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The Social Production of a Menace: the Securitization of Migration in the EU

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, irregular migration has received extensive attention : sensational media reportages, popular and political discourses foment the apparition of apocalyptic images as the 'exodus' of migrants from the south of the world and the consequent 'invasion' of the north. All over the European Union migration management (mainly in the form of policies aimed at the reduction/ containment of the phenomenon) has become a top priority for the political élites, acknowledged as a crucial and necessary step in order to ensure national security in the political agenda.

The emergence of migration as a security issue and the consequently implemented policies (defined as the securitization of migration) are largely controversial issues, both in terms of their actual efficiency and of their humanitarian impact.

The first hypothesis that I am going to propose is that these policies are ineffective and unsustainable in terms of economic, humanitarian and strategic costs, indeed.

Given the consideration above, the fact that politicians continues to implement them is simply astonishing (why should a policy-maker continue to implement a policy that does not work?), and the aim of this paper is exactly to unpack and analyse the mechanisms that has produced these apparently irrational events to take place.

In order to do so I propose a second hypothesis, profoundly interrelated with the first one. I will argue that the securitization of migration is neither a random occurrence, neither migrants do pose a concrete and immediate threat to statehood and sovereignty. On the contrary, I will prove that the securitization of migration has been socially produced in response to external pressures and internal needs of European societies and of its political élites.

The research is a sociological quest; I will therefore focus on how the process societal interaction among several social actors can actually cause a menace to emerge and consequently shapes the related political response.

The research question that has guided the development of this paper is: why and how the securitization of migration process took place in the European Union?

Moreover, the time span considered relevant for this analysis is from the 1990s up to now (2020), since in this period the phenomenon has developed for the first time and has apparently reached is apex (2000s and 2014-2016). The precedent period (1950s-1970s) will be considered briefly just for comparison purposes.

Even if the main theoretical focus of the paper is a sociological one, I will try to test my hypothesis adopting a multidisciplinary approach. The securitization of migration process will be analysed from different angles, including international security study, linguistic, historical and political sciences insights. I would like to highlight and remark that these views are never utilised per-se, but always in light of the sociological aim and structure of the analysis. Moreover, theoretical stances will be always supported (each time that it will be possible) by empirical data and facts.

Well, this paper will begin specifically from empirical facts regarding the securitization of migration in the European Union, indeed. In concrete, my intention is to develop this research applying a reversal zooming process, therefore going from the specific case studies to the general mechanisms that have produced their existence. The following brief of the structure of the paper and the annexed brief illustration of the content will illustrate the meaning of the sentence above.

The research will be structured in three chapters.

The first chapter deals with (security oriented) policy implementation, which is the last step of the securitization of migration process. I decided to put this last step at the forefront because I felt that the conceptualization of migration and the concrete description of the phenomenon were a necessary first step to take in order to properly deal with the issue, and to acknowledge its relevance. In concrete, in the first chapter I will set the stage for a scientific research separating the common sensual understanding of the migratory phenomenon from the technical one. Then, I will analyse the characteristics of the contemporary migratory flows towards the EU and the consequent political reaction. Finally, two specific case studies will be taken into consideration: the Italian-Libyan cooperation in the migration management field, and the Spanish-Moroccan one, moreover, I will analyse the intervention of the EU in both the situations. The whole chapter is designed to test the first hypothesis.

The second chapter deals with the analysis of the actual social mechanism that has transformed migration in a security issue. The chapter begins with the conceptualization of "security", and proceeds with the application of the "securitization process" – as defined by the Copenhagen School- to the specific case of migration in the EU. I will illustrate why and how migration has become a security subject and national and supranational identities the respective security object. Then, I will illustrate the role in this process of the mass media, public opinion and political élites as securitizing actors. Finally, I will take into consideration the role of discourses (of better speech-acts) as the main securitizing instruments.

The third chapter, in conclusion, goes into details of the arguments addressed in the previous chapter, offering a final (and hopefully convincing) argumentation about the political and not substantial nature of the migration threat. The main focus of the chapter are the different articulations and the common traits of the securitization of migration discourse in the EU and in its member states. I will firstly analyse the existence of alternative discourses to the securitization one (the economization of migration), and explains why they have remained marginal and not become hegemonic. Then I will analyse the main axis along which the securitization of migration discourse use to evolve, and above the manufactured and mythological nature of their respective argumentations. I will consider the key role of the (exclusionary) populist parties in spreading neo-racism. Well, in conclusion, I will analyse the (timidly) different articulation of the securitization on migration discourse proposed by the EU in comparison with the less tolerant version of its member states.

Finally, the second and the third chapter are dedicated to the testing of the second hypothesis.

1. MIGRATORY INFLOW AND POLITICAL REACTION

1.1.   INTRODUCING MIGRATION'S COMPLEXITY

International migration studies are characterized by an inherent difficult in theory formation, mainly due to the complex nature of the subject matter. Moreover, the historical embedment of the migration-mobility discourse in the political realm has strongly compromised the aspiration to neutrality and objectivity, which should be the deontological basement of research. This persistent situation of conflicting interests has caused the activity of theory-formation to become even more cumbersome and migration to become acknowledged as a contentious issue. Therefore, before to start developing the core discourse of this research paper, it is necessary to point out some clarifications, in order to separate common sense and the commonly shared "migration related knowledge" from sociological analysis.

First of all, it is necessary to contextualize the contemporary migration processes in the current world arena. Indeed, despite the 21st century being regarded as the era of globalization by definition, its alleged fluidity and openness is not all comprehensive. In practical terms, while free movement of goods and capitals almost represents a worldwide respected rule, the free movement of people is still strongly regulated. This may seem counterintuitive, but it is a paradox that needs to be highlighted and understood.

Technology and culture, in fact, are normalising free movement only for a certain (high) class of people, conducing them to think and live beyond borders and so to cross them frequently, generally constructing international careers. While this high skilled worker movement is sustained and celebrated as "professional mobility", the movement of low income and low skilled people is generally condemned, usually even through legal means, and defined as "illegal migration". Said in the very Bauman's words (1998): "the right to be mobile is more class specific and selective than ever".

It is now clear that the narrative that presents the 21st as an era quintessentially characterized by mobility and openness is not realistic, and that the widespread perception of living in a border-less world is heavily overdrawn. More specifically, this vision only applies to the North of the World and has become hegemonic due to its enormous soft power, and therefore its capacity to produce and spread knowledge and images regarding migration and migrants.

In second place, the movement of low-skilled and poor people is generally presented as harmful and dysfunctional by this dominant political discourse, and more recently even as an existential threat to the stability and the prosperity of the hosting state. In brief, the idea that low skilled migration should be reduced or eliminated since it represents a threat to prosperity and public order has almost become an axiom, constituting the backbone of migration policies of almost every country in the Northern Hemisphere. This negative view of migration presents the phenomenon as something of intrinsically damaging and dangerous,

and therefore presents eradication as the only possible solution to it. The a priori conceptualization of migration as a danger for the hosting society constitutes a recognized analytical bias. Bekewell defines this posture as "the sedentary bias", indeed.

Moreover, while governments keep reflecting on which strategy would be better suited for reducing and managing such inflow, the debate over the argument has highlighted the limits of every attempt designed to regulate the migration phenomenon.
According to Stephen Castles (2010) in fact, the reduction of migration flows cannot be considered a problematic issue in itself since it is beyond the political reach; indeed, he as defined migration as an "individual strategy to accommodate social change", and social transformation is by definition unstoppable.
In addition, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other UN agencies have demonstrated that migrations are a constant of the human history and that the proportion of the migrant population remains stable, around the 3% of the whole world population, over time. Various eminent scholars as De Haans (2006) support this thesis, he has affirmed that even an all-comprehensive development of the countries of origin would not reduce migration, indeed.

Therefore, now that the impossibility of the removing the phenomenon has been acknowledged, it is fundamental to focus on the aspects of migration that are possible to manage, in order to improve both the experience of the migrants and the experience of the hosting countries.
For example, the mitigation of the condition of chronical inequality and discrimination under which most South-North migration takes place, would lead to safer migratory journeys, to the lessening of marginalization and to a decrease of the social tensions in the hosting society.

The graph shows how the percentage of the migrants stock over the global population tends to be stable over time. Precisely the percentage oscillated from the 2,891% in the 1990 to the 3,347% in 2015. It is a graphic re-elaboration of the chart provided by the World Bank dataset.

1.2. ANALYSIS AND CHARACTERIATICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MIGRATORY FLOWS TOWARDS THE EU AND ITS CONSEGUENT POLITICAL REACTION.

1.2.1. Why and how do people move?

People while migrating do not actually move between two fixes places, as the common sense generally presupposes. The evidence from research strongly challenges this view; and this is the case even for the inflow seeking to accede to Europe. Indeed, as Heaven Crawley and Dimitris Skleparis (2018) demonstrated, people usually arrives to Europe following a series of separate migration decisions. Moreover, generally a considerable amount of time – even years- use to pass between the decision to leave the country of origin and the arrival on the European soil. People decide to move on the basis of the partial (and often limited and incomplete) knowledge and information they have at the time of the beginning of their journey, and it is exactly through keep moving that they acquire additional information over which destination is more suitable to their needs. This leads migration processes to be characterized by continuous adjustments; migration is a fluid and "stop-and-go" process, indeed.

The authors in this paper (ibid.) made a concrete exemplification of the nature of this phenomenon reporting the experience of Afghans and Syrians. Both respectively perceived Iran and Turkey to be their final destination, before deciding to flee to Europe. People basically, decides to expatriate in order to conduce a more dignified existence, and according to the author this can be translated – to just give some examples- in the quest for more favourable economic condition, for a more extensive human right protection or political right coverage and even for the purpose of conducing a safer existence. Therefore, every single decision to migrate comprehend the analysis of all these variables and more, it includes processes that may range from the value-judgement to the costs-benefits analysis. And specifically, in order to arrive to Europe, this sort of considerations, as we have stated before, generally have to be conducted more than once.

The complex and variegate decision-making process described above clearly produces complex and variegated results. In fact, the migratory inflows directed toward Europe, is generally profoundly heterogeneous. They have been defined as "mixed migration flows" and they are composed by asylum-seekers, regular economic migrants and irregular migrants (economic migrants aspiring to be regularized). Moreover, it is fundamental to keep in mind that being the whole migratory journey often composed by

separate migration decisions, people may actually change their status during the process, therefore shifting from one legal category to another.

These factors have become even more accentuated in contemporary migrations. While from the end of the WW2 to the 1990s, it was pretty easy to individuate the dominant migration trajectories and their respective origin and destination areas, contemporary migrations are far more unpredictable, indeed (Mezzadra, 2007). In concrete, contemporary migration trajectories are multiples and in a constant process of evolution and adjustment, it is no more possible to individuate the precise geography of these movements and to encapsulate them in approximately coherent "migratory systems" as it was used before.

The map below brings back the focus on the European case, it shows all the sea and land routes that migrants use to reach Europe. Moreover, another crucial information contained is the respective flow rate for each migratory route both in 2015 (at the peak of the Migration Crises) and in 2018 (at the end of the crisis). Finally, it is interesting to note the variation of importance and weight of the different routes over time, and that this drastic variation has not caused any sensible decrease in the securitization of migration trend and process (as will be analysed in the next chapter).

Migrant numbers in 2015 and 2018

Graph from the "Infomigrants" dataset.

1.2.2. European reaction: the "de-bording of European borders"

As it will be analysed in the following chapter, Above all after the 11/09 and the 2014-16 wave of terrorist attacks conduced in Europe (exactly during the Refugee and Migrants Crises), The 2008 Economic Crises

(also the 1970s one in a smaller extent), the rise of unemployment in western democracies and the contemporary rise of populism in politics; migratory inflows have been increasingly associated with a variegated bundle of problems including terrorism, social unrest and criminality. Migration and asylum issues, as a consequence, have started to be considered as security threats that should be managed by the member states and by Europe itself through an accurate policing; the issue indeed become extremely politicised. This process is often referred to as "the securitisation of migration", and it is one of the two main trends currently characterizing the European border management landscape -it will be analysed in the following paragraphs-.The other trend is the "externalization of migration and asylum policies" - which will be analysed later on-.

First of all, the European securitisation process of migration mainly assumes the shape of border-work or border-management. Well, before starting to analyse the wide range of different manners through which such function is implemented it is fundamental to understand the extreme peculiarity of the EU case. Indeed, the scholar Didier Bingo refers to the Union bordering practices – and, more generally, to the whole European security architecture – as "virtual", since it "proceeds through a fluid assemblage of actors, functions and mechanism and no one of them can be identified as the physical bordering state".
In concrete, the main strategies actually pursued by the Union for the purpose of border defence are four. First, the "thickening" of border defences in order to create "buffer zones" between Europe and the various country of origin, as for example, the creation of joint naval patrols with third neighbouring countries. Second, the application of the notion of "smart border", with borders performing the function of a filter (according to strict criteria well-established by EU law, with professional skills being one of the discriminants as stated before) rather than a total blockade, as they used to do in the past. Three, the increasing use of military technology – EUROSUR,VIS e SIS[1]- , in order to enhance border protection; it is becoming a common trend to have European agencies' military activities performed outside the actual territorial border of the EU. And at last, the insurance of forced return of illegal migrants to the country of origin or to one of the countries of transit.

Moreover the new EU border work, is not only about the management of the migratory flows, but is an integral part of the wider European attempt to "secure the external", that is a fundamental guideline of the EU foreign policy.

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[1] EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System) is a pan-European border surveillance system designed to support the Member States in their efforts to reduce the number of irregular migrants entering the European Union. It is aimed at improve surveillance at the EU level by introducing more advanced technologies (drones, reconnaissance aircraft, offshore sensors, big data analysis and satellite remote sensing) and on information sharing and coordination. VIS (Visa Information System) is the database containing information on persons applying for Schengen visas, in order to better respond to evolving security and migratory challenges and improve the EU's external border management.
SIS (Schengen Information System) is the most widely used and largest information sharing system for security and border management in Europe. SIS enables competent national authorities, such as the police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on persons or objects.

The idea of exerting pressure and influence over its neighbours in order to reach security objectives has always been an important part of the European foreign policy, and more specifically, it has been addressed and implemented by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)[2].

However, the rhetoric underling the utilisation of this political instrument has recently been changed. Indeed, while in 2003 this security objective was being pursued through an ENP underlined by a rhetoric of friendship and cooperation; from 2009 on this narrative has been substituted by another explicitly based on preventive security. In fact, while in 2003 the EU policy was aimed at achieving the stability of the its external border by creating an adjacent "ring of friends", a clear example is offered by the engagement in state making in the Balkans; already in 2009 the 90% of all EU aids to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – all of them classified as ENP countries – has been directly spent on border management.

The example depicted above is just an illustration of a far wider trend, and in the light of these considerations, it become logical to infer that the EU is actually using its influence and resources in order to convince its neighbours to become its policemen, above all for what concerns irregular migration.

However, neighbouring countries are not the only providers of preventive security for the EU. Indeed, the main purely European actor endowed with the same aim is FRONTEX: the European Agency for the management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Members States of the European Union.

Established in 2004 with the EU Council regulation No 2007/2004 (3), FRONTEX capabilities and tasks have been subsequently expanded through EC following regulations. In concrete, the agency is required to carry out a multiplicity of tasks that range from the providing of training to the national border guards of the member states, to the carrying out of risk analysis. They even include the coordination of member states joint actions, and the possibility to conduce direct actions of detention and deterrence of incoming migrants through land, sea and air forces in order to prevent them from touching European soil.

The vertiginous rise in the FRONTEX budget, from 6.2 million euro in 2006 to 87.9 million euro in 2010 is illustrative of the strength of the securitisation trend in the area of EU border-management.

The other fundamental trend to analyse is the "de boarding of European borders", academically referred to as the externalisation of migration and asylum policies. It does not represent a new-entry in the EU foreign policy field in which it has been firstly introduced as early as 1999, precisely in the Tampere Council conclusions, but it is currently becoming one of the core concepts at the base of EU border-management project.

The implementation of the EU externalization policy consists in the activation of two subsequent operational levels. The first level is about the delegation of asylum management and irregular migration to the

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[2] The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a foreign relations instrument of the European Union . The EU works with its Southern and Eastern Neighbours to foster stabilisation, security and prosperity, in line with the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy.

(geographically) peripheral member states of the EU (i.e. Spain, Italy and Greek), which consequently become responsible for the protection of inner states from the accession of undesired people. The need to fulfil this task had made the reactivation of international border checks in the Schengen area often a necessity.

The legal base enabling the possibility to implement this first step are the Dublin II Regulation of 2003, for what concerns the border-work delegation, and the "fist safe country principle", that precisely refers to asylum claims. Indeed, according to the "first safe country principle", asylum seekers should submit their asylum claims to the first safe country they reach, notably the peripheral EU country through which they had necessarily acceded European territory. It is fundamental to highlight that Greece represents the only peripheral European member state to which the status of safe country has been denied.[3]

The second level, on the other hand, involves the delegation of the management of irregular migration and asylum from peripheral states to third countries. It is mainly achieved through the signature of bilateral readmission agreements and partnership agreements between EU member states – or the EU itself- and relevant third parties. These fundamental political instruments allow peripheral member states to return illegal third country nationals occupying their soil to their country of origin or to a transit country. Such practice has been mainly developed within the context of the ENP and involves Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, East Georgia and Azerbaijan to the east, and the he entire region between Syria and Morocco to the south.

Also the legal base of this second level of externalization is the Dublin II Regulation, in which the possibility to return asylum seekers to "safe third countries" is highlighted, but clearly depending on the existence of previously signed readmission agreements between the two countries involved.

There is a further relevant sub-division regarding the externalization procedure of migration and asylum control, in fact, policies are generally developed according to one of this two *modus operandi*: the fencing model and the gate keeping one.

Politics following a fencing strategy are designed to actively target illegal migrants in order to arrest and then expel them, while policies designed according to a gate-keeping strategy generally have the aim of concretely restrict the means of access to a nation and to its institutions.

These two dimensions can be combined with the two level of externalization previously discussed in order to create a 2x2 all comprehensive typology able to illustrate all the declinations and nuances of the subject matter, and to provide an exemplification of the measures more commonly implemented for each kind of model.

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[3] On the 21st of January 2011, the European Court of Human Rights issued the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment, on the asylum seekers transfer system within the European Union. The Court held that asylum conditions in Greece were so bad that not only Greece had violated the ECHR, but also Belgium for having transferred an asylum seeker back to Greece. Greece was no more considered a "first safe country". On the 22nd of September 2011, according to the opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, asylum seekers may not be transferred to other Member States if they could there face a risk of serious breach of the fundamental rights which they are guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

	Gatekeeping Fencing	Gatekeeping Fencing
Externalisation towards other EU MS	- Visa procedures - Carrier sanctions - Paper controls at ports of entry (land border or sea border or airports) - Procedures to deal with asylum at the border or within the country's territory - Labour market checks and controls of access to welfare and other services - Cooperation with countries of origin and transit to prevent irregular migration	- Border controls outside ports of entry, at land or sea - Cooperation with transit or origin countries for expulsion and readmission procedures - Internal controls at public places - Detention, expulsion, removal and other procedures to enforce return
Externalisation (to third countries)	- Visa procedures - Carrier sanctions - Paper controls at ports of entry (land border or sea border or airports) - Cooperation with countries of origin farther away to prevent irregular migration	- Border controls outside ports of entry, at land or sea - Cooperation with origin countries for expulsion and readmission procedures - Detention, expulsion, removal and other procedures to enforce return

Source: Compiled by Anna Triandafyllidoub and Angeliki Dimitriadi (2013)

Therefore, after having analysed how actually the externalization procedure works, the strategic and special role played by the peripheral EU member states finally appears to be clearly demarked.

They are both at the receiving end of the externalization process performed by the inner states and are delegating agents to third control, indeed. Triandafyllidoub and Dimitriadi (2013) classified them as the "European outposts" since it is on their territory that EU mechanisms and policies firstly emerges as a response to the migratory influx, and their territory is where these policies are firstly implemented and tested.

All the processes described above has produced a change in the very nature and function of the European borders, this process is perfectly summarized by Etienne Balibar (1998; also 2009), in her paper "Europe as Borderland": EU borders are no longer merely the "shores of politics but …the space of the political itself"

1.3.   CASE STUDIES

In this section, I am going to focus on two case studies: the Spanish and Italian migration management, and their peculiar partnership with Morocco and Libya. In both the cases the states act as forerunners for the EU, that eventually becomes more and more involved in this initial bilateral partnership.

These two cases have been selected for two main reasons. First, Italy and Spain are two peripheral EU member states; therefore, the concrete analysis of their border-management experience would practically illustrates what in the previous section has been politically and legally illustrated. Second, both Morocco and Libya are south-Mediterranean countries and the Mediterranean has long been the premier site for the prolongation of EU influence and the externalization of European Governance.
The Mediterranean, moreover, has also become Europe's graveyard; tragically, there has been over 10.000 documented deaths along the EU maritime frontiers in the past 10 years.

The map below (Limes) illustrates the three main Mediterranean routes through which migrants and refugees use to reach the EU. First, the Western Mediterranean route directly involves Spain and Morocco in its final stretch, second, the Central Mediterranean Route directly involves Italy and Libya, finally, the Eastern Mediterranean routes involves – on the respective shores of the Mediterranean- Turkey and Greek. Moreover, the number posed over each vector indicates the actual number of migrants that in 2015 have reached Europe through that specific route. It is, moreover, fundamental to highlight that all the data contained regard the 2015 migration flows, indeed. For the EU 2015 has been a crucial years of the 2015-2016 Migration Crisis, and this data are fundamental to understand the extension of the phenomenon while its intensity was peaking. The scenario was astonishing, during that year 1.008.616 migrants reached EU trough the illustrated routes, and 3.760 of them disappear. Fences and walls were rising all over the continent, and several countries in the Schengen area reactivated internal border checks.
The key role that this six states, and of their bilateral collaboration, have played – and are still playing- should now distinctly appear.

1.3.1. Spain and Morrocco

Ceuta and Melilla are the two Spanish exclaves, peculiarly situated in Morocco; they have constituted a true laboratory for the externalization and securitization (and, therefore, militarization) of the migratory issue in the EU. They are the only two Spanish cities in the African continent, but seven more Spanish-owned

populated territory are present: the *Islas Chafarinas* (composed by *Isla del Rey, Isla Congreso and Isla Isabel II*), *Isla Alboràn*, the *roca de Alhucemas* and the *roca de Vélez de la Gomera*. Their respectively geographical distribution and dimension is illustrated in the map above (Limes).

The city of Melilla is situated on the North-East Moroccan coast and has a population of 86,384[4] inhabitants. Ceuta is situated at the extreme North of the country, it is practically located on the Strait of Gibraltar; the city has a population of 85,144[5] units.

Both the cities are "artificial", since their economy is neither able to justify nor to sustain their actual existence, the two cities are largely dependent on subsidies by both the EU and the Spanish government. The latter has allocated in 2019 has almost 271 million for Melilla and 317 million for Ceuta, indeed, an amount incredibly higher than the budget generally spent on the management of Spanish city of a similar size but located on Spanish soil.

Both Ceuta and Melilla enjoy the status of Autonomous City, and both their security apparatus are outnumbered. Moreover, the two cities are surrounded by barriers, which separates Spain and Europe from Africa.

The wall built around Ceuta consisted of two parallel 6-metre high fences topped with anti-migrant razor wires - strongly criticized by human rights organizations -, with regular watch posts and underground cables connecting the spotlights. A large deployment of military technology is usually employed, including noise, movement sensors and facial recognition systems. The deployment of military personnel is considerable, given that dozens of guard ships and patrol boats check the coast, while the Guardia Civil and the Police control the shore. Despite this massive militarization of the frontier, numerous attempted and successful breach has been conducted, sadly often resulting in the death or wounding of migrants and agents. One of the most tragically known of these cases is the attempted breach of the 7th October 2005[6].

The structure of this peculiar frontier has remained almost entirely stable up to the 2019, when razor wires started to be removed, and the fence has been elevated from 6 to 10 meters. The restructuration of the fence has been partially funded by the European Union and conducted by Morocco. Moreover, it is important to highlight that Spain in the years between 2008 and 2016 has received 1/3 of the FRONTEX budget for the control of its shores and frontiers.

The reason for the existence of all these exceptionalities – even anomalies at same points- can be explained in relation to the special condition of Ceuta and Melilla and of the peculiar role of Spain. The country, in fact, is the owner of the only two European cities in the African continent; they are the first and last Spanish,

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[4] this figure dates back to 2018

[5] this figure dates back to 2018

[6] Hundreds of migrants attempt the crossing of the border fence; caught between Spanish rubber bullets and Moroccan gunfire, between 13 and 18 people died, and more than 50 were wounded. Some of the dead were wounded by live ammunition. The event catalysed the international attention.

and therefore European, frontier line. Ceuta and Melilla have, indeed, an enormous political and strategical weight with regard to irregular migration.

Even Morocco itself, as every country sharing the border with the EU, have the possibility to display a fundamental role as an implementer of the EU preventive security agenda. The EU gradually developed a method according to which huge amounts of resources were allocated to neighbour third countries in exchange of their engagement in the containment and management of migratory flows directed towards the EU. This has been the case for Turkey, in 2016 the country received a 3 billion package by the Union (over an agreed 6 billion total), for Libya that received 130 million in 2017, and for Morocco too, that received 140 million in 2018.

Moreover, for these countries the exercise of the role of "gate keeper" is not only financially rewarding, but also significantly strategic. It allows them to exercise a major political pressure over the Union, indeed. Using the menace of "opening the gates" to illegal migration, they acquire an enormous lobbying and negotiating power.

In conclusion, the transformation of third neighbouring states in the EU policemen implies enormously high prices both politically and economically, and as we will see soon, it produces fluctuating results.

Despite these huge investments, migration flows have not stopped yet, and –in some cases- have not even been reduced. The recent Spanish experience offers an extremely fitting exemplification.

In concrete, in 2018 118795 migrants have acceded to Spain, 59000 of them have acceded the country through the southern border – the Ceuta and Melilla frontier- and the other 59 795 have moved in disembarking.

Well, even if the total magnitude of the flow has diminished if compared to the 2006 level, the number of disembarks has sensibly raised, in fact in 2006 the number of arrivals by sea was of 39170. Moreover, according to the Spanish ministerial dataset, the total number of arrivals in 2018 have been higher than the sum of the total arrivals of 2015, 2016 and 2017. If one considers that the 2018 is the year in which the Ceuta and Melilla southern border has been fortified, these statistics are a clear demonstration that the militarization of the main migratory routs does not automatically produce a reduction in the whole influx. There is, indeed, a much larger sample of variables that needs to be take into consideration and it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that the partial closure of a route's main consequence is generally the creation or the consolidation of alternatives ones.

This is precisely what has happened after the extremely costly fortification of the southern Spanish border (Ceuta and Melilla frontier), that in fact has merely produced the growth in importance of the Central Mediterranean route and the of the establishment of the alternative Canary Islands route. While, in concrete, the whole magnitude of the flow continued to oscillate independently from these military containment measures.

Jesus A. Nunez ,coordinator of the *Institudo de Estudios sobre Confictos y Acción Humanitaria (Iecah)* , offers a recapitulation of the discourse presented in this sub-section, he sustains: "The efforts of destination countries to curb the migration inflows results in the lengthening and segregation of the migratory routes, they never achieve their closure. This is because for a desperate does not make a difference if the barrier he/she has to cross is eight or eighty meters high: he/she has nothing to lose anyway". This is a translation of the quote reported in the 06/19 number of the Limes editorial.

However, despite all these evidences against the security- coercion based approach, the EU still continues to bet on the Spanish military recipe. This trend has been demonstrated by the constant growth in the budget of FRONTEX and, even more, by Junker's proposal to triplicate the budget destined to the management of the frontier and of migration in the 2021-27 period in order to create a permanent military force presiding the whole EU border.

1.3.2. Libya and Italy

If compared to the result produced by the joint fortification of Spanish-Moroccan frontier, the partnership between Libya and Italy has produced consequences that are more tangible in terms of reduction of the inflow. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to consider both the different nature of their collaboration, then the consequently different strategies implemented, and finally the incredibly high cost- in humanitarian and economical terms- associated.

To understand all these differences, it is necessary to begin this section with a brief historical introduction. Italy has been at the receiving hand of irregular arrivals and asylum seekers since the mid-1990, but its importance started to growth exponentially since 2005, due to the beginning of the cut-off process Ceuta and Melilla. It caused migration flows coming from Northern Africa to be redirected towards the Italian Island of Lampedusa. Libya, therefore, due to its geographical position, become a privileged departure point.
The map below (Canali, 2019) illustrates the main migratory routes passing through the African continent and directed towards the European one. Almost all the various minor ramifications converges in three main routes (indicated by "1", "2" and "3" in the map), and two of them passes though Libya. The powerful visual impact of the map allows to rapidly acknowledging the crucial geopolitical position of Italy and Libya for the EU migration containment purposes.

Once understood the crucial function of Libya, Italy suddenly decided to strengthen the already existing cooperation with the former.

Indeed, already in the years between 2000 and 2005 the two countries started to develop a partnership, only partially codified, mainly informal in nature, and based on two main pillars. First, the mobilisation of parallel patrols conducted by both, preventing therefore the exit of migrants from Libya and their possibility to accede to Italy. Second, the return of irregular migrants to Libya as a point of transit or origin for the migrants. In exchange, Italy had to lift the Libyan embargo and equipped the country with war gear for border surveillance.

Despite the implementation of these policies, arrivals continued almost unaffected until 2009, which represents a turning point. In 2008, in fact, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. In this treaty the practice, that was performed by these joint patrols of interdicting boats full of migrants and to return them summarily to Libya, was codified. Even the EU joined this effort of migration deterrence; it offered its assistance to Libya for the control of its vast southern border located in the Sahara Desert (EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM missions) and provided the country in 2017 of 130 million euros for the containment and management of migration flows.

In 2010, arrivals were at minimum, but it implied an incredibly economic and humanitarian high price. Italy had to pay a 5 billion dollar "colonial compensation" to Libya. Moreover, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)[7] and the European Court of Human Rights[8] declared that the Italian "push-back policy" was against the principle of *non-refoulement[9]* , a binding principle for all the signatories of the 1951 Convention on the status of Refugees and of the European Convention on Human Rights (and Italy is part of both). In concrete, the Italian practice of directly returning vessels to Libya, without assessing migrants' asylum claims, resulted to be a violation of International and European law.

However, the situation radically changed in 2010, when Arab springs erupted in Northern Africa. Revolutions spread out in the vast majority of MENA countries, often producing devastating consequences, including in terms of political stability, as in the case of Libya.

In Libya, the uprisings and the governmental repression become so extended and violent that protests suddenly turned into civil war. During the civil war, Gadhafi has been deposed and his regime overthrown, but no viable alternative to it have emerged yet. The subsequent years have been characterized by the collapse of the governmental system of the country, chaos and militia wars, indeed. Two main figures emerged from the failure of the Libyan state. First, the General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Second, Fayez Al-Sarrāj, President of the Libyan Presidential Council. In 2015, the UN recognizes to the latter, under the conditions dictated by the Skhirat Agreement[10], to rule the country legitimately for a period of two years. Al-Sarrāj, therefore, become the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), that however in 2017 concluded its unsuccessful mandate, leaving the country still in a situation of political vacuum. Anarchy again raged all over the country.

Now, the reflection of these events on the European migration inflow, more precisely through the central Mediterranean route, will be analysed. In concrete, since the 2014 on, the influx of migrants have constantly grown, reaching its pick in 2016, with 181000 arrivals. In addiction in the first 6 months of the 2017 almost 100000 migrants have disembarked, and it is striking that, at the end of the year, the total amount was just of

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[7] "Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol," January 26, 2007. The UNHCR have found that non-refoulement obligations are not limited by territorial boundaries and that the Refugee Convention prohibits states from returning refugees to persecution from outside their territories. It applies wherever a state exercises control or jurisdiction, including on the high seas or in another state's territory.

[8] Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC], Application No. 27765/09 (2012). The case concerned Somali and Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya. Returning them to Libya without examining their case exposed them to a risk of ill-treatment and amounted to a collective expulsion.

[9] The principle of non-refoulement forms an essential protection under international human rights, refugee, humanitarian and customary law. According to it, no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status. It applies to all states parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and to its 1967 Protocol.

[10] The Skhirat Agreement also known as the UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement is a 2015 United Nations-mediated deal that consolidated Libya's government. It was aimed at ending the division that persisted since the 2011 uprising that ousted longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi.

119 000 souls. July 2017 has represented a true turning point, indeed, from then on, the influx magnitude has remained stable, of almost 23 000 units, so in line with the level ensured by Moammar Gadhafi. Even the manner of performing human trafficking has profoundly changed after that fatidic July. While before traffics were openly conduced, after that date, they returned to be a covert operation, indeed.

The expiration of the period of biennial transition, under the lead of the GNA, – as provided by the Skhirat Agreement- has opened up the possibility for each faction to become the governmental one. Nevertheless, history teaches, that the possibility to govern is only achievable if international and national support exists. Therefore, political legitimacy become a primary good to which each faction aspires.

And when the EU, and the wider international community, declared that they would not have supported any emerging Libyan power correlated to people smuggling, then militias found themselves virtually obliged (if willing to continue their inherent quest for power and richness) to radically transform their migration-related businesses.

Libyan militias, that were the principal agents of the migratory industry, have subsequently become the principal actors of migrants' detection, indeed.

They transformed the latter in an industry too, so not to renounce to economic profits while gaining the political legitimation connected to the role. As summarized in the Editorial *Dalle Libie All'Algeria Affari Nostri* (Limes): migration business has shifted from the "consensual exportation of migrants" to the "forced importation of slaves".

Effectively, the only places where migration containment is factually enforced is on the Libyan costs, while in the Southern deserted border of the country human trafficking still continues undisturbed.

Emblematically, the LNA –now considered an international actor- , which controls numerous detention centres on the costs, contemporarily actively introduces migrants from Sudan to the Kufra region. Clearly, they have actively contributed to the transformation of the country in a "bottle neck"; literally a place where migrants are stored and where value is brutally extracted from them. While in Libya, indeed, migrants usually find themselves in a situation of extreme vulnerability, often out of money and without any kind of legal protection or status; migrants are often held hostages in the detention centres.

One of the most common form of abuse perpetrated on them is the kidnapping for ransom. Migrants are often horribly tortured, and their sufferings filmed and transmitted to their families, in order to ensure the payment of the ransom. Sadly, data shows the rapid spread of the phenomenon, while in 2014 1 over 4 migrants was estimated to become victim of kidnapping for ransom, in 2018 the proportion was estimated to be at 2 over 3, indeed.

The usage of these practices has been proved to take place all around the country, even in the detention centres formally managed by Tripoli (GNA), and therefore co-financed by the EU. Indeed, it is common for such militias to take possession of EU founds, which are formally designated to the construction of exemplary detention centres.

Tragically, even enslavement of migrants has become a common practice. Militias, in fact, use to "sell" or to "rent" migrants to local entrepreneurs or directly force them to work to pay the debt accumulated during their transportation.

In this context, prostitution has become one of the most diffused forms of migrant-slaves exploitation. This is precisely the motivations behind the incredible rise in the number of sexual assaults perpetrated on migrants in Libyan detention centres. According to a recent research of the Human Right Watch, up to the 70% of migrants held in detention centres have been victims of sexual violence, indeed.

These data are the demonstration that the main result of the internationally declared war on smugglers, at least in Libya, has been to cause the worsening of the already dramatic conditions of the migrants, which were exactly the people that the international community meant to protect.

In conclusion, in this peculiar case, the actual magnitude of the migrant inflow has been incredibly reduced, but, as we have seen, at an incredibly high price, above all in humanitarian terms. Moreover, this solution is clearly not sustainable in the long run. Indeed, despite the evidences, migrants still continue to perceive Libya as an attractive destination due to its proximity to European coasts, therefore the raising number of migrant's stock would lead the proliferation of the migration-detention businesses, adding a further element of destabilization to the already chaotic North African country. Well then, the measures intended to fight illegal migration, has actually produced the dramatic side effect of increasing the Libyan entropy level, and therefore to produce a menace to European Security comparable (arguably bigger) to the migration one.

2. THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF A MENACE

2.1 CONCEPTUALIZING "SECURITY"

In this chapter, I am going to analyse how and why the securitization of migration process has developed in the European Union. Since both the concept of "security" and the concept of "migration" (and therefore the linkages between them) have a subjective nature, the first and necessary step to take is to conceptualize them according to a theoretical posture. Well, in order to provide these theoretical lenses, it is necessary to start with a brief excursus of the evolution of the concept of security, while the concept of "migration" has been previously clarified (chapter 1, subsection 1.1).

The End of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union represent a demarcation line between the traditional view of security and its modern understanding. There is, moreover, a correspondence between this traditional view and a narrow definition of security, and between this modern view and a broader one. On one hand, the narrow definition of security is profoundly state-centric and tends to focus on national security in terms of material capabilities as the use and control of military force.

In concrete, according to this view, a state (security object) can be only threatened and attacked by another state (security object) trough military means, and therefore, military attacks should be state's only security concern. Consequently, a state is only thought to be secure if it is able to defend its territorial integrity and the physical integrity of its inhabitants, and if it can prevent other states to compel its political action (Walt 1991).

State centrism, the focus on material capabilities and the quest for power are all core elements defining the realist doctrine, which is inextricably linked (clearly) with this narrow definition of security.

On the other hand, the broader definition of security acknowledges the possibility of the existence of multiple security objects and multiple security subjects. It recognizes the existence of political, economic, societal, cultural and environmental security threats (i.e. climate change, a pandemic widespread, organized crime, economic crisis etc.) beyond the classical military one and examines how these threats affect not only states but also groups and individuals, and society as a whole (a broad range of non-state actors, indeed).

The Copenhagen School has played a leading role in this redefinition of the concept of security, mainly through the development of the "securitization approach". Buzan, Waever and Wilde have designed this theoretical frame in 1990s, and it is so innovative because, for the first time in the academic history of the field, they have applied a constructivist rationale to security studies.

In Buzan's words: "securitization means that an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures. According to the securitization process, something is designated as a security issue

because it can be argued that it is more important than other subjects. By framing an issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics, securitization represents an extreme version of politicization which means that an issue is part of public policy" (Buzan et. al. 1998, 23).

To paraphrase and summarize, a subject becomes a security issue, not necessarily, because it represents a real threat, but because it is presented (by securitizing actors) as such through the securitization practice. This view allows, therefore, to tackle and analyse the subjective nature of security specifically, and of its subjective linkages with security objects and subjects (Nazli Choucri).

While the traditional (realist) view postulates that threats concretely and objectively exist and only needs to be "discovered" by the relevant parties involved, the securitization approach is a constructivist one, it presumes that threats are constructed in the process of social interaction between the relevant parties. In concrete, security interests are no more fixed, but are defined by the interplay of actors who respond to cultural factors, and that are pressured by the external environment.

In this chapter I will break down Buzan's and Nazli's definition of the securitisation process, isolating and analysing in each sub-section its main building blocks, in order to understand clearly the mechanisms described by this sociological understanding of security.

2.2 SECURITY SUBJECT AND OBJECT

According to the Copenhagen School, two of the main components of the securitizing process are the security subject and the security object. Security is an actor-based process, and actors mainly through their discourses can depict an issue as a security object or subject. Specifically, an issue becomes a security subject if the relevant actors depict it as a security concern.

In addition, the referent object is an issue or a thing that is framed as being under threat.

Clearly, another fundamental component of the securitization process emerges from the description above: discourses, or better "speech acts". For the Copenhagen School, the enunciation of insecurity itself may create a new security necessity and may produce an urgent call for political intervention beyond the 'normal politics' means. In the securitization process, discourses and actions are entangled, and this performative power of words is expressed by the concept of "speech act". However, this point will be analysed in the following section.

In this section, the focus of this analysis will be the relevance of migration as a security subject and the relevance of national and supranational identities as the object related in the contemporary socio-political-economical European context.

The aim, therefore, is to understand why – in contemporary times - migrants, and not other social groups has

been securitized. In the past, indeed, other social groups have been the objects of securitization discourses, as it has been the case with "the communists" during the cold war era. While in contemporary times, social groups that endanger our democratic system (such as the resurgent far right movements all over Europe) have not been securitized. This highlights the socially constructed nature of security issues.

Identity, security and migration has been recently associated since they all have recently become hottest topics of both the institutional and public debate.

Several contemporarily circumstances and development threaten the classical understanding of national sovereignty, and therefore identity, indeed. Some among them are the crisis of the western European welfare state model, the general rise of poverty even in developed countries, the deterioration of the living condition in the cities, and globalization.

I will briefly focus on the latter, considering its huge implication for this study.

Financial deregulation, free movement of capital and goods, high-skilled workforce, and cultural/audio visual products, characterize the process of globalization. These reflects the loss of authority of nation-states (in the classical Westphalian sense) in a world that is more and more interconnected. As Lord Curzon (1908) affirmed –in translation- "the integrity of the borders is the condition for existence of the state".

With the spread of globalization the very "raison d'être" of borders seems to disappear and this is inadmissible for a nation state, since territoriality (and therefore border management and enforcement) and sovereignty, according to the classical and Weberian understanding of statehood, are two inextricable elements. Borders are the visible mark reaffirming state sovereignty. The existence of nation states, therefore, is deeply linked to the existence of physical borders, and since their very existence is threatened by these unstoppable forces, states needs to find an alternative way to keep enforcing them, if they want to continue to exist.

Bigo (2008) propounds that securitization is a result of states' efforts in this direction; in his words "securitization is a result of states efforts to create new borders, with social and identity elements, beyond existing psychical borders", indeed.

Paradoxically, one of the biggest side effect of globalization has been the proliferation of borders, which have assumed a novel significance beyond their classical geopolitical one. The new nature of borders is anthropological and political (Mezzadra, 2007).

Moreover, according to Campbell (1992), Huysmans (1998) and Wæver (1995) when people feel insecure tend contract in their political community of belonging, and in security practices, the political and social identification of a community and its way of life develop in response to an existential threat.

In the following paragraph, I will demonstrate why actually migrants do represent the ideal cultural threat

that allows the state to erect new identity-based borders, now fundamental for the survival of the Westphalian order.

According to the Schmittian scheme (Carl Schmitt), then further developed by Simmel and Simone de Beauvoir, opposition creates identities. In concrete, new identities are created by the opposition, generally manufactured by a powerful actor or a set of them, of ones' own identity against the "enemies", merely "others" presented as aliens, as people that are incompatible to and dangerous for our values and culture. To paraphrase, the existence of "constitutive other" is a *conditio sine qua non* for the construction of ones 'own identity, and each historical period, for each state (and non-states actor), has been characterized by the existence of their peculiar "others", depending on which interests and self-image they would like to pursue and project.

Like "security" also "identity" is a social construction, it takes its building material from collective memory and history, which meaning is organized and reorganized according to cultural projects and social power relations (Stivachtis, 2008). Therefore, identity building is a process that, each time that is at work, generates two competing collectives, good "us" against evil "them".

Well, up to the end of the Cold War it has been rather easy to detect who actually this "us" and "them" was, for example, the identities of the "communists" and of the "liberals", of the "(filo)Russian" and of the "(filo)American" implied set of values and belief that mutually excluded and reinforce each other. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, western democracies desperately needed a new "enemy" for maintaining and enhancing their level of social cohesion.

Three crucial moments have contributed to the conceptualization of migrants as the novel "enemy" of western democracies, above all in the European Union and in the US.

The first moment has been in 1996, when Huntington published "The Clash of Civilization", this book prepared the theoretical ground for the development of the securitization of migration discourse. He identifies multiculturalism as a cause of societal disintegration. According to the author, Interactions among civilizations intensify "civilization consciousness", namely the awareness of the fundamental (and insurmountable) differences in their tradition, language, religion and culture. He predicted civilizations crash to shape the post-Cold War global order (as the levels of civilization consciousness rise) and he theorized the application of the same reasoning to societal integration, when individual members of different civilization do actually meet.

In concrete, the existence of other cultures alongside the home culture endangers its survival, and therefore, migration is depicted as being one of the main factors weakening societal homogeneity and national tradition.

For the first time, migrants have been presented as different and not adaptable, and to naturally "clash" with

the "western civilization" social model, or better myth, of the hosting society.

This narrative, in fact, is based on the (false) presumption that a distinct and homogeneous national community/western civilization existed in the past and that it can re-established by the expulsion of people belonging to other civilizations, namely migrants coming from the south of the world, indeed.

Second, the 9/11 events enormously stimulated the circulation, diffusion and adoption of the securitization narrative. Moreover, it has been the cause of the creation of a further securitizing nexus involving migrants besides the migration-cultural security one. Migrants started to be considered as a threat to individual and national security, the existence of a migrant-terrorist nexus was affirmed by (and for) the public opinion, indeed.

The 2004 Islamic terrorist attack in Madrid, the 2005 attack in London and the wave of attacks conduced in Europe in 2014-2016, exactly during the European Migration Crises, caused the strengthening of the above mentioned nexus, and the general spread of racism and xenophobia all over the continent. It caused the worsening of the living condition of anyone who belongs (or has belonged) to the "migration spectrum", from refugees, economic migrant, up to second-generation migrants already integrated in the hosting society and in possession of citizenship.

One of the main actors that produced the strengthening of the discourse that presents migration as a security concern are the extreme-right, exclusionary populist parties, that clearly growth and proliferated in an economically fragile (2008 financial crises), insecure and scared Europe. The nature of this actor will be better analysed in the third chapter.

Third, the growing influx of migrants during the European Migration Crisis itself has been a crucial element producing pressure on the member states' reception infrastructures, and reinforcing the conflict tension among migrants and settlers.

Finally, there is a further element qualifying the peculiarity of the European case, and it is Europeanization process itself. As we have stated before, migrants have gradually become the "cultural" others against which nation states enforced their cultural borders and defined their own identity.

Well, in the European Union this process has been twice at work, since it has been run both at the member states' level to reinforce their own national identity and by the EU itself, that from the mid-1980 on attempted to construct an all-comprising "European Identity". As Mary Kaldor wrote, the 1980s has been the period in which the EU recognized the need to create and solidify a new European identity based on a social and cultural, no more merely on an economic one. This resulted in the proposal of several measures: a European national holiday, a European "transnational" anthem, a European flag and European Union signs on external borders.

In concrete, the EU attempted to construct its supranational identity adopting the same methods generally

implemented by the nation states, including the conceptualization of migrants (non-European) as "constitutive others" (Chantal Mouffe) and their consequent securitization. This discourse will be further developed in chapter 3.

In conclusion, it is because migration allows the reconstruction of the reason to be of borders, through social and identity elements, in a world in which they are actually fading, that it has become the greatest security issue of the 21th century. This is the rationale underlying the securitization of migration process; it provides the explication of why political élites paradoxically insist in implementing policies of securitization of migration, while it has been demonstrated that they do not produce effective results.

Summarized in Didier Bigo words "proliferation of border controls, the repression of foreigners and so on, has less to do with protection than with a political attempt to reassure certain segments of the electorate longing for evidence of concrete measures taken to ensure safety."

The political nature of the securitization of migration process will be subsequently analysed in the following section.

2.3 SECURITIZING ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS

"Even if one accepts that the arrival of large groups of outsiders can be pretty disruptive for a community of the established, the definition of the situation and the way one tries to govern it depends on political and social processes (Elias and Scotson 1994)."

As briefly mentioned before, the Copenhagen School, defines security (and insecurity) as a political and socially constructed phenomenon. In concrete, this section explores the societal dynamics that has produced migration as a securitized phenomenon in the European Union: not a threat for what it is, but a threat for what it represents.

According to the Copenhagen School definition, securitizing actors are the ones who creates or triggers the perception that the referent object is under threat. In the context of this analysis, the main actors, proposing migrants as a threat for national communities, are political élites- national governments, political parties and international organizations-, the public (and his opinion) and the media.

Another fundamental concept related to the study is the one of "speech act". Actors frame a thing as a security subject through "speech acts", that are the principal instruments available to them in the securitization process. Discourses (in any conceivable shape: worlds, images, videos, tweets, posts),

according to this view (for the first time proposed by Austin, as anticipated in the section 2.2) acquire a performative power (Michel Foucault, Judith Butler), indeed.

Finally, Robert M. Entman defined framing as "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text", "frame" can affect the public understanding of the political world (Reese 2007), indeed.

2.3.1   Definition of "hegemonic discourse"

Speech-acts only conduce to an effective framing (which actually affects and shapes the general understanding of an issues) if the discourse type on which they are based on becomes hegemonic. In concrete, an issue becomes securitized only if the securitization of that issue becomes the hegemonic discourse type in a society.

In the following sub-section, I am going to analyse the social dynamics that has caused the securitization of migration discourse to become hegemonic, and that therefore lead securitization to take place. While, the focus of this section will be the theoretical definition of the core concept of "hegemonic discourse".

The "hegemonic discourse" is a composite concept, partly deriving its meaning from the Gramsci's theory of hegemony and partly from Michel Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-theoretical approach.

On one hand, Gramsci theorizes that hegemony was cultural in nature, and that actors try to preserve their hegemonic position in a society by designing and diffusing an ideology that justifies, reaffirms and reproduces the position of the hegemonic class, therefore defending the status quo. Gramsci's theory is generally applied to the International Relations domain, but it is suitable for almost any level of analysis.

On the other hand, following Foucault, the discourse-theoretical approach presents power - intended as politics - as governing every aspect of social life, and presents discourses as the instrument through which such practise is conducted.

From the combination of these two theoretical views the genesis and definition of "hegemonic discourse" follows. In Buonfino's words "the prevailing ideology or political force that is hegemonic at one time will produce a hegemonic political discourse through which it will construct and reproduce power relations aimed at the preservation of its hegemony within society".

However, it is important to highlight, that the European Union is a democratic institution and that its member states are democracies too, and that consequently European and member states politics is constrained to follow the logic of the democratic game.

Therefore, the exercise of power by politicians is heavily constrained by decision of the public to support them or not. If politicians do not receive enough consensus and votes, they will not be able to exercise power. The characterising interplay between media, public opinion and political élites becomes necessary for the creation of a hegemonic discourse, exactly because of this democratic rationale, indeed.

Another implication of democracy is that the one hegemonic discourse produced by the hegemonic political force at once will never be the only possible discourse in a democratic society. Democracy implies plurality, and in this context, plurality means that there are as many discourses as there are political forces, and that these forces (and therefore their discourses) are in a continuous power struggle aspiring to become hegemonic.

In concrete, the prevalence of a discourse type over another (and therefore the decision of the hegemonic party to adopt a discourse instead of another), according to Mouffle, "usually occurs because of the beneficial effects that the chosen discourse type can have (or is perceived to have) on the preservation and strengthening of existing power relations within society".

2.3.2 Societal interaction: from Private Fears to Securitization

According to the researcher Alessandra Buonfino (2004) the process of securitization is divided in two steps, the first one is the politicisation of an issue, and the second is when the related political discourse becomes hegemonic –namely, the extreme politicisation of an issue-. A discourse only become hegemonic if it is adopted by the hegemonic political forces, in concrete, only if the hegemonic political force adopts policies in compliance with the kind of narrative promoted by the politicised discourse.

The securitization process, therefore, represents a continuum that goes from private fears to the actual implementation of securitizing policies.

I am going to analyse the social dynamics that characterizes each aspect of this evolution, starting from exploring the ones that has led to the transformed migration into a politicised phenomenon.

The mass media plays a key role in determining how the public and policy-makers are responding to new migration challenges. In western societies, media do represent the main channel through which hegemonic and subaltern discourses are referred to individuals, and the main channel individuals have to expose public concerns to political élites. Moreover, "reporting and commentary does not just reflect the events that are happening and views that are already 'out there', it actively contributes to construct our understanding of what events mean" (Hall, 1997). That is exactly the rationale that explains why the (public) description, categorization and representation of migrants do matter, and has a crucial weight in the securitization process.

However, the power relation between the political realm, the public sphere and the media is far from being straightforward.

Media relationship with the public is extremely complex. It has been demonstrated by several studies over the last decades that mass media has an influential role in shaping people's perception of social and political issues; but it is difficult to disentangle media's impact on public ideas from the impact of other (potentially

infinite in number) causal factors. However, as Koopmans (1996) suggests the effects of media coverage on the public are more intense in a direct proportion to the visibility level of an issue. Moreover, extensive research literature (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002; Vergeer, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2000) points at the strengthening of this correlation when the messages presented in a certain information environment (i.e. in a state) are consistently biased in one direction, or cumulatively "cultivates" attitudes or expectations about a particular subject. This scenario precisely adheres at the migration case in the EU, and the following cases offers a clear exemplification.

First, Sciortino and Colombo's study (2004) focused on the Italian case. They analysed the coverage of the migration issue in "La Stampa" and the "Corriere della Sera" (two of the most prominent Italian newspapers) over the 1969-2001 timespan. They have documented an explosion in the visibility of migration, passing from 232 immigration related stories in the period from 1982 to 1985, to 1754 from 1989 to 1991. Moreover, they documented a shift in the core discourse presented in the stories. While in the 1970s, immigration was mainly associated with the labour market, in the 1990s it has been mainly correlated with crime.

Second, Benson (2002, 57) conduced a similar analysis in France and reached similar conclusions. While during the 1970s immigration was mainly conceived in humanitarian terms in the news, in the 1990s it started to be prominently associated with illegality, drugs, riots and crime, indeed.

In sum, mass media do not only reflect and report public fears (Dal Lago), but actually can strengthen and structure them, transforming pre-existing public concerns in a powerful and coherent discourse for the authorities. In fact, media are able to polarize the feelings of the public sphere by reinforcing their private discourses based on fear ("we may be in competition with migrants") with strong words, symbols, potent nodal points and myths ("migrants do take our jobs away") and redirecting it to the public.

As the public concern grows, the political élites may feel more and more compelled to take action. Clearly even the political élites can actually utilize the media as an instrument to exercise their power, generally displaying a certain amount of control over them. The relationship between the mass media and political élites (again) is far from being straightforward. But, at list this time two power relations can be clearly individuated: political élites may exercise power "over" media, and the media may exercise power "on" political élites. This second stand will be further analysed below.

Habermas defines this process as "opinion management", and Robinson offered the operational definition of this kind of power of the media ("CNN effect"), as "the influence that the media exerts on policy by forcing officials to pursue particular courses of action and by creating a political imperative for policy-makers to act".

Politicians only feel compelled to act out of fear of damaging their public relations or their public image (Robinson). In concrete, the stronger is the public opinion regarding a given issue, the more pressured is upon the politicians, and the more constrained are politicians' related choices, indeed.

In conclusion, this sort of triangular interaction between the media, the social and political spheres generate a "public discourse", defined as the sum of social (media and public opinions') accounts on a given issue. When a discourse on a given issue exits in the private sphere and then becomes public, it means that it has actually been politicised. Moreover, a discourse present in the public sphere may only become hegemonic through an extreme form of politicization. This discourse would actually become hegemonic if (and only if) the pressure that it is able to exercises on political actors is enough to result in political action. In concrete, it means that when the hegemonic political authority adopts this public discourse, they transform it in the hegemonic discourse through its actual implementation in political practices and policies.

The authors have detected three necessary conditions for this process to take place. These three interconnected ingredients generally produce an effect strong enough to make politicians feel compelled to act, indeed. In concrete, a sufficient media coverage of a peculiar form (ingredient 1), contributes to the creation of a public sense view (ingredient 2) in that peculiar direction. This results in the development of a public concern that, jointly with the bombarding of press reports, act as an imperative demand for the government. Moreover, policy-makers are more prone to accept this resulting influence when they have no policy on this considered issue or when the executive is divided (ingredient 3) over what the appropriate course of action should be.

This is precisely how the migration issue has been securitized. The media returned to the public their private fears of the "foreigner" in a coherent and well-structured form ("migrants are criminals" "migrants steal our jobs" "migrants do not share our values, they are dangerous for our culture"). Private fears so become a public concern, since migrants were considered as a source of insecurity by the majority of the general public, European and member states' policy-makers felt compelled to act to reassure and satisfy its electorate. As anticipated before, the relationship between media and political élites is not univocal, and both these securitizing actors plays and active role in shaping the securitizing scenario. Media discourses (and public concern) are not only the compass of political action, but they can also represent its vital justification and substantiation. Media discourses and public concerns may also offer legitimizing lymph to political action, above when there is the will to make politics go beyond its ordinary means.
That is how private public fears of migrants developed in a public securitization discourse of migration, and finally in a hegemonic securitizing discourse (and policies, when extraordinary means – as illustrated in the first chapter- has been adopted in the name of security).

In the next chapter, I am going to analyse concretely the different discourses regarding migration developed in the EU and in its Member States. Moreover, I am going to analyse why the securitization one has become hegemonic and what peculiar narratives characterize it. At last, I will demonstrate the political nature of this

securitization choice by examining how the main claims generally moved against migrants are not based on evidences but on myths.

Clearly, due to the reduced extension of this study, it would be impossible to analyse the hegemonic discourse developed in each European Member states, the focus will be on general trends, indeed.

Before to conclude, it is necessary to make an acknowledgment. There is the need to add a further layer of complexity to the process explained above while applying it to the Europe Union, indeed.

European policies, in fact, are also the result of a compromise between the Member States and the European Union, and not only the government's answer to public concerns about an issue.

It is necessary to consider an additional level of institutional bargaining and the EU willingness to present itself (both in front of its citizens and on the global stage) as a moral institution.

3. SECURITIZATION OF MIGARTION DISCOURSE(S)

Before to start it is necessary to clarify that in the sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2 the European Union and its Member States are considered as a single entity, and so that all the trends and information presented do represent shared features. These common features also derivers from their (previously assessed) common identity creation needs. The EU decided to create a European identity according to the model provided by its member states in the19th and currently reaffirmed due to the globalization conduced crises, indeed. Moreover, all these commonalities are linked to the – still strong- intergovernmental nature of the organization, and to the unanimity decision-making method frequently adopted. Unanimity means that member states have an enormous capacity to influence the decision-making process at the EU level. However, it is important to highlight that the EU has a dual nature, and its supranational aspects allows the EU to pressure and influence its member states, and grants to the organization a certain degree of independence. These mutual influences and constrains have led to the existence of differences and variations (even if not substantial) in the development of their respective political and hegemonic migration discourses. The peculiar nature of the EU adds a further layer of complexity to the process explained above. European policies are also the result of a compromise between the member states and the European Union, and not only the government's answer to public concerns - and the deriving pressures- about an issue, indeed. It is necessary, therefore, to include in the analysis this additional level of institutional bargaining to assess its impact on the securitization of migration process.

Alessandra Buonfino (2004) defined this process as the European "re-invention" of the national securitization of migration discourse. This will be analysed in the sub-section 3.3.

3.1 THE EUROPEAN UNION: ECONOMIZATION VS SECURITIZATION DISCOURSE

Although it is a difficult generalisation, it is possible to argue that, during the 1950s and 1960s, the public discourses regarding migration, in most westerner European Countries, mainly evolved around a logic of economization of migration.

The economy necessitated cheap and flexible workforce in order to growth, and the domestic labour market was not able (or better, willing) to provide it. The general public recognized and supported this economic call for migrants, native people used to consider migrants as an extra workforce with which they were not in direct competition. Migration was not even a political sensitive issue.

Migration policies of countries as France, Germany and the Netherlands were extremely permissive – sometimes even promotional-, indeed.

In the 1970s, the migration issue started to be politicised. There was a shift from a permissive immigration policy to a control-oriented, restrictive one (Fielding, 1993; Hollifield, 1992), mainly due to an economic contraction and the consequent member states' willingness to protect their domestic workforce. However, this did not change the previous general understanding of migration.

As stated in the first section, the political rhetoric regarding migration in the EU has changed dramatically in the 1980s. Discourses presenting the relation between migration and destabilization of public order become more and more diffused (Doty, 1996; Marie, 1988; Ugur, 1995) and local people's awareness of the (increasing) migrant population increased.

The end of the 1980s, precisely the years of a substantial speed up of the Europeanization –as stated in the previous section- , has been the period during which the foundation of the "Fortress Europe" has been laid out, and the securitization of migration discourse has actually become hegemonic.

However, the economization of migration discourse still continues to exist alongside this hegemonic one. The OECD, as many business and governmental organization officially recognized the need for skilled and unskilled workers to fill the shortages of skilled, unskilled and seasonal workers in western economies – actually in stagnation- and to increase their overall competitiveness, indeed.

Moreover, both the UN commission on Population and Development and the Eurostat[11] point at the demographic aging of the European Population. Economically speaking, it means that the proportion of people in working-age (taxpayers), if compared with the proportion of people retiring (mainly benefiting from taxes), is shrinking. Such developments are likely to have profound implications both at the social and at the economic level, with high risks of further corroding the already damaged member states' welfare systems. The UN points at migrations as an opportunity to reverse this trend and to rejuvenate European populations.

Despite all these evidences in support of the economization discourse, European policy-makers still insist in rendering migrants' entry more and more difficult, and not only for economic migrants works, but also for refugees. The general public widely refuses to accept the economization discourse, too.

Clearly, the payoff that would derive from the policy-makers' adoption of this kind of discourse will be undeniably high.

Why, the securitization of migration discourse become hegemonic instead of the economization one, then? Well, because the payoff produced by the policy makers' adoption of the securitization discourse can be even higher.

In the eyes of policy makers, the economic success that the economization discourse would produce and its consequent effect on the public opinion is not comparable with the extremely high degree of public

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[11] "Ageing Europe" report, 2019 edition

satisfaction (measurable in electoral success) that governments have attained after the implementation of the securitization discourse, indeed.

In a society in which insecurity is a structural feature (Beck, 1992), public opinion needs to be reassured, and governments found in the securitization of migration practice a powerful tool for the management of people's fears, and therefore, for gaining people's trust and votes.

3.2 THE AXIS OF THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION DISCOURSE

It is really interesting to note that discourses presenting migrants as a threat for the hosting society, and for the individuals that compose it, are based on a limited and recurrent set of rhetorical arguments. Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) have individuated three main trends which characterizes the European Union landscape. Each of these trends represents a peculiar declination of the hegemonic securitization of migration discourse and, in this section, I am going to analyse each of them and to dig into their respective ambivalences and inconsistencies.

First, migrants are often presented as an economic threat for the hosting society. Migration has been associated with unemployment, the rise of informal economy, the crisis of the welfare state, and urban environment deterioration.

Scholars (as Buonfino, 2004) have noted that this kind of hostility is class specific. The European working class and the unprivileged sectors of society tend to perceive migration as an additional challenge to their already present economic insecurity. Paraphrasing Foster's idea of "limited goods", they tend to perceive migrants as competitors for the already (structurally) limited resources available to them.

The media generally support this perception. The two themes of the high costs incurred by the hosting country ("a 'lions's share of taxpayers' money is used to sustain refugees' livelihood") and of the threatening migrants' competition in the labour market have suddenly become two evergreens in the news coverage.

Well, the inconsistences and the ambivalences presented by this discourse type are numerous and easily detectable. For example, how could migrant represent an economic threat to the hosting society if their very arrival generally depends on an economic call? It is a fact [12] that the main cause producing migrations' inflow to the European Union is the still existing and huge informal European labour market demand, indeed. Migrants, above all if not regularized, (sadly) represent an incredibly cheap and easily exploitable labour force, and this (sadly) enables many firms to cut on production costs and increase exports. The

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12 As demonstrated in the study conducted by the De Haas in 2008 (extensively cited in the bibliography)

achievement of these short-term economic results permits the survival and the development of many firms that otherwise would not have existed.

On the contrary, the media presents the attractiveness of an undefined "European el dorado" compared to the misery of migrants' countries of origins as the main push for arrivals (Berry et al, 2015).

Finally, this discourse type rejects any rational and concrete argumentation presented by the economization of migration discourse, even the ones adduced by the most preeminent actors (as UN[13] and Eurostat, their argumentations have been presented in the sub-section above).

Second, another apprehension widely presented in the media discourses and in the public concerns is the correlation between migration and crime. Migrants are presented and perceived as a social threat for the hosting country and for each individual composing those societies.

On the one hand, for what concerns national security, the mere presence of migrants on the hosting country soil tends to be perceived as the demonstration of the incapability of the state to defend its borders, therefore posing a symbolic threat to its sovereignty. Clearly, the efficacy and the impact of this argumentation increases proportionally to the increase in the number of arrivals, as it has been recently the case.

However, at a closer look, even the migration negative impact on sovereignty and borders appears to be manufactured, and the case of African migration to Europe offers a clear exemplification. Despite the extensive media representation of "boat arrivals", the sea routes - the ones that directly confront European borders and so that may indirectly demonstrate their porosity- are only marginal. The vast majority of migrants use less risky – and often legal (airports are among the more common ones) - methods to accede to Europe, indeed. In concrete, migrants use to access Europe legally though tourist visas and to overstay then. Well, it is now easy to detect that the correlation between borders, sovereignty and migration is not so tight as it is usually depicted (ibid.).

On the other hand, considering the individual security level, the "criminal migrant thesis" use to rely on statistical data and not, as before, on the symbolic meaning attributed to migrant presence. The bulk of data generally employed to support this view is the proportional overrepresentation of migrants in European prisons and their high criminal involvement rate during the 1990s[14].

However, before to recognise the genuine nature of this threat, it is important to consider that even empirical data may hide biases. In this case, the nature of such distortions is methodological and composed by different facets. For example, the social composition of the overall migrant population is extremely different from the composition of the overall national population. In fact, while migrants are generally young, male, poor and unmarried - and each of these variables is criminogenic itself -, the national group is far more heterogeneous – and therefore, these variables have an undoubtedly inferior influence-. In concrete, for the

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13 "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?" UN Report, 2000
14 Data from the article by Ceyhan and Tsoukala in 2008 (extensively cited in the bibliography)

purpose of an unbiased analysis and of a more accurate cross-groups comparison, a group of young, male and poor "nationals" should have been taken into consideration for the sampling process.

This public concern for the "criminal migrant" is generally express by all the social strata, but it tends to cause a more intense insecurity and fear to middle and upper classes, since they recognize themselves as a plausible target.

Other influential variables that should be taken into consideration are that the criminal justice system of the hosting country of often discriminates against migrants (Tsoukala, 1999), migrants are usually involved in high visibility crimes[15], European Courts seldom imposes on migrants punishments alternative to detention and, at last, the general lower quality of migrants legal defence during trials.

Moreover, the Terrorist attack of the 11/09 and the wave of terrorist attacks conduced in Europe during 2014-2015 have caused the tightening of the already present migration-criminality nexus, and have produced the apparition in the public imagination of the figure of the "terrorist migrant" alongside the figure of the "migrant thief or pusher".

Third, the rhetoric of for the non-assimilability of migrants, especially when they originate from the south of the world and reside in a hosting society located in the north of the world. According to this model, the place of belonging of a person implies the belief in a defined set of values, defined ways of life, a cultural and an ethnic identity; in short, it implies the belonging to a "civilization model".

Different civilization models - especially "Southern" and "Northern" ones- are incompatible, above all when they are forced to coexist in close proximity, indeed (Huntington, Clash of Civilizations).

The French Nouvelle Droit, in the first place, and the Exclusionary Populist Parties – now rising all over Europe-, in a second moment, have both contributed to articulate and transform this posture in a well-developed system of beliefs : "post-racism".

This ideology is based on an "anti-foreignization" narrative (Fennema, 1997); it differs from "mainstream racism" because it focuses on the negative impact of foreigner living on the host society soil on the host society itself, instead of focusing on the *per se* ethno-cultural inferiority of foreigners.

In concrete, post-racists conceive multiculturalism as a synonym of separatism and, therefore, claims that a genuine democratic asset is only achievable starting from a culturally and ethnically homogeneous community.

As Bossi's [16](in translation) said: "Immigration threatens to transform the European nations demographically, culturally, and politically into an appendix of countries that don't belong to the European

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15 If we do not take into account immigration offenses, most migrants are charged with property or drug offenses (Albrecht, 1997)

16 Umberto Bossi (born 19 September 1941) is an Italian politician, former leader (between 1991 and 2012) and founder of the Northern League (NL). The NL advocates the transformation of Italy into a federal state, fiscal federalism, regionalism and greater regional autonomy, especially for northern regions. At times, the party has advocated the secession of the North, referred to as "Padania", and consequently Padanian nationalism. The party has always opposed illegal immigration, especially when involving non-Europeans and Muslims.

continent. Immigration and a 'multiracial society' promoted social alienation and thus weakened the internal cohesion of European societies". This quote offers a clear exemplification of how politicians from exclusionary populist parties have posed the basis and contributed to the spread of anti-immigrants discourses. Moreover, one of the most diffused and utilized slogan summarizing the *diktat* of their posture is the expression "one's own people first", which becomes more diffused as exclusionary populist parties acquire electoral relevance, and has resulted in growing levels xenophobia, harder migration policies and a far more difficult integration.

However, in concrete, who are these "one own's people" that should be the first?

The conceptualization on which post-racism is based dramatically fails to consider that all the host society have been countries of origin of migrants at once, and that their civilization is already the by-product of multiple migrations and interbreeding. The Western Pure and Homogeneous civilization that they seek to defend has never existed; they seek to defend a myth through a strong anti-migrant rhetoric, which has become the centre of their politics.

Finally, it is fundamental to highlight that exclusionary populist parties are one of the core actors in the securitization of migration process. They have contributed – coupled with negative media coverage- to make the terms of the political and public debate evolving around migration more hostile and more negative in general (Berry et al., 2015).

Several opinion polls do demonstrate the affirmation of these patterns in public opinion, indeed. In concrete, a European Commission report in 2006 pointed out that "public perception of migration tends to be increasingly negative throughout Europe" (Beutin, et al., 2006). Moreover, European public surveys held in 2010 (cf. European Commission, 2010) revealed that the association between feelings of insecurity and migration was becoming capillary.

The dehumanising and rough language extensively utilized for depicting migrants by populist and the far right, has been gradually adopted also by centre-left and centre-right parties (clearly with some variations and moderations). They started to recognize the potential of anti-migration discourses as a precious form of electoral propaganda, and this has produced a significant rightward shift of the mainstream political debate (Richardson and Colombo, 2013), indeed.

The Italian example offers another insight in the variation of the attitude of mainstream political parties toward migrations. In the last twenty years, the Italian party system has been high volatile and polarised, consequently (often) requiring the formation of coalitions in order to govern. The process of coalition formation structurally implies some imperatives, namely, bargaining and trade-off. Therefore, the different stances of the different Italian parties tended to be diluted and become directed toward the most convenient direction (Cetin, 2015), namely, the securitization of migration (in our specific case). The Italian case is peculiarly relevant, since volatility and polarisation represent two increasingly growing trends in the EU member states' party systems.

In conclusion, the deconstruction of the securitization discourse alongside its main axis should have provided some key instruments to the reader in order to appreciate the distance that elapses between political discourses and facts in this specific migration case, and how speech-acts has manipulated and distorted the public image of migrants.

The aim of this sub-section was to underline the "mythological" and interested nature of the securitizing discourse. It is fundamental to consider the multiple benefits that the adoption of this narrative has produced, indeed. In concrete, it has led to the empowerment numerous interest groups which have adopted it (producing electoral gains for the political class, availability of cheap and exploitable work force for business groups, offering the possibility for employ the army now that European states are no longer used to fight external wars, etc.).

Finally, the manufactured nature of the migration menace, as theorized by the Copenhagen School, has been demonstrated.

3.3 EU VS MEMBER STATES' HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE

In a Europe affected by a worst legitimacy crisis than its member states and where the majority of national immigration policies are directed toward the securitization of migration, clearly discourses and inputs converges towards the areas of security and control of migration. The Europeanization process has led to the creation of a common external border and its defence against the "others" wishing to get through it, as offered the optimal presumption to create a European identity. The securitization of migration discourse, therefore, has demonstrated to be extremely functional for the aspiration of creating a social Europe – close to the heart of Europeans (Buonfino, 2004) -, alongside the well-established economic one. Both the EU and its member states socially constructed an analogous meaning for migration, borders and identities, developing their hegemonic securitization discourses around the very same nodal points.

On the one hand, the effort towards a stronger internal cohesion is still ongoing, and therefore the hegemony of the securitization discourse appears to be far from fading.

On the other hand, the EU also has some external obligations that are not fully compatible with this securitization posture. The EU presents itself on the international stage as a moral institution, a global actor engaged in the protection of human rights, indeed. The EU has attempted to concretize this second posture through the development of a "new vision" over migration, regarding the "creation an area of freedom, security and justice, concepts (which) are of equal importance none is superior to the others." (Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Antonio Vitorino).

This "new vision" is only namely "new". It resulted to be a re-invention, in a humanitarian key, of the member states' securitization discourses. In the EU border control and security are conjugated with

humanitarian assistance and fundamental rights protection. But, again, the main objective of this enlighten policy are the EU citizens, or who is recognized to have the possibility to legally applies for citizenship. This definition again traces a distinction between "in" and "out", the EU wants to become an area of justice, freedom and security against the chaotic outside, and irregular migrants are considered the agents that actually bring the chaos inside.

Therefore, even if once refugees/migrants are inside their protection is granted, the necessity to keep migrants out (including refugees, considering that the possibility to reach European soil is often indistinctly precluded) remains the biggest concern and strategic priority.

The Turkish-EU recent relationship offers a clear exemplification, in 2016 the two party have signed a bilateral agreement in order to tackle jointly the migrant crisis. The results produced by these agreements are astonishing since they have effectively turned Turkey in the refugee camp of the EU. Actually, nowadays about four millions of asylum seekers[17], above all Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis, reside on Turkish soil behind the Greek-Turkish highly militarized border. The agreement stipulated the payment of 6 billion euros (not entirely allocated yet) in exchange of this controversial containment service, and the promise of a major access to the internal market.

The securitisation of migration discourse remains intrinsically the same that its member states have adopted, indeed. The EU has only proposed (timidly) a different articulation, which –as it has been illustrated in the first chapter- is more rhetorical than effective.

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17 Data published by Limes on 6/03/2020 (the source is cited extensively in the bibliography)

CONCLUSION

This paper began assuming that the militaristic and repressive policy implementation, deriving from the securitization of migration discourse, is ineffective and not sustainable in economic, humanitarian and strategic terms. In the first chapter evidences has been presented in support of each part of this statement. Eminent actors as the IOM and UN agencies demonstrated that, despite any recent attempt to reduce international mobility, the percentage of global population migrating is stable around the 3% of the total. Moreover, as demonstrated during the analysis of the Spanish-Moroccan case study, the main consequence deriving from the fortification of a migratory route is the proliferation of others and the consolidation of the existing ones. The main result of the strengthening of the military defences of Ceuta and Melilla has been the opening of the Canary Islands route and the consolidation of the Central Mediterranean one, indeed. The main achievement of this policy approach, therefore, is the lengthening and toughening of migrants' path toward their destination.

Another policy approach deriving from the securitization rationale is the EU declared "war on human trafficking", which combined with the economic and political support that the EU and Italy gave to Libya, is contributing to produce a humanitarian catastrophe. Libyan militias, looking for international support, converted their "exportation of migration business" in an "importation, forced detention and exploitation" one.

Estimates affirms that in 2018 the 70% of migrants held in detention centres has been victim of sexual assaults, while 3 over 4 of them has been kidnapped for ransom. The same militias that in the south of the country smuggle migrants in, in northern costs held them in detention; Libya has become a "bottle neck" were migrants continue to be stored and the level of violence continue to raise. The country is still considered a "third safe country", therefore a viable country of origin/transit for forced returns.

In economic terms, the amount of resources employed for securitization purposes is huge. In 2016, the UE has accorded the transfer of 6 billion euros to Turkey in exchange of their containment of the migration influx. In 2017, Libya received 130 million for the same reason; in 2018, Morocco received 180 million too. In 2010, FRONTEX received an 87.9 million budget, and it has been growing since then. These are just some of the more blatant examples, without even considering the expenditures of the single member states. Finally, not only the economic costs paid by the EU for convincing its neighbouring country to be its own border police are extremely high, this also imply incredibly high cost in strategic terms. The fact that they may "turn on the tap" made them acquire an enormous lobbying and negotiating power on the EU and on its peripheral member states.

It is not worth it.

Why then securitization policies continues to be implemented? Well, because the securitization of migration discourse produces the optimal output for the actors that decides to adopt it.

The second hypothesis that I have sustained is that the securitization of migration is not a duly response to a

concrete need, but a social product derived from external pressures and internal needs of European societies and governmental élites, indeed.

Militaristic and restrictive migration policies are the last step of the securitization of migration process. In order to understand how and why they continue to be implemented despite their failures, it is necessary to analyse all the process systematically. The Copenhagen School contribution and the concept of hegemonic discourse has been two prominent theoretical instruments for the analysis indicated above.

The process started with the individual private fear of the "foreigner", this fear then become a public concern ("migrants steals our jobs", "migrants are criminals", "they are terrorists"), this represents the first step of the process, and it is called politicisation. If the public view that perceives migrants as a threat is strong enough, and the media supports this narrative too, then the hegemonic political force may feel compelled to adopt the securitization discourse and implement the related policies. At this point migration has been extremely politicised (step 2), and the securitization discourse has become hegemonic. It is clear that the three relevant actors in the securitization process are the media, political élites and the public. I have to underline that their relation is far more complex than the one illustrated above, and that they mutually influence each other at each step of the process. Their complex interaction has been extensively analysed in the second chapter.

Well, now that the "how" part has been addressed it is time for the "why" one.

In the contemporary world, globalization centrifugal forces are demonstrating the scarce utility of physical borders, threatening therefore states and their sovereignty. The adoption of the securitization discourse type allows for the reconstruction of borders, giving them a new social, ethnic, and identity meaning, while the physical ones are actually fading. Therefore, migrants have become the "constitutive others" in contraposition to whom European identities are being reconstructed, in the attempt to block the declining levels of social cohesion, and giving new legitimation to the very existence of the states (and of the UE, also facing a legitimacy crisis, but for other reasons than its member states).

The ineffectiveness of the related measures become irrelevant, since the mere adoption of this kind of narrative appeared to reassure the population, the optimal result in this period of structural insecurity (Ulrich Beck). The political forces that has adopted this kind of narrative have experience a clear-cut growth in popular support and votes, indeed. The media gain in economic and visibility term by the divulgation of sensational and alarmist histories.

Finally, migrants – if in clandestinity -do not have any legal protection and are generally poor; regretfully they are the perfect scapegoat.

Migration, therefore, do not represent a real threat *per se*, it has been socially constructed as such.

On the contrary, it is the securitization practice currently adopted which may represent a real threat.

Securitization practice not only targets migrants attempting to accede to the European soil, it also target migrants who have already legally settled in, indeed. It means that wide sectors of the public starts to consider every person that may "look like a migrant" as a potential menace. Levels of xenophobia and

racism in the EU are growing, and social integration is gradually becoming more and more difficult to achieve, indeed. And poor social integration leads to social tensions and instability, which is by far more threatening than a properly managed immigration inflow.

It is fundamental to acknowledge that the real problem, therefore, it is not migration itself, but its flawed management.

In conclusion, it is time to administer resources properly, removing them from the implementation of such counterproductive measures, and allocating them in order to improve actually both the experience of migrants and of the hosting societies. It is important to focus on things that can actually be managed and improved, and not on the structural features of the phenomenon. For example, focusing on softening the condition of chronical inequalities under which South-North migration usually take place would be a precious first step toward a human-centric security model, a duly focus shift, since the securitization-militaristic one has failed.

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RIASSUNTO

Nel corso degli ultimi anni il fenomeno migratorio è stato al centro del mirino mediatico, del dibattito politico e delle paure ed incertezze del grande pubblico. Reportage sensazionali parlavano (e parlano tuttora) di "esodi" ed "invasioni", ampie fasce delle popolazioni delle democrazie occidentali percepivano (ed ancora percepiscono) la presenza di un'aura minacciosa attorno alla figura del migrante, additandoli come causa principale della loro insicurezza economica ("ci rubano il lavoro"), culturale ("la nostra tradizione nazionale scomparirà") ed individuale ("i migranti sono criminali, ladri e spacciatori"). Le politiche dell'Unione Europea e degli stati membri hanno adottato (e stimolato) questa visione negativa delle migrazioni, divenendo sempre più aspre e repressive dal 1990 in poi. Ciò ha impattato enormemente sulla politica estera dell'UE, convogliando verso il contenimento dei flussi migratori ingenti risorse economiche, diplomatiche e militari. Sebbene nell'ultimo quinquennio – precisamente dopo il termine della "Crisi dei Rifugiati", che ha investito l'UE nel 2012-2016 - il trend degli arrivi sia in netta diminuzione, e nonostante i derivanti e preponderanti effetti collaterali, l'intensità di implementazione di tali politiche di securitizzazione è curiosamente aumentata. Questo approccio politico intollerante verso l'immigrazione si è tradotto in un approccio pubblico intollerante verso i migranti stessi, anche quando di seconda generazione, causando la diffusione di razzismo, xenofobia, ai danni di una pacifica e fruttifera integrazione sociale e dimostrando l'insostenibilità di questa pratica sul lungo termine.

Questo paradossale e controintuitivo accanimento politico contro i migranti è particolarmente lampante nei messaggi propagandistici dei partiti populisti e dell'estrema destra. Matteo Salvini descrive nel 2017, ad esempio, l'immigrazione verso l'Italia come il motore di una "sostituzione etnica vera e propria", rincara poi la dose descrivendo la modalità 'adeguata' per condurre il primo soccorso marittimo: "bisogna salvare chiunque in mezzo al mare, ma poi riportarlo indietro. Bisogna scaricarli sulle spiagge, con una bella pacca sulla spalla, un sacchetto di noccioline e un gelato".

Comparare la veemenza ed il linguaggio disumanizzante di tali discorsi; poi estensivamente riprodotti dai medie, ed ampiamente supportati dal pubblico (appoggio poi tradottosi in effettivo supporto elettorale); con gli esigui numeri degli arrivi in quel periodo, ha fatto prima accendere il mio risentimento e poi la lampadina di un'idea. La propaganda politica di ogni epoca ha sempre avuto i suoi miti, i suoi eroi ed i suoi villani; che i migranti siano "i cattivi per eccellenza" dell'età contemporanea per le democrazie occidentali (come lo sono stati, ad esempio, i comunisti fino alla fine della guerra fredda)? E perché proprio loro?

A partire da questo spunto, dunque, ho iniziato ad indagare e a sviluppare la mia ricerca, dando quindi una forma concreta ed analizzabile alla mia intuizione.

La *research question* attorno alla quale si articola questo elaborato è, infatti, "Perché e come i fenomeni migratori sono diventati un tema di sicurezza nazionale e soprannazionale nell'UE?". Inoltre, il lasso di tempo ritenuto rilevante va dal 1990 al 2020, ed è stato selezionato poiché comprende gli anni del primo

sviluppo e della massima espansione di tale fenomeno di securitizzazione.

Per rispondere a tale domanda, ho avanzato due ipotesi, ognuna delle quali volta ad analizzare un aspetto differente di tale processo. Mentre il primo capitolo dell'elaborato è dedicato alla dimostrazione della prima ipotesi, il secondo ed il terzo capitolo sono dedicati alla dimostrazione della seconda.

Il primo capitolo è dedicato alla concettualizzazione del fenomeno migratorio ed alla descrizione delle caratteristiche specifiche che hanno assunto i flussi diretti verso l'Unione Europea. Inoltre, verrà dedicata una particolare attenzione alla conseguente reazione (in termini di reazione politica e di attuazione delle stesse) dell'UE e di alcuni suoi stati membri. Lo scopo di questo capitolo è di dimostrate la mia prima ipotesi, ovvero, che le l'attuazione di politiche che considerano i flussi migratori come un tema di sicurezza nazionale ed europea, sono inefficienti ed insostenibili sul lungo termine.

La dimostrazione dell'ipotesi presente nel primo capitolo, conduce immediatamente all'ipotesi che sostiene la stesura del secondo e del terzo capitolo, le due sono strettamente interdipendenti.

La dimostrazione della prima ipotesi, infatti, conduce immediatamente ad una considerazione: perché uno stato (oppure l'UE) continua ad attuare politiche inefficienti? Da questa considerazione scaturisce la mia seconda ipotesi, ovvero che l'immigrazione verso l'Europa non rappresenti una minaccia effettiva alla sicurezza europea, ma che tale percezione sia stata costruita e riprodotta da complesse dinamiche di interazione sociale in risposta a pressione esterne (globalizzazione) ed a necessità interne (pay-off elettorale); e che la sua securitizzazione sia, dunque, di natura meramente politica ed interessata.

Nel secondo capitolo la validità dell'ipotesi è dimostrata da un punto di visto principalmente teorico, ovvero, viene adottata la *securitization theory* della Scuola di Copenaghen ed applicata al caso specifico della migrazione da stati terzi verso l'UE. Il capitolo è dedicato, dunque, all'analisi dei meccanismi di interazione sociale che hanno prodotto questo cambio radicale nella percezioni dei migranti da parte delle società ospitanti. Vengono infatti individuati i principali attori (élite politiche, mass media e opinione pubblica), la relazioni che intercorrono tra essi, e gli strumenti (principale: *securitizing hegemonic discourse*) che caratterizzano lo svolgimento di tale processo. Questo capitolo, dunque, offre una parziale risposta alla ai "come" e "perché" della *research question*.

Il terzo capitolo fa in modo che tale risposta diventi completa ed esaustiva, offrendo uno *zoom* pratico sui risultati ottenuti nel precedente capitolo. Vengono analizzati, infatti, le differenti sfumature ed articolazioni del principale strumento di securitizzazione, presentandone le principale manchevolezze ed incongruenze. Viene indicata, soprattutto, la natura mitizzata delle principali argomentazioni in supporto della tesi generalmente accettata (che rappresenta l'antitesi del mio discorso) che sostiene che i migranti rappresentino, effettivamente, una minaccia. Dimostrazione conclusiva che il nesso *migrazioni-sicurezza* sia artefatto.

L'elaborato consiste, dunque, in un'analisi sociologica, e la sociologia rappresenta l'elemento cardine per la sua strutturazione. Ad ogni modo, ai fini della produzione di un'analisi olistica, ho deciso di analizzare il fenomeno della securitizzazione della migrazione da differenti prospettive accademiche. Ho inserito, ad esempio, riferimenti ed utilizzando strumenti propri del diritto Europeo ed Internazionale, della Linguistica, delle Scienze Politiche e degli Studi sulla Sicurezza. Ci tengo a sottolineare, inoltre, che tale approccio multidisciplinare è subordinato alla struttura ed agli scopi sociologici descritti prima, e dunque meramente funzionale allo sviluppo di una risposta per la *research question,* svolgendo dunque lo stesso ruolo dei dati empirici – semplicemente di supporto-.

Prima di proseguire riassumendo il contenuto dei capitoli, è necessario chiarire due aspetti fondamentali dell'elaborato. Il primo aspetto riguarda la terminologia, infatti riguarda la definizione del significato del termine "migranti", estensivamente utilizzato in tutto l'elaborato, e fortemente controverso per via dell'estesa politicizzazione dell'argomento. Dunque, quando utilizzo il termine "migranti" mi riferisco al suo significato più ampio, ovvero a ogni persona il cui status rientri in una delle seguenti categorie legali: "rifugiati/richiedenti asilo", "migranti economici" e "migranti illegali".
Il secondo chiarimento riguarda la struttura stessa dell'elaborato. Il processo di securitizzazione delle migrazioni verrà analizzato, infatti, alla luce delle complesse dinamiche (istituzionali, identitarie ed economiche) che intercorrono tra l'UE ed i suoi stati membri, determinando alternanze prospettiche che talvolta assegnano un peso maggiore o minore a questi due attori, e che talvolta portano alla prevalenza di *common trends* o alla discordia. Verranno analizzate entrambe queste situazioni.

CAPITOLO 1

Il capitolo è diviso in tre paragrafi. Il primo paragrafo riguarda un'introduzione alle complessità del fenomeno migratorio, lo scopo è quello di separare il sentito comune dall'analisi scientifico-sociologica. Innanzitutto, viene smentita la diffusa percezione dell'età contemporanea come periodo d'oro della mobilità internazionale e della libera circolazione. Il mondo è globalizzato solo settorialmente; mentre la libera circolazione di merci e di capitali è ormai la prassi, il movimento internazionale delle persone è ancora strettamente regolarizzato (soprattutto se povere e prive di qualificazioni professionali).

Viene poi, presentata la prima argomentazione a supporto della prima ipotesi, prodotta da attori internazionali preminenti quali la International Organization for Migration (IOM) e diverse agenzie delle Nazioni Unite. Queste ultime sostengono che i flussi migratori, indipendentemente delle politiche adottate dai vari stati per il loro contenimento, sono una costante della storia dell'umanità: la proporzione di popolazione globale migrante rimane stabile attorno al 3%.

Il secondo paragrafo riguarda le motivazioni che spingono gli individui a migrare verso l'UE, le caratteristiche principali di tali flussi immigratori, e la conseguente reazione politica dell'UE. Innanzitutto, il processo migratorio viene definito come la sommatoria di risposte individuali ai fini di gestire il cambiamento sociale; tale decisione è basata su argomentazioni che variano dalla *cost-benefit analysis* al *value judgment* e su informazioni spesso parziali e limitate a riguardo della destinazione finale. Dalla complessa natura del processo decisionale, deriva la complessa e composita natura dei flussi migratori stessi, che vengono infatti definiti "misti", ovvero composti da: migranti economici, migranti irregolari e rifugiati.

Comunque, è importante specificare, che la grande maggioranza dei migranti raggiunge il continente europeo attraverso mezzi legali (soprattutto tramite aeroporti) ed entrano nella clandestinità solo successivamente, prolungando la loro permanenza oltre la scadenza del visto; la militarizzazione delle rotte sopraccitate, dunque, è condannata in partenza a produrre un impatto limitato. Questa considerazione rappresenta una seconda argomentazione a favore della prima ipotesi addotta.

La prassi della securitizzazione delle migrazioni ha trovato il suo riscontro pratico nell'implementazione di politiche di lavoro frontaliero e di gestione delle frontiere. Il caso Europeo è estremamente peculiare, poiché la complessa struttura dell'Unione conduce un variabile e fluido assemblaggio di attori (l'UE, FRONTEX, gli stati membri o addirittura paesi terzi) all'espletamento di tali funzioni.
Tale prassi di securitizzazione è caratterizzata da due principali tendenze: la militarizzazione dei confini dell'UE e l'esternalizzazione delle politiche migratorie e di asilo.

Le strategie principali generalmente attuate, ai fini della militarizzazione dei confini europei, sono la politica di inspessimento delle difese frontaliere ai fini di creare "zone cuscinetto" tra i paesi d'origine e le destinazioni europee; l'applicazione della nozione di *smart borders,* ovvero la trasformazione dei confini in dei veri e propri filtri; il crescente utilizzo della tecnologia militare (EUROSUR, VIS e SIS) e il tentativo di assicurare il rimpatrio forzato per i migranti irregolari.

Il processo di esternalizzazione consiste nell'attivazione di due livelli operativi successivi. Il primo livello consiste nella delegazione, da parte degli stati (geograficamente) centrali dell'UE, della gestione e delle richieste di asilo e dei migranti regolari ai stati membri periferici. Il secondo livello, invece, riguarda l'ulteriore possibilità di delegazione di tali responsabilità da parte dei suddetti stati periferici a stati terzi.

Da ciò deriva un ampliamento della comprensione classica del concetto di "confine", poiché esso non più rappresenta meramente il luogo dove termina la capacità legislativa di un attore, ma – al contrario- diviene proprio il luogo dove (ed in funzione del quale) la politica si sviluppa al suo massimo potenziale (Etienne Balibar). Ne è un'esemplificazione la proposta di Junker di creare un esercito permanente al presidio dei confini dell'unione europea tra il 2021 ed il 2027.

Il terzo e conclusivo paragrafo presenta due casi di studio, che permettono di apprezzare concretamente quanto descritto nel paragrafo precedente e, soprattutto, ne descrivono i risultati pratici.

Il caso della collaborazione Spagnolo-Marocchina illustra la principale conseguenza che spesso produce la fortificazione di una rotta migratoria, ovvero, la creazione di rotte alternative e l'aumento della portata di altre rotte. Nello specifico, viene descritto come la fortificazione della rotta passante per Ceuta e Melilla abbia prodotto l'apertura della rotta delle Canarie e l'intensificarsi del traffico della rotta del Mediterraneo Centrale.

Il caso della collaborazione Italo-Libica illustra, invece, come tali politiche possano essere insostenibili anche in caso di effettivo contenimento dell'immigrazione. Da quando l'UE ha dichiarato la *"war on smugglers"*, e con lo scadere dell'Accordo di Skhirat, le milizie libiche hanno iniziato una corsa alla legittimazione politica (sia nazionale che internazionale), senza però voler rinunciare ai benefici economici ricavati dal precedente business delle migrazioni clandestine. Tale business, perciò, è stato riconvertito nell'importazione ed estrazione di valore coatta attuata ai danni dei migranti presenti in territorio libico.

Tali politiche di securitizzazione, in conclusione, (oltre agli enormi costi umanitari) implicano anche costi economici e politici elevatissimi. Ne è un chiaro esempio l'enorme dispiegamento di risorse economiche da parte dell'UE verso i paesi confinanti ai fini del loro coinvolgimento nella gestione dei flussi migratori, o più specificamente, del loro effettivo contenimento. Nel 2016, infatti, l'UE ha accordato il trasferimento di 6 miliardi di euro alla Turchia (principalmente per contenere l'afflusso di migranti e rifugiati Siriani successivamente ai devastanti sconvolgimenti dovuti alla guerra civile ed alla presenza dell'ISIS); nel 2017 ha accordato un pacchetto di aiuti per la Libia del valore di 130 miliardi di euro (principalmente per contenere i flussi originanti dall'Africa Sub-Sahariana e dallo stesso Nord-Africa); e nel 2018, per lo stesso motivo, il Marocco ha ricevuto un finanziamento da 180 milioni di euro. Inoltre, l'assegnazione di un tale ruolo prominente a stati terzi risulta nella loro scomoda capacità di esercitare pressioni lobbistiche sull'UE; essi possono (e sogliono) avanzare, infatti, la ben nota minaccia di "aprire il rubinetto".

CAPITOLO 2

L'inizio del secondo capitolo è dedicato alla concettualizzazione del termine "sicurezza" in accordo con la *broad definition of security* e con il *securitization approach* sviluppato dalla Scuola di Copenaghen.

Il corpo centrale di questo capitolo è dedicato all'analisi approfondita del concetto di *securitization*, ed alla sua applicazione al caso specifico dell'immigrazione verso l'UE.

La Scuola di Copenaghen, concepisce tale fenomeno come un processo basato sull'interazione di attori rilevanti che, principalmente tramite i loro discorsi, riescono a politicizzare estremamente determinate problematiche o questioni, fino a raffigurarle rispettivamente come problemi di sicurezza (*security subject*) o

come potenziali vittime di tali problemi (*security object*).

Tali discorsi (*speech acts*) – in ogni forma immaginabile, intesi come diffusione di: parole, immagini, video, tweet, post, comunicati stampa - sono descritti come il principale strumento di securitizzazione. Essi hanno un impatto effettivo sulla comprensione generale di un argomento, solo se il tipo di narrativa che supportano diviene egemonico (*hegemonic discourses,* concetto derivato dalla combinazione della teoria dell'egemonia culturale di Gramsci e dal *discourse-theoretical approach* di Foucault, Laclau e Mouffe). Un discorso diventa egemonico quando è prodotto, oppure adottato (tramite l'attuale implementazione di politiche correlate), dalla forza politica dominante e diviene, dunque, parte dell'ideologia dominante; ai fini di riprodurre le relazioni di potere atte a preservare la posizione egemonica di tale schieramento politico. Infine, gli attori (*securitizing actors*) nominati precedentemente sono coloro che, per definizione, creano ed innescano la percezione che i *security objects* siano minacciati.

Nella seconda sezione di questo capitolo, le migrazioni e le identità nazionali e sovrannazionali sono identificate rispettivamente come *security subject* e *security object*.

La crisi del modello del modello di welfare statale europeo, l'aumento del livello generale di povertà nelle democrazie occidentali, la deteriorazione delle condizioni di vita nelle città, la deregolamentazione finanziaria, il libero movimento dei beni hanno prodotto un'influenza estremamente negativa sull'autorità degli Stati Nazionali. Il processo di globalizzazione ha reso evidente, infatti, l'inadeguatezza della loro limitata competenza territoriale, rivelando la sempre più flebile utilità dei loro confini fisici e ponendo una minaccia esistenziale alla loro sovranità.

E come propone lo studioso Dider Bingo (2008), gli stati hanno trovato una risposta a questa crisi nella *securitization practice,* essa infatti permette agli stati di creare nuovi confini di carattere sociale ed identitario, per supplire allo sbiadire dei confini fisici, e riaffermando la necessità della loro sovranità. Sergio Mezzadra (2007) afferma, infatti, che uno dei principali effetti collaterali della globalizzazione è stato il proliferare di confini di natura antropologica e politica, mentre il classico confine geopolitico ha perso di importanza. Il ruolo chiave attribuito all'identità nazionale e sovranazionale ora risulta evidente; il rafforzamento di tali identità contribuisce infatti al rafforzamento della coesione sociale, e perciò al contrasto di tali aggressive forze centrifughe.

Secondo Carl Schmitt, Georg Simmel e Simone de Beauvoir, le identità si creano e rafforzano per opposizione, ovvero tramite la giustapposizione di un "noi" ed un "loro" (*constitutive others*), entrambi determinati da una serie di valori e caratteristiche culturali definite come incompatibili e mutualmente dannose. Anche il concetto di l'identità, come quello di sicurezza, è dunque un costrutto sociale, il cui significato è riorganizzato in base ai progetti culturali e dalle relazioni sociali di potere (Stivachtis, 2008).

Tre momenti fondamentali hanno contribuito alla contemporanea designazione dei migranti (extra-europei) come i *constituitve other* rispetto all'identità della popolazione europea ed a quella dei suoi stati membri.

Il primo è avvenuto nel 1996, quando lo studioso Samuel Huntington ha pubblicato il suo celeberrimo libro

"The Clash of Civilizations". Libro in cui, per la prima volta, i migranti provenienti dal Sud del Mondo sono presentati come intrinsecamente diversi e non adattabili alle società del Nord del Mondo; inoltre, l'autore indica il multiculturalismo come causa di disintegrazione sociale. Tale scritto ha gettato le fondamenta teoriche per il successivo processo di securitizzazione delle migrazioni.

Il secondo evento è avvenuto nel 11/09 a New York, si è ripetuto nel 2004 a Madrid, nel 2005 a Londra, ed include l'ondata di attentati terroristici condotta in Europa tra il 2014 ed il 2016. Il triste diffondersi dell'estremismo di matrice estremista islamica ha radicalmente cambiato la percezione generale dei migranti; nell'opinione pubblica si è affermato il nesso migrante-terrorista, trasformando quest'ultimi in una potenziale minaccia concreta alla sicurezza nazionale ed individuale e non più solamente culturale e sociale. Infine, ciò che rende particolarmente interessante ed unico il caso Europeo, è che tale processo di costruzione identitaria per contrapposizione è stato condotto in maniera doppia e parallela dalla fine degli anni 80 in poi. In quel periodo, infatti, è iniziato il processo di Europeizzazione, ai fini di creare una propria identità sociale e onnicomprensiva (oltre i meri valori economici), l'UE ha adottato la stessa strategia che i suoi stati membri stavano adottando per contrastare la crisi dello stato nazionale.

Nella terza sezione di questo capitolo è descritto il ruolo dei mass media, le élite politiche e gli individui (e le loro preoccupazioni) come *securitizing actors;* viene illustrata, inoltre, la complessa interazione sociale che ha portato alla produzione di un discorso egemonico basato sulla narrativa della securitizzazione dell'immigrazione, ovvero il *securitizing instrument* di tale processo.

La complessa interazione triangolare tra questi tre attori (principalmente dovuta alla natura democratica dell'UE e dei suoi stati membri), tra la sfera sociale e quella politica, genera un discorso pubblico, definito come la somma delle opinioni pubbliche e mediatiche su un determinato argomento. Il processo che porta alla trasformazione di un discorso da privato a pubblico è definito politicizzazione. Tale discorso pubblico diventa egemonico solo se la pressione, che è in grado di esercitare sule élite politiche, è sufficiente per innescare in un'azione politica basata sulle sue direttive. Un discorso, dunque, diventa egemonico solo se l'argomento trattato subisce un processo estremo di politicizzazione.

CAPITOLO 3

Il capitolo inizia comparando le due tipologie di narrative che hanno caratterizzato, e caratterizzano tuttora, il dibattito europeo attorno al tema delle migrazioni: il discorso di *economization* (attualmente subalterno) e quello, appunto, di *securitization* (attualmente egemonico).

Ciò che ha determinato l'adozione della seconda narrativa, è stata la sua capacità di generare profitti più significativi e rilevanti, considerando le peculiari caratteristiche dell'età contemporanea.

In una società in cui l'insicurezza è un fattore strutturale (Beck, 1992) l'opinione pubblica ha bisogno di essere rassicurata, ed i governi hanno scoperto che questa narrativa di securitizzazione è lo strumento ideale

per farlo; convogliando e gestendo così le paure pubbliche, ed ottenendo voti ed approvazione.

Né gli enormi benefici economici, né la possibilità di invertire il pericoloso trend dell'invecchiamento della popolazione europea, né il supporto della più eminente organizzazione internazionale (UN), sono valsi ad innescare il meccanismo che avrebbe condotto il discorso di *economization* a tornare egemonico.

Il corpo centrale del capitolo è dedicato all'analisi concreta del discorso di securitizzazione, delle principale declinazioni che esso assume, e delle principali contraddizioni ed incongruenze che lo caratterizzano.

Gli studiosi Ceyhan e Tsoukala (2002) hanno individuato tre nodi concettuali ricorrenti.

In primo luogo, i migranti sono spesso presentati come una minaccia economica per la nazione ospitante; le migrazoni, infatti, sono spesso associate con la crescita dell'economia informale, la crisi dello stato di benestare, con il deterioramento urbano e con la crescita del tasso di disoccupazione. La veridicità di questa argomentazione è facilmente contestabile.

Innanzitutto, questo ragionamento è basato su un'inversione logica: non è la presenza di migranti in territorio europeo a causare l'espandersi del mercato informale, ma è l'enorme domanda di manodopera economica e sfruttabile, prodotta da questo stesso mercato, che stimola ed attira questo tipo di immigrazione. Inoltre, purtroppo, lo sfruttamento di questa tipo di manodopera (in parte composta da migranti irregolari, e dunque non tutelata legalmente), permette (tristemente) di tagliare sui costi di produzione, comportando immediati guadagni economici per i datori di lavoro.

In secondo luogo, la correlazione tra migrazioni e criminalità è estremamente ricorrente. I migranti, infatti, vengono spesso presentati come una minaccia per gli individui della società ospitante. Tale argomentazione è spesso sostenuta riferendosi alle statistiche che dimostrano la sproporzione di migranti coinvolti in attività criminali rispetto alla media della nazione ospitante. Statistiche nelle quali, però, sono stati individuati innumerevoli errori metodologici e sistematici, ad esempio, errori di campionamento ed di tendenziosità (ad esempio, non è stata considerata la qualità mediamente inferiore della difesa legale dei migranti rispetto ai residenti, ed il fatto che le corti europee assegnino ai migranti pene alternative alla detenzione estremamente infrequentemente).

Inoltre, i migranti vengono spesso presentati come una minaccia simbolica alla sicurezza nazionale, poiché la loro mera presenza viene assimilata alla lampante dimostrazione della porosità dei confini, e dunque dell'incapacità dello stato o dell'Europa di difenderli. Argomentazione senza fondamenta, poiché – come anticipato precedente- gran parte dei migranti accede all'UE tramite vie legali; e dunque non confrontandosi direttamente con i suddetti confini.

In terzo luogo, i migranti vengono spesso presentati come una minaccia per la cultura e la società della società ospitante. Tale narrativa è principalmente supportata e diffusa dai Partiti Populisti Esclusivisti e dall'Estrema Destra, attori cruciali nel processo di securitizzazione.

Questi ultimi hanno contribuito alla trasformazione del pensiero di Huntington in una vera e propria dottrina

politica ed ideologia: il "post-razzismo". Il post-razzismo è basata sulla volontà di "non contaminazione" delle caratteristiche etniche e culturali del proprio paese, e dunque, percepisce i migranti come un elemento contaminatore. Differisce dal razzismo poiché non considera gli stranieri come inferiori *per se*, ma li considera negativamente per via del loro ipotetico impatto denaturalizzante" sulla società ospitante. Questa dottrina auspica il blocco dell'immigrazione e rimpatri, promuovendo tali azioni come propizie per il ritorno alla pura ed omogenea civilizzazione occidentale, ignorando, che in realtà ciò non è mai esistito.

Il capitolo termina esaminando il (timido) tentativo dell'UE di riconciliare il proprio ruolo di attore globale ingaggiato nella protezione e promozione dei diritti umani, e le sue (chiaramente incompatibili) politiche di securitizzazione dell'immigrazione. Il risultato di tale sforzo è una "reinvenzione" del discorso egemonico di securitizzazione dei suoi stati membri in chiave umanitaria; rimanendo però, inesorabilmente legata alle sue pratiche ed alle stesse priorità.
In conclusione, la natura di tale reinvenzione risulta essere più retorica che pratica.