the KDP. The main rival is the patriotic union of Kurdistan, the PUK founded by Jalal Talabani, and their base is in Sulaymaniyah to the South East of Erbil. The main cause of the conflict between the KDP and the PUK is each party's attempt to control the Kurdish region. To achieve victory, they resorted to external forces, Turkey and Iran supported them. Because all the fighting, Civil war Erupted in 1994 and lasted for years inevitably wider Middle East politics, further inflamed the conflict. Kurdish parties were united in support of the idea of an independence referendum, and Barzani had his way by staging it in September 2017. Still, other countries, both the region and the West, have played a part in both heartening and demoralizing the voters. Advisors like Kouchner and Levy are close to Masoud Barzani, and they helped him in the referendum.

## **Syrian Kurdistan**

Syrian Kurds are the 15 percent population of Syria's 22 million people, and the most significant Kurdish communities are in Damascus and Aleppo. Kurds of Syria have lived in the northern piece of the nation along the outskirts with Turkey and Iraq. The Kurdish territories of Syria are divided into three main parts, which structure regional outgrowths of the more prominent Kurdish domain in the neighboring nations.

The three Syrian zones are Kurd Dagh (the Kurdish Mountains in the north-western corner of Syria, which conveys the vast majority of Syria's olive creation). The territory around the town of Kobani situated by the Baghdad railroad; furthermore, the Jazira zone in north-eastern Syria in upper Mesopotamia. The Jazira experienced an extensive change from the finish of the nineteenth century and all through the central half of the twentieth century, as wanderers settled and became ranchers, transforming the region into the storage facility of Syria. Simultaneously, the area got plenty of Kurdish vagrants from the disturbance that arose in the wake of the making of the new Turkish republic. Kurds likewise live in large urban areas, including Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. In Damascus, the Kurdish occupants are said to go back to the twelfth-century attack by Salah al-Din Ayubi, himself a Kurd. In Aleppo and different urban areas, the Kurdish populace comprises basically of workers from the Kurdish rural regions. Generally speaking, at the hour of the French

Mandate, the Kurds made up 250,000 of the all-out Syrian populace of 2,950,000, about 8.5 percent (Zisser 2014, 194). By 2011 the Kurdish-speaking populace established around 10 percent of the Syrian populace or more than 2.2 million (Gunther 2014, 2). As per the standards of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France was conceded control over Syria by the League of Nations after World War I, the understanding was confirmed in 1923. As indicated by Jordi Tejel, the order time frame made ready for a specific political culture among the Kurds of Syria, portrayed by patient encounters and convenience of a vague political scene (Tejel 2009, 2). I discover two occasions urgent in this regard: the arrangement in 1927 of the Khoybun League, which strived for Kurdish national arousing, and the reception of the 1936 constitution, which preferring the Arab population, set off a call for independence by the Jazira Kurds. Political culture converted into reasonable restrictions inside the nation and even a level of cooperation with the officeholder system, as referenced above. Furthermore, Jazira was viewed as a unique case, coming full circle with around 120,000 Jaziran Kurds being denied of their citizenship in 1962. Even though the Kurdish nearness in the Syrian region goes route back, the Kurds were not bound together as a national gathering before the hour of the French Mandate. Generally, the Kurdish personality depended on nearby inborn alliance and unwaveringness towards neighborhood notables, likewise, it applies to the other ethnic gatherings of the Ottoman Empire. The objective of the Khoybun was to break these vertical ties and activate the Kurds around thoughts of a national Kurdish people group bound together by level ties. The nationalistic arousing propelled the Khoybun that The Kurds of Syria struck the European nations during the nineteenth century and arrived at the Ottoman Empire at the start of the twentieth century. In the Syrian setting, the activation of the Khoybun was a prompt response to the recently settled Republic of Turkey.

The Khoybun League was built up in 1927 and included Kurdish savvy people, ex-officials, sheiks and ancestral pioneers (Tejel, 2009, 17). A portion of the establishing individuals from the panel was exiled from Istanbul, where they had joined the Kurdish clubs. They had fled Turkey after the revelation of the Kemalist Turkish State or had been constrained into banish after the fizzled Kurdish uprising in 1925. Among them were Memduh Selim, Ihsan Nouri, and the Bedir Khan siblings (Tejel 2009, 144, n19). The Khoybun by and large increased most help in the regions that got the most outcasts from Turkey, for example, Jazira and Damascus. The principal objective of the development was to contradict the Kemalist system in Turkey, and accordingly, it didn't challenge the French Mandate in Syria. Depending on a gap and-rule system, the French specialists even permitted the alliance to meet and assemble inside Syria as it could be used against Turkey.

The outskirts among Turkey and Syria presently couldn't seem to be at long last settled, and this caused a few pressures between the two forces. Council bolstered the Ararat Revolt (1927-1930) and, in this way, turned into the center of the political and military authority of the revolt. After the annihilation in 1930 by the Turkish military, the Khoybun came back to the scholarly and social exercises of the Ottoman time frame, the siblings Jaladet and Kamuran Bedir Khan assuming driving jobs. While the political venture was elitist and present moment, the social activities had a more extensive also, increasingly perpetual effect. Jaladet Bedir Khan crafts

most significantly. He depicted also, formalized the Kurmanji vernacular and engendered the Kurdish letter set dependent on Latin letters. The siblings additionally altered Kurdish diaries and distributed investigations on customary music, history, and Kurdish ethnography. The primary motivation behind these exercises was to join the Kurds. Kurdish clubs and social orders rose, where Kurds could meet to contemplate the language and offer the Kurdish history and legacy (Yildiz 2005, 29).

The old Kurdish first class of Jazira, in collaboration with Assyrian notables, tried for more than social rights. They needed self-sufficiency like the one allowed to the Druze at Jabal Druze and the Alawites of Latakia toward the start of the 1920s (Tejel 2009, 29). The territory of Jazira was the end zone inside the Mandate, an area to be enslaved to the French position, which did not oversee the locale until 1927 (Tejel 2009, 27). State nearness was negligible, tallying just a few officials and state functionaries, and the foundation was powerless, for example, impoverished streets, no emergency clinics, and hardly any government-funded schools. Jazira unquestionably spoke to the outskirts of Syria. The 1936 Franco-Syrian understanding, which endowed the ability to the Arab more significant part of Syria, was the absolute last thing that could be tolerated. A revolt broke out in 1937. However, it was stifled right away. The independent cases laid on reliability to neighborhood notables and clan pioneers, yet after 1937 a developing doubt between the Kurds and the Assyrians emerged. The shared uncertainty among Jazira and Damascus continued. In this way, the inheritance of the French Mandate was a separate society. The French specialists had utilized a conventional separation and-rule strategy, which made pressure between the rustic and the urban. The Kurds of Syria populaces, among focus and outskirts and between the various minorities and the Arab more significant part (Tejel 2009, 41; Yildiz 2005, 28-29).

As a matter of first importance, the Syrian Kurds speak to a little network, which was cut off from the more noteworthy Kurdish people group by the fringes of the new states developing after World War I. They had associations with the Kurdish developments in the neighboring countries, in any case. The arrangement of the Syrian Kurdish gatherings can even be said to have been urged by outside Kurdish on-screen characters. It clarifies the mechanism of the Khoybun League, the Kurdish groups, and the PYD. In line with this, the activation of the Syrian Kurds was focused on the Kurdish rebellions in Turkey and Iraq and just to a littler degree at Kurdish legislative issues in Syria and certainly not at military obstruction against the Syrian system. Several Syrian Kurds were selected as peshmergas to Iraq during the 1970s and 1980s, mostly by the KDP (Tejel 2014, 73), and an assessed 7,000-10,000 Syrian Kurds were slaughtered in Turkey, battling as PKK guerrillas in the 1980s and 1990s (Tejel 2014, 76). The entirety of this occurred with the endorsement of the Syrian system, the point being to destabilize Iraq and Turkey in the provincial strategic maneuver.

The Syrian Kurds, on the other hand, were too heterogeneous to even think about forming an intermediary themselves. By 2011 the entirety of this changed. An increasingly self-assured resistance was framed in the wake of the Damascus Spring and the Qamishlo Revolt, looking for a progressively hard way to deal with the Syrian system. In this way, the new Kurdish restriction battled for Kurdish rights and impacted in the Syrian culture, leaving cooperation with the policy behind. The conventional war, which ejected as some portion of

the Arab Spring, focused increasingly world consideration on the Syrian Kurds. Two occasions during the conventional war have incredibly affected the change of the Syrian Kurdish character. The first was the withdrawal of the Syrian system from the Kurdish zones, leaving the regions of northern Syria in the control of the YPG volunteer army. The subsequent occasion was the development of the Islamic State, which end up being a foe of both the Kurds and the worldwide network. This occasion furnished the Kurdish YPG with a fundamental global military partner, in particular, the universal alliance battling the Islamic State. Fighting not just for Kurdish personality, the Kurds of Rojava grasped the universal reason for battling against the Islamic State also, for the vote-based system, ladies' privileges and pluralism, along these lines turning into a genuine accomplice of The Kurds of Syria worldwide alliance. The Federation of Northern Syria is pushing for a solicitation to the excellent arrangements on the eventual fate of Syria. They are introducing themselves as a coordinated piece of another political truth of a future Syrian organization. Incredible pressures among Kurdish gatherings and gatherings keep on speaking to one of the most considerable difficulties to Kurdish self-assurance in Syria, as the strain between the PYD and the KNC is not just a nearby wonder, yet also, includes their provincial and universal partners. What is more, autonomous Syrian Kurdish activists have raised their voices. They advocate liberal majority rules system and human rights, looking for help among Western intelligent people and legislative organizations.

## **Iranian Kurdistan**

Iran has always been a Shi'a state. It also ever tried to expand its hegemonic power.

Iran is highly connected with Iraq; the Kurdish case was used in 1975 in the settlement over the Algiers agreement. Iraq stopped the deal, and there was an eight-year war between them. Iran dealt with the Kurdish problem since the Islamic Republic has got power and connected with the "Arargai Ramazan" (Iranian Intelligence). It is believed that Shi'a sectarianism help to strengthen nationalism and the following quickly the Islamic revolution. Iran, while history has been self-isolated, the reason comes from the pre-Islamic era. Kurds have two approaches. Both reject the hegemony of Iran. The first is secular. It considers the idea of Islam of the demise of nationalism. The second is the nationalism of Sunni religion, which does not accept Shi'a hegemony. Kurds, in general, do not take Shi'asm Iran have tried to influence the Kurdistan region politically directly. In Kurdistan, there is a robust Islamic awakening. The ISIS-controlled Mosul, they advanced towards the Kurdistan region. At the same time, there was the creation of the Shi'a militant group "Ashd Alshabi." After the invasion of 2003 in Iraq, Iran played sectarian politics, by moving its extremist militants in Iraq. This policy was adopted to distance themselves from a similar attack. The same happened in Syria during the revolution, which led to the creation of ISIS. Recently, Iran policy has assumed a different role, giving every party the same importance; the country per se took positive steps towards equality between the various local groups and cultures. Kurds consider Iran as the region's savior. The formal policy of the Kurdistan Regional Government and for other parties is the avoidance of sectarian politics and the willingness

to build a relationship step by the step with Iran on shared interests and geography. Iran knows the importance of regional relationships in today political climate, Iran should respect the region of Kurdistan and support their aspirations to create stability and avoid the security threats into Iran. Conflicts related to ISIS, especially in Iraq and Syria, have created a shift in power across the neighboring states, Iran, mostly, who are trying to increase their political influence. Yet, the unequivocal strategy of Iran towards any Kurdish expectation of autonomy is a negative one. Accordingly, Iran will attempt its most extreme to obstruct any genuine exertion of Kurdish individuals to satisfy their fantasy of a free state. The explanation behind this can be found in the extent of Iran's influence over the more noteworthy Kurdistan whereby Iran appreciates significant impact over Kurds in three of the more prominent Kurdistan's four sections. Iran, Iraq and Syria and, purportedly, the Alawite Kurds of northern Kurdistan in Turkey. Nonetheless, as it is clear from the present moves in Iran's strategy, the nation's political elites comprehend that they can no longer proceed with their customary international policy concerning Kurds just as the more extensive Middle Eastern. As referenced, Iran has additionally profited by the development of ISIS and the squeezing matter of combatting its danger. It permits the country to introduce itself once again in the universal field, as an enemy of fear-based oppressor partner. What is more, the four-sided alliance between Iran, Russia, Iraq, and the Syrian system has reinforced Iran have a voice in the worldwide network as to the eventual fate of the Syrian regime, just as in other provincial issues. Despite the high confidence and raising desire of the area in the course of the most recent couple of years, the Kurdistan district is at present encountering oil value decay, just as playing host to 1.7 million exiles and uprooted people. Because of these variables, and its progressing battle against Islamic State, the Kurds are experiencing extreme money related hardship. With the end goal for Kurdistan to endure monetarily right now, Mahwi (2016) proposes that the agent workplaces of the Kurdistan district abroad will legitimately approach have nations for money related and military guide, to help Erbil adapt to an ocean of outcasts and a progressing war with ISIS, amid an emotional decrease in oil costs over the previous year" As of late, in the expressions of Rudaw (2016): "Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, quickly referenced on Tuesday that Moscow had sent a few arms to Iraq's Kurds, not long after they were undermined by Islamic State (ISIS) fear monger" This is despite the way that the Kurdistan area is not a piece of the alliance between Iran, Russia, Iraq, and Assad, as its genius progressive position has been clear since the beginning of the Syrian transformation. In this way, it is additionally in light of a legitimate concern for the individuals who restrict an Iranian-Russian alliance, both provincially and around the world, not to surrender the Kurdistan district at this crucial time. Kent (2016) features that Iran has applied a remarkable impact over Kurdistan, which has been seen politically as a partner of the West (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs). The position once involved by the West, of military help for the Kurds, has now been filled by Iran, whose inspiration lies to a great extent in "ending out its transformation and testing the West" as the help from the West decreases, Iran's impact becomes more grounded and more grounded (Kent, 2016).

It can be viewed as a multifaceted Iranian key position, first by containing it inside its territorial zone of impact and force reach and second, by keeping it away from its desire towards self-assurance, including a future self-

assurance choice. Furthermore, the technique tries to energize collaboration with the local Iraqi government and its unified arrangements, just as setting Iran in a place to reconsider its position from hostile to Syrian ace system, regarding its impact over the Kurds. The administration of the area has started to take more confidence in its relations with the West, beginning from a year ago numerous visits by president Barzani, to the USA, Europe, and local Western partners, for example, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Numerous individuals saw these visits as an endeavor to accumulate worldwide and provincial help for the up and coming submission on self-assurance. This submission is especially significant, and one could contend an authentic point in the legislative issues in the whole Middle East. It is up to the entertainers to include how genuinely they add themselves to decide the result. Effectively, a portion of the superpowers has just said something regarding this issue. Kent (2016) comments that UK-Kurdistan relations are needing improvement to forestall the locale going to powers who may not share our qualities" (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee). These worries are not unwarranted and are likely given the profound monetary and political emergencies of the Kurdistan district. (Kent, 2016). Even though the Kurdish ideological groups and the KRG have made numerous endeavors at maintaining a strategic distance from partisan legislative issues, partisan assessments uncover themselves at whatever point any political pressure introduces itself inside the focal government in Baghdad. This is because of the way that it is overwhelmingly driven by more substantial part Shi'a ideological groups, effectively bolstered by Iran. Particularly with the present preparation of the Shi'a activists, the presentation of partisan trademarks has been habitually revealed, energizing against the region and its authority. Nonetheless, territorial partisan polarization is rising and is set to proceed if Iran doesn't receive moderate, non-partisan governmental issues towards the aspirations of the Kurds.

The Kurds in Iraq, one could contend, have appreciated government self-administering since 1992, after the uprising of 1991 and the result of the Iraqi attack to Kuwait, during which it persevered through the thrashing of its military by a universal alliance drove by the USA. Stansfield (2014) contends that having been self-governing in Iraq since 1991, they [the Kurds] noticed the goals of the United States in 2003 to aid the evacuation of the Ba'th system of Saddam and carried on honestly of the game set up in the post-2003 period" In this manner, upon Iraq's destruction in 2003, the Kurdistan district deliberately took an interest in building another Iraq along with other Iraq's ethnic gatherings, making what Rafaat alludes to as an intentional association with Iraq. "As indicated by the Kurds, they have protected their entitlement from separating themselves from Iraq, particularly as the Iraqi government wouldn't like to actualize the constitution, which is the agreement that ties them to Iraq. This agreement exists in the introduction of the Iraqi Constitution (2005: 2), as follows: "he adherence to this Constitution jelly for Iraq its free association of individuals, of land, and power"" Since 2007, and right up until the present time, the Iraqi focal government does not wish to stick to the constitution. Therefore, as O'Leary (2015) puts it, "he inquiry that Kurdistan must pose to itself is: does it have any sensible proof to accept that the universe of 2005 as guaranteed in the content can be made genuine? My view is no" This is despite the way that the choice development, close by the Iraqi general races on 3the 30th of January 2005, ran a choice survey, as per the Kurdistan Referendum Movement International

Committee (2005), in all the Kurdish territories, including the supposed questioned zones; "the absolute number of Kurdi voters taking part in the submission was 1,998,061 individuals". As per a similar source, 98.88% of them cast 'yes' for the autonomy of Kurdistan, and the outcomes were: governorate decided in favor of freedom decided in favor of remaining in Iraq. The ideological groups at that point would have liked to ensure the Kurdish rights inside the Iraqi constitution by remaking Iraq and continuing inside it, as opposed to following up on the desires of the 98.88% of the voters. As they baffled the Kurds with continuous Iraqi governments neglecting to actualize the Constitution, step by step, the situation of the Kurdish ideological groups moved towards more grounded help for freedom.

## **Turkish Kurdistan**

Turkey's organizer Mustafa Kemal (otherwise called Atatürk - - "father of the Turks") instituted a constitution 70 years back, which prevented the existence of social sub-bunches in Turkey. Accordingly, any articulation by the Kurds (just as different minorities in Turkey) of remarkable ethnic personality has been cruelly curbed. For instance, until 1991, the utilization of the Kurdish language was unlawful. Any discussion that traces of Kurdish patriotism is esteemed dissent, and reason for detainment. The Turkish government has reliably defeated endeavors by the Kurds to sort out strategically. Kurdish ideological groups are closed down in a steady progression, and gathering individuals are pestered and detained for "violations of conclusion." Most broadly, in 1994, Leyla Zana - - who, three years earlier, had been the main Kurdish lady chose for the Turkish parliament - - was condemned to 15 years" for "rebel discourse." Her gathering was restricted. All the more as of late, in June, the pioneers of the expert Kurds Democracy Party (HADEP) were condemned to multi-year jail terms for purportedly having ties with the banned PKK guerillas. The examiners proof comprised to a great extent of public statements found in the HADEP workplaces from a news organization near the PKK. Adding to the complaint Turkey's Kurds is the financial underdevelopment of the southeast. The Ankara government has efficiently retained assets from the Kurdish locale. Subsequently, there are two particular Turkeys: the northern and western regions are profoundly evolved and cosmopolitan, some portion " the "main world," while the south and east are really the "third old." The divergence and constraint prompted the arrangement of an equipped dissenter development, the PKK, in 1984. While Turkey's don't transparently bolster rebellion from the Turkish State, many do support the PKK as the main power battling for more extensive Kurdish social, financial, and political rights. The State quickly reacted to this danger with expanded power, sending somewhere in the range of 300,000 soldiers in the southeast at a yearly expense of \$8 billions. What's more, the Turkish military established an arrangement of "town watches," paying and furnishing Kurds to keep the PKK guerillas out of their towns. Towns that will pass on the gatekeeper framework face destruction by the Turkish military, while those that endure under unforgiving retaliations by the PKK. The war raised drastically in the mid-1990s. Between 1984-91, an expected 2,500 individuals had been murdered. Throughout the following four years, that figure shot up to 20,000. Around 3,000 towns have been demolished

by the military with an end goal to defeat out PKK supporters, making more than 2 million outcasts. While Kurdish oppression turned out to be increasingly particular during World War II, to a great extent limited to Kurdish scholarly people, the general arrangement in Turkey has stayed predictable. This stranglehold is reflected in Kurdish writing. In this century, just around twelve works have been created in Kurdish. The creators usually have gotten jail sentences. Proof shows that Kurdish areas in Turkey are intentionally and reliably immature. Turkey's current military system, Kurds are hard hit by the strategies of a junta dreadful of political resistance. Since 1980 the Eastern and Southeastern regions have been exposed to in any event five military moves planned for threatening Kurds. The New York Times has detailed that in the nine months that followed the military takeover, 122,609 individuals were purportedly arrested. Of 40,386 officially charged, capital punishment was looked for 900. Of 70,000 current political prisoners, more than 20,000 are purportedly Kurdish, and 90 percent of these are presumed to have been peaceful protestors for Kurdish social rights. Until now, captures in Kurdish territories have totaled 81,634. Of these, 378 have supposedly been tormented to death, and 374 have been killed in evening time assaults. The most regular legitimate support for these captures is Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish reformatory codes that "ensure the financial establishments and social establishments of the country" and endorse 5-15 years detainment for "hose "trying to wreck the political and lawful request of the " te." Among the non-Kurds captured is Ismail Beshikchi, a creator and humanist who has been more than once detained for his analysis of authentic strategy. Recently captured invalidating the official case that Turks had brought forth world's extraordinary human advancements. Beshikchi is at present in prison for assaulting Turkish people, a belief system he portrayed as a bigot and colonialist, one planned to subsume independent organizations - the media, coops, colleges, and schools - under its rubric. Kurdish badge is banned. In Diyarbakir, 12 people were captured for selling Kurdish music tapes. The proprietors of shops with Kurdish names - HEVAL (companion) or WELAT (country) - were compromised and requested to change the signs inside the hour. One tailor who would not go along was tossed into jail for two days, and his symbol was modified. It is illicit for guardians to give kids Kurdish names; they should choose Turkish names or face discipline. In a strike on the town of Doganbey, the gendarmerie, whose battalion administrator was cited as saying, "We will annihilate all "curds," tormented the imam (blessed man) of the town for a few hours. The occupants were then compelled to communicate in Turkish. The ladies didn't talk Turkish, in any couldn't comprehend the orders. At the point when the town monitor interpreted them into Kurdish, he was beaten. At the point when he attempted to disclose that he needed to interpret because the ladies talked no Turkish, the officer requested the locals tormented because didn't communicate in Turkish. Such strategies have not been limited to the connection between Kurds and Turks. Two individuals from a French, human rights association (Medecins Sans Frontières), Luc Devineau, and Marie-Annick Lanternier were making a trip through Turkey to Iran when they were captured for having a tape of Kurdish music. They were additionally conveying a pamphlet in French about Kurds. They were condemned by a military court to 51/2 months in jail. German voyagers have additionally been capturing or making purposeful Kurdish publicity. One visitor was as of late tormented and ousted in the wake of being

held for ten days without having the option to contact his international haven. It is not substance to oppress Kurds inside its fringes. In 1980 the Turkish Embassy in Denmark requested the Union of Workers from Turkey to cease a Kurdish language course sorted out by the Copenhagen Evening School. The course was planned for consolidating Kurdish in the home language showing programs in Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, and West-German schools. The Embassy Councilor asked, "Would you say you are not Turkish residents? You should not instruct Kurdish to Kurdish youngsters." Turkey is away from the UN announcement of human rights and the European show of Human rights. As both an individual from the UN and the Council of Europe, Turkey should regard the central social privileges of its minorities. The Council of Europe has denounced Turkey for its concealment of ideological groups and associations, detainment and torment of political nonconformist and its legal executive procedures that ensure no assurance for the blamed. The Council has requested that Turkey reestablish law-based establishments, including the option to free discourse and protects for strict minorities and that it discharges political detainees and license a Red Cross assessment of jail condition Turkey's junta legitimizes its arrangements as being fundamental for the reclamation of big government.

Additionally, the protected and legal arrangements supposedly being considered by the national security don't leave a lot of trust in the outcome of a reestablished majority rule system. Corrections currently being proposed would build Executive force in the legislature and lessen the freedom of the legal executive. Another "State Security "court, liable just to the Executive, would have practically unchecked control over political cases, would boycott political exercises of trade guilds and expert affiliations, and take out every single political association aside from the two significant moderate gatherings. Given present mentalities towards political resistance inside Turkey, global supposition might be the main compelling switch against the fuse of such measures in the new constitution - measures that destroy restriction as well as render the ethnocide of Kurds in Turkey always useful. The mistreatment of Kurds is without contemporary equal in Europe yet is approved by the quiet of Western forces who keep on outfitting Turkey with the military and monetary guide. The West may well satisfy the job speculatively cast for it by Turan Gunes, previous Minister of Foreign Affairs, at an ongoing meeting of the Council of Europe, as he reacted to the issue of Kurdish freedom: The resistance was of only a couple of nations like West Germany, France, and England. They will have no issue selling a great many Kurds.

In 2002 the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP), a preservationist; however, non-confessional vote based gathering with Islamist root cleared the administrative decisions. It came to control under the apparent initiative of Abdullah Gül since party pioneer and previous Istanbul city hall leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was ineligible to serve in parliament or as an executive on account of a 1998 conviction; an established correction in late 2002 evacuated this ineligibility. Erdoğan was against the parliament in mid-2003 and immediately supplanted Gül as head administrator. That equivalent year Turkey would not allow travel through its region to the US military during the Iraq War, however it extended rights to air transport. The PKK, calm since the catch of Öcalan in 1999, continued guerrilla exercises in 2004 under

another name, Kongra-Gel, picked in 2003. Although the association returned to its previous assignment (PKK) in 2005, a few components kept on utilizing the new name. The gathering was believed to be the wellspring of various resulting assaults, and in October 2007, the Turkish parliament affirmed military activity for one year against PKK focuses on the fringe in Iraq; a progression of strikes started in December, and a ground invasion was launched in February. Even though the United States demonstrated its help for the restricted moves against the PKK by imparting insight to Turkey, it energized the advancement of a drawn-out goals to the contention. In spite of the fact that many recommended that the underlying Islamist foundations of the AKP may speak to at Turkey's mainstream popular government, others felt that the intermittent interruption of the military into Turkish legislative issues represented a more noteworthy danger. In April 2007, a huge number of secularist nonconformists, careful Erdoğan's Islamist roots, exhibited in Ankara trying to dishearten him from looking for the administration. Erdoğan submitted. The AKP at that point designated Gül as its competitor, although he imparted a comparative political history to Erdoğan: both started their professions in a master Islamic gathering since restricted, and both were hitched to ladies who selected to wear the headscarf, a noticeable marker of religion in an unflinchingly mainstream republic and a significant wellspring of dispute in present day Turkish society Gül's union with a lady who wore the headscarf was especially alarming for sure voters since wearing it at state capacities or organizations was prohibited and was viewed as a wrong experience of religion and State. The military, which had moved Turkish administrative procedures before, gave an update on the Internet reprimanding the rising job of Islamists in the administration and showing military availability to act if an unapproved up-and-comer, for example, Gül, won the administration; this methodology was named and upset by savants. Gül proceeded to get most of the vote parliament's political decision for the administration. Yet, the CHP resistance boycotted the vote and caused Gül to miss the mark regarding the substantial majority by a limited edge. Thus, the political decision results were later toppled in court, and a pause followed. Erdoğan attempted to determine the stalemate by calling for early parliamentary races, in which the AKP made sure about an unequivocal triumph. Regardless of the past political impasse, the AKP then again designated Gül as its competitor, and in the legislative races that tailed, he won the administration by a full edge.

The encounter between the AKP and the secularist restriction took on another measurement in June 2007 when Turkish specialists revealed a reserve of weapons having a place with a supposed ultranationalist arrange plotting to topple the administration. The disclosure propelled a progression of extensive interrelated examinations that saw several patriot figures, including various high-positioning military officials, captured and put being investigated for having partaken in antigovernment tricks. The occasionally Kafkaesque investigations regularly depended on the declaration from individuals from the military engaged with the Hizmet development, a system of devotees of the moderate Islamist pastor Fethullah Gülen. About 300 military officials, scholastics, columnists, and others were sentenced before the finish of the mass preliminary in 2013. While many hailed the examinations and preliminaries for uncovering a secularist "covert government," others were worried that the AKP was utilizing the reason to follow political adversaries in a

witch chase. All the feelings were upset in April 2016, yet by then, the capacity of the secularists to check the AKP had just been fundamentally subverted.

In 2010, amidst these preliminaries, the AKP proposed, and Turkish voters affirmed 26 changes to the constitution. These changes intended to reinforce popular government following EU guidelines and make the military increasingly responsible yet, also extended the impact of the president and parliament over legal arrangements. From one perspective, the revisions expand nation's offered for participation in the EU. They included estimates that reinforced human rights and diminished the force and invulnerability of individuals from the military. Be that as it may, given the progressing examinations and preliminary of the claimed Ergenekon plot, many were worried that the changes were a force snatch planned to empower the AKP and Erdoğan to seek after and indict protesters.

In the interim, in February 2008, the parliament had cast a ballot to Turkey's constitution by taking out a restriction banning the headscarf from being worn on college grounds. The correction irritated a long-standing separation point inside Turkish society. While segments of the populace upheld the freedom to wear the headscarf, others expected that the change Turkey's mainstream standards and could prompt expanding pressure upon those ladies who decide not to wear the article of clothing. Excited by the correction, rivals of the AKP recharged charges that the gathering had an Islamist motivation that undermined Turkish mainstream request. In March 2008, the established court cast a ballot collectively to hear a case that required the destruction of the AKP party and a five-year boycott of Erdoğan and many other gathering individuals from Turkish governmental issues, and toward the beginning of June, it canceled the change. The AKP effectively held its position. Nonetheless, when in July 2008, the court administered barely against gathering's conclusion. Starting in 2009, Turkish authorities and PKK pioneers held mystery converses with investigating alternatives for harmony. Exchanges vacillated when the repatriation of 34 PKK contenders and evacuees to Turkey in late 2009 incited an open festival among PKK supporters, incensing Turkish authorities. The dealings proceeded for a few additional rounds before consummation in 2011 without progress. During that time, Turkish specialists kept on capturing individuals from legitimate Kurdish gatherings, typically on charges of having had a place with psychological oppressor gatherings. Viciousness expanded after talks finished, arriving at its most significant level in over ten years.

An encouraged Erdoğan and the AKP face obstruction. In 2011 the AKP battled for parliamentary decisions on a promise to Turkey's current constitution. In June, the AKP won by enormous edges in the decisions, making sure about a substantial more significant part in the Grand National Assembly and another term as head administrator for Erdoğan. Be that as it may, it missed the mark regarding the 66% larger part expected to compose another constitution singularly. Another round of harmony exchanges among Turkey and the PKK was reported in December 2012. From an early stage, the new talks demonstrated more guarantee than the ones that had finished in 2011. In March 2013, the PKK discharged eight Turkish prisoners, and PKK pioneer Öcalan, still in Turkish care, reported his help for a truce. The truce finished in 2015 after talks had slowed down. Toward the beginning of June 2013, Turkey saw an extraordinary showcase of discontent after a little

exhibition in Istanbul over designs to change over an open park into a shopping center was fiercely separated by police. The occurrence started an overflowing of outrage against the Erdoğan-and AKP-drove government. Shows against monetary imbalance just as against administration's apparent tyranny and strict conservatism immediately spread through the nation. They were, on numerous occasions, met by revolt police discharging poisonous gas and elastic slugs. Erdoğan reacted rebelliously, excusing the dissidents as hooligans and vandals and holding rallies for AKP supporters. Soon after that, examiners who were engaged with the Ergenekon preliminary, and thought to be individuals Gülen's Hizmet development, declared a debasement test of individuals Erdoğan's internal circle, setting the AKP and the Hizmet event in opposition to each other. AKP rules restricted Erdoğan from looking for another term as leader, and in August 2014, he looked for the to a great extent masterful job of the president to stay in open life. Ahmet Davutoğlu assumed control over the post of leader that equivalent month. Davutoğlu, an AKP part who had recently served for a long time as a remote priest under Erdoğan, was generally expected to follow the course set by his forerunner in both domestic and outside issues. In a parliamentary political decision in June 2015, the AKP missed the mark concerning a flat out a more considerable part without precedent for its history, getting only 41 percent of the vote. The outcomes were generally observed as an objection to Erdoğan, who had made it realized that he would look for sacred changes that would extend the forces of the administration. The difficulty was a short one for the AKP, be that as it may. Arrangements over the mid-year neglected to deliver an administering alliance, setting off a snap parliamentary political race on the 1st of November The AKP won effectively, recapturing lion's share and missing the mark regarding the number of seats expected to singularly call a submission on extending the forces of the administration. AKP under tension: bombed overthrow endeavor, a crackdown on protesters, and monetary emergency. On the evening of the 15th of July 2016, a little group inside the military endeavored to dispatch an overthrow against the AKP-drove government, conveying tanks and troops to the avenues of Ankara and Istanbul and holding onto offices, including TV channels and scaffolds. In an announcement, the overthrow plotters blamed the legislature for dissolving the vote-based request and harming the standard of law in Turkey. The upset was half-baked, however, with no sponsorship from the general population and just fractional help inside the military, and it started to sway nearly when it began. Erdoğan, who had been traveling on the Mediterranean coast, surged back to Istanbul, utilizing web-based social networking to rapidly revitalize his supporters to go up against upset plotters in the avenues. Faithful military units and regular folks before long overpowered the upset planners, and before breakfast, the administration was immovably back in charge. Almost 300 individuals, generally regular people, had been murdered in showdowns. Incidentally, the overthrow endeavor Erdoğan's turn in stifling restriction and difference. He immediately pointed fingers at Gülen and his Hizmet development not long after (Fethullah Terror Organization "FETO)" by the legislature and like this by the Turkish press. Throughout the years that followed, Erdoğan led a wide cleanse, capturing countless individuals and expelling more than 100,000 individuals from their occupations—including police, warriors, scholastics, and government workers—over doubts that they may have been thoughtful to the upset. The association of vast numbers of them to the Hizmet development

was questionable. In April 2017, voters barely affirmed a submission that significantly extended the forces of the administration. Under the alterations, the president would become head of government just as the head of State and use expanded position to make administrative arrangements and pass laws by declaration, and the post of the executive would be wiped out. The progressions were set to be executed after the following decisions, initially booked to occur in November 2019. Early decisions were called, be that as it may, and were hung on the 24th of June 2018. Before the choices, the AKP went into a union with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Partnership all in all lion's share of the vote in the political challenge and Erdoğan won an out and out more significant part in the presidential challenge. The established changes were then actualized in July 2018 with the introduction of the new govern Erdoğan's new powers that were welcomed by a financial downturn started by a money emergency. The political precariousness of ongoing years had presented various vulnerabilities. Joined with populist monetary measures, remembering a driven blast for open works ventures Erdoğan's open restriction to raising loan costs, a money related downturn was at that point developing when of his re-appointment. Financial specialist certainty was sabotaged further in July when Erdoğan delegated his child in-law nation's fund to serve. Only weeks after the fact, the national bank declined to raise loan costs despite market weights to do as such. At that point, on the 10th of August, the United States reported taxes against Turkish steel and aluminum sends out. The lira endured a shot with every occasion and lost a fourth of its incentive by mid-August. On the 13th of September, the national bank assuaged a portion of the strain by climbing financing costs, and the estimation of the lira gradually improved. The emergency caused a waiting lull in financial development, and by 2019 the Turkish economy had gone into a downturn.

Taking off costs turned into the focal issue as the 31st of March 2019, local races drew nearer. Since districts in Turkey are answerable for controlling numerous fundamental administrations, the tracks were significant not just for the capacity of the AKP to actualize its national political plan, however the result was additionally expected to reflect open disappointment with the increasing expenses of living. The AKP-drove government in a few urban areas started to set up slows down to sell produce at cost. In the interim, Erdoğan, battling for the gathering, accused rising costs of remote obstruction and vowed to lead crackdowns on wholesalers. Despite these endeavors, the AKP lost its hang on five Turkey's six most significant urban areas, including Ankara and Istanbul.

During the budgetary emergency, apparent debasement, and a staggering constituent misfortune for the AKP, uneasiness with the course of the nation under Erdoğan started saturating the gathering itself. Among the individuals who reprimanded his administration after the local races were previous president Gül and previous PM Davutoğlu just as different heavyweights.

## Conclusion

This thesis analyzed the Kurdistan situation going into political and social issues that help to maintain this inequality between different culture, especially damaging the ethnicity of the Kurds. As we have seen before political processes still antique and they are not the only issue. Political parties play a central role in the whole Middle East, especially in the Kurdish question, having all these parties representing one ethnicity can be dangerous, because they create hostilities between them worsening the ongoing situation. The KRG and Barzani are the main characters, the referendum showed how democracy can exist in every situation and all over the world.

An important result, if not the most important, is about the “Arab Spring”, the hegemony was lost by a unitary Arab state in Middle East. The uprising of the people, that asks the recognition of their rights and the respect of their democratic freedom, represent a clear signal that the ideology of the Pan-Arabism has no reason anymore to exist. As already said, after the Sykes-Picot agreement of the 1916 and the Treaty of Lausanne, two parts of Kurdistan have been passed under the control of the Southern Kurdistan and the Northern Kurdistan. In 2003, after the fall of the Saddam Hussein’s Regime followed by the Iraqi War, the Southern Kurdistan obtain an autonomy form of the New Constitution, the new government is called Regional Government of Iraq and becoming a sort of State in the State. The Rojava Kurds had started a “*silent revolution*” against the Baathist Syrian Regime and conquered their autonomy on the field, assuming a fundamental role in the proclamation of the Islamic State. The long-term stability in the whole area is not possible without the concession of the autonomy to the Kurdi Regions and the recognition of their culture, there is the need of new government systems more open to the sharing of power. The most aggressive player in the region is Turkey, it is the key member of the NATO in the Middle East arena, it has chosen to remain seated outside of the war against the Syrian ISIS, they decided to move the war against the Rojava Kurds. These armed conflicts worsen the conflict increasing the confusion of the political situation of the Middle East. Turkey seems to beware, more than everything whatsoever form of autonomy for the Kurds in every part of the world. The idea of a democratic confederation in the Northern Syria that recognized the autonomy of the Kurds and other ethnic components where present terrify Ankara’s government, that see in danger the founder ideology of turkey itself: the one Nation-State based on the hegemony and the existence of only one ethnic group. The border between Syria and Turkey is long more than 900 kilometers and it is populated by the Kurds. The only interest of the Turkey is to block the Democratic Syrian force and the Kurds population to obtain achievements, it is showed from the declaration of President Erdogan. Turkey is falling apart, the anti-Kurds politics and the expansionism of this country, has made Turkey the same victim of the wars in Middle East. The strategic politics of Turkey in Middle east has fallen tragically. Years ago, Turkey was considered as successfully developed country, respected around the world. It represented a model of democracy in the context of the Islamic world and the political strategy to never be in disagreement with the neighborhood countries.

The party AKP was only hiding under its very nature, nevertheless it collapsed after the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict. The only way to resolve all their issues is to establish a peace with Kurds, and helping them to build their own political place, stop to consider them as enemy, and tolerate their differences.

Turkey and Iran are in competition to get the formal control of the Iraqi Kurdistan and the Syrian Kurdistan. Turkey use Sunni forces, which Erdogan stands as paladin, to put pressure on the Shiites government in Iraq, and to the Alawi government in Syria, both extremely sustained by Iran that wants to stabilize these areas under the control of its powerful Shia political regime. There is a strong alliance between Iran and Syria, it is based on profound common interests: the safeguard of the oppressive system of the State founded only on one ethnicity and the offset of the Sunni's hegemony and Western's hegemony. Kurds are a very important minority in Iran, they already have all the potential to defend themselves and, on the self-government, included political parties as the KODAR, PJAK, KJAR and KRC. The most important is the KODAR (*Dûyemîn Kongreya Komalgeha Demokratîk û Azad a Rojhilatê Kurdistan*) that is trying to promote a third path that is not in line with the current disastrous situation, they propose a model of modern autonomous democracy. The Baathist regime in Syria has always have a centralist regime and did not recognize the rights of single communities neither the ones of the Kurds. Nevertheless, the fight against the Kurds to recognize their rights in Syria is also the struggle for the democratization of the country. Kurds are not fighting to have their own country, but their goal is to create a democratic system in the North that could be a model for the future of the State. Unfortunately, a solution for the Kurd's question in Syria was not possible: only in the case for which the Syrian regime would accept to start a democratic platform would be possible to try to find an agreement. Since 2012, Kurds stabilized a democratic administration in the Rojava, that has as first goal the peaceful coexistence between the different ethnic and religious groups. As we have seen previously, the parties have all the power, in Northern Syria the government is based only on the ideas of the PKK founder, Abdullah Ocalan, detained from 1999 in prison. The "Democratic Nation" is a project on the limited political artificial borders that have created by colonialist power as the extension of their political strategy of division and domain of society. The definition of the democratic nation is plurality and community, the coexistence of free equal citizens, that is not bound by political borders or by a language or only one culture. The democratic nation is a project that generate democracy and fraternity, peace and freedom: not only between Kurds and not only in Kurdistan, but between all citizens in Middle East. The goal of the project of Abdullah Ocalan is clearly to setting up a new mindset and to create structure formed by citizens and politically activity, independently from their ethnicity, language, culture and religion. This system wants to make every member of the community politically active and give to them more power. The power of the democratic institution comes from the assemblies. It is on the base of this plan that Northern Syrian citizens has created a democratic system. This is in totally disagreement with the idea of centralized state-nation of Damascus, that is based on the marginalization of all the cultures and languages different from the "official" one, while the intent of the Democratic Confederalism is to celebrate the pluralism and the unicity of the various languages, cultures of all the Middle East.

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## Riassunto di tesi in italiano

In questo studio ho analizzato la zona del Kurdistan e le popolazioni che ne fanno parte, contando una densità di 35 milioni di persone. Questa minoranza curda venne distrutta nel 1920 dal trattato di Sèvres, il quale cancellò l'assegnazione di un proprio territorio nazionale. Il "Paese dei Curdi" non esiste su alcuna mappa geografica, ma essi sono la quarta etnia del Medio Oriente. La maggioranza di essi è musulmana sunnita: sono presenti in Turchia, Iraq, Siria e Iran. Alcune volte il popolo curdo viene riconosciuto e prende parte nei processi di partecipazione sociale e politico con potere decisionale, mentre altre volte subisce emarginazione ed esclusione sociopolitica.

Nel primo capitolo viene descritta la situazione generale dell'area del Kurdistan, lo scopo di questo lavoro e dello studio affrontato volge a sottolineare le difficoltà a cui questo popolo è sottoposto, e come, pur essendo nel ventunesimo secolo, la democrazia non appartenga totalmente alle forme di governo presenti in questa regione. I partiti politici curdi hanno un ruolo centrale nell'area del Kurdistan, i quali cercano di risolvere le questioni sociopolitiche, trovando una soluzione positiva presentata dalla popolazione. I processi di partecipazione possono essere considerati come un punto cardine nella democrazia, la frammentazione politica in questa area non permette alle minoranze di avere potere decisionale con scarsa considerazione in tema di diritti, come la Turchia, mentre in paesi come l'Iraq, dove l'autonomia politica è stata ottenuta nel 1992, questa minoranza etnica viene sostenuta e riconosciuta, permettendo la creazione di un proprio parlamento con potere legislativo. Questo elaborato descrive come i partiti sviluppano delle piattaforme per creare una relazione con la popolazione e come essi influenzano l'evoluzione della società e della politica nel Kurdistan. Il testo approfondisce le discrepanze nelle aree, guardando come un paese senza governo possa esistere e migliorare la sua posizione. Negli ultimi anni la presenza di differenti competitori nelle presidenziali e allo stesso tempo l'impatto dei media, ha aumentato del grado di conoscenza degli individui, questo bisogno di esplorazione è risultato in investimenti sugli individui di questa regione, nella struttura politica, e soprattutto nelle zone più in difficoltà. Nel secondo capitolo vengono descritti i processi partecipativi dell'area curda e le sue diverse peculiarità divise per territorio. Come in precedenza è già stato affrontato, la partecipazione pubblica e politica dei cittadini curdi è quasi inesistente, un grande passo è avvenuto tramite il Referendum del 2017 da parte del partito del KRG, questo referendum indipendentista si è rivelato purtroppo un fuoco di paglia, che ha scatenato ulteriori difficoltà, le faide interne difatti sono rinate, ed il governo federale sembra approfittare della situazione difficoltosa di questo stato e di questa etnia. La partecipazione politica e pubblica, e le forme di governo sono i fattori critici per questa area, e questi assicurano la partecipazione dei cittadini nelle politiche del governo. Il ruolo della partecipazione pubblica nel Kurdistan è diviso tra diversi attori nel pubblico, invece di ascoltare la popolazione, il governo curdo ascolta i partiti politici e gli esperti, ed i cittadini non sono coinvolti in questo cruciale processo. Due forme di governo rappresentano le due correnti che i curdi seguono, il primo è centrato sui partiti politici che formano il KRG, dalla tradizione del KDP e del PUK. Questi partiti

lottano per il potere all'interno di questo "stato", ma allo stesso tempo, lo costituiscono. La seconda corrente venne creata da diversi partiti e prese ispirazione da Abdullah Ocalan, il leader del PKK. Il grande enigma di questo movimento si sintetizza nel fatto che le relazioni tra riconoscimento nazionale e ostruzione statale dovrebbero prendere la forma di una organizzazione a sé contro lo stato, considerato come un "non-stato democratico". Il fine dei movimenti nazionali di liberazione nati nel 1960 fu la stabilizzazione di uno stato indipendente. Nel 1994 nacque il proto-stato strutturato dell'Iraq, mentre nel Kurdistan Siriano, la Federazione Democratica della Siria del Nord (DFNS), compreso il Rojava, esso è stato creato in base a forma non-statista di un'organizzazione della società riferita in termini di autonomia democratica e confederalismo democratico. In questa tesi, abbiamo analizzato il motivo per cui l'area del Kurdistan si trova in queste situazioni problematiche nella sfera politiche e sociale. Ciò che emerge da questo studio è la mancanza di partecipazione a livello pubblico nel processo di decisione del governo, poiché uno stato reale non è presente. L'insoddisfazione è visibile, i cittadini ed i curdi, non si sentono rappresentati da nessun tipo governo. Le aree più colpite sono, Turchia e Siria, dovuto alle decisioni illegittime prese dal governo, e la percezione negativa delle amministrazioni governative. Lo stato non permette ai cittadini di prendere alcuna decisione che interessa loro. La regione curda, e la mancanza di processi di partecipazione nelle decisioni pubbliche, causato da un uso improprio delle entrate. L'ostacolo della fiducia è uno dei più grandi problemi della partecipazione pubblica nel settore pubblico organizzative, i cittadini normalmente richiedono la trasparenza e la partecipazione alle decisioni statali, ma le organizzazioni pubbliche non si fidano dei loro cittadini. Questo significa che i membri delle comunità non sono accettati facilmente dal governo per uno scambio eguale di idee verso le decisioni pubbliche. I partiti hanno un ruolo centrale in ogni decisione presa, e sono i partecipanti più importanti. Nel terzo capitolo, viene descritta la volontà di questa cultura di raggiungere una propria indipendenza, dove riuscire ad essere liberi ed essere padroni del proprio territorio, inoltre ogni area specifica viene analizzata a livello storico e sociopolitico. I curdi hanno fallito nel creare una propria nazione, ma nel Marzo del 1991 il Kurdistan Iracheno si è rivoltato contro il regime reggente, per la prima volta nella storia essi sono riusciti ad ottenere delle elezioni parlamentari. Il processo democratico è stato raggiunto in poco tempo, la divisione di poteri tra i partiti politici del PUK e il KDP è venuta a mancare, per queste ragioni il paese ha subito una sanguinosissima guerra civile. Il Kurdistan semi-indipendente viene considerato come la parte Sud dell'area curda. I curdi sono stati vittima di violenti scontri, essi inoltre non sono riusciti a sviluppare il proprio territorio e la propria cultura fino all'arrivo del popolo americano in Iraq, che ha aperto la porta alla globalizzazione. L'invasione del 2003, avvenuta per l'esplorazione delle risorse naturali del territorio, ha mostrato al popolo nativo la modernità, portando volontà di cambiamento. Il Kurdistan Iracheno rappresenta l'esempio che dovrebbe portare ad una modernizzazione delle forme di governo presenti negli altri tre stati, dove la cultura curda non viene altro che danneggiata e non considerata. Come abbiamo visto in precedenza, i partiti politici sono il cuore delle decisioni politiche in tutto il Medio Oriente, specialmente nei quattro stati studiati. La rivolta della popolazione chiede la ricognizione dei propri diritti ed il rispetto della loro libertà democratica, essa rappresenta un chiaro segnale, il Pan-Arabismo non ha più ragione di esistere. I curdi del

Rojava hanno creato una rivolta silenziosa contro il regime Battista-Siriano e hanno conquistato la loro autonomia nel territorio, raggiungendo un ruolo fondamentale nella proclamazione dell'ISIS. La stabilità a lungo termine in tutta l'area non è possibile senza la concessione di autonomia alle regioni curde e la riconoscenza della propria cultura, c'è un estremo bisogno di un nuovo sistema governativo, che sia più aperto alla possibilità di divisione di poteri tra le diverse culture. La Turchia rappresenta lo stato più aggressivo, questo paese ha un ruolo fondamentale all'interno della NATO nella scacchiera del Medio Oriente, ha deciso di rimanere al di fuori di tutte le lotte e le guerre avvenute in quest'area contro l'ISIS, e sono entranti in guerra con i curdi del Rojava. Questi conflitti armati sono peggiorati con il tempo, aumentando la confusione della situazione politica di questa regione. La Turchia sembra rifiutare ogni forma di autonomia nel mondo, l'idea di una confederazione democratica nel Nord della Siria che riconosca l'autonomia dei curdi e di altre etnie terrorizza questo paese, e sembra che tutti i partecipanti di questa scacchiera politica vadano ad intralciare questa rinnovazione.

Il fine di questo studio volge ad intendere il significato di una cultura di avere un proprio spazio, cioè un proprio paese per sentirsi parte di esso, e più importante di avere la possibilità di scegliere per il proprio destino e futuro, dove possono prendere decisioni connesse con il governo. Il Kurdistan non ha mai raggiunto lo stato di nazione, ed è il più grande "non-stato" al mondo. L'area curda è sottoposta a diverse difficoltà, inclusa la rilocalizzazione, urbanizzazione, prostituzione, femminicidi, e basso indice educativo. In questa ultima decade, abbiamo visionato un chiaro sviluppo del Kurdistan in termini politici, con una accentuazione del Kurdistan come stato, in entrambe pratica e parole. La direzione politica degli individui curdi oggi è centrata sul teatro curdo come non mai. La questione più conosciuta del piano del Kurdistan è la "solidarietà dei curdi". La reazione dei gruppi ideologici a questo improvviso innalzamento delle aspettative è stata molto soddisfacente. La perdita di Kirkuk, specificamente, dopo la decisione nel Kurdistan Iracheno del 16 Ottobre 2017, ha stabilito una svolta all'interno della politica curda.