



Department of political Science

Chair: Analysis and Evaluation of Public Policies

THE SETTING OF AN EMERGENCY POLICY:

how the traditional ways of tuning programs are reshaped by unprecedented events

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Introduction

Humanity has always found itself facing complex situations that could have jeopardised its physical safety and the integrity of the context in which its members lived. Initially given the general inability that characterised the ancient “*antropoi*” and the total misunderstanding of the dynamics behind the disasters that endangered “them”, the primitives attributed to these events divine features, which in fact explained the impossibility to understand them. The only awareness that the humanity in the past had was regarding the ineluctability of the re proposal of such events, with an unpredictable cadence and in a non-forecastable manner.

Over the centuries humans began to accumulate experience regarding the types of calamities (at the time natural caused) that could endanger their life and the environment in which they lived, and that changed relatively to the time of the year; consequently, for example, they started to be aware of the fact that, in summer, fires could occur, in winter they had to take into account cold temperatures and blizzards as in the rainy season they would have to look after the floods. In an early period human activities continued without taking into account external stimuli and risks; with stability and with the transition from nomadism to permanence, ancient *homini* began to consider these inputs, which came from the environment where they lived and to set up their activities in such a way as to avoid the effects of calamitous events.

On the other hand, in the first moments of their existence in nature, humans generally tended to save themselves, or their relatives and close affections, from the effects of natural events that they still could not control and understand. It was with

territorial stability and with the birth of the first social aggregations that human kind, once having understood how to set up activities so as to avoid the effects of the calamitous events, began to have “compassion” for the members of his community who had been subject to the consequences of the possible natural disaster that happened. In this way we can affirm that in ancient times the rescue and protection of “others” were lived to the mercy of the singles, which could have wanted to provide relief (exposing themselves to risks) or not.

With the transformation of the social context in which “*antropoi*” of the past lived and with the birth of the first state apparatuses, the sense of mutual mercy of individuals was replaced by the action of the authorities who held the reins of the social context. In this way, based on the experience accumulated over years concerning natural events and their consequences, humans (now urbanised) relied on the validity of the policies that the institutions of their "government" imposed, with the aim of systematically avoid the effects of disasters, and organise the environment on the basis of these external stimuli. In a nutshell we could call this new way of acting and managing as a “prototypal risk-management”, in which the pastimes humanity summarised all the experience accumulated over the centuries regarding the disastrous events and their effects and consequently tried to organise his activities and lifestyle in a systematic and generalised way.

This general and "narrative" introduction is necessary to understand what is the fundamental awareness that has pushed humans to develop, during their evolution, a common sense regarding the need to plan actions in order to better manage emergencies, when they occur. In fact, the awareness of the inevitability and re-proposal of calamities is a strong engine that pushes the members of a society to organise themselves, so we could say that in fact "necessity is the mother of

invention.” This same push that moved ancient populations in the management of their activities in consideration of the inputs deriving from the environment, has at the same time contributed to their attempts to manipulate the natural context to try to control the calamitous events. Sometimes, the management of the territory has led to an effective mitigation of the effects of the disaster, other times instead it has led to their tightening.

In general, however, the goal of managing human activities within a community has always been to "avert the risk" and to derive the greatest possible benefits from the use of the resources at one's disposal. With this in mind, the urbanised and sedentary humans had always tried to plan their own actions, managing their resources in the best way. In general, so-called "public policies" have developed in more evolved social contexts, where institutions and administration replace the intentions of individuals, managing common interests in their place. In this sense we should draw on the very concepts of "state" and "community" that are provided to us by the social sciences, but this is certainly not the place and the occasion for a digression of this kind.

Instead, what is urgent to underline here is the intent of our work, which we are preparing to develop on the basis of this common awareness of the inevitability of the occurrence of emergencies and crises. Furthermore, investigating this social action of the setting of public programs offers many ideas for reflection, especially at the light of contemporary events, which we are programmatically going to “exploit” for our research intents. In fact with this work we aim to investigate how, in order to respond to the challenges of an emergency, policy decision-makers actually act, evaluating how the activities implemented by them modify the classic steps that lead to the formation of a policy in non-critical periods. In other words, our research

question to which we will try to answer through this work will be: "How is the traditional policy cycle modified by the threats posed by the emergency environment?".

To complete our work we will take advantage of the many works that over the years authoritative academics have completed, collaborating in the production of an extensive academic literature in the field of policy formation, on the evaluation of the same and more recently on management of risk. We will practically develop our work in such a way as to be able to carry out a contrast analysis, a sort of comparison, between the traditional way of developing public policies in non-emergency contexts, also taking into consideration the classic doctrines concerning risk management, with respect to how the methods of action change when the policy maker is faced with emergencies never experienced. Programmatically to this extent we are going to stress the differences in timelines and procedures that divide the classical and non emergency theorisation from the actions *de facto* made by institutions during crises.

More precisely, our work will be organised into five chapters, giving to our work a "two parts" structure. In the first chapter we will attempt a careful review of the traditional "Policy Cycle" concepts, analysing the different steps in which it is divided for the formation of a public policy in non-emergency periods. In this work we will refer to the most important traditional theories on which the academic literature on the subject is based and articulated, in order to provide a clear, albeit general, image of what is the process of forming a public policy that is usually followed in non-critical contexts. In this regards we have here to stress that the mentioned conceptualisation are going to refer only to the praxis, as it is articulated in "average" times. Indeed the more relaxed timelines used in such moments are

inherent in the same essence of the structure of the policy to come, leaving room for in depth analyses and assessments on the subject. In a second chapter we will then highlight the general characteristics of another fundamental concept for political science in the field of public policies, that is to say the "policy evaluation cycle". This process is in fact essential for decision-makers as it provides them with the necessary information and evaluations in order to better set the policy itself. Also in this chapter we will produce a general review of the most authoritative literature on the subject in order to clarify which assessment methods are most used in relation to the various moments of the policy formation cycle. With these first two chapters, in summary, we aim to implement a revisiting of the classic methodologies of formation of public policy in non-emergency periods, referring to the fundamentals of academic literature and tracing, as far as possible, the traits of the most recent theoretical developments on the subject .

While with the first two chapters we will dedicate ourselves to the analysis of the construction and evaluation strategies of the policy in non-emergency periods, in a third chapter we propose to take into consideration the most widespread doctrines with respect to emergency management, analysing the literature regarding the so-called "Disaster" management". Also on this occasion we will try to trace the characteristics of the most important conceptualisations on the subject, ranging from the concept of "disaster", with references to the principles of "mitigation" and "preparedness. In this way we will define the main attributes of each of the passages of the traditional "Disaster Management Cycle", stressing the fact that it is outlined as the traditional strategic approach for the management of emergencies that have already been experienced. In a certain sense, disaster management represents the definitive evolution of the process of accumulating experience in the field of

calamitous events, of which the ancient man was the first actor, actively interested in managing his own activities in consideration of calamities. If on the one hand to manage emergencies we have come to the conceptualisation of a predefined procedure, composed of parts and processes in the same way as for the creation of non-emergency policies, on the other hand this cycle appears to be effectively limited to the crises whose features are well known, and on whose cyclicity there is certainty and experience. In fact, only by accumulating knowledge in the management of recurrent threats (think of an earthquake in Italy) will the policy maker manage to follow the steps outlined in the "disaster management cycle".

From this last assumption we will develop the "Part Two" of our work, in which we aim to complete our comparison between the classic models of formation of a policy and the management of known emergencies, in contrast to the decisions and actions carried out by the institutions in case of critical issues never encountered, on whose management there are no experiences, so that referring to codified methodologies has no relevance and usefulness. In the two chapters that compose this second section of the thesis we are going to depict the main evolutive steps underwent by our Civil Protection towards its current organisational structure, providing the readers with informations about the "official" approach used in dealing with the sanitary risk (in Chapter Four) . Moreover, in the fifth chapter, using the analysis of a current case study, we will define our second comparison "term" and we will try to answer our research question, ascertaining if and how the classic moments of the non-emergency policy cycle are modified by the needs of the context of crisis. This appears more interesting the more the crisis emerges as unpredictable and continuously changing, in other words as a "disaster". Specifically, we will try to

analyse the contemporary context bringing as an evaluation a comparison of the actions carried out by our institutions in the management of the *Covid-19* emergency.

This last chapter will be useful to us also to ascertain the level of detachment from the “official and pre-determined” actions usually enacted to deal with sanitary risk that underlies the management actions of the current health emergency made by our institutions. In fact that is the very “point” we have to stress to ascertain the usefulness in crises as this of the “traditional” cycles ideal types, as capable of portraying the evolutive process of a responsive and efficient emergency program.

Additionally in the last chapter we will consider also the so called “side effects” of the purely sanitary emergency, taking into account two aspects of the social programs that the authorities have structured to respond to the crisis. Specifically, in fact, we will analyse the social and economic response that the institutions have developed, stressing the principles of action used and the weight that the interest groups have had in modelling programs. In other words, through this work, we aim to assess whether the institution's response to the crisis can be consistent with the various "cycles" of action identified by the literature for non-emergency moments, and how they may be modified, reinterpreted and curved.

First part

The first part of our work, which we are going to draw up, is essential for the production of the "first term" of our comparison analysis. In fact, in the following three chapters we will deal with the definition of traditional ideal-typical models of *policy making*, *policy evaluation* and *disaster management*. It should be emphasised, as already done in the introduction, as the descriptions that we will carry out in the first part, relative to the aforementioned "cycles", will refer exclusively to the way in which academic literature defines the action of policy makers and public managers in contexts of "tranquility", in non-emergency situations. The importance of this clarification lies and characterises the programmatic approach of our own work, as it is fundamental for developing the "contrast" between the "average" and "emergency" actions carried out by the institutions. Here in the first three chapters our intent will be to produce a review of the most relevant theoretical expressions regarding the ideal typical cyclical models that are traditionally used to better define the "building" and evaluation processes of public policies as well as to manage known emergencies that could happen.

Consequently, as we will see later in the work, the "Second Part" of our work will provide the other term of the analysis that we will carry out, to ascertain whether and how the classic models defined so far (usable in non-critical contexts) will be modified by the action of the

institutions in the management of the "case study" (*Covid-19* emergency).

Chapter One

The “Policy Cycle”

An overview of the academic model of the policy making process in common and in emergency situations

1.1 Introduction and chapter strategy




Figure 1: Example of the European policy Cycle. Source: <https://epthinktank.eu/2019/09/03/the-european-councils-role-in-the-eu-policy-cycle/>

With this first chapter we aim to analyse, albeit in a very general way, what are the various "facets" of the so-called "policy cycle". This analysis aims at focusing on the features that the policy cycle has in common non-critical periods and how it changes

during emergencies, shaped by the continuously changing threats of a critical environment. In fact, as we are going to see in the developing of our work, it is intended to be our main goal in this analysis. Anyway we have to underline that this first chapter, as well as the following two, are intended to provide a “revisiting” of the literature explaining how the traditional cycles of both the policy building and evaluation are organised during “normal” periods; this adjective is to contextualise our analysis as referred to the ordinary periods in which the institutions of a country have “relaxed” timelines to let such cycles to “roll” in analysing circumstances and developing a social program.

First, it will be helpful to explain the meaning of the term "cycle" in this context. The academic model has succeeded with the term "cycle" in exemplifying a concept that is theoretically quite complex. In fact, the word cycle is an image, a representation of a more complex process that leads to the effective implementation of a policy. The term "policy cycle" therefore refers to the recurring model shown by the procedure which has the creation of a public policy as its ultimate goal. In this sense, it can well be said that the concept of the policy cycle is advantageous for theories, providing a single cyclical form to refer to different, sectoral and marked moments of the policy making process.

Before providing a further and more in-depth explanation of the various moments that make up the policy making process, at this stage it will be sufficient to outline briefly how they are made up. It might be interesting to provide some historical hints about the first theorisation of the concept of the cyclicity behind the process to build up public measures.

What is also urgent to remember here is that the model for forming a public policy only ideally takes the "form of a cycle". In fact, in other words, the very cyclical nature of the formation of a policy, according to how the traditional model defines it,

and how Lawssell understood it, is entirely ideal-typical. The process of forming a social program is much more complex and multifaceted than what is defined by traditional theory, but the image of the "cycle" is the one that most of all manages to explain the trail of processes that are behind a policy. In fact, we could say that the use of a cyclical model allows to simplify the policy process, given that each of the parts that compose it can be considered separately. So the notion of a policy cycle makes the process of its formation and construction more logically comprehensible. In fact, the policy making process is a multidimensional and multifaceted reality which, however, is "disentangled" from the use of the logical and consequential model of the "policy cycle" which makes everything "clearer". In these regards, it may be useful to quote Sabatier: "Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find some way of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understanding it"¹. In other words, the value of the concept of "political cycle" lies in its very characterisation as a "tool" which facilitates the understanding of the policy making process by breaking the complexity of the same in several successive phases and, as stated by Everett in 2003², "is a mechanism to help the public sector manager smooth a complex policy process and to inject rigour into the process". The same model represents a useful heuristic for dividing the policy process into separate units and for being able to illustrate how policies are actually made³.

¹ Sabatier, P:A: (2007). *Theories of the Policy Process*, Second Edition. Westview Press, Colorado USA

² Everett, S. (2003) *The Policy Cycle: Democratic Process or Rational Paradigm Revisited?* Blackwell Publishing Limited, National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 62 (2). *Pages: 65-70*.

³ Knill, C. *et* Tosun. J. (2008) *Policy Making*, Working Paper 01/2008, University of Konstanz, Germany. In: Daniele Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press. 2008. *Pages: 495- 519*.

The policy cycle concept was developed by Harold Lasswell in the United States in the 1950s. Lasswell explained the concept of "policy cycles" by theorising as many as seven⁴ distinct parts that are all fundamental in decision-making.

The view proposed by Lasswell has been abandoned by academics on current days, being the majority of them convinced that the policy cycle should be divided into five fundamental steps⁵. As stated by Howlett and Ramesh in 2003 they are the *agenda setting, the policy formulation, public policy decision-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation*. This last one is on current periods of a great importance, considering the many implications that the implementation of a public policy practically produces over the various areas composing the highly interconnected social tissue or the contemporary society.

Thus, all such things considered, there should be great attention to be posed on the side of the evaluation of the policy that the decision makers are contributing to develop, *de facto* introducing a parallel cycle. This last is the so called "policy evaluation cycle", that is a process that starts together with the policy making one,

⁴ Savard, J.-F. with the collaboration of R. Banville (2012). "Policy Cycles," in L. Côté and J.-F. Savard (eds.), Encyclopedic Dictionary of Public Administration. *From:* www.dictionnaire.enap.ca

"The concept of policy cycle was developed by Harold Lasswell in the USA in the 1950s. At the time, he provoked a near revolution by describing public policy science as being multidisciplinary, problem-solving and explicitly normative. On the basis of these characteristics, Lasswell developed the concept of policy cycles, which he broke down into seven fundamental stages in decision-making."

⁵ Savard, J.-F. with the collaboration of R. Banville (2012). "Policy Cycles," in L. Côté and J.-F. Savard (eds.), Encyclopedic Dictionary of Public Administration. *From:* www.dictionnaire.enap.ca

"Even if the concept identified by Lasswell with respect to policy analysis have withstood the test of time, his cyclical model is now largely criticized for its fragmented approach to explanatory factors. At present, there is a consensus in the research community that the model should be divided into five major stages: agenda-setting, policy formulation, public policy decision-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation "

“shadowing” it all along its duration. Especially during emergency situations it could be of a great interest to try to read more in-depth how the interlay of these two parallel processes changes in respect to the one expressed in average periods, trying to pose high attention on the way in which the two cycle are affected separately. In fact, given the unknown and continuously variable threats posed by the emergency to the decision makers and to the actors participating actively in shaping the public action and in the evaluation of the societal environment in which the measure is going to be implemented, both the policy cycle and the evaluation cycle will be “compressed” and re articulated to generate effective policy responses.

In this direction it would be worth to remark that the stakeholders involved in both the processes are generally of a high number. Their importance is clearly connected to their ability to generate and then to put pressure on the political class of a certain societal context. Such a characteristic furnishes to them a great power in many of the main steps of the policy building, rebalancing the competitive pushes inside them and changing the priorities with regard to their interests. The analysis of this last aspect will be introduced in the following part, with great attention to the moment of the “agenda-setting”.

Given the great importance of the various actors participating in the policy making process and due to their relevance in influencing each of the five phases mentioned above, all such steps would be remarkable in our analysis. Anyway in the parts that follow we are going to focus mainly on three fundamental steps. In such a direction we can say that the policy cycle can be simplified in three moments: *agenda-setting*, *policy formulation* and *policy implementation*. Such last simplification is in fact necessary for our intents, given the necessity we have to delineate the “normal and non-emergency” trail of making-up a policy in its fundamental steps only.

1.2 Agenda-Setting: definition and selection of socio-political issues.

In this section our intent is to provide the main characteristics of the very initial point of the policy cycle, as it is organised during average and non emergency periods. That last contextualisation is necessary to let the reader better understand the intent and the structure of this chapter and of our work more in general, as we are trying to propose a sort of a “contrast analysis”, comparing the features of the “standard” and non emergency policy making routines with the modifications they entail in critical situations. In fact, after having accomplished the descriptive task and having introduced the “general” course of a public policy, it would be interesting to try to compare its general characteristics (that we would have identified and explained) to the way in which they are influenced and modified by the pressures of an emergency context.

The primary step in the building up of a public policy and the first task that decision makers carry out in the policy cycle is the *agenda setting* procedure. It represents the initial phase of the policy making process and indicates the set of activities through which problems and issues are selected with the intention of intervening in a specific public area with particular policies. It is therefore clear that the study of the process of setting the agenda of a public policy is complex and holds strong links with the social tissue of the state or the institutional structure in which it is carried out. It should be also emphasised that the agenda-setting provides for the analysis of the political dynamics through which new proposals and new definitions of relevant problems in the group are brought to the attention of decision-makers.

Alongside the definitional intents on “what” the agenda-setting is, another point on which to pay close attention is how to determine the relevant problems and issues within an anthropological and social context. In fact, as it has been anticipated in the

introduction to this chapter, it is urgent to note that the interests that the decision-makers and the various actors involved in the agenda setting share, change the process itself and influence the rest of the policy cycle as a consequence. Anyway there are many facets of the agenda setting that are complex to be interpreted and that have led commentators to produce many theories on this field.

First of all, it should therefore be mentioned what has been underlined by G. Majone regarding the agenda setting process. In fact, the author claims that it is part of what he defined as the "pre-decision analysis". At this moment of the formation of a policy the focus is placed on the depiction and study of the social situation that will be the subject of the specific policy under implementation. Thus, as a consequence, Majone introduces two more steps; the first is the so-called "*problem definition*" step which will be necessary for an in-depth understanding of the agenda formation process. In this context, the social problem or issue is defined and characterised, in order to accomplish a smoother and easier continuation of the setting of the policy. Another point of the "pre-decision analysis" is the so-called "*feasibility analysis*", and it is essential to understand what are the possible policy choices that can be made. In fact, with this situational study are taken into consideration the various socio-economic, technological, political and institutional constraints that delimit the possible choices.

It is clear that the process of gradual construction of the agenda and its *in itinere* evaluation, as introduced by Majone, is a very complex activity and which would need another location to be studied in depth. In this direction and to try to give a first answer to the question, on how to characterise and define correctly the problems and social issues to be introduced in the agenda it must be said that the list of social problems is much wider than the possibilities of public intervention. Consequently,

as it will be explained better later on the paragraph, to understand and identify problems better, a process based on competitions could be worth to be used.

Combining the objective assumption on the relevance and influence of the stakeholders and of the various parties involved in the policy cycle with the “need” for a correct selection of issues that have just introduced, it will appear clear that the bargain leading to the “choice” is a profoundly competitive one. For that reason it would be useful to mention the "aphoristic" definition that E.E. Schattschneider gives to the activity of selecting policy alternatives. According to this scholar, in fact, the definition of policy alternatives is the "supreme instrument of power"⁶, thus underlining how the agenda setting process structures political choices. At the same time, however, it is also the political choices that influence the agenda setting. Defining the bi-univocal characterisation of this relationship of continuous and mutual affection is relevant to underline, once again, how this process is characterised by a great competitiveness. Here, therefore, in the same way as the choices taken and the problems selected, "non-decisions" are essential in the setting of a public policy. By non-decisions we mean the deliberate exclusion of certain specific problems from the political agenda, such as a downside or a secondary aspect of the competitive process of inclusion and selection itself.

Another important aspect that must be considered is the fact that the specific determination of the way in which the policy agenda is formulated, can give us the idea of how the decision maker will concretely deal with the problems that have been included in it. Such things considered, the agenda setting is a crucial moment in the political cycle because, as is clear when interpreting Scattsneider's statement, it determines what should be treated as a public issue within a society at a certain

⁶ E.E. Schattschnieder, *The Semisovereign People: A Realist View of Democracy in America*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston

moment in its history. To better understand how the political process is influenced by the setting of the agenda and how, *vice versa*, the political context influences the first one, it is necessary to bear in mind two different contexts in which to interpret such crucial passage of the policy cycle. It will therefore be clear how the possibility of choosing political alternatives is a strong tool in the hands of decision makers, which can determine which issues should be considered noteworthy problems for society in a historical moment. The first of the two contexts in question is that of the "*full policies cycle*"; it refers to the prior definition of the agenda that the political class of decision makers carries out. In this context we consider the step preceding the electoral competitions, the moment in which the definition of the social problems and issues to be included in the agenda will be subject to the "programmatic" intents of the political class. In fact the agenda setting in a context of *full policies cycle* represents the step when political programs are introduced, electoral campaigns are organised and government programs are characterised.

It could be added that in this context of *full policies cycle*, at least in principle, the agenda will tend to include all sectors deemed to be the specific objectives of public policies. In this case it is clear that politics has a strong influence on the characteristics and forms taken from the agenda. In fact, in this context, the power to choose which problems to insert and the possibility of deliberately omitting others from the agenda influences the latter in a predominant way.

Another situation in which the agenda-setting process can be analysed is that of the so-called "*partial policies cycle*". This second contextualisation refers to the continuous re-drafting and re-shaping of the agenda during the institutional life of a government or governmental organ. In this case the agenda will be affected by the will and influence of politics, but at the same time the Government and a parliament could be pushed to change the agenda following the spreading of contingencies not

deriving from their way of acting or their own needs; the agenda could in fact be modified in reference to policy choices already made in the past, proving to be a correction or a recalibration of the same. But in the same way the agenda could be altered or corrected by the decision makers as the socio-political landscape in which it was initially established has changed. The most classic examples of this second event may be those related to changes in the agenda of a policy deriving from economic or financial crises, natural or health disasters. Such last point provides us some basic considerations for a further analysis of the reshaping procedure affecting the various moments of the policy cycle in emergency situations.

Cobb and Elder (1972) introduced a further classification of agenda types. According to what the two scholars said, it is possible to identify a so-called *Systemic agenda*. This first category can be defined as a public agenda and conceptually goes to contain all the problems that are considered worthy of public attention by members of the political class. In this case, during the “identification of issues” and social problems to be included in the drafting of policy priorities, there will be questions related to the legitimate intervention carried out by government authorities. In this dimension, of course, it appears clear that the competitive characteristics of the decisional process around which issues merit attention emerge with great strength; as a consequence of what just stated, indeed, this last kind of agenda is also called “*discussion agenda*”.

The second further classification that was introduced in 1972 by the above mentioned authors is that relating to the so-called “*institutional agenda*”. This type of agenda is also known as “*formal*” given that all the problems that the government deems to be faced through specific public policies are included within it. In this case, therefore, it is the political institutions that directly influences the composition of the agenda, that is to say that government action and the life of the institutional apparatus

(understood as its activity) requires a specific agenda formulation and construction in order to be able to smoothly continue.

The types listed above are intended as consecutive moments in the formulation of a policy agenda. In this sense, it is functional to take into consideration two essential moments that contribute to an in-depth understanding of the construction phases of this piece of the policy. In the first instance, attention will have to be paid to the perception and gradual definition of a problem; this phase also includes the need to use a certain interpretation to be completed. Afterwards it will be essential to identify the resources needed so that the previously identified problem can be inserted first in the *Systemic* agenda and then in the *Institutional* one. In this sense, referring to what has been said a few lines above, the identification of issues to be included in the agenda of a specific policy and to be treated as "problems" is a matter of interpretation. In fact, there is never the presence of a political problem "per se", while there is commonly a series of facts or events (issues) that are sufficiently objective and that in order to be considered as political-social problems need to be interpreted.

One factor that must be taken into account is therefore how an issue becomes a political problem and can become part of the agenda. It is quite simple and objective to assume that public policies launched in a country are closely connected to the economic and social tissue of the same; there will therefore be economic and social explanations to the question of how an issue can be perceived as a political problem. First of all, the level of economic development of a group guides the drafting of the agenda, shifting the attention from one to another of the businesses within the area covered by the policy itself. In fact, a specific intensity in economic development will lead to the declination of the policy agenda in a direction consequential to it, rather than to one that moves away from it. In other words, the form of public

intervention of a policy is determined, with its specific characteristics, by the level of economic development of the group promoting it. In summary it can be said that there is a convergence between the group of public policies applied and implemented in a country, which is directly dependent on the economy of the state itself.

On the other hand, however, alongside economic reasons, political variables also play a great role in shaping issue perception. In this perspective, the so-called *political-economic cycle* is of a great importance representing the crucial phase for the political partnership that characterises the period immediately preceding the elections. As Niskanen⁷ affirmed, specific political ideologies have a relevant weight in this discourse; in fact, they represent the prime engine behind the actions of the political class, “binding” it to behave in a certain way to influence public policies and economic fluctuations.

The political variables are then able to affect specific activities and determined public or institutional interventions, given the interests of the same political class and the weight that such interests have in these concerns. This influence is visible above all in certain types of policies as well as, for example, distribution and welfare measures. In fact, it will be easy to assume that towards a state policy aimed at the redistribution of funds and therefore at the protection of a certain social class or of an economic group, the political class will be brought to pay more attention. Of course there are also the needs of political parties that promote a policy, which will push more towards the inclusion of specific issues in the agenda; these issues will be those that are most likely to bring political favour in the face of the party or its own ideology. Here then, as already stated by Niskanen and mentioned a few lines above, the political variables and the political class are “obliged” to influence the agenda setting.

⁷ Niskanen, W.A. (1971). *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*. Routledge

Great relevance should also be given to the interlay between the private sector and the Public, given that, as we were saying earlier, not only the institutional actors but also (and sometimes above all) the private stakeholders must be included in the group of politics influencers at stake. In fact, it is precisely the latter that, sometimes, acting through pressure groups or representing private bodies with strong economic power, manage to profoundly affect the drafting and subsequent prioritisation of the agenda of a public policy. However, it will be necessary to consider the various elements reported so far (that takes into account the high level of competitiveness which characterises the process of selecting and interpreting the issues to be included within the agenda of the policy in question) as different parts of the same common “body”.

The features listed so far in the previous pages have been useful for the coverage of the complexity of the policy cycle since its initial step. Its entangled composition is given by the fact that various actors participate actively to the same process, with as many varied and different interests. These interests are capable of influencing and actually curving the drafting process of the agenda of a policy, making it highly competitive. This competitiveness is essential and is at the basis of the “democratic” nature” of the decision-making process and the very source for choosing between the various public policy options to be carried out in a group by its institutions.

It has been crucial for our discussion and programmatic intents to stress the complexity of this policy making passage, as we will do for the other two listed in the introduction to the chapter, in order to better outline the policy cycle in average situations. In fact when there is not the need to provide immediate responses to the threats posed by a critical environment, there is enough time and space left to competitiveness, and for the stakeholders to exercise their pressures. Another discussion will be made regarding the drafting of the policy agenda in emergency

situations, trying to develop reflection enabling us to complete the comparison anticipated in the introduction.

1.3 Policy Formulation: analysis and evaluations behind the best option.

In the following section our aim will be to give an exhaustive, albeit broad and descriptive, illustration of what is the next step in the policy making process immediately following the agenda setting. We are referring to the second of the three main moments into which, as anticipated in the introduction to the chapter, the policy cycle process can be divided. It is the step of the so-called "policy formulation". In this paragraph we intend to provide the main characteristics of this policy making step, always bearing in mind that this depiction portrays the policy formulation in the non emergency context; we are in fact trying to ascertain with are the features of such procedure in periods of "normal activities" and, as said for the agenda setting discourse, when there is enough time for the policy cycle to run smoothly.

Once the existence of a social problem has been ascertained and the need to hit it with a specific public policy (process that connects and extinguishes with the agenda setting), the decision maker moves on to the selection of the policy draft that can best solve the previously identified problem. This process consists of the activity of analysing and evaluating all the possible solutions to political problems, weighing the pros and cons and finally deciding which can be accepted and which rejected⁸.

To be more precise in defining what it is, we should proceed step by step in our analysis, once again with the intention of outlining and understanding its degree of

⁸ Howlett, M. and M. Ramesh (2003). *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*, Toronto, Oxford University Press

complexity; indeed, even this "moment" of the political cycle (as it happens for the agenda setting) is very articulated even in situations of general "tranquility", making us reflect on how it can change in response to critical and emergency threats. First of all, it must be said that the policy formulation is part of the so-called "pre-decision" step of the policy making, this to mean that it is not yet in the phase of adoption and implementation of the institutional measure. This process is delicate and is identified in the characterisation and / or crafting of a group of policy alternatives in order to face the social problem for which the policy is defined. In doing this, a narrowing of the set of possible solutions to this problem is implemented, preparing for the final policy design. The decision maker, in completing what we have described so far, poses questions, in order to answer which he actually carries out an "a priori analysis". It is therefore worth mentioning again the so-called "policy evaluation cycle" that we mentioned in the introduction to the chapter and which returns at this stage of the policy making process with a high relevance.

This activity "shadows" the policy cycle, giving decision makers an additional tool with which to organise the whole set of actions that are necessary to analyse and then select the best alternative (in the specific case of the policy formulation) among the many provided by policy designers. Among these questions there is the most "basic" one, especially in a moment of "pre-decision"; we are referring to the question for which the decision maker wonders what the problems to solve and the objectives of the policy are. Strongly linked to this question there is another and directly consequential one, following which one could wonder what are the available options to achieve the purposes of the policy or to solve the problems identified in its agenda. Later, and having collected the necessary information and the various policy proposals, the decision maker moves on to a more in-depth analysis. By examining

each of the design options in his or her hand, the decision maker analyses which are the costs and which are the benefits contained and derived from each of them.

The legislator also investigates what the externalities (both positive and negative) that a specific design of policy could cause if implemented. This last category of analysis, relates strongly to the evaluation cycle of the policy we mentioned earlier. In fact, both in the previous moments and during the adoption and subsequent implementation of the policy, cost-benefit analyses are performed, aiming at providing the decision maker with all the tools needed to ensure his or her choice. In this action, obviously, the institutional agents will have to keep in mind the interests of the various stakeholders behind the policy itself, in order to implement the choice that leads to the adoption of the measure that best fits the characteristics of the social tissue in which it is substantiated.

Thus, from what we have said so far, derives a further and different definition of the moment of the policy formulation. The Policy Formulation is in fact the development of effective and acceptable lines of action to pursue what is included in the agenda. "*Acceptable*" refers to and means acceptable to the community and the social characteristics of the group requiring the implementation of the "reform". By *effective* we mean instead the adoption of measures that are those that have obtained the best "score" in the analysis referred to above; that is those that have the best "ratio" between costs and benefits produced and that achieve the best results for the community with the least use of effort possible, and also keeping in mind the needs and interests of the stake holders and members of the group itself . Furthermore, to be more precise, "effective" options means those policies that analysts evaluate as valid, efficient and implementable, those that are the most realistic considering the situation and the context to which they will have to give an answer. In fact, this moment of the so-called pre decision analysis is fundamental, and it embodies and

reflects the characteristic complexity of the policy formulation. It will be interesting to reflect on how it can change in times of emergency, including above all such emergencies that never occurred and whose evolution is unknown, even in the very short term.

It should be added that by "acceptable" we want to define all those policies that are politically feasible, that are likely to be accepted and authorised by the competent institutional authorities, in general following a bargaining process that defines their outlines by the will of a majority. Precisely this last piece that we have just introduced, regarding the "democratic nature" of the formulation procedures, is essential for the understanding of such moments of the policy cycle.

In fact, "policy formulation" is a process that consists, generally and also very schematically, of three sequential phases or parts, which give this model a mathematical "flavour". Indeed, it can be said that the policy formulation derives from the summation of an "analysis" plus an "authorisation". Once this logical link behind the policy formulation has been identified, it is also necessary to define which figures are practically implementing these phases, "calculating" this operational sum.

On the one hand, there are in fact the policy planners; these subjects represent the "technical" and sectoral aspect of the analysis of the policy proposals that is carried out during the policy formulation. They actively contribute to this moment of the policy cycle, providing a valid technical analysis on the means by which the policy should be implemented (if selected). They then give an indication of the behaviour to be followed considering each specific policy proposal and provide projections relating to the costs of each of them. Departing from the results of such last kind of analysis then they contribute to the development of guidelines and implementation strategies to substantiate, in the subsequent moments of the policy cycle, the development of one or another measurement project. Obviously their work is

necessary for ascertaining the consequences and effective outcomes that the policy will produce once adopted, This projections are really useful especially for the next step, where, as we are going to explain better later on, bureaucracies will continuously interact with the decision makers and policy designers for the enactment of the measure. It should be reiterated that the policy planners provide "only" a technical analysis of the various policy proposals, not consequently being considered accountable to the public.

On the other hand, there is the figure of institutional officials elected or politically appointed; the latter actors do not necessarily have the knowledge and technical-scientific expertise, nor the analytical ability that makes them able to face the problem. However, the latter have left the burden of implementing an overall judgment, a sort of value analysis, regarding the overall effects of the policy. In addition, they are given the ability to decide on what compromises are feasible in relation to a specific field of action of a policy and, therefore, to select the project that is as close as possible to the social needs of the group at the given historical moment in question. It is therefore clear how these actors are, in theory, the responsible actors before the democratic government for the selection and implementation of policy proposals.

In the final analysis, it could easily be said that the complete building up of the policy formulation phase is based all on a proactive collaboration of these two types of analysts and decisional actors. In fact, returning to the two phases that make up the above mentioned summation (whose result is the formulation), it is clear how the policy planners contribute to completing the first of the two addends (the analysis), while the officers elected or politically appointed implement the second part of the operation (the authorisation). The interplay between these two figures and their ability to exchange mutual judgments, technical for planners and of value for

officials, is the basis of an efficient and effective policy formulation. This assumption is even more true in an emergency, in which the recirculation of the exchange of training can influence the timely and effective identification of a response to the challenges of the crisis.

As we have largely discussed in the previous paragraph focusing on the agenda setting, also with regard to the policy formulation it will be interesting to study the way in which the various actors participating in it influence, because of their interests, the choice of policy options which they are more suited. It could be said that it is a competitive, almost confrontational, procedure because it is characterised by decision-making. We refer to the second of the two passages listed above, which is that of the authorisation of a specific policy proposal implemented by elected or politically appointed officers.

This peculiarity of the policy formulation process was understood by Schattschneider who stated that the "definition of alternatives is the choice of conflict and the choice of conflict allocates power"⁹. Consequently to what has been studied by the American scholar it is clear that the policy formulation and the possibility of deciding which is the most suitable, globally, among the various policy proposals analysed in the phase prior to authorisation, is a critical phase of the policy process. In fact, it allocates the power between the economic, social and political interests of those who contribute to the choice itself. Here, therefore, the policy formulation assumes the function of "backroom" with respect to the agenda setting. There are fewer players participating in it compared to the previous step of the policy cycle, but they are all highly representative. We are talking about government bureaucracies,

⁹ Schattschneider Elmer E. (1960). *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston

members of pressure groups who represent their interests, highly delegated legislative committees. In summary, this is the moment of the policy cycle where the "choice" is carried out.

To concert the interests and wills, at different times, of many actors is a complex thing, and it becomes even more complicated in times of emergencies. In such situations it is essential to identify the best of the possible design options for the policy, and for this reason it will be interesting to introduce the concept of policy design itself, starting from the studies in this sector. The attention paid by academics in this area of policy making began to emerge in the 70's in response to studies regarding the implementation of the policy which, meanwhile, were being carried out in the same period. Consequently, the policy design process was articulated and orchestrated in connection with the implementation of the policy; it consists in analysing if and how the original policy formulation processes contribute to the final results of their implementation. Furthermore, policy design is a procedure that seeks to understand the depths in the context in which decision makers act and to identify the selectivities they place in the choices.

To better understand how policy design and studies in this sense have a value in practice, it will be very useful to mention an organisational decision-making structure that has had a lot of notoriety in the past and that, given the uncertainty of the results that are generally produced following its implementation, once again underlined the need to create a literature to give us indications to avoid the randomness of the answers to the problems that often arise with policies.

We are referring to the "*Garbage Can Model*"¹⁰. The organisation is intended as a "trash can" where a disordered collection of items is mixed with each other and can interact. The problems to give a solution, the potential solutions and eventually the

¹⁰ Cohen, D.M, March, G.J, Olsen, P.J. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of Organization Choice, JSTOR

people who have to make the option are put in this jar. The four elements that influence the decision and that are summarily “thrown” inside the container are: Problems (thought as the social, political and economic issues covered by the policy), the decisions, the participants (in the decision-making process, with the set of their interests) and choice opportunities. It is therefore clear that this decision-making process is characterised by a high level of randomness, of confusion; in fact both the problems and the solutions are extracted from the container (depicted as a garbage can in the classic artistic representations) in a completely random way.

This model is also characterised by the most absolute lack of rationality as there is no logical connection between the actions of the individuals who participate in it and the outputs generated by such actions; this due to the overall uncertainty of individual preferences, given the fact that the cause-effect relationships are not clear and since participation in the decision-making process is fluid¹¹.

In summary, a decision will be the result of the unorganised action of several relatively independent currents within the same organisation. The Garbage Can Model generates consequences that make the logical motivation behind the decision taken in the formulation of a policy unclear; for example the solutions could be proposed even when the problem does not exist. Consequently, decisions are made without the problem (if there is any) being truly solved, with the possibility that it persists without its resolution. Only a few problems can be solved with the adoption of a choice through the garbage can model, it is quite clear how this model unwillingly in the majority of the cases is the most used one to deal with uncertain emergencies’ developments. In fact it will be easy to understand that the unawareness of the future developments of such moments and the fluidity of the participation to the formulation of the policies to mitigate the effects of the emergency, contribute to

¹¹ Cohen, D.M, March, G.J, Olsen, P.J. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of Organization Choice, JSTOR, page 1

the substantial disorganisation of the risk management institutions, sometimes promoting the adoption of measures able to solve only a compressed amount of problems.

Policy design is specifically designed to limit this uncertainty, putting different aspects of policy making contexts into consideration, which shape *de facto* the characteristics of the policy option. The academic world has focused on identifying and theorising indications that the class of decision makers can use to implement the drafting process of a policy design. Specifically, a subset of the academic literature has defined the so-called "policy tools".

These tools are defined by Bardach (in 1977) as "things that Governments do"¹². With this definition, the scholar means all the activities and actions that the institutions perform as they are legitimated to do so. We are talking about the taxes that are levied, the regulations adopted, the subsidies that are given (through distribution measures) and more. In this sense, the decision maker designs the policy following his "natural" way of acting.

On the other hand, however, the use of policy tools implies a certain managerial competence and ability to carefully carry out the choice of which tools are most suitable for dealing with the specific situation. This is because the choice of policy tools influences the management of the public itself. Various approaches to the study of public policy have used a 'tools' or 'instruments' approach to make sense of the complexity of contemporary policy-making.

Another definition of policy tools is that carried out by Hood (1983, 2007). The scholar founded his approach to the explanation of modern policy making by stating that for any policy problem, government has four basic tools at its disposal and that tend to possess by virtue of being government. The first one is "nodality", the property of being at the centre of social and information networks; the second is "authority",

¹² Bardach, E. (1977). *The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law*. The MIT Press.

the legitimate legal or official power to command or prohibit; the third is "treasure", the possession of money or fungible chattels which may be exchanged; and the fourth is "organisational capacity", the possession of a stock of people, skills, land, buildings and technology. Each political solution will be composed of a combination of these four instruments, each of which has advantages and disadvantages in terms of being more or less expensive or renewable. However, there are limitations that characterise the policy design model and the policy tools provided by Hood. Specifically, if analysed more carefully, The mechanism produced by Hood does not seem to guarantee the choice of policy design which is a direct consequence and which adheres to what is defined in the agenda setting. Furthermore, the same specification of the political procedures does not seem to lead, if carried out according to the model characterised by hood, to their implementation in an accurate way.

It is equally interesting to observe which actors can participate in the policy formulation using the policy tools introduced by Hood, bearing in mind that he started from the example of the British and American realities. On the one side we find the courts; in fact, the legal institutions work by issuing sentences, being therefore entitled to use the second of the policy tools that Hood has identified: the "Authority". The courts with their example of policy formulation provide special cases of comparative study, to analyse, above all, the way in which institutions influence the curvature in the design of the formulated policies. However, the role of non-governmental organisations appears to be limited in relation to the possibility of implementing policy formulation, given that they can hardly be legitimised to use one of the four policy tools that have been identified by Hood.

From what we have said so far regarding the Hood model, it is clear that it has not been able to give a totally comprehensive theory of the reality of policy making, relative to the definition of policies and government tools. In fact, it seems that the

scholar has failed to consider how some actors, albeit minorities, in fact actively participate, or carry out personally policy formulation processes within the social fabric of the group in question.

A policy formulation model that goes beyond the simple organisation of the same procedure as based on consecutive and apparently separated phases is that provided by the scholars Schneider and Ingram. The two just mentioned scholars manage to conceptualise a policy design procedure that is interactive and that actually goes beyond the formulation of policies based on consequential steps, especially bearing in mind that such last feature was one of the fallacious characteristics of the model proposed by Hood. The procedure of the two scholars in fact manages to bring the discrete parts of the policy making process into a single model, being able to emphasise the linkages between the steps belonging to the so-called "pre-decision" phase. We are referring to the connections that Ingram and Schneider identify and underline between the "problem definition", the "agenda-setting" and the "policy formulation". It is precisely in this last facet that this theory can overcome what suggested by Hood, starting from which the policy design options selected in the policy formulation were not always consistent with the characteristics of the previous phases of the policy cycle. In addition, by combining everything in a unique process, they have also been successful in underlining the consequentiality and "articulated linearity" that exists between policy formulation and the subsequent policy adoption and implementation.

It should also be noted, following what has been said about the "double bond" that exists between the institution that formulates the policy and the curvature of the policy itself, that the formulation and specifically the policy design framework becomes the "basis" of the characterisation of policies and public measures that generally are selected and implemented in a particular group. This interaction appears quite clear and, indeed, it could be said that the elaboration of policies

reflects the efforts to promote certain values and interests that will always be traceable by analysing the particular bending of design that the policies have. Furthermore, the design not only affects the implementation of the policies, but also manages to affect the political mobilisation and consequently, the authors continue, the very characteristics of Democracy. The moment of the policy formulation in that way, becomes an institution in itself, auto legitimising its actions on the basis of the future link that will exist between policy ideas and the interests that move them. In addition the policy formulation changes the fabric of democracy that encompasses the group's social interests.

On the other hand, what we have just said is undoubtedly a consequence of the competitiveness that characterises both the policy formulation step and the agenda setting, as parts of the pre-decision analysis which are, in fact, directly and strictly connected to the characteristics and interests of the group. The moment of the policy formulation therefore appears as the subsequent continuation of the previous agenda setting process. It is the culmination of the *pre-decision analysis* phase, and will leave room for the subsequent adoption and then for the implementation of the specific policy. The fact that each policy contains a particular design, and that this design is the result of the "choice" of the actors that contribute to the decision, shows how policies on the one hand are the mirror of society, but how at the same time they manage to "curve" the characteristics of the social tissue in which they are implemented. Among other things, they are able to operate in this direction even at the fully institutional level, influencing the features of the *modus operandi* of the specific state.

Thus, we could affirm that what we have defined in this paragraph has been essential to underline the complexity and the articulated links of the policy formulation process in the normal course of the political action in taking measures. In fact what we have just provided is nothing more than a revisiting of the most

prominent literature contributions to the conceptualisation of the formulation of a policy in non emergency timelines, when there is room and time to develop the analysis and selection connected to the very nature of the formulation in itself.

Later we will try to provide basic reflections on the difficulty of implementing an adequate selection and subsequent authorisation (that is the policy formulation itself) of the policy design in times of emergency, given the impossibility, or the extreme difficulty, of being able to complete the competitive process (basis of this phase of the policy cycle) in a compressed amount of time.

1.4 Policy Implementation: a “continuum” between setting and enacting.

As we are starting to understand, the process of building up a policy is complex and even if portrayed in a so “scholastic” way it could generate misunderstandings and create doubts. What we aim to remark, again, is that also the next portion of the chapter is intended as a examination of the main academic ideas on the structure that the “policy cycle” takes in average times, when there is not a crisis that is ongoing or posing threats. The lines that follow are a revisiting of one of the most remarkable portion of literature on public policy, always focusing on the setting of a policy in non emergency contexts. Consequently to what we have just said, in the following section we will focus on the last of the three major "blocks" in which, as stated in the introduction to the chapter, the policy cycle can be subdivided. Specifically, with this paragraph we will move towards the final part of the policy making process, that is to say the one that provides for the adoption and the effective implementation of the policy, enacting the features of the design which were refined in the immediately preceding steps. We are talking about the "*policy implementation*", or the process of

putting the policy into effect. This step occurs when a decision is made through the application of government directives and confronts reality¹³.

The study of this passage is essential in that it marks, as Mégie asserted precisely, the effective implementation of the public measure; however, the practical transformation of the policy design that has been theorised is not always consistent with its conceptualisation as constructed in the pre-decision phases. This discrepancy, Mègie (2004) continues, between the intent of a policy and the result, derives from the role played by its actors, in particular the public officials in charge of its implementation. Indeed, in this direction, it seems that even the personal propensities of the public officials in charge may weigh on their perceptions and even on their intentions when it comes to implementing a policy.

The fact is that the implementation process, a bit like all the steps of the policy cycle, is strongly affected by the interests of the actors who participate in it and who will implement actions capable of curving the way in which officials apply the policy. In this regard, as noted by Brooks (in 1998), that organisational culture plays a fundamental role in this direction, transmitting ideological and professional norms, as well as agency specific techniques, which can influence the implementation process¹⁴. In fact, external actors who, however, have interests in the implementation of the policy and in the area that will be covered by it, can contribute to increasing the gap between the intentions of the government and the institutions (relative to the implementation of the policy) and the observable results thereof. For example, interest groups or lobbyists can implement strategies and manage to influence the way officials implement the policies.

¹³ Mégie, A. (2004). "Mise en œuvre," in L. Boussaguet, S. Jacquot and P. Ravinet, *Dictionnaire des politiques publiques*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, pp. 283-289.

¹⁴ Brooks, S. (1998). *Public Policy in Canada: An Introduction*, Don Mills, ON, Oxford University Press.

As we have tried to do in the previous sections inherently to the other parts of the policy cycle, also in this paragraph we will try to explain, always in a fairly general way, what are the major theoretical and academic currents behind the definition of the implementation of the policy. As it will be clear to see, this moment of the policy making process is the one characterised by the greatest number of studies and currents, that are divided into three different and distinct waves. This peculiar "abundance" of notions and interest is due to the interweaving of variegated and many functional and organisational theories at the very moment of the policy implementation, which contribute to characterising its essence and at the same time to underline its complexity.

From a definitional point of view we could say that various realities of different social studies contributed to the identification of the characteristics of this policy building phase. In fact the theory and the thoughts on the policy implementation are the final production of the intersection between political science studies, organisation theory, public management and public administration sciences.

As anticipated a few lines above there are three major waves of literature regarding policy implementation, and in the part that follows our intent is to provide a brief introduction of such waves, before to analyse them more in dept.

The first wave of academic research in the field of policy implementation occurred in the 70's. During this period, wide-ranging public measures were launched in the United States in many areas of society, the validity and effectiveness of which opened many debates. It was in response to these debates that the first wave of research and subsequent academic literature was produced. However these researches were united by a latent but present pessimistic undertone, catalysed by the presentation of many case studies of policies that have had sensational failures in their implementation. It can be said that the most important result of this first wave of research on implementation was the fact of having contributed to making the whole

academic world, but also the general public, aware of the need to study this aspect of the policy cycle too.

It was only with the second generation of implementation studies that a more systematic and scientific (albeit still incomplete) series of theoretical and hypothetical frameworks for this final moment of the policy cycle began to be presented. At this second stage belong the two most famous projects of the studies on implementation: the "Top-Down" and "Bottom-Up" theories.

The third and final phase follows the two just mentioned and is characterised, right away, by the awareness of the need to rely on more scientific foundations. In fact, in this phase there is the creation of clear theoretical hypotheses, united by the search for their correct operation. In this third phase, as a consequence of their greater scientific nature, the theoretical proposals are accompanied by the collection of examples and empirical evidences capable of substantiating and demonstrating them in practice.

Each of the above reported moments has produced a set of particularly relevant theories that has been relevant examples, due to their innovative formulation, in the academic world. In the following lines we will summarise what have been the main results of three theoretical waves just introduced and then we will analyse the different blocks in the following pages.

Specifically, Top-Down theories and Bottom-Up theories are the two categories that have left the major amount of theories and academic works. Top-down models of theories place emphasis on the ability of policy makers to implement policy goals effectively and directly, from top to down, leveraging on their direct authority over the step of implementing them to achieve these results.

On the contrary, the theorists of bottom-up criticisms see the local bureaucrats as the real drivers of the implementation, developing a modification of the practical

characteristics of the policies that takes place daily at the "street level", as the result of along negotiation processes within the networks of public officers.

In the next part we will provide a more detailed analysis of what have been the most authoritative contributions both in the Top-Down and Bottom-Up areas, to analyse how the theory has evolved trying to give answers to the need to envy, in periods of normal administration, strategies that can easily explain how the implementation of policies is carried out. Specifically, we will begin by identifying the assumptions behind the theoretical proposals of top-down models.

For these top-down theoretical lines, the basic assumption is that implementation is a process that stems from a decision made by the central government. Indeed, we can say that this top-down approach sees the decision-making process as something organised around the action of elites who are placed in the central government. One of the best known models in this sector is that produced by Pressman and Wildavsky, who used a rational approach. The starting point for these two scholars was the analysis of the way in which policy makers set the political objectives of the policies to be implemented, always keeping in mind the fact that the practical implementation of the policies is based on "interaction between the definition of objectives and actions aimed at achieving these goals ". Implementation, therefore, implied the identification of some type of procedure that guaranteed bureaucrats the possibility of implementing the policies and indications of the political elite in the most accurate and adherent way possible. Practical implementation is left, in the Pressman and Wildavsky system, to the action of ad hoc agencies that have all the necessary and sufficient resources for their purposes. The agencies themselves are then in charge of managing the practical implementers of the policy in a hierarchical manner, by means of the central government institution that controls them and with whom they are in a top-down hierarchical relationship.

Another contribution to the Top-Down theories was made in 1979 and then in 1980 by Sabatier and Mazmanian. These two scholars were among the first to assume the existence of a clear separation between the formation and the implementation of a policy. Even for these two scholars, who belong to the field of top-down theorists, the starting point of the implementation process is the action of the central government's political decision-makers, who from above set the policy objectives providing the directives to reach them. Indeed, according to their thinking, policy makers could guarantee an effective and adequate implementation of the policies through a detailed definition and characterisation of their program. Furthermore, they are the same political leaders who, contrary to what happened in Pressman and Wildavsky model (in which there was a delegation to the agencies in charge), directly structure the implementation process, without leaving much decision-making space for bureaucracies. The actors of the central elites are directly in charge of the implementation process and can control all phases through careful planning.

But the two theorists have gone even further defining practically the implementation models of the policies that can be followed and that lead to an effective enactment of public measures in a state. Specifically, their model identified six different implementation criteria. These criteria are: policy objectives are clear and consistent, the program is based on a valid causal theory, the implementation process is structured adequately, implementing officials are committed to the program's goals, interest Groups and sovereigns are supportive, there are no detrimental changes in the socioeconomic framework conditions. In general, as can be seen from the two examples of theories listed above, one can argue that the theories identified from top-downs find in the governmental elites the primary source behind the implementation of policies.

The policy objectives identified by the decision makers and by the authorities pertaining to the political area, in fact, were seen as a sort of "policy inputs" whose

output (with its various characteristics and passages carried out by bureaucracies and appointees) is the implementation itself. The underlying democratic model that derives from the top-down implementation setting is an “elitist” one, given the importance and core relevance that the central government groups have in setting the objectives and regulating their actuation and practical achievement.

One of the most recent publications in the field of top-down theories is that provided by Parsons in 1995. The author has produced studies on public policies in general and a theory on implementation. In this latter area, his so-called "black-box" study approach allowed him to formulate his point of view regarding the practical and effective enactment of the policy design previously identified during the Formulation phase. In this sense, and on the basis of the black-box approach that we have just introduced, Parsons himself identifies the presence of causal links between the policies and the observable outcomes (of the same). From his point of view, therefore, the author underlines the consequentiality and the "command" and "implementation" setting of the implementation, which sees on the one hand policies as inputs and implementation as the way to achieve their outcomes, according to the conception of the top-downers, are set directly by the elites in power.

In the following lines we move towards the analysis of the opposite strand, consequent to the top-down one, which has provided many contributions to academic research in the field of implementation: we are referring to the so-called "bottom-up" academic lineage. The vein of bottom-up theories developed between the late Seventies and the early Eighties as a critical and direct response to top-down works. The keystone of the top-down theories is dismantled by the bottom-up ones, which do not see anymore the implementation of the policies and the political objectives set by the government elites at the beginning as united by a causal link and by an always clear and direct consequentiality. On the contrary, the bottom upper theorists assert that the political results do not always refer sufficiently to the original political

objectives, setting the implementation of the latter as something different from the view of the scholars of the previous academic “vein”. In fact, with the beginning of this new academic trend, the idea that policies were strongly predefined at the central level and that the implementers had to refer to them in the most appropriate and orderly way possible, was abandoned.

The innovative core of bottom-up theories lies precisely in this last step; they considered local bureaucracies as very important actors in the policy implementation process, assigning them the role of protagonists in actuating practically the measure. If we reflect, in fact, the local bureaucracies are much more aware of what the practical problems and actual needs of the community are, given the fact that they are directly inserted within it and therefore manage to curve the policies (with respect to the central directives) and to ensure more an effective implementation. These "street level implementers"¹⁵ carry out daily the processes of adaptation and curvature of the elites' directives, developing a direct and effective implementation of the policies.

We could therefore say that the Bottom Up theorists, unlike the authors of the top-down models, identified the implementation process as a procedure that started from the bottom and headed upwards, following the direction set by the "individual bureaucrats" and that exploited administrative networks to reach the objectives set by the government. The very character of the implementation procedure was very different from that of the top-downers; in fact, instead of a hierarchical guide who based the relationship with the bureaucrats around the concept of the command from above, a problem-solving process was identified and set as the core activity for a policy “*mise en œuvre*”

From this bottom up implementation model derives a participative democratic model, that is emphasised considering the relevance of the local bureaucrats, which

¹⁵ Lipsky, M. (1969) *Toward A Theory Of Street-level Bureaucracy*. The MIT Press.

are inspired by the experience of the communities in which they work and give an answer to the needs of the individuals who live in them.

With the next part we will proceed with the introduction of an example of a bottom up model which has had a great deal of relevance in the academic vein. We refer to the theoretical model of Lipsky (produced and re defined in 1969, 1971, 1980) which identified the figure of the so-called "street level bureaucrats". Michael Lipsky started from an analysis of the social reality of the United States in the Seventies and focused on the figure and tasks of public service workers. The public officers just introduced are identified by the scholar as the "street level bureaucrats". In this direction and in relation to the "localist" context identified, Lipsky emphasised the importance of direct relations and interactions between citizens and social and public workers, which should have been held in high esteem by political analysts.

By setting his discourse and theory on these figures, Lipsky manages to demonstrate how previous top-down theories have failed in their theoretical attempts, not having taken into account that a hierarchical chain of command and well-defined political objectives are not sufficient to ensure effective implementation per se. In affirming all this, the author underlines how these bureaucrats enjoy a certain autonomy, in their work and in the way they approach the "clients" (as in 1969 Lipsky defined the individual users of public services)¹⁶, compared to the agencies they work for. Here, therefore, the bureaucrats work in symbiosis with the upper and central functions but enjoying a certain autonomy, exploiting the administrative networks that come in this way to substantiate themselves.

A further theoretical lineage that starts from the two just considered is that of the so-called hybrid theories. It is also interesting to analyse this last theoretical framework as it represents the attempt, through the work of the academics related to

¹⁶ Lipsky, M. (1969) *Toward A Theory Of Street-level Bureaucracy*. Institute For Research On Poverty, The MIT Press.

it, to implement a synthesis between the top-down and bottom-up schools. Specifically, the authors who contributed to this category of implementation theories have taken the attention to an effective execution of policies (typical of top-downers) as a starting point to which to combine different characteristic elements of the bottom-up theory and other temporary strands.

Wildavsky produced a model¹⁷ that is precisely in the direction of what is defined in the introduction to this section of hybrid theories. In fact, he defines the implementation process as an evolutionary shaping and remodelling activity of the policy programs (defined by the centre) which is affected by several changes during its course. Indeed, if for Wildavsky the inputs of the policy are defined by central government's policy makers, such inputs will be implemented in a way that differs from the parameters and the rigid directives defined by the central decision makers themselves, by virtue of a *continuum* learning process that makes the policy actuation effective and enabling the measure to adequately respond to the needs of the social group.

The model proposed by Wildavsky embodies fully the features of hybrid theories, starting from the fundamental assumption of the top-downers (who sees the centrality of the elites of the decision-makers of the central governments as fundamental), to then "adjust the shot" by enriching the work with bottom uppers' thoughts. In fact the directives, as just said, are not followed in a "military" way and directly adapting to the characteristics of the inputs set by politicians; instead directives follow a continuous remodulation which is the result of the pressure of the actors working in the public service and that vertically, and this time from the bottom, exploit the administrative networks to re-shape public measures and make them more responsive to reality.

¹⁷ Majone, G. and Wildavsky, A.(1978) "Implementation as evolution," in H. E. Freeman (ed.) Policy Studies Review Annual, Vol. 2. Beverly Hills, CA. Sage.

This method of implementation seems to be, at first glance, the one that most of all could respond to the needs dictated by emergencies and crises, where flexibility is needed to ensure that the objectives set by the centre are quickly implemented. In fact, as stated by Wildavsky, the implementation could be defined as an “evolutionary process”, considering it as an adaptive concept that envisages a more dynamic interaction between the making and the implementing of the policy.¹⁸

Another academic to keep in mind is certainly Sharpf; above all, this author is responsible for having identified the concept of political and administrative networks. In fact, with regard to the definitional problem of the implementation process of a policy, the academician has evolved the implementation principle, characterising it as something beyond just carrying out the indications of the central bodies. In fact, this position would have been typical of an author belonging to the territory of top-down doctrines.

On the contrary, Sharpf considers the implementation of the policies as the process of enacting its goals, carried out by a series of actors and protagonists sharing different and specific interests, for achieving which they use distinct and peculiar strategies. This is the very concept of political networks, or that set of actors that with different objectives and heterogeneous strategies contribute to carrying out the goals of the policies for the public interest. Here, therefore, in this perspective, the degree of communication between the actors that are part of this process becomes important, among the members of the political and administrative networks that it has entered into. Their "heterogeneity" is connoted in the same mutual interdependence that characterises them, making communication essential in order to shape the implementation process making it as effective and efficient as possible.

The implementation studies we have quoted so far have shown that we all focus on an entirely national reality of policy implementation, interpreting the ways in

¹⁸ Alexander, E. R. (1985) From Idea to Action: Notes for a Contingency Theory of the Policy Implementation Process. *Administration & society*. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.] : Sage Periodicals Press, Vol. 16.1985, 4, p. 403-426. *Abstract*

which, state by state, policies are actuated. More modern and innovative studies have tried to go beyond this sector, no longer focusing solely on the analysis of the national implementations. As a consequence, the importance of implementation is growing at an international level, with a large portion of the academic literature focusing on the modelling of theories capable of explaining the application of supranational and internationally-oriented policies in the domestic reality of individual states. This is especially the case if we consider the supranational organisations that set the principles of community policies which will then have to be implemented in the different countries that are part of the community itself.

The strand of academic literature that derives from it is that of the implementation scholars who deal with "Europeanisation". To mention, albeit in a very broad and general way, how studies on the Europeanisation of the implementation of supranational policies at a domestic level have evolved can be interesting, especially in light of hypothetical common strategies that could be taken by the central bodies of the EU to effectively counter an emergency.

Studies in this regard can be divided into two main waves with different characteristics. The first wave is the one that has also contributed to explain the formation process of today's EU, dealing with studying the implementation of the legislation of the Union itself. In carrying out this operation, the scholars belonging to the first wave have assumed an "top-down" point as an operational base, trying to give a technical reading key (certainly not by providing a political analysis) of how the objectives of the policies were set at the central level, from top to bottom.

The second wave of studies on Europeanisation developed in the nineties and which continues today. The point of view of this second wave differs from the focus of the previous one; in fact, the scholars belonging to this vein have put attention more on the social profile and on the "viscosity" of the historical-institutional roots of certain administrative and legislative practices. In other words, they sought to carry

out an analysis of how deeply rooted the implementation practices of each member country of the Union were, weighing up the degree of detachment of the same with respect to the "ways" set by the supranational bodies. This degree of detachment is fundamental to consider, as it characterises the way of "doing things" that each state has traditionally elaborated and developed domestically, in terms of political legacies and organisational provisions. It could be said that with the second wave of Europeanisation we move more closely towards the analysis of the results of the implementation of the policies, evaluating the outputs that have been produced individually in each state.

The comparative perspective adopted by "European" scholars to analyse the implementation of policies has been one of the great technical innovations made in this field of political science studies. The result was a further innovation which lies in the very nature of the analysis of the degree of detachment in the implementation of the EU directives in the individual states; in fact, there was not a single theory of community implementation, while there was a tendency of the various states towards putting into practice different implementation models of the same common policy.

The process of implementing public policies is the definitive step of the policy cycle. In fact, as we have tried to underline in this last paragraph, the identification of the social problem to solve, where to intervene and the choice of the best policy option to deal with it have as final step the implementation of the agreed strategies and the realisation of the desired objectives. This realisation, as well as the achievement of the aforementioned objectives, are nothing more than the outcomes of the implementation of the policy.

The implementation process must therefore be considered as in close relationship with the rest of the public measurement construction cycle, reading it as closely connected (above all) with the passage of the policy formulation. In fact, if we consider the link and the reciprocal need that policy analysts and decision makers

have in the policy formulation, we are going to understand that such connection is something traceable also in the implementation procedure. We are referring to the interdependence that exists between the central decision makers and the bureaucracies that put politics into practice.

The way in which this interdependence has been defined by the various waves of studies on implementation is not as important as the need for emphasising the causality of their interconnection and, above all, of their two-way correspondence. In fact both the two parts above mentioned are mutually "necessary and sufficient" (using a scientific nomenclature) in the actuation of the policy, contributing to defining their implementation as a "continuum" between the directives of the central elites and the activities of the street bureaucracies. The recent studies that have brought the analysis of the implementation to the international level, actually abandoning the purely domestic perspective of studies on policy setting, give the possibility to consider social problems from a community point of view.

In the next paragraph we will try to analyse how the implementation, especially at the supranational level, of common policies that respond to an emergency situation is structured. In fact, the derogation from the autonomies of the member states could be, in emergency situations, the most effective way to give decisive answers in a short time. but it could also mean a delegitimisation of the authority and effective autonomy of the various member states that are part of the European union. What we should try to investigate is how and if the unified dictum of wide-ranging public policies that we try to implement in Europe during the "normality" of non-emergency moments (through for example cohesion policies) is effectively outlining strategies common implementation...

1.5 The policy cycle in emergency situations: how the environmental threats contribute to its continuous reshaping.

What we have so far analysed in the previous paragraphs was necessary to give a general idea of what the policy cycle, or the process of forming a public policy, is as generally theorised by academic literature and as it is characterised in “not critical period”. In fact, the best way as we have already said to proceed in this work of ours seems to start from the analysis of the literature that exemplifies and explains how the policy cycle in times of non-emergency is structured to then move on to the production of reflections, albeit linear and only theoretically, on its compression. Indeed our aim, in the section that follows, will be to produce reflections on how the emergency continually remodels each of the three main phases of the political cycle that we have identified. So the activity of describing such main moments of policy building up does not appear to be an end in itself, but it has been programmatically carried out in order to develop a contrast analysis, a comparison between “academically” defined policy cycle and the one deriving directly from the tentatives to “re-tune” the policy and to make it more responsive to the challenges of the emergency context.

First of all we have to introduce the concept and the definition of the term “emergency”; it could be defined as “something dangerous or serious, such as an accident, that happens suddenly or unexpectedly and needs fast action in order to

avoid harmful results"¹⁹. The characterisation provided by the Cambridge University dictionary enlightens the feature of “unexpectedness” and the sudden and dangerous manifestations of the crisis. Such things require fast institutional or public defence actions to avoid the consequences that could be worse than the emergency itself, playing a role in defining the temporal continuation and the magnitude of the crisis. For that reason the society should be able to enact as fast as possible regulations and direct actions to prevent the situation from escalating, by acquiring a kind of “preparedness” and “readiness” and being more highly responsive to the sudden environmental threats. Such characteristics are essential for a responsive action of the institutions through a public measure in times of disasters or crises and is a peculiarity of the rationale of these called “disaster management” literature. We are going to provide the basic assumptions of this relatively modern academic production in another chapter.

The first contrast analysis that we will deal with relates to the agenda setting and to the definition of the problems and issues that in a given historical moment are relevant for the social group in question. The first particular situation that we have to take into account is that relating to the contextualisation of the selection of problems, as we have just stated, specifically at the time of the so-called “partial policies cycle”. We have already provided a definition of this contextualisation in paragraph one of this chapter, talking precisely of the part of the pre-decision analysis relating to definition of the social problem. In this context the agenda setting of the policy, planned to be enacted, could be subject to several *in itinere* changes and

¹⁹ “Something dangerous or serious, such as an accident, that happens suddenly or unexpectedly and needs fast action in order to avoid harmful results”.

From: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/emergency>

modifications due to causalities and threats posed by the environment. This is an event that can influence the actions of an Executive or of a Governmental institution, curving in a certain direction the very vision of the priorities to be included in the agenda. In fact, it is sufficient to imagine the weight that a catastrophic event has on the institutional trend of a state to understand how in a context of this kind the agenda of the policies that they had planned to adopt will change.

Furthermore, a more careful reflection will also be made on the legislative process which, following the needs posed by the crisis. It would have of course changed, *de facto* derogating from what is the usual legislative *iter* that the Constitution has dictated for periods of “normality”. A striking example is the usage in place in our country to try to give effective and rapid responses to the various crises to which our society and our territory have been subjected in the last few decades.

We are talking about the emergency legislative production that generally takes place in response to natural catastrophic events, the management of earthquakes and, in general, geological emergencies to which Italy is subjected. Trying to buffer the serious consequences of emergencies of this type as quickly as possible, our constitution allows for an exception to the division of powers from the way way in which it has been "normalised". In fact, the legislative power, for reasons of urgency and necessity, is delegated to the executive power retaining institution, to the government, through the possibility of issuing a decree. Such is the law decree, governed by Article 77 of the Italian Constitution, and which in fact allows the government to implement immediately or in any case more quickly measures responsive to the needs and pressures imposed by the crisis. A recent example is the Law Decree number 189 of 2016 (and subsequent amendments) concerning the

actions to be implemented in favour of the populations affected by the 2016 earthquake.

The Decree-Law, as it has been defined, despite having the force of law, requires transformation into ordinary law following a vote in Parliament. The formulation and promulgation of a Law Decree is the most evident sign of the weight that emergencies can have on the institutional life of the political class, but also on that of society. In fact, this provision represents the most emblematic example of how the choice of problems to put on the agenda, as well as the problems themselves, can be changed by an emergency. Again with regard to the agenda setting, we highlighted the great competitiveness by which this moment of the policy cycle is characterised.

Such competitiveness, as remembered referring to the first paragraph of this chapter, is dictated by the presence of many actors (both institutional and non-institutional) who participate in this moment of policy development and who share different interests among themselves, in the name of which they put pressures. Such activity enable them to change the perception of what the relevant problems and issues are within the group's social tissue and, consequently, the agenda itself. This competitiveness was summarised very well by the aforementioned academic E.E.Schattshneider, who defined the "choice" (and the possibility of executing it and not executing it) as the greatest of the powers in the hands of the executive and of the decision makers class.

If on the one hand in times of normality the decision-makers have these great possibilities, on the other hand in situations of crisis or emergency this "weapon" actually becomes a burden. In fact, the decision-making process and its competitiveness will be strongly distorted and compressed. The interests of the various pressure groups and stakeholders who participate in the same agenda setting

will be duly set aside in favour of the community's best interests. In this case, therefore, the "choice" made by the executive must take into account the new priorities that are emerging and which are dictated by the catastrophe itself.

Hot debates are triggered whenever there is a serious crisis regarding the size of a country's budgetary gap. This is a very striking example in that it highlights how the priorities of broad national policies and also the characteristics of financial laws can be reshaped by crises. A valid example connected to this situation are the measures taken by the Liguria region to mitigate the effects of the catastrophe linked to the collapse of the Morandi bridge in Genoa in 2018. The texts of the normative provisions following this criticality have taken into account the interests of all the "groups" and classes (both social and economic ones) which had been damaged from the collapse of the bridge. Beyond the emergency peak, which in situations of natural disasters or collapses of infrastructures is generally limited to the moments of the actual emergency (the collapse of the bridge and the following hours, in our example), its effects have longer lasting and more inclusive duration and repercussions. The interests of the damaged parties have played a fundamental role in influencing the fate of future planning of measures at the local level, effectively taking care of the agenda of subsequent legislation and economic planning. Such last consideration is valid also for the national level; at that wider and more inclusive tier there is the use of enacting immediately effective decrees that is playing a core role in reshaping the global agenda and in modifying the plans for the national public policies. The main field that worries decision makers and the political class is the economic compression and real recession that could be produced by wide-spreading emergencies, entailing the necessity for a wider and deeper remodulation of the public measures' agenda at the light of the new needs and interests, *de facto* bending

the very perception of what are the problems to be considered worthy of attention at this moment in history.

However, what we can say following what has been reported so far is that the always greater diffusion of decrees in Italy has been the focal point for debates and various interpretations for legislators and scholars. In this sense, it should be remembered that the process of putting it up to speed and, in fact, of its acceptance as an ordinary and necessary practice has been slow and gradual. It entailed the issuance of Decrees of the President of the Council of Ministers in succession, the most recent of which (DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 16 February 2018) implements the "Guide to the analysis and verification of the impact of regulation ", proving to be an attempt to clearly determine the modalities of formation and choice of a policy by virtue of defined criteria to evaluate its weight and impact. It is clear therefore, how analysis and evaluation are essential elements for rapid and effective actions with the ordinary agenda setting and formulation. In fact, we have previously anticipated that the policy making process goes hand in hand with the policy evaluation cycle, on whose general form and emergency modification we will focus further on in our work.

We will now continue with the production of reflections on the modification and remodelling that a crisis or an emergency can generate on the next step of the policy cycle: the policy formulation.

As we have extensively discussed before, the policy formulation represents the "core" moment for producing a public measure. It is sufficient to think "the choice" that is actually taken in this step determines which policy design option will have to be subsequently implemented and enacted, always remaining committed to the issues and priorities highlighted in the agenda. Indeed we are aiming at providing reflection

on how it is curved by an emergency always in connection with the agenda setting itself, given their mutual interrelation. The policy formulation consists of two parts, distinct but logically and necessarily consequential. They are the Analysis and Authorisation (which we have explained more fully in the paragraph dedicated to the formulation) and are performed by two distinct figures.

The analysis is carried out by the policy analyst who is the technical-scientific figure, while the authorisation is issued by the official who is either elected or appointed. The latter figure is concerned with performing "qualitative" evaluations, analysing what the general "cost" of the policy design of the public measure is. The analysis and evaluation that these two figures complete requires time, time that is not always available in emergency situations. Indeed, we could say that it can almost never be exploited, even more so in emergencies whose developments are unknown (because there is no experience in the field behind it) even in the short future. These assessments, as we will see in a part dedicated to the policy evaluation cycle and its remodulation in times of crisis, will be largely compressed by the emergency.

In order to buffer the situation, the "commissariamento" of the emergency management is often done, according to an increasingly widespread use. The extraordinary commissioner, in the Italian legal system, is a government official appointed to deal with urgent or extraordinary tasks through a centralisation or an increase in powers and an action in derogation. The office of extraordinary commissioner can be covered either by a managerial figure of the public administration or by a member of the political class. There have been cases of assignment of the role of extraordinary commissioner to the body itself, or institutional body, which would ordinarily be required to produce rules and regulate the subject matter, in this case, of emergency. Obviously the reason for this

eventuality lies in the emergency nature of the event itself and in the consequent need to produce rapid and effective responses to the constantly changing challenges it poses. In fact, extraordinary commissioners can operate through accelerated procedures, and in derogation from current legislation. For example, they have the right to assign public works without a contract notice, but at their discretion.

The legislative regulation of the figure of the extraordinary commissioner is with the law of 23 August 1988, n. 400. Its attributions were established in this normative text.; in particular, it was specified: that in order to achieve specific objectives deliberated by Parliament or the Council of Ministers, or for particular and temporary needs for coordination between state administrations, extraordinary government commissioners may be appointed. The process of appointment of an extraordinary commissioner was enacted immediately after the seismic events in the Central Italy in 2016. In that circumstance, a scientific technical table was immediately opened which was entrusted with the task of carrying out the assessments on the matter, in such a way as to prepare in the shortest possible time the necessary measures to contain the consequences of the crisis. What is clear is that from the first moments of the seismic emergency, institutions ran into the need to remodel the operations of the executive, effectively moving away from what had been planned as "to be done". In fact, the social problems previously identified as worthy of being placed on the agenda and considering which the best of the design options should have been selected during the policy formulation immediately lost their centrality.

With the D.P.C.M. February 14, 2020, the lawyer Giovanni Legnini was appointed extraordinary Commissioner of the Government for the purpose of reconstruction in the regions of Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche and Umbria affected by the seismic events that occurred as of August 24, 2016. The exit from the state of emergency following

the earthquakes for the areas listed above, was then set for December 31, 2020, reflecting the fact that emergencies can drastically change the plan of a state and its executives, effectively pushing them to bend the the agenda and the choice of the right policy option for all public measures that will need to be implemented. The effects of emergencies in terms of building a policy are therefore prolonged over time and are not limited to timely response. In this sense, in the next chapters we will propose a whole series of literature cues that will be necessary to better understand how we tried to organise the response to emergencies and according to what principles we intended to structure an action aimed at mitigating the effects of a catastrophe in the future and the resumption of "normal administration" activities with the emergency ended.

The above mentioned D.P.C.M. of February 2020 shows how the derogated powers assigned to the extraordinary commissioner go beyond the peak phases of the crisis. In this way the concept of emergency is outlined as a continuum that goes from the outbreak of the crises to the reconstitution of the situations that prevailed in the moment immediately preceding it. As long as the competitiveness of the choice process that unites the agenda setting and the policy formulation will be compressed by the different perception of social needs and problems that is dictated by the crisis, these two moments of the pre-decision and selection will be compressed Both in their timelines and competitiveness.

In fact, we have widely anticipated in the previous paragraphs how the process of selecting the problems to be included in the agenda and of choosing the most effective of the policy designs, is able to influence the politics and the democracy itself of the social system of a state. The choice is the result of debates among different shareholders and are. Moved from their interests; such bargains will duly

play a minor role during catastrophes and will leave the floor to debates around crisis' management. In fact, it is the same extraordinary commissioner who acts directly, obviously surrounding himself with a technical staff to which the policy analysts will be part, derogating from the usual legislative formation procedure. Sometimes, especially when the emergency is unprecedented and its future bending are impossible to be forecasted, the managing panel created to solve the problem is crossed by conflicting opinions regarding the management of the crisis itself.

So far we have analysed the way in which the sections in which the choice, within the policy cycle, is carried out are reshaped by the emergency. In such situations it can happen that the disorganisation and the confusion generated by it can lead to decisions that fail to solve all the problems that the crisis has generated. Indeed, sometimes these measures are nothing more than sectoral actions and respond to the needs posed by only one of the problems that exist. We could therefore affirm that, given the fluidity from which the decision-making process is crossed in certain situations and the limitations found in the measures taken, it seems that (maybe unknowingly) the Garbage Can Model is used.

With the following part our intent is to focus on the implementation process dwelling on how it is influenced by an emergency or a crisis. It would also be interesting to consider the context in which the policy is implemented; in fact if the entity that deals with the enactment of a public measure is part of a supranational union (with other states) it will be clear that the process to put the policy into practice will be different as it was an autonomous or fully sovereign state. In any case, the starting point and the basic assumption behind our analysis regarding the remodulation and changes that the policy implementation process undergoes in emergency periods is that it must be streamlined and necessarily speeded up.

As we have like we have already done for the other two phases of the policy cycle we all start by defining the concept of implementation. Implementing a policy does not just mean to enact it; indeed put it into practice is something more complicated. In general, it is outlined as a sort of continuum between the directives dictated by the central political class and the actions carried out by the bureaucracies for an effective and direct actuation of the same. Obviously, as we have widely anticipated in the previous paragraph, the implementation of a policy is the result of a multitude of uses, ways of acting and distorted processes that have contributed to the shaping of the political essence of a state or a community.

Thus, as a logical consequence of what has just been said, the process of formation and implementation of a norm or of a public measure in France will appear different from the one followed in Germany. Bureaucrats and officers always take into account the characteristics of the policy as they were set up in the previous phases of the policy cycle, making continuous adjustments for their implementation more adherent to the relationship. In general, to try to make the implementation of an emergency policy faster and more responsive, we try to anticipate the times and create a planning of the interventions and actions to be undertaken for the implementation of the measure. This strategy, as we will see in greater depth in relation to the analysis and evaluation to be carried out in the policy evaluation cycle, generally takes the name of "risk management" and is the result aof a fairly recent strand of academic literature concerning risk analysis and planning the actions to be taken for achieving a "risk aversion".

These intentions clash, however, with the reality of the facts if we find ourselves in the face of emergencies whose notes have never been found and, therefore, whose evolution is not known. In a national context, the implementation of a policy in times

of emergency turns out to be a headache. Without prejudice to the assumption that there is a need to cut the implementation timelines, if a state does not have the technical-scientific expertise to be put in place to decide in a short time the curvatures to be implemented to enact it, it is clear that the aforementioned commissioner will also be compressed in its effectiveness.

In this situation, national bodies will be assisted in completing this process by the supranational bodies set up within the supranational organisations to which the state has adhered. In principle, then, it could also be said that the supranational body should derogate from the sovereignty of each of its members, acting in a direct and centralised way. It is to say that what has been anticipated by the Top-Downers in defining the implementation, could play (in emergency circumstances) a decisive role for producing responsive answers to the threats of the crisis. In fact this hierarchical eating of the implementation, from the central authorities setting the objectives of the policy, to the agencies implementing them in the territories, is the one providing the best and more adherent implementation.

Anyway, some times it could happen that the central international offices do not know the domestic environment of their member states so well, and cannot produce effective and efficient implementation processes. In such moments the bureaucratic and administrative networks are essential for thinning the detachment of local implementation procedures from the centralised one, translating the features of the measures set at the higher levels into something that will fit better the local environment.

Sometimes, however, as we will try to analyse further below, it is the same national organisations or other states belonging to the same union that represent a reason for slowing down operations which, otherwise, could have been faster and

more effective. There is therefore a double bond that entails advantages and disadvantages to the community and to the state that is part of it, making all the steps of the policy making, and specifically the implementation, faster or more cumbersome. We will take the European Union, for example, in contexts of general crisis (for reasons of convenience).

Diatribes may arise regarding jurisdiction over the implementation of a policy and its detention. Generally, EU treaties are signed for the implementation of a supranational and wide-ranging policy, which must then be ratified. The lack of ratification by one of the member states which had also taken part in the stipulation of the multi-party treaty generates the failure to implement the provisions of the agreement in the domestic context of the signatory but non-ratifying state. For this reason, as we said earlier, the studies on the European implementation have highlighted the presence of the delineation of multiple domestic implementation doctrines for the individual member states and not the formulation of a single process for all.

This clearly appears as the consequence of the lack, historically, of backgrounds or experiences that have seen the whole European Union (to remain within the scope of this example) subjected to a general and all-encompassing emergency and that has had them all equally unprepared.

The general different internal organisation of the member states from the institutional profile and the provision of public services (as well as the strategic objectives and the role of the policies) entails a lack of cohesion even when it would be needed to implement policies univocally and quickly in all States. Each individual member of the EU has developed its own very personal implementation process, the result (as we said above) of very long and complex institutional and social political

processes; to result in such ways of doing and "operating" would be detrimental to the same peculiarity of the individual states and their characteristic system of democracy.

The emergency requires unity and identification of simple and streamlined paths to implement the policy by implementing it effectively, but the very characteristic of the union, which has widened more and more without however "deepening" seems to make it difficult to fight the general crises that could cover it. We will deal with this last facet later in a dedicated chapter, with the case study on "Covid-19".

Chapter Two

The policy evaluation cycle

The general theorisation and the emergency remodulation

2.1 Introduction and chapter strategy




Figure 2: *The Policy evaluation Cycle.*

3

The policy building process, as we have extensively analysed in the previous chapter, is very complex; effectively, through all its steps, it will lead to the formation of policy outcomes and outputs, starting from the political and societal inputs that are formulated on the basis of the interests and needs of the social group. To identify the problems on which to intervene with specific policies, to select the most suitable and feasible of the policy design options, to then implement the public

measure project in the most appropriate and effective way, the decision maker and public officials carry out, throughout the course of the construction of the policy, various evaluations and assessments.

The proposal of this chapter will therefore be to carry out a contrast analysis, a comparison, starting from defining how the policy evaluation cycle is generally composed, and then investigating how its various steps change in an emergency context. In this regard, we must point out that the parts reported and the examples with the literature of this first part of the chapter (and of our work) are functional to the intent of our research. For this same reason it must be remembered that the tentatives to explain the features of the evaluation cycle are referring to the "normal" procedure for analysing and evaluating social situations and the environment from which then proceeding with the production of a policy. In fact, they are explained by how they are structured when "relaxed" timelines are available, and there is not the necessity to act quickly to produce in the shortest possible time an effective response to the challenges that a crisis would pose. As we have widely anticipated in the previous chapter, in fact, the process of policy building up is accompanied throughout its course by the procedure of evaluating it.

In the first chapter we have already introduced the decree law relating to the regulation of the impact assessment of a public policy. In fact, the public measures that are adopted always have two reverses: due to the fact that they are developed starting from the interests of the group or of the stakeholders within the group, they will inevitably end up bringing benefits to certain categories and leaving others aside.

The evaluations, as we will see in the course of the paragraphs, are carried out to assess not only the impact in terms of "side effects" of the policy in question, but also and above all to implement the most convenient selection when authorising the

policy design option, as well as its efficient implementation. We will find practical examples of what has just been introduced by analysing the "cost-benefit" and "cost-efficiency" analyses. What should be kept in mind is the fact that this evaluation process shadows the policy cycle not only throughout its duration, but goes even further, taking into account and defining what the practical effects of the policy in terms of outputs and effects on the society are. In the following sections we will carry out a general definition of the main steps and main portions of the policy evaluation cycle. We will focus more on the operational implementation of the various assessment steps of the policy in question, so as to underline their differences in times of crisis.

In fact, as we will see, the emergency changes the way in which decision makers evaluate the quality and validity of the policy that has been implemented, as well as their perception of the problems and issues that should be addressed by the public measure is affected also.

2.2 The canonic policy evaluation cycle.

2.2.1 General assumptions

In the following part, the intent of our analysis will be to define how the policy evaluation cycle is organised in its various facets, trying to underline its complexity. In doing this we will tend to be as broad as possible, to allow more space for the analysis of the remodelling that an emergency or a crisis could bring, in the duration and practice of the assessment cycle.

We start from a first fundamental assumption for the purpose of our investigation: the definition of the evaluation process as a "cycle". In the same way as stated in the previous chapter regarding the policy building process, also the evaluation activity is configured, in its various consecutive parts, as a cycle. It should be noted that the cyclicity of its form and its setting is driven by academic necessities of theorisation of the same process, which emerges as a parallel track with respect to the actual policy cycle. In fact, the policy evaluation cycle consists of three fundamental groups of analyses and evaluations that are connected and directly refer to as many moments of the policy cycle.

These steps are that of "*ex ante*", "*in itinere*" and "*ex post*" evaluations. As explained in *figure 2*, the *a priori* analyses take place during the very first moments of the construction of a public measure. In fact, once again analysing figure number two, we note that the moment of the agenda setting is the one in which these types of evaluations regarding the policy are concentrated.

Furthermore, we have widely anticipated in the first chapter how the identification of issues and social problems to be included on the agenda of a policy, as well as all the phases, in general, of the pre-decision analysis, are the result of a bargaining process. In such an activity the wishes and interests of the various societal actors that contribute to the formation of the policy itself *de facto* define the direction that will be taken in the subsequent stages of the policy building course and collaborate in defining the competitive aspects of the process. There are other types of assessments that analysts carry out during the later stages of the public policy formation. In fact, the assessments relating to the pre-decision analysis we have just mentioned, as well as more generally the *ex-ante* assessments can be linked to the time of the agenda setting.

The policy evaluation cycle however is shadowed during its entirety by the evaluation cycle, therefore every other moment of the policy cycle will be accompanied by a specific evaluation. During the moments of policy formulation and policy implementation, the processes implemented by decision makers and bureaucracies to complete the procedures just mentioned are continuously monitored through so-called "*in itinere*" evaluation methods. As we will see more carefully during the course of the paragraph, these ongoing monitoring activities are essential in the policy formulation but above all in the implementation of the public measure to curve and adapt the same to the environment in which it is contextualised. Whether the work done by each of the actors (behind the moments just mentioned) is going in the appropriate direction or not, is an assessment that is provided by the ongoing evaluations.

Another type of analyses that can be completed are "*ex-post*" ones; in this case analysts will investigate what are the effects that the policy is having or has had after its implementation. The measurements will be completed in these cases, as we will see, on the so-called policy outcomes, by carrying out randomised field experiments or other related evaluations.

In our analysis we go, first of all, to indicate what are the areas that will be covered by the evaluations and the objectives that the policy evaluator aims to achieve. The first distinction to be made, in this direction, is inherent to the moment in which it is developed by the evaluator; in fact, we have already stated that the types of analyses will differ according to whether you are preparing to perform an "*ex-ante*", "*in-itinere*" or "*ex-post*" evaluation. Consequently, the problems that the evaluation of the policy must or will affect will also vary.

In the moment before the implementation of the measure, analysts usually try to carry out breath-taking and general research into the policy it is about to build. For example, they try to define the nature and extent of the problem, its position or category and the number of people who could be affected. In addition, analysts will try to understand if the problem they have identified really has dimensions and relevance within the social group that can justify the affairs of a new policy, or the expansion or modification of some other already existing programs. Furthermore, an ex ante evaluation has the task of solving the problem of identifying a specific type of social or public policy program that is actually able to solve the initial problem setting or in any case to effectively mitigate its effects. As mentioned just a few lines above the *a-priori* evaluation analysis is also essential to identify the population that will be at the centre of the policy that decision makers are about to implement.

On the other hand, however, the analysis or evaluation of a public policy is necessary even after its implementation. It will therefore be interesting to try to introduce the problems that the policy analyst intends to solve through the execution of ex-post analyses ("*ex-post*"). With the analyses carried out following the implementation of the policy, problems can be solved, such as understanding the real effectiveness of the policy; we will therefore investigate the outcomes it is having on the population, placing the latter in comparison with the one that was identified at the beginning (the target population).

Obviously in carrying out an analysis of the effects of the policies, the analysts will have the "tact" to limit their investigation to the context, to better understand if its implementation follows the objectives set by the central government and decision makers, or if the bureaucracies and Public Officials have completed the necessary adjustments during implementation. In fact, therefore, the ex-post evaluations will

serve to determine whether a specific program has been correctly implemented by the administrations or by the responsible authorities.

Together with the identification of the problem and the issues, in the immediately initial stages of the social program development the decision-maker will also try to set specific objectives that must be achieved through the subsequent moments of the policy cycle, culminating in the implementation. With regard to the effective achievement of these objectives, the analyst will in fact be enabled to investigate using the *a-posteriori* analyses, determining, in fact, whether the program is reaching the aforementioned goals or not. A further problem that could be addressed in this way by the policy evaluators is that concerning the reasonableness of the costs of the policy; we will see more fully in the continuation of the paragraph how two particular types of analysis are dedicated to the resolution of this evaluation issue.

We continue now in our description of the policy evaluation cycle going to deal with its historical evolution, obviously postponing generalizations in providing an insight on this topic. Also this field of study concerning public policies was born in the United States, inherent to the systematic evaluations that were carried out (for the first time in the 1930s) regarding the great social measures in health and public education.

An exponent of the branch of evaluation is Herbert Simon who tried to analyse the work of municipal activities in 1938²⁰. In his publication the scholar just mentioned brought forward a first theory regarding the definition and development of measurement techniques for the action of public entities (specifically municipal action), setting the standards to be followed in these analysis cases.

²⁰ Ridley, E.C. Simon, A.H. 1938 *Measuring Municipal Activities: A Survey of Suggested Criteria for Appraising Administration*. The University of Michigan.

The drive that led to the actual spread of an evaluation of the policies was made in the years of the Second World War. In fact, during the conflict, the use of carrying out investigations concerning the morale of soldiers at the front had spread. It was used to remodel the action of military institutions and facilitate the lives of the military. Consequently, especially from the 1960s onwards, a number of associations and institutes were still used in the United States to implement assessments regarding public measures adopted in the nation. One above all is the example embodied by the use of GAO, the General Accounting Office, which had to deal with the control of the expenses of public institutions but that during the Johnson administration (and more generally throughout the course of the twentieth century) dealt with ever greater constancy in the analysis and evaluation of public programs. It took into account the degree of deviation of the results achieved by the objectives that had been set in advance by the decision makers

Therefore it is to note that on the basis of this gradual process in the 1990s, analysts and social scientists managed to theorise and rationalise a system capable of evaluating social programs in a wide variety of sectors, especially in the more developed countries. In order to make the assessments provided by the offices and associations in charge as realistic and truthful as possible, there is a tendency to make the latter autonomous and detached from the government and the political class in their actions.

As we anticipated in the previous paragraph regarding the assessment of the impacts of emergency policies launched in Italy through the law decrees, specifically referring to the "DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF

MINISTERS 16 February 2018"²¹ (directive of the Prime Minister), assessing public measures it also means weighing up its indirect and direct impacts. This process which in Italy has been slow and only in recent history has led to a normalisation of the practice relating to law decrees, is actually much more developed and usual in other countries, among all in the United States.

In fact, in the USA, the Regulatory Impact Assessment was introduced under the Reagan administration; specifically, the President of the United States made its implementation immediate by issuing an executive order, which in fact implemented the use of assessments to evaluate government interventions through public measures. It must be said, however, that Reagan for his part put in place this move to try to slow down the launch of public and social measures, adding another filter specifically cut expenses deriving from their approval and subsequent implementation. However, the US administration as well as the high bureaucrats had to change their mind and accept the effective value and usefulness of the assessments as a tool to weigh and ascertain the success of the policies. During their mandates, Democratic presidents Clinton and Obama supported the use of policy evaluations, considering them a useful tool for achieving the efficiency and the best success of politics and the vision of a state.

The evaluation practice, as mentioned a few lines above, became widespread in the 90s in all the most advanced countries, and obviously also in the European continent which in the meantime was carrying out its integration process through an

²¹ Presidenza del Consiglio Dei ministri. (2018). DIRETTIVA DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 16 febbraio 2018. Approvazione della Guida all'analisi e alla verifica dell'impatto della regolamentazione, in attuazione del decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri 15 settembre 2017, n. 169. *From: <http://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/pdf/GuidaAIR.pdf>*

extension of its borders and a growing cohesion between member states. The result of this latest process was the adoption of an Impact assessment unit by the European Commission in the early 2000s. This European Impact Assessment is based on an Integrated Checklist on regulatory reforms which was provided by the OECD in 1995 for the member countries, and that was followed by another document for the states that are part of the APEC in 1999. We will provide a reading of the two, starting from the more modern one.

As stated in the 1999 document, the APEC and OECD tried to produce a practical guide aiming to be a policy instrument for "regulatory quality, competition policy and market openness".²² The 1999 document continues by stressing that the checklist is a "voluntary tool"²³, de facto giving the political and economic authorities of each of the individual member states the possibility of autonomously deciding whether to accept or reject the use of this tool. The evaluations, however, remain the central node of this checklist which is seen as a guide to drive decision makers on the right path to be taken in the development of a public measure, dividing the same measures into various classes, related to various types of policies (such as regulatory reforms, integrated policies or competition policy and law).

The foundations for this instrument were already established by the OECD in 1995 with its "*checklist for regulatory decision making*"²⁴, containing the points that we list below: "1) Is the problem correctly defined?, 2) Is government action justified?, 3) Is regulation the best form of government action, 4) Is there a legal basis for regulation?, 5) What is the appropriate level (or levels) of government to

²² APEC-OECD (1999) INTEGRATED CHECKLIST ON REGULATORY REFORM, *preamble*

²³ APEC-OECD (1999) INTEGRATED CHECKLIST ON REGULATORY REFORM, *preamble*

²⁴ OECD. 1995. "RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE OECD ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION (ADOPTED ON 9 MARCH 1995)", *page: 14*

take action?, 6) Do the benefits of regulation justify the costs?, 7) Is the distribution of effects across society transparent?, 8) Is the regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible, and accessible to users?, 9) Have all interested parties had the opportunity to present their views? 10) How will compliance be achieved?"²⁵. Indeed, all the above points represent the questions that are most commonly asked by the evaluator when he or her is about to carry out evaluations of the public policies that are being developed or implemented.

What is urgent to keep in mind, in fact, when it comes to evaluating public policies, is that there is no "one size fits all", that is, a univocal approach that can be used for the assessing all types of policies that are adopted in a nation. Here, in this regard, it can be remembered what we said with respect to the document-instrument provided to us in 1999 by APEC-OECD. In fact, it contained guidelines for implementing an evaluation of policies that was appropriate to the type of measure being investigated. Precisely because there is no single method for producing assessments, it should be underlined the deep interplay that there is (or should be) between the nature of the policy with its environmental setting and the repertoire of techniques and approaches used to analyse the policy itself.

The evaluation projects, therefore, as a consequence of what has just been said can be either simple or very complex. Their simplicity will be dictated by the narrowness of the social area that the policy will cover, determining the setup of the analysis as restricted around a "precise question".

²⁵ OECD. 1995. "RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE OECD ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION (ADOPTED ON 9 MARCH 1995)", *pages: 14-19*

The nature and features of the questions are also important characteristics for the purpose of setting a good analysis strategy by the evaluator. But what are the characteristics that make an evaluation question "good"? Starting from a general assumption we could say that in order to be considered good, the evaluation questions must be reasonable and appropriate. In this sense it can be added that the evaluator should be able to identify those aspects of the social program in development which are more interesting (and which are relevant for the interests) in the eyes of the stakeholders. Furthermore, the analysis questions have to be able to clearly characterise those portions of the public program that address social areas in which results can realistically be obtained (by means of implementing a policy). Therefore, in order to achieve the result of formulating appropriate and effective evaluation questions, the evaluator should start by drafting a detailed and complete report of the policy program.

In summary, the analyst must first become familiar with the policy program and then formulate a draft of the analysis questions. Indeed if it follows the process described that part of the study of the policy program, passes through a careful reading of the wishes and interests of its stakeholders and culminates in a careful evaluation of the activities and hypotheses, the analysis questions proposed by him / her will be automatically "good" (that is to say, they will be "appropriate and realistic").

On the contrary, an evaluation process could be very complex if the social issue that the policy intends to resolve is of a large size (for example, think about the pension system reforms or regulations to limit the abuse of alcohol or drugs). In this cases, the tools and projects for the evaluation will be many and organised on various tiers and directions.

Generally, however, an evaluation project can be identified as defined around three concepts which are: question to answer, methods to be used, nature of the evaluator-stakeholder relationships. In fact, the evaluator is never free to select the method of research and analysis, but must take into account the will and the interests of the stakeholders involved. We have widely anticipated in the first chapter that a policy is based on the will of those who develop it, following the decisions taken (or not taken) in a highly competitive process. The interested parties could therefore consequently increase the pressure on a policy suit and the assessor should be ready to encourage dialogue between the interested parties.

However, the possibility that some of the interested parties may not agree with the evaluation strategy set by the analyst remains and therefore could contest the results.

2.2.2 The “ex-ante” evaluations

We continue in this paragraph going a little more deeply into the different types of analysis that we anticipated in the introduction and in the initial part of the paragraph. We are referring to the "*ex-ante*", the "*in-itinere*" and the "*ex-post*" evaluation.

Before starting our review of the most used strategies to “assess” a policy is important point out that, as stated for the “policy building cycle” the nomenclature we are going to use and the “technical” division in separated steps of the different evaluations carried out, is just an academic conceptualisation. In this sense we mean that the “description” we are attempting in that paragraph is not aiming to depict the moments of the policy analysis as “static” or “frost”, instead we want to summarise their “ongoing” nature, rolling in relation with different and consecutive steps of the

“policy making process”. Again it is important to remember the strong interplay between the policy evaluations and the policy making processes, as shadowing each other to “enhance” the work of policy evaluators and decision makers.

In this sub paragraph we are going to ascertain the characteristics of the “ex-ante” analysis, that is to say the set of analysis strategies to assess the pre-decision phase moments of the policy building cycle. This evaluations are the ones that “catalyse” the actions of the analysts and decision makers to “take the decision”, authorising (after the *policy formulation*) the most suitable and feasible of the various policy design options. Regarding the various of the *a priori* evaluations related to the agenda setting moment, we have already talked about in the first chapter, but it could be worth to remember what are the phases that characterise it in this step of the policy cycle. First of all, we must mention the "problem identification" procedure which is the basis of the agenda setting and which consists of a series of social assessments. In fact, it will be the perception of the issues found in a group that will lead decision-makers (and the actors of the policy building process) to their definition as notable problems and therefore worthy of being resolved through the adoption of a policy or modification of already existing measures. The assessment of policy issues is connected to a very delicate phase in any evaluation program; we are referring to the phase of identification and definition of the questions that the evaluator wishes to address. This process is very complicated due to the various inputs that the evaluator must keep in mind when planning an assessment strategy; it is therefore quite rare that a policy analyst has ready from the outset an evaluation program that is close to the context and that is effective for the purpose of his investigation.

Returning to consider the question of the inputs to keep in mind when carrying out, or intending to carry out, an evaluation, a very important role is played by the sponsors and stakeholders who promote the investigation of the policy under construction. At the same time it is also very rare that during the very first stages of analysis the evaluation questions are clearly identified or indicated by the sponsor of the same.

This consideration is the result of a logical consequentiality, which sees as the main source of the identification of the same questions, the degree of competition and the bargain process that accompanies the definition of the analysis program. This process and trend is on the one hand "good" in that it prevents the evaluator from making mistakes by asking questions of analysis that do not focus on the true core of the policy, but on the other hand it could lead to incorrect assessments; in fact, the sponsors themselves could put pressure on the policy analyst, as we have already explained before²⁶. Again, regarding this step of policy cycle we have already identified another type of assessment that is generally carried out to determine what are the constraints within which the decision maker must remain formulating the design of the policy. This last type of evaluation is the so-called "feasibility analysis" which is used by the evaluator or political consultant to determine the marginal limits of the space within which a feasible choice can be made.

²⁶ We mean that, during the analysis, policy evaluators have to assess the policy taking into consideration the necessities of the parties that "hold interests" in the social area in which intertwining with the policy in question. In this way the policy "evaluation sponsors" will be the same parties that share the interests to implement the policy. In the case of an emergency policy, the "policy evaluation sponsors" are the institutions and the "decision makers" themselves. Indeed, as we are going to see further in the chapter, in critical situations the "interests hold" are the interests and the needs of the civilian population.

Such constraints are different and characteristic on each social group and are also the main focus of many social sciences such as economics. In fact, the limits can be both social, political and economic, and the good analyst should consider them all, paying attention to the context in which the agenda is designed. In fact, the constraints are analysed first in the so-called "systemic agenda" and only in a second moment is the "institutional agenda" (compare the first chapter to deepen this topic).

We must also take into consideration the fact that the limits and constraints can also come from the context outside the country in which the policy is being assessed. In fact, there may be external constraints in the national agenda posed from the directives that the international bodies of which the country possibly belongs (for example WTO or IMF). The presence of these further boundaries within which the choice options analysed and evaluated as "feasible" must remain has given rise to the rise to various interpretations.

There are in fact branches of academic literature on this subject that go in opposite directions; on the one hand, there are those who interpret the directives of supranational organisations as *further limits*, effectively compressing both the interpretative and development possibilities for policies. Among the best known works of this theoretical branch is the theory of "Diminishing Democracy".

On the other hand there are those scholars who interpret external constraints in a positive way, seeing them as additional possibilities for evaluating and developing social projects. It will therefore be good what to take advantage of these additional limits, using them as an opportunity.

At the heart of the theory of the so-called "The inescapable trilemma of the world economy"²⁷ there is the consideration of how the limits placed on the development of a policy can influence, in fact, democracy, sovereignty and globalisation. By elaborating a whole series of possible combinations of the three elements mentioned above, Rodrik concluded by affirming that only combinations made up of only two of the three characters can lead to the adoption (and evaluation) of policy projects that are acceptable.

The other "ideal typical" step of the "policy cycle" during which the "*ex-ante*" analyses are carried out is the *policy formulation*. For the analysis of this particular moment of the policy evaluation cycle we have to premise that, in the following lines, for linguistic necessities we are going to use ideal typical nomenclature to introduce the "actors" of the evaluation (in thatches of the policy formulation) itself. Consequently "policy analyst" and "public officer" will be described as hypothetical actors whose tasks are to assess and to authorise the most feasible of the policy options proposed. Additionally it would be better to point out that the policy formulation is part of the "pre-decision" phase (that we introduced and explained in the first chapter); indeed the decision has not been taken yet, so that the connected evaluations are to be inserted in the "*ex-ante*" ones.

First of all, we will produce a basic assumption behind the theorising of the concept of policy formulation. As we have amply explained in the specific paragraph of the first chapter, policy formulation is a process which consists of two consequential and mutually necessary phases. In fact, the formulation of a public measure can be defined as the result of a careful analysis and subsequent

²⁷ Rodrik, D. (2007). The inescapable trilemma of the world economy. Dani Rodrik's weblog. From: https://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/06/the-inescapable.html

authorisation of the policy design option which was considered by the evaluators to be the one that best suits the resolution of the previously defined problem. In order to obtain authorisation, the evaluator generally tries to answer a series of questions, which are the basis of the policy formulation itself.

Starting from the most basic, and then moving on to the more specific questions, the *policy analyst* (who is the actor responsible for the technical evaluation of the policy projects) wonders what the plan is to tackle a problem, what are the objectives and priorities of the same and through what possible policy options to achieve them are. As already mentioned above, the forecasts regarding the future effects of the policy (if implemented), in terms of costs and benefits that will derive, will have a significant importance here. It may be interesting to analyse how this moment of the evaluation process (during the policy formulation) is modified by the emergency environment. In summary, therefore, the process of ongoing analysis at the time of the policy formulation is the basis of the formulation itself, and gives the public official the opportunity to complete his (or her) task that is to authorise a regulatory proposal.

In the following lines we will move on to analyse the moment of the policy analysis linked to next policy cycle steps. We refer to evaluations, that are carried out during the time of the practical implementation of the policy or of the social program. In this type of analysis, those that are most functional for the reorganisation and adjustment (when necessary) of the actions to contrast an emergency must be traced. In fact, as we will see in the third chapter, a whole branch of literature based on the principle of risk management is organised around the need to structure actions that are constantly monitored and among the operators of whom there is always an open preferential communication channel. In this way the flexibility of the

implementation (and of the response produced to the emergency) should be guaranteed. But we will deal with this analysis in other parts of the work; we have here to remember that we have referred up to now to the description of the types of analysis carried out in non-emergency moments.

2.2.3 The “in-itinere” evaluations

After having ascertained the steps towards the “decision” that compose, in other terms, the set of “e-ante” evaluations methods we move into the field of "*in-itinere*" analyses. We are tending to remain in this “analysis field” , addressing further on in the paragraph, the assessments and monitoring that are carried out during the implementation of public policies. In doing so we are just proposing an excursus of the various methods used to evaluate the trend of a public policy (during its course) in non emergency moments, when there is the need to adjust it continuously and rapidly. The *in itinere* evaluations are such analyses carried during the implementation of the public policies.

Always keeping in mind (as we have already introduced widely), that the evaluation process shadows the policy building cycle, we will proceed to investigate what are the techniques used to monitor "*in-Itinere*" the implementation of a public policy. For this purpose it will be essential to introduce the concept of *program process*; indeed many steps are needed to transform a program project into a fully operating public norm, as well as many efforts are needed to keep it operating at its maximum capacity, avoiding that at the same time it may deviate too much from its initial setting and original characteristics that were given by the designers (and

stakeholders). So it is clear from what has just been said that it is essential, but at the same time problematic, to ascertain whether the program is being fully implemented as it was conceived and wanted by its sponsors. Furthermore, however, an analysis of this kind and that attempts to ascertain how well a program works (or does not work) is a useful and important one; it is known as the *evaluation of the program process*. This assessment, as we will see, is represented by a fairly inclusive family of concepts, techniques and methods.

Obviously, as will be clear from a first interpretation of the name, the central theme and the ultimate focus of the "evaluation of the program" is the program itself. The evaluator will therefore focus on the components of the policy, its activities, performance, resources; therefore, it will examine every facet of the measure.

When this activity occurs as repeated over time requiring a constant acquiring of data we will refer to a so-called "*program process monitoring*".

The evaluation of the program aims to ascertain, among other things, whether the development and implementation that is being performed (of the same) is adapting to what was planned, with respect to the targeted population (which as we said before is identified before the implementation of the policy). By evaluating the program of a policy, we generally intend to verify and assess its performance, from the point of view of the use of the services that the social program offers to the target population and relative to the technical organisation of the same. Specifically in the first case (concerning the assessment of the use of the services) it will result in an examination of the degree of reception, by the target population, of the envisaged programs. On the other hand, instead, referring to the evaluation of the organisation of the program, it requires comparing the plan for what the program should do with what is actually being done, in particular as regards the provision of services.

The characterisation the analysis questions to assess the program of a policy, therefore, will tend to focus on topics that enable the evaluator to measure, in practice, the degree of detachment of the practical implementation of the policy from what had been its original objectives. It should also be remembered with regard to this precise evaluation that it never refers directly to the impact of the program, but simply to how it is being implemented.

However, it can be said, as a completion of the explanation of this particular type of assessment, that it can be both an independent analysis (inherent to the program only) and an analysis accompanying an assessment of the impact of the policy (as we will see later). In general, in fact, the praxis provides that when analyses or assessments on the impact of a policy are carried out, they should always be linked to a minimal investigation of the policy program.

When the evaluation process of the policy program requires continuous efforts, and is outlined as a process repeated over time, it is called program process monitoring. This type of assessment, which is a real monitoring, is outlined as the continuous and systematic documentation of the various aspects and program performance; it then assesses whether the program functions as expected and whether it approaches appropriate and pre-determined standards for these instances. Continuous monitoring of the policy program and its performance is an essential component of public policy evaluation. In fact, it allows the decision maker (on the wave of advices provided to him by the evaluator) a continuous adjustment of the program itself, with respect to its initial setup and to ensure the achievement of the best possible objectives, including the provision of the best possible services to the target population. Furthermore, without an analysis of this kind it would be practically impossible for the decision maker to make any changes, if only in a direct

and "live" way, forcing him to operate according to a "closed box" criterion and only downstream of the analysis on the results and impact of the public measure under consideration.

The reflections produced so far about the analysis and evaluation of public policies have always been focused on the *in-itinere* monitoring, non considering the impact produced by such measures on the societal environment. On the next part we are going to explain which are the main forms of evaluations and assessment techniques used to ascertain the “weight” of the public policy’s outcomes, considering both the area of intervention and the target population.

2.2.4 Ex-Post evaluations. The policy impact assessment

With this session, our intent is to go on to describe the main forms of analysis and evaluation techniques available for policy assessors in relation to the impact of the same on the environment and on the target population. In this regards we intend to contextualise our description in the average non emergency environment, when such evaluations are carried out (as we will see) with a complex but “non-hasty” process. In our description we will focus on the definition of "*policy outcome*", taking the same as a useful unit of measure for the purpose of "indexing" the level of validity of the policy, relative to the parameters just indicated.

Before proceeding with the description of the most used strategies for carrying out analyses in this dimension, it will be interesting to dwell on its definition; an impact analysis intends to evaluate whether a program produces desired effects beyond what would have happened without the intervention or, in some cases, with an alternative

intervention. In this sense, it will also be necessary to underline how such analyses should generally be carried out by comparing the effects that the population has experienced as the result of a program that is alternative to that identified by the decision makers. This population must in all respects be identical to that defined as the "target population", the only difference would obviously be the type and characteristics of the policy implemented.

Furthermore, it will be interesting to define the moments of the policy cycle in which it is more appropriate and functional to complete an analysis of this kind. In fact, the assessment of the impact of a measure can be relevant in many parts of the course of the same, whether you are in the definition of the same or in the subsequent moments of the policy cycle. Specifically, in the phase of elaborating a policy (therefore in all the initial moments of the policy cycle) it can be commissioned by the competent authorities to the technicians to drive the draft of a "pilot program", with similar characteristics to that of the policy to be built. The same decision makers will have to commission the evaluators to implement an impact analysis of the example program just built, so that they can predict what the effects will be, what will in other words be the impact that the policy would be destined to produce on the target population or compared to a specific social situation.

Even after the authorisation of a social program, it may be worthy to carry out an impact assessment (and it will be very interesting to observe how this situation occurred in the case of the treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic emergency). We are referring to the practice whereby a program once selected and authorised is administered first to a small population community. The effects of the policies on this restricted population will then be assessed through an impact analysis and it will then

be decided (on the basis of this analysis) whether to extend the application of the social program to the entirety of the target population.

The use of impact assessments relating to the results of a policy can make sense even if carried out on social programs that have already been in progress for some time; in fact, by analysing the effects that a program produces at a certain period of time, it will be possible to modify the same to try to achieve optimal or better "outcome changes". This strategy should be implemented in a systematic and periodic way to all those social programs implemented by a state that have a certain breadth and inclusiveness (both in terms of target population and content).

In the lines that follow we are going to focus our attention on the description of the "*measuring and monitoring program outcomes*" process. We should start from a basic assumption, ie the definition of program outcome; a program outcome is the change in the status of a target population or a specific social condition for which the policy or public measure has been defined and implemented. In this sense, it should be emphasised that the outcomes, in order not to create confusion, are the observed characteristics of the target population or of the specific social situation covered by the policy, they are not the features of the program itself (which are instead monitored with the monitoring analysis described in the final part of the previous section). In fact, with this type of evaluation, the assessor intends to dwell on the impact of the program on the social group, not so much on the degree of deviation of the same from its initial setting in the pre-decision phases.

Another distinction that is important to make is that between *outputs* and *outcomes* of the policy; indeed, while the outputs are the services provided to the population, the outcomes are the results and effects that the policy generates through the provision of these services. In assessing the impact of the policy it will also be

important for the evaluator to try to keep in mind two relevant conceptualisations regarding the outcomes themselves. We are referring to the concept of "*outcome level*", that is to say the status of an outcome at a certain moment of time, and the concept of "*outcome change*", which means the change in the status of an outcome in different moments of time.

Another concept to take into consideration when evaluating *a posteriori* is "*program effect*"; this nomenclature is intended to indicate the part of an outcome change that can be uniquely attributed to a program as opposed to the influence of some other factor.

Thus, consequently to what has been indicated so far, the level of change deriving from a program, in terms of modifying the specific social situation or increasing the benefits for a target population, is defined as the "impact" or "effect" of the program. Carrying out an assessment that wants to express how extensive the changes in the social environment made by a policy are, is one of the most complex that can be attempted, but it is very important for the effective awareness of the validity (or absence of validity) of the implemented measure.

We continue with our description of the ex post evaluations that are made to weigh the actual results of an implemented social program. Like what happens for the definition of "analysis questions", the characterisation and identification of adequate and relevant outcomes for the measurement analysis is very important in this kind of assessments. In fact, there could be outcomes that were not foreseen at the beginning of the implementation of the policy but that in the practice the same measure could produce. These non-voluntary outcomes can be as important, for the purposes of evaluation, as those intended from the outset, and for which the policy itself was set. However, it will not be possible to identify these results if one looks at

the effects of the policy always and only from the point of view of the sponsors and its stakeholders; in fact the latter, simply, may not be interested in this kind of effects and would not notice their production. It should also be noted that this last type of results, or involuntary ones, cannot be identified even through the use of the classical theory of the impact analysis, nor by referring to previous research. However, the fact remains that these kinds of results are the most interesting for evaluation, whose definition at the same time is one of the most important products of academic evaluation work.

The "learning by doing" approach in the evaluation of public policies is based on the tracing of unexpected results of the social programs launched and implemented. Once the relevant results and effects of the policy have been identified, it will be up to the evaluator to define an appropriate method for their measurement and indexing. This task is quite complex, as "measuring" is not intended only as describing, but it means being able to transform the observations in the field into quantifiable and indexable data. This evaluator task will be more complex the more important and relevant (for evaluation purposes) is the outcome produced by the policy. In fact there are results of public measures which are very easy to read and appear practically and generally "one-dimensional".

At the same time, however, there is the presence of much more complex results to interpret; for the full representation and indexing of these outcomes, it will be necessary to introduce a further procedure by which to analyse them, meaning them as characterised by many dimensions. They are basically intended as "multidimensional", then going to differentiate the multiple facets that are, each, relevant for the purposes of certain results that the program is attempting to produce.

Another difficulty is dictated by the relative limitation of the measurement methods itself on which the evaluator can rely. The political analyst in general can use observations, evaluate responses to interviews and questionnaires or have a physical measuring device for field analysis. The information collected through these few means will then have to be transformed into indexable data, through their operationalisation which is carried out using unique and generally pre-defined techniques.

In general, these procedures must satisfy the criteria of sensitivity, reliability and validity in order to be considered capable of providing an adequate indexation of the observable data that has been collected. However, it must be said that once the right procedures for such indexing have been defined it will be possible to use a series of different approaches to try to understand some of the results themselves, increasing the understanding of the validity of the implemented political measure.

One of the procedures that can be used is the "*monitoring of results*" of the program; we have already introduced this form of analysis while defining and describing the monitoring of the program. This form of assessment is based on the continuous and repeated collection of data and information relating to the effects produced by the implemented program, that is, it focuses on the changes (both positive and negative) that the implementation of the policy has generated on the target population or in relation to specific social circumstances.

The best way to analyse the outcomes of a social program is however the so-called "*randomised field experiments*" method. This analysis system is quite recent, especially if considered at the light of its interesting implications in the field of economic analysis. In this regard field experiments represent a great tool to understand the causal links from one variable to another. "They have been used by

academics to help answer interesting and policy-relevant questions in the developed world relating to educational attainment, tax avoidance, consumer finance, negative externalities, charitable giving, and labour market contracts”²⁸.

In the following lines we intend to introduce a first general definition, starting first of all by providing how they are differentiated from the laboratory experiments. In fact, field experiments must be defined in contrast and detached from "*pure experiments*" (ie those carried out in a laboratory); in this sense the term "*field*" shifts the attention to the domains and the real, "naturalistic" dimension of this type of experiment. As stated by the academic world, the term "*field experiment*"²⁹ derives from the fact that these experiments were initially used to study the crops and the way in which they grew, based on the type of treatment and the care they received. Specifically, different areas of the same cultivation field were *randomly* assigned to "*control areas*" and to "*treatment areas*", which were believed to have influenced the productivity of agriculture. Consequently to what Fisher stated in the articles and book of 1926 and 1935, many authors interpret the definition of field experiments (which is given to us by Fisher himself) as necessarily inherent in the "randomisation" of the assignment of a group as "group control" and the other as a "

²⁸ List, J. and Robert M. (2014). 'Field experiments in the developed world: an introduction'. *From: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/176b/9bc57a6017160ea31d819ec690d3ce7355aa.pdf> Page: 585.*

²⁹ James, O., John, P., & Moseley, A. (2017). Field Experiments in Public Management. In O. James, S. Jilke, & G. Van Ryzin (Eds.), *Experiments in Public Management Research: Challenges and Contributions* (pp. 89-116). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"R.A. Fisher's article 'The Arrangement of Field Experiments' drew on his work as statistician for Rothamsted agricultural research centre and the methods were popularised by Fisher's article and subsequent book (Fisher 1926; 1935)". *Page: 5*

treatment group “. In particularly we are referring to the works produced by Gerber and Green in 2012 in the regards.

Consequently to what just stated concerning the randomisation component such field research, a basic assumption known to all social sciences that develop research of this type must be underlined. In fact, for the social sciences, field research is carried out by routinely connecting subjects as they have in common a relationship of randomness. It could be clear by analysing the reality, that the members of a group are generally distinguished between each other and sometimes the unique commune feature they have is inherent in the fact they belong to the same “societal group”. Anyway it is in a generic population that the authorities tend to analyse the appropriateness and effectiveness of the programs they designed, considering the causality of the connectedness of its members.

All such things considered the most important difference distinguishing the member of a group becomes the fact that they have been or have not been provided with the treatment (the enactment of a public policy in our case). Specifically "when gauging the effect of an intervention, a researcher must be able to distinguish the treatment effect from incidental differences between treated and untreated subjects. In cases in which the intervention is not randomly assigned, those who receive the treatment may be systematically different from those who do not. This problem is especially acute when subjects self-select into (or out of) treatment. Random

assignment can be used to overcome this selection bias”.³⁰ “Randomised experiments have become the mainstay for estimating causal effects”³¹

So this proposition is reproduced in randomised field experiments, in which we see how the population is randomly divided into groups. A group is called a "control group" (which will not receive any regulatory intervention) while the other group will be called an “intervention group”. The assessors then analyse both groups and try to determine the existence or not of an equivalence between them. The best way to achieve equivalence between the intervention and control groups is to use randomisation. Randomisation, in fact, is a procedure that allows chance to decide whether a person (or other unit) receives the program or the alternative to the control conditions. Furthermore, we can affirm that the great value of "randomised field experiments" lies in their ability to combine the benefits of "randomisation" with the characteristic projection on a "real", natural and effective domain. In this way, as already mentioned a few lines above, they manage at the same time to move away from the ephemeral abstraction of laboratory tests (in which the populations analysed are not “real”) and to identify the causal relationships within the same experimental focus context group. In other words, they manage to highlight how the administration of the social program has somehow generated its results on the "treatment group", by identifying the catalysing components of these effects internally, within the chosen group.

³⁰ Green, D. P. and Thorley, D. (2014). Field experimentation and the study of law and policy. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, Vol. 10, pp. 53–72, 2014. *From: <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110413-030936>*. Page: 53

³¹ Egami, N. Hartman, E. (2018). Covariate Selection For Generalising experimental results. *From: [princeton.edu \(https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/negami/files/covselect.pdf\)](https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/negami/files/covselect.pdf)*. Page: 1

However, it is not always possible to carry out randomised field experiments and in this case other types of research are implemented to evaluate the effects of a social program on a population. However, all the types of research that fall into this group are certainly characterised by an underlying bias, the presence of distortions. In fact, all the analyses at this juncture, while being well thought out and elaborated, in the end could always produce estimates distorted by the effects of the program itself. That's why you always prefer to use, when possible, of course, the randomised field experiments. Generally biases are produced when the results on a program on a population deviate from what would have been the effects and characteristics of the same population if the program had not been implemented. There may in fact be the so-called "selection bias"; these latter occur when the analysis does not provide for the assignment of group members according to the logic of randomisation. An example of research design where groups are not based on randomised composition is called "non-equivalent" design analysis. The bias that would result in this case would be, in fact, a bias relating to the selection of members made. This distortion would be the difference that would appear on the measure of the result even if neither group had obtained the program.

During the search, distortions, so-called "friction" biases can occur; these biases can also be classified as a consequence, or rather as a subset, of selection errors. These biases are the effect of data loss on outcomes for the members of the intervention and control groups already trained. In fact, it could happen that the members assigned to a research group leave and cannot be reached and analysed anymore. Otherwise it could happen that the subjects aware of the event of the analysis do not want to make themselves participatory, in this circumstance the biases cannot be "controlled".

2.2.5 *The efficiency analysis*

Another type of analysis that can be performed is related to the efficiency of the policy or a program. This type of analysis deserves a dedicated sub-paragraph as it cannot be framed solely in relation to a single moment of the policy or to a step of the policy cycle. Such analyses can in fact be performed both *ex-ante* and *ex-post* with the necessary assessments and adjustments. We have already mentioned the type of analysis of a policy in this chapter and we are going to define the outlines with this section. The efficiency of a social program implemented in a country is generally measurable using two evaluation methodologies; we are referring to *cost-benefit* analysis and *cost effectiveness* analysis.

The difference between the two methods is limited to the way in which the results of the analysis itself are expressed; while in the cost benefit analysis the results are translated into economic (monetary) terms in the cost-effectiveness analysis they are expressed in substantial terms. The *cost benefit analyses* are however those that are most commonly used and can be carried out prospectively during the formulation phase of the policy, effectively guiding the choice of the best policy design option to be selected and authorised. Similarly, analyses of this kind can be performed retrospectively, i.e. after a program has been in place for a certain period of time and has been proven effective by an impact assessment, and it is interesting to make the program permanent or possibly extend it (*ex post* efficiency analysis).

It should be said, however, that the prospective cost-benefit assessments could be vitiated by heavy valuation errors, drastically underestimating or overestimating the net benefits that would occur with a specific program (ie the effects less the costs), give the fact that in the pre decision moments there are not empirical data to develop

correctly such kind of assessment. This makes the idea of how the evaluation of the inputs and outputs of a policy is a much debated portion of the validity and effectiveness of this analysis. In fact, consequently to this consideration the cost benefit analyses are carried out following the implementation of the social program, collecting empirical data on the impact of the same.

Furthermore, it should be added that this type of assessments must always be considered as a completion of the impact assessment analysis, and not as an alternative analysis could be mistakenly thought of.

2.3 The “emergency policy evaluation cycle”

2.3.1 Paragraph objectives

In the various preceding sections we have described the policy evaluation process, with greater attention to the techniques used in "weighing" the impact of a social programs. In fact, as regards the actions that are generally undertaken for the other types of analysis we have already provided a description, albeit indirect, in the first chapter focusing more on the actual construction of the policies rather than on their assessment.

However, for the purposes of the reflections that interest us the most (that is the programmatic purpose of our work) we should concentrate our attention precisely on the evaluations of the pre decision phase and on the "*in-itinere*" analyses . In fact these two kinds of analyses are the ones that have the greatest relevance in the policy setting and implementing. In addition we have to remark that all the informations and explanations we have tried to provide so far are referring to the non emergency content, a period in which such analyses are carried out in more “smooth” way than during crises.

In the following part we therefore propose to pursue linear reflections on how the "ex-ante" and "*in-itinere*" evaluation are in practice remodulated, in their process and duration, from the context of a hypothetical emergency. In doing this we would like to focus "more" on the aspects of setting the evaluation question, and on how the interests of the sponsors are overshadowed or even change considering the emergency.

Later we would like to investigate the relationship between evaluator and stakeholders and how it changes in crisis contexts; in fact, in the upper sections we provided some explanations of how this relationship is organised, in ordinary moments, also having in mind the role that the evaluator himself or herself plays in the context of the "competition" to define the problem and choose or "not choose" the ways of action for its resolution.

The other aspect that we are going to evaluate will be the one inherent in the importance that, in critical situations or in contexts of emergency management, the ongoing evaluations relating to the "performance of the program". We are talking about the discussed and described (in the upper sections) "program process" analysis or monitoring procedure. In a context of crisis, is it possible that the program, as it is set up at the beginning of the emergency, can achieve the desired results, continuing to maintain high standards of efficiency and performance throughout the course of its duration? To answer this question, it will be very useful to analyse, in fact, the ways in which the monitoring of the process (and of the performance of the same) of a social program are reshaped by the critical content. These passages are important in order to let us conclude our discourse regarding the relevance of the tight interlay existing between the policy cycle and the various assessments and evaluations, being such kind of analysis the "guideline" for policy decision makers in setting the management for crises.

2.3.2 The re shaping of “issue identification phase” (ex-ante evaluations) and the “analysis questions” setting (the case of the 2007 fires emergency)

In the chapter number one of our work we have already tried to explain how the “praxis” has contributed to change the way in which policies are set and adopted in emergency contexts, more specifically regarding the Italian perspective. At the light of the consideration about the pre decision analysis setting that we have carried out in the above dedicated part, we are now going to try to explain their relevance and remodulation in critical environments.

Given the task of identifying social issues to be included in the agenda of a policy, it will be very useful during the evaluation phase to organise analysis questions that deepen the understanding of social problems, considering the various "forces" at stake inside the specific area in which you want to intervene with the program. In this sense, it will be up to the evaluator together with the sponsors of the analysis and the stakeholders to organise a debate about the setting of the analysis questions.

In order to understand how all this occurs in “excited” moments following the outbreak of a crisis or an emergency, it will be very useful to try to define which figures are actively participating in the decision-making process just listed, as well as characterising the same relationship with the policy evaluator. Precisely for this purpose it will be interesting to take a cue from an emergency situation that happened in Italy. We refer to the great spread of calamitous events that took place in 2007 in the central-southern regions of the peninsula, which recorded the spread of forest fires and "combustion events" in their territories.

To analyse this case of emergence, we refer to the emergency rules that have been launched in this context and which, among other things, represented a sort of

"precedent" for the subsequent normalisation of intervention and prevention practices for the spread of forest fires in our Country. We refer to the orders of the President of the Council of Ministers numbers 3606/2007 and 3624/2007. Specifically, by analysing the second of the two regulatory documents (which is available in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic), it is clear from the outset which parts are affected by the emergency and whose needs and interests must be supported by the authority.

In fact, the document reports (translated from Italian):

"Considering that the aforementioned calamitous events in addition to manifesting themselves as forest fires and in rural areas, have caused huge damages to centres, infrastructures and public and private building heritage , with consequent danger for the public safety".³²

Furthermore, the interested parties are also large economic categories, such as those in the tourism sector, agriculture, which will be of great importance in the subsequent consultations and debates to set up the post-emergency and recovery programs. The "sponsors" of the evaluation in this case are represented by the institutions and by the Civil Protection, which had advocated the publication of the previous order decree mentioned above (3606/2007).

Continuing in the "reading" of the document, it is clear from articles 2 and 3 how the attention of the institutions towards the interested parties led the evaluator (the

³² Presidenza del Consiglio Dei Ministri (2007) ORDINANZA DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 22 ottobre 2007. From: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2007/10/30/07A09208/sg>. Preamble

technical legislator in our case) to arrange the "analysis questions" in such a way as to make the "reimbursement" and support system for the same parties effective. Specifically, article 3 determines the amount of the contribution that the institutions will have to pay to citizens damaged by fires. This consideration shows that the evaluator has asked himself specific questions, such as "what is the magnitude of the damage suffered by citizenship?", "On the basis of which parameters to evaluate the damage?".

In settling these questions, the evaluator played the role of "moderator" of the debates between the interested parties, a task that belongs to him in all situations and that in cases of emergency, where greater responsiveness is required, he will have to carry out with more "energy". In fact, it will be sufficient to consider the very circumstances of an emergency to make it understood that, in such cases, the same "competitiveness" of the decision-making process and identification of the issues to be placed on the agenda is compressed and shortened.

Other evaluation questions can be "inferred" from reading article 5 (paragraphs 1 and 2) of the document in question; at these points the possibilities of the delegated commissioner (who had been defined in the previous decree by the Civil Protection) were outlined to directly disburse the state contributions to encourage the resumption of "industrial, agricultural, commercial" activities. Here, therefore, it will be clear that the evaluator has used "forecasts" to assess the impact of the emergency policy that must be set (and which is in fact set with this decree); these forecasts, among other things, were made starting from the analysis of the effects of the same emergency.

Once these empirical data were collected (in terms of losses and economic compressions in this case) the evaluator asked himself very specific questions, such

as: "what were the negative outcomes of the emergency and how to move to remedy them?" ; or: "What is the maximum burden that the Government can support now to have positive effects following the implementation of the policy?", "What will be the benefits (in actual and economic terms) that will lead to the recovery of the condition preceding the emergency?". The evaluator asks all these questions taking into consideration the inputs that come to him from the institutions above him, and to which he is obliged to give indications in order to allow them to make "decisions".

Once again, all this analysis shows that the policy evaluation cycle is a sort of "guide", especially in emergencies, of the policy decision making process. In fact, the decision makers cannot do anything about a policy in its early stages of life, given the role played by the evaluators, at the same time as "technical guide" and "moderators of bargains", at the time of the pre-decision.

2.3.3 Monitoring the performance of the emergency policy (in itinere evaluations during crises)

Policy assessments are also important when implementing their programs or immediately after they are activated on the territory. The monitoring of the performance of a public emergency plan is even more important for the purposes of a continuous re-setting of the same to encourage, when necessary, a more effective and timely remodelling of the directives and, consequently, of the rescue or recovery activities.

To better understand how the evaluation system of emergency policies is organised, we must first analyse the operational practice of actions in these contexts; how is the so-called "help or aid machinery" organised in practice and how are the directives contained in the Prime Minister's emergency decrees carried out on the territory?

In bringing this description to term, we refer to a case study in order to make the understanding of the emergency technical organisation system easier to understand.. We refer to the protection from seismic risk which in Italy was legislated by the PCM Directive 14 January 2014 "National relief program for seismic risk" (G.U. n. 79 - 4 April 2014). In this order decree, the importance of emergency planning was emphasised, to encourage greater responsiveness of actions to resolve them and to increase risk management capacity. We will deal with this particular facet in the next chapter that will focus on the "disaster management" literature. Again, this ordinance underlines the importance of defining an approach to planning anti-emergency activities that ensures their flexibility and sustainability, based on a typical character which is that of "resilience".

The Italian emergency response system is based on a multi-level approach, characterised by the co-presence of large structures and their various substructures; this system is able to guarantee greater contact with the local context where the emergency has developed, while maintaining the vertical structure of the "hierarchical command" unaltered, still enabling the officers to perform a "two-way" flow of information.

The system described so far is based on the framework of the Italian national security system, the "Civil Protection". This State Department is responsible for tackling emergencies in the area, in coordination with other police forces and with

national and local authorities. The control of the performance of an emergency policy is carried out by this same system, and it is pursued continuously throughout the emergency. In this case, the evaluator is the same Civil Protection officer who has contacts on the territory where the emergency is underway and with whom he (or she) maintains a close and continuous relationship during the implementation of the policy.

Specifically in the case of seismic emergencies, the system provides that the so-called "Situation Room Italy - SYSTEM (S3)"³³ is connected in real time to all the underlying and local control units (Regional Operating Room, and the various provincial and municipal Civil Protection commands), ensuring that the continuous flow of information (that is collected in the field) can be monitored and indexed, so as to draw evaluations. The assessments that follow, once the data have been collected, will be of fundamental importance to allow, if necessary, the modification of the manoeuvres and actions for which the policy in question is implemented.

This "military" approach works very well and comes very close, in theory, to the very definition of "policy implementation" that was developed by the theorists of "hybrid" theories (compare the first chapter). In fact, in this case the implementation process and the monitoring of its performance make the program as a "fluid" entity in continuous evolution and capable of responding to the challenges and pressures posed by the changing context of the emergency.

The monitoring procedure of the program performance is configured as a "continuum" based on vertical two-way flows of information that move in channels of "communication" between the national system and local levels. In fact, the territorial referents of the Civil Protection will implement the directives contained in

³³ Prefettura – UTG di Roma (2015) *La Gestione Delle Emergenze. Annex 1*

the emergency decrees and which have been set following an evaluation carried out in the "pre-decision" phase. In this situation, that is, they act almost like "street level bureaucrats³⁴" favouring a rapid reorganisation of the interventions (where necessary) and a better and more effective implementation of the policy.

For the purposes of the ongoing evaluation of the performances of a program in times of emergency, the fundamental points to be taken into consideration, therefore, will be the degree of detachment of the central organisations in relation to the needs of the local context which "lives" the crisis in a direct way, and the possibility of obtaining "continuous" data flows on the evolution of the situation. The emerging context leaves no room for "normal" evaluation activities, with "relaxed" timing; on the contrary, it requires continuity in monitoring and speed of response, especially in all those cases where there is a need to remodel the interventions. This process is carried out by an evaluator who is at the same time an active Civil Protection officer, in contact with citizens and at the same time technical analyst.

Generally speaking, the action of these technical analysts is directed by the delegated commissioner indicated by the council of ministers and placed at the head of the Technical Scientific Committee for the evaluation of the risks of the emergency (we will see better regarding the Covid-19 health emergency). The evaluation panel implements a continuous activity that will allow the regional authorities (always considering their autonomy in the Italian national context) to activate an adequate and responsive action to combat the crisis.

We have therefore understood, following this analysis, that the emergency context and the evaluation of the performance of the programs for its resolution, requires, at the Italian level, the activation of a cohesive strategy between the various "multi-

³⁴ Confront *Chapter 1*

level" realities that constitute the organisational structure of the Italian Civil Protection.

in this context, the assessment of the policy always prefigures itself as a "monitoring program process" activity, which, however, is compressed in time and speeded up in the relationships between its actuators.

During the emergency, and especially while it is still on course, the spreading of the crisis makes it basically impossible to ascertain in real time if the action undertaken are the ones enabling the crisis management panel to obtain the best policy impact; This is in fact why we are just focusing on the monitoring of the program performance rather than on the assessment of its impacts.

Anyway, as we are going to explain in the next chapter, the impact of the policy will be taken in great consideration by the assessors, in a a priori forecasting activity, in order to produce projections able to prefigure the real effectiveness of the emergency policy and to create a pilot program aiming to avert the risk.

Chapter three

Averting the Risk:

A scope of the strategies to manage well known emergencies

3.1 Introduction and chapter strategy

Emergency contexts are capable of exerting a great weight on society, both from the point of view of the risks to which the population of a geographical area or of a state may be subjected, and from the point of view of economic damage that it can generate, and that will affect the social and relational fabric. The state or institutional body active in the territory, once the emergency is unleashed, will put in place (will try to implement) a policy aimed at limiting the damage of the emergency, to help the population subject to the same and will try to work to organise medium and long-term plans aimed at returning to the pre-emergency situation.

As we have widely observed during the previous chapters, the development of action plans and policies designed to carry out what has just been said requires the implementation of various activities, organised around the policy cycle and the policy evaluation cycle. The setting of these particular emergency social programs can entail quite a few difficulties, due to the lack of time to implement actions that are able to concretely remedy the situations damaged by the crisis. Furthermore, an emergency action requires the exploitation of a high amount of resources, economic, technical and practical, which rise more and more when the emergency becomes agitated.

We have seen, even if only by mentioning it, how in crisis situations the central government aims to obtain an implementation of the emergency policy launched by it that is as effective as possible, implementing cost-benefit assessments. In carrying out these analyses before or during the development of the policy, there is a risk that to run into analysis errors, wrong assessments, and it is therefore preferable to limit their use in relation to defining the impact of the social program. To reduce the scope of mistakes that can be made during the implementation of programs aimed at limiting the effects of an emergency, and to ensure that they are as cost-effective and resolute as possible, a precise strategy is used, which could be defined a sort of "prevention", or rather, of "planning the management of the emergency itself".

Indeed, a part of the academic literature, mostly widespread in the context of the United States of America, has dedicated itself to the theorisation of this area of political science and public management. We are talking about the so-called "disaster management" and the attempt to implement a "risk aversion" by forecasting and planning strategies to be implemented whenever a specific criticality is determined.

As we will see during the chapter and the sections that follow, the disaster management doctrine provides for the activation of a series of actions that will be specific for the resolution of a criticality whose characteristics are well known to the institutions and to the civil protection apparatus of a state. These characteristics have been collected over the years, through the experience that officers and members of the national public safety department have expanded on the field, acting in risky contexts and in which even very serious calamitous events have developed.

The purpose of this chapter will therefore be to provide a contrast analysis, between what has been highlighted so far in the previous peers regarding the

modification of the policy making practice that occurs with the explosion of an "unknown" and unprecedented emergency. Indeed, in the following parts we will try to provide an analysis of how they conventionally act to implement measures capable of buffering the effects and helping populations damaged by disasters and emergencies of which the institutions themselves are awarded, given the historicity of their happening and precedents.

In addition to what we have just said we have here to clarify the difference in between "risk management" and "emergency management". Averting the risk has always been the main objective of the public actin. With "averting the risk" we mean the set of actions and strategies enacted and planned by institutions (through Public Administration's officers) to avoid or mitigate the effects deriving from the "mismanagement" of the public. As we said in the first chapter, the set of the problem and issues that can affect society is way larger than the possible public actions to solve or buffer them. It is clear, consequently, that a minimum "mismanagement" of the public will "catalyse" the risk deriving from such societal issues, making it impossible for the institutions even just to try to mitigate them. What we are going to review in the following chapter parts is the main theory behind the ideal typical conceptualisation of the various actions to deal with the risk deriving from emergencies. Indeed is the Public that should act in combating the possible worsening of a crisis, averting its risk from breaking out and "going out of control". On this basis we are going to develop a revisiting of the most prominent literature in this field, stressing the "ideal" and "example driven" nature of the steps composing the "disaster management cycle"; in this activity we will have to bear in mind the interplay and the consequentiality between risk and emergency management, comparable as two strategies to *avert the risk*.

3.2 *The general theory of disaster management*

As we said in the introduction of this chapter, the "terrain" of emergencies is very difficult for policy decision makers who have to organise a program capable of remedying the damage and the effects of the calamitous events that are the consequence of crises and disasters.

In this first section we aim to provide the main definitions and theoretical cues around the concept of *risk, disaster* and management of the same.

First of all we focus on providing an analysis of the possible causes of a disaster. Generally there are many factors that underlie the unleashing of disasters. It may be appropriate to list a few; these factors include, for example, the "prone to disasters areas", the "residential areas"³⁵ of the population, the poverty that grips this population and the living density of the citizens. These factors are the result of a coexistence between anthropic activities and natural situations, given that the level of housing density and the poverty in which citizenship flows are often the result of sociological developments of a group that are strongly directed by the activities of the same.

Linked to this last cue there is another subgroup of factors, connected very strongly to the human manipulative activities of the natural environment in which it establishes itself and where, therefore, it will implement various types of activities, linked to its needs. For example, in this category, making a very general discussion, the topic that is today among the most debated in the international political discourse

³⁵ Sinha, A. Srivastava. R. (2015) Concept, Objectives and Challenges of Disaster Management. *From <https://www.ijsr.net/archive/v6i7/ART20175259.pdf>. Page: 418, paragraph 2*

falls. We are referring to Global Warming which is connected (or reconnected) to a series of other man activities; among the factors that catalyse global warming, the foundation of new "human settlement regions" can be traced (especially in countries with strong economic development) and the construction of new anthropogenic works with economic and development purposes (compare, for example, the Three Gorges Dam in China, completed in 2006 after 23 years of work). Furthermore, these industrialisation works put the population of a geographical area to a severe test and at risk; if we think of the just reported example of the Three Gorges Dam, it entailed the forced displacement of more than a million inhabitants and the submergence of 1200 rural villages³⁶ in Hubei.

In relation to what has been said, among others, causes of the occurrence of disasters are the use of new technologies by man, the great industrialisation and, a factor connected to it (with references to our national experience), the corruption.

These factors just listed here require further analysis, as the basis of the very concept of disaster that we will try, as a consequence, to describe in the following parts. We defined the concept of "areas prone to disasters" as a catalyst for disasters; in fact, there are many geographic areas that turn out to be for entirely natural reasons much more susceptible to the occurrence of the onset of natural disasters. In fact, due to the same strong endogenous activity of our planet, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides and other upheavals of this kind have increased in number in recent years. Just think of the disaster that occurred in 2004 following the gigantic "Sumatra –

³⁶ Corriere Della Sera (20 Maggio 2006) "Inaugurata la diga più grande del mondo" *From: https://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2006/05_Maggio/20/diga.shtml*. "More than 1,200 villages have disappeared under the water, such as Zigu and Zhongbao, or have been rebuilt a few kilometers further."

Andaman earthquake"³⁷, which devastated an immense area, involving many states that are washed by the Indian Ocean.

In this case many factors, together with the natural one due to the earthquake itself, played an important role in defining the event as a large-scale disaster. Among them there is one of the factors that we have included in our enumeration, that is the location of residence. In fact, to remain in line with our example, coastal areas are more vulnerable to the effects of weather disasters, such as storms and cyclones, as well as to the devastating action of the sea itself, especially if triggered by earthquakes or by the consequences of the activities of the tectonic plates. At the same time, inland or mountain areas are more vulnerable to landslides or hydrogeological instability, placing the population living in these geographical areas at great risk.

Indeed, population density is another element that makes it possible for an event, even a natural one, to be classified as a disaster. The densely populated areas are much more susceptible to being the subject of disasters given the strong presence of infrastructures and the high number of people living in them. It could be affirmed that in general the higher the density of a geographical area, the greater the incidence of a calamitous event on it will be. If we take the Asian Continent as an example, especially in developing countries, we will realise that the strong population density, combined with the widespread poverty for which the population suffers in such places, makes the incidence of disasters even higher.

³⁷ Lay, T.; Kanamori, H.; Ammon, C.; Nettles, M.; Ward, S.; Aster, R.; Beck, S.; Bilek, S.; Brudzinski, M.; Butler, R.; DeShon, H.; Ekström, G.; Satake, K.; Sipkin, S. (20 May 2005). "The Great Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake of 26 December 2004". *From: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/20879/2/Lay_SOM.pdf*

Poverty itself, on the other hand, limits the ability of populations to actively respond to disasters through actions aimed at mitigating their effects, given the lack of resources at their disposal. The stroke of development and industrialisation are one of the various contributing factors that are making the rate of global warming grow more and more; from this it is clear how the linkage of natural forces and anthropogenic causes can be a strong catalyst for the onset of disastrous events. In fact, the climate change induced by the activities of the populations and by global warming has caused the number of tropical cyclones and extreme weather events to rise. In this direction, for example, the strong marine tornadoes of the last summers in Southern Italy.

Furthermore, the ever increasing population in developing countries settles in new, increasingly overcrowded, civic centres, which are characterised by a high rate of vulnerability to catastrophic events and risks. In fact, nations that do not have many resources, will find themselves at a much higher rate of vulnerability to events than advanced countries, given their lesser ability to implement effective and resolute crisis response programs, counting on their poor resources and assets.

Linked to the growing industrialisation of many countries around the world is the setting up and establishment of new plantations delivering the development of new technologies. This type of anthropological activity has in history marked an increase in the number of disasters due precisely to the growing technological activism of countries' economies. In fact, this "catastrophic" facet represents the "downside of the medal" of technological innovation itself, which if on the one hand brings improvements and developments from an economic and technological point of view, on the other can cause a lot of damages; we could say that there it is never a technological innovation, (at least as far as we have seen in history) that has brought

benefits without producing negative side effects. Indeed, many catastrophic events have occurred in the past, linked to the development of new technologies; one example, above all, is the Chernobyl nuclear plant, which damaged a large geographical area exerting its effects on a huge population that was characterised by a high rate of vulnerability (given the direct exposition to radiations in that case).

From the other side, however, it was precisely this latest event that catalysed the attention of the world population and of the general public, around the need to implement an attentive and careful management of disasters, giving a new lymph to the Disaster management literature.

Another aspect for the need of emergency and criticality management, but in general in times of ordinary administration, a possible cause of a disaster, is corruption. Imagine, indeed, a concrete example: there is a serious natural emergency such as an earthquake for whose resolution the Government appoints a commissioner for managing the activity of rescue and securing the environment. In this case, the authority of which the extraordinary commissioner is appointed gives him or her full powers, also and above all in the field of allocation of state assets. The "bad" administrator (that is to say the corrupt administrator) will tend to take for himself part of the funds that were entrusted to him, with a negative effect on the needy populations, who will not be able to fully benefit from the actions that were "said" in their favour.

3.3 Hazard and Disaster: meaning and concept

With the following part we will try to give space to the definitional discourse around the characterisation of the concept of “disaster”. The previous section appears in that direction “programmatic” for the development of this part, taking into consideration what we have said so far regarding what can be identified as disaster-provoking factors, and which considers a multitude of indicators that derive from many different areas of study.

In fact, the term "disaster" has been defined in various ways by scholars of various disciplines, and has changed in relation to the currents that have shaped the building up process of Human Communities. The United Nations defines a disaster as a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society³⁸. In addition Disasters involve large and heavy impacts on the anthropic works, on the natural and technological environments, highly damaging also the economic tissue of a group. Therefore such impacts exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources, being more stressful the less advanced or rich its organisation is.

However, beyond this definition which appears very clear and which contributes to defining the concept, in order to fully understand the meaning of disaster, other terms must be taken into account indicating ideas that are

³⁸ Pandey, W.B. and Nikhil, R. (2016). Concepts and Practices of Disaster Management.

From: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320126456_Concepts_and_Practices_of_Disaster_Management_Concepts_and_Practices_of_Disaster_Management.

320126456_Concepts_and_Practices_of_Disaster_Management_Concepts_and_Practices_of_Disaster_Management.

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closely connected to those of the disastrous event. We refer for example to the concepts of *extreme events*, *hazards*, *vulnerability*, *disasters* and *environmental stress*.³⁹

Indeed Disasters spread when hazards strike a human population or societal group. For this reason it is necessary to define the concept of *Hazards*; Hazard is a dangerous phenomenon, a dangerous human activity or a circumstance that is capable of causing damages among the members of the community in which the disaster occurs. However, Hazard is also able to trigger injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damages, to buffer which the population must be able to effectively use the resources at its disposal.

We then have the concept of *Vulnerability* which contributes to the definition and the occurrence of a disaster. Indirectly, the degree of vulnerability of a population or of a social group has already been shown in the previous paragraph, taking up the causes that trigger a disaster and that also contribute to the cataloging of a calamitous event as a real disaster. In fact, the concept of vulnerability indicates the extent to which this community, or a public service or a geographical area can be damaged by the occurrence of a disastrous event such as to result in the loss of human lives or the cessation of human activities that occurred in them .

This level of propensity varies from country to country and depends a lot on the composition of the social group, on the population density of the region in

³⁹ UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (Geneva, Switzerland : UNISDR, 2009) at 17. From: https://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf

which it occurs, on the morphology and physical characteristics of the geographical area in question. In fact, it will be sufficient to consider, for example, a population characterised by a high percentage of elderly people to understand how it will be more vulnerable to the action of a health disease hazard than a younger population. In the same way, the inhabitants of towns in the *Ligurian hinterland* will be more subject to landslides than those who live in the *Tavoliere delle Puglie* (to give examples of our national environment). In other words, vulnerability is the set of characteristics of a social group, a geographical area or a population that makes it susceptible to the effects of a Hazard⁴⁰.

Let's now define the "core term" of our investigation, or the concept of Disaster. To fulfil this task we want first of all to introduce an etymological reflection in our discussion on the meaning of this terminology. The word disaster has its roots in the 16th century term '*desastre*'. This lemma gave from two other Latin terms, namely "*dis*" and "*aster*"⁴¹, which literally mean "unfortunate star", "bad star". So we can say that the term disaster can be more simply traced back to all those calamitous and unexpected events that depend on the stars.

More generally disasters are sudden and extreme events, which are neither foreseeable nor controllable and which cause serious damage to people,

⁴⁰ Sinha, A. Srivastava. R. (2015) Concept, Objectives and Challenges of Disaster Management. International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR). From <https://www.ijsr.net/archive/v6i7/ART20175259.pdf>

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⁴¹ Treccani Enciclopedia. For the "*Disaster*" etymology. From: <http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/ricerca/disastro/>

animals and plants living in a geographical area. Important to fully determine the definition of the term disaster is to underline the unpredictability and immediacy of such events, which are prefigured as sudden, unexpected and that cause damage in an "indiscriminate" manner. All of disasters, then, can be defined as calamitous events, like real hazards. On the contrary, hazards are not all configured as disasters, becoming such if they damage and affect the inhabited areas of a geographical spot with their effects.

The higher the population density of the geographic area is, the greater the vulnerability of the populations that live in it, as well as the greater the possibility of having intent damages in these one, will be. In fact, where there are highly inhabited areas, there will always be a high density of human works, private homes or public buildings, infrastructures for the provision of services.

As Amit Sinha and Dr. Rajlaxmi Srivastava emphasise in their work on the conceptualisation and objectives of disaster management, there are three meanings with which we can understand the concept of disaster. The first is that which interprets this term as a state of irremediable and extreme ruin; the second meaning is that which foresees disaster as a situation that leads to extreme loss, causing lasting discomfort, serious afflictions or life-long injuries. The third etymological meaning with which we refer to the term *Disaster* is that which identifies it as an event that has, in fact, disastrous consequences. The term, according to this latter meaning, is used when there is total destruction and large-scale devastation. In this characterisation of the

term disaster, the authors mentioned above took their cue from the UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction which, among other things, we have already included in our references.

From an economic point of view, defining the concept of Disaster is as relevant as its purely technical characterisation. From this angle, disaster can be defined as a natural event that causes a disturbance to the functioning of the economic system. This disturbance generates significantly negative effects on assets, on factors of production, on products of the economy, on employment and on consumption.⁴²

Going further, in our discussion, regarding the conceptualisation of this term, we can consider what is defined in the Tampere Convention⁴³. Disaster has been defined here as "a serious disturbance of the functioning society, posing a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property, or the environment, whether caused by accidents nature or human activity and whether developing suddenly or as the results of complex long term processes". In a nutshell, as also confirmed by the ASEAN Agreement Disaster Management and Emergency Response⁴⁴, it means a serious interruption in the functioning of a community or social group which causes widespread human, material or economic losses. When the cumulative effect of these

⁴² Hallegatte, S. Przyusky, V. (2010) *The Economics of Natural Disaster : Concepts and Methods* (The World Bank, Sustainable Development Network Office of the Chief Economist, 2010) Policy Research Working Paper 5507, at 2. From: <http://econ.worldbank.org>. (Accessed on 21.01.17)

⁴³ United Nations Treaty Series. Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, June 18, 1998. From: <https://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I271EN.pdf>. ART 1. Paragraph 6

⁴⁴ ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response July 26, 2005. ART 1, Paragraph 3

damages is such as to surpass the assimilation capacity of the environment, the resulting state of high disturbance is called *environmental stress*.

It is evident that the stress of the environment represents the "maximum ceiling" within which the environment can adapt to the effects of the natural hazard (not only natural but also of other types); once these limits are exceeded, as we have already anticipated a few lines above, the context directly suffers the damage caused by the hazard.

Having introduced Hazard's term prior to the concept of Disaster made us understand the true nature and ultimate meaning of this important concept. Generally, to summarise, we can say that natural hazards have always occurred in the history of our planet, with the only difference that in the past there was no presence of a human population that could be involved, or that could suffer the effects of the hazard. As a result, a Hazard, as we anticipated in the previous row, becomes a disaster only when it affects the human population.

Bear in mind that, however, a Hazard does not have to be exceptionally large in numbers or strength to be classified as a disaster. In this, the definition that the Treccani dictionary offers us still helps us; in it there is an example that says: "the death of the father was a disaster verse for that family"⁴⁵. This natural hazard that has happened does not have the destructive scope of a landslide or typhoon, but retains the connotations of suddenness and the strongly negative and lasting effects for the members of a group that are involved, in this case the family of the deceased father. Just this last assumption, as well as the necessity of the presence of the damage projected on a human population, are necessary for the drafting of the next part,

⁴⁵ Treccani Enciclopedia. *For the "Disaster" etymology.*

From: <http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/ricerca/disastro/>

which will deal with the management of emergencies and risk, from a more technical and regulatory point of view.

3.4 The Disaster management: concept, objectives, “cycle”, principles and approaches

3.4.1 Concept explanation and definitional process

In the preceding parts we focused on providing the definitions and explanations of the concepts of Disaster and of the other terms which are "corollary" to it. In the following part, we now propose to identify and define the more technical aspects and regulatory approaches that define the theory of "Disaster Management", to complete the description of the first comparison term of the analysis on the setting of an emergency policy. In fact, in the following chapter we will focus on setting the response measures to the *Covid-19* pandemic emergency that have been put in place by our government and which have not been able, due to the unusual and unprecedented nature of the crisis itself, to rely on strategies pre determinable and well planned.

Our analysis of the Disaster Management Cycle strategy, however, can be carried out not before having defined the very conceptualisation of the emergency management principle, which we will try to give in the next lines.

We can affirm that historically the approach to the management of a disaster has been commonly or in most cases has been set following an "*a-posteriori*" perspective. Indeed, if you look at how crises and emergencies were managed in the

past, you will find a common guideline in all the activities of the various governments; the latter deployed the resources necessary to restore the situation prior to the outbreak of the Hazard only after the latter had released its full potential, that is, had extinguished its activity. Think of a typhoon: according to the method used before the management of the disaster was conceptualised, once the gusts of wind and torrential rains had passed, and that the affected population had suffered all the damages, they would have acted the necessary measures (in terms of resources) to return to a situation prior to the outbreak of the disaster. It can be said that only over the years, with the collection of data and the accumulation of field experience from the management of various emergencies, the growing awareness of the effects of a disaster has increased the attention regarding the need to organise its management. The debate on crisis management has thus become central in the speeches of scholars of various areas, from economics to sociology to political sciences.

Among other things, generally before the growth of this awareness regarding the need to organise emergency management, disasters were "buffered" through the provision of aids, economic resources, to ensure a relief of the affected population and to allow a resumed following the disastrous event.

There was no awareness in these phases of the possibility of setting up a priori disaster prevention or mitigation activities prior to the outbreak of the disaster. Nor was there any knowledge of the importance of being prepared for the event of a calamitous event, always keeping the preparedness level high.

The need to prevent the effects of the disaster comes precisely and the awareness of its importance among academics and regulators comes as a consequence of the extremely high costs that must be faced to "cure", to "reduce" its effects after they have occurred. In other words, there has been a general awareness about the need to

change the perspective in the management of hazards that have consequences on a population or on an inhabited area, in the name of which we move from "reducing" the effects after their realisation, to prevent, to pre-act to avoid or limit the damages it produces.

Hence, therefore, from this process and from this change in the point of view of the action, a first definition, or better conceptualisation, of the "disaster Management" process is produced. In fact, we can define Disaster Management as the set of activities developed to maintain control over emergencies or disasters and put in place to provide populations at risk with the appropriate tools to allow them to avoid or mitigate the effects of these critical situations.

It is clear from what has just been said that completing the setting of such a sector of actions and regulations requires a multi-disciplinary approach which, as mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph, entails collaboration between academics from various fields of study in the human sciences. Indeed, this multidisciplinary approach is the most effective method for tackling the front and back effects of a disaster that spill over a social group or a geographical area where populations reside.

It will be up to the institutions or organisations of the regions, states or local realities (think of a state structure based on several levels) to develop these activities, planning all the strategies to protect populations from premature and unpredictable effects, as well as from those expected, of the emergency. In addition, the sector of these actions will be deployed to ensure rapid rescue of the affected populations, so as to facilitate their recovery following strictly rescue activities. Indeed, it is clear that Disaster Management includes disaster recovery plans. This last statement is actually a consequence of what has been said so far regarding the characteristics of

this multidisciplinary process, but it is also catalysed by the need to prevent the disaster itself from happening. These plans of actions must be implemented when the hazard is taking place and must be completed with due care, in order to minimise errors and be as effective as possible in compressing the effects of the disaster itself.

Disaster management therefore prefigures itself as a technical discipline developed in order to deal with the risk or avoiding it whenever possible; to achieve this goal, those involved in the management of critical issues try to predict the effects of the disaster before it occurs, on the basis of these forecasts, they develop precise plans with which to act in advance. In fact, careful planning is the basis of every action that aims to avoid the possibility of the hazard itself, and can be found in any attempt to evaluate and develop social programs. In fact, we have found this peculiarity also with regard to the cost-benefit forecasts performed ex-ante regarding the possible outcomes of the policy that we plan to implement.

Obviously, when speaking of risk forecasts for known emergencies resulting from natural or human made hazards, the introduction of forecasts in this regard is confirmed and made "safer" by the number of data empirically collected during the management of similar emergencies in the past. This last assumption is in effect "the main axis" on which the doctrine of disaster management itself is articulated, and from this point we move the intent of our work: that is, to investigate how an unprecedented emergence can be treated through an ad hoc social program. The good plan of disaster management, moreover, does not only contain forecasts regarding the effects of the same, but introduces clear action plans to counter them, on how to organise any relief actions for the affected population and how to implement subsequent measures to make the social group able to "re-start".

The disaster management doctrine is well known especially in the United States of America, in India and in other countries that adopt this planning method for avoiding and mitigating the risks related to disasters and emergencies in general. There are other ways of appealing Disaster Management itself that can be used; one of them is *Emergency Management* which has replaced the use of the lemma "*Civil Defence*" in the praxis: the latter nomenclature could also be linked to the concept of defence of the civil population in more generalised contexts with respect to the point of view of the disaster alone. In fact, in this perspective it is intended to operate the defence of the civilian citizen that is continuous, in the same way in times of peace and in times of war.

In the European Union there are other terminologies that are used to define the sector of methodologies, techniques and strategies for buffering the effects of a crisis (be it natural or man made) or an emergency. In the European context, the term most commonly used is that of *Civil Protection*, which generally refers to systems or departments authorised and recognised by the governments of the various member states. These systems that operate in different well-structured organisations have the possibility of managing resources and experts in order to fulfil the task of protecting the civilian population. Generally, the civilian population of a member state of the EU is defended from the risks and consequences of a calamitous event, be it natural or the result of anthropic works, by the departments of Civil Protection.

Also in the European context, but it is aimed from a purely political tier point of view, the term Crisis Management is used. It is used to underline the development of plans to safeguard the security policy and dimension, and not directly the needs of the population affected by a disastrous event. The technical and purely academic aspect had a great role in approaching the definition of a methodical and well-defined

process, as indeed Disaster Management itself prefigures today. In completing their theoretical work, scholars from different scientific areas have coined the term "Disaster risk reduction", which is a concept that is growing especially in environments and contexts of high managerial activism.

We can therefore affirm, consequently to what we have so far enumerated, that the process of definition and conceptualisation of the term "Disaster Management" was an evolutionary procedure that led to the characterisation of this process as a well-defined and methodical cycle. Indeed, as we will see in the following sections, the evolutionary process is not yet complete and indeed is in continuous genesis. In other words, there is no unique method of approaching the management of a disaster, there are general guidelines that can drive the public manager or public officer to dependencies of an institution in implementing crisis management.

These guidelines can be traced back to particular cornerstones of the Disaster Management action that we will observe and take into account in the next parts.

3.4.2 Objectives and “cyclicity” of the Disaster management

In the section above, we focused on defining the concept of disaster management as a set of activities aimed at predicting, compressing and reversing the effects of the disaster. Practically it could be said that we have tried to underline how through the management of an emergency we try to prevent the same from turning into disaster, involving a whole series of negative effects both directly jeopardising the health of the affected population, and in indirect terms, requiring the use of a large amount of resources to allow institutions to buffer the situation. In this part that follows we will



Figure 3. The Disaster Management Cycle. From: <https://sites.google.com/site/dimersarred/disaster-management-cycle>

focus more on what are the main objectives of Disaster Management and on defining its cyclical structure, which we have seen to be common to the already described procedures for building and analysing a policy.

As we said at the end of the previous paragraph, there is no single way or one way to approach the management of a disaster; this due to the fact that the procedure of disaster management itself is an activity in continuous evolution and which involves

the adoption of ever new components, which have developed proportionally to the increase in experience in crisis management.

What can be said in general, without prejudice to this first assumption, is that Disaster Management is organised around consecutive phases that refer to different moments of the explosion of a hazard. The first phase will be the pre-disaster one, followed by the actions implemented during the crisis; then the last and third phase will be the one that covers the operations to be implemented following the end of the critical event.

The phases just mentioned enclose within them the very objectives of the management of an emergency, which are in principle summarised in three goals. In fact, each implementer of crisis management operations aims at reducing or avoiding losses from hazards, while assuring prompt assistance to victims in order to achieve rapid and effective recovery⁴⁶. These goals are organised around the figure of a continuous, cyclical schedule that can take into account the need both to plan a priori, to complete actions during the crisis, and also to catalyse the process of re-establishing situations prior to the emergency.

Figure number three shows the cyclical nature of the Disaster Management organisation as we have just introduced it.

Specifically, the figure shows the presence of further sub-sections that participate in the characterisation of the emergency and disaster management process in its entirety. In fact, we see how in the so-called "pre-disaster" action we can also trace the presence of the "prevention" of the "mitigation" and of the "preparedness".

⁴⁶ Warfield, C. The Disaster Management Cycle *From:* https://www.gdrc.org/uem/disasters/1-dm_cycle.html.

We will now try to better articulate what these appellations mean. The concept of "prevention" is widespread in all areas of public management. Generally it is defined as the complex of activities and procedures to be planned and implemented in order to avert the risk, that is to say to avoid the risk which, in this case, is attributable to the outbreak of a hazard that would make it harmful to the populations characterised by a high index of vulnerability. In this circumstance we can say that the very need to organise a risk management and disaster management process is articulated and depends on this basic assumption: the need to avoid foreshadowing a calamitous event with risky consequences for a community. In other words, if there was no risk, the need to try to avoid it, or at least to mitigate it, would not be envisaged. In fact, as we said a few lines above the concept of "mitigation" of the risk associated with a disaster is just as important for this regulatory activity as the will itself to avoid it.

We can also say that the need to mitigate the effects of a disaster was born in consideration of the awareness of the almost impossibility of avoiding the hazards and the possible disasters that ensue, trying to make a more efficient and at the same time decisive use of the resources that you have available to manage emergencies. In fact, mitigation activities manage in the practice to eliminate or reduce the possibility of a disaster or, where it is in fact impossible, they are able to reduce the consequences of inevitable disasters: they mitigate them.

The set of actions to achieve mitigation and disaster is truly extensive and very inclusive, then intersecting with the subsequent and complementary concept of *preparedness* that we will shortly analyse. In fact, all preventive activities are part of the actions to mitigate the effects of a disaster, such as for example, analyses regarding the vulnerability of a housing centre, of a population; cadastral surveys and regulatory plans for the use and management of public land; preventive health care

and public education. In a nutshell, all those public services that are delivered by local bureaucracies in compliance with the directives of the central governments, as well as the awareness programs regarding the risks of the environment in which we live, are in some way "preparatory", preventive and make us aware of the need to implement certain behaviours in order to prevent the risk of a disaster. In addition it should be a good practice for the institutions of a state to participate in capacity building processes, in order to develop the skills enabling the society to lessen the sale of the eventual disaster.

The *mitigation* itself will also depend on the ability of the state or community in question to incorporate risk and emergency indications and data directly into the field in its development and growth policies during the management of past crises. This process will only trigger if the institutions are able to directly take into account the analyses of risk factors and to operate medium / long-term public policies on the basis of the data of these evaluations.

Let's now analyse the next and complementary concept to the previous one that we find in relation to the Pre-Disaster phase. We are talking about *preparedness*. It can be technically defined as the procedure for maintaining inventories of resources which must then be used as effectively as possible by public officials; the latter must be trained in such a way as to guarantee efficient and decisive emergency management. The objective of *emergency preparedness programs* is to guarantee the achievement of a sufficient and exhaustive level of operational readiness to respond effectively to any type of emergency. This level of responsiveness will be achieved, as mentioned above, through the implementation of training programs capable of improving the actions of governments and institutions, structuring them, among other things, around well-structured plans; plans will have been already organised in the

previously described phase of "mitigation" which therefore is prefigured as a part of the organisation of emergency management complementary to the latter.

Measures to enhance preparedness can be described as logistic readiness to deal with disasters and can be improved through the implementation of response systems, the development of education programs for the population. In the last case just listed, a striking example may be the evacuation tests that are held at the Italian state school complexes or the exercises of emergency actions to be put in place to be able to escape the risks of the consequences of an earthquake. Still to make the population of a geographic area characterised by a high level of vulnerability more "ready" and responsive to the threat of a disaster, rapid alarm systems can be built as in the case of sirens that warn the arrival of a tsunami that are placed along the shores of the countries overlooking the oceans. Other types of examples regarding actions aimed at raising the degree of preparedness are ones aimed at the creation of food or medicines stocks and other basic necessities that may be able to guarantee a practical mitigation of the effects of a disaster on the population affected by it.

The preparedness, we have already said, is not only a logistical readiness, but is also based on the implementation of practical activities that governments, institutions, and individual citizens tend to develop in the phases preceding the outbreak of an emergency. These plans will be implemented with the aim, for example, of saving lives, minimising the effects of disasters and improving response operations. Similarly to the operations to mitigate the effects of a disaster, the preparatory actions also depend on the integration of appropriate measures in the short and medium term national and regional development plans. In addition, their effectiveness depends on the availability of information on the dangers, emergency risks and countermeasures to be taken and on the extent to which government

agencies, non-governmental organisations and the general public can use this information.

The availability of information, as will be fairly straightforward to understand, is based on the repertoire of data that has been collected in the field during the management of other emergencies in the past.

So far we have carried out an examination of the activities taking place in the so-called pre-disaster phase. In the following lines we will first deal with defining the actions during the disaster in order to concentrate on the concepts relating to the next part, that is, things to be implemented following the end of the actual emergency.

The phase of the actions to be carried out "during the disaster" includes all those activities that the personnel of the Civil Protection, the National Guards and the police services put in place in order to bring the very first aid to the population affected by a natural or man-made disaster that can occur suddenly in any portion of the national territory (see the previous paragraphs for the characteristics of the disaster, among which the suddenness is found). The various passages in which the rescue steps are generally divided into the concept of "*Response to disasters*".

In fact, the direct and rapid response to emergencies is generally organised around the use of national security services. "Response" means the deployment of the necessary emergency services and first responders in the disaster area. Consider, for example, the emergency of the 2009 L'Aquila earthquake; the moments of response to the emergency were when the Fire Brigade and ambulances began to arrive to provide the first aids to the population. In addition, these primary emergency services can be supported, where necessary, by specialist emergency teams, so-called "secondary" responders because they perform increasingly specialised roles and

tasks. In this phase, sometimes is left to the humanitarian action, calling on humanitarian agencies, NGOs, Onlus to provide the first aid to the population.

Like other "official" agencies for the protection of civilian populations, humanitarian agencies will need the leadership of experts from the sector of rescue actions, strong guidelines and staff training to make them ready to face the disaster. In fact, if the member of the personnel lacks of adequate training, the organisation would not be able to obtain the desired results, that is to say to save human lives (in this first phase of rescue).

We have so far talked about the operations that take place in the so-called "during disaster" phase, that is, all the first aid operations and direct and immediate help to revive the fate of the populations affected by the hazard turned into disaster. Continuing in the analysis of the organisation of the disaster management, we now move on to the immediate action phase following the safety, the control of the emergency itself. We refer to the "recovery" sector; as the emergency becomes under control of the security forces, the population can resume a whole series of activities that make it able to sustain itself.

The focus of the recovery operations is therefore very different from that of first aid, of the "rescue" phase which we have outlined a few lines above. In fact, the primary objective of this phase will be to seek to restore the area in which the emergency broke out to the situations that prevailed in the moments immediately preceding it. The efforts themselves put in place during the recovery operations concern different objects, such as the debates about the decisions that must be taken once the population has been made safe and the reconstruction, for example, of private goods has been damaged by the disaster.

In other words, the recovery is to be carried out to obtain the normal situation, through the setting of medium and long-term public policies. In this step it is the time to take decisions that may entail modifications of the social structure or of the lifestyle of a population, in order to mitigate the effects of an inevitable next disaster or to avoid the repetition of a similar catastrophe. Social sciences explain us that a social group will more willingly accept changes imposed on its lifestyle if carried out to mitigate the effects of a possible future disaster, when it remembers the memory of the disaster that has just occurred. Then there are more technical assessments in these period that must be carried out and that require the help of technical scientific expertises on the subject. For example, the necessity dictated by the rebuilding of an inhabited centre destroyed or damaged by a seismic event is prey; in this circumstance, after the Civil Protection has made the inhabitants safe, he begins to discuss the reconstruction. Specifically, technical evaluations will have to be carried out regarding the materials to be used from there onwards for construction in these areas, also assessing whether it is appropriate to rebuild in the place of the opposite crater and move to places that expose the population to a lower rate of vulnerability.

3.4.3 Principles and approaches to Disaster Management

Up to this moment we have dealt with describing the organisational structure around which the practical and technical operations of Disaster Management are organised. With the following part we want to focus on what are the principles that move decision makers and institutions, as well as the national security services of civilian populations in the management of emergencies. We will then analyse the

importance and programmatic nature of the analysis and evaluation processes for the purposes of crisis management itself; in doing this we will try to underline how the evaluation cycle (like what we have already seen for public policies) is intended as a guide to direct the bureaucrats and public officials in their work and to approach emergency management.

In this analysis, we start from a general assumption: Disaster Management in its multidisciplinary setup and complexity is characterised, however, by a certain methodical setting. This method is "harmonised" by some basic principles that guide the crisis management approach that has been identified by FEMA.

We will focus on introducing this organisation later in a paragraph dedicated to disaster management in the United States of America; for now it will suffice to say that The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security. The agency's primary purpose is to coordinate the response to a disaster that has occurred in the United States⁴⁷. These principles are the basis for Disaster Management action planning, and are generally rules that can be traced behind the setting of any public management action. Specifically, FEMA has assumed that a disaster management plan should be: Comprehensive; Progressive; Risk Driven; Integrated; Collaborative; coordinated; flexible; Professional. Wanting to analyse the meaning of these principles we must underline that they guide the manager's action.

So first of all it must be Comprehensive, that is to say inclusive of the analyses necessary to define all the aspects of the hazard that we have identified in the dedicated paragraph. We are referring to the degree of vulnerability of the populations or of the geographical areas where the hazard (natural or due to

⁴⁷ The FEMA definition and mission. *From: <https://www.fema.gov/about-agency>*

anthropic works that it is) could occur. Furthermore, a crisis management plan must be inclusive also and above all in its programmatic nature; in the sense that it must take into account all the portions of the action into which the disaster management itself is divided (Compare the disaster management cycle and the Pre-disaster and Post-disaster action phases).

It should also be added that the good emergency management plan must take into consideration the needs, interests and wishes of all the stakeholders and subjects affected by the hazard, as well as always remembering all aspects of the disaster impact (i.e. the negative outcomes that it will produce and on whom they will fall).

If we want to analyse the "Progressive" and "risk Driven" concepts, we can say that the planning of a criticality management action must take into account certain aspects of the same in an adherent way and these indications. In this sense we want to say that managers and decision-makers will have to interpret every area of the possible emergency in order to build an "app" of the risk and the prototypes of its "evolution"; on the basis of the information taken and the plans they have been able to elaborate, the experts will then have to implement constant communication with the political decision-makers. In this way they will make the political level capable of implementing programming choices aimed at creating a resilience to disasters in the population exposed to hazards, assuming that they are never completely avoidable, but that they can be mitigated in the effects. .

For this last consideration, let us recall once again the necessity of the implementation of the so-called "mitigation" actions and the launching of a "training" action, both for the staff and for the civilian population, aimed at making them more responsive and prepared for disasters. This gradualness, guided by risk, is an essential and basic factor in the action to manage any type of criticality, based on

the assumption of the need to set up an action plan that is immediate but at the same time gradual, that is to say "scaled" in based on the strength of the disaster.

An emergency response plan must then be Integrated Collaborative and Coordinated. This is even more true when the organisation of the state or group in which the emergency occurs is more complex. We are referring to the need to set up an action that takes into account all the needs of the various "organisational" and area levels at which the emergency develops, for example, from bottom to top, from local to general, according to a certain "verticality" in setting the action. In this situation, FEMA undoubtedly refers to the federal approach of the United States of America, dividing its structure into ten "Regional Offices".⁴⁸ This model and this approach could also be extended to the Italian reality, with the addition of many more sub-levels, given the complex multi-level structure in which our country is organised.

To make coordination between the various units easier and more direct and create a sort of "team spirit", communication between the various tiers must be enhanced, making the plan implementation process as fluid as possible. Furthermore, an emergency plan must be "flexible"; in fact, even if starting from a pre-established basic approach (according to the practice of a priori planning to reduce the use of resources and make emergency treatment more effective and decisive) the project must be able to be modified during the work, if necessary, following the peculiar characteristics of each disaster that occurs.

All this can be facilitated if the actors who contribute to the implementation of the plan itself act according to a professional criterion. By this we mean that they will have to abide by the rules dictated by the protocols of action in these cases (take for example the post-earthquake reconstruction and the indication on construction

⁴⁸ FEMA regional offices organisational substructures. *From: <https://www.fema.gov/about-agencies>*

criteria and on the use of materials) being at the same time liable for their action and responsible for the safety of the people they rescue and recover.

In this framework of principle, the implementer wonders how, in practice, to start setting up a planning and then putting it into practice, managing to take into account the real needs and the risks to which the civilian population or a specific geographical area is subjected.

At this juncture great help and guidance provided by the "analyses", which become the key components of the disaster management itself.

One type of analysis that can and will have to be carried out will be related to the strict characteristics of the hazard that could occur (or are known to occur, due to previous experiences) in an area and on a specific civilian population. This type of evaluation will tend to identify what the hazard profile is, underlining its outcomes; it will still be able to identify the sources of the same, the reasons that trigger it, for example natural (exposure to the south of a mountain ridge where harmful avalanches occur in an inhabited centre) or caused by man.

Another type of analysis that the evaluator will be able to prepare and then give indications to the implementers of the management plans will be the one concerning the "*vulnerability*". The so-called vulnerability analysis indicates the reasons, the causes, which involve a higher or lower rate of remuneration (i.e. exposure to the risks that can be caused by a hazard) for a specific area or population subject to study. Furthermore, this type of study also provides the characteristics of the effects of the vulnerability of a particular society or geographical region, highlighting what could be the impacts of a disaster on them.

But the type of analysis that is most important for the construction of an adequate emergency management planning is the so-called "*hazard risk analysis*". It includes

all considerations regarding the definition, characteristics, assessments and parameters of the risk magnitude of the hazard, as well as the setting of the "risk communication". On the basis of the information reached by this type of analysis, the risk assessor will have to produce indexations capable of making the relevance and the "weight" of the risk computable. Various scales have been introduced over time to index the vehemence of calamitous events, such as the *Mercalli* or the *Richter* scales for earthquakes.

The way in which the impact and therefore the level of risk of a hazard is expressed is also very important, especially for the purposes of the so-called "*risk communication*". The risk can be expressed in terms of human lives in danger or in hectares of forest land destroyed in the event of the outbreak of forest fires (see the example in the "policy evaluation" paragraph in chapter two). The risk communication is an important process that manages to implement the principles of "integration and coordination" dictated by FEMA (see lines above) and at the same time to organise a close-knit structure to catalyse readiness and responsiveness, both of the protection force and of civilian population. In fact, the risk communication process is organised along two different channels: the first is the one dedicated to informing humanitarian associations or first aid services to broaden their awareness of the type of emergency. The second, on the other hand, is the one dedicated to information "takers", ie the vulnerable populations that are formed with respect to the characteristic of the risk they run, so as, as stated above, to create a "resilience" to adversity.

We said in the first part of this chapter about the approach to emergency management that it has not always been oriented towards mitigation and an attempt to avoid the risk of the emergence of a disaster. In fact, we have already stressed that

originally the praxis of managing a critical issue was always based on an a posteriori approach, preferring to let the emergency exhaust its strength and make its effects, and then try to remedy the same when they were totally exhausted .

This method, although simpler as it requires fewer evaluation efforts, which can be easily set following direct and linear empirical analyses relating to the amount of damage, is however very expensive. In fact, generally, if the mitigation processes are not implemented and the development of preparedness and resilience is not aimed, both in the population and in the personnel of the civil security forces, the effects of the disaster itself will be much more extensive and profound.

As we have already said, in order to implement a more coordinated and above all long-term management approach, there should be an integration between the warnings of technical-scientific expertises (which are based on the data collected on the ground during the management of past calamitous events) and the descriptions made by the political tier, which will have to plan the social programs, the state property plans and a whole series of regulatory rules on the basis of the technical directives, to allow, in fact, a mitigation of the risk. In other words, it is important for the management of an efficient and decisive disaster, both the work of the civil protection forces and the work of the technical scientific committee, but even more so the decisions taken by political decision-makers.

In this direction, it is important to mention the UN⁴⁹ declaration that defined the decade 1990-2000 as the International Decade for Reduction and Disasters. This declaration introduced a programmatic shift in approaching emergency management, from an a posteriori action to today's conceptualisation of the same. Its cyclicity

⁴⁹ UN. (1990 and 1994) Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction

and organisation has already been widely discussed. It will suffice to recall in this section how the continuous approach to mitigation and treatment of emergencies is to limit the effects of the same and above all to be less expensive and more resolute over time for the affected populations.

3.5 Two ways of dealing with disasters: The US and German models

3.5.1 The evolution of US Disaster Management institutions

In the sections drawn up so far, we have dedicated ourselves to addressing various issues in which the concept of disaster management as well as its development of principle and structure have been explained, in light of the programmatic nature of this operation, as defining a first comparison term to bring at the end of our comparison. In fact, with the following chapter, focusing as we said on the management of the ongoing health emergency, we will try to highlight the differences that exist between how to manage known crises (such as the disasters we are aware of) and unprecedented ones (such as the health crisis from Covid-19).

Continuing with the drafting of the chapter, in the following sections we will devote ourselves to the description of two models of action in the management of emergencies and disasters, belonging to two different contexts and we will try to underline their differences and common portions. This comparison appears very interesting in that both the two state structures show the same federal structure, albeit

with differences, and therefore determine a managerial organisation of the national security services certainly based on a multilevel system.

First of all, we will analyse the structure of the US National Security Service in this paragraph and then shift our attention towards the way of managing crises that is used in the European context and in particular in Germany. To start we will focus on what has been the historical evolutionary process of the security service and disaster management institutions in the United States of America.

Generally, three consecutive phases can be identified in the evolutionary history of the public security institutions (as well as of the approach they used to manage emergencies) in the United States.

They are:

A first phase that goes from 1800 to 1930 (also called the phase of the first years.

A second phase that ends with the Cold War (1930-1950)

A third phase that goes from the 1950s to 1979 and which marks the moment of shift from "civil Defence" to actual Disaster Management (as we will see focusing more on the management of natural disasters).

Beyond the only schematic periodisation, what is urgent to underline is how even in the United States the process of transition from a post-crisis crisis management model to a scientific, integrated and professional one (typical of disaster management) was long and gradual . As can be seen from the historical analysis of the legislative regulations on the defence of the civilian population in the United States, in the first period of the previous periodisation (i.e. in the years between 1800 and 1930), the efforts and actions against the magnets were limited to the fight against diseases and forest fire threats.

Specifically, the protection of the civilian population was implemented in a totally retrospective perspective, allocating relief bills or relief aids. Some normative texts could be cited that exemplify this approach, including the 1803 Fire Disaster Relief Act⁵⁰, or the 1928 Lower Mississippi Flood Control Act⁵¹. It could be said that the most significant progress made by the institutions in this period was the establishment by the Congress of the Council of National Defence in 1916, which consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interiors, Commerce, Labor and Agriculture. The focus was primarily on civil defence⁵². It can be seen that in this first phase the care of civilians in the United States was always seen from a military perspective, and it is understandable already analysing the only organisation of the aforementioned Council of National Defence.

A step forward in the evolution of the approach and institutions for safeguarding and managing emergencies and disasters in the United States only took place with the outbreak of the Cold War. Specifically, the enormous risks dictated by the possibility of a large-scale nuclear conflict moved the authority to change the structure of the National Security service. In fact, driven by the need for an ever greater rationalisation and methodical approach to setting up this service to defend itself from the atomic risk, a process of professionalisation of emergency

⁵⁰ Drabek (1991). The Evolution of Emergency Management. Page 6 With this Act federal funds were made available to help the city of Portsmouth and the state of New Hampshire recover from extensive fires. This congressional act of 1803 could be considered the first step of the US disaster management activism.

⁵¹ FEMA Educational Paper. Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. *Paragraph 2.2.2*. This legislation was passed as a means of responding to the lower Mississippi River flooding in 1927. At the federal level there was only the sending of troops for relief operations.

⁵² FEMA Educational Paper. Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. *Paragraph 2.2.2*.

management was undertaken. During the whole period between 1930 and the second world war there were various acts of President Roosevelt which led to the normalisation of the management of floods, floods and reconstruction praxis to be implemented following earthquakes⁵³.

During the Second World War an overflight raid service was activated, to check the national territory in order to ascertain the presence (or not) of direct threats on the domestic territory that could be a source of risk for the civilian population⁵⁴. Once again it is clear from what has just been reported that in this period the setting of the protection of civilians in the states was based on a "wartime" structure. Institutional evolution is to be noted as in 1945 the Office of Civil Defence was abolished.

The evolutionary process went through its most important moment between 1950 and 1979. In fact, in this period of time there has been a succession of disastrous events in the United States of America that has brought the attention of the institutions to the need to set up ad hoc offices, specifically designed to manage these situations. The first step was in 1950 with the introduction of The Federal Civil Defence Act (FCDA) of 1950 (Public Law 920)⁵⁵. With this regulation it is established (as historically and according to the praxis it was already consolidated)

⁵³ Drabek (1991). *The Evolution of Emergency Management. Page 6.*

and

FEMA Educational Paper. *Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. Paragraph 2.2.2.*

In 1933 President Franklin Roosevelt granted the Reconstruction Finance Corporation “authority to provide loans for the repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities that had been damaged by earthquakes....”

⁵⁴ FEMA Educational Paper. *Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. Paragraph 2.2.2.*

⁵⁵ FEMA Educational Paper. *Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. Paragraph 2.2.3 1950-1979: Natural Disasters and Shifts From Civil Defense to Disaster Management*

that the management of emergencies in and of itself still remains a local prerogative, entrusted to the administration of individual states. At federal level, however, the desire to set guidelines through general regulations valid cross nationally for member states is underlined for the first time. In the same year, The Disaster Relief Act put into place a national and permanent disaster relief program, replacing ad-hoc, event-specific aid packages with general disaster relief law. With this act the authority to declare a disaster was given to the President and no longer to Congress, also marking the introduction of the cost-sharing principle of emergency management.

This desire to centralise the management faculties had as a result of the risk of a total nuclear war, fuelled by Soviet development in this sense. In fact, during the 1950s we see a speeding up of the planning processes of the national security services of civilians, also catalysed by the Cuban missile crisis. This emphasis placed on creating mass shelter from the nuclear threat lasted until 1964, when the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness was signed by President Johnson. Attention from this moment onwards shifted from fallout shelters to crisis-implemented programs such as evacuation.

The Coordination principle for setting up a good disaster management plan has its roots in the 1969 Disaster Relief Act, that passed following Hurricane Camille also introducing the role of the Federal Coordinating Officer to represent the President in coordinating disaster relief ⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ FEMA Educational Paper. Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. *Paragraph 2.2.3*

Flood damage insurance was introduced in response to natural hazards in 1973⁵⁷ and in 1974 The Disaster Relief Act was passed following the destruction left in the wake of Hurricane Agnes. This series of catastrophic natural events that occurred in the 70s led to the launch of a series of natural emergency management programs, gaining some experience in various fields. In fact, it was this process of struggle against continuous and repeated natural hazards that made the transition from ex post action to the ongoing management of disasters through the cyclical process we identified in the previous paragraphs.

At institutional level, this process resulted in the creation in 1979 of FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. To FEMA was given the power to establish federal disaster policies, mobilise federal resources for disaster response, coordinating federal efforts with state and local governments, and managing federal disaster response. The FEMA Director was appointed by the President of the United States and was, until the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, part of the cabinet. Since its inception, FEMA has gone through moments of "ups and downs", which have seen it be overshadowed for reasons related to the allocation of Congress funds.

Indeed from 1980 until 2001 this "troubled" process of development of its functions and general evolution eventually led to the affirmation of FEMA as the main organ of integrated disaster management in the United States, if only until the

⁵⁷ FEMA Educational Paper. Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. *Paragraph 2.2.3. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973*

drastic change of approach that took place in 2001. For example in 1986, after this institution had already seen the modernisations at the management level in 1983 with the adoption of the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS), there was a profound refinancing of the organisation, through the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorisation Act⁵⁸. Difficult years were those between 1989 and 1993. In fact, before Hurricane Hugo hit the Southeastern United States and FEMA's inability to respond was severely criticised; a year later, the earthquake in Loma Prieta ⁵⁹ also led to more criticisms for FEMA. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit and devastation was widespread leading to a renewed reexamination of FEMA's competencies.

This series of natural catastrophes focused on one of the most relevant portions of disaster management, namely mitigation action, as we have discussed in advance in the initial paragraphs, it is prefigured as the only way to try (together with the training of staff and the population to increase preparedness) the reduction of the effects of inevitable disasters. FEMA focused precisely on this portion of disaster management and returned to increasing its credibility with the succession of other natural disasters that were better managed.

Another important moment in the periodisation of the development of emergency management in the United States of America was that which occurred after the attack on the Twin Towers of 11 September 2001. In fact, in this circumstance there was a sharp change in the orientation of the federal action aimed at safeguarding the civilian population, inaugurating, a decade that has seen the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and numerous changes in disaster management

⁵⁸ FEMA Educational Paper. Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. *Paragraph 2.3.11980- 2001: The Fall and Rise of FEMA*

⁵⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica: Loma Pietra. From: <https://www.britannica.com/event/San-Francisco-earthquake-of-1989>

organisations. FEMA itself, which had represented the backbone of the integrated and coordinated management of national security services for decades, joined 22 other federal associations under the control of a new department: the *DHS* the *Department of Homeland Security*.

This gigantic organisation created on the merger of 22 federal agencies represented a single-cabinet institution that would face the exceptional challenge of being able to unite several bureaucracies that had accrued under the aforementioned agencies⁶⁰. From 2005(which continues to exist but under the aegis of DHS) only the response and recovery function was left to FEMA, while the activities to increase the Preparedness were managed directly by the DHS.

In this contemporary disaster management the "watershed" is represented by the disaster event of Hurricane Katrina. In this disaster, FEMA had completed evacuation drills during periods immediately preceding the hurricane. Despite the various meteorological forecasts regarding the criticality and risks associated with this event, the funds destined for the same FEMA for the management of this emergency never came due to the reallocations decided by the DHS. There were shortcomings in the management of the Katrina emergency, even if FEMA alone managed to save many lives, in accordance with its relief and recovery function.

After Katrina federal emergency management policies were revised to vest more power in the President and the FEMA was reorganised. The mission, functions, and authorities of DHS were clarified, followed by a series of important regulatory documents that led to the identification of the current management structure of disasters and emergencies.

⁶⁰ FEMA Educational Paper. Disaster Policies: History and Institutions. *Paragraph 2.3.2 2001- Present: Homeland Security and Disaster Management*

3.5.2 The Crisis Management System in Germany

In the previous section we have outlined in brief ways what have been the steps for the realisation of the current method of disaster management in the United States of America. The US model represents one side of emergency management activities and a way of approaching their risks and the activity aimed at their resolution.

We now proceed with the description of the main characteristics of another model, which represents another type of approach with which to manage disasters. We are talking about what the widespread approach used in Europe that is called "Crisis Management". Let us analyse the German model of crisis management, given that this country shares the federal organisation with the US.

The primary objective of the discussion will be to highlight how the responsible public authorities interact in crisis management within the federal tier and in the individual states of the Federal Republic of Germany. As the guide prepared by the German Ministry of the Interior (which we mentioned among our bibliographical references) rightly suggests, it will be appropriate to start from the analysis of the European background in the field of emergency management. In this way it will also be possible to highlight the common guideline which can be found behind the crisis management of all EU member states.

To ensure joint action in the field of contrast and control of critical issues and emergencies, it will be necessary that all countries share a common perception of what the risks and dangers deriving from possible hazards or emergencies are, with the primary objective of implementing a cohesive policy marked by foresight. What has been defined so far is found in accordance with the so-called "EU's common

security strategy"⁶¹ and should be implemented by all member states in order to allow the achievement of a common synergy and organicity at Community level, as required by the "cohesion policies "themselves. In this sense, the same German national organisations have developed even further to ensure maximum synergy in the deployment of the resources necessary to deal with crises in domestic borders (by the responsible actors), and the response to the common challenges represented (especially after 2001) by global terrorism, pandemics and the spread of new transmissible diseases.

Specifically, Germany has put in place a crisis management system that is organised, for obvious reasons dictated by the same form of the (federal) state on two lines. At the level of the Lander (the federal states into which Germany is divided) the response preventive action is entrusted, especially for natural criticalities, caused by man or for the outbreak of epidemics. When the disaster that occurs reaches an exceptionally large scale, the individual Lander will be able to request support at the federal level, especially any the side of organisation and allocation of resources. For the lander in difficulty there will also be the possibility to request help from other states.

The Federal level, among other things, is in a situation of collaboration and continuous support with individual states, as regards and analysis operations regarding the degree of vulnerability of a population or a geographical area to the risks of a particular hazard or to better structure the management of crisis contrast plans. This continuous communication is strengthened and revealed especially in cases of interstate or even federal level crises (as in the case of the ongoing Covid-19

⁶¹ Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Mode, March 2010

In: Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page:* 5

pandemic), in the organisation of an integrated and multilevel management corps, which incorporates a chain of command based precisely on the communication between the Landers and the centre.

This general system of crisis-management develops further and continuously, following a process of perpetual refining, to be as effective as possible and to guarantee, regardless of the particular crisis that occurs, a flexible response to the emergency. In these characters the way to approach the management and planning of interventions for deals with the crisis, the German system appears adherent to the principles on which to base the disaster management that have been identified by FEMA (see the above paragraph) In this we can trace a first similarity between the two models.

These that we have just listed represent the so-called general principles of the action of the crisis management forces in Germany, which, as we have said, refers to the integrated and cohesive European approach following a synergic multilevel organisation. It will be interesting to go and analyse the regulatory provisions governing the actions of the two crisis management tiers, in the same way as done with the enumeration of the "acts" enacted in the USA.

Starting from the level of the individual states, in compliance with the provisions of article 30 of the German Basic Law and article 73⁶² of the law concerning the division of legislative power, the Landers are responsible for producing the rules for the prevention of threats, as long as they do not include defence. As a rule, the regulations on preventive policies at the state-level hazard level come from the legislation of the Landers themselves. Among these laws are the regulations regarding the treatment of forest fires, which, in compliance with what is stated by the guide of the German Ministry of the Interior, assign the states the duty to

⁶² Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page: 7*

eliminate fires and to guarantee the rescue and relief of the population and of the things they damaged. As for the methods of action of the police forces in these scenarios, as well as in general in crisis scenarios at the state level, they are also regulated by the laws and statutes of the security forces of the individual states.

Let us now analyse the legal framework behind crisis management at the federal level. Here the question becomes more complex, both for the fact that the crises regulated by these laws will be on a much larger scale than the state ones, and because the federal regulation provides for the establishment of an overarching crisis management system. In general, the first task of the Federal tier is that of Defence, as prescribed by article 73 of the German Basic Law⁶³. In this sense, it will be up to the central government, as seems obvious, to safeguard the civilian population from the risks that war hazards already entail.

Overall defence is divided into *military* and *civil defence*; in our analysis we should analyse how the second function is articulated. *Civil Defence* includes continuity of government, civil protection and supplies and civil support for the military.

In the event of an emergency on a national scale and a need for defence, the Basic Law of Germany provides for the possibility of enacting special laws. These are the so-called Emergency Laws, and can derogate from ordinary legislation giving the central government greater powers so as to speed up the implementation of measures necessary for the management and rapid resolution of any crisis.

We have seen that in the American model, analysing the evolutionary process of that approach to managing emergencies and disasters, the power to declare a disaster and manage the operations aimed at its resolution has been repeatedly centralised in the hands of the President. This situation, even if it happens more frequently

⁶³ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page: 8*

following moments of serious disasters, is a much more widespread process (in terms of cadence) in the USA than in Germany; where the derogation from the regular division of legislative power between the Landers and the centre is allowed only in crisis situations, and limited to the moment of its maximum harshness. In this we can say that the German system more resembles Italian practice, where, as we have widely seen, we arrive at the assignment of an extraordinary plenipotentiary commissioner to manage crises more effectively.

The further difference that can be traced to the German and Italian model trail in this matter is that, although indicated by the constitution, the process of derogation from the normal division of powers in Italy is a mechanism that derives from praxis rather than from a real will of the legislator. In Germany, on the other hand, there was a direct intention to indicate the ways to manage emergencies, being able to respond more quickly when necessary. By adopting our analysis of the regulatory "system" behind emergency management in Germany, not only for reasons of national defence but also for the protection of state areas of clear federal interest, it is possible to resort to the adoption of emergency laws. Take for example the case of critical issues threatening the communication or transport routes, which are strategic for the country. At that point Emergency Laws will be enacted to secure these assets, to catalyse the implementation of which the various states may request the intervention of federal police forces (if necessary)⁶⁴.

But how is federal crisis management in Germany organised in practice? First of all, we must point out that the management of emergencies is managed, as in most states, by the "political" level which, to use a classic nomenclature of military exercises, would be defined as the "COD" (Chief of defence) level of the

⁶⁴ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page: 9*

organisation chart. In Germany, at the federal level, the minister responsible for the matter in which the emergency develops (for example, the minister of the jump) is responsible for directly organising the the crisis management.

In fact, during the periods of normal administrations, ministers will have carried out exercises aimed at increasing preparedness and identifying the most effective method of treatment possible for the crisis that lies ahead. In this way, they will be able to quickly appoint competent task forces on the matter and implement the plans made. Specifically the ministerial Task Force that will guide the field activities and that will have full powers. Task force members are directly appointed by the minister and the other Federal level ministers have to provide staff members to extend the emergency management panel expertise. Obviously, all federal ministers will have to ensure the availability of their liaison officers and members even outside the usual and ordinary working hours in order to allow the greatest possible response flexibility to the crisis.

When very serious crises occur throughout Germany, a prominent function is performed by the Federal Ministry of Interior. The Federal Minister of the Interior will have to call a task force (BMI) which will have the task of coordinating the crisis management actions that are occurring in more than one of the Landers or that are making strategic areas of particular importance at Federal level. In this Task Force led by the BMI there will be members of all ages under the control of the ministry itself, experts in the matter of the hazard and they will be led directly by the minister.

If the need arises, the task force can be extended to states or other agencies. When there are particularly serious crises, the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) is assisted in the management of the crisis by other ministries, forming Joint Crisis Task Forces.

For example, a collaboration may be formed between the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Health (BMI / BMG)⁶⁵; the task of such crisis task force is to deal with pandemics and bioterrorism. From what we have said so far, it is clear that the German crisis management system, especially at the federal level, is set up in such a way as to guarantee maximum coordination and collaboration between its various managerial components (political and otherwise). In fact, the Joint Crises Task Forces incorporate the principle of coordination set by the FEMA (see paragraph above) and keep in touch with the realities of the various states by not coordinating rescue and recovery operations, but also, in advance, by acting as catalysts for mitigation activities and preparedness exercises. Sometimes joint task forces can be assisted in their advisory work by a Federal Advisory Team which will send the states the information they need to manage crises.

Furthermore, especially within the European Union, there is a constant communication system capable of increasing the level of coordination between the task forces of the member states. In this way, the knowledge of each of the different realities becomes a common patrimony to manage hazards more and more effectively. Among other things, in order to speed up and orchestrate communication and inter ministerial collaboration at the federal level, an Inter ministerial Panel on National Crisis Management⁶⁶ was established, which provides the forum for inter ministerial coordination on strategic, organisational and procedural matters related to crisis management. This panel oversees the coordination of inter-ministerial interaction, information and consultation on the planning of management activities.

⁶⁵ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). *The Crisis Management System in Germany. Page: 12*

⁶⁶ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). *The Crisis Management System in Germany. Page: 13*

A Federal agency that covers, if we want, the task of the US department of Homeland security is, in Germany, the Inter Ministerial (Crisis Management) Coordination Group (IntMinKoGr)⁶⁷. This body covers a fundamentally important task, as it organises the management of complex emergencies that occur in Germany, coordinating the Federal and State levels. Its tasks are to ensure coordination between the state and state emergency response systems are not from the point of view of their collaboration and communication (task of the aforementioned Panel), but also and above all to draw on the relevant expertise for the federal ministries to produce coordinated recommendations, in order to advise the concerned state.

In this perspective other task of this agency will be to organise joint rescue and recovery exercises, joint risk assessments and indexing of the degree of vulnerability. In this way, every moment of the Disaster Management Cycle will be made organic and coordinated, with a continuous collaboration between the Federal level and that of the individual States.

In addition, to carry out an active and functional interaction between crisis management services at federal level and crisis management in individual states, joint exercises are carried out among all management levels. These are the LUKEX⁶⁸, or Joint federal – state crisis management exercise at strategic level in which the ministries, subordinate agencies, relief organisations, associations and private companies all participate.

Let us now analyse the organisation of the response to the emergence that occurs at the level of the individual states of the Federal Republic of Germany. In this

⁶⁷ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page: 14*

⁶⁸ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page: 16*

direction, as we have already anticipated in relation to the legal "background", the regulations are given by the German Basic Law, which gives the states the power to legislate on police-led threat prevention, rescue services, fire protection and fire services, and disaster control and management, the states have enacted their own laws in these areas. Given this characteristic of the division of legislative power, it obviously follows a difference in the setting of the methods of action and management and staffing between the different security systems of the individual German states.

The necessity of a more unified structure and uniformity of the forces of the individual states, according to command and control and organisational criteria equal at all levels, came after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and after the flooding of the Elba river of 2002⁶⁹. These two disasters have raised the awareness of the Landers and the federal level of the actual existence of a high level of risk (and a related vulnerability) by immediately implementing a Joint Federal-State Working Group for implementing a New Strategy for Protecting the Population.

Among the principles that moved this new strategy, we find the need to set strategic priorities based on risk and vulnerability analysis. In this mode of action, the German system after 2001 conforms to the US model which, as we have seen, incorporates coordinated action with the directives and suggestions of technical-scientific expertises. In fact, it is important to be able to organise a careful analysis and evaluation of critical issues and then outline, based on their results, action plans. The founding of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance

⁶⁹ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). *The Crisis Management System in Germany. Page: 17*

(BBK)⁷⁰ and creation of a uniform command and control system at all levels, was sanctioned following the work of the aforementioned Joint working group.

Germany in this circumstance considered it appropriate to create standardised command and control systems at all levels. In this way, for example, it made uniform the management of forest fire emergencies, and based the subsequent implementation of emergency management on the creation of a system of coordinated task forces. This system, like the Italian Civil Protection mode of action that we introduced in the second chapter (regarding seismic events), should allow maximum coordination between all levels of command, from the most general to the most local.

3.5.3 Analysis conclusions

In these two parts we have analysed two systems of verses to approach the management of critical events whose effects can have disastrous results on a geographical area and on the civilian population that lives in it. The Disaster management style used in the United States represents a model that has been exported to many other countries, including New Zealand, South Africa or India.

As far as we have been able to analyse, in the American context there is always a tendency towards the centralisation of the disaster management powers in the hands of the President, especially following the occurrence of major disastrous events. This at least until very recent history, when the "watershed" occurred in 2005 which in fact seems to have interrupted this trend towards the centralisation of skills.

⁷⁰ Bunderministerium Des Innern. (December, 2015). The Crisis Management System in Germany. *Page: 18*

The management of Katrina has in fact underlined that centralised management may not always be more effective, above all because it will tend to underestimate the real needs of resources of the most local levels, coordinating their management directly and in person. This is what happened with the Katrina disaster management when the DHS did not allocate the necessary resources to the agencies coordinated by it and which had requested a very important refund, precisely in connection with the weather forecasts.

Among these agencies there was the FEMA which, although it had proved not very skilled in the management of emergencies in the past (see the Loma Pietra Earthquake in this regard), had requested the allocation of more resources. And in fact the management of emergencies and crises is a question of resource management that a social reality has at its disposal and can only rely on them to resolve the situation. This assumption seems to have been well received by the German crisis management system, especially following the events of 9-11 and the flooding of Elba in 2002.

The two Federal systems that we have described seem to be characterised by two distinct degrees of centralisation and command and control strategy. The American model seems to be much more centralistic, even following the post-Katrina rearrangement.

On the contrary, the German crisis Management, with all its institutes and panels dedicated to communication and coordination between the Federal and State levels, is focused on the proactive coordination and collaboration between all areas of society. Furthermore, the German model, being part of a co-existent and coordinated supranational security system among the members of the EU, has focused even more on the uniform and decentralised management of the emergency; doing this has

created preferential continuous communication channels between all levels of crisis management, capable of speeding up the reorganisation of operations should the need arise.

A common point that the two models seem to have concerns the principles they use to set up disaster management plans, in order to make them effective and decisive. These principles have indeed been outlined by FEMA and have been well explained in a dedicated paragraph above. In conclusion, we can assume that the two models, although both tending in principle to the coordination and integration of the action, are characterised by very different levels of management centralisation.

Conclusions to the first part

What we have done so far has been the provision of the most important theoretical examples that academics have produced in the field of the traditional policy and management cycles. The review we have attempted is functional to the objective of our work; indeed with this "first part" of our thesis we have tried to characterise the first subject of our comparison, by summarising the major features of both the policy cycle and the policy evaluation cycle in non emergency contexts. In this direction such a description has been useful to delineate the traditional academic conceptualisation (around the concept of cyclicity) of the classical and non emergency way to both build the policy and evaluate it. Consequently the user of such work would have been able to understand, albeit generically, how the policy production and assessment process are made of, are composed, in the light of the future comparison that we are going to develop with the second part of this thesis.

In addition in the first part we wanted to remark also which are the most important features of another "predetermined" way of acting. We are referring this time to the actions that are usually made to avert the risk, following what in the "public management scope" is called *risk management*, that is to say the preventive activities to deal with the risk produced by events. In fact, as we have depicted in this last chapter, the hazards (both natural and man caused) are unavoidable, so that the institutions and public administrations are "bound" to consider planning activities to preventively manage the risk deriving from the disaster. The report we attempted on this "cycle" that took the nomenclature of "disaster management cycle" has been useful and programmatic to the intent of our work. Indeed we aimed at framing which are the "usual" actions and steps that the institution enact in dealing with

experimented and known emergencies, whose features are well known and on which basis decision makers elaborate preventive management plans.

This last assumption represents the core feature in contrast to which we are going to elaborate the second part of our work. In fact when an unprecedented and never experienced event occurs, the cyclical modalities we have depicted are dismantled by the vehemence and sudden nature of happenings so that all the activities usually actuated have to be rethought, and a completely new strategic approach has to be elaborated *in itinere*. In a nutshell in the next part we will try to evaluate if the traditional non emergencies policy and management cycles are still adaptable and useful in never experienced emergency contexts; in addition our will is to assess if and how this usual *itineraria* of action are modified by the programs enacted in dealing with a new crisis, also weighing the role of public opinion and pressure groups in prioritising their agenda.

Second Part

In this second part we are going to carry on the definition of the "second term" of our comparative analysis. In fact, if in part one we have described the classic functioning of ideal-typical "cyclical" models, with regard to the process of formation and analysis of policy and risk management, in this Part Two we will "test" their validity in contexts of unexpected crises and never hope. For this purpose, we will use the analysis of a case study that is as current as ever, focusing on a portion of the analysis of political sciences that is very important, not new, but of renewed relevance. In fact, we will carry on the study of the regulatory responses that our institutions have produced to manage the emergency of *Covid-19* that the whole world has been suffering for a few months now. It will be interesting to ascertain whether and how the ideal-typical classic model for the formation of a policy is still able to best exemplify the trail of the production of effective and decisive emergency countermeasures, also proposing a "picture" of how generally our National protection system approaches health risk management.

In few words with the second part we aim to answer our research question, summarising all our work in the subsequent conclusions.

Chapter four

The Italian Civil Protection and the approach to the Sanitary Risk

4.1 Introduction and Chapter Strategy

With the second part of our work, as we anticipated a few lines above, we will deal with defining the "second term" of our compartmental analysis, answering the research question of our thesis.

Before dealing with this last task, however, it will be necessary to continue the work done in the third chapter. If we read this part of our work, the analysis that we have completed of the US and German civil protection services will immediately come to mind. At that stage of our work we had used the description of these two models to analyse how the concept of "risk management" and preventive actions to limit the effects of a disaster were implemented in two different state systems, trying to highlight the similarities and differences between these models. In this fourth chapter we will try to define the functioning of the Italian Civil Protection system.

In our description, however, we will start from a different point of view, using it programmatically to the objectives of the next chapter, the fifth. In fact, we will try to define how Civil Protection has evolved in Italy and what is the practice of action in the management of health risk, to then compare all that with what we observe regarding the management of the *Covid-19* emergency. Our aim will therefore be to carry on a kind of "comparison in the comparison", underlining how the pre

determined actions and strategies, however well planned, are valid as an operational basis only in the event of calamities already experienced and fought. In effect, this is the very basis of the "disaster management cycle" which is an ideal typical model around which all the a-priori risk management procedures deriving from a hazard are divided to be better analysed and executed.

We will therefore try, in this fourth chapter, to ascertain how the concept of aid to the civilian population has evolved in Italy, passing from the primeval medieval "charity" to today's setting of the "National Service" of Civil Protection. In fact, in the first part we will deal with the evolutionary steps which characterised the change of our civil protection over the years, underlining how the most striking reforms have been arrested, almost always, following the occurrence of major disasters, whose management has not been up to par needs.

In a second part we will deal more clearly with the practical way of acting in the management of health risk, defining this risk and the way to approach it. In fact, as we shall see, the Italian Civil Protection has codified, especially following the 2009 L'Aquila Earthquake, a whole series of operational organisational units that manage the health risk associated with the occurrence of disasters in practice. From this last feature of health risk we will structure the next chapter; in fact, we will observe in the following sections how in Italy there are plans to manage "health risk" only in conjunction (and as a consequence) with other dazzling events, which are characterised as its source. The fifth chapter will therefore be, in consequence, a "mirror" that will reflect the detachment from the classic way of managing the health risk operated by the institutions to manage Covid-19.

In order to fulfil our task, it would be relevant to give a reading of the system on which the action of the security services for civilian populations is based in Italy, as

we did in previous chapter regarding the German and American models. In this way we will be able to understand which are the principles behind the activities of the Italian Civil Protection, helping the institutions in buffering the sudden sanitary emergency and in organising medium and long term recovery plans from an economic and social point of view.

4.2 The Italian civil defence: history and way of acting.

4.2.1 The evolutionary steps: from the medieval solidarity to 1908 legislations

In this first part, our aim will be to provide a “picture”, an image, of how the system of protection of the civilian population in our country is organised. This portion of the chapter seems therefore to be quite relevant for our attempt to answer to the “research question” of our work, analysing the way in which the Italian national “watchdog” has managed (and is still doing it) the ongoing *Covid-19* emergency.

We will start with a necessary digression regarding the history and evolution that has affected the Italian Civil Protection department over the years. The Civil Protection is in fact the body that deals with the management of emergencies and whose task is the safeguard and protection of the Italian civilian population within the national borders and internationally. It will be interesting to say, first of all, that the evolutionary trail of Civil Protection as we see it today is a very complex process, whose milestones and deeper changes were conditioned and catalysed by the many

natural disasters that followed during Italian emergency history. In fact, the territory of the Italian Peninsula, as anticipated several times with examples in the previous chapters, has been hit many times by hydrogeological instability, earthquakes, large-scale forest fires and other calamitous events.

The skills and experience gathered in the field in the management of these critical issues, as well as the national awareness of the Italian population have contributed over the years to forging the awareness of the need for protection of the civilian population and for safeguarding the territory. All this has led in recent times (1992) to the creation of the modern Italian Civil Protection, an organ not only able to act in the most dramatic moments by performing rescue and recovery actions, but also to organise mitigation activities, increasing the preparedness of civilians and of the forces that make up their staff, and enhancing the resilience of the population to unavoidable natural hazards. In a very general way, we can affirm that also in Italy, in the same way as in all those countries which adopt the Disaster Management strategy, reforms are usually promoted and adopted in the periods immediately following the disasters themselves. In fact it is in such moments that the public opinion, driven by the memory of the recent disaster, it will be more inclined to make the necessary change in lifestyle and state policies, so as to avoid the recurrence of such disasters.

Before to deal with the description of the evolutive trail of the first civil protection institutions in Italy, it would be interesting to dwell on the moment in which and on the process that led to the creation of a common perception of "civil protection" in Italy. In fact, the concept of civil protection as an expression of solidarity, a spirit of collaboration and "public spirit" has distant roots; there is the idea that the first

solidarity associations have their roots in 1200 and 1300 (such as the *Misericordie*⁷¹ di Firenze), supported by religious orders, and that they assisted the population of Italy (not yet unified) after the event of great natural devastations or disasters.

For the discourse regarding the evolutive process that characterised the development of our Civil Protection department, it will be useful to create a sort of periodisation, taking inspiration from the information provided to us by the internet domain of the Department itself. Specifically, we will initially analyse the phase of the Pre-Unification. Trying to investigate what was, in general, the structure of the various intervention agents to protect the civilian population in the various states of the peninsula.

First of all, it will be necessary to point out that before the unification of Italy the services for the protection of the population and the ways of managing the disasters were diversified from state to state. There was a praxis not dissimilar from what is carried out today to manage faster and directly the emergencies: the various states in fact appointed an extraordinary commissioner to whom to entrust the management of the disaster and to which to give ample powers. This happened on many occasions such as following the earthquake in the Valle di Noto (1693) or the earthquake in Calabria in 1783.⁷² In this pre-unitary period, however, the individual states that made up the Italian chessboard took the first steps from a legislative point of view in regulating emergency management actions.

In fact, in the Papal State, in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and in the Duchy of Mantua, rules were produced to regulate the procedure for managing critical issues due to earthquakes. Specifically, in the Duchy of Mantua the first earthquake-proof

⁷¹ Protezione Civile. La storia. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/dipartimento>

⁷² Protezione Civile. La storia. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/dipartimento>

house in the western world was designed by Pirro Ligorio. In fact in 1570 the city of Ferrara was hit by terrible earthquake shocks; 40% of homes, public buildings and churches were damaged. It was precisely Ligorio who wonders why the houses did not withstand seismic events and why the inhabitants did not defend themselves in any way. Indeed, the architect himself thought that seismic forces were not enemies impossible to beat; on the contrary the author wrote: "*come i terremoti accadono, dove e quali danni fanno è pertinenza della razionalità umana, perché ... difendersi dai terremoti è un dovere dell'intelletto umano*"⁷³. In English it is: "how earthquakes happen, where and what damage they do is pertinent to human rationality, because ... defending oneself from earthquakes is a duty of the human intellect". This effort carried out by the architect Ligorio represents, in fact, the first expression of attempt to respond to the growing awareness of the need to implement a strategy aimed at defending the civilian population. This strategy adopted by Ligorio seems moreover to anticipate the times, aiming at an effective prevention of critical issues, putting into practice a defence "a priori" through the construction of buildings that could withstand earthquakes, instead of adopting a recovery measure following the disaster event, rebuilding from scratches.

Following the entry into force of the Albertine Statute (an obtruded constitutional charter) first applied in the kingdom of Sardinia in 1848 and then expanded after the unification, the uses and praxis that were used in the northern regions of the peninsula and in Sardinia, were expanded to all the territories. The anti-seismic regulations Papal State and the Duchy of Mantua were therefore set aside, in favour

⁷³ Ligorio. P. Libro Di Diversi Terremoti. The author was convinced that actions could be implemented and works capable of expanding the population's possibilities of defense against seismic events. The author and architect Ligorio Pirro showed extraordinary foresight, titling the last part of his treatise: "Remedies against earthquakes for building safety".

of a legislative corpus that went more in the direction of the containment and channeling of river waters, on the wave of the experience gained in northern plains by agricultural operators and by architects.

What appears evident following the unification of Italy is that the concept of “protecting the population” is not yet part of the social and political fabric on which the state itself develops and articulates. On the contrary, the safeguarding and rescue of populations that have been subject to the effects of a disaster (whatever it may be) falls within the range of public generosity and in the field of the industriousness of military forces, which have always been considered as mercies. An example of what has just been said is the flood of Rome in 1870⁷⁴ and the organisation of relief in that situation. In fact, in this case, the first to assist were the army soldiers who had

⁷⁴ Biblioteca Idraulica Italiana. *Le inondazioni del Tevere a Roma. About the 1870 flood*: A disastrous flood occurred in 1870, in the year of Rome's declaration of capital of Italy. On that occasion, the level of the river in Ripetta marked the height of 17.22 meters. The impression was great and thus began a serious planning for the construction of works to defend Rome from the impetus of the Tiber. On 1 January 1871 a technical commission was set up, which however remained largely inactive due to lack of funding. The situation was released by an impulse by Giuseppe Garibaldi, who in 1875 pushed the Parliament to finance the work and simultaneously presented a project to deviate the Tiber and the Aniene. In the end the project by Raffaele Canevari prevailed, with the proposal to stem the Tiber by means of the high travertine walls still present today. The last stone was laid in 1924, and their height was set at 18.45 meters above Ripetta's zero. From: <http://idraulica.beic.it/avvenimenti/le-inondazioni-del-tevere-a-roma/>

conquered the city two months earlier through the famous "breach of Porta Pia⁷⁵". In fact, as a consequence of what has just been said about the characteristics and the perception itself that the institutions had of the procedures for managing emergencies and their duties with respect to the implementation of relief and recovery actions for populations subject to emergency, the legislation on national security appears fragmented and very thin in the immediately post-unitary period. Indeed, at this juncture, the framework of rules is limited to providing for specific interventions and only after events with a marked relevance, generally uniquely for rectifying particular situations.

However, there was a desire, also in this period, to carry out quickly the works necessary for the management of Crises. Such intent is fordable into the use of conferring extraordinary powers of "ordinance" to prefects and local institutions. This remembering the praxis of appointing extraordinary commissioners for the management of emergencies that was put in place in the period prior to unification. In the specific case of the power of ordinance, we are referring to Law no. 2359 of 25

⁷⁵ Treccani . Dizionario di Storia. (2011). Porta Pia, breccia di: Opening through which the Piedmontese army entered Rome leading to the end of the Church State. On 20 Sept. 1870, the stretch of Aurelian walls between P.P. and Porta Salaria was the target of the main attack, during operations for the occupation of Rome, by Italian troops led by General R. Cadorna. After the first artillery shots hit the walls, the pope ordered the general in chief of the papal troops H. Kanzler to limit the defense to the time necessary to affirm the protest of the Holy See and to open the surrender negotiations with the first cannon shots. . However, Kanzler preferred to postpone his decisions and the papal troops surrendered to P.P. only after an assault by the 40th infantry regiment, when the Italian units closest to the large breach that in the meantime had been opened in the walls by the artillery, that is, the 35th battalion and the 39th and 40th infantry regiment, began the entry of the Italians into Rome. *From:* http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/porta-pia-breccia-di_%28Dizionario-di-Storia%29/

June 1865⁷⁶, according to which prefects and mayors can dispose of private property in case of breakage of the banks, overthrow of bridges and in general in all cases of emergency. We can define that the process of action in case of emergency was developed as follows; the first to rush to the scene of the disaster in the event of emergence were the Army and Law Enforcement Agencies, which were immediately mobilised to buffer the situation and provide immediate relief.

The crisis management process became rigid and codified only once the news concerning the occurrence of a disaster was dispatched to the Prime Minister. On this occasion, this figure also covered the role of Minister of the Interior, effectively coordinating the operations. In this historical period the news arrived at the Prime Minister's table with an in-forecastable timeliness and depending on the geographical distance. In fact, a few days could pass, as well as weeks before the news reached the capital of the kingdom, due to the obvious lack for the time of communication lines and consequently of links for the rapid sharing of news. At the time, emergencies were considered national only if they affected communication lines and roads of national importance or if they damaged structures of public utility. The process continued by carrying out the first assessments on the extent of the impact of the ongoing emergency. Subsequently the Ministers of the Interiors and of the War were

⁷⁶ Florence: Capital of the Kingdom of Italy, 1865-71. *Page: 176* Law n. 2359 of 25 June 1865: expropriation for public cause. June 25, 1865. Published in the Official Journal of 8 July 1865. Art. 1 [The expropriation of real estate or property rights for the execution of works of public utility can only take place with the observance of the forms established by this law] (3).

(3) This law has been repealed by art. 58, Legislative Decree 8 June 2001, n. 325, with the effective date indicated in art. 59 of the same decree and by art. 58, Presidential Decree June 8, 2001, n. 327, with the effective date indicated in art. 59 of the same decree. The repeal was confirmed by art. 24, Legislative Decree June 25, 2008, n. 112.

immediately asked for managing the emergency services; specifically it was a duty of the Minister of War to deploy directly on the site of the critical situation the closest armed forces available.

A first experience of “humanitarian activities” could already be found at the times of the unification of Italy, when associations of voluntary rescuers, both “secular” (lay) and Catholic, gave the very first aids and provided relief to the populations affected by the emergency. Contrary to what happens today, where humanitarian activity and charity are sometimes left with the possibility of carrying out the population's first aid operations (compare the previous chapter), the actions of these organisations at the time were not coordinated with those of the institutional law enforcement agencies and they took place completely randomly.

At the very start of the 20th century there were the first cycle of “legislative activity” to more organically regulate the actions to be enacted in dealing with disastrous events. Given the high volcanic risk to which the national territory is subjected, and it was also about a century ago, in 1906 special laws were issued on volcanic eruptions, the defence of inhabitants and roads from landslides, floods, storm surges and hurricanes. Furthermore, in 1908, after the disastrous earthquake in

Messina⁷⁷, the earthquake classification of the territory was introduced and the first anti-seismic legislation came into force.

⁷⁷ Terremoto di Reggio Calabria e Messina 1908. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/attivita-rischi/rischio-sismico/emergenze/reggio-calabria-messina-1908>

The earthquake represents one of the most serious seismic catastrophes that have occurred in Italy.

The cities of Messina and Reggio Calabria were almost completely razed to the ground, and the shock affected, with its most serious effects, an area of 6000 sq km. The characteristics of the foundation soils and the quality of the constructions determined the severity of the damages observed. In Messina, the old part and in particular the low and flat part of the city, founded on the sands, suffered the most serious damages. Many important buildings were destroyed, among them the famous "Palazzata", the sequence of buildings that runs alongside the port, already destroyed and rebuilt after the 1783 earthquake. Very serious damage occurred in numerous towns and small towns in the Messina and Reggio hinterland . The shock was followed about ten minutes later by a devastating tsunami wave, which caused further damage and casualties.

For the vastness of the area involved and for the consequences, the event conditioned for years the economy and the demographic dynamics of the affected areas, which were characterized by a temporary depopulation followed by a migratory flow recalled by the request for manpower needed for reconstruction .

The earthquake of 1908 marks the beginning of the action of the Italian State to reduce the effects of seismic events, through the introduction of the seismic classification of the territory and the application of specific rules for construction in the classified territories. In fact, the first Royal Decree containing rules valid for the entire national territory dates back to 1909.

4.2.2 *The evolutionary steps: the Centralisation phase and the first organic laws*

In our "ideal periodisation" of the evolution of the Civil Protection up to its current structure, we now analyse the phase that led to the drafting of the first unified and organic law on civil protection: the so called "*centralisation phase*". First aid services in the event of natural disasters were organised by a normative text for the first time in 1916. On this occasion, however, the normalisation of the rules to be followed to structure the first aid services to the populations was limited to the eventuality of earthquakes. At the head of first aid services, and with the task of their centralised management and organisation, there is a designated institution; we are referring to the Ministry of Public Works, under whose jurisdiction and direct control are all local civil and military authorities. Already from this first normalisation it appears clear the "centralising intent" on the emergency management and for the safeguard of the civic population that institutions wanted to enact in Italy.

Anyway for a more organic standardisation, another nine years would have to pass; in fact in 1925 the first general regulatory text on civil protection was drawn up. Specifically, we refer to law number 473⁷⁸ which identifies the Civil Engineering Department as the fundamental organ for rescue in the Ministry of Public Works and in its operating "harm", with the assistance of health facilities. In the following year (1926) a further regulation was issued, which came into force in 1928. This new regulation further defined the procedures for managing and organising the aid, reiterating once again the centrality of the aforementioned Ministry of Public Works

⁷⁸ Protezione Civile. The first organic regulation corpus. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/servizio-nazionale/storia/accentramento>

in the management and coordination of the same. This particular Ministry was also central in managing other portions of the public administration and of the public security services of the time. With this law it was effectively put in charge of the coordination of the Fire Brigade, the State Railways, the Red Cross, etc. Furthermore, in this legislation, relief efforts are not limited to acting only against "earthquake disasters", but their competence was extended to "other" emergencies.

This first examination highlights how the apparatus for managing the coordination of actions and forces in the field to counteract crises was directed towards a very strong *centralisation* of competences in the hands of a central body, which was precisely the Ministry of Public Works. When, however, the criticality manifested itself with high vehemence and unpredictability and there was no time to wait for the directives of the Minister of Public Works or the Undersecretary of State (or at least until these two figures produced the directives) the first aid actions were coordinated by local authorities. Specifically on a principal scale, the powers to activate and manage the rescues during the very first stages of the emergency were given to the prefects, public officials who, given their very close link with the territory they administered, were in fact able to enact the most effective strategies, adequate to solve the problems or at least to buffer the situation (the best policy implementers).

On a municipal and even more local scale, the emergency services were managed in the very early stages by the mayors. The latter, once they become aware of the emergency, have the task of deploying the firefighters and the personnel at their disposal, giving immediate communication to the prefect. The staff who has the task to deal with the rescue of the affected populations is instead handled and deployed by the civil engineer who, as we said a few lines above, represents the active arm of the Ministry of Public Works.

Up to now we have witnessed the attempt to put in place an organic structure of a civil security service at a national scale that takes into account a certain programming of the modalities of action and that aims towards a centralisation of the competencies. The normalisation in this sense was in fact interrupted by the Second World War, which inevitably shifted the attention of the institutions towards the setting of the strategies for protecting civilians by the enemies military actions. In this we can see what we said during the previous chapter regarding the strategy of action of the national guard in the United States of America in the equivalent period. In fact, WWII and up to the 1960s the strategic defence discourse was aimed at safeguarding civilians from hostile acts by enemy soldiers, also implemented through physical patrols (see the overflight of planes on the national territory by the Air Force) to search for any threats.

It was only during the second post-war period that in Italy Institutions started to act to renew the Civil Defence structure, pushed by the call for a generalised renewal asked by the public opinion. A succession of regulatory attempts occurred in 1950 in 1962 and 1967, when three bills were produced. They represented the unsuccessful attempt to implement an organic reform that could bend the “internationalisation” of the Civil Protection action, basing it on a concept of prevention and mitigation. However, the times seemed “too calm” to attempt such an approach and another emergency had to break out in order to urge the reforming action of the institutions in this sense. In fact, in 1966 there was the flood of Florence; it had a great resonance as it was the first to be followed directly and step by step by the media around the world. In their attentive reportage of the event, the media played a great role in “portraying” the inadequacy of the centralised emergency management service. In fact initially the only relief to the population of the Tuscan city came from the

volunteers and the soldiers who were stationed in the city and only a week after the outbreak of the crisis (six days to be precise) the government and central institutions were able to implement an organised and resolute management of the emergency. The most striking "shortcomings" of this system were undoubtedly due to the absence of a continuous monitoring service of the situation of the river Arno, so that its flooding was not foreseen and the population was not prepared.

But the failings of the system had also made themselves felt in another situation, regarding the Belice earthquake. On this occasion, the rescue arrived late, but to surprise even more was the inadequacy of the management of the post-emergency "restart". The urban centres destroyed by the earthquake were abandoned and the inhabitants of those places were encouraged to move to new communities and villages, distant completely unrelated to the traditions of those places both for building structure, and for the spatial logical organisation that distorted the usual aggregative and socialising modalities.

Finally, following these two very serious emergencies and due to the fact that the inability and shortcomings in their management by the public security services of the time appeared evident, in 1970 there was the drafting and implementation of the first organic law regarding Civil Protection. We are talking about the law number 996 of December 8, 1970, which represents the first proof of the understanding and the changed perception that the legal system and the institutions in Italy would have had forward with regard to civil protection, introducing for the first time also the concepts of natural disaster and catastrophe.

In this it could be said that the Italian system shows similarities with the evolved process of the American Disaster Management which would have arrived 10 years later (in 1979) to the creation of the FEMA (see chapter three for more information).

In addition, with this law for the first time the Italian institutions (undoubtedly driven by national public opinion that always awakens following the outbreak of crises or emergency events) regulated for the creation of a civil protection service that was the most structured and coordinated as possible, based on the predisposition and the integrated management of interventions to be carried out (as needed). Among other things, in order to get help to the population as quickly as possible, the competences of the various police and security forces have been established in a rigid and firm manner, precisely determining the tasks of each of the actors involved in the management activities. At the institutional level there was a reform, with the transfer of the competences of organisation of civil protection from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, the general concern brought with the 1970 law provides for the possibility of appointing an extraordinary commissioner (which has always occurred in the praxis) to manage the crisis directly on the place where it broke out.

In order to guarantee a flexible response and increase coordination even further, Emergency Response Centres have also been set up, establishing more connections with local realities given their greater proximity to populations. Similar to what appears to be the management of emergencies in Germany today, already in 1970 in Italy the creation of an Inter-ministerial Committee for Civil Protection was planned to coordinate the actions and directives of the various ministers and expand the scope of communication channels (continual) between them. At the same time, with the law of 1970, the roles and importance of the work done by the volunteers was officially recognised, given that already in 1966 Florence Flood (see above) they actually substituted the official law enforcement agencies in providing first aid to the population.

But there would be, little by little, other occasions to demonstrate how once again the organisation of the Italian Civil Protection, as it was, could not guarantee the effective and decisive management of natural emergencies. In fact, the law of 1970, as we have described it, was limited to defining the criteria for implementing activities in the immediate aftermath of emergency, to remedy and bring rapid relief to the population. The protocol implementing the same law would have been approved only 11 years later, following the occurrence of two major seismic events which were characterised by a failing management of the rescue and subsequent recovery activities. In fact, in 1976 there was an earthquake in Friuli Venezia Giulia⁷⁹ and in 1980 an earthquake in Campania⁸⁰. In general these two seismic events were united by an inadequate management, with “aid helps” that arrived late and the population seriously affected. The post-earthquake action was generally poorly structured; in Friuli, the option of rebuilding the inhabited centres as they were before the emergency was chosen, involving slowness and completing the process only 15 years later. Public opinion and institutions began a long debate which structured the perception of civil protection in Italy. In fact, the system moved from the concept of “managing emergencies after they have exhausted all their effects”, to the conceptualisation of an activity of "imagining, describing and experiencing" the disaster in order to manage it. In this sense there was a need for a Civil Protection service that based its action on the prevention and planning of emergency management activities, and not only on subsequent actions.

⁷⁹ The quake struck at 21:00:13 (20:00:13 UTC). Seventy-seven villages in the Friuli region were affected. Gemona del Friuli was greatly damaged

⁸⁰ The earthquake occurred on the evening of November 23, 1980 at 19:34 local time. The main shock was of magnitude M 6.9 with an epicenter between the provinces of Avellino, Salerno and Potenza.

After these events of exceptional scale and characterised by bad management, the 1970 law was accompanied in 1981 by the implementation of its "executions rule". With it an effective reorganisation is given both to the practice of action of the Civil Protection and to its structure; in fact, the ordinary governing bodies that are, at the state level, the Minister of the Interior, the Prefect and the commissioner of government in the regions and mayors in the municipalities are identified. Furthermore both ordinary and extraordinary "civil protection" figures and bodies (such as the Extraordinary Commissioner for emergencies) were established in this occasion.

4.2.3 The evolutionary steps: the Decentralisation phase

We are now approaching the subsequent step in the evolutive process of the Italian Civil Defence, step that is taking the system closer to the current organisation and is characterised by a decentralisation. In 1982 there is a further important piece of the evolution of the Italian national security service. Indeed the figure of the Minister for the coordination of the Civil Protection is formalised. It works by making use of civil protection and all the resources that the state deliver to safeguard the safety of civilians, the environment and human settlements. The Civil Protection Department is not given a bureaucratic organisation and a "pari-level" weight to that of the other ministries, but this apparatus is characterised in a more streamlined way, so as to make it super-ministerial and supportive in its action. We have come to a real watershed in the way of perceiving the very activity of the protection of civilian populations, not only as a "cure" for the damage of a calamitous event, but as a

programmatic action based on mitigation and preparedness (see previous chapter). In fact, consequently, the Department of Civil Protection collects information and data for preventing emergencies, prepares the implementation of national and territorial civil protection plans, organises the coordination and direction of emergency services, promotes volunteers initiatives, and coordinates emergency planning for civil defence purposes. We can therefore say that now after 1982 the Civil Protection moves along four different directions which are: *prediction, prevention, rescue and restoration of normality*.

On the basis of this renewed sense of perception of the tasks and action modalities, in 1992 the law number 225 was passed which marks the birth of the National Civil Protection Service. The main task of this state organ becomes that of "protecting the integrity of life, property, settlements and the environment from damage or from the danger of damage deriving from natural disasters, from catastrophes and other calamitous events"⁸¹. The civil protection structure is profoundly reorganised as a coordinated system of competences to which State administrations, Regions, Provinces, Municipalities and other local bodies, public bodies, the scientific community, volunteering, orders and professional colleges and any other institution, including private ones, Contribute in an active and direct way. The reorganisation of the National Service's action follows the principle of *subsidiarity*, distributing itself on many levels. In the event of an emergency, the municipal level will answer first and guarantee the management of the relief. The mayor becomes the manager of the crisis and in case of inability to implement the

⁸¹ LEGGE 24 febbraio 1992, n. 225. Istituzione del Servizio nazionale della protezione civile. (GU Serie Generale n.64 del 17-03-1992 - Suppl. Ordinario n. 54). From: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1992/03/17/092G0253/sg>

management, he (or she) will have to appeal to the higher levels: the prefectures, the provinces and the regional commissioners. Coordination and integration of the action of all Civil Protection forces at national level is guaranteed by the President of the Council, who makes use of the Department of Civil Protection.

The same law of 1992 (number 225) establishes the necessity to carry out Prevention and Forecast operations, to be carried out by analysing the calamitous events of the past and identifying their causes. A staircase is identified in three levels of extension of the calamitous event: *A (local)*, *B (regional)* and *C (state)*. The President of the Council of Ministers will deliberate the beginning and duration of the state of Emergency and defines the necessity of appointing a commissioner in charge for the coordination of the emergency management. In addition, the organisational structures and the National Civil Protection Service recognise the activities performed by the volunteers. Law 225 of 1992 also normalises the necessity of expanding the inclusion of the widest possible number of citizens and voluntary institutions, especially in all those prevention and first aid activities following the disaster.

What we have seen so far marks the transition from a centralised coordination of civil protection actions, distant from the population and from the areas in which emergencies spread, to a more elastic, decentralised model that is based, as said, on subsidiarity. In this evolutionary step, the Italian national civil protection service approaches not only by "principles" or by "perception", the way of acting of the American institutions of disaster management, but it is the same law 225 of 1992 which establishes the need to follow those that are the characteristic steps of the Disaster Management Cycle (see previous chapter for more details). In other words, following the 1992 law, it would have been necessary to establish planned and

programmed actions, based on a careful analysis of the causes behind the problems and calamities that could erupt on the national territory (and not only), also taking into account, and above all, the need to prevent their repetition as much as possible.

Rather than mitigating the effects of the calamitous event (essential feature of disaster management actions), the national civil protection system tries to prevent the repetition of events similar to those that have already occurred. It does this through the institution of training programs aimed at raising the level of preparedness of the population and national defence personnel, but also through prudent and careful post-emergency programs. These programs, although they could lead to limitations and changes in the ways of life and socialisation of the populations affected by a disaster (think of an earthquake and a reconstruction in other areas compared to those affected), could actually lower the level of danger of another event of similar characteristics. Obviously, to carry out plannings of this type, careful analysis of the level of vulnerability and exposure to the risk of disasters that the territory has will be necessary, moving to where the level will be lower.

The drive towards further decentralisation of the system based on the principles of subsidiarity and integration is felt throughout the 1990s. In fact, in this decade, the regions are demanding ever greater autonomy by directing the political debate and leading to the reform of Title V of the Constitution which, in practice, gives greater autonomy to the regions from the central government. With this in mind, the decree implementing the Bassanini Law drafted and implemented in 1998 that restructures the Civil Protection, the National Service in a decentralised sense, as well as entrusts greater autonomy to the regions and local authorities in the sense of organising civil protection and management activities of emergencies. Specifically at the central level, core competences remain, such as that of declaring the state of emergency (in

coordination with the regions that can request it), organising exercises and directing the actions of the rescuers and the aid machine in type C events (look at some line above) or of a national entity.

The Regions, on the other hand, take care of preparing risk forecasting and prevention programs, on the basis of national guidelines. In fact, the expertise of scientists and various technical-scientific experts will deal at national level with providing the main indications and addresses based on the type of criticality. Furthermore, the regions are committed to implementing urgent interventions when "B" type events occur, also making use of the National Fire Brigade. The organisation and usage of volunteering has been recognised since 1992 and the regions will have to deal with this area too. Similar tasks are entrusted to the provinces, obviously with a territorial scale that is increasingly narrowing. As a matter of their competence, the provincial institutions organise the forecasting and prevention of emergencies, structuring gestational activities of the crises and supervise the predisposition of the provincial forces and the urgent services that can be activated in cases of need. Still further down the subsidiarity scale, we meet the municipal level, which has the same tasks as the previous ones, but represents the level closest to the population and the one that will make represent the central institution in providing aids, recovering and guiding the affected populations.

We have seen so far those that were the fundamental stages of the process of decentralisation of the authorities and administrative competences, from the point of view of the Civil Protection but which in the 90s expanded to all areas of the state. The final point of this process is represented by the reform of Title V of the Constitution which took place in 2001. On this occasion, Civil Protection is considered for the first time as an area of ordinary state legislation and is placed in

the context of the "framework laws". In this way, the regions will regularly have competences in the field of Civil Protection. In 1999 two decrees changed the general structure of the Italian public administration and of the organisational structure of the Council of Ministers. Consequently to what has just been said, the same structure of the Civil Protection has been further reorganised. From the point of view of central control and coordination, the responsibilities have passed from the Prime Minister to the Minister of the Interior. In this way, the intention was to return to the figure of the President of the Council of Ministers the classic competences of Impulse and guide of principle rather than those of absolute operative activism. From the point of view of the technical organisation, the Civil Protection Agency is set up to handle technical and operational tasks.

4.2.4 The evolutionary steps: the 2012 reform

So far we have talked about the fundamental steps and the normalisations that have followed one another regarding the evolutionary process of Italian civil protection. In our path of depicting its evolution it will be necessary to place a further element that had led to its current imposition. We are talking about the process that enacted a further reform of the National Civil Protection Service in 2012. Indeed the

decree law n 59. of 2012 (and its subsequent ordinary conversion law number 100 of July 2012⁸²) supplement and modify the legislative text of law 225 of 1992.

In this new document, civil protection duties are further regulated by the original core of its competences as they were identified in 1992. So the tasks of the National Service, organised around the Department of Civil Protection, are to manage emergencies through activities that make the same relief and the buffering of calamities (when they happen) more incisive. The regulatory text of Law 100 of 2012 also touched on key points of the National Service, in addition to the close activities that civil protection must manage; the law has in fact reorganised the state of emergency, which can be declared for limited periods of time. Specifically, at the time of the declaration it cannot last for more than 90 days and then it can be extended for no more than 60 others. Essential note is that, already from the moment of the definition of the emergency and the state of criticality, the Government will have to identify which are the institutions of ordinary competence which would continue in the management of the territories and the restarting of the populations after the end of the emergency.

The state of emergency may also be declared (in agreement with the regions, following the 2001 reform of the Title V of the Italian Constitution) also in the moments immediately preceding the emergency. It can therefore be based once again on a forecast of the occurrence of a calamitous event, to mean that the civil protection approach now favours the preventiveness of the actions rather than the

⁸² LEGGE 12 luglio 2012, n. 100. Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 15 maggio 2012, n. 59, recante disposizioni urgenti per il riordino della protezione civile. (12G0123) (GU Serie Generale n.162 del 13-07-2012). *From: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/gunewsletter/dettaglio.jsp?service=1&datagu=2012-07-13&task=dettaglio&numgu=162&redaz=012G0123&tmstp=1342431485783>*

care of overly degenerate situations. The 2012 law once again regulates the powers and assignment of the “power of ordinance”. They are regulated for the first time by a law and are no longer issued by the President of the Council of Ministers, but directly by the Director of the Department of Civil Protection. In this context, the orders issued within 30 days from the declaration of the state of emergency immediately enter into force and take effect, while those issued after this deadline require the participation of the Minister of Economy and Finance that contribute to the “screening” and eventual authorisation. In addition to these regulatory and completely technical indications, in the 2012 law number 100, the duties of the Civil Protection are reported by law, which in addition to the classic management of disasters takes into account the importance of prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities. In fact, prevention actions are made explicit and for the first time there is clear talk of warning, emergency planning, training, dissemination of knowledge of civil protection, information to the population, application of technical regulations and exercises. The national alert system for weather-hydrogeological and hydraulic risk is framed in an organic way, thus taking up the various measures that have regulated the warning activities for civil protection over the years.

The list of regulations regarding the organisation of civil protection is changed again in 2013, when law number 119 changes again law 225 of 1992. In this case, the timing and duration of the State of Emergency declaration are reviewed. it can last for 180 days and will have to be extended for other 180 days; at the end of the state of Emergency, the resolution will continue with the identification of the institution with ordinary skills in the continuation of the management of the social programs to be enacted in the territory affected by the disaster. The latter represents an effective change with respect to the point resolved on the matter with respect to the previous

legislation. In fact, in the law of July 2012 the competent authority in ordinary (non-emergency) times was identified before the expiry of the state of emergency itself.

This reported so far, is the evolutionary process of the Italian Civil Protection. This examination was necessary not only for the record, as the case study emergency that we are going to interpret and analyse has been managed (and continues to be) by our Civil Protection, but also and above all to make a comparison with other management modes of the critical issues that we introduced in the previous chapter (see Disaster Management in the USA and the German model). Furthermore, it was an essential basis for proceeding with the next section of this first paragraph which will deal with the different standardised methods of approach to managing critical issues, which vary according to the critical issues themselves. Specifically, in fact, in the following section we will try to focus on defining the methods of action for the management of health emergencies that is used by our Civil Protection.

4.3 Different approaches for different emergencies: the Italian Civil Protection way of dealing with the sanitary risk.

4.3.1 Risk nomenclature and characterisation

In the upper portion of this chapter we talked about the general functioning and the steps that led to the current structure of the National Service of the Italian Civil Protection. We started from the origins, not to go into a description without outlets, but to try to show how the process to achieve the current conception of emergency management has been gradual and, above all, very long and complex. We could see that it was accompanied by a high number of regulations, which were intended as the formalising expression of the changes in principle that characterised the institutions' predisposition towards the treatment of risk and the protection of the civilian populations residing on the National territory.

In the previous chapter we have tried to do the same with regard to the management of public action in the event of hazards, natural or derived from human action, of which we have more or less in-depth knowledge and whose "periodicity" is known more or less certain. The upper part of the paragraph therefore represents a sort of continuation from the previous chapter in relation to this evolutionary aspect of the perception itself of safeguarding civilian populations. It will also be necessary to remember here that the civil protection and emergency management systems, whatever they are, and wherever and from any state they are adopted, have different types of approach that change according to the peculiarities of the type of emergencies that must face. For example, in fact, the approach of managing a flood

will be different from that of managing the chemical risk caused by the spillage of sewage from an inland water. In this next section of the paragraph we will focus on the management method and the approach that our Civil Protection adopts in cases of health risk, in order to compare the actions performed by the national system in the management of the Pandemic from *Covid-19* (to be carried out in the subsequent portions). For the definitions and references to the strategies used, the field of risk to the health of civilians refers to the internet domain of the Italian Civil Protection, in the area relating to the risks that it deals with buffering, managing and fighting.

We will begin our examination of health risk by analysing the definition of the same that is provided to us by Civil protection. First of all, it must be considered that the Health Risk⁸³ is a risk always due to the occurrence of some other situation, in the sense that it will always depend on an external, determinant and trigger factor. In fact, the health risk could be defined, or better be considered, as the "qualitative variable" which expresses the possibility that an external element (a particular situation) could determine the deterioration of the health of the civilian population, object to the effects of this external factor. Precisely because this particular risk is always caused (and not a direct cause) by other external dangers and events, it is defined as "second degree risk". The *incidence* of the health risk, that is the probability that it can happen, gives us an idea of the measure and the size of the risk itself; in other words, it determines what the effect of the risk in question might be. Health risk, given its consequentiality to other factors, can also be distinguished between "natural" and "anthropic" health risks. The difference between the two appears quite clear and is to be connected to the characteristics of the external

⁸³ Protezione Civile: Description of the risk; Health Risk. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/risk-activities/health-risk/description>

factors, the events from which it arises (which are the substantial cause). Specifically, "natural" health risk is determined by a series of natural events, such as landslides, earthquakes or floods, which endanger citizens' health. On the other hand, the "anthropic" health risk is traceable in all those degenerative situations of the health of the civilian population which are caused by human activities such as industrial accidents, industrial and agricultural activities, transport, waste (see the example given some lines above relatively the spillage of sewage into internal waters and the health risk connected to it).

Instead the "natural" health risk is determined by a series of natural events, such as landslides, earthquakes or floods, which endanger citizens' health. Furthermore, human activities can damage the health of civilian citizens temporarily or permanently, and the damage caused is generated by some variables with different nature and characteristics. In fact, they can be "variables" of a "biological" nature, such as pathogens, viruses (as in the case of *Covid-19*), genetically modified organisms. Furthermore, we can find two other variables that can be traced more directly to the human activity than the previous one; they are the "chemical variables" determined by the use of benzene, fertilisers, heavy metals, and the "physical variables", which are instead a direct consequence to the use of radiation (ionising and UV), at the emission of noises (noisy pollution and harmful frequencies) and at work in situations of temperatures either too low or too high.⁸⁴ Also for the health risk of natural origin, that is triggered by natural events such as earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes, etc., there are variables that cause, in particular, the possibility of the deterioration of the effective health of civilian people.

⁸⁴ Protezione Civile: Description of the risk; Health Risk. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/risk-activities/health-risk/description>

However they are all attributable to the natural event in itself (therefore to the earthquake in itself) and not to particular areas of a generating event (as in the case of chemical variables was the use of fertilisers which is a small part of agriculture). We have amply affirmed in past chapter (about disaster management) but something that can generally be extended to all areas of public management and therefore to risk management, that it must be organised around well-designed and planned activities. Above all the FEMA itself (compare previous chapter) had established the principles to be followed when planning to manage a particular type of critical activity, in order to be responsive and effective in the counteractions it seeks to give.

4.3.2 How to organise sanitary risk counteractions

Well then, just in this regard, we are going to try to identify what are the strategies and activities implemented by our Civil Protection for the management of health risk. In fact, given that the same health risk, by definition and as we have anticipated above, emerges whenever dangerous events that can lead to a degradation of human health (of civilians residing in a particular area) occur, it will be very important in "quiet" times the planning of rescue strategies and the implementation of emergency actions. Specifically, given the complexity of the multilevel organisation of our Civil Protection, in the case of Italy, the municipal, provincial and regional emergency protocols are adopted (always thinking in view of the subsidiarity principle that we had anticipated in the previous subparagraph).

To organise practically an action based on these principles, the Department of Civil Protection has been moving for 19 years now through the issue of Directives. In

fact, the method used by the head of the department to better organise the rapid implementation of emergency management plans or strategies is precisely that of issuing Directives with immediate effect. Since 2001, the National Civil Protection Department has issued directives to ensure the implementation of tested and pre-determined emergency health management systems, characterised by planning and predetermination. Specifically, in 2001 the first directive "*Principle criteria for the organisation of disaster relief*" came out; it was followed shortly after by the document on "*Principle criteria on the supply of drugs and medical devices for an advanced medical post*", of the year 2003⁸⁵.

During an emergency, it is essential to categorise the sick when rescuing them, in order to better treat them and guarantee the treatment in the most rapid way possible for the majority of the affected population. In 2007 the directive "Procedures and forms of health triage" was published, which outlined the procedures for the division of patients by severity and treatment priority in the event of a disaster. In 2006, the Department chose to dedicate an internal document to a very delicate aspect in the management of an emergency which is psychological and psychiatric assistance during a catastrophe: with the "Principle criteria on psychosocial interventions in disasters", common objectives and organisational schemes are identified. Finally, in our analysis we identify the *psycho-social assistance* action that the Civil Protection provides to populations affected by the catastrophe and who have lived or are experiencing a health risk.

In the previous part, we dealt with the discussion of the regionalisation of the organisation of the Italian national structure and thus also of the National Civil

⁸⁵ Protezione Civile: Description of the risk; Health Risk. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/risk-activities/health-risk/description>

Protection Service. In fact, in 2011, on the basis of the decentralisation of powers, the regulation of the assignment of regional health modules came for the first time. Still in the sphere of regulation of the management of the health risk generated by calamitous events, in 2013 the ordinance containing the directives for the regulation of pitched health posts was born, until the emergency was overcome and from the moment of its outbreak. In this way, an attempt is made to guarantee a service for the protection of the health of private civilian citizens affected by the disaster during its entire duration. Furthermore, in this way it is possible to guarantee a "safe" transition from the health point of view from the moment of the actual emergency up to the passage (return) to the normal administration of the situation.

The last stage of the evolutionary process of health risk management with a view to the principle of predetermining and planning the actions to be taken is in 2016 with the publication of the directive identifying the Remote Central Emergency Relief Operations - Cross and the Regional Health Referents in case of national emergency. Great attention must be paid, in the event of calamities but also of ordinary administration, in giving proper care and organising help and recovery services for people with disabilities; the "Abili a Proteggere" project⁸⁶, which Civil Protection has been carrying out for some years now in agreement with and in partnership with the Europe Consulting cooperative, is precisely in this direction. Whatever it is, we need to underline in this light the fact that the organisation of effective and decisive management of the health risk connected to emergencies (and generated by them) can be reduced around three main cornerstones. Specifically, as

⁸⁶ Abili a Proteggere. Able to protect, it presents the activities that the Social Cooperative Europe Consulting Onlus carries out with the Department of Civil Protection to keep attention focused on assistance and assistance to disabled people in an emergency, but also to encourage prevention interventions in these areas. From: <https://www.abiliaproteggere.net/>

we will see very shortly, there are three macro-areas of address around which the action of the Civil Protection is articulated when it comes to approaching the management of health risk; we are talking about Prevention, Rescue Organisation, and Psycho-Social Service offered to members of populations affected by the criticality,

First of all, speaking of prevention of health risk, what is urgent to underline and bring to the attention is the fact that it, being a danger connected to the occurrence of other events (always, as said a few lines above in relation to the definition of Health Risk) it is difficult to foresee, both in the modalities and in the timing of the event. However, as also explained by the Civil Protection itself on the matter, if careful planning and careful organisation of emergency health interventions are implemented, it will certainly be possible to reduce response times and, consequently, the damage suffered by the population. In this case, it will be useful to recall what we have introduced in the previous chapter regarding the identification of the capabilities of operators and the infrastructures and means of Civil Protection themselves, which can be implemented through the organisation of the execution of exercises. In fact, to broaden the readiness and preparedness of the health service and to reduce the health risk itself in crisis contexts, there will be no better strategy than testing the responsiveness of the plans to be implemented (through simulations) in non-critical times. But preparedness affects not only the side of rescuers and institutions who have to prepare themselves to provide quick answers to the environment; on the other hand, it also affects the civilian population and is subject to the vulnerability index, that is, put at risk directly from any criticality. In this context, it will be essential to broaden the awareness of the population in the health sector, through educational programs on the subject to be carried out using

institutional information channels and leveraging on the souls of public opinion. In fact, in this way the negative effects of the emergency can be eliminated and people can be instructed to implement behaviours capable, in practice, of avoiding certain consequences or of lowering vulnerability.

A practical tool that has been developed by the Department of Civil Protection is the compendium of the "Principle criteria for medical aid in disasters". They include the guidelines and the characteristics of the emergency plans both for events that can be managed by local systems and for those that require coordination of the National Civil Protection Service, because they are on a national scale. In fact, it will be up to the lower level (provinces and municipalities) to identify any potential factors on which to carry out assessments and manage the planning of the interventions to be carried out. It is up to these authorities to research the incidence index of calamitous eventualities such as epidemics, risks associated with industry or other related situations, all to improve the health response in these situations.

At the European Union level, the National Civil Protection Service participates in the processes of mitigation and prevention of health risk through collaboration in the drafting and correction of the so-called "civil protection modules". The latter are civil protection interventions with uniform operating standards, made up of people and materials from the Member States. The modules aim to standardise and make the interventions of the civil protection systems of the Member States faster and more effective, making them able to produce effective, flexible and decisive responses. In the context of risk mitigation activities and therefore attributable to prevention or the desire to prevent this health hazard, there are the exercises that we have already introduced. In fact, various exercises have been held at the national level in which

the forces at the disposal of the Civil Protection Department have tested the responsiveness and operational capabilities of which they are actually capable.

After focusing on the conceptualisation and exemplification of the principle of prevention in the context of the management of health risk during emergencies, we now move on to defining the ways in which we intervene in the territory where the emergency is leading to a health risk. First of all, it must be said that the health intervention articulates and is connected in the set of actions necessary for the protection of people, and in general of public health, which is part of "disaster medicine". In fact, it will be precisely from this point of view that the Italian Civil Protection has produced general criteria for the organisation of medical aid and for psychosocial interventions in disasters, so as to guarantee the implementation of homogeneous and easily manageable strategies in cases of c-level catastrophes (of a national nature).

In these indications and general guidelines, the modalities in which all the actors who participate in medical aid and recovery in an emergency situation should move are defined. These procedures result in a series of practical actions that the Department of Civil Protection has codified by introducing standardised procedures for healthcare actions with ordinances. These are the same ordinances that we have defined a few pages above regarding the processes that led the approach to managing this type of risk to be characterised in a way that is contemporary to us.

Specifically (ordered in the aforementioned directives of 2007 and 2011) is the AMP (advanced Medical Post), which represents the cornerstone of the action to reduce and manage health risk in emergency situations. The Health Modules are "health task forces" ready for departure, equipped with the necessary means to move and operate independently for at least 72 hours, equipped with at least one AMP

(advanced medical post), in which doctors and nurses who are experts in emergency medicine operate. In this way, the Department of Civil Protection intended to create an auxiliary health service to those of the regions that find themselves in difficulty and that can intervene on the operating theatre in a very short time.

Another "bulwark" of the action of the Civil Protection is Pass, the so-called Social Health Care Post which is a field health post, capable of replacing outpatient clinics and medic posts made unusable by the emergency or which, in cases of large national health emergencies, helps hospital service that could be over addressed. This tool was implemented especially after the experience of the 2009 Earthquake in L'Aquila. Another tool that was worked on after the earthquake in Abruzzo, was the *Svei card* that is a card for assessing immediate needs and meeting the necessities of the most fragile people involved in an emergency

The last important step for the reorganisation of the national emergency medical assistance system in the event of a catastrophe was the directive on the identification of the Remote Medical Assistance Operations Centre for the coordination of emergency medical assistance and for the Regional Health Referents in the event of a national emergency. With this tool, the Department can organise in a unified way the link between the various regional services in order to uniform efforts and actions. achieve more flexible and responsive goals and results. In addition, the health service of the affected regions is thus helped from a financial point of view, as funds that are available to the National Civil Protection Service can be brought directly into the coffers of the regional health service put in difficulty. The latter strategy, we will see, has been used extensively in the management of the *Covid-19* emergency, in which the Civil Protection Current Account was made accessible to the civilian population wishing to assist the National Service to assist public health in the action of contrast

to the rampant pandemic. In this case, among other things, typical prevention tools such as communication and information have served as a catalyst for the animosity of public opinion, in some way increasing the number of donations to Civil Protection.

Finally, in our analysis we will identify the psycho-social assistance action that the Civil Protection provides to populations affected by the catastrophe and who have lived or are experiencing a health risk. This phase includes all the activities carried out by the Civil Protection to guarantee a slow and gradual return to non-emergency normality for the affected population. In this case, the necessary actions will be taken to guarantee this transition, including the installation of temporary but medium-long term health facilities, aimed at helping the national sanitary system of the affected region which is in difficulty. Important are also in such perspective the psychological therapies enacted by specialised operators that help the citizens to come back to the ordinary activities and routines. In general, therefore, from what we have reported so far with regard to the ways of acting for the control and management of health risk, our state has developed a programming and planning of interventions to be carried out, especially as regards the management of the health of populations affected by serious disasters or calamitous events. In fact, as we have seen above in the subparagraph, the legislation itself, the Civil Protection orders, has given over time a continuous rearrangement of the strategies and methods of approach to managing this risk, based on the experience gained in the field during disaster management. The Abruzzo earthquake of 2009 seems to have been a watershed in this evolutionary process, posing a historical milestone departing from which (and it is enough to compare the enumeration of the successive ordinances that we have provided above) our system has really taken its cue, reaching its today's setting.

What appears clear from the examination carried out regarding the health risk topic is that our system always considers it as an induced risk, and in fact organises its management always in contexts of catastrophe, of which the same risk will be a consequence. In other words, it does not appear, at least from the information provided to us by the Civil Protection, that there is a pre-determined tactic of action to manage the health risk in and of itself. It seems that there are no plans that had highlighted the possibility of a large-scale epidemic, or worse than a global pandemic, as has been happening in recent months with *Covid-19*. This situation is due to the actual lack of experience gained in the field in the management of situations of this kind by the National Service of our Civil Protection. Consequently, the evaluations could not be carried out, strategies could not be planned, and an enhancing preparedness program could not be organised. In a nutshell, the usual strategies implemented in the "risk management cycle" could not be implemented based on which our public safety works. All of this because, we emphasise it again, there has never been a recent criticality with connotations equivalent to that of our case study.

What is clear from what we have said in this chapter is that our Civil Protection system had to go through many passages before being characterised in its current "form". In fact, the very concept of the need to safeguard civilians' "health" as a primal objective for our state system was achieved only after many years from the unification of the Peninsula territory under a single state. Furthermore, even after the territories have been collected under a single system, the very concept of the centrality of safeguarding the population had to leave room for many and continual restructuring of the very organisational model of the Civil Protection, before acquiring the core importance it has on current days.

Another concept that emerges is that in Italy there is no predetermined method of managing health risk as an emergency in itself. To be more precise, analysing what was said in the second part of the chapter, the sanitary threat is defined as a "secondary" risk, which comes from other eventualities, and for this reason there are no planned preventive actions focused purely on its management. On the contrary such risk is just perceived as a consequence deriving from the breakouts of other hazards, so that the actions in dealing with it are thought as "an appendix" to the management plans for the "primary risk" generating it.

In the next chapter,, we will try to analyse how our system, our institutions have responded to an emergency that has never been experienced before (in recent contemporary times) and with respect to which management did not have the necessary skills and experience.

Chapter Five

An Unprecedented Scenario:

How to deal with an unexpected and new emergency.

5.1 Introduction and chapter strategy

Dealing with an emergency context through adequate and resolute measures is a difficult task that the institutions of a country must implement quickly, cohesively and aiming to solve the problem while keeping an eye on the resources they have available for such operations. In fact, as we saw in the previous chapter, communities, social groups and countries can only count on their own resources to resolve the crises that could possibly affect them. In fact, a country that has less resources to invest in these operations would find itself damaged by the expenses for managing the crisis and to enact the following activities (the recover) in parallel public service areas. We are referring to the "side effects" that a crisis will generate, and which will not be the logical consequence of the characteristics inherent in the crisis itself, but will come from it. Take, for example, to better understand, an emergency due to the landslide that isolates a country in the southern Sub-Apennines. In this circumstance we will have the "direct effects" of the emergency which will be consequent to the very characteristics of the hazard (private homes destroyed, wounded people who were killed, collapse of roads connecting with other inhabited centres) and the "indirect effects" produced by the same (economic crisis and the need to recover), who are generally more durable and put policy decision

makers in great difficulty in setting medium or long-term policies aimed at recovering the territories and and their social tissue.

The institutions, bearing in mind the limited resources they have at their disposal, try to organise action plans aiming at producing efficient and resolute policies, through them. Such plans, as we saw in the previous chapter on Disaster Management, are based on the experience gained in the field by the various rescue and defence bodies of the civilian populations of a state, led by a technical panel that refers to the directives of the political class. This panel will move on the basis of pre-established strategies that take into account the extended characteristics of the emergency that its members are willing to face. These situation applies in the event of an emergency whose characteristics, timelines and average scale are known by the institutions, and on such informations it is possible to enact preparedness enhancing activities (for example exercises) or to promote mitigation and prevention actions.

But how to operate in the event of a criticality whose characteristics are unknown? The focus of this fifth and final chapter of our work will be precisely this: trying to answer this question using a case study that makes this operation easier. In fact, during this chapter we will try to bring forward a description of what have been the activities carried out by the Italian institutions to manage the *Coronavirus "Covid-19"*, by analysing the regulations and the decrees produced by the Government and the Department of the Civil Protection.

Leaving aside the in-depth analysis of the purely sanitary, epidemiological, and scientific aspects for the spreading of the *Covid-19* virus, our intent will be to take these characteristics into consideration, evaluating them as "inputs" affecting the decision makers in their decisions. It is therefore clear how what has been said a few lines above regarding the differentiation between direct effects and side effects of the

crisis is a factor that we must take into consideration in our analysis to try to answer the key question of our work: How an unprecedented crisis can modify the traditional policy and risk management cycles? In fact, and consequently to what just stated we are going to develop an analysis of the most important regulations (the well known DPCMs and OCDPCs) that have provided the civil officers with the operative directives to better operate in order to buffer the sudden extents of the emergency and to organise the recovery (economic and social) to come.

5.2 An unpredictable and unprecedented emergency. The Covid-19 Pandemic: Problem definition and study, evolution up to the 30th of January

In this new chapter, as already anticipated in the immediately preceding lines, we will deal with the analysis of the unprecedented crisis that has been affecting a large part of the world in recent months. We are obviously talking about *Covid-19*, a Coronavirus pandemic that has emerged, in the dynamics of its development and in the characteristics that it has then assumed, as an emergency never experienced by modern national health systems and civil protection services. Leaving aside the purely scientific aspects, which however we will have to "touch" to deal with the process of defining the emergency, it will be necessary to take into account all the secondary implications (and not only strictly clinical and inherent to the physical health of the civilian population affected) that this emergency has generated, affecting all areas of the current social reality.

5.2.1 initial informations and clinical definition

With the following lines we will focus on providing technical and "sanitary" indications concerning the appropriate definition of the viral agent behind the global crisis that we want to take into consideration to exemplify how the dynamics of decision and policy making are repeatedly put struggling from the crisis environment. Once the "clinical" problem will be defined, we will focus on the evolution of the Italian situation, after the infections have gradually increased and the first cluster of Covid cases circulating within our country has been identified. It will be quite complex to reconstruct the dynamics of the evolution of the crisis itself in Italy and therefore to help us in our examination we will refer to the regulatory provisions on the matter. In this way we will be able at the same time both to give an image of how the situation has evolved, and to analyse the moves that our institutions, together with the Civil Protection have intended to put in place to manage this emergency and to get to give decisive answers. As we will understand from our analysis, it has not been easy, and continues not to be, for the Italian system (as well as for none of the affected systems) to put in place strategies to contain and manage the emergency and citizens' needs, especially those not strictly sanitary, leading to the necessity to repeatedly re adjust the measures taken previously, more than once as the environment changed constantly.

This in a few words will lead to the answer of our original research question, that is, to analyse how the classic system of the policy building cycle can be modified, shortened, compressed and put in difficulty by an environment that constantly changes and that puts all areas of society in serious crisis, from the purely medical

one (concerning the degradation of the physical health of citizens) to the economic and social one (with the compression of both the purchasing power of citizens and their freedom in interpersonal relationships).

In fact, as we will see, the Virus has led to the opening of many debates and to the lively discussion of all state forces, political and public and private, doubtful about the correctness of the setting of the social limitations that the Government has put in place and the containment strategy. Quarantine was in fact a highly criticised strategy which, although it proved to be valid, entailed the introduction more than a few debates and criticisms of the Government's action. All such situations will have their space to be analysed better, for the moment we are focusing on the definition of the main source of problems: the Virus itself.

First of all, taking all the necessary informations from the “Ministero della Salute” domain, we will focus on the provision of a definition for the “natural” agent that has provoked the spreading of such worldwide emergency.

We will take a few words to define what a "Coronavirus" is, and then go deeper into the analysis of the specific agent behind the current emergency. Generally Coronaviruses⁸⁷ can be identified as a family of viruses that can generate very varied diseases, and ranging from the common flue to much more serious syndromes. In fact, other epidemics caused by a coronavirus have occurred in the past, such as MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) and severe acute respiratory syndrome

⁸⁷ Ministero della Salute. Novo Coronavirus e Covid-19. They are positive-stranded RNA viruses, with a crown-like appearance under an electron microscope. The subfamily *Orthocoronavirinae* of the Coronaviridae family is classified into four coronavirus (CoV) genera: Alpha-, Beta-, Delta- and Gamma-coronavirus. The *betacoronavirus* genus is further separated into five subgenres (including *Sarbecovirus*). From: <http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioContenutiNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=5337&area=nuovoCoronavirus&menu=vuoto>

(SARS). Coronaviruses were identified in the mid-1960s and are known to infect humans and certain animals (including birds and mammals). The primary target cells are the epithelial cells of the respiratory and gastrointestinal tract. So far seven Coronaviruses have been isolated as capable of infecting humans⁸⁸.

Let's now define what *Covid-19* is, or the new Coronavirus of 2019. Generally a new Coronavirus is a virus strain that has never been detected in humans. Even the one called SARS-CoV-2 (previously 2019-nCoV), has never been identified before being reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019⁸⁹. As for the nomenclature, it was produced in the middle of February 2020 by the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV). Specifically, a pool of scientists⁹⁰ who were in charge of studying the new Virus compared it with the previous Sars-CoV and highlighted its commonalities and differences. The expert opinion is that the new coronavirus is the “brother” of the one causing SARS (SARS-CoVs), hence the chosen name of SARS-CoV-2. The same virus is better known with the appellation of *COVID-19*; in fact this is the way in which the WHO (the World Health Organisation) has called it, by making a sum of the terms Corona Virus Disease plus the year of its spread

⁸⁸ Ministero della Salute. Novo Coronavirus e Covid-19. Seven coronaviruses have been shown to be capable of infecting humans:

- common human coronaviruses: HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU1 (*Betacoronavirus*) and HCoV-229E and HCoV-NL63 (*Alphacoronavirus*); they can cause common colds but also serious lower respiratory tract infections
- other human coronaviruses (Betacoronavirus): SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and 2019-nCoV (now called SARS-CoV-2).

From: <http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioContenutiNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=5337&area=nuovoCoronavirus&menu=vuoto>

⁸⁹ Ministero della salute. Nuovo Coranirus e Covid-19. From: <http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioContenutiNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=5337&area=nuovoCoronavirus&menu=vuoto>

⁹⁰ Gorbalenya, A. Et Al. (2020). Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus: The species and its viruses – a statement of the Coronavirus Study Group. From: <https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.02.07.937862v1.full.pdf>

(2019). This alternative nomenclature is the most used all over the world to identify the set of symptoms related to the syndrome; in fact, there is a set of different manifestations with which *Covid-19* can be encountered in humans, and precisely this multiplicity and variety of forms and symptoms has made it very difficult, especially in the early stages of the emergency, to carry out a study that would have made it possible to track effective treatment strategies. In general, however, it was immediately possible to detect how the most common and widespread symptoms of this new Coronavirus were Fever, headache and Dry cough, in all respects symptoms similar to those of a common flu. In addition, in most cases there is a gradual symptomatology, which tends to worsen with the passage of time from the moment in which the subject contracts the virus, comes into contact with it and becomes infected. In some subjects, again from Ministerial sources (Ministry of Health), it is also possible to encounter symptoms such as runny nose, stuffy nose, muscle pain, diarrhoea and sore throat.

However, from this symptomatology just reported, it is not clear why the 2019 New Corona Virus could become a planetary problem, putting, as we will see, the policy makers and institutions to the test in finding a way to counteract the real emergency and then to create adequate social programs capable of restarting both the health system and the society as a whole. In fact in the most serious cases the symptoms have taken on very different connotations from those just reported, becoming very serious and debilitating; in fact, we can go from respiratory difficulties to interstitial pneumonia, up to severe respiratory syndrome (with the need to intubate patients and assist them in breathing), even to kidney failure and death in severe cases. Obviously, from this last reported symptomatology, it can be better understood how the corona virus is a very debilitating pathology and not least

contributing deficits to the people who are affected, not only at the purely clinical level, but also at the social level. We will then see better these last implications in the following parts. It must also be said that the problem deriving from the spread of the virus has been and is aggravated by the fact that many of the subjects who are infected with it do not show any of the symptoms that we have just reported; these individuals are called *asymptomatic* and represent a difficulty most for the health system of a state and for the civil protection called to assist it, as they will be very difficult (if not impossible) to trace and then eventually treat.

Among other things, the symptoms of *Covid-19* are almost slowed down in the manifestation in infants and young subjects, which at a first examination, without carrying out more in-depth analyses and with the aid of tester machines, will therefore appear healthy. In general, the percentage of the worsening of the symptoms occurs on average in every case out of 5 diagnoses of positivity, with the subjects who will need to be hospitalised. Furthermore, in case of contagion, elderly people with previous pathologies (such as cardiopathy) or immunosuppressed will be more likely to develop serious symptoms deriving from contagion. The very important feature of this virus is also the period of incubation, it was immediately noticed that the symptoms of the virus did not manifest themselves in the immediacy of the infection. In fact, the symptoms of Covid-19 occur between 2 and 11 days (up to a maximum of 14) after the infection of the subject has occurred. This last variable has been the very first input that policymakers (following the advices of the technical and scientific panel) has evaluated in defining the features of the quarantine and closing policies.

Another variable that contributes to make the picture of the situation even more complex is the transmission pathway by which the virus actually passes from person

to person. So the sick person, coming into contact with "healthy" singles, will infect the latter by transmitting the virus only in certain ways. Specifically, the new coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 is a respiratory virus that spreads mainly through contact with the breath droplets of infected people. There are various ways to get in touch with such salivary residues such as through saliva, coughing and sneezing, or through direct personal contact, for example by touching the mouth, nose or eyes with contaminated (not yet washed) hands. In fact, the virus persists for many hours on surfaces; surviving on them, the virus could potentially come into contact with other humans who, by touching the contaminated surface with their hands (last case), will be subjected to the possibility of contagion with a clearly higher cadence. Furthermore, in some cases, albeit very rare, contagion has been found through contamination of the feces. As far as food is concerned, which could be understood as a vehicle of potentially dangerous viral agents, it generally tends to be excluded that it could cause contagions. The good rule however provides for the best hygienic treatment of the food you want to consume, trying not to let raw food come into contact with cooked food. According to the WHO, the main route of transmission of the virus, reading the available data, is close contact with symptomatic people. It is believed possible, although in rare cases, that people in the prodromal stages of the disease, and therefore with absent or very mild symptoms, can transmit the virus.

Since the beginning, from the first emergency signs and from the outbreak of the same, an attempt was made to carry out an information campaign, albeit based on the little knowledge that was available. Specifically, attempts were made to leverage hygiene, as the only way to mitigate the force of the infections that immediately manifested themselves as disruptive and high in numbers. Hygiene refers to the hand washing, avoiding letting them come into contact with the eyes, nose and mouth

before they have been sanitised. In fact, it was immediately realised that the virus could be killed already with the use of very common sanitising solutions, with an alcohol base at a concentration of at least 70% or with bleach. On surfaces, the virus survives for many hours, but even here it will be sufficient to use a little alcohol or bleach to sanitise the environments and make the probability of spreading the virus much lower.

All these data, as we have anticipated a few pages above, were necessary to frame the crisis features and its spreading ways. In the following part we will dedicate ourselves to defining what have been the evolutionary stages of the emergency, up to the 30th of January 2020. The paragraph that comes later will be programmatically used to analyse the Italian evolution of the crises and of the counteractions made by our institutions.

5.2.2 Emergency evolution up to the 30th of January

In this part of the chapter we will dedicate ourselves to the analysis of the evolution of the crisis, from the outbreak of the epidemic in China, to the very first signs and the real emergency of the last few months in Italy. As we have announced in the upper lines it will be the case in this section to try to "tell" how the spread of Covid-19 has evolved. We would start from its diffusion on the Chinese soil. Specifically, the Coronavirus had an epicentre, as it is known from the news, in the

Chinese city of Wuhan⁹¹, in the Hubei region; in this large city the first ascertained case of Coronavirus has already been found on the 1st of December 2019. This case, however, was not recognised as related to a new viral agent and for this reason it was not considered by the authorities as a possible danger, or in any case as a situation needing attentive further analyses. It was declared as the first recorded case of Covid-19 only on January 13, 2020.

Still in the weeks that follow and specifically between 8 and 18 December, seven cases of infection are recorded, as provoked by a new coronavirus (not yet isolated and called Covid-19), of which in the meantime on 12 December 2019 the Chinese television broadcaster CCTV gives news on television. Exactly this broadcaster says that on 12 December a new coronavirus outbreak was found in the Wuhan province in China, in the district of Hubei. It should be noted that of the 7 cases that occurred in these 10 days (between 8 and 18 December) 2 had had direct connections with the so-called "wet market of Wuhan", a place where for the immediate aftermath and for the opinion of experts the Virus would have made the "jump of species" and would have infected the man.

⁹¹ Enciclopedia Treccani. Wuhan: Wuhan Conurbation of China (11,081,000 inhab. In 2019), capital of the province of Hubei, formed, since 1949, by the cities of Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang, located in the central-eastern section of the country at the confluence of Chang Jiang and of Han Shui. There stands the bridge of the same name, built in 1957 and the first bridge to cross the Yangtze erected in the country, flanked by numerous others on the same waterway and on Han Shui. Important cultural and industrial center of central China, it has been hosting one of the main Chinese steel complexes with blast furnaces and steel mills since 1958, fueled by the ore from the nearby Tayeh deposits and coal from Pingsiang, in the province of Kiang-si. Road and railway node of primary importance, since 1995 W. has an international airport (Wuhan Tianhe International Airport), with a movement of about 20,772,000 passengers in 2016, the fourteenth in China, located in the Huangpi district. Home to the University of the same name since 1928, and Huazhong University of Science and Technology since 1953. *From: <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/wuhan>*

Meanwhile, the international public opinion was unclear of what was "being born" in China and in fact even the World Health Organisation itself was informed by the Chinese authorities only on December 31, 2019. The authorities (precisely in accordance with what we said some above), claim that the new cases of Coronavirus pneumonia recorded in Wuhan originated in a fish and animal market in the same city. In fact in the following day (the 1st of January 2020) the Chinese authorities close the Fish Market in Wuhan, where the very first contagions were thought to happen. By the "scientific" perspective in the meanwhile the Chinese expertise was working on the recognition of the features and the very nature of the virus responsible for the Wuhan cluster spread. In such direction, as a result of their study, on the 7th of January 2020 the institutions confirmed that the scientists had identified a new Coronavirus (that is a particular specie of respiratory virus, as explained better in the pages above); such Virus was called in the very immediate aftermath of its identification "2019-nCov" (that means New Coronavirus of 2019). Just two days later, on the 9th of January 2020, there was the news reported the very first death caused by the Covid-19. As a consequence, the same day, the World Health Organisation confirmed the existence of a new disease caused by an unknown new Coronavirus, that was detected by the Chinese authorities after the signalling of a cluster of pneumonia in the city of Wuhan, whose sources were mysterious at the beginning.

What we also have to consider about the situation at its very initial stages is that the scientists (virologists and physicians) were totally unaware about the features and the possible symptoms of the diseases caused by this new Coronavirus; indeed at the time when the emergency started to assume a larger scale there was still the absence of a diagnosis examination protocol. The first publication of an officially recognised

diagnosis trial is dated 15th of January 2020, when the WHO recognised a protocol in such a direction produced by the Chinese medical authorities. Anyway, though many efforts were given in providing some basic new guidelines for analysing the cases and ascertaining the correspondence of the symptoms as caused by the new Coronavirus, at the beginning neither the scientific expertise nor the “first line” medical personnel was aware of how to retrace with certainty such external manifestation of the Virus affection. In the same way the unawareness was practically affecting all the areas of the society at the time, with the governmental institutions, especially the central ones, that were not able to practically manage the situation, and not only by the uniquely medical perspective but also and maybe more by the organisational point of view. The disorganisation and the unpreparedness in dealing with such phenomenon were posing risks to the same societal context of the city of Wuhan, with the institutions standing to under estimate the situation, just because it sounded more “comfortable”.

Anyway the international public opinion seemed to be always more oriented towards a deeper understanding of the reality of the situation developing in China. The European Health Institution, that is to say the ECDC (the European Centre for Disease Control and prevention) started to re-analyse the possibility that the virus could have reached Europe, given the great interconnections with China. The product of the ECDC evaluations was the re-rating of the risk that the Virus could have reached Europe, from “Low” to “Moderate”. As a consequence there was the start of the first airports checks on civilians landing from China. In the meanwhile in Wuhan and in general in China the cases of contagion continued to grow and in the 21st of January there was the signalling of the first case in the United States of America.

Globally in the world at the time there were around 310 cases (312 to be more precise) and 6 confirmed deaths for Coronavirus.

This last data unitedly with the spreading of the situation internally in its territories, pushed the Chinese institutions to evaluate the possibility to enact very restrictive measures to both try to delay the contagion and to avoid the possibility of being “accused” of political and practical inaction by the global public opinion. In fact what would have been done the next day (the 22nd of January) is something that is never been enacted in modern times, except that in war situations. The 22nd of January 2020 the Chinese institutions decided to put the city of Wuhan under quarantine, practically isolating the totality of its 11 million inhabitants. Such a regulation has resulted as the very first “hard” tentative to buffer the situation and to stop the Virus Epidemic spreading, and in fact it was enlarged to the totality of the Hubei province, reaching 60 million civilians living there. Such a measure is the biggest human quarantine in history, *de facto* “immobilising” 60 million people for sanitary reasons. Every kind of transportations from and to the city of Wuhan was immediately stopped and the institutions made it binding to wear personal facial masks in public. Anyway, given the fact that sometimes (as we have anticipated above) the affected people may not present any symptoms but remain able to “infect” other humans, the authorities thought it would have been necessary to practically isolate the city, *de facto* building “walls” and closing the streets to avoid the risk of escapes from the area.

In the following days there has been a subsequence of different restrictive regulations. The 23rd of January the central authorities of Beijing decided to stop the events that would have been held in that period for the Chinese “new Year’s recurrence”. In the meantime given the high number of cases, was started the

building of a new hospital able to cure up to 1000 Covid-19 patients in the city of Wuhan. The very first worldwide institutional communication by the central Beijing authorities is dated 25th of January 2020 when the President of the Chinese Popular Republic Xi Jinping announced the high complexity of the situation in China and the difficulties in its management met by the institutions. In fact the spreading of the disease contagion has accelerated harshly in the days immediately after the decision to “lock down” Wuhan and the entire Hubei region, and for that reason the medical personnel as well as the authorities in general did not manage to adequately control the situation. In the same day (25th of January) Hong Kong as a preventive measure cut down the number of commercial exchanges with China, limiting the flight to reach such country.

In relation to what has just been said the WHO started to re evaluate the situation about the global risk deriving from the Coronavirus. In this direction the degree of risk in China was changed into “really-high”, while the situation for the rest of the world was graded “high”. In fact in the same period (specifically on the 28th of January) in Canada and in Germany the first two “western” cases of Coronavirus were diagnosed and registered. Many countries started to organise “charter flights” to evacuate their civilians from the Hubei regions, the very first were the United States; in Germany there were other 3 cases registered.

The 29th of January was a particular day, given the fact that in such moment many private flight companies, Google and many States decided to “close”, to “lock” their contact with China. Specifically United Airlines, American Airlines, Air France, Cathay Pacific, British Airways and Lufthansa stopped their flight activities from and to China; Google close its offices in the Hubei as a preventive measure and the Russian Federative Government close its terrestrial limit with China. Such day is so a

sort of a “watershed” in the chronicle of the “coronavirus” evolution, given the fact that many closures were enacted and that, the following day the WHO made a very important communication. In fact during an extraordinary meeting on the 30th of January about the evolution of the disease scenario the WHO declare that the global risk deriving from the Covid-19 epidemic was rated as *very high* for the international public health, providing the states with precise directives on how to treat the Virus in the best way possible.

The 30th of January 2020 is a very important day for our work too; in fact our analysis of the measures enacted by our Government and institutions to manage the crisis starts in this day. But why? The 30th of January, two cases of affected civilians were registered in Italy, specifically in Rome. This two people were Chinese tourists from Wuhan that were in Italy for a tour. Even if at the time there was not a local circulation of the Virus and the two just reported cases got the contagion in China, the Italian Institutions decided to advocate the “Emergency State” (as we have said prerogative of the Prime Minister) for a 6 months duration and to block all the flights to and from China.

With the part that follows we are trying to provide an attentive analysis of which have been the major regulations and the inherent decisions taken by the Italian institutions in managing the Coronavirus *Covid-19* emergency. In doing so, as anticipated above, we will take into consideration the many legislative documents produced and how the “gradualness” of the decisions has been proportioned to the threats posed by the crisis. In addition our main focal point will be directed on ascertaining how the traditional policy cycle has been compressed by the threats of the crisis. Then, as it will appear more clearly by analysing the evolution of the decisions made by the institutions, we want to underline also how the same measure

enacted are not only produced in a compressed manner, but are continuously modified and re-tuned for themselves. As a further reading we propose to evaluate if the sources for such continual redrafting and modifying of the measures could be retraced on the common institutions unawareness about the features of this emergency (unprecedented and on whose management anyone has elaborated programs before), so to let us to answer the *research question* itself: “how is the traditional policy cycle modified by the the threats posed by the continuously changing emergency environment?”

5.3 The main steps for the management of the crisis in Italy

In this new paragraph we will analyse the regulations (in the form of decrees of the President of the Council of Ministers and in Ordinances of the head of the Italian Civil Protection department) which are a regulatory expression of the will and decisions taken by the institutions of our country to manage the crisis. Furthermore, we will try to deal with the issue of "communication", given that a policy is also and to a large extent (especially if it is an emergency) communication and connection with the population; specifically we will analyse the methods in which the media and communications to citizens have been exploited by the Government, to promote preparedness and mitigation of the ongoing disaster, and educate civilians in enhancing their resilience to the continuously varying environmental threats. In our analysis, of course,

we will also have to consider what were the gradual measures taken by the institutions regarding economic and social aid to the population that was affected by the health risk. In fact, as we will see, due to the decision to put the country in a "lockdown" state, many commercial activities have had to close their doors and many companies, including private ones, have suffered from the compression of productivity in a very heavy way. Obviously, there was the need to launch quickly the welfare measures that took at the same time the needs of citizens (who could not be left behind) and the needs related to the global economic situation of the state. Indeed as we will try to describe there have been a lot debates relating to the form of the aids, to the clauses to access them and to their features.

In a nutshell such a situation offers many interesting ideas and points for analyses; it is indeed an emergency never seen before, for inclusiveness, characteristics and generalised implications, leaving us a great space for discussing how the "Traditional Policy Cycle" is continuously compressed and remodelled by the inputs of the crisis. Anyway for a matter of conciseness we will concentrate our attention on two main policy aspects: On the one hand we have the gradual closing and following reopening regulations; on the other hand we will concentrate on the regulative directives introducing, step by step, new forms of socio-economic aids for people and companies.

5.3.1 *The social policy profile: social distancing, quarantine and re opening. The actions up to the local outbreak.*

In this part we are going to focus majorly on the legislative production of regulations and on the passages that have led the institutions to declare the “lockdown” state in Italy, and the subsequent gradual reopening through the so called “fase due”. In our work we will try to evaluate how the institutional actions in this regards have been articulated and if their course have followed the “traditional policy cycle” setting or if the emergency environment have changed the *iter* of action. In this eventuality we will try to evaluate how the policy cycle commonly adopted has been changed. Such analysis will be done step by step, after the reading of each of the most important regulative documents produced by the Government and by the Department of the Civil protection.

As we have just remembered in the immediate above lines on the 30th of January 2020 the President of the Council of Ministers has declared the health Emergency State in Italy, for a duration of 6 months. Such act is the very first institutional decision that has been made in order to make it easier in the near future to manage with more rapidity the emergency and enacting all the necessary regulations. In fact State of Emergency is a disposition that can be declared directly by the Prime Minister (the president of the Council of Ministers) when there is a particularly wide scale emergency or calamitous event that is affecting a plurality of regions or the entirety of the national territory. Anyway, in a more general perspective, the importance of such an act made by Conte (the Italian Prime minister) on the 30th of January 2020 is inherent in the extraordinary nature of the problem that was starting to diffuse in Europe at the time, and on whose proportions the WHO had just

provided clarifications. In fact as anticipated a few lines above, on the 30th of January the WHO stated that the Covid-19 represented an high risk for the public health of all the countries in the world, *de facto* making the public opinion aware of the real scale of the ongoing emergency spreading in China and diffusing in the rest of the world. The high interconnectedness of all the countries on current days, in fact, would have led the Virus to diffuse in a very fast way exploiting the "free passes" that sick people would have given to it by traveling by plane to and from China.

As an immediate consequence, therefore, the decision of our institutions was to immediately close all air traffic between Italy and China. It is therefore clear that January the 30th represents the primary input for our institutions to start evaluating the possibility of having to face a very serious health risk situation directly on national soil. Respect to such a kind of emergency, as we saw in the previous paragraph, our Civil Protection Department does not have predetermined action plans. Indeed, we reiterate again, our system considers health risk as a consequence of another calamitous event (it as "second degree risk"), and organises its management in view of the rescue activities and the care of the injured following of a disaster (such as an earthquake, for example). This means that, for various reasons such as the actual lack of similar events that have occurred in recent history or in any case during the existence cycle of our Civil Protection (as it is organised today), the Italian national system does not provide for any intervention planning to manage an epidemic or pandemic health risk, beyond the few "standards" of detection, isolation and treatment that are the basis of active prophylaxis in these situations. The aforementioned activities cannot, however, be understood as well-structured planning, but rather as a principle for an action which (fortunately) in contemporary

times has almost always had to be carried out in limited cases and on small populations.

The actions that were then taken immediately afterwards by our institutions actually follow what is in practice when such situations arise, in which the possibility of the occurrence of a risk on a national scale is foreseen. Specifically, on 31st of January the head of the Civil Protection Department, Angelo Borrelli, convenes the Civil Protection Operational Committee. In a press release that has the legal function of Advertising⁹², the Civil Protection gives us knowledge of this convocation, adding also that it will be, as usual, the Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte to lead the panel, together with the Minister of Health Speranza. The Committee would meet on January 31st to take immediate decisions at the light of the state of emergency declared the previous day precisely for the Coronavirus issue. We should recall that at the time in Italy the presence of a local circulation of the virus had not yet been detected, thus the actions that have been carried out in these days, while following the procedure usually implemented when declaring the state of emergency, have a value of "prevention and mitigation" in this particular situation. In fact, we could affirm that with this way of acting our institutions have somehow benefited and immediately wanted to emphasise the need to implement targeted controls to identify any local spread of the disease on the national territory.

As proof of what has just been said, it is the Internet domain of the Italian Government which states: "The President recalled that, from the early stages of the epidemic, inspired by the *precautionary principle*, airport controls were implemented

⁹² Protezione Civile. (31 Gennaio 2020). Coronavirus: convocato il Comitato Operativo della Protezione Civile.
From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/media-comunicazione/comunicati-stampa/-/content-view/view/1202033>

in Italy for citizens coming from the epidemic outbreak area and implemented accurate control measures - body temperature measurement, identification and isolation of patients, procedures for tracing and quarantine of close contacts - which, together with an efficient epidemiological and microbiological surveillance system, ensure rapid containment of possible cases. In addition, a Task Force was established at the Ministry of Health to coordinate, in continuous connection with the competent international institutions, all the control actions to be taken in order to limit the spread of the virus and verify its compliance with the recommendations of the WHO."⁹³

In fact, it is the Italian government itself which in a press release dated 31 January specifies that, following a Council of Ministers held in the morning, the necessary funds (5 million euros at the time) have been allocated "to implement the precautionary measures following the declaration of International health emergency published by the World Health Organisation (WHO)"⁹⁴. As a consequence and programmatically to the enactment of the necessary ordinances by the civil protection, the Government has deemed it necessary to declare the State of Health Emergency for a duration of six months.

The following day, the 1st February 2020, the Civil Protection Operational Committee met again, once again in a preventive key to try to plan as much as possible the management of the near future. The main objective of the panel was to carry out "forecasts", analyses for the future scenarios. In fact, all the possible evolutions of the virus diffusion and its related critical issues (both health and the

⁹³ Governo Italiano. Coronavirus le misure del Governo. (30 Gennaio 2020). *From: <http://www.governo.it/it/coronavirus-misure-del-governo>*

⁹⁴ Comunicato stampa del Consiglio Dei Ministri n.27. 31 Gennaio 2020. *From: <http://www.governo.it/node/13937>*

consequent associated social and economic difficulties) were assessed. On the basis of the forecasts and their assessments, the measures to be taken in a very short time were then prepared, in particular as regards air and maritime traffic control. These also include the increase in health checks that must be carried out at airports and seaports, with the help of a thermo scanner to identify possible sick people and trace their contacts to immediately isolate any eventual virus clusters.

At the same time, other institutions that are not directly involved in the coordination of the management of the health risk connected to *Covid-19*, due to their centrality in the management of international affairs, have given immediate implementation to the indications and directives of the Operating Committee and the of Council of Ministers. We are talking about the Farnesina which has decided to set up *a special operational unit* under the coordination of the Crisis Unit with the Ministries of Health, Infrastructure and ENAC to facilitate all the procedures relating to Italians in China. In this, Italy has aligned itself to what has been done by other countries a few days before (see the previous sub-paragraph in relation to the periodisation of the evolution of the emergency).

What emerged so far is that the actions of our institutions were intended as immediately enactable, following the principle of prevention and planning of actions to ensure effective management of the emergency. From the immediate outbreak this emergency has tested the organisational capacities of the institutions of all countries. In this regards the course of the actions has seemed to immediately “run out” of the common and traditional policy building cycle path as we introduced it in the first chapter. In addition, also the usual management setting based on the predetermination of the possible actions and on the planning of the activities to buffer the crisis has been put “out of the game”. In fact, these two cycles (the policy

and risk management one) were immediately compressed and shortened both by time and “*cursus*” perspectives. Consequently to this consideration the same evaluation of the possible scenarios that has been carried out in the 1st of February, was elaborated in a very short amount of time, similarly to what was generally done in a “war council”.

Beyond the "similarities", the traditional policy cycle would have foreseen, at this moment, the phase of the so-called "issue identification". As we know from the first chapter (in which we have tried to introduce this moment of the traditional policy cycle in the most exhaustive way possible) it is a highly competitive process in which not only the institutions that promote the social program and public action, but also the private interested parties (stakeholders), participate. Specifically, the latter also guide, in non-emergency situations, the evaluation of the policy performed during the formulation phase by the evaluators, as they are the actual sponsors of the same (compare chapter 1 and 2 in this regard). Obviously these two parts have been highly scaled with respect to the timing and above all to its classic setting which characterises it as a real debate between the parties involved in the construction of public policy. On the other hand, the problems have been easily identified, given that the risks induced by the possible explosion of an epidemic are preceded and well known. Furthermore, as stated in the press release of the 3rd of February in relation to the Civil Protection ordinance issued by the Department, directives were also identified by private bodies, to underline how all the stakeholders and the necessary

parties in this situation of complexity were required to participate in the management of the crisis, however free of charge⁹⁵.

In addition it seems that the rapidity with which our institutions has immediately enacted the regulative path for enabling the Civil Protection to emit its ordinances and to work exploiting the “extreme urgency” criterion had been a matter of fact demonstrating how in this moments there was greater awareness about the gravity of the situation that could have spread from the contagion reaching Italy (and Europe in general), especially if compared to its general underestimation (by the international newspapers and public opinion) of the immediately previous weeks. Furthermore, this approach seems to have been desired and predetermined if we consider that in this way, precisely, the Civil Protection would have been able to act immediately and to implement the actions necessary to manage and contain the eventual crisis. Summarising all the actions undertaken by our institutions in the 3 days following the declaration of the State of Health National Emergency has been adopted as preventive measures.

In our review of the actions taken by the institutions we continue with the date of February the 3rd. In this circumstance, we analyse the first regulatory document, specifically an ordinance, which was issued by the Civil Protection Department. Specifically, this is the OCDPC number 630⁹⁶ in which the head of the department

⁹⁵ Protezione Civile. Comunicato stampa. (3 Febbraio 2020) Coronavirus: Capo Dipartimento firma l'ordinanza di Protezione Civile

From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/media-comunicazione/comunicati-stampa/-/content-view/view/1203456>

⁹⁶ Ordinanza n. 000630. Primi interventi urgenti di protezione civile in relazione all'emergenza relativa al rischio sanitario connesso all'insorgenza di patologie derivanti da agenti virali trasmissibili. *From:* <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/documents/20182/989700/Ocdpc+n+630+3+febbraio+2020/dec616d1-7cc7-4255-ab50-b26241a2180d>

regulates the first urgent interventions in the field of health risk deriving from the spread of transmissible viral diseases. The provision examined entrusts the Head of the Civil Protection Department with the coordination of the interventions necessary to face the emergency on the national territory which, for the realisation of the same, will be able to make use of the components and operational structures of the National Civil Protection Service, also of implementing entities identified among public economic and non-economic bodies and private entities that will act on the basis of specific directives. Already from this first introduction, the connotations of *extreme urgency* and *necessary* immediate implementation of the measures to manage the crisis that could explode in the very short future are underlined. In addition, the document immediately defined the "chain of command" of crisis management actions, which sees the Head of the Department (Borrelli) as head of the business with a view to speeding up the actions. At the same time, the need for coordination and communication between the various institutional components that will face the crisis was also highlighted, stressing how the Department of Civil Protection will always act in conjunction with the Ministry of Health and depending on the advices of a technical-scientific Committee which would have guided its management choices in the purely emergency phase. In the document it was also underlined that the Head of the Department together with the other actuators may act in derogation from the current regulations in force on contracts by entrusting directly to a public or private operator (compared to another) the implementation of a particular aspect of emergency management, without any "call for tenders", following the "*sum urgency*" regime.

In this way the institutions gave immediacy to what they intended to implement, in fact allowing those who normally have to organise the management of any

calamitous event on our territory, and of any event connected to it, to act in the shortest possible time. Indeed, as the facts have shown, the indications contained in the ordinance and the directives issued with it have had the expected results. If nothing else, the "numbers" show that the work carried out by the volunteers and civil protection workers was exceptional, as demonstrated by a "press point" issued by the Civil Protection Operational Committee which, on February 6, through a speech by the Premier Giuseppe Conte thanked the members of the Civil Protection. In fact, they checked 62,000 passengers and 521⁹⁷ international flights in the 3 days following the issuance of the OCDPC 630, underlining how the preventive actions and the containment of possible contagions were enacted immediately and carefully.

Once again, with regard to the directives established, we have to affirm that they have been an effective derogation from the common methods of formation and implementation of public policies. We can clearly see, in fact, how all the "classic steps" identified in the previous chapters have been strongly compressed, in fact making a "leap" from the a priori evaluations (which took place quickly in the committees of the 31st of January and of the 3rd of February) directly to their implementation. The enactment of the management bodies directives has passed from the decision-making rooms directly to the action of the actuators; these two actors have constantly maintained a communication by exploiting those "preferential channels" that we introduced in chapter 1 regarding implementation theory and that we exemplified in the second chapter talking about the mode of action of our Civil Protection.

⁹⁷ Governo Italiano. Coronavirus le misure del Governo. (6 febbraio2020). *From: <http://www.governo.it/it/coronavirus-misure-del-governo>*

In the meantime the global situation continued to evolve with the Virus that was expanding the number of new infections in China and with other outbreaks that in Asia. On February 12, ICTV, as said in the paragraph dedicated to the description of the virus, determines the nomenclature of Coronavirus, which officially takes the name of *Covid-19*. On February 13th, a meeting of the EU Health Ministers at the European Council was held in Brussels on the initiative of the Italian Minister Speranza to evaluate the situation and start talking about a hypothetical common strategy. In the meanwhile in Italy a series of different ordinances by the Head of the Civil Protection Department enlarged the scope of the activities and controls to be done by the Civil Protection members together with the other actuators (both private and public ones) on the national soil.

On the 15th of February in France the first death for Covid-19 in Europe took place; it was also the first outside the Asian continent. On February 17, a group of WHO officials reached Beijing to examine the actions of local institutions for managing the emergency; in addition the WHO members in China had to control the methods used for “counting” the new cases and deaths. In this regards few debates spread in the public opinion, as in the future they would have exploded again, also in relation to how the “counting” was carried out in European countries. On February 19, the number of cases in China was declining until some companies including Toyota restarted production in risk areas, after closing it on January the 29th (compare previous paragraph). The following day, the 20th of February, the WHO releases very positive data regarding the patients and the probability of recovery, a sign that the virus is slowly starting to be understood. In fact, studies relating to the purely scientific aspects of the Virus had continued to be crammed out in China and in the rest of the world. In Italy an expertise of the Spallanzani hospital in Rome had

managed to isolate the virus and in China a treatment had been developed for the sick, directly from the plasma of infected people.

5.3.2 The social policy profile: social distancing, quarantine and re opening. From the northern regions outbreak to the total Lock-Down

In our discussion we came to the day that in Italy represented the beginning of the real emergency, and that will see us again engaged in the analysis of the directives issued by our institutional systems. We are obviously referring to February the 21st, 2020, the day in which several local cases of coronavirus were registered in Italy. We must dwell on the adjective "local" as in fact the members of the ISS (the Italian Institute of Health) had affirmed in previous days that in Italy there was still no evidence that proved the local circulation of the Virus. In this case, however, a first focus of Covid-19 was identified in Castiglione D'Adda in Lombardy, in which a 38-year-old man, his family members, the people with whom they had contact and several health personnel officers (of the hospitals where the sick had been housed) got the contagion. In the meantime, other cases were recorded in Padua and the second local Italian outbreak was identified. The response of the Italian institutions to what happened followed the logic of *immediacy* and *speed of action*, facilitated by the aforementioned state of health emergency which was declared on January 30th. In fact The Ministry of Health has emitted the press release n. 85 Covid-19: "New

mandatory quarantine measures and active surveillance"⁹⁸ containing a new ordinance by Minister Speranza which provides for mandatory quarantine isolation measures for close contacts with a positive case. This urgent regulation provides also active surveillance with fiduciary home permanence for those who has been in risk areas for the past 14 days, with reporting obligation for the person concerned to the local health authorities.

At the same time, civil protection also issued an ordinance. In fact the praxis in these cases provides that it is the head of the Department to indicate the directives of action for the overcoming of the emergency, as among other things already affirmed in the aforementioned order (630) where the crisis management was commissioned for the Coronavirus to Borrelli's directives (as head of the Department). To be precise in the order number 637 of 21 February the head of the Civil Protection Department entrusts further tasks to the primary actuator of the emergency management actions. In fact in article 1 of the ordinance entitled "further attributions to the implementing body of the Ministry of Health" it is stated that the Ministry of Health itself "is authorised to enter into conventions or agreements with the supervised entities of the

⁹⁸ Ministero della Salute. Comunicazione numero 85.(21 Febbraio 2020) Covid-19: "Nuove misure di quarantena obbligatoria e sorveglianza attiva"

From: <http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioComunicatiNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=5451>

Ministry of Health, as well as to ensure any communication, information and training deemed necessary”⁹⁹.

From what is written in this first article we can affirm that the intentions of our institutions in this case, in addition to the aforementioned need for speed of decisions and immediacy in actions, were to hinder, when the number of cases was still relatively limited, the spread of the virus. This intent can be seen by reading the last words of article 1 ("as well as to ensure any communication, information and training initiative deemed necessary") with which the need to implement a "mitigation" action and improve the "preparedness" of the population and healthcare workers. In this we can glimpse the similarities with the classic path of the "risk management" cycle, even if generally the mitigation and preparation activities are done *a priori*, before the disaster occurs. In this situation, instead, our Civil Protection Body has had to implement these actions "*in itinere*", to try to limit the emergency to the areas of the outbreaks of Lombardy only. In this regards we could affirm that institutions took from the “disaster management cycle” the parts they needed in this circumstance, and used them to enhance the people resilience and preparedness.

With this in mind and with these objectives (the containment of the spread of infections) on the evening of February 21, the Lombardy Region, together with the Ministry of Health, issues an ordinance decreeing the creation of a "red zone" for 10 municipalities all in the province of Lodi. Specifically, this ordinance prohibits the

⁹⁹ Protezione Civile. Ocdpc n. 637 (21 Febbraio 2020). Ulteriori interventi urgenti di protezione civile in relazione all'emergenza relativa al rischio sanitario connesso all'insorgenza di patologie derivanti da agenti virali trasmissibili
From: http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/amministrazione-trasparente/provvedimenti/dettaglio/-/asset_publisher/default/content/ocdpc-n-637-del-21-febbraio-2020-ulteriori-interventi-urgenti-di-protezione-civile-in-relazione-all-emergenza-relativa-al-rischio-sanitario-connesso-a

possibility of entering and leaving the municipal territories for all inhabitants, effectively isolating civilians in an extreme containment perspective. In this we can see an attempt to contain the health risk as much as possible, according to the standard prophylaxis of virological containment activity which consists in the immediate isolation of positive cases, for identifying all the people with whom they have come into contact and then "treat" it (where possible and needed). In addition it can be easily affirmed that this last regulative document has been the very first step towards the posing of legal and physical boundaries to the citizens, a step that had started the panoply of subsequent regulations leading to the total "lockdown" setting of Italy.

This step towards the contingency of the health emergency finds further legitimacy in the following Law Decree number 6 of 23 February 2020 (later converted with law number 13 of 5 March 2020). Already in the preamble to this Decree Law we can trace the will of our institutions to underline the "extraordinary need and urgency to issue provisions"¹⁰⁰. In this lexicological choice, the strong will to "jump" immediately to the point in the management of the emergency can be traced, and in fact, continuing to read the document, it is clear that all the articles issued in fact are indications for which the Municipalities can actually create the "red areas" and take all the necessary initiatives to contain the spread of health risk as much as possible. In fact, we find in Article 1 of this legislative text the possibility for all municipalities to: prohibit the removal from the municipality (Article 2, paragraph A), prohibit access to the municipality or the area concerned (Article 2,

¹⁰⁰ DECRETO-LEGGE 23 febbraio 2020, n. 6. Misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell'emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19. (20G00020) (GU Serie Generale n.45 del 23-02-2020). *Preamble*. From: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/02/23/20G00020/sg>

paragraph B) , to suspend events or meetings of any kind (paragraph C) and to suspend educational activities of any order and degree (Paragraph D). Furthermore, always with a view to containment, paragraph H of article 2 of the decree of 23 February legislates the possibility for municipalities to adopt the supervised quarantine for any civilian who has come into contact with positive citizens. Furthermore, in advance of what would subsequently be adopted on the national scale, the possibility for the municipality of limiting economic and commercial activities and public services (not only transport but also administrative ones) was already foreseen in this circumstance (see paragraphs J, K, L)¹⁰¹. In addition, in the “annex 1” to this decree there is the official central government recognition of the “red zone” in the Lombardy Region that was built up the day before, in order to contain actively the very first local outbreaks of the Virus in Italy.

In our review of the regulatory actions implemented by the institutions, it will also be necessary to take a "look" at the changes to the tax and general economic regulatory processes that have been implemented as the territories affected by the local circulation of the virus were isolated. In fact, on 24 February the Minister of Economy and Finance, Roberto Gualtieri¹⁰², signed the ministerial decree which intervenes on the obligations of taxpayers residing in the Municipalities of the so-called "red zone" identified, as mentioned a few lines above, by annex 1 of the

¹⁰¹ DECRETO-LEGGE 23 febbraio 2020, n. 6. Misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell'emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19. (20G00020). *For all the mentions about the paragraphs of Article 2.*

¹⁰² Roberto Gualtieri, Minister. Born in Rome on 19 July 1966, graduated in Literature and Philosophy in 1992 and obtained a PhD in Contemporary History in 1997. He is an associate professor of Contemporary History at the University of Rome "La Sapienza". He swore on 5 September 2019 as Minister of Economy and Finance in the Government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte.

From: <http://www.mef.gov.it/ministro-uffici/ministro/ministro.html>

Presidential Decree of 23 February 2020. Specifically, as can be seen by reading the decree just mentioned, in Article 1 it is legislated that for people who had residence in the municipalities indicated in Annex 1 of the previous decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, the terms for the fulfilment of tax payments as well as the payment cards issued by the tax authorities are suspended¹⁰³. In this circumstance, the degree of awareness of the institutions is evident, as in the very first moments of its "manifestation", the crisis is acquiring connotations that are not only sanitary but which affect all areas of community life, from the economic one to the social one.

In these very first moments of emergency, when the actual extent of the emergency is still unclear, both from the point of view of health and economic and social risk, the actions of the government and institutions are "frantic" and pressing. In fact, in an attempt to give effective answers and at the same time to try to understand the crisis that was developing, a series of Decrees substantially concerning the same areas of regulation followed one another in a very limited time "spectrum" from February 21 till the end of the same month. All these documents are however necessary for our analysis and must be taken into consideration to better understand what was the process that led, as mentioned in the introductory lines to this sub-paragraph, to the total closure of the national territory and the mandatory quarantine for All the Italians. In fact, on February 25, a new decree of the President of the Council of Ministers Giuseppe Conte was published in the evening, following the meeting that the President had in the morning with the Ministers of Health and

¹⁰³ Ministero dell'Economia e Delle Finanze. Decreto Ministeriale. (24 Febbraio 2020). From: <http://www.mef.gov.it/ufficio-stampa/comunicati/2020/documenti/DM-Proroga-Termini-Zone-Rosse.pdf>

Economy and with the presidents of the regions (through the State-Regions Conference¹⁰⁴).

Specifically, this new Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, consequently to what has just been stated, is nothing more than a clarification that provides further directives in compliance with the previous decree of 23 February. In fact, in the preamble it is said "having regard to the aforementioned decree of 23 February «Urgent measures regarding containment and emergency management epidemiological from COVID-19 »"¹⁰⁵, the so-called "urgent measures to contain the infection" are decreed. Again, therefore, it goes to resume a regulation already carried out, it is modified and parts of it are added. In this direction we could already affirm that it is not only the traditional policy cycle that is compressed by the emergency, but also that the continual new challenges posed by an unknown and changing risk effectively oblige the institutions to retrace their steps and "put their hand back" in areas in which they already legislated. In this way we do not want to affirm any judgment of merit (or demerit) in relation to the actions implemented by our institutions in this juncture, but we only want to provide an objective analysis. In fact, this process of continuous modification of regulations and decrees already

¹⁰⁴ Conferenza Stato-Regioni. The permanent conference for relations between the state, the regions and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano is established with D.P.C.M. of October 12, 1983, as a special collegial office useful for promoting cooperation between the activity of the State and that of the Regions and the autonomous Provinces and normally meets on a fortnightly basis. It represents the privileged seat of political negotiation between the central and regional administrations, the seat where the government acquires the notice of the Regions in relation to the general policy government addresses incident in matters of regional competence (with the exception of foreign policy addresses, defense and national security and justice)

From: <http://www.statoregioni.it/it/presentazione/attivita/conferenza-stato-regioni/>

¹⁰⁵ DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 25 febbraio 2020. *From:* <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/02/25/20A01278/sg>. *Preamble.*

issued will accompany the legislative activity of the institutions throughout the emergency, up to the beginning of "phase two".

The other very interesting aspect that was introduced with the decree of 25 May was the one inherent to the regulation of "agile work" the so-called or "smart working". In reality there was already a regulation, as written in article 2 of the decree of 25 February, which provided for the characteristics of this type of work, governed by articles 18 to 23 of the law 22 May 2017, n. 81¹⁰⁶. Specifically, Article 2 of the decree continues, this working modality would have been applicable by employers until the March 15, 2020 date. It is relevant to underline this last regulative area, give the important consequences and implications that smart working would have in remodelling the society. Furthermore, by the side of the "timelines", it was immediately attempted to give a "duration" to the extraordinary nature of this setting, so as not to slow down the economy and social life of the country too much, also in light of the other closures that had taken place in the fragmented period. The closure of schools of all levels and degrees in many northern regions until March the 15th had been foreseen in the previous decree of February the 23rd, while, always in Article 1 of the Decree of February the 25th, it determines the termination of any sporting competition, of every order and category, both publicly and privately performed (while individual and team training behind closed doors still did not stop).

To give further organicity and greater clarity regarding the measures to combat the spread of the virus and, in other words, to contain it, is the decree published on March the 1st, 2020. This document in fact incorporates and extends some of the measures already adopted for the containment and management of the

¹⁰⁶ DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 25 febbraio 2020. *From:* <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/02/25/20A01278/sg>. *Article 2.*

epidemiological emergency from COVID-19 and introduces further directives, aimed at regulating the framework of interventions in a uniform way and ensuring uniformity throughout the national territory for the implementation of prophylaxis programs. With the entry into force of this DPCM, the validity of all the previous ones, adopted in implementation of the decree-law 3 February 2020, n. 6., falls. In a nutshell we are faced with a further clarification of the actions to be taken, a sign of an understanding of the emergency that is gradually maturing over time and which still does not seem to be total. In fact, the institutions themselves proceed, as already stated a few lines above, taking up the regulations for specific areas of action at national level and manipulating them over and over again. This on the one hand is the sign of the ever greater understanding, as just said, of the diffusive dynamics of the virus and the need to act for its confinement as long as it is possible. In the same way it is visible how the analyses and evaluations carried out by the institutions in order to produce organic and decisive regulations, being too compressed by the challenges posed by the emergency (temporal and practical), do not provide sufficient results for an efficient production of policies .

Specifically, the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of March the 1st¹⁰⁷, 2020 establishes uniform regulation for the entire country and reiterates more clearly what measures to adopt for the municipalities of the "red zone" (again comparing Annex 1 of the DPCM February 23) or proceeding with the extension of the virus containment measures and epidemiological emergency prophylaxis in Lombardy, Liguria, Veneto and Emilia Romagna. In general, the possibility for

¹⁰⁷ DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 1 marzo 2020. Ulteriori disposizioni attuative del decreto-legge 23 febbraio 2020, n. 6, recante misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell'emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19. (20A01381) *from: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/03/01/20A01381/sg>*

employers to adopt "smart working" has been expanded throughout the national territory, the necessary termination of all sport activities is reiterated and the termination of educational trips is recalled. Public transport as well as public offices must be sanitised in the territories of the regions indicated as being most at risk. In the meantime, the global health situation is getting heavier and heavier, and of course things are going in this way in Italy too. There are more than 1000 infections in Italy and in the DPCM itself generalised regulations are adopted for all health personnel on national soil. In fact, the health staff follows the preventive measures for the spread of respiratory infections and applies the indications for the sanitation and disinfection of the environments provided by the Ministry of Health. In the same way, the DPCM in question regulates that all public administration offices or public utility offices install sanitising liquid dispensers for hand cleansing.

However, this DPCM should be seen organically related to another, the next one, which would have been issued on March the 4th, 2020. In the latter document, all the new regulations included within the decree of March the 1st are confirmed, with the addition of the need to close schools across the country, of all levels (including universities). With this latest decision, which came following a meeting that took place the previous day with the Minister of Education Azzolina, a further step was taken towards the closure of all the activities that would arrive a few days later. Obviously, the worsening of the health situation in Italy certainly accelerated the decisions towards closure. In fact, the number of infections rose dramatically in the North of the country, especially in Lombardy, with the local health system that was experiencing the first criticalities and the first moments of difficulty.

The next phase of regulations that we are about to analyse is the most important of the period of the actual emergency. Within 3 days, as many decrees are issued that

change the situation, consequently to the other, in a direction of tightening the closures, effectively transforming all of Italy into a "protected area" and expanding the "red zone" to the whole national territory. With this in mind, we must take into consideration this succession of legislation, not so much as a sign of the inability of our political class to give concrete answers in a single resolutive document, but as a necessary adjustment of the response itself based on sudden and continuous changes of the emergency context that happened in these excited and confused days. Beyond the "communication" with which these changes were disseminated and, at times, anticipated, with all the subsequent consequences (the result of incorrect communication), the continuous resumption of the rules and their continual modification, is the sign of total uselessness (in such complex cases whose evolution in the immediate future is unknown) of the traditional policy cycle based on defined timescales and consequential and proportional analyses.

The first of the normative documents that has been introduced is the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of the 8th of March 2020. With this regulation, the creation of a single area is implemented, including the territory of the Lombardy Region and other 14 Provinces (five from Emilia-Romagna, five from Piedmont, three from Veneto and one from Marche). Within this area, the application of reinforced measures to contain the infection is envisaged in light of the epidemiological dynamic that has developed in the last few days. Article. 2 of the decree provides for the restatement of the measures to contrast the epidemic, subject to uniform application on the rest of the national territory. With this decree, a different course of action is implemented for the first time, much harder and more restrictive than that adopted with the previous decrees. however, the purposes of the policies implemented remain the same, that is to say, the limitation and containment

of contagions, both geographically and numerically. The latter clarification has become very important, especially in light of the latest developments in the disease that has put the sanitary service of the northern regions to the test, first of all the Lombard one. In fact, the high rate of contagiousness of the Virus, together with the fact that the infections had spread initially among citizens who were already ill or in any case older, had in fact overcrowded the hospitals and, above all, the intensive care units.

It is the same DPCM text that introduces all the limitations for the citizens of the restricted areas in Article 1¹⁰⁸. By reading such article it is clear that it would not have been possible for all citizens to move from their home from that moment on, except for proven and real work or health motions. In addition, for all those who showed symptoms of respiratory infections or fever above 37.5 degrees, it was strongly advised not to move from their homes for any reason, as well as it was forbidden to leave the house for any reason for all those who were subjected to precautionary quarantine. The whole social and administrative system would have stopped in these areas, with the suspension of the competition activities and the “administrative fitness” exams. The sport aggregative activities (also professional ones) as already said in the previous decrees were confirmed closed. Only the offices of public function and of strategic importance, that all members of the technical and health staff remained active, without the possibility of "regular" leave.

In order to facilitate the lightening of the hospital system of Northern regions, the institutions started to act in a “harder” way, by introducing a new concept: we are

¹⁰⁸DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 8 marzo 2020. Ulteriori disposizioni attuative del decreto-legge 23 febbraio 2020, n. 6, recante misure urgenti in materia di contenimento e gestione dell'emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19. (20A01522) (GU Serie Generale n.59 del 08-03-2020)

From: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/03/08/20A01522/sg>

precisely talking about the so-called "reinforced containment". With this in mind, the Minister of the Interior Lamorgese immediately issued an ordinance that provided a directive for the prefects¹⁰⁹ so that the containment activities in the territories identified in the DPCM of 8 March were implemented with attention and capillarity. This ordinance provides for the immediate convocation, even remotely, of the provincial committees for public order and safety, for taking the necessary coordination measures; specific indications for the controls relating to the limitation of the movement of physical persons in and out of and within the "enhanced containment" territories.

There was a serious lack, however, of the institutional system on this occasion. This journalistic "cut" digression is necessary to then develop a first reflection on the importance of communication in the policy cycle. In fact, on the night of March 7, before the Prime Minister's Decree was issued establishing the enlarged "red zone", some "rumors" filtered about the impossibility, even for those not domiciled in those areas, of leaving these territories. On the night between 7 and 8 March there was a real "mass exodus" from the regions of northern Italy to the south of our country, effectively undermining the programmatic intentions of the institutions and lowering the effectiveness of the restrictive measures taken. It is very important in fact, during the creation or setting up of a social program (especially if it is an emergency one) the ability to communicate in the best way possible with citizens as the situation is evolving. Especially in an emergency situation like the one we were experiencing in those moments, communication becomes even more important, especially as it could be exploited to increase the preparation of civilians themselves and to "educate" them

¹⁰⁹ Direttiva ai Prefetti. (8 Marzo 2020) *From: https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/direttiva_ministro_interno_08032020.pdf*

to undertake "mitigating" behaviours of risk. In this circumstance, however, the communication was poorly managed and generated the effect contrary to the purposes of the policy itself: to isolate and limit the movements of citizens at that time in the north of the country.

The measure of March the 8th is nothing more than an anticipation and a gradual step towards the actual enlargement of the reinforced containment action to all national territories that would have occurred on March 11. Before focusing on this latter date, it will be important to analyse an additional intermediate step among those just mentioned. In fact, on March 9 the Premier Conte publishes a new Decree: the so-called DPCM "#Iorestoacasa". This decree contains new measures for the containment and contrast to the spread of the Covid-19 virus on the whole national territory. The provision extends the measures referred to in art. 1 of the Dpcm 8 March 2020 to the whole national territory. It is also forbidden to gather people in public places or open to the public. Practically, therefore, the concept of "reinforced containment" that we have introduced a few moments ago is actually extended to whole Italy, transforming the country into a "protected area". On national territories the level of attention with regard to healthcare containment is raised and gatherings (i.e. the meeting of many people in limited spaces, or in any case without adequate interpersonal distance) are also prohibited both in public places and in private homes. The media campaign was launched by the institutions and seemed, this time, to be able to programmatically use "communication" and exploit all the media and social networks to "educate" the population to stay at home. In this way it is evident that through communication the institutions have tried to "educate" the population to implement "mitigating" behaviours of the actual health risk by actually lowering the

percentage of harmful infections by eliminating the possibility for healthy subjects to get the contagion.

The following day (11 of March 2020) a further decree was issued by the Prime Minister. The production of further containment regulations has proved necessary following the renewed worsening of the health situation throughout the country (with the spread of the first cases also in the southern regions) and to make the concept and purpose of the reinforced containment referred to in the decree of 9 March. The country with this latest decree would have been officially placed in a "lock-down". Specifically, in this normative document the Premier states that "considering that the World Health Organisation on January 30, 2020 declared the epidemic of COVID-19 a public health emergency of international importance, and considering the evolution of the epidemiological situation, the particularly widespread nature of the epidemic and the increase in cases on the national territory. It was deemed necessary to adopt, on the whole national territory, further measures regarding the containment and management of the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19. Considering, moreover, that the supranational dimensions of the epidemic phenomenon and the interest of several areas on the national territory make necessary measures aimed at guaranteeing uniformity in the implementation of prophylaxis programs developed at international and European level"¹¹⁰.

With all these considerations, the Prime Ministerial Decree of March 11 appears necessary as the result of a continuous analysis of the changing situations that characterised the environment of those particular moments. In fact, an *a priori* evaluation that made it possible to predict a situational evolution in these modalities was impossible to carry out. The classic cycle of policies could therefore never have

¹¹⁰ DPCM 11 Marzo 2020. From: <http://www.governo.it/node/14299>

been adopted as a "model" to follow in order to codify effective and decisive legislation on situation, both regarding health and emergency in general in this historical moment with so many external inputs. Furthermore, this Prime Ministerial Decree is a very important document in that it represents a real precedent in the history of our Republic as regards restrictive measures for citizens' sociability in times of peace. In fact, with this decree the whole of Italy was declared a "Red Zone", that is, the "Lock-down" status was activated in the same way as had been done in Wuhan in China. All retail business activities were declared closed and the Italians were "subjected" to the regulatory regime already decreed for the municipalities subjected to "enhanced containment" (compare the Prime Ministerial Decree of 9th of March). The quarantine for all Italians officially begins and, at the time of its introduction was planned as enforced until March 25, 2020.

Meanwhile, the health situation was worsening and there was a surge in the rate of health workers who got the contagion. indeed, in order to make up for the actual lack of doctors to be placed in the geographic areas and territories where there was a need, our Government, in concert with the Civil Protection and on the proposal of the Minister for Regional Affairs Francesco Boccia, has in fact decided to create a task force of doctors from all over Italy to be sent to the territories with the most critical health issues. In this regard, the Head of Civil Protection signed an order, which was sent to the Regions for the agreement. The medical team would contain up to a maximum of 300 doctors, with participation on a voluntary basis. The staff, selected to meet the most requested needs, would have worked to support regional healthcare structures. Also to meet this need, there is extensive use of communication through the media, especially a television campaign through the participatory networks (Rai)

was held for disseminating the request of the institutional and health authorities in this regards.

To further tighten the spread of the Viral disease of *Covid-19*, the Minister of Health Speranza then signed the ORDER 20 March 2020 "Further urgent measures on the containment and management of the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19, applicable on the entire national territory ". In this order, legislation was made regarding the closure of public parks (obviously fenced ones and with access through access points). In fact, despite the constant appeals of the institutions to stay at home, in the 10 days following the enactment of the previous Prime Ministerial Decree of 11 March which placed the country in quarantine, there were several episodes of crowds in the green areas that could not be managed by police. In this direction, the ministerial order signed by Speranza eliminates the problem at the root, emphasising even more the resoluteness of the action of the institutions in slowing down the spread of the infections. The ban on sporting activities in gyms and in groups in any case is reiterated, while in the same ordinance it is declared possible to carry out mild physical activities, individually and in the vicinity of one's home.

While the containment measures were having their effects with the first amelioration from the point of view of the emergency health situation, especially for hospitals in northern Italy that were beginning to breathe a little more, a great debate had opened up relatively the need to close all production activities to really allow the population to always stay at home. In fact, until March the 20th, only the retail stores had been closed, while all the production activities (strategic according to the official nomenclature of the regulations) had continued to produce in order not to stop Italy's production engine.

On the evening of March 21, the Premier Conte announced on social media and with a press point to the nation the Signature of a new DPCM which announced, from the following day, the effective closure of any production activity not considered essential. With this statement, the institutions intended to reassure the population that essential activities such as public transport and the sale of food would continue to be guaranteed. This last point is also very important, as due to a lack of specification in the communication of the intentions of the institutions in this regard, there had already been episodes of crowding of supermarkets, with queues outside the stores and gatherings that in situations of the could have catalysed the contagion in an exceptional way.

5.3.3 The social policy profile: social distancing, quarantine and re-opening. The last days of March and the trail to the re-opening.

The DPCM 21st of March extended the period of compulsory quarantine for Italian citizens whose end was previously set for 25th. It would have been prolonged at least until the month of April. With this preliminary observation we want to introduce another aspect of the actions made by or institutions in the “social side” of the programs to buffer the *Covid-19* emergency. Indeed after the primal signs of betterment of the health situation the public opinion started debating a lot about the end of the quarantine, especially wondering if the restrictive measures adopted would still be so necessary. In addition, the visible indecision of the institutions regarding this aspect of policy programming acted as a catalyst for the debate itself, stirring up

both political oppositions and the opinion of citizens. In fact, the population, especially in the central and southern parts of the country, not experiencing firsthand (at least in most cases) the great health crisis of northern Italy, felt forced home without motivation. The prime engine behind the government and civil protection choices regarding the reopening, or rather the continuous skidding of the reopening, would have been the opinion of the technical-scientific committee. In fact, this panel was intended precisely with the task of "adjusting the aim" of political decision-makers, "moving the helm" of institutional decisions in view of scientific reasons. In the following lines we are going to focus on the analysis of the different measures that lead to the reopening and the starting of the "Fase 2", moment in which the purely sanitary emergency seemed to be passed.

Coming back to the continuation of the quarantine it is clear that the institutions have never proved "sure" of the decisions they should have taken. Obviously this gradual approach to the setting of the duration and characteristics of this measure of great limitation of citizens' personal freedoms was essentially due to the continuous mutation of the health situation and the evolution of the infections. Among other things, the government approach in this case rightly wanted to keep as prudent and moderate as possible, in order to avoid overcrowding and the creation of inevitable gatherings that would have occurred if there had been a reopening. In fact, with a subsequent Decree of the 1st April, the DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 1 April 2020 "Implementing provisions of the decree-law 25 March 2020, n. 19, containing urgent measures to deal with the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19, applicable throughout the country ", the quarantine period was extended until April 14th.

Once again, the gradual action of the institutions, it should be emphasised, was a consequence of the uncertainty posed by an environment as changeable as that of the health emergency in which we all are today. Indeed, if there were more certainties regarding the evolution of the epidemiological situation, the severe and restrictive measures regarding quarantine would have eased. The fact is that, despite everything, the concert of the communication activities implemented by the institutions was working as the population was autonomously implementing the risk mitigation behaviour that had been transmitted to them by the authorities, that is, staying at home. A discussion could be launched at this juncture on the actual "assimilation of the concept and the danger of the virus by the population", or if it was instead the risk of a complaint that pushed the citizens to stay at home. Certainly the introduction of self-certification, especially and in a more pronounced way in the early stages of the emergency, played a deterrent role. The self-certification has also been a matter of social debates, given that there have been emitted a lot of different versions of it. In fact, consequently to any of the various DPCMs emitted, there was an adjustment of the self-certification, catalysing the critics of the citizens. Anyway the necessity of such measure has been showed especially by the side of monitoring the movements of the civilians, and to tack the habits during the quarantine. In fact, we remember again, it was boundary for the singles to stay home and not to exit the commune boundaries.

With regard to the extensions of the quarantine and in relation to what has been said with respect to the continuous postponements and the gradual reopening, the subsequent decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of April 10 extended until May the 3rd the restrictive measures adopted so far for the containment of the epidemiological emergency from Covid-19. This was certainly the most difficult and

painful decision of those made by the government and the Presidency of the Council. In fact, President Conte himself who will say that for this choice all political responsibility would have been taken, considering the consequences not only social but also economic that would have meant continuing to keep all non-essential production activities closed.

Another essential node and point of the emergency question, if we want, was represented during the whole phase 1 and at this moment in particular by the opinions of the “scientific-technical committee”, that is that pool of experts employed by the Head of the Department of Civil Protection that we have mentioned above in the paragraph. The opinion expressed by this expertise would have been the basis for Conte's decision. In fact, the same committee had already given positive opinions regarding the encouraging trend of the "epidemic curve", confirming in fact the functionality of the quarantine as the only "weapon" to curb the infections. On these assumptions, the Prime Minister's decision materialised in the signature of the Prime Ministerial Decree we have just mentioned, and which leads to the lengthening of the periods of isolation and social distancing, as well as the closure of the activities. While on the one hand it has prolonged the quarantine, on the other hand the Government had stated that it was already working to organise the re-start for the citizens, in complete safety so as to allow an economic recovery as quick as possible to be carried out by returning to the workplace in complete physical safety for workers (workers and employees as well as freelancers). We are obviously referring to the organisational phase of the so-called “Fase due”, that is the phase in which we find ourselves at the time of writing. Among other things was started the work of a Task Force, known as the "Colao task force" led by the great manager Colao, who would have guided the work of a committee of experts from many sectors of the

human sciences for a safe restart. The Restart that would arrive, albeit once again very gradually, from the following month, specifically from May the 4th. Meanwhile, bars and restaurants still in the month of April could only carry out home deliveries, so as to continue their activities without keeping the premises open.

The news of the restart and the beginning of "phase two" would arrive a few days later, specifically on April the 26th, the day in which (in the evening) news was given of the signing of a DPCM¹¹¹. With this last document the Premier acknowledged the gradual re openings that would take place a week later. In general, the biggest novelty in terms of reopening was the possibility of moving outside the municipal area, while remaining within the regional limits. Obviously the movements, as we all we know, would still have to be motivated through a self-certification form. It would have been allowed to move between the regions only for marked and documented work and health needs, as well as (big news) to reach one's domicile in another region. The public parks would have been reopened and it could have been possible to practice single motor activities in the open air even far from home. Obviously the rules concerning social distancing should have been respected (keeping an interpersonal distance of at least 1 meter) and using personal facial masks.

In this regulation we go towards a first reopening and in fact we start the so-called phase two. On a communication level, the President Conte, as can be seen by analysing the video¹¹² on the official internet page of the Italian Government, has always wished to remain prudent, emphasising the need to reiterate the application of the principle of gradual application of re openings and return to the previous phase. 'emergency. It was stressed that the Italians had done a great "job" in fact by

¹¹¹ DPCM (26 Aprile 2020) From: http://www.governo.it/sites/new.governo.it/files/DPCM_20200426.pdf

¹¹² Conferenza stampa del Presidente Conte. (26 Aprile 2020). From: <http://www.governo.it/node/14518>

implementing the mitigating behaviours to which they were programmatically educated through the information campaigns¹¹³ launched by the same government over the months. As for commercial activities, catering activities, in addition to home delivery, it would have been possible to collect the meal to be consumed at home or in the office. Starting from May the 4th, they could also have resumed manufacturing, construction, real estate brokerage and wholesale trade. For these categories, as of April the 27th it would have been possible to proceed with all those preparatory operations for reopening such as sanitising the environments and for the safety of workers. To allow a gradual resumption of sporting activities, closed-door training sessions of individual sports athletes would have been allowed from May the 4th.

Gradually, therefore, the country seemed to be moving towards a “pseudo normality” in which the choices and controls made by the political institutions would have to be even more attentive as the population would again find themselves making closer contacts. On the basis of the principle of gradualness adopted so far, therefore, the prohibition of “crowds” to carry out private meetings between friends and relatives remained in force, until May the 18th, when they would have been reopening.

The next step towards the situation in which we find ourselves at the time of writing was taken on May the 16th¹¹⁴, 2020 by our Government. In fact, in a press

¹¹³ Campagne di comunicazione sull'emergenza sanitaria coronavirus. *From:* <http://www.governo.it/it/coronavirus-campagne-comunicazione>

¹¹⁴ DECRETO-LEGGE 16 maggio 2020, n. 33. Ulteriori misure urgenti per fronteggiare l'emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19. *From:* <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/05/16/20G00051/sg>

release the national regulatory framework was disclosed within which, from May the 18th to July the 31st, 2020, with specific decrees or ordinances, state, regional or municipal, the movement of natural persons and the methods may be governed to carry out economic, production and social activities. Obviously, this regulation was carried out, as usual in times of emergency, through a Prime Ministerial Decree. Analysing the text of this decree, it is clear the will to implement a gradual reopening and always emphasising the possibility for the government to reiterate the use of restrictive measures if there were repercussions of the epidemiological situation in certain areas of the national territory. Such measures must be taken by the central government and must follow the criteria of adequacy and proportionality. With this in mind, the Government has marked as its primary objective the return to "normality" for the population, with however the possibility of "closing the taps" (to quote a phrase said by Conte himself) .

The text of the legislative decree takes into account intraregional travels for the citizens. In fact, since May the 18th, travel has been made possible without any limitation within the whole region, with no need for any self declaration. Since June the 2nd it is now possible to leave the borders of the regions both by means of private vehicles or public transport. As regards travel abroad at the time of writing, there is still uncertainty about how to operate, even if what is affirmed for the internal movers in our territory is valid and with possible different limitations between state and state and always following the principles of adequacy and proportionality. As for the reopening of commercial activities, starting from May the 18th, economic production and social activities should have taken place in compliance with the contents of protocols or guidelines, suitable to prevent or reduce the risk of contagion. The limiting measures of economic and productive activities can be

adopted, in compliance with the principles of adequacy and proportionality. In order for the health safety rules to be applied in the best possible way, the regions are required to carry out weekly checks on the progress of the epidemic and to give indications regarding the data collected. This is what is actually happening at the time of writing our work in which the Civil Protection every day updates the estimates of the infections and the percentage of spread of the virus itself, by issuing press releases¹¹⁵.

Let's now move onto the reflections produced on the basis of the analyses carried out so far. With this list of regulatory theses issued by our institutions we have in fact attempted to provide an analysis of which have been the fundamental steps in the "practical" management of the emergency *Covid-19* as regards the social aspect of the policy. By social we mean the area relating to the freedom of socialisation of individual citizens and the related compression entered by the rules delimiting socialising spaces to meet fellow citizens and, from a certain point of view, personal "possibilities". Specifically with this work, halfway between the report and the analysis, we wanted to provide a summary of the main characteristics of all the decrees issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers for the management of the health emergency and which concerned, precisely, the plan for the compression of citizens' sociability. Our intent has always been to provide a reading of how the classic public policy cycle is modified by the crisis or by the unknown and changing emergency context such as that of the criticality we are experiencing. Well as a result of this small digression we can say that all the work done so far has not been a simple "chronicle", but a comparison analysis, which was also attended by the small

¹¹⁵ Protezione Civile. Comunicati stampa. From: <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/media-comunicazione/comunicati-stampa>

comments that, from time to time, we wanted to leave during the discussion . Here it is worth implementing a summary of what has been said so far, while drafting the above lines' commentaries.

From our analysis it emerges quite clearly how the classic policy building cycle, as we have introduced it in chapters 1 and 2 of our work regarding "non-emergency moments", cannot be the key for counteracting to emergencies, especially in case of unusual and unprecedented ones. Indeed the various phases of the policy cycle were not only "crushed and compressed" by the emergency, but it seems that the institutions are forced from time to time to start all over again and resume "moments" of the formation of a social program in a repeated way. This is what happened in relation to the moments immediately before the total "closure" that that have "locked-down" Italy on mature the 11th. In fact, if on the one hand the "abundant" regulatory production that has taken place in this period may be the sign of prudence on the part of the institutions and of a desired gradualness (as we have also underlined), At the same time it was the continuously changing environment that has contributed to determine the consecutive production of regulatory responses in such a short time, also affecting their capabilities. In a certain way our institutions have always followed the criterion of adequacy and proportionality (as repeatedly stressed in many of the Prime Minister's decrees), which seem to be the most prudent and secure way to respond to unpredictable emergency inputs. In fact, when the moves of the opponent are unpredictable (as it happened for the Virus), in the same way the responses of the institutions can only be consequential to them. Such response are in a nutshell the most consequential responsive possible to the damages suffered.

In the same way, however, where it is possible to make damage forecasts, it will be necessary to implement calibrated actions in a preventive and precautionary

manner, which for example go through the implementation of risk mitigation programs as dictated by the "risk management" literature (compare the third chapter) perhaps feasible, as done by our government, even during the development of the emergency, especially when it slows down, leaving more room for the institutions to carry out the just introduces plans. In the arctic our institutions have shown to be able to implement this strategy, by immediately enacting information campaigns to sensitise citizens and "educate" them, in some way, to the practice of such mitigating behaviours, while trying to increase their preparedness, listing the actions to be taken in case of manifestation of symptoms. In any case, however, the logic of the gradualness of the action, or rather of the reaction, seems to have been the principle most followed by the Italian institutions in this emergency situation, which relied largely on the help of Civil Protection in the practical management of the social emergency , also through volunteers.

We can say that this gradual logic led to the application of a sort of mix between the traditional non-emergency "policy cycle" and the activities dictated by the "disaster management cycle" (see the third chapter). In fact, if we analyse the response to the first moments of the crisis, it has been organised according to the classic criterion of preventive analysis, the use of the projections on the costs and benefits of the actions undertaken, in the scope of adoption forecasts analysis as the prime engine for regulating the management of the crisis. As long as the emergency did not "speed up" in development and the "disaster" itself did not reveal, this kind of projections and organisational setting have been fruitful (see the adoption of general containment strategies and non invasive quarantine till the end of February).

When, however, the situation evolves too quickly to be able to predict any evolution and when there is not the necessary experience gained in the management

of similar emergencies that makes the institutions able to orchestrate the crisis management, there is the need, on some occasions, to “improvise”. Such non-strategic approach lacks the analysis capabilities to structure a program able to fully solve the threats and problems posed by the emergency, with the consequence that only some policy portions will be useful for decision makers; other aspects will therefore remain problematic. In fact, the phase of the policy formulation in the setting of the emergency response has resulted very fragmented, obviously for temporal reasons and for the impossibility of carrying out functional and "truthful" analyses and evaluations in these circumstances. With due precautions we could almost say that the "defects" of the *"garbage can model"* for the formulation of the policy, in this case, have come to the surface and it is as if our institutions at some juncture have been forced to follow this "confusing" model, to try to correct at least some of the many problems of this immense emergency.

Completely opposite has been the approach towards the codification of regulations able to direct the gradual reopening, up to the current days situation. In fact, once the purely sanitary emergency phase was over, in which the health risk left little room for planning, for the analysis of the medium-term and forecasts, the government political designers together with the members of the technical scientific committee and (as we will see in the next paragraph) the members of the committee led by Colao focused on the organic organisation of the “Fase Due”. We can therefore say that once the real health emergency had passed the type of policy cycle used for the formulation of the subsequent measures to be taken could have been organised in a more "relaxed" way, given the more time institutions had to implement analysis and evaluations that had more predictive capabilities and effectiveness. In fact, in the meantime, the awareness and scientific knowledge about the Virus have

expanded and the technical-scientific committee as well as the expertises of the "socio-economic" committees for the restart have been able to work in concert, programmatically and without the necessities dictated by the suddenness of the "disaster".

Here therefore our thesis turns out to be corroborated, that is to say that, at least as regards the setting of the "social part" of the response to the emergency and, therefore, of the social program under analysis, the institutions are grappling with not only a compression of the classic moments of the traditional policy cycle, but with the need to hybridise the latter with the risk management cycle, at the same time using crushed evaluation analyses that are unable to provide "workable" results. It is sufficient, however, that the current emergency ceases so that the recovery centres can develop more calmly, giving back to the policy making process its more traditional characteristics.

In the next section we will focus on a second aspect of the political response of our institutions to the emergency. In fact our intent is to analyse the features of the economic responses elaborated by our Government, in order to understand if anyhow the cyclical models for elaborating a social program in non emergency periods could be useful and usable. In addition we aim to ascertain which has been the "weight" of the pressure exercised by other "forces" (inside our country but outside the government) that have de facto oriented the institutions in shaping the counteractions to the emergencies.

5.4 The actions to deal with the emergency in Italy: the socio-economic aspect.

In the previous part we dealt with the evolutionary analysis of the responses that our institutions, according to the aforementioned principles of adequacy and proportionality, have given to the challenges that the *Covid-19* emergency has immediately placed on the Italian national territory, with a certain gradualness, both in the closing and in the subsequent “staid” reopening. This area of the policy is not the only one in which the emergency program carried out so far, as it has been set up, ends; in fact, we have said many times during the pages of our work that the extent of this emergency is so broad and general that it affects all areas of our society and of the life of the population. To manage an emergency it is necessary to know how to make the best out of the available resources, as only on them a state can count for carrying out all the necessary actions to buffer the emergency, which go well beyond the moment of "rescue activities" . On the contrary, managing your resources in the right way and organising a good plan of action will be essential especially after the purely emergency phase, when you will have to structure and promote the “restart”.

After all, in Italy the real symptoms of *Covid-19* (especially following the betterment of the strictly health situation and the amelioration of the hospital management) affected mostly the economic profile, with great compressions of all production activities in general, but with repercussions especially on small and very small businesses.

In the following part we will try to address a second area of the emergency policy set-up, analysing once again the various decrees and regulatory documents that have, in fact, regulated the flows of aids and economic measures in this sense. Many

debates have opened regarding the "form" of economic aids and about the ways in which the population actually accesses them. As we will see also in this aspect of the policy setting, there have been many and repeated steps backwards and subsequent changes in the form and "depth" of the aids, a sign that the limited time available to wander the options and produce answers (based on the assessments) was very limited. Beyond the assessments of merit that could inevitably arise if we focused only on the analysis of the timing of the action by the political class, in this part we intend to analyse if and how much the interests of the various groups have weighed economic and social Government choices, that is to say how the shape, depth, and the extent of aids was influenced, in the setting, by "external pressures". In a certain way we will try to ascertain whether, despite the compression and hybridisation (as mentioned in the previous paragraph) which the traditional policy cycle undergoes in this emergency, there is still room for "competitiveness" in identifying the issues to be included in the agenda, or rather in prioritising the agenda (from the point of view of economic responses), and therefore practically directing redistribution extents first to one or another social category each time requiring a new "edition" of regulatory texts.

5.4.1 Economic counteractions: the "red zone"

From the socio-economic point of view, the first regulation encountered is the Law Decree issued on February 28, 2020, regarding economic support for families and businesses. It is titled "Urgent support measures for families, workers and

businesses related to the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19" and aims to ensure the first necessary economic support to citizens and businesses facing financial liquidity problems due to the health emergency internationally declared by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the episodes of spread of the virus that occurred in our country. This was a first way of intervening in support of those who were being damaged by the economic compression caused by the Virus which in these moments was starting to spread especially in Northern Italy.

Specifically, in fact, these measures were issued in favour, especially, of the citizens of the so-called "Red zone" (compare previous paragraph) whose geographical limits were determined in the territories of 10 municipalities in Lombardy in annex number 1 of the Prime Minister's Decree of 29 February . Analysing the decree law, there is a first part intended for the "suspension of payments" (which, as will be remembered from the first chapters, is the type of legal measure most used in times of emergency): in fact, "due" payments are suspended, the folders Exacting tax collectors and accrued dumb instalments granted by Invitalia¹¹⁶ to companies. Not only, therefore, aid to private citizens, but from immediate aid to the economic activities of the affected areas. Furthermore, the payments of electricity, water and gas bills were immediately suspended, until April 30, with the possibility of paying the fees due in instalments. A second portion of this decree is dedicated to the regulation of measures to support families, employees and self-employed workers and to strengthen social safety nets in the "red zone". In other words, the real core of the Decree Law is found in this portion of the regulatory, text,

¹¹⁶Invitalia. Definition. Invitalia is the National Agency for Inward Investment and Economic Development. It is owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy. Invitalia aspires to boost Italy's economic growth, focusing on strategic sectors for development and employment. It is committed to reviving crisis areas and operates mainly in the South of Italy.

From: <https://www.invitalia.it/eng/who-we-are/the-agency>

which determines an immediate attention of the institutions to the economic sector. Specifically, the decree provided that it draws on the "ordinary layoffs" for the production units operating in the listed municipalities and for the workers domiciled there, also expanding the same to employers. This document also introduced the possibility of suspending the extraordinary redundancy fund and drawing on the ordinary one for all those companies that had requested the aid of this redistributive measure before the outbreak of the emergency. Furthermore, a redundancy fund has been provided for employers in the private sector, including agriculture, with production units operating in the listed municipalities and for workers domiciled therein. Work has been done in this direction to favour those private sector workers who cannot benefit from the current income support instruments, only for the duration of the suspension of the employment relationship and in any case for a maximum period of three months. This analysis shows the willingness of the institutions to widen the redistributive measures and to buffer the emergency also from an economic point of view, considering the repercussions on the social apparatus that the loss of the job for a large part of the domiciled of the red zone would have entailed .

Another part of the aid went to self-employed workers, the so-called "freelancers", who are not entitled to layoffs. In this direction, the push of the sector associations has played a fundamental role in directing the choices of the government which, in analysing the problems, have in fact prioritised the economic emergency policy agenda by finding the funds also for these categories. Specifically, an allowance of 500 euros per month has been established, for a maximum of three months, for workers who have coordinated and continuous collaboration relationships, for commercial agents, for professionals and for self-employed workers that are

domiciled or or that are carrying out their activities in the listed municipalities, parameterised to the effective duration of the suspension of the activity. Great attention has also been paid to small and medium-sized enterprises with enlargement of the fund for 12 months, as well as for the tourism and hotel sector; in fact, tax relief has been provided for pension contributions and the users have been provided for fair compensation for the lack of opportunity to take advantage of the tourist packages purchased.

The measures at this time were limited only to the areas of the "red zone" (with exceptions for the economic activities of the areas immediately adjacent to the red zone which had been largely damaged). In this we find again the *proportionality* and a *gradualness* in the action of the institutions. In fact, the setting of emergency countermeasures from a socio-economic point of view was initially concentrated limited to the most affected areas, where the highest number of infections was spread. In addition, economic associations in the sector were able at this time to act with "limited" pressure because the general priorities of citizenship, that is to say the health risk and the understanding of the characteristics of the Virus, exercised greater leverage on both the institutions and on public opinion.

5.4.2 Economic counteractions: The expansion of the red-zone economic measures and the “Cura Italia Decree”

An important date from the programmatic point of view for the elaboration of the subsequent socio-economic measures, and which allowed from the legal point of view to channel the funds necessary for the production of the following aid is March the 5th 2020. As in fact it is evident by analysing the periodisation presented on the internet domain of the Italian Government, on March the 5th institutions (the Premier and the Minister of Finance) signed the so-called "Report to Parliament for 2020". In this document, the Government has stressed the need for Parliament to "deviate" from the OMT standard for 2020 (medium-term target), so as to be able to channel all the liquidity necessary for the formation of economic aid and the implementation of the redistributive programs needed in the context of the Covid-19 socio-economic emergency. This date therefore represents an intermediate step through which it would then have been possible to implement all the subsequent measures we are going to talk about. The document of the "report to parliament" was further modified on March the 11th. We have spoken extensively in the previous paragraph of this date and the importance it holds from a social point of view, as it represents a precedent in republican history; in fact, it was decided to lock the whole country, closing all retail sales activities with the exception of pharmacies and grocery stores. Specifically on March 11th in order to further strengthen the support provided for the health system, for citizens and businesses and increase resources for civil protection and security, the Council of Ministers number 36 approved an addition to the report to Parliament for 2020 (compared to that approved on March 5) for further recourse

to debt. In fact, the deviation from the MTO widened further to 104.5 billion euros in 2020 in terms of competence and 154 billion euros in terms of cash, with an increase in appropriations of up to 25 ¹¹⁷ billion both in terms of competence and cash terms.

The next step in our analysis, as well as the subsequent countermeasure that was adopted by our government in the field of socio-economic safeguard action, was the one adopted on March 16, 2020. We are talking about the so-called "Curaitalia"¹¹⁸ Law Decree, containing the new measures to support families, workers and businesses to counteract the effects of the coronavirus emergency on the economy. In this sense, we start with an analysis of the normative text, by introducing the macro areas of intervention of the same. The Decree legislated on 4 main fronts, then branched out into other particular measures. We are interested in analysing those macro areas that are related to the socio-economic interests of the nation in this period of really high health emergency. In fact, the first section of the document is the one dedicated to measures regarding financing to strengthen the national health system, the capabilities of the Department of Civil Protection and all the other actors active in dealing with the emergency. The second part is dedicated to supporting employment and workers for the defence of work and income. The third macro area of measures focuses on credit support for families and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, through the banking system and the use of the central guarantee fund. The fourth area is a more "practical" one by legislating on the suspension of payment obligations for taxes and contributions as well as other tax obligations and

¹¹⁷ For all the economic data see: 5-11 Marzo 2020. *From:* <http://www.governo.it/it/coronavirus-misure-del-governo>

¹¹⁸ Decreto Curaitalia. 16 Marzo 2020. *From:* <http://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-37/14324>

tax incentives for the sanitation of workplaces and bonuses for employees who remain in service.

Before analysing which measures have been taken, it should be noted that for the first time there is no longer any mention of an economic decree limited to the areas of the "red zone" alone, as it no longer existed since March the 11th, the day on which all of Italy had been made into a large "red zone". We move onto the analysis, albeit rapid, of the various measures to contain the economic emergency deriving from the "Covid" undertaken by the "Curaitalia" decree. We premise that in the time fragment, from the previous decree to this moment, the health situation had worsened very strongly, with the hospitals in northern Italy that were collapsing and no longer had resources. Programmatically the strengthening of the health system must therefore be understood both the "title" of the decree and its core objective, intended as a normative document that carefully regulated the financing to strengthen the actors involved in the management of the crisis and at the same time the families, businesses and individuals.

The first major pillar of the action of the "Curaitalia" decree was intended for the immediate enhancement of the national health system. In fact, in this portion of the decree, funds are foreseen to "cover" the 20,000 hires already approved for the national health system, while the "fund for national emergencies" has been extended by € 1,650 billion overall. The sanitary personnel had to work for longer rounds, so the allocation of 150 million was decided to cover overtime for the staff. Similarly, the budget for increasing the number of beds in intensive care units has increased by 2020 to 340 million. In addition, the institute for the revitalisation and enhancement of the Italian economic sector, the "Invitalia" (see above lines for more infos) has been authorised by the Government to grant non-repayable loans for companies

producing sanitary equipment (for a maximum ceiling of 50 million euros). Furthermore, in this first macro area, all regulations for the increase in military health personnel, for the fixed-term recruitment of undergraduates in Medicine to make up for the shortcomings of medical personnel, as well as funds for the extraordinary sanitation of school complexes and large cities have been included there, with the primary objective of increasing the capacity of the health and emergency system.

These circumstances could show that, once again, the weight of the stakeholders has been very limited since the institutions themselves have decided to facilitate the productivity of the companies mentioned above, in order to strengthen the national health system in serious crisis. We could therefore say, that in this historical circumstance and limited to this portion of the decree, the general interest is prevailing on the pressures of the interested parties, which however benefited from this decision.

Another very important situation regulated by this decree in the first area is that relating to the appointment of the "Extraordinary Commissioner" for the management of the epidemiological emergency from Covid-19. The Commissioner would have been appointed the following day, March 17th, through a special DPCM, and would have been identified in the person of Dr. Domenico Arcuri, CEO of Invitalia and therefore the perfect candidate to manage the emergency especially from an economic point of view . An economic particularity must also be underlined, as prescribed in Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the Decree¹¹⁹, namely that Dr. Arcuri would have carried out his duties as Commissioner free of charge.

¹¹⁹ Decreto Nomina Arcuri. Commissariamento emergenza Covid (17 Marzo 2020) *From: http://presidenza.governo.it/AmministrazioneTrasparente/Organizzazione/CommissariStraordinari/CS_Arcuri/Arcuri%20covid-19.pdf*

The second macro area is the one that could provide more sources for thought regarding the weight that pressure groups, trade associations and unions have had in the practical organisation of aids to workers. In fact, the second section of the Decree is that relating to support for workers and companies, with the aim that no one would lose their job due to the emergency. This social objective, even before economic, is actually the result of reasoned considerations regarding the country's global economic situation. The physiological compression of the productivity and economic power of the nation following the health emergency were exacerbating the situation of the Italian system, which was already in itself not optimal. So the aids are seen programmatically to the achievement of a restart or better of a not total block of our real economy, and of the strength of our state. Let's now pass to the analysis of the measures taken; First of all, there was the decision to extend the redundancy fund to the whole national territory, which can be used by all employees of any production sector. employers, including companies with fewer than 5 employees, who suspend or reduce their activity following an epidemiological emergency, can take advantage of the layoff earnings notwithstanding the new reason "COVID-19" for a maximum duration of 9 weeks. Furthermore, the redundancy fund, this time accessing to the *ordinary* fund, is possible for all employers with at least 5 employees. This possibility is also extended to companies that already benefit from the extraordinary layoffs. Precisely with regard to layoffs, a clarification will be required here. In fact, this regulation regarding the actual replacement of any other type of layoffs (ordinary and extraordinary) with that in derogation is the only provision on which the institutions have never gone back. As we will see instead on other types of redistributive measures and aid for the population, the legislation has changed several times in the following decrees. In fact, many debates have developed

regarding the characteristics of the aid, its size and the methods of access, but not on the layoffs. In these other situations, the weight of interest groups and trade associations and unions has undoubtedly been relevant in influencing the shaping of the same aids, but we will talk about it later.

Returning to our discussion, the second part introduces help to self-employed workers on whose definition, economic relevance and destination there has been much debate. We are talking about the contribution of 600 euros on a monthly, non-taxable basis, for self-employed workers. This allowance would be paid to a fairly large audience of Italian citizens, amounting to 5 million units. The pressure has been significant in defining and introducing this aid for professionals not enrolled in the orders, artisans, traders, direct farmers, settlers and sharecroppers, seasonal workers in the tourism and wellness establishments, workers in the entertainment sector, agricultural workers. media coverage of institutions. In fact, in the immediate period preceding the issuance of the "Curaitalia" decree, there were very heated debates in many political broadcasts, which in fact catalysed the necessities and requests of the businesses and citizens most affected by *Covid* on the financial profile. In addition, in the codification of regulations in this sense, category associations and unions have played an important role. The same large companies, which have pushed from the beginning to ensure that production does not stop completely, have requested the use of these redistributive measures to alleviate their "cashes". In addition the *Fund of last resort* is also set up with a budget of 300 million euros as a residual fund to cover all those excluded from the compensation of 600 euros, including professionals enrolled in orders. In this way also the professional figures that were not covered by the auxiliary fund above mentioned (the 600 euros one) would have been compensated for their losses. In this portion too could be "traced" the great pushes of

the members of such categories towards the adoption of such new fund. It was in fact the second time in which the regulations characterised such monthly based aid for self-workers, after the first of 500 euros introduced only for the “red zone” commonalities workers.

The next analysis section of the "Curaitalia" decree is very important for our reflections, to verify how the pressure groups have managed to regain strength in the competitive process of allocating the priorities of the policy agenda. Indeed, the very fact that the institutions have taken steps to guarantee aid in all these areas and all these categories has reasons that can be found in the pressure of public opinion on the one hand (voice of the needs of the population) and companies on the other (damaged from the loss of liquidity). Furthermore, this sector of measures can be considered as what most of all goes to "cure" Italy, in the sense that it regulates the revitalisation of the "real" economy of the country through a system of participation between banks and the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti . The action now introduced was divided into a moratorium on loans to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (which concerns leasing, credit openings and short-term loans falling due). Furthermore, it was decided to strengthen the central guarantee fund for small and medium-sized enterprises, also for the renegotiation of existing loans. Specifically, this last aspect, without going into economic technicalities that are not necessary for the purposes of our work, contains a long list of the facilities for companies to apply for loans at very low interest rates. The participation of the banks in this manoeuvre could not have taken place without the introduction of a "counter-guarantee" mechanism by Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, with which to allow the expansion of credit also to medium-large companies affected by the crisis. The goal would have been to free up around 10 billion of additional investments.

The fourth and final macro area of the legislative decree is the one that affects fiscal measures, in order to avoid that obligations exacerbate liquidity problems. In this context, the weight of public opinion in the agenda prioritisation process is once again very important. In this sense, the same issues identified by the policy makers were "induced" by the needs of the population, according to the criteria of proportionality and adequacy which seemed to be the most objective and direct to "manage" the crisis and the areas in which the intervention of the government would serve. Among other things, this would have been the second time that the executive governed these socio-economic areas damaged by the crisis, which it had already done in the decree of February 28th relating only to the Red Zone. In this the Government once again applies the principle of gradual action and proportionality, necessarily updating the suspensive measures for taxes and fiscal deadlines on a national scale. Specifically, there is the suspension, without limits of turnover, for the sectors most affected, of the payments of withholdings, social security contributions and premiums for compulsory insurance for the months of March and April, together with the VAT payment in March. Furthermore, this "Curaitalia" decree determines a suspension of the terms of the obligations and of the tax and social security contributions for taxpayers with a turnover of up to € 2 million, as well as the suspension until May of the terms relating to the liquidation, control, assessment and collection activities by the offices of the Revenue Agency. Another important suspension is that of the terms for the collection of taxes, suspension of the sending of new folders (of collection) and suspension of executive acts.

In a nutshell, in addition to what has already been said regarding the primary intent of this document, that is, the aim of strengthening the health and management systems of the health emergency, at the same time this decree has a much more

incisive value. The socio-economic dynamics, obviously central to the intent of this normative document, have been "driven" by the interest groups responding to the needs of the associations and the various sectors most affected by the crisis. This consideration is all the more true if we consider that at this precise moment the complete closure of all production activities had not yet been reached, but only retail sales. This closure is related to "all non-essential or strategic production activities"¹²⁰, would have come with the Prime Ministerial Decree of 22 March 2020. In this decree, if you analyse Annex number 1¹²¹, it is clear what the so-called "essential and strategic" activities are; in fact, in addition to the sectors of agriculture, fishing, extractive activities and companies in the food supply chain, those activities essential for the continuation of everyday life for quarantined citizens are also traced. This obviously refers to hardware, assistance services for household appliances and technological peripherals with which to implement "telework" (the smart working).

5.4.3 Economic counteractions: the trail to the "Rilancio Decree"

Given the multi-level approach of our state system, the Government, in coordination with the various economic associations and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, wanted to regulate with a Prime Ministerial Decree the problems of the municipalities that have been most affected by Covid-19. Such is the Dpcm which anticipates the disbursement of 4.3 billion of the municipal solidarity fund. In addition, another 400 million are made available by order of the Head of the Civil

¹²⁰ Coronavirus, firmato il Dpcm 22 marzo 2020. From: <http://www.governo.it/node/14363>

¹²¹ DPCM 22 Marzo 2020. Allegato 1. From: http://www.governo.it/sites/new.governo.it/files/dpcm_20200322.pdf

Protection Department for emergency food solidarity measures¹²². In this way, the Government has shown to adapt its action according to the principles of proportionality to the needs of all Italian realities, as well as to the needs of those fringes of the population who were already in serious difficulty so much that they cannot purchase the foodstuffs of subsistence. In fact, public opinion played a fundamental role in this, *de facto* prompting the government to implement decisions that would help families in real difficulty, after voluntarily, spontaneous campaigns had been launched on social networks for citizenship in favour of the less well-off.

Another regulation that our government has implemented in economic matters is that enacted on April 6th. In fact, in this further normalisation the methods of access to credit and postponement of obligations for businesses are determined. These two aspects have been debated in the weeks of the emergency, already from the first moments, and certainly public opinion, as well as large companies played a great role in “posing pressures” for debating in such a direction. In a nutshell such entities, (which are taken into consideration in this new document) had a weight in the declination of all the measures for how they were then elaborated. In general The decree intervenes in support of companies in difficulty with specific measures on five

¹²² Ocdpc n.658 del 29 marzo 2020. Ulteriori interventi urgenti di protezione civile in relazione all'emergenza relativa al rischio sanitario connesso all'insorgenza di patologie derivanti da agenti virali trasmissibili. 30 marzo 2020
Pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n.85 del 30 marzo 2020. From: http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/amministrazione-trasparente/provvedimenti/dettaglio/-/asset_publisher/default/content/ocdpc-n-658-del-29-marzo-2020-ulteriori-interventi-urgenti-di-protezione-civile-in-relazione-all-emergenza-relativa-al-rischio-sanitario-connesso-all-

main areas. The first regulatory subgroup is that concerning access to credit, support for liquidity, exports, internationalisation and investments

The measures adopted provide for guarantees by the State for a total of approximately € 200 billion granted by the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, in favour of banks that provide loans to companies in any form. In particular, the guarantee will cover between 70% and 90% of the amount financed, depending on the size of the company, and is subject to a series of conditions including the impossibility of the distribution of dividends by the company beneficiary for the following twelve months and the necessary destination of the loan to support expenses for production activities located in Italy¹²³.

“The decree further strengthens the Guarantee Fund for small and medium-sized enterprises, increasing both its financial endowment and the ability to generate liquidity also for companies up to 499 employees and professionals. The Fund, already expanded by the “Cura Italia” decree (decree-law 17 March 2020, no. 18) with 1.5 billion euros, thus completes its transformation into an instrument to support small and medium-sized enterprises, to protect entrepreneurs, artisans, self-employed and professionals, as well as safeguarding exports and all those sectors that make up the backbone of our production system with the excellence of Made in Italy. There is also a strong streamlining of bureaucratic procedures to access the guarantees granted by the Fund”.

“The decree also enhances public export support, to improve the incisiveness and timeliness of state intervention. The intervention introduces a co-insurance system according to which the commitments deriving from the SACE insurance business are

¹²³ Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 39. From: <http://www.governo.it/node/14417>

assumed by the State for 90% and by the same company for the remaining 10%, thus freeing up to an additional 200 billion resources to be used to enhance exports. The goal is to allow SACE to meet the growing demand to ensure operations deemed of strategic interest for the national economy that the company would not otherwise have the financial capacity to cover".¹²⁴ This measure would have been equally debated in the hours following its launch and implementation, as it signalled the actual weight that companies had at this stage on government action. Obviously the companies falling under this normalisation are all strategic ones, which have had a great influence on the prioritising agenda but at the same time become functional to the next regulatory step, that is, to structure the restart in view of the re openings.

In fact, on April 10, the Government announced in a press conference following the signing of the DPCM in extension of the quarantine (see paragraph above), announced that it is already working in view of the so-called "phase two". In order to organise the economic and social restart that would have occurred in the phase following the reopening of May 4th, in fact on April 10th, the establishment of a working group of experts and the safety protocol in the workplace were carried out. The Committee, led by Vittorio Colao and composed of experts in economic and social matters, would have had the task, in consultation with the Technical-scientific Committee, to develop the necessary measures for a gradual recovery in the various sectors of social, economic and productive activities , also through the identification of new organisational and relational models, which take into account the needs of containment and emergency prevention. In this committee all hopes of the population

¹²⁴ Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 39. *From:* <http://www.governo.it/node/14417>

were entrusted as well as small, large and medium-sized enterprises to allow safety of the restart and physical safety for workers.

Another great topic on which there were great debates, and continue to exist while drafting this work, is that relating to the theme of "surgical masks". These are devices on whose technical validity as a means of protection from salivary "droplets" believed to carry the virus has been much discussed. The arguments on which we must reflect here, as they have been able to shift the regulatory action of the government, are those relating to the availability and costs of facial masks. In a context of such a serious health crisis, many were unable to find such individual protection means directly on the territory, purchasing them in pharmacies. In fact, one of the real reasons that pushed the government to commission emergency management was precisely the apparent unavailability of the masks themselves, which in fact needed a careful and plenipotentiary regulator to be better managed. It was decided, as mentioned above, to appoint in this regard Arcuri as Extraordinary Commissioner who deliberated in the most effective and programmatic way on the question of masks and especially on the topic of their prices. On April 20, 2020 in consideration of the evolution of the emergency context and in order to allow the continuation of the planned interventions (purchase of personal protective equipment, medical equipment and all kinds of instrumental goods useful to counter the emergency, as well as the expansion of both temporary and definitive hospitals intended for the treatment of patients with coronavirus), has approved a further allocation for a total of € 900,000,000¹²⁵ in favour of the extraordinary Commissioner for the emergency *Covid-19* from the Fund for national emergencies.

In this particular case too, public opinion was the one to manoeuvre the government's

¹²⁵ Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 41. (20 Aprile 2020). From: <http://www.governo.it/node/14496>

actions. Let's say that this time the adequacy of the measures taken has been prudent and proportional to the actual needs of the population.

From a purely economic point of view, the Economic and Financial Document of 2020 was signed on 24th March 2020. All the economic decisions towards the deviation from the aforementioned MID-Period Objective (see above) and debt were justified further from the institutions. The communal dynamics of the European economy were taken in this direction and to implement these further indebtedness measures (necessary in order to agree the subsequent decree that would have been implemented shortly). In fact, it is precisely to the indications of the central bank and the Community mechanisms that the member countries must submit and that, after careful evaluations, have allowed a temporary departure from the mid term objectives of the repayment plans precisely in consideration of the crisis that is going on. Leaving aside the political controversies and the debates on the level of European aid and the economic strategies of the Union, we must concern ourselves with the choices made by our government. Also on this occasion they seem aimed at allowing the satisfaction of the needs expressed by the pressure groups of the big companies and by the public opinion, characterising the government's action as purely welfare.

The latest expression of the intent to manage the socio-economic crisis caused by Coronavirus is the "Relaunch Decree". With this regulatory document, the President of the Council of Ministers, together with the Head of the Department of Civil Protection and all Ministers, has legislated on the economic, social and health plan at the time of reopening. In fact, this Prime Ministerial Decree, the signature of which was disclosed in a press release dated 14 May 2020, in fact governs the characteristics of the Italian country system for the "total" reopening which would take place on May the 18th and would have allowed the country to enter the core of

"phase two". The decree intervenes in various areas, in a transversal way so as to ensure a certain unity, organicity, and completeness of the measures. Reading the text of the decree, they encounter rules aimed at protecting families and workers, safeguarding and supporting companies, artisans and freelancers, consolidating, streamlining and speeding up institutions of protection and social cohesion.

In a nutshell, we are facing a third regulation (fourth if we also consider the "red zone" decree of 28 February) relating to the economic sphere and aid to families, businesses and workers. This continuous recovery and repeated regulation of the social and economic aspects most affected by the emergency is due to the continuously changing context and the continuous and different pushes of public opinion on the one hand and of companies and trade associations on the other. In this the traditional Policy Cycle cannot succeed, if used in the traditional organisation that we saw in the initial chapters, to meet the needs of the environment, in fact leaving it shortened, compressed, hybridised and, if we want to innovate.

Precisely as a result of what we have just said, we see yet another change in the regulation of aid to businesses; we are referring to the introduction of a non-refundable aid contribution. Furthermore, the figures relating to this aid are again regulated. It is in fact for self-employed persons and companies also with than 5 million production. The contribution is due if the amount of turnover and fees for April 2020 was less than two thirds of the amount of turnover and fees for April 2019. For those who started the business from 1 January 2019, the contribution is also due in the absence of the requirement of the drop in turnover. The amount of the contribution is determined as a percentage of the difference found. In this, the Government wanted to regulate a "standardised" method for the distribution of funds and to determine the possibility of accessing them, so that it would be "univocal" and

equalised. Furthermore, it has shown here again that it intends to follow the principles of adequacy and proportionality, as it has introduced a "percentage" criterion (which we do not report for reasons of space)¹²⁶.

With regard to exemptions, the exemption from the payment of the IRAP balance due for 2019 and the first instalment, equal to 40 per cent, of the advance payment of IRAP due for 2020 for companies with a volume of revenues were regulated between 0 and 250 million and self-employed workers with a corresponding volume of remuneration. With regard to exemptions, the exemption from the payment of the “IRAP balance due for 2019 and the first instalment, equal to 40 per cent, of the advance payment of IRAP due for 2020 for companies with a volume of revenues were regulated between 0 and 250 million and self-employed workers with a corresponding volume of remuneration. Furthermore, the capital strengthening of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the authorisation to Cassa Depositi e Prestiti S.p.a. (CDP) to the creation of a destined patrimony, called "Relaunch Patrimony", to which assets and juridical relationships are brought by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which can be divided into sectors and whose resources will be used for the support and relaunch of the Italian productive economic system”¹²⁷.

All that has been done so far has been a general reading of the various regulations used by our government (and by various ministries) to organise economic (and social) aid for the families and companies affected by the COVID. From our analysis, once again halfway between the news and the reflection, the great weight

¹²⁶ Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 45. (14 Maggio 2020). Paragraph 2.1. *From:* <http://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-45/14602>

¹²⁷ Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 45. (14 Maggio 2020). Paragraph 2.2. *From:* <http://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-45/14602>

that the relevant groups, the public opinion and the companies have had in shaping the measures adopted by the government certainly transpires. Specifically, the weight of these parts is felt above all from the point of view of the formation of aid and their characterisation. In this we do not want to absolutely say that the government has been "piloted" in its actions, but we want to emphasise that even in emergency contexts, in the policy agenda and in its prioritisation there is always room for pressure to be put by interested parties. This is even more true the more powerful (economically and socially) the parties are, also taking into account the "weight" and the "leverage" they can exert on public opinion.

Anyway what remains from this analysis is that the common and traditional trail of the policy cycles (evaluation and building ones) is not compatible with the needs of the society to buffer and manage the emergency. As we have already said in the previous sub-paragraph in the key study we analyse there has been a great compression and reiteration of the main "basic and traditional" steps of the "policy cycle", leading to its quasi-hybridisation with the disaster management one, proving to be more responsive in managing sudden changing realities. In this regards the "strength" of our institutions has laid (and is laying) in their capabilities to adopt the principles of adequacy and gradualness in acting, while, at the same time, starting activities with the objective to enhance the preparedness and the resilience of the populations. At the same time, the institutions have also proved to be able to exploit the "classic" analysis methods used during the common and non emergency policy evaluation cycle, forecasting (when it has been possible) the eventual future evolutive scenarios of the sanitary emergency.

On the other front, while buffering the socio economic situation, the reiterated prudence by which institutional actions are characterised (especially relating to the

“staid” re openings) can be perceived as the symptom of the general lack of knowledge and experience in dealing with crises of this genre. Anyway this first “precedent” (both by the management and by the legislative side) could have given to the authorities the right indications for buffering, in the future, the sanitary risk.

5.5 Final consideration about the role of external pressures on governmental actions

Furthermore, it is necessary to complete a further consideration, or better to say a clarification regarding the pressures that have been “suffered” by the institutions and posed by forces internal to the nation but external to the government. In fact, since the very first emergency signs, when the only epidemic outbreaks were still concentrated in China or in any case outside our country, the political opposition forces, many opinion leaders capable of conveying public opinion, together with the action of interest groups, have put pressure on the Government. In a context of normal regulatory production, in a non emergency situation, these pressures collaborate in the formulation of the best policy option among those designed to manage the social problem that is intended to be combated; it is precisely the wishes of the various parties involved that, in the moments of “issue identification” and “agenda setting”, has a fundamental role in shaping the future policy to come. On the other hand, in a sudden and ever-changing emergency contextualisation, in which the future evolutions of the risk being sought are not know, these pressures, on the contrary, do not help the government elites to produce counteractions that are effective and decisive.

We can therefore say that, as a result of what has been analysed with respect to the social sphere of response actions to *Covid-19*, the external pressure component has certainly played a big role in the bending of the programs enacted by the Government. In fact, the "voice" of the stake holders in the context of the prioritisation of the policy agenda (deciding which was the economic response area to be "dealt with" first through the policy) had had a great role.

There has been much discussion in recent times whether government action has been well thought out, especially in the field of principle, at the economic level. Specifically, the political opposition forces have heavily criticised the government's choice to set economic (and consequently social and re distributive) aids, as based on "the extension of the debt" of companies and population, instead that focusing on the enhancement of their "liquidity". Specifically the criticisms were articulated around the consideration that, by favouring the opening of loans, even at subsidised rates and with many instalments, the government has effectively widened the debt of companies and population, consequently sinking the "real economy" already very compressed by the health emergency. It will be easy to understand, in fact, how a company that contracts new debts to "survive" the liquidity crisis in which it finds itself, will be led to hire less staff in the medium or long term (due to the debts it has contracted), in fact weakening the economy more.

Another critic moved by the opposition, together with the "trade associations" and the unions (exploiting the discontent of the citizens), is in relation to the implementation timing of certain re distributive measures. Specifically, the heaviest criticisms were expressed with regard to the layoff payments (as an extraordinary and "derogating" means) to those citizens who had made an official request. Inevitably the pressure had been directed towards the need to implement a simplification of the

Italian bureaucratic model in general. In fact such forces took inspiration from this "lack" of the government, or rather from this slow implementation, to broaden the discussion. Many have "invoked" the implementation of a general derogation from all the guarantees and bureaucratic mechanisms that characterise our system, to allow a more streamlined and rapid implementation of the necessary measures. However, these criticisms did not take into account the modality and the purpose of the same guarantees that they advised to put aside, in fact going to generate other regulatory failures. On the other hand, the formalisation of a decree that fully simplifies the Italian system is not simple, and its hasty approach could bring "bankruptcy" consequences in the short term.

Beyond the examples just reported, what interests us here is to highlight how the pressures placed on the Executive have put the institutions in even greater difficulty in this emergency situation. If in fact in the "normal administration" of non-emergency periods the contribution of interest groups, other political forces and public opinion "shaped" the very essence of the formation of the policy, this is not equally true in times of emergency, where the decision makers are already under pressure and there is a risk of overburdening them. Indeed we could say that even if they have characterised the shaping of the responses of our institutions, bending and speeding them up, on the other hand the pressures posed have inevitably led to a lowering of the "quality" of the responses to the crisis. De facto the same implementation delays in enacting the "derogation layoffs" are due in the same way to the pressure of the emergency itself and to the influences of the forces inside the country.

This last consideration has been produced to reiterate the concept that, in emergency contexts, and in particular in the "*Covid-19*" case study analysis, the non

emergency “policy cycle” as we introduced in the previous chapters, undergoes a profound distortion, both in timelines and procedures. Consequently the “quality”, effectiveness and responsiveness capabilities of the produced programs are compressed and distorted too, leading to a qualitative lowering of the governmental actions.

Conclusions

The awareness of the inevitability of the re-proposal of emergencies or calamitous events and the will of mankind to try to manage them is the prime mover behind our work. In fact, as widely stated in the introduction, from the moment in which the humans became permanent they had accumulated experiences and information on which to try to organise their activities and to produce a systematic management of the environment to mitigate the effects of the crises that could happen. This modality of action can be generalised to any type of human activity, as well as the structuring of sociality, the organisation of collaboration between the members of the group and, in general, the management of "public affairs". This last point, among other things, is more relevant the more the human community has evolved, passing from the small group of hunter-gatherer humans, to the most advanced ancient civilisations, up to today's organisation of state realities.

In this context, we are talking about the organisation of the so-called public policies, which are nothing more than a way of organising public action for intertwining in a specific area of society in solving certain problems through a program. The identification of the issues that the policy will have to solve, or at least to deal with, is a complex procedure in which the voice of the interested parties and of the last "users" of the public service must necessarily fall. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 1 of this work, the wishes and interests of these latter parts has an active role in shaping the public action, both from the point of view of its technical organisation and in the subsequent implementation on a practical level.

To facilitate the work of those who practically have to devote themselves to the creation of public policies, traditional "academic" models have been theorised, which propose a mode of action to achieve the implementation of public action in a codified manner. In this sense we are referring to the "cyclical models" that we have broadly defined in chapters 1 and 2 of our work and which provide a "*modus operandi*" to organise the formation and evaluation of policies (and therefore of public action) in non-emergency contexts, describing the activities that decision makers generally carry out in "average" situations. In this regards we are here to underline that the model explained in these two chapters (1 and 2) consider the "relaxed" timelines that the policy makers have for carrying out "steps" by which they are composed in non emergency situations. In fact, generally, this "slower" rolling of the activities developed to elaborate policies in "average" and normality contexts facilitate the evaluations and assessments made by policy designers to formulate the most feasible and appropriate regulative structure possible, not risking to compress the quality of the policy responses produced.

But the same certainty regarding the re-proposal of calamities and critical events that could jeopardise society and the members of a group, have pushed decision-makers to act preventively, on the basis of the experiences in the management of crisis that the humanity had accumulated since ancient times. In this direction, a more recent wave of academic studies has produced considerable theorisations, introducing another "cyclical" model regarding the management of risk deriving from disasters. We refer to the "disaster management cycle", that is the sector of risk management activities with which to aim at its "aversion", also to those mitigation of the effects of those calamities that, this is certain, will recur.

These cyclical models that have been theorised over the years by academics (and which we have attempted to review) exemplify the traditional mode of action in relation to non-critical contexts, pointing out how generally the decision maker acts in determining the best policy alternatives to organise public action in non-emergency settings. Among other things, also the risk management model, the so-called "disaster management Cycle" refers to the complex of preventive activities that are implemented to manage critical issues and emergencies, on which knowledge has been accumulated. In view of what has just been said, the reason that prompted us to formulate our *research question* is clear. In fact, with our work, articulated on a comparative perspective, we asked ourselves if the traditional cyclical models could be adaptable and useful to act in contexts of unprecedented emergencies. In addition, we also attempted to evaluate whether and how the models described in chapters 1, 2 and 3 of our work had been somehow modified in the management of an emergency never experienced in recent times, such as that of *Covid-19* infectious disease.

With our study we have come to determine an answer to this question, at least in relation to the areas of social program that we have evaluated, among those used by Italian institutions to manage the health and socio-economic crisis that derives from Coronavirus today. We have tried to carry out such comparative "task" by stressing the "differences" in timelines and procedures that the classical non emergency models so far depicted show in average non critical contexts, separating them from the modalities of action used by institutions in the management of the case study threat.

We conclude our work by affirming that in the social and economic response carried out by our institutions in this context, the traditional "cyclical" models, if used in their traditional setting, are not valid and useful to organise a counteraction to

the changing challenges posed by a crisis never experienced. Furthermore they underwent a “compression” in the management of the current emergency. Specifically, the traditional model of the "policy cycle" (and the corresponding evaluation process from which it is always "shadowed") appears compressed and crushed in its preliminary phases (*issue identification* and *agenda setting*) which are brought to a very short term. In fact, we could say that, beyond the obvious consideration with respect to the crushing, both temporal and procedural, to which the building process of a policy undergoes in times of crisis, in the management of the emergency analysed there has been a "jump" from the first evaluations on issues, directly at the implementations step. This mode of acting has been catalysed by the necessities posed by the sanitary needs. With the Northern Italian hospitals (especially in Lombardy) that had serious management difficulties.

How the plan of action was characterised is another matter and we discussed it extensively in chapter 5; what we want to underline here is that, in addition to crushing, it seemed to us that in the management of *Covid* the cyclical models have been "*hybridised*". In fact some passages of the "Disaster management Cycle" have been used in the Government action. At the same time institutions have tried to diffuse the use of "mitigation activities", for buffering the incidence of the risk itself, effectively lowering the level of vulnerability of the population. In doing so the institutions have also enhanced the preparedness and the resilience of the civilians, by “educating” them to act in a proper manner and to “stay strong”. These activities, obviously taken from the cyclical model of risk management, were conveyed by information propaganda campaigns, underlining the importance of communication for the development of a policy even in times of emergency. In other words, the management "*cursus*" of the *Covid-19* crisis used by our institutions seemed to us to

greatly compress the classic "cycles" that we have previously described; furthermore, from what emerged from our analysis, it appears as it hybridised the policy building cycle and the disaster management cycle models. This statement is based on the consideration made before regarding the use of some "tactics" theorised in disaster management and others taken from the classical policy cycle, especially with regard to the early stages of analysis and identification of the most important problems triggered by the crisis.

In conclusion, the answer to our research question is not easy to elaborate. Making a clarification we could say that it can in fact vary from emergency to emergency, relatively and as a consequence of the gravity and unpredictability of the same. Furthermore, a decisive factor, we repeat, is the degree of knowledge and experience in the management of emergencies similar to that which is occurring, which, albeit with the necessary modifications, could be used to guide the response. We therefore are willing here to respond in a non-general way, but only in relation to the behaviour enacted by Italian authorities so far in managing the emergency from *Covid-19*.

In our case, the traditional models of organisation of public policies in non-emergency periods (and if "considered" in their original setting), do not appear useful to develop an effective management response to unprecedented and unexpected crisis. At the same time, however, these traditional models can in some way be "adapted", demonstrating the validity of their general approach even for continuously changing situations. Specifically in our analysis, there was a hybridisation of the policy cycle and disaster management models, on whose "mixture" the counteractions of our authorities were elaborated.

Furthermore, by expanding our "scope of analysis", we can affirm that some characteristics of the initial moments of the "traditional policy cycle" also remain in critical contexts; we refer to the weight of the interest groups and the public opinion in guiding the identification and prioritisation of the agenda of the social programs developed in response to the socio-economic emergency deriving from the Coronavirus. In other words, the great "competitiveness" and the weight of the interested parties remain in the background, albeit officially "eliminated", in affecting the shaping of responses and, *de facto*, bending the institutional proposition in acting towards specific purposes.

Another consideration that has to be pointed out in the conclusions to our work is the the distortion that the policy formation process undergoes. In this sense, however, we mean the "practical process of debates and discussions" legally necessary for the formation of the policy which is distorted in its traditional procedure and, above all in the timing. In fact, as we have discussed extensively in the final considerations of the fifth chapter, the fundamental difference between the non-emergency and the "crisis" process lies precisely in the timing and in the role that, in this context, the pressures posed by external agents on the government forces can have . We reiterate one more vote that even the policies produced will be distorted, compressed in their specific validity and not able to be responsive and effective as necessary.

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Executive Summary

Human societies have always tried to organise the public actions in order to reach the satisfaction of their needs at a general level and the achievement of the interests of their members as individuals. In ancient times human beings had to take into account the challenges that were posed to them daily by the environment in which they lived, which represented an impediment to achieving their goals, and which at the same time could have endangered their physical health. The greatest deficit for humans in ancient times was represented by the inability to understand the causes behind natural manifestations and events which, in fact, were great limits to the realisation of their objectives. Indeed, the only way primitives had to explain natural events to their eyes was to attribute divine properties to them. Furthermore, the only awareness that mankind had about events (at the time only of natural origin) was limited to the impossibility of avoiding their repetition; on the contrary they were aware of the certainty of their happening, repeated over time (albeit with different characteristics and an unpredictable cadence).

Gradually with the advance of time and with the evolution of the "homo" species, the society developed, passing from nomadism to permanence and transforming its members into stable farmers and breeders (from nomadic hunters and gatherers as they previously were) . At the same time, throughout its evolutionary path, the human being of the past had stored information that had made it able to understand the effects of those natural events and manifestations that could, in fact, represent a problem for their activities and for the achievement of its goals and interests. Consequently, humans began to organise their activities taking into account the

knowledge and experiences gained on the field, to better manage their "coexistence" with the predominant forces of the environment in which they lived.

With the further transformation of human communities and with the birth and evolution of the first "state" apparatuses, the members of the growing societies started to rely on the validity of the programs designed and implemented by authorities. These programs are nothing but the very first prototypes of systematic public policies, programmatically set to manage the risk deriving from natural events. For the design of the same, the institutions of ancient societies drew inspiration from the amount of knowledge that, as we said a few lines above, the human beings themselves had accumulated during their evolution. On the basis of this common "knowledge" the action of the institutions of ancient societies was able to articulate itself, in such a way as to develop precise methods of intervention for the purpose of "averting the risk".

In general, in fact, the goal of managing human activities within a community has always been to "avert the risk" and to derive the greatest possible benefits from the use of the resources at one's disposal. Consequently to what has just been said, the human being of the past has therefore always tried to structure his actions, managing his resources in the best way. In general, so-called "public policies" have developed in more evolved social contexts, where institutions and administration replace the intentions of individuals, managing common interests in their place.

Starting from the assumption of the ineluctability of the re-proposal of the risk deriving from calamitous eventualities, the social groups have therefore always tried to organise themselves in order to try to mitigate or avoid (as much as possible) the consequences deriving from the effects of these events. In fact, on the basis of this common awareness of the inevitability of emergencies and crises occurrence, we

wanted to structure our work. Specifically, we tried to focus on the study of a particular subject which is certainly not new in the political science discourse; at the same time, however, it is outlined as a current topic in light of the crisis that we are experiencing in recent months, and above all capable of offering many “food” for thought. We are referring to the analysis of the actions taken by decision makers to properly set up a policy capable of effectively responding to the challenges posed by a never experienced emergency, for whose resolution the traditional planning-based management of critical issues has proven ineffective.

Specifically with this work we wanted to investigate how, in order to respond to the challenges of an emergency, policy decision-makers actually act, evaluating how the activities implemented by them modify the classic steps that lead to the formation of a policy in non- critical periods. In other words, we asked ourselves a very specific research question to which we tried to answer during our work. It was "How is the traditional *policy cycle* modified by the threats posed by the emergency environment?". As is clear from what has been said a few lines above, answering this question seems extremely topical and, given the unpredictable nature of the crisis we are experiencing , also quite complex.

To accomplish our research goal we structured our work as a comparative analysis. Our main intent was to compare the way in which policy makers act in two totally different contextual realities, which are non-emergency and crisis situations. Specifically, we structured the analysis into two parts; in the first one we dealt with the definition of the first comparison term of our analysis, that is how the decision-makers act, generally and ideally, in "quiet" and non-emergency contexts. In the second part, however, we are dedicated to defining the second comparison term of our analysis, that is, how the critical context influences and modifies the traditional

way of acting of decision makers. Everything was programmatically structured in order to achieve our goal of evaluating if and how the ideal typical cyclical models of policy making and policy evaluation are still usable and valid in unprecedented emergency contexts.

The two parts of our work have been divided into five chapters. Specifically, Part One focuses on the review of traditional literature in the context of the conceptualisation of ideal-typical policy building and policy evaluation models in non-emergency contexts. In this direction, the first chapter was structured around the review of the main academic contributions to the study of the various distinct moments of the "policy cycle". In this way we wanted to outline, albeit in a very general way, the boundaries and features of the action of decision makers in non-emergency contexts. In doing this, however, we underlined the purely ideal-typical nature that characterises the structure of the same cyclic model of policy making, affirming how it actually follows a much more complex and multifaceted "*cursus*".

During the drafting of the first chapter we have repeatedly stressed the tight connection that in fact unites the policy cycle with the policy evaluation cycle; indeed the process of evaluation and analysis of the policy "shadows" constantly the work of policy makers throughout its duration, influencing the characteristics of the program in question. Due to the importance of the evaluation process, we considered it necessary, again for comparative purposes, to define what are the fundamental steps around which, in general, the evaluation process is articulated, in fact parallel to that of the construction of the policy itself. In this direction, the work done by us in the second chapter was once again a great help, though which we "reread" the main scientific contributions for the definition of the "ideal" model of the "policy evaluation cycle"; in fact, even on this occasion, the policy assessment process is

actually much more complex than how it is described by traditional literature, especially in non-emergency contexts where the timelines are "relaxed" and there is more room for holding deep and complex evaluations.

These models that we have defined and analysed are essential and of great help when we want to study the way in which public policies, in general, are "built" and "analysed". At the same time, however, it will be necessary to go back and consider again the "*stimuli*" that humans of the past received from the environment in which they lived. In fact, as we have affirmed few lines above, the awareness of the inevitability of the recurrence of emergencies and critical issues prompted the members of the ancient communities to accumulate experience and to enrich their knowledge regarding the characteristics and effects of the "hazards". As we have already said, moreover, as societies evolved, the members of the same have increasingly relied on the ability of the institutions to organise management plans capable, if nothing else, of mitigating the effects of emergencies and to "avoid" the risk arising from them. In this way, the evolution of *risk management* went "hand in hand" with the evolution of societies, and systematically structured public action replaced the organisational intentions of the individuals.

Starting from this consideration, we have carried out in the third chapter, a review of the most important contributions of a more recent branch of academic literature. This portion of studies is actually related to the theory of the *disaster management*, which shares the intent to avert the risk deriving from the mismanagement of publicly relevant situations and realities with the more general doctrine of public management. This portion of academic literature has dealt, ideally, with a cyclical organisational model around which to summarise the actions that are commonly implemented to manage emergencies in a preventive way. In fact in the third chapter

we defined the ideal typical model of the "disaster management cycle" to ascertain, programmatically using two case studies, how the known and precedented emergency management actions are organised and strategically coded, *a-priori*, in two different state realities.

The ideal-typical model of the disaster management cycle proves useful in order to organise a preventative mitigation action of the risk deriving from calamitous events that have already been experimented and, in some ways, counteracted in the past; in other words, its validity is effective only when the amount of experience in the management of similar emergencies is such as to provide enough information to enable institutions to set *ad hoc* designed plans for its prevention. But what happens if an unexpected and never experienced emergency occurs?

With this question mark we have closed the first part of our work, trying to give an answer to our research question on the last two chapters, which make up the second part of the thesis.

In Part Two of our work we defined the second term of comparison, programmatically using the case study of the emergency management resulting from the *Covid-19* spread. Specifically, the two chapters sought to ascertain whether and how the challenges posed by the emergency environment change the traditional ideal-typical models of *Policy Making*, *Policy Evaluation* and *Disaster Management*, as they are characterised in non-critical contexts. In other words, during the fourth and fifth chapters we tried to evaluate whether the policy cycle, and the models connected to it, is still usable and valid in its traditional and non-emergency form, in situations of unprecedented crises.

Specifically, the fourth chapter is a sort of continuation of the analysis of the third one, providing a further "comparison in comparison"; in fact in it we analysed the

evolutionary process of the Italian National Civil Protection Service, elaborating an essential historical digression that investigates its birth and its evolutionary process up to recent reforms. Furthermore, we focused on the organisational and operational practice in situations of high health risk and how the protocol of action provides that the management of these critical issues must be structured, in a preventive and implementing manner. Consequently, in the fifth and final chapter we implemented our "confrontation", the "contrast" we were already talking about in the introduction, analysing how the challenges posed by unexpected and unprecedented emergencies actually lead the institutions to act in derogation from the codified practice.

The fifth chapter is in fact organised around the analytical report of the actions taken by Italian institutions in the management of the health and socio-economic emergency resulting from the spread of *Covid-19* infectious disease. Indeed our intent was to implement a careful rereading of the various regulatory documents (DPCMs and OCDPCs) that have been gradually produced by the institutions. In doing this we tried to ascertain the "weight" that the forces inside the nation but outside the Government have had in influencing and shaping institutional decisions and, consequently, the characteristics of economic and social aid for citizens.

In this dimension the challenges and threats posed by the emergency itself had a great relevance too. In fact, we should reiterate it here, that the one deriving from *Covid-19* is an emergency never experienced in recent history and, above all, almost completely unpredictable in its evolutions. At this point the reason that prompted us to formulate our research question is clear. In fact, with our work, articulated on a comparative perspective, we asked ourselves if the traditional cyclical models could be adaptable and useful to act in contexts of unprecedented emergencies. In addition, we also attempted to evaluate whether and how the models described in chapters 1, 2

and 3 of our work had been somehow modified in the management of an emergency never experienced in recent times, such as that of *Covid-19* infectious disease.

We concluded our work describing our main findings by answering to our research question, even if only relatively to two sides of the responses produced by the institutions of our country. In fact we focused on the analysis of the response to the social and economic needs of the population that have been produced by the institutions, de facto under the form of socio economic aid for citizens. Basically what we have found in this analysis was that the traditional "cyclical" models, if used in their classical tuning, are not useful to counteract the changing challenges posed by an unprecedented crisis. Additionally such ideal typical models (as described in chapter 1,2 and 3) underwent a "compression" in the management of the current emergency. Specifically, the traditional model of the "policy cycle" (and the corresponding evaluation process from which it is always "shadowed") appears "cut" and crushed in its preliminary phases (*issue identification* and *agenda setting*) which are brought to a very short term. In fact, we could say that, beyond the obvious consideration with respect to the crushing, both temporal and procedural, usually underwent in times of crisis, in the management of the *Covid-19* crisis, there has been a "jump" from the first evaluations on issues, directly at the implementation step. This mode of acting has been catalysed by the necessities posed by the sanitary needs, with the Northern Italian hospitals (especially in Lombardy) that had serious management difficulties.

Furthermore what we want to underline here is that, in addition to crushing, it seemed to us that in the management of *Covid* the cyclical models have been "*hybridised*". In fact some passages of the "*Disaster management Cycle*" have been used in the Government action. Indeed institutions have tried to diffuse the use of

"mitigation activities", for buffering the incidence of the risk itself, effectively lowering the level of vulnerability of the population. In doing so the institutions have also enhanced the preparedness and the resilience of the civilians, by "educating" them to act in a proper manner and to "stay strong". These strategies have been "taken" from the "*Disaster Management Cycle*"; they were conveyed by information propaganda campaigns, underlining the importance of *communication* for the development of a policy even in times of emergency. In other words, the management "*cursus*" of the *Covid-19* crisis used by our institutions seemed to us to greatly compress the classic "cycles" that we have previously described; furthermore, from what emerged from our analysis, it appears as it hybridised the *policy building cycle* and the *disaster management cycle* models. This statement is based on the consideration provided before regarding the use of some "tactics" theorised in disaster management and their strategies taken from the classical policy cycle, especially with regard to the early stages of analysis and identification of the most important problems triggered by the crisis.

In conclusion we can say that giving a unique answer to our research question is an arduous thing: we can however say that it varies from emergence to emergency, also in consideration of the level of unpredictability and suddenness of the same. In fact, a decisive factor, we repeat, is the degree of knowledge and experience in the management of emergencies similar to that which is occurring, which, albeit with the necessary modifications, could be used to guide the response. We therefore are willing here to respond in a non-general way, but only in relation to the behaviour enacted by Italian authorities so far in managing the emergency from *Covid-19*.

In our case, the traditional models that we defined in the "first part" of our work do not appear usable, if taken in their traditional form, to organise a resolute action

against the crisis. At the same time, however, if attentively "modified" and curved they could remain valid and be used for developing counteractions. Specifically in the management of the case study we analysed, there was a *hybridisation* of the policy cycle and disaster management models, on whose "mixture" Italian institutions were able to elaborate and then to put into practice measures to counteract the crisis.

Furthermore, analysing what we wrote in the fifth chapter, we can conclude by saying that the competitiveness that characterises the *agenda setting* and its *prioritisation* in the traditional (non-emergency) policy cycle is still present also in the management of the emergency that is contemporary to us. In fact, the shaping of socio-economic aid has been influenced and "bended" by the pressures of political opposition, public opinion and interest groups that have always been present in the background, albeit officially "eliminated". In this context of general organisational "confusion", if the traditional policy production and evaluation models appear compressed and distorted, their results (in terms of built programs) will also be distorted. The hasty timing, the analyses carried out in a short time and under a lot of pressure lead to a lowering and a downward crushing of the quality of the programs produced, that are compressed in their validity and which in fact are not able to be effective and decisive as it would be necessary.