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Course of GLOBAL STUDIES

METAPOLITEFSI:
GREECE AND CYPRUS IN 1974

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INDEX

INTRODUCTION

"The defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy"[1].

Those who speak about democracy, are usually perceived as those that do not know the real meaning behind it. De Benoist, a respected French journalist and political philosopher, has stated that every single political actor likes to decorate himself with the noun democracy, and as a protector of its values[2]. The word democracy in recent years, has been used loudly in public settings, to disarm quickly all the adversaries and all the critics. It has also been used as an alibi for actions taken in the name of the, aforementioned, democracy and the term "fighting for democracy", can be used, however, as a mean to subdue the "non-democratic" nations[3].

Since I will be analyzing the democratization process of Greece in 1974, I think it is important to analyze the Greek idea of democracy. The Greeks defined it in contrast with two systems: tyranny and aristocracy. Furthermore, democracy assumes three conditions: isonomy (equality before the law), isotimy (equal rights to enter in all public offices), and isegory (Freedom of expression)[4]. The analysis of ancient democracy has obtained a range of reactions from many scholars and authors: for example, Francesco Nitti believes that the Athenian democracy is an exquisite example of civic responsibility, for Paul Veyne it induces the realm of activist political parties and for Giovanni Sartori, it is still a totalitarian regime.[5] In general, however, there is a common conception that modern and ancient democracies are considerably different.

In my thesis I decided to tackle the topic of the democratic transition, that started after in invasion and the war initiated in Cyprus, by the Turks, and that concretely disrupted and ended the authoritarian regime of the Junta, after seven years. In particular I used the term *metapolitefsi* which is used to describe that specific historic moment that refers to the collapse of the military authoritarian regime of the Junta and the transition to a new democratic political era[6] .

The peculiar democratic transition in Spain, Portugal and Greece, initiated a "new Southern European" profile in political, military and economic discussions. However, the case of

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[1] Orwell, G. *Nineteen Eighty-four*, 1954, pp. 162, Secker & Warburg

[2] De Benoist, A. *The problem of democracy*, 2011, pp.6, Arktos

[3] Sunic, T. *Against democracy and equality*, 2010, pp.6, Arktos Media Ltd; English edition February 26, 2011

[4] De Benoist, A. *The problem of democracy*, 2011, pp.18, Arktos

[5] De Benoist, A. *The problem of democracy*, 2011, pp.24, Arktos

[6] Giannakopoulos, G. *Governing Diversities*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012, pp.2

Greece differs from the other two for certain political experience it has displayed[7]. More specifically, the Greek political system had had a more recent experience of liberal democratic rule, and its transition to democracy in the 1970s has been perceived to be a smoother one than Spain and Portugal[8]. The Greek case argues that the key factors in the democratic transition and consolidation were both the "format" and the "mechanics" of the new post-junta party system, and also the system's relation to society and the role of the democratic system that had been newly implemented by the political elites who controlled the shaping of the transition process[9]. One of the main features of the Greek society, has been the unpredictability of the nature of its politics, that include intermitted military involvement, political crisis, and conflicts within and outside the political parties[10]. Since the 1900 Greece had, in fact, experienced five international wars; two civil wars, the first one from 1917 to 1918, and the second one from 1946 to 1949; three periods of military / authoritarian regime, ten major revolts guided by the military power, and an extent period of foreign occupation during both World War I and World War II[11].

In my thesis I will provide a general survey of Greece's continuity and change in its transition to democracy. Through an analysis that is informative and analytic, I will also evaluate the level of democracy obtained in 1974, taking into consideration that Greece has been described and it is recognized as the cradle of Western Civilization and Wester Democracy. My analysis wants to study not the Greece that "it was", but rather, the Greece "that is". It is worth mentioning that despite its rich history, Greece only became a nation-state in the nineteen centuries, and only after four hundred years of Ottoman domination, and with the intervention of international forces.

In my analysis of the democratization process of Greece, I thus concentrated on three key themes: historical background of Cyprus and Greece, relationship between Greece and Cyprus, analyzed through the usage of sources (mainly journals and newspapers) of that specific time frame, and a statistical analysis of the Greek democracy after 1974, using databases that take into consideration the five main features that a "good democracy" should possess in order for it to work efficiently and properly. More specifically the objective of my thesis is to analyze the democratization process of Greece in contrast with its international

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[7] Featherstone, M. *Global culture: an introduction,* 1990, pp.179
[8] Featherstone, M. *Global culture: an introduction,* 1990, pp.179
[9] Spourdalakis, *From protest party*, in Spourdalakis (ed.) PASOK, 59, 1996, pp. 167
[10]Kourvetaris, G. *The impact of European Integration,* Praeger Publishers, 88, USA, 1987, pp. 58
[11] Couloumbis, T. *A new model of the Greek American relations: from dependence to independence*. New York, NY: Pella1980, pp. 24

liaison with Cyprus, Turkey, USSR and USA. The thesis is made up of four chapters; in the first one I, thus, concentrate my attention on the historical backgrounds of both Cyprus and Greece in order to understand and capture the main factors that lead, in 1967, to the facilitation of the arrival of the colonels, and later in 1974 the introduction of a new democracy. The historical ties between Greece and Cyprus are crucial for the analysis of democratic perspectives and outcome of both countries. The historical roots of both countries are intertwined, and, in my thesis, I tried to compare their paths to understand were the fractions and frictions with the neighboring countries erupted. Undoubtedly, the past of both Cyprus and Greece has been signed by violence and lack of identity, it is in fact reported, later on in the thesis, that Greece has been signed by a dominance by foreign actors, namely United States and Great Britain, rendering their democratic path rocky and tortuous. Adding onto this already complicated situation, the relationship of Greece and, consequently the Greek Cypriots, with Turkey has been signed by reluctant stands by both parties, because of the diplomatic decisions taken on the control of the Island. It is worth mentioning that in this specific case, Cyprus, is portrayed as the "forbidden apple", and the acrimony between the countries, is not only related to the representation of the minorities on the Island; the countries are, in fact, squaring up to each other over the access to the island's natural resources, mainly potential gas and oil deposits under the seabed of the Mediterranean Sea.

In the second chapter, I discuss the end of the authoritarian regime of the colonels in 1974, the objective of this section, is to understand how Greece distanced itself from its past of authoritarianism and extremist ideologies, and how it changed the way it wanted to be perceived internationally. The main actor that I analyzed is Constantine Karamanlis, the leader who pushed Greece towards a democratization process, that has been described as successful by many authors and scholars. In the second chapter, I also decided to analyze the failed relationship of Greece with the United States and, the consequent fiasco of the peacekeeping operation process in both Greece and Cyprus. The transition strategy of Karamanlis and his newly created political party (New Democracy), is what facilitated the transition of Greece to democracy. Again, in this chapter, I also evaluate the leader's approach to the Cyprus situation, his attempt to have a discourse with the Turkish Leaders, and the impact of the international framework. His main objective was that of creating a new Greece, by detaching it from the horrors of the past, by modernizing its institutions and political scenario, by rendering the peninsula crucial in the functioning of the Mediterranean area and by disengaging itself from the control and protection of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom.

The third and final chapter is a complete analysis to evaluate the quality of democracy achieve by Karamanlis in 1974. The data gathered analyzed specifically the years of 1974, with the arrival of the new leader, 1980s which signs the arrival of the leftist political party (PASOK), and then 2009 in order for me to compare it to a modern database. My analysis also takes into consideration the dataset of the European Union, to possess a broader and complete view. The analysis made in this chapter, is crucial to understand through numbers the real quality of the democracy achieved. The dataset does not only take into consideration the quality of democracy trough the Global State of Democracy database, but also analyzed the levels of Freedom achieved after the end of the authoritarian regime of the colonels. To conclude, my analysis also takes into consideration the economic fluctuations that, undoubtedly, impacted the democratic quality of Greece. I, thus, took into consideration the changes in Greece, in both 1981 and 2012. The analysis will not only show how the statistics changed the positive trend initiated in 1974, but also its relations with the European Union. In the last chapter, the evaluation of democracy does not take into consideration Cyprus, as the fractions between Greece and Turkey, is still ongoing and the situation in in Island, cannot be said to be completely solved. However, throughout the thesis, the liaison between the two countries will be analyzed thoroughly.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUD

Greece and, consequently Cyprus, have had the longest and most painful transition to democracy. Before talking about Cyprus, it is important to point out the historical background of Greece. In modern Greek history it has been observed that, there is a close link between radicalization and national humiliation: the defeat of the Greek military power by Kemal Ataturk, in Asia Minor, in 1922, eventually lead to a systematic expulsion of the officer corps, the disruption of the Establishment, and the forced exile of the royal family, and the incursion of thousands of refugees, that initiated and contributed to the rise of Marxist and workers' parties in the 1930s[12]. The defeat of Greece in 1941, by the Axis Powers, that lead to a national resistance front, that was a serious attempt by the Greek communist Party to transform the war of liberation into a victory of Josef Stalin. Throughout the years, it was the issue of Cyprus, that the semi-legal leftist parties were able to influence, going beyond their constituency. It was openly criticized the fact that Greek Speaking people had been sacrificed to British forces and the NATO. To this, conservative politician such as Karamanlis and Averoff pushed them to find a suitable solution. After the end of the junta in 1974, this rhetoric was renewed, when Cyprus had been sold out to the command of Henry Kissinger, and consequently abandoning the Turks and the Greeks.[13]

THE METAXAS REGIME AND WORLD WAR II

The break between the civil society and the political representatives occurred due to the endless political corruption that had been publicly present and growing over the years of the dictatorship and, most importantly due to the news that the main political representatives of the Greek government were negotiating with the communists on the future outcome of the Peninsula.

In the mid 1930s, the restoration of the monarchy has been achieved through a political crisis between Republicans and Royalists that lead to the dismantling of the Greek institutions and, after a plebiscite under the royalist military dictatorship of General

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[12] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 131
[13] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 131

Yeórgos Kontilílis, King George II had been able to return to Greece after his exile in England in November 1935[14].

The fate in the government was restored once General, Ioannis Metaxas replaced the non-political figure that had been representing Greece until 1936. Metaxas exploited the general unrest of the population to pursue his right-wing agenda. His appointment as statesman and leader of Greece, finally happened on august 4th, 1936, when he inaugurated a dictatorship under royal authorization using general strikes as a lever to suspend the key articles of the constitution. This suspension was intended to last for a brief amount of time; however, the parliament did not reassemble for another decade. His political takeover had been relatively smooth by dint of the strong support of the army and consequently the king, George II.

Metaxas, pushed by his paternalistic ideologies and wanted a reconstruction of Greece starting from the bottom, he was a strong nemesis and shared a strong loathe for parliamentary democracy, liberalism and most importantly communism.

His "Fourth of August Regime" in the first year of its existence was a conservative dictatorship that, in 1938 transformed itself in into an authoritarian state, as Metaxás himself was a strong supporter of authoritarianism: his government during the interwar period strongly resembled a *Polizeistaa[15]t* that closely resembled the European totalitarian regimes, such as the ones of Nazi Germany and Italian Fascism[16]. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that, largely because pushed by the king, the Greek peninsula also kept its ties with Great Britain.

Metáxas' ideology was very clear: citizens had to comply with the state and the national identity, with a total elimination of dissidents, nonconformists or subversives. Everything had to be controlled and the motto was that of "order, discipline and work" leaving no room for loafers[17]. Therefore, his main objective was that of re-establish the Greek character in a more disciplined mode, trying to recast the values of ancient Greece, especially following the ideologies of Sparta. Through the adoption of the Byzantium empire, he wanted to re-establish a "Third Hellenic Civilization".

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[14] Pietilä-Castrén – Vesterinen. *Grapta Poikila*, Papers and monographs of the Finnish Institute at Athens, vol. VIII, Helsinki, 2004, pp.3-4
[15] Police state: a country in which the government uses the police to severely limit people's freedom
[16] Kovas, J. *Intervention and Underdevelopment*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University park and London, 1983, pp.131-132
[17] Kovas, J. *Intervention and Underdevelopment*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University park and London, 1983, pp. 152-152, 160

At dawn of the Second World War, Metaxas tried to maintain the neutrality of his country, however he was strongly pressured by Dictator Benito Mussolini, aligned and supported by the military aid of Adolf Hitler. The continuous pressure by Germany and Italy ended up with the rejection of the ultimatum given by Mussolini, and on October 28th, 1940, Italy invaded Greece form Albania, that had been occupied eighteen months previously. An attempt made by the dictator to reconquer the lost territories successfully pushed the Italian army back to Albania, holding the Italian forces under siege for the next five months[18].

On account of the liaison between the British government and Greece, Metaxas accepted the military aid that had been offered to the country, however his biggest fear was that of trying to avoid the interference in the conflict of the German power. The relationship between Britain and Greece, strengthen when the German troops, due to the instability and weakness of the peninsula, decided to enter in the borders in April 1941. This attack led the Greeks and British to retreat in Crete, where they struggled to fight against the parachute and glider troops sent by the Germans for ten days. However, the resistance lasted for a short period of time, in fact by the beginning of June, the Greek territory was tripartite between Germany obtaining the territories of Salonika and its surroundings and most of Crete; Bulgaria was granted Macedonia and Thrace and the remain of mainland Greece and her islands, that had been already occupied before the beginning of the war were allocated in the hands of Italy. This resulted in the king George II abandoning his country and escaping in the Middle East; lack of food due to the confiscation of food stocks by the invaders that led to the death of at least 100.000 people between the years of 1941-1942, and finally the deportation of virtually the entire Jewish population to death camps, most of them deported to Auschwitz. The Germans, hence, devasted the country, disrupted transportation and farming, terrorized civilians and led to the collapse of the Greek economy.

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[18] Bowman, S. *The agony of Greek Jews, 1940-1945*, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2009, pp.58-80

Verikoukis, 2006

PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION

The Greek communist party's struggle to obtain the power in Greece can be distinguished in three different phases. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) was born in 1918, originally known as the Socialist Workers' party of Greece, the first attempts were made to introduce the party in the political arena and find the approval of the Greek citizens. The first phase of the party is vaguely defined: the climax however it has been pointed out between the years of 1943 and 1944, during the occupation of the peninsula by the Germans, when the war led to a status of civil war. The second phase can be defined as the attempts made by the party to seize control of the Capital, and consequently of the rest of the country, in 1944 right after the end of the German occupation. Lastly, the third phase is known as the Civil War that ranged between 1946 to 1949[19].

In this part of the chapter, the main focus will be mostly on the period that goes from 1941 to 1947, in particular on the period from 1945 to 1947; useful to clear the path that will lead us to the definition of democracy in the year 1974. From 1941 until October 1944, Greece remained under the rule of the Axis power. As mentioned in the previous section of the chapter, although Italy and Bulgaria had participated in the administration of the country, the real control of the peninsula laid in the hands of the Germans. The organization of the

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[19] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002

shared power functioned through collaborationist cabinets under the Axis' authorities. On the contrary the Allies recognized *de jure* that was represented by the government of the exiled King George II. With the exiled king far from its throne, the main actor that was competing against the control of the Allies was the communist party (KKE). The representatives of the party were accustomed to clandestine activity since, during the Metaxas dictatorship they had been persecuted and needed secret networks to manage the party in secret[20].

In May 1941, the National Mutual Aid (AE) was founded by the communists, and just a few months later the National Workers Liberation Front (EEAM) had been founded. What helped reinforcing the role of the newly created communist front happened during the sixth Plenum, that met under a new central committee that had been recreated thanks to the help of some KKE representatives who had escaped from the Akronafplia concentration camp. For reference, The Plenum is composed of all (300) MPs elected in the general elections, which are normally held every four years unless the Parliament is dissolved at an earlier date. The interval between two elections is a "Parliamentary Term" (Hellenic parliament). The main objective that needed to be achieved was that of creating a new national front policy that pushed Greek people to "for a national liberation front". Consequently, by the end of August a crisis between the old central committee and the totality of the KKE organization that survived the Metaxas dictatorship had accepted the creation of a new central Committee and in September 1941, the Seventh Plenum gathered and on the 27th of September 1941 the National Liberation front (EAM) came to life[21].

It is worth mentioning that during these years other resistance groups tried to put themselves into this newly created political arena, however the EAM remained the most important one. Indeed, its influence was so strong that at the end of the occupation in 1945, it became virtually a *de facto* government and, therefore, a rival to the regime that was in exile. The KKE, through the EAM and the support of the armed forces of the ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army) became the dominant resistance party in the peninsula. The same party, just a few years early was almost destructed under the Metaxas dictatorship, had become the representatives of the resistance of Greek's citizens with almost 300.00 members. The

[20] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002
[21] Vlavianos, H. *Greece, 1941-49: From resistance to Civil War*, Scholarly and reference Division, New York, 1992, pp.24

numbers that instead represented the EAM/ELAS organization were roughly two million members, almost thirty per cent of the population[22].

From the creation of ELAS in April 1942, its influence grew exponentially, strengthening their conditions thanks to the Germans that were exacerbating food supplies and assets from the villages and forcing the survivors of the famine to take matter in their own hands and enter in the guerilla's lines. By September the fight against the Axis representatives became frequent, with thousands of people joining. By the spring of 1943 the occupation decreased its control on the peninsula: it had unstable control in parts of the North East, the Centre and the South West, withdrawing entirely from some towns[23].

THE BATTLE FOR ATHENS AND THE BEGINNIG OF THE CIVIL WAR

In October 1944, the German forces withdrew from a devasted Greece, considering that at least 500.000 people died during the occupation; however, this strengthens the role of the EAM claiming the membership of at least two million members and, de facto, running a proto government in eighty percent of the country. In this chaotic environment, the British forces guided by the command of lieutenant general Ronald Scobie, were preparing to restore the king with the installation of a provisional government guided by members of the EAM in Athens. However, tensions grew between the two forces, when Britain hoped to disarm the EAM supporters as quickly as possible since it was considered to be dangerous for the future of the Peninsula. The climax was reached on December 3rd, 1944 when the Greek police shot 28 people and injured hundreds of civilians at a pro-EAM demonstrations. In response to this brutality, the EAM organized a general strike. Two days later Churchill ordered Scobie to eliminate all the forces of EAM present in Athens: "hesitate to act as if… in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress." The British forces eventually prevailed, but only with the help of German prisoners and reinforcements from Italy. However, 267 troops died in the fighting and at least a thousand were wounded[24].

The tensions at the end of the Second World War between the communists of the KKE and the "Westerners" that represented the royalist government that was restored by the

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[22] Vlavianos, H. *Greece, 1941-49: From resistance to Civil War*, Scholarly and reference Division, New York, 1992, pp.24-25
[23] Vlavianos, H. Greece, 1941-49: From resistance to Civil War, Scholarly and reference Division, New York, 1992, pp.20-31
[24] Sinclair, G.F. *To Reform the World,* Oxford University Press, UK, 2017, pp. 75-102

plebiscite in 1946. The Greek civil war has been defined as Europe's most intense and violent armed conflicts during the Cold War period. It witnessed the intervention of countries that were not directly related to the national issues, however the strategic position that Greece had at the beginning of the Cold war, saw the intrusion of Superpowers in the conflict. The Greek government army was supported by the United Kingdom and the United States, while the Democratic Army of Greece was backed up by Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria[25].

Even though the communists were consistently outnumbered by the "Westerners forces" they were veterans of Guerilla warfare and had the means to fight well. They represented the communist ideologies in Greece, however the USSR limitedly supported the rebels, because the main objective of the Soviet Union was that of creating instability rather than taking over in Greece. An important role in supporting the rebels was played by Marshal Tito that supported them with thousands of rifles, machine guns and land mines. The only thing that communists lacked were basic supplies, meaning that they only had enough strength to carry on resistance, but not nearly enough to exert control[26]. Furthermore, the Greek period from 1946 to 1949 has to be perceived as the result of a communist- inspired revolution conceived domestically. The leaders of the insurgency viewed their struggle at the time, generally labeling a people's revolution (*laiki epanastasi*) whose goal was a people's democracy (*laiki demokratia*) would be the first major step on the road of "true socialism"[27].

THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR

Britain officially withdrew from the Greek territories in the early 1947, however the American military advisors turned the tide favor of the Greek government after 1948. President Truman strongly rejected Greek calls to finance the national army; the support given to them was only happening through equipment and training. Reinforced by this American stand, the Greek government forces successfully pushed the rebels into the mountains[28].

[25] Marantzidis, N. *Foreign Affairs Hellenic Edition,* 2013
[26] Lengel, E. *Modern War Studies,* 2020
[27] Iatrides et al. *Studies in the history of the Greek Civil War, 1954-1949*, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987, pp. 30-31
[28] Lengel, E. *Modern War Studies,* 2020

The Greek civil war reached its climax in August 1949, when the last major communist stronghold in the Massif of Grammos near the Albanian border, had been targeted by the American forces supporting the Greek government. After days of strenuous combat, the rebels broke, streaming back across the Albanian border. The end of the civil war in Greece was signed by the final assault on Mount Grammos[29] supported by Helldivers[30] dropping napalm and consequently destroying the remnants of the rebel army. The fight was officially over once Stalin ordered the Greek communists to end the war and declare cease-fire (Marantzidis, 35-40). The defeat of the Democratic Army in 1949 would lead to a complete elimination of the communist party from the Nation's political arena. The rehabilitation of the political party will have to wait the self-destruction of the colonels' junta twenty-five years later[31].

The end of the civil war paved the way to the democratization process, however a harsh price had to be paid. The forces of the Greek government suffered about 48,000 casualties from 1946 to 1949; their opponents suffered about half as many casualties. Both sides however through their death squads murdered thousands of civilians, however many more died from brutality, famine and diseases. As a result, at least 158,000 Greeks died as the result of the civil war[32].

POST CIVIL WAR GREECE: 1949-1967

After the end of the tumultuous times of the civil war, Greece officially entered in the Cold war period and the constraints that once came from the internal fractures, now are coming from the two Superpowers that are willing to control the strategic peninsula. The importance played by Greece during the cold war has been analyzed thoroughly by many historians, and it has been painted as the "landing zone" of the Cold War animosity. However, the characteristics of Greece in from 1949 has been perceived to be similar to many Iron Curtain countries, thus diminishing the important role that has been buckled to the peninsula. Greece since the beginning of its presence in the Cold War scenario, was mostly interested

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[29] Operation Pyrsos
[30] a small greyish-brown North American grebe, Podilymbus podiceps, with a small bill
[31] Iatrides et al. *Studies in the history of the Greek Civil War, 1954-1949*, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987, pp. 26-29
[32] Lengel, E. *Never in Finer company*, De Capo Press, 2018, pp. 20-35

in its diplomatic relations, economic stagnation and the intervention of the United States and Great Britain, and internal conflict with the anti-communist movement in Greece. The rhetoric that has been promoted by Washington in promoting directives related to the anticommunism and anti-subversion, was created to safeguard the United States against the enemy of Socialist American communist supporters. The American tactics towards Athens, after the Civil War period, was perceived as a mean through which there was an absolute compliance from both sides regarding their individual necessity. The elites in Washington wanted Athens to be a "moderate government" to create a balance of powers to avoid a right- and left-wing polarization, that led Greece into the civil war. Consequently, the ultimate objective of the United States was the achievement of a strong and stable government in Greece, avoiding the intromission of the communist supporters in the political life of the Greek citizens[33]. Furthermore, the United States fearing the possibility of an expansion into the Mediterranean of the communist ideologies and dominance, has used Greece and its global importance to the Cold War narrative as a protection against the enemy in the East.

The first post-civil-war government, two new political parties arose in Greece: the first one represented by Marshal Papagos, head of the Greek rally, who was commander in-chief during the later stages of the civil war. The second political party was the United Democratic left, which was representing a branch of the banned communist party. The Greek rally deranged the people's party on the right and consequently won the majority of the votes. The system used however upset the United States that publicly threatened a reduction of the economic aids, unless the electoral system was changed from the former one of proportionality to majority. The strong constraint coming from Washington benefitted Papagos whose, helped by the outbreak of the Korean war, was perceived to be by the American elites the best guarantor of political stability and peace and an important ally against the leftist party[34]. In November 1952, the Greek rally won the elections; the majority system that had been newly adopted translated to 49% of popular vote into 82% of the seats. Since the arrival of Papagos in power, the right-wing party will rule until 1963[35]. Greece remained part of the democratic world, entering NATO in 1952, to further strengthen the grip and control of the United States in the peninsula, however the price was an illiberal democracy that treated the weaken and defeated communist counterparts

[33] Tzolis, HX. *The price of Freedom: Greece's role in the Cold war*. Thesis, Georgia state University, 2013, pp. 43-44
[34] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 144-145
[35] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 146

harshly, deepening the division in the Greek political arena. Washington wield the Greek politics while the newly elected king Paul, who succeeded his father George II, alienate the elected governments, especially in the mid-1960s. Notwithstanding, Greece remained a democracy[36]. Concurrently, nine years after the end of the civil war the banned communist party, that was repressed by a leftist party during these tumultuous political times, managed to become, for a brief period of time, the second strongest party, however the leading politician was Konstantinos Karamanlis, a conservative leader who in only eight years, from 1955 to 1963, transformed Greece. He successfully linked Greece with the European communities and more spectacularly he was responsible for an impressive economic growth due to rapid industrialization and investment in tourism and infrastructures. Karamanlis found a provisionary solution to the Cyprus problem, that since the 1950s had plagues foreign relations and most importantly, domestic relations. Greek Cypriots represented the majority (78%) in the Island. The minority (18%) represented by Turkish Cypriot, felt constantly threatened by the possibility of *enosis*[37]. Karamanlis, instead of insisting on the merger between the two territories, agreed with Turkey and Great Britain, to create an independent Republic in 1960[38].

The positive impact of Karamanlis, however, did not last. Following an altercation with the King Paul, the conservative leader was forced to resign and then lost the elections in 1963 to a centralist leader George Papandreou, who resigned shortly after to seek an absolute majority; his gamble paid off and his Centre Union party obtained 53% share, a figure only once exceeded in the post-war period, and a seemingly absolute majority also in the parliament in 1964. As the newly elected leader of Greece, he introduced a program of social reforms; he strongly criticized the excessive influence of the United States in the affairs of the country (Stergiou, A. *Greece's Ostpolitik*, Springer international Publishing, 2008, pp. 70-71). Unfortunately, Papandreou's office did not last long. A major crisis started in Cyprus, destabilizing his premiership, and consequently impoverishing the Greek figure at an international level. The prelacy of foreign affairs over domestic ones, interfered in the accomplishment of all his election promises, weakening his position. As soon as Papandreou took power, the system of power sharing in Cyprus implemented by his predecessor Karamanlis, broke down. In November 1963, President Makarios[39], who was

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[36] Hatzis, Aristede. *Law and economics: philosophical issues and fundamental questions*, Routledge, 2015, pp. 11-12
[37] The union of the island with Greece
[38] Hatzis, Aristede. *Law and economics: philosophical issues and fundamental questions*, Routledge, 2015, pp. 11-15
[39] Archbishop and primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. He was a leader in the struggle for enosis (union) with Greece during the postwar British occupation, and, from 1959 until his death in 1977, he was the president of independent Cyprus.

in line with the Orthodox tradition, requested a drastic reduction in the powers that had been granted to the Turkish minority. The response of the Turkish Cypriots was in the negative and the proposal had been forcefully rejected by the Turkish government. In December, the inevitable fight broke out and the threat of a Turkish intervention in the Island was spreading[40].

The response of Papandreou to this chaotic situation is what led him to lose his grip on the control of the political life of Greece. He rejected a form of "double" enosis, which contemplated the union of Cyprus with Greece, with the creation of a self-governing Turkish cantons on the Island, the installation of bases controlled by mainland Turkey, and the cession of Kastellorizo, a small Greek Island. Furthermore, Papandreou's inflationary economic policies, threaten the very delicate financial stability achieved during the years of Karamanlis[41].

The climax was reached in July 1965 when the prime minister needed the consent of the King to take over the ministry of defense. The king, Constantine II, refused Papandreou request because "improper" as his own son was under investigation for his role in the Aspida conspiracy[42]. After this decision Papandreou was forced to resign. Withal, his political life was not over: he consistently argued that new elections were the only way out of this hectic political situation and, eventually, these were scheduled to take place, under a "provisional" government, in May 1967, following an agreement between Papandreou and Kanellopoulos, the new representative of the National radical Union, once under the leadership of Karamanlis. The strong campaign proposed by the two leaders, however, was eclipsed by strenuous demands for the parliamentary immunity of his son, Andreas, after the accusations for the Aspida conspiracy. Simultaneously, the provisional government failed in its purpose, and Kanellopoulos was charged with the supervision of the elections. Howbeit, on April 21st, 1967, a group of officers organized an efficient coup, whose objective was to pre-empt the certain victory of the Centre Union[43]. These actions will catapult Greece in seven years of authoritarian regimes.

[40] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 155-160).
[41] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.70
[42] Allegations that the younger Papandreou was looked upon as a leader by a conspirational group within the army, a vaguely left-wing counter part of the ultra-right-wing IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek officers) which had been founded among Greek forces in the Middle East during the Second World War.
[43] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.159

THE COUP D'ETAT: THE MECHANISM AND STRUCTURE

The coup was essentially an indolent and bloodless procedure. It started around two AM, on the 21st of April 1967 and by the end of the day the key objectives of the coup, such as radio stations, communications, journals and the air base pf Athens, were under the control of the military rule, and their ideologies were quickly spreading throughout the territories of Greece. In the morning of the 21st of April, the military junta broadcasted to the Greek population the following announcement:

"The armed forces have taken over the government of the country. The king in accordance with article No. 91 of the Greek constitution following a proposal by the cabinet, in case of a serious trouble or an obvious threat to the public security and order of the country, has ordered a royal decree the suspension all over the country of Articles No. 5,6,8,10,11,12,14,20,95, and 97 of the constitution. The king also in accordance with Article No.91 has formed special courts – martial".

However, it is worth mentioning that the usage of the name of the King had not been authorized. The king had to initiated nor supported the coup; this point had also been strengthened by the UPI interview of one of the coup leaders colonel Nikolas Makarezos, who reinforced the notion that the king was not aware of any of the decisions taken by the junta[44].

On the same day it was also announced that the state was to be considered under a state of siege[45] stipulating that: *"(1) Individuals can be apprehended and arrested without charge. They can be detained for any length of time. (2) All citizens independent of position, can be bought before an emergency court-martial. (4) All gatherings, indoors or outdoors, are forbidden. All gatherings will be dissolved by force. […] (7) It is forbidden to denounce or publish any kind of information in any way through the press, radio and television without censorship beforehand. (8) Letters, telegrams and all means of communication will be censored […] (10) Everyone who commits a crime which should be punished by law, even if it is not against the army will also be judged by court-martial"[46].*

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[44] Donald, Munn. *Military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974)*, Monterey, California, 1980, pp.45-47
[45] a situation in which the government limits people's freedom to enter or leave a city, town or building

[46] Donald, Munn. *Military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974)*, Monterey, California, 1980, pp. 48

The communist threat was the most widespread justification to the implementation of an authoritarian regime in Greece. However there has not been any real or tangible evidence produced by the junta leaders to support this theory. The officers that had fought the communist between 1944 and 1949 and in the Korean war, and the Junta certainly tried to convince the Greek citizens of the communist threat. Historically and politically, as previously mentioned, had shown developments preceding the coup to support the fears of the communist threat. In 1956, elections had legitimized EDA; in 1958 the EDA received twenty-five percent of the vote and became the opposite party. In 1963, Papandreou's party took the control of the government, shifting the political influence of the country to a more "leftist" approach. Finally, Papandreou, was very vocal about the crown, the NATO and lastly the USA, all of which the military stood for[47].

From a political point of view, the two years of political turmoil with the continuous change of administration and leaders, have to be considered as slightly responsible for the coup of the junta. The coup can be perceived to be the deathblow to the wreak of the previous multi-party system that had been deteriorating at a slow pace[48].

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[47] Donald, Munn. *Military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974)*, Monterey, California, 1980, pp.51
[48] Donald, Munn. *Military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974)*, Monterey, California, 1980, pp.52

TABLE 4

NAME, RANK AND GOVERNMENTAL POSITION

OF THE MAJOR COUP LEADERS

Name	Rank in 1967	Governmental Position
G. Papadopoulos	Colonel	Minister to the Prime Minister
S. Pattakos	Brigadier General	Interior and Security Minister
N. Makarezos	Colonel	Economic Coordination Minister
G. Spandidakis	Lieutenant General	Deputy Prime Minister & Defense Minister
G. Zoitakis	Lieutenant General	Undersecretary for National Defense
J. Ladas	Colonel	Undersecretary for Thessaly
D. Ioannides	Lieutenant Colonel	Commander of the Military Police

James Brown "military intervention and the politics of Greece", 1974, pp. 236, table 12

The main actors and initiator of the coup were, Brigadier general Stylianos Pattakos, Colonel Nikolas Makarezos and Colonel Papadopoulos, however the latter is recognized as the real representative and the real architect of the coup. He was a prominent member of conspiratorial group of officers, untied by the sense of super-patriotism. In the seven years of total control of Papadopoulos he was not unable to build any degree of popular support. He was the victim of an assassination attempt in august 1968, however the security apparatus surrounding the prime minister were able to protect him, and the perpetrators of the attempted assassination had been harshly punished through the widespread usage of torture. This inhuman treatment of "political enemies" of the newly created government, was the coup de grace that led to the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe[49].

The widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the Greek citizens is tangible in the reports arrived in Paris on the 12th of May, according to which at least two underground resistance

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[49] Kouvertais, G. *A profile of Modern Greece, in search of identity*, Internet archive, 1987, pp. 94-118

organizations had been formed. The first one was named *Patriotiko Metopo*[50], created by a former leftist EDA Parliamentary deputy Mikis Theodorakis just few days after the coup d'état. The Second organization was the *Demokratiki Amyna*[51] mainly created and supported by the members of the Central Union and followers of Papandreou[52]. However, the life of the two organizations did not last long, in particular, Theodorakis was arrested and imprisoned without a fair trial and stated "(I am) suffering daily from all kinds of pressure"[53].

The third source of danger that Papadopoulos failed to recognize at its stage, were the body of students of higher education. Their resentment was, at first, only concentrated on domestic matters, such as the right to elect their own political representatives and discuss the content of their educational curriculum. The real threat, however, was the possibility of a collaboration between the students and a disciplined organization of the working classes. However, this newly created organization presented little threat to the junta in 1973. Their means were not harsh enough for the junta to be overthrown[54]. The most prominent organizations survived by inactivity, less popular ones emerged and disappeared in a short period of time. One of them in particular, the Greek anti-dictatorship Youth (EAN), was responsible for arm explosion in April, that assassinated an Arab visitor. Still, the perpetrators of the terroristic attack were quickly captured and arrested[55].

The actions and attempts of this organizations, cannot be perceived to be a success story, however the unanimous hatred towards the authoritarian regime is what will lead Papadopoulos to loosen his grip on Greece and, in particular, on Greeks.

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[50] Patriotic front
[51] Democratic defense
[52] Schwab, P, et al. *Greece under the Junta*, facts on file, Inc. USA, 1970, pp.66-67
[53] Schwab, P, et al. *Greece under the Junta*, facts on file, Inc. USA, 1970, pp.36
[54] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002, pp. 112-113
[55] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002, pp.113

CYPRUS: ISLE OF DISCORD

The Island of Cyprus occupies in the Easter Mediterranean area, a strategic position, since it is positioned five hundred miles from Greece, but only forty miles from the cost of Turkey. It has a total area of 3,572 squares miles, with a length of one hundred thirty-wight miles and a width of fifty-nine miles[56]. Of the estimated population of 650,000, as much as eighty percent speak Greek and follow the Greek Orthodox religion, while the minority is represented by the eighteen percent, that speaks Turkish and is Moslems. The residue is made up of Maronites, British and Armenians[57]. The first sovereign state in Cyprus emerged in 1571, when the island had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks, a regime that lasted for three hundred and seven years, and during which the Turkish community had been forced to exist side by side the Greek speaking community[58]. The Turkish administration ended in 1878, when the control of the island was granted to Great Britain[59], in exchange for protection of the Ottoman empire against the aggression of Russia[60]. In November of 1914, as Turkey entered World War I, the island was formally adjoined by Britain, and in 1925 it became a British colony. The crisis for *enosis,* for Britain, was reinforces following World War II, as they were pushing Hellenic Cyprus to return to Greece. On the other side, the Turkish forces, were insisting on the division of the Island, to protect the Turkish minority on the Island. These divergent demands by both parties, lead to a civil strike instigated mainly, by the Greek terrorist organization, EOKA, led by Makarios and a Greek Army colonel, George Grivas[61]. In 1957, after ten years of an intermittent guerilla, the British forces ceded to change the sovereign status of the Island. The idea was that of transforming Cyprus into an independent nation, however this independence, was to be charred with certain restrictions to alleviate the fears and preoccupations of the Turkish Cypriot Minority[62].

Greeks-Turkish relations in Cyprus have been marked by both antagonism and mistrust. The conflict in Cyprus can be defined to be a domestic ethnic conflict. It usually takes place within a state, however the consequences might, sometimes, extend beyond the natural

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[56] Streissguth, T. World Conflict in Cyprus: Divided Island, Lerner Publications Company, Minneapolis, 1975, pp.513

[57] Streissguth, T. World Conflict in Cyprus: Divided Island, Lerner Publications Company, Minneapolis, 1975, pp. 513

[58] Ehrlich, R. *A population bomb*, A Sierra Club, Ballentine Book, 1966, pp. 15-81

[59] In the Turkish-British agreement, there was a stipulation that Cyprus was to pay to Turkey a sum of 97,799 pounds, 11 shillings, and thruppence. This was such an economic burden to the island for over seventy years, and the development of the country was in danger due to a lack of funds.

[60] Georgallides, *Cyprus*, 1970, pp. 691.692. Also, Richter, History of Cyprus, pp. 483

[61] Streissguth, T. World Conflict in Cyprus: Divided Island, Lerner Publications Company, Minneapolis, 1975, pp. 514

[62] Turnbull, Cyprus and the British, British History illustrated, 1974, pp. 77).

geographical boundaries. Ethnic groups, especially the minorities or the ones considered to be the weakest, are more inclined to look for support and collaboration beyond state boundaries, to strengthen their role internally. Since the world is becoming more ethnic and less geographic, it is pretty straightforward that ethnicity has had, and will have, a major impact on the future international policies. Thus, it is crucial to keep in mind the role played by ethnicity both domestically and internationally[63]. Cyprus's fate has been determined by three different geographical characteristics: location, size and the fact that it is an island. It is at the crossroads of three continents and it has a strategic position in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. Its strategic position, the overly exposed coastline and the small size, has made it very appetible for the outsiders and eventual colonizers[64].

Source: Magellan Geographix, 1997. A simple political map of the Republic of Cyprus.

FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN CYPRUS

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[63] Joseph, J. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and international politics, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 1997, pp, 6-7).
[64] Joseph, J. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and international politics, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 1997, pp, 15-20.

When talking about the Cyprus and the international consequences that were later initiated by both Cyprus and Greece, for my analysis it is also worth analyzing the failure of the international community that bittered the later communications between the two parties. Following the appropriation of power in 1963, Archbishop Makarios, openly presented Cyprus as a "unitary Hellenic state", and he described the Turkish minority present on the island as the "rebellious minority", not perceived by the Greeks as a politically equal partner[65]. He, also, exploited the hatred between the East and the West, represented by the Soviet Union and the United States, to blackmail both parties into supporting the Greek Cypriots in their crusade against the Turks. Consequently, on the 23rd of February 1964, three soviet ship, landed on the cost of Cyprus (specifically in Famagusta) with cargo to support thorough arms and military attire[66]. Because the international situations and dynamics were worsening due to the involvement of too many parties in the island business, it was up to Britain, the designated third guarantor of the peace in Cyprus, and to the UN to fulfill their obligations on the Island[67]. On the 4th of March 1964, the UN security council met and opted for the implementation of resolution 186, that sent to Cyprus a UN peacekeeping force, the UNFICYP, that as its main objective had to "facilitate a return to normal conditions", however, the westerners weakened and involved in the Cuban Crisis, and fearing a possible retaliation by the leader Makarios, decided to give impunity to the Greek Cypriot and Greece[68]. This approach however, quickly turned into captivity. The UN troops that had been stationed on the island, were keep hostages rather than protectors or as restorers of order. This dramatic and dangerous situation was captured perfectly on the 13th of September 1964, when George Ball[69], on Ban urgent visit to Cyprus sent a telegram to the Secretary of State reporting that: "The Government of Cyprus is committed to a strategy which, after our discussions of the last two days, I think even they should believe is silly, of trying to neutralize Turkey by a Security Council Resolution condemning aggression and guaranteeing territorial integrity. In this manner, they hope to eliminate the one defense of the Turkish Cypriot population, so that the Government of Cyprus can proceed happily with systematic genocide, without outside interference [...] We must face the fact that Cyprus is an island infected by a blood lust, and that there is no government that seriously wants to maintain order. It is only desire is to liquidate the Turkish Cypriots" (British Embassy to

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[65] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.3
[66] Salahi R, Sonyel. *Cyprus: the destruction of a republic* – British Documents, 1960-1965, Eothen Press, 1997, pp. 85).
[67] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.3
[68] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.3-7
[69] US undersecretary of State

Mervyn Brown of FO, Ankara). One day after the implementation of the resolution, Makarios descried the solution as successful and as a win for all the Greek Cypriots of the island, however historians, in particular, described the taking of the Resolution as: "It is remarkable that the United Nations not only failed to condemn the usurpation of the Constitution by force, but actually rewarded it by, in effect, recognizing the Greek Cypriot administration, which had usurped the Constitution, as the 'Government of the whole Island'" [70].

After the intervention of the Turkish air forces on the 8th and on the 9th of 1964, to protect and safeguard its minority, in Kokkina and Mansura, the USSR, on the 15th of August 1964, publicly announced that it would take action to help Cyprus in the event of a future foreign invasion, and that it was going to be ready to begin eventual negotiations on the matter[71].After this public stand of the Soviet Union, perceived as a threat to the international equilibrium, Dean Acheson and the British foreign Secretary, Butler, met on the 3rd of September 1964, to map a common strategy and work cooperatively towards a joint plan: ""The danger of a settlement of this kind (a common plan) collapsing in the face of Makarios' intransigence leads us all to the extreme and reluctant conclusion that there is no alternative to Papandreou's' idea of a Greek coup d'état, if a Mediterranean Cuba is to be avoided..."[72]. This conclusion by both the United States and the Soviet Union, is the proof of the success of the approach that Makarios had with both superpowers. The failure of the UN and the international community, had been, on the 10th of September 1964, covered up with the following words: "I think it is necessary to point out, with regard to the reference in the Security Council Resolution to 'a return to normal conditions', that there has been all along and continues to be what I consider to be a misunderstanding on the part of the Turkish community of Cyprus and of the Turkish Government as to the function and duty of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. The position of the Turkish side is that by a 'return to normal conditions', the Security Council intended a complete restoration of the situation in Cyprus exactly as it was before the fighting broke out in December, including, of course, the restoration of the constitutional situation. Therefore, in their eyes, UNFICYP should have been employing force, whenever necessary, to restore, over the opposition of the Cypriot Government, the constitutional situation relating to the privileges, rights and

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[70] Sonyel, op.cit., pp. 86

[71] [71] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.7-12

[72] Secret FO minutes, 10 September 1964, citation

immunities of the Turkish community in Cyprus. Thus, in this view, UNFICYP should not regard the Cypriot Government or any act taken by it as legal; the present Cypriot army, the National Guard, should be considered as illegal and should be treated as such by UNFICYP; the importation of arms by the Cypriot Government should be considered illegal under the Cypriot Constitution and should be stopped by UNFICYP in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions. I have not, of course, accepted these positions and have pointed out to those who hold them that the Security Council did not indicate such intentions in adopting its resolutions on this question"[73].The reality was, however, that the Security Council countries that in were involved in the peace keeping operations in Cyprus, backed down from their international obligations to defend the rule of law in Cyprus, as well as the decisions that had been taken on the 4th of March 1964[74]. The phrase previously stated "a return to normal conditions" in fact, only meant a return to the constitutional order before the fighting between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots broke out. The betrayal of the international community did not only fail the safeguarding of the Greek Cypriots, in the report dated on the 10th of September 1964, the Turkish Cypriots desperately asked to the community to save the 1960 bi-communal republic, which was never addressed or taken into consideration in the meetings of the Secretary-general. The UN security council, after having allowed the Greek Cypriots violations of the international agreement that has been set, even though the Turkish Cypriots were strongly against it, could not turn to the Turks minority and tell them that it was impossible to change the 1963 *fait accompli*[75] without the approval of both parties. Regrettably, this is what the international community had been asking to the Turkish Cypriots, when it told them that the future and their status, would have been asked, without their intromission, at a negotiating table.[76]

The attempts on the 4th of March 1964, and the consequent failure of those decisions, resulted in a fracture of the political balance between the two constituent peoples of the Island, and even worsened future compromise that could have been based on mutual power sharing, this, sadly, only led and prepared the grounds for the events of 1974. The failure of the international community disrupted the process of "partnership state-building" in Cyprus and lead the two communities to go back to their territories for survival and security.

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[73] Report, S/5950, para. 218

[74] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.5.

[75] A thing accomplished and presumably irreversible

[76] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.7-9

THREE PHASES OF CYPRUS

Three main phases have characterized and shaped Cyprus in recent decades. Until 1960 the issue was colonial that has been settled with the granting of independence and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. From 1960 to 1974, the main issue was related to the internal disputes between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, in which both internal and external powers were involved. These powers were mainly Greece, Turkey and Britain, those who guaranteed the independence of Cyprus up until 1960. Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union, were also involved by virtue of their superpower status. The third phase is the one that goes from 1974, where the dominant element that has been taken into consideration is the facto the division of the island the military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkey[77].

FIRST PHASE

As we analyze the first phase of Cyprus, it is worth noting that what led up to the violent revolts of 1955 were not merely spontaneous actions taken by an opportunistic leadership but rather they were a mass protest which had built up during the seven decades of the colonial leadership of Great Britain[78]. The Greek Cypriot EOKA[79] launched a guerilla campaign against the colonizers, while the Cypriot political leader, Archbishop Makarios brought the matter in front of the United Nations and further international bodies. This resulted, however, in the Turkish Cypriots objecting the union with Greece and called for an equal partition of the Island. The EOKA's anti-British movement, thus, led to outbreaks of violence[80]. In the early stages of the rapprochement of Cyprus, an important actor that played a crucial role was Archbishop Makarios that had been elected on December the 13th, 1959, as the president of the Republic of Cyprus. As the newly elected president, he was a key actor that helped the later agreement recognized as the Zurich – London agreement. A solution to this dramatic situation was needed. Pressure coming both from inside and outside the island could only be solved thought diplomatic means. In the early moments of 1959, tripartite talks were arranged in Zurich between Britain, Greece and Turkey. The

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[77] Joseph, J. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and international politics, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 1997, pp. 14-20
[78] Adams, P. *A rough map of Greece*, Little Brown and Company, 1964, pp. 209
[79] National organization of Cypriot Fighters
[80] Adams, P. *A rough map of Greece*, Little Brown and Company, 1964, pp. 6-7

outcome of the diplomatic talk was the establishment of an independent Cypriot state, the republic of Cyprus. The final agreement was signed in London on the 19th of February 1959. However, it is possible to say that it was in effect a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey under the supervision of the British elites[81]. This was possible due to major differences between those who were directly involved in the matters of Cyprus. The agreement, in fact, was reached taking into consideration ethnic, historical, linguistic, cultural and religious ties.

A joint report was issued by Karamanlis and Menderes, after their meetings between the 5th and the 11th of February, stating that the foreign ministers Evangelos Avweoff-Tossizza of Greece and Fatin Rustu Zorlu of Turkey had been send to London to inform Britain about the reached agreement[82].

The two contending states – Turkey and Greece – were allowed, with this agreement, to station armed contingents in Cyprus, more specifically 650 for Greece and 650 for Turkey. However, the army never came into being and was promptly replaced by the Greek National Guard, the Cypriot police became totally Greek and as a reaction the Turkish Cypriots established an independent militia to protect their independence[83].

In the London-Zurich agreement, elaborate and excessive features were outlined for the protection of the Turks minority. The Turks, indeed, were granted thirty percent of the seats in the unicameral parliament[84] , and forty percent of the positions in the projected (never adopted) bicommunal armed forces. Additionally, the vice president of the Turkish Cypriots, as well as the Greek president, were intitled veto power[85]

SECOND PHASE

As previously mentioned, Cyprus gained its independence in 1960, however the precarious peace that had been hard to obtain, did not last long. Two and half years later a new crisis erupted, precisely on the 1st of January 1963. The newly elected president, Makarios had recently abolished the municipal councils, and the functions were all granted to the Greek Cypriot- dominated central government[86].

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[81] Joseph, J. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and international politics, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 1997, pp, 20-21
[82] Tonybee, A. *The western question in Greece and Turkey*, Alpha editions, 2019, pp.54-60.
[83] Ibid. pp. 8
[84] The House of Representatives
[85] Tonybee, A. *The western question in Greece and Turkey*, Alpha editions, 2019, pp.9-12.
[86] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.171-209

Tensions were further aggravated when on the 30th of November 1963 Makarios proposed a series of constitutional reforms, that included the abolishment of the Turkish Cypriot veto in the legislature procedure[87].Makarios understood that an amendment of the constitution was imperative. Fazil Küçük, vice president of Cyprus and representative of the Turks minority in Cyprus, however, was strongly against this forced change. In response, in 1963 Makarios called the guarantors of the Power, namely Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom, for an exceptional meeting to discuss this tense situation, that eventually led to a meeting that was held in London[88]. Turkey supported the Turkish vice president, and the conference that needed to fix the incompatibilities in Cyprus, was further strengthened. In response to the failed meeting, in November 1963, Makarios announced his thirteen points, created for the reconstruction of the constitutional order, nevertheless Turkey rejected this initiative without the consultation of Küçük[89]. The problem behind this dispute laid in the feeling of unfairness shared by both minorities. The Greek Cypriots rebuked what they felt to be unfair share of power: the agreement of 1960 in fact, gave them less than what they were expecting, given the size of the population and their contributions for the economy of Cyprus. The disappointment of Greek nationalism and the deprivation of the rights that needed to be granted, added to the apprehension concerning the eventual objectives of the Turkish Cypriots, were fueling the desire to promote a strong partition between the two minorities[90].

For the Turkish Cypriots present in the island, the constitution of 1960, needed to be implemented as strongly as possibly because it was the only way for them to cope with the overwhelming numbers of Greeks present on the island. Therefore, a sudden change in the constitution was perceived as suspicious by the Turkish Cypriots, since it could have meant a change in the political internal equilibrium of the Island. This tension led to the breakdown of the 1960 and renewed, in1963, to the ethnic violence.

The outburst of violence erupted on the 25th of December 1963, and the fighting reached its climax in 1964, with the bombings of Northwestern Cyprus by the Turkish air forces, straightening the already tense situation that started from in the 1950s. The outcome was a wave of riots, protests and marches following the submission of the thirteen amendments. Subsequently, in 1964, Makarios took the issue to the United Nations.

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[87] Ibid. pp. 204
[88] Ioannis, V. *The 1974 crisis over Cyprus: foreign will or ethnic conflict,* Master of Arts in national security affairs, 2007, pp.9
[89] Ibid, pp.9-10
[90] Kitromilides, P. *Cyprus Reviewed*, The Jus Cypri Association in Cooperation with the Coordinating Committee of Scientific and Cultural Organization, Nicosia, 1977, pp.50

The inevitable consequence was on the 4th of March 1964, when the UN security council through resolution n° 186, established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in order to "prevent a recurrence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions" in Cyprus (Naomi, 1977). The peacekeeping operation consisted of 6,411 military personnel Commanded by General Gyani, accosted by 175 civilian police personnel that had been deployed at the beginning of April 1964. The resolution of 4th of march, however failed to reduce the tensions in Cyprus. The next day Turkish armed forces fired shots in the Saint Hilarion fortress, and just two days after on the 6th of March, a bomb exploded in the Turkish Cypriot communal chamber[91]. Similarly, as in 1958, was to blame the Greeks and to use it as an excuse to quarrel. This new explosion of violence was used by both Turkey and the United States to impose a neat partition upon Cyprus, the so-called *Acheson Plan*[92]. The plan, in August 1964, proposed an enosis in return for a NATO base of the island under Turkish command, however Makarios rejected it, as he believed that the plan would lead to a double enosis[93].The plan in fact, consisted in a series of negotiations between the United States, Britain, Greece and Turkey settling the disputes under the supervision of the NATO; the initiative called for a double union, if requested by the two parts, or the creation of a self-administrating cantons by the two communities. It was considered the possibility of arrangements between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea (Micheal, 2003, pp.74).

In March 1965, the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, subjected a report to the secretary general U Thant[94], dispensing recommendations for a settlement, yet the Turkish side was not in line with the revisited Acheson plan (Adams, 1988, pp.4). Starting from 1964, and reinforced after the facts of 1965, the Turkish Cypriots were dependent on economic and military aids coming from the Turkish Government, and both Greece and Turkey increased their military troops and contingents on the Island, going above the levels that were set under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance.

On the 7th of May 1965, King Constantine called for a meeting, which was attended by the following: Prime minister George Papandreou, foreign minister Kostopoulos, former prime

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[91] Stavros, P. *The history of Modern Cyprus*, Herts England, 2005, pp. 206
[92] Kitromilides, P. *Cyprus Reviewed*, The Jus Cypri Association in Cooperation with the Coordinating Committee of Scientific and Cultural Organization, Nicosia, 1977, pp.51
[93] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.210.

[94] Thant, known honorifically as U Thant, was a Burmese diplomat and the third secretary-general of the United Nations from 1961 to 1971, the first non-Scandinavian to hold the position.

ministers Pipinelis and Kanelopoulos, Defense minister Garoufalias, president of Cyprus Makarios, his foreign minister Kyprianou and the minister of defense Yiorkadgis; in the meeting the Greek government and the one of Cyprus, were considered to be acting unconstitutionally, because they were both not respecting the Zurich-London agreement of 1960[95]. Makarios was underlining that his main aim was to achieve Enosis, but without making any territorial concession to Turkey; he was only able to grant minority rights to the Turkish minority in Cyprus[96].

In 1966, the diplomatic relations in Cyprus deteriorated even further. The resignation of Galo Plaza[97] , following strong pressures coming from the Turkish minority, Makarios refused the intervention of another mediator in the internal affairs of Cyprus. There was however the necessity of a solution, and on the 2nd of March U Thant in concomitance with his special representative, Bernardes, to push for a discussion among Greece and Turkey. These talks between the two countries, however, did not lead to any agreement, leaving the situation in Cyprus unstable and unsure[98].

Finally, in 1967, the intercommunal violence overhastened into a further crisis. Following an attack in November by the Greece Cypriot National Guard on two Turkish Cypriot villages, in response Turkey transferred large amounts of troops to the Thracian border with Greece and Cyprus. The mediation and the intervention of U.S presidential emissary Cyrus Vance, bettered the tense situation and the sense of fear and hatered towards the two competitors on the island was rapidly calmed down. Both Greece and Turkey agreed to withdraw from the territories of Cyprus, all the military contingents that were considered over the numbers stated in the Treaty of alliance. Additionally, General Grivas, the Greek officer who has led the EOKA insurgency, resigned his command and returned to Greece.

THIRD PHASE

The Greek Coup d'état of 1967 favored a group of colonels to power in Athens and this caused a re-evaluation of the foreign policy of Ankara. The colonels, faced the situation in Cyprus by submitting a proposal in September 1967, following the guidelines of the Protocol that had been signed in 1966 – the Acheson plan – however in the wake of the

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[95] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.218
[96] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.219
[97] Galo Plaza Appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus
[98] Panteli, S. The history of mode4rn Cyprus, Herts, England, 2005, pp. 367

1967 crisis, the Turkish Cypriot leadership set up a Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration, headed by an 11-person council, to administer the affairs of the community (Adams, 1988, pp.7-8).

A lack of compromise, between Greeks and the Turkish, was expected after the coup, since it weakened the Greek side both internally and externally, and the Turkish Cypriot wanted to take advantage of the conditions. The newly created Greek government was facing a tough European response to the coup and a US embargo of weapons. For what concerned the European reaction it came through strong pressure for a return to a parliamentary democracy, human rights and economic pressured coming directly from the European community, but not taken into consideration by the governments involved[99]. For what concerned the US countermovement, was instead necessary and directly influenced by American security needs, related to Israel; in fact, President Nixon had been quoted on the 28th of July 1967 in the New York times by demanding policies defending Israel's security with assistance to Greece and Turkey, yet the impossibility of collaboration between of the two governments undermined this initiative[100].

It is worth mentioning that in 1967, the diplomatic consultations between Greece and Turkey, were not concluded under the involvement of Archbishop Makarios. The choice, taken by the new authoritarian government in Athens, was driven by nationalistic objectives. The intention was that of monopolize the responsibility for any developments in the case of Cyprus, and this was only possible thorough the removal of the leader of the island. This was possible using the National Guard[101] and the Greek forces that had been stationed in the Island. Even though, internally the division between the Junta and the Archbishop was neat, publicly they were portraying a collaborative approach between the leaders, in order not to create any frictions with the Greek and the Cypriots[102]. To further entangle the already unstable situation, the military leader of the Greek troops allocated in Cyprus was openly disagreeing with Makarios, which lead to grave implications for the Greek -Cypriot community.

In November, after the failure of the September talks, Grivas with the consent of the junta, launched an attack on two villages designated to the Turkish minority in Cyprus, in response

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[99] Panagiotis, L. *Greek Turkish Crisis since 1955*, Naval post graduate school, Springfield, 1997, pp. 37-40

[100] Panagiotis, L. *Greek Turkish Crisis since 1955*, Naval post graduate school, Springfield, 1997, pp. 37

[101] The National Guard is part of the Hellenic Army and are voluntary corps, mainly located in areas near the frontiers, consisted of trained and armed volunteer men

[102] Valinakis and Dales, 1994, pp. 38-39, The voting procedure, has been generally considered to be fair

to a minor incident and used it a scapegoat to initiate the attack. The reaction of Turkey was prompt, enclosing the possibility of overflights by the Turkish Air forces under the authorization by the Turkish National Assembly for the conduction of military operation outside the borders of Turkey[103].

The New York times reported on the 29th of November 1967: "The Turks see the moment ripe to get back at the Greeks for all the injury and insult they feel they have suffered in Cyprus since the US in effect prevented them for invading after communal fighting in December 1963. Now it is the time, the Turks say, for the security of their minority on the island to9 be assured for once and all, by agreement possible, by far if necessary"[104].

The reactions of Turkey confirmed a certain pattern that will characterize Cyprus until 1974. Cyprus did not have complete sovereignty of its territories, and the problem of how much territory was beyond its control was a question related to quantitative rather than qualitative difference[105].

While the Turkish minority in Cyprus was weakened by both internal and external constraints, there was a counterbalancing strengthening of Turkey through the threats and the usage of force. Parallelly, The Greeks role on the issue vacillated and no strategy or plan was implemented or followed successfully.

The reaction, rather than coming internally as expected, mainly came from the intervention of the international community, mostly following initiatives designed by the USA. The first approach saw the UN with special envoy Rolz-Bennet, the NATO represented by Secretary General Brosio and the US with Cyrus Vance, who collaborated to prevent further hostilities. A "fire-fighting" operation had been implemented to defuse a crisis rather than solving the main differences between the two parties involved[106]. An agreement was reached on the 30th of November, with Greece bending down to the requests of the Turks minority. The troops that were stationed in Cyprus had to be withdrawn, and General Grivas had to return to Greece; the last request was in relation to reparations that had to be granted to the victim families, and most of the responsibilities had to be left in the hands of the UNIFICYP[107].

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[103] Panagiotis, L. *Greek Turkish Crisis since 1955*, Naval post graduate school, Springfield, 1997, pp. 38-39

[104] Heraclides, A. *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean*, Palgrave Macmillan; UK, 2010, pp.73

[105] Ibid, pp. 38

[106] Stearns, M. *Entangled allies*, Council on foreign relations Press, Monteagle Stearns, 1992, pp.11

[107] Sazanides, C. *Hoi Hellino-Tourkikes Schesis Sten Pentaetia 1973-1978,* Thessaloniki: published by the Author, 1979, pp. 204-210

Turkey, in exchange, had to eliminate all the military agglomerates opposite the Cyprus coast.

It is significant to point out why Greece decided to comply with all the requests made by Turkey. Some scholars, in particular Bacheli, believes that even though it was pretty clear that Greece could not stand up to Turkey in a war, it enjoyed the status quo that it had of local "superiority", and so the search for reasons has to be considered to go beyond the ones related to military superiority[108]. Bacheli, states that the reality was that the colonels' decision was based on a reluctance to operationalize Turkey after the proposals related to the possibility of creating a Greek-Turks "friendship", the internal and external problematics, and their weak position due to an *a priori* orientation with NATO and the United States, which many were thinking were pulling out the regime[109]. On the Turkish side, the problem was within the borders of the Country: Demirel[110], had been highly criticized for his inability of carrying out the invasion of Cyprus as he was professing to the elites. Bacheli, by pointing out these different points, shows concretely that the strategic approaches between these two countries were different starting from the roots.

The 1967 has been defined as the turning point in the History of Cyprus. A period of detachment from the Island by Greece and Turkey was starting. Greece understood that its provocative strategy was not working successfully, and it was much rather involved with the domestic matters. Turkey gained strategic territory in Cyprus, facilitating the later invasion of 1974[111].

CYPRUS AND GREECE: 1974

The post-civil was socio-political system of Greece's repressive status, almost came to an end in 1973. Internal and external events lead to the common belief that something could be done to directly confront the Colonel's military regime. The *événements de mai,* in France, the *sessantotto* in Italy and the Vietnamese victory against the United States of America, lead to a violent and impulsive reaction of the students in Greece, that were ready themselves to extirpate the tyrannic dominance of the Colonels in the Peninsula. Mostly

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[108] Panagiotis, L. *Greek Turkish Crisis since 1955*, Naval post graduate school, Springfield, 1997, pp. 38-39
[109] Panagiotis, L. *Greek Turkish Crisis since 1955*, Naval post graduate school, Springfield, 1997, pp. 40
[110] Served as the Prime Minister of Turkey seven times between the years 1965 and 1993
[111] Panagiotis, L. *Greek Turkish Crisis since 1955*, Naval post graduate school, Springfield, 1997, pp. 40-41

relating to the Vietnamese example, that demonstrated that "a people, however wear, when they have belief in themselves and follow the correct revolutionary strategy, can even defeat superpowers"[112]. Many European capitals, in particular Berlin and Rome, were protesting against the Greek Junta, that deeply exposed domestic public apathy[113]. As a response, the Colonels, fearing a generalized explosion, passed a series of educational and economic reforms in a desperate attempt radicalize the situation, however it was a failure. The result was the occupation of the Athens University law school in March and the Athens polytechnic in November 1973, fueling the revolution even further[114]. It only lasted from the 14th to the 17th of November, however it triggered a revolution movement challenging the military regime, and that started the popular mobilization in many sectors of the Greek society. The demands were simple: "Bread, Education and Liberty"[115].

 Between 1969 and 1973 the number of the students involved the revolution rose. In 1969 there were 12,175, in 1972 there were 14,218 and in 1973, 15,389[116]. The revolt was bittered by the education system, that was not granting the students necessary expansion of lecture rooms or hire extra professors.

Consequently, On November 25th 1973, the leader of the Junta, Papadopoulos was finally forced to resign by a combination of factors: firstly, his inability to unrest and sedate the student revolts that lead to a stream of violence between the military affiliate of the junta's leader, and the citizens that were fighting for their liberty; secondly the path that he followed to seize the power in Greece, mainly thought the elimination of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic and his self-appointment as president, thirdly the presence of corruption present in all the layers of the government and lastly, there were tangible indications that the economy of Greece was beyond the control of Papadopoulos[117]. All these factors facilitated the appointment of a new leader through his countercoup on November 25th, 1973. He was supported by the Greek military police and he announced a return to the "Revolution of April 21st, 1967"[118]. After the countercoup, General Phaedon Gizikis was appointed as President of the Republic by Ioannidis, whom, operated behind the scenes. He was denouncing publicly the decisions taken by the former leader

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[112] See EKKE, 'Vassika Politika Keimena, 1970–1974' [Essential Political Texts, 1970–1974] (Athens 1944), 46–7; see also EKKE, 'The Left of the Left', Eleftherotypia, 18 June 1976.
[113] Kassimeris, G. *Junta BY another name?* Sage publishing, 2005, pp. 746
[114] Featherstone, K. *Modern Greek Politics*, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 1982, pp.199
[115] Kassimeris, G. *Junta BY another name?* Sage publishing, 2005, pp. 746
[116] Polydorides, G. *The impact of reform policies*, Comparative and international education Society, 1978, pp.80-1
[117] Donald, Munn. *Military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974)*, Monterey, California, 1980, pp.106
[118] Xydis, A. *Greek Art: A critical review*, Themata Horou + Technon, no.3, 1975, pp.509

Papadopoulos; however, he was even more oppressive than his predecessor. He further closed newspapers without any explanation and he re-opened island prison camps to which new prisoners (mostly political) were sent[119].

In Athens, there was a common necessity of eliminating, definitely, the military dictatorship. Many rumors were spreading in Greece; one of them stated that a group of two-hundred and fifty officers of III Corps in Macedonia had issued a statement requiring the resignation of the government and the return of the king; another one said that General Davos who was the commander of the III Corps, was moving to Athens to arrest the new leader of the Junta, Ioannidis. However, the reality of the situation was that Ioannidis was still in power[120].

Ioannidis, while in power, saw the need for drastic actions not only toward Greece and its administration, but also its surrogate, Cyprus. The primary enemy of Ioannidis was Makarios. The climax of their conflict was reached between June and July of 1974. Ioannidis, in fact, explicitly stated that to Washington, through his contact with the CIA underlining that: "something must be done about Makarios". There were further speculations about a secret agreement that Ioannidis had signed, that lead to the crisis in Cyprus, however there were no tangible facts that supported that statement [121]. On the 26th of June, aa spokesman for Makarios, reluctantly stated that the leaders of EOKA-B[122] was in Greece; he also added that the leaders of the EOKA-B in Athens were the agents of the revolutionary military regime. The continuous tensions between the two leaders, were inevitably going to lead to a conflict[123].

Both Makarios and Ioannidis, strangely enough, displayed the utmost calm about the public conspiracies that were circulating. The Greeks were referring to this situation as a skinothesia (a charade). The assumption was that the Americans were staging and administrating the situation secretly and that the Turks were playing a carefully controlled part. Even if, military actions had to be taken to appease the situation, no one was expecting an eruption of a war.

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[119] Donald, Munn. *Military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974)*, Monterey, California, 1980, pp.106
[120] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 161
[121] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002, pp. 150
[122] EOKA-B (In words National Organization of Cypriot Fighters B) was a paramilitary organization established in Cyprus in 1971, founded by Georgios Grivas. Its aim was to create the conditions that would lead to the union of Cyprus with Greece. The organization on its peak had 10 thousand members, some of them ex EOKA members.
[123] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002, pp. 151

The possibility of a new war also reached the US administration. During the second half of June, Ambassador Tasca was given the task to give Ioannidis a direct command on not to attack Makarios; his reaction however was that he did not have to obey to the command since he was not in power, and he was only a direct subordinate. He falsely reported the claim to his "superior", however it did not give any result since they were all his underlings[124]. It was clear that throughout the whole crisis, Ioannidis was convinced that there would have not been any reactions by the Turks, and similarly Makarios was convinced that the Greek leader would not attempt anything drastic. Howbeit, from an objective point of view, Averoff[125], was alerting Makarios, Gizikis and Karamanlis of the threat and the possible outcome of this drastic situation. The precarious situation was aggravated by three resignation on the 2nd of July: the most important of the three was Angelos Vlachos, the secretary general who knew Cyprus well, since he had served in its territory, and he was the one suspecting what Ioannidis was plotting[126]. Furthermore, a formal letter of complaint was sent by Makarios to Gizikis. To summarize his message Makarios wrote: "more than once before I have sensed, and sometimes almost felt, an invisible hand reaching out from Athens and seeking to terminate my earthly existence"; Makarios concluded pointing two demands: firstly, he wanted the Greek government should withdraw all mainland officers from the National guard, secondly that it should command the EOKA-B to cease all their activities; however, no reply was ever sent or received in response[127].

If Papadopoulos was defined as a Fascist in constructed following the examples of Mussolini, Ioannides resembled more like a Nazi. He execrated the laxity and the corruption of the former government, he was a sadist and hardly believed in the culture of extreme militarism, he did not care about the wellbeing of the citizens, but rather he was far more interested in the fear he provoked. Ioannidis' proposal to Makarios was something typical of him rather than something exceptional[128]. For Ioannidis, conciliation was a synonym of cowardice. He knew that Makarios, was covering the presence of anti-junta Greeks in Cyprus; he suspected Cypriot leftist of being involved with the polytechnic revolt and he was biased for what was concerning the Turkish situation. At the end, Ioannidis thought

[124] Montague, C. *The rise and fall of the Colonels*, London Toronto Sydney New York, Grenada Publishing, 1985, pp. 151

[125] Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas son of Anastasios, was a right-wing Greek politician and author of several books on political and historical topics

[126] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002, pp. 151

[127] C.M. Woodhouse, *The struggle for Greece, 1941-1949,* Hurst publisher, 2002, pp. 152

[128] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 77-78

that an enosis was better than none, differently the United States thought that any partition was better than none. This will be proofed to be lethal for Cyprus and Greece[129].

ROLE OF KISSINGER

As things work positively in one's country, statesmen and leaders tend to claim full credit for the successes; when things instead are a failure, ineluctable and uncontrolled forces are blamed. This was the case of Kissinger in Cyprus. The Secretary of State, multiple times had reported that the situation in Greece and Cyprus in 1974 took him off guards as "he was not expecting such things to happen so quickly", however it has been reported by many that these were all lies. Not only because as a National security advisor, could have been unaware of the situation in Cyprus and the commitments of the United States to the Greek Junta, or the commitments made by the junta for the removal or the overthrow of Makarios.[130] The American elites knew about the pending coup that was being organized by Ioannidis, however they did not do anything to prevent it; more specifically there are six instances in which the American government failed in their role: the first one was on the 7th of June 1974, the *national intelligence daily*[131], delineated a filed report dated back to the 3rd of June in which it was stated: " Ioannidis claimed that Greece is capable of removing Makarios, and his key supporters from power in twenty-four hours with little if any blood being shed and without EOKA assistance. The Turks would quietly acquiesce to the removal of Makarios, a key enemy […] Ioannidis stated that Makarios decided on some type of extreme provocation against Greece to obtain a tactical advantage, he is not sure whether he should merely pull the Greek troops out of Cyprus and let Makarios fend for himself or remove Makarios once and for all and have Greece deal directly with Turkey over Cyprus's future"[132]. The second one, was the reaction of Kissinger to this claim: It took him until the 29th of June to respond. He gave instruction to the American ambassador in Cyprus, Tasca, to oppose Ioannidis in any attempts that he had to penetrate in Cyprus;

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[129] Ibid, pp.78
[130] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 78
[131] The President's Daily Brief (PDB), sometimes referred to as the President's Daily Briefing or the President's Daily Bulletin, is a top-secret document produced and given each morning to the president of the United States, and is also distributed to a small number of top-level US officials who are approved by the president, and includes highly classified intelligence analysis, information about covert operations of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and reports from the most sensitive US sources or those shared by allied intelligence agencies.
[132] O'Malley et al, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, I.B Tauris Publishers, London New York, 2001, pp.165

however, ambassador Tasca refused to pass it on[133]. The explanation on why the directive was not passed on, resides merely on the fact that Ioannides was not the effective ruler of Greece, and therefore it was not perceived to be relevant; no further admonitions or indications were given to Ioannidis. The third one, was later reported in 1976 stating: "It is clear, however, that the ambassy took no steps to underscore for Ioannidis the depth of concern over a Cyprus Coup attempt". The fourth one, came from the then Cyprus desk officer, Thomas Boyatt who repeatedly warned the American statesmen, about the coup and the inevitable response of the Turkish forces. He confirmed that the junta was planning an attack in Cyprus, however he was ignored by Kissinger, and later on he was forbidden from testifying before congress and was only permitted to do avoid being cited for contempt[134]. The fifth one, was on July 1st, 1974, where three senior officials, of the Greek foreign ministry, resigned It was publicly known that these officials were moderate on the Cyprus issue.

The last one was related to Kissinger's reaction to the letter that had been sent by Makarios to the puppet president of Greece, Gizikis, complaining about the junta because he feared for his life, using it as a scapegoat to eventually attack Cyprus. Kissinger lied both by *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*[135]. The informations were present and Kissinger, when given proofs and tangible issues, displayed anything but indifference for the problematics and the warnings[136].

END OF THE JUNTA: CYPRUS 1974

On the 2nd of July 1974 Makarios sent a letter to the general Ghizikis who was the Junta president of Greece, however he received a different reply coming from the Greek dictator Ioannidis together with general Bonanos who the commander in chief of the Greek armed forces was and General Galastanos chief of the army; they, in fact, acquainted Georghitsis and Papadakis [137], to carry out the plans of the military coup [138].

In the summer of 1974, the extremist paramilitary organ represented by the Greek Cypriots, that favored the unification of Cyprus with Greece, after the attempt of unification of Cyprus

[133] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 78-79
[134] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 78-79
[135] The suppression of truth is the suggestion of falsehood
[136] C. Hitchens,1984, *Cyprus*, pp. 81
[137] Chiefs of the Greek armed contingent and supreme command of Cyprus
[138] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.292

in 1960, supported by the dictatorship in Greece, in trying to eliminate the democratic principles that were left in the island and aroused by the anti-Turkish feeling through a military coup. The objective of the new coup concerning Cyprus, were the same as their predecessors. For the junta, Makarios was perceived to be an obstacle to the plans of unification with Greece, and Grivas was working to remove Makarios with someone who would approve enosis. As a matter of fact, EOKA had been reborn and transformed into the EOKA B terrorist team in 1971, that multiple times tried to kill the Archbishop, but was unsuccessful[139]. Ioannidis was also pushing for a coup, for the recent discovery of petroleum in the Aegean Sea, that fueled the hostility between Greece and Turkey. The pressure on the regime of Makarios reached its peak on the 15th of July 1974, when the Greek Cypriot National Guards, flagrantly confronted the Makarios and his forces, in attempting to capture him, kill him and end his mandate.

In the early morning of the 20th of July, Turkey boldly decided to invade Cyprus. The decision, however, had been already settled by the Turkish elites five days before. The operation was implemented through the usage of the whole Turkish military machine, helped and supplied by the American and NATO forces, and supported to defend the country's and the allies' interests [140]. Numbers of the invasion have been reported in order to understand the massive military occupation carried out by Turkey: the invaders with an estimated population of fifty million plus an army of over half a million, that encroached an unprepared island, member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the council of Europe that had approximately 630.000 residents and a military contingent of 10,000 guardsman, supported by a thousand Greek section and 5000 among others[141]. The operation became known as "Attila 1". The Turkish paratroops joined the 650 Turkish-Cypriot fighters, in order to land in the Northern part of Nicosia, to establish a secure road from Kerynia to the capital, in order to enclose the Turkish Cypriot population and isolate the Turkish minority from the Greek- Cypriots[142]. The Turkish prime ministers Bullet Ecevit, openly justified the invasion of Cyprus as a mean to defend themselves from the prior Greek invasion, intended to protect not only the Cypriot communities, but also to dislodge Sampson's Greek Cypriot Junta; to increase the defense capability, Sampson had

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[139] Ioannis, V. *The 1974 crisis over Cyprus: foreign will or ethnic conflict,* Master of Arts in national security affairs, 2007, pp.13
[140] Stavros, P. *The history of Modern Cyprus*, Herts England, 2005, pp. 264
[141] Ibid, pp.264
[142] Ioannis, V. *The 1974 crisis over Cyprus: foreign will or ethnic conflict,* Master of Arts in national security affairs, 2007, pp.14

ordered tanks to leave the territory and to free the 10,000 loyalists that he had imprisoned, leaving the Turkish forces to enter without any resistance[143].

Before speaking about the coup of 1974 that brought back the democracy in Greece, it is worth talking about the year 1974 in respect to Cyprus, as it was defined by many scholars as an *"annus horribilis"*[144]. Firstly, around 37,5% of the territory of the Island is (mid- April 2005) under the occupation of Turkey and, as much as 142.000 Greek Cypriots were removed from their homes. The refugees were making up for the 69% of the area's population and 24% of the total inhabitants of the island. To worsen the already dramatic situation, of the 142.000 displaced people, at least 19.500 were enclaved in the Turkish zone, and later displaced and driven out of the occupied area. At an international level, the volume of refugees was proportionally enormous, making up at least forty percent[145]. This made, and will make, the problems of absorption, re-allocation and rehousing complex. By contrast, the 40 thousand Turkish-Cypriot refugees did not have to face such difficulties; the Turkish side succeeded through various means for example, by renaming settlements, the process of *dehellenisation*, the erection of monuments in 1974 for the liberation, to pursue the sense of separation and independence[146].

Following the Coup, the presidential Guard on duty was overcome, however Makarios succeeded in escaping from the rear part of the Presidential Palace. While he was escaping, the Cyprus radio came under the control of the Turkish armed forces and at 10.45 a statement had been broadcasted: *"Greek Cypriot people. The tragic situation during the last months in Cyprus was leading directly to civil war. The provoked disorder in the bosom of the Church, and the danger appearing that the armed forces would come under the control of anarchist and criminal elements, with consequences which cannot be calculated for the future of Cyprus, led the armed forces to the decision to remove those responsible for the anomaly i.e., the president of the republic and its Government, who have usurped the authority of Government for a long time, without the free will of the people of Cyprus and who make every permissible and non-permissible effort to retain the personal regime which they created. The armed forces will appoint temporary Government of National Unity"*[147].

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[143] O'Malley et al, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, I.B Tauris Publishers, London New York, 2001, pp. 188-189
[144] a year of disaster or misfortune.

[145] Stavros, P. *The history of Modern Cyprus*, Herts England, 2005, pp. 265
[146] Ibid, pp.265
[147] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.292-293

After two days, the goal that was set up by the Turkish elites, was accomplished: they successfully established their powers in Kerynia and they reconnected with the Nicosia, a region that included more than 60 thousand of the Turkish population. The casualties were high for both sides; many thousands of civilians died trying to escape the bombs and the fires, many had to leave behind their houses and atrocities were committed in the process, with no discrimination of gender, race and age[148]. On the 23rd of July 1974, the coups in both Greece and Cyprus were finally replaces by a civilian rule that saw Clerides and Karamanlis, as prime ministers, that were both accepted by the Western allies[149].

ATTILA II: THE SECOND INVASION

Military histories

On the 13th and on the 14th of august 1974, The Turkish forces commenced a second invasion that aimed and successfully conquered the whole Northern part of Cyprus. As much as three hundred tanks with 40 thousand soldiers were moving towards the eastern

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[148] Ioannis, V. *The 1974 crisis over Cyprus: foreign will or ethnic conflict,* Master of Arts in national security affairs, 2007, pp.15--20

[149] Ioannis, V. *The 1974 crisis over Cyprus: foreign will or ethnic conflict,* Master of Arts in national security affairs, 2007, pp.16-17

and western cities, assisted by thirty battleships and covered by air protection[150]. The military power of Turkey successfully conquered one third of the island, from Lefka, to Famagusta to the northern part of Nicosia. Starting from the 14th, the Turkish military re-engaged its ethnic cleansing of the population that was non -Turks through the usage of bombing, mass execution, tortures and rapes; at least 200.000 Greek-Cypriots were forced to leave their houses and lands under the strenuous pressure of Turkey (Newsroom, 2018). Some of the Turkish forces were moving dangerously to Dhekelia, threatening the British base, provoking a response by the British forces, and alerting their own military body. The Turks fearing the intervention of Great Britain, withdrew from the territory in order to avoid a conflict that would have encouraged Greece's engagement in the war (Vlachos, 2007, pp. 17). The decision of partitioning Cyprus decided by Turkey, forced 200.000 Greek Cypriots to move to the South of the island and imprisoned as much as 60 thousand Turkish Cypriots. In a very brief span of time, the Turkish plan to change the population distribution of the Island, was finally accomplished: The Turks were moved to the North, while the Greek-Cypriots were all restricted in the Southern part[151].

INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS IN CYPRUS AFTER THE COUP

The coup, naturally, instigated an international reaction. The Soviet Union highly criticized the coup and the Greece's intervention as it was violating the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Both the United States and the Soviet Union ordered their navies to sail towards the Eastern Mediterranean, however they were both suspicious of one another: the USSR were fearing the United States for wanting Cyprus to turn it into another NATO base, while the USA were fearing that the Soviets wanted to expand their control over the region. The last claim was tangible because Makarios had associated Cyprus as a non-aligned country during the first years of the Cold War[152]. The coup was not only discussed by the two superpowers, the NATO, undeniably, had an extraordinary meeting on the 17th of July. The NATO Council agreed that Greece had to withdraw the Greek officers from Cyprus and that the leader, Makarios, had to return to the island as soon as possible. This decision was also taken to avoid further conflicts between the two member states – Turkey and

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[150] Ioannis, V. *The 1974 crisis over Cyprus: foreign will or ethnic conflict,* Master of Arts in national security affairs, 2007, pp.16
[151] Ibid, pp. 18
[152] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.295

Greece - because this would have led to a weakening of the eastern side of NATO, leading to a strengthening of the opponents: The Soviet Union[153].

Makarios, escaped in time from the coup; he flown from Paphos to the British Base of Akrotiri and, on the 17th of July he arrived in London. Makarios believed that Britain, as it was perceived to be one of the Three guarantors of the independence of Cyprus, had a legal moral duty to respond to the need of Cyprus and to honor its treaty obligations. Prime minister Wilson and foreign secretary Callaghan assured Makarios on three main points: firstly, they recognized him to be the legal president of Cyprus, secondly, they pushed him to take the issue to the United Nations, and lastly, they refused to intervene militarily in Cyprus to restore the constitutional order[154]. On the 19th of July, Makarios flew from London to New York, to address the Security Council, as he accused the Greek Military junta of organizing the coup not only against him, but also against the Cyprus government[155].

The period that goes from 1974 to 1980, saw a consequential increase of international operations, as a reaction to the events in July and august 1974 that were threatening the security status of the Southern eastern area of Europe and the cohesion of NATO. Even though, the operations did not reach a concrete agreement, it created important developments that will lead to changes of attitude in the two communities that affected the peacekeeping procedure[156].

The 1974 events were indubitably a major turning point not only for Cyprus, but also for Greece. The coup staged by the Greek Junta, and the Turkish invasion as a response to the threat left their mark on every aspect of the Cyprus problem, creating internal problem that did not facilitate the signing of a satisfactory solution for both parties[157].

A ceasefire was reached few days later, on the 16th of august, but only after the strenuous pressure of the American forces. The first round of negotiations lasted from the 25th to the 30th of July 1974; the United Nations Security Council called for a meeting with Britain, Greece and Turkey, in order to restore peace and constitutional government in Cyprus through the resolution 353 of the 20th of July 1974, paragraph 5. At the end of the days of negotiations, the British, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, respectively, Callaghan Mavaros and Gunes, agreed that all the areas that had been conquered needed to remain

[153] Ibid, pp.295
[154] Tofallis, K. *A history of Cyprus: from the ancient times to present*, London: Greek Institute, 2002, pp.298
[155] Ibid, pp.198
[156] Mirbagheri, F. *Cyprus and international Peacemaking*, Hurst & company, London, 1988, pp.87
[157] Ibid, pp. 87

untouched and that no further aggressive stand needed to be taken by the parties; furthermore, a security zone was created which only the UNFICYP[158] was granted the access[159]. Greek Cypriots agreed to evacuate all the archipelagos that belonged to the Turkish Minority, and to discharge the hostages that had been kept since the beginning of the Coup, nevertheless the most important accomplishment of the talks concerned the recognition of two different administrations in the Island[160].

The second round of talks took place in Geneva from the 8th to the 14th of august 1974. The atmosphere in this specific meeting was described as "[an atmosphere] of charges and countercharges"[161]. It was attended by three ministers for foreign affairs and, later joined by Clerides[162] and Denktash[163]. After numerous debates over the existence or non-existence of the Constitution signed in 1960, the representatives of the three countries, tried to settle the disputes through specific provisions; however, the reality was that Turkey did not want to negotiate any agreement, but rather it was trying to give an ultimatum to the other parties involved[164]. Greece and Great Britain were required by Turkey to accept either one of the two plans proposed based on Turkish administration of 34% of the Island's territory: in the first case it was a singe area in the north going from Limnitis on the West coast through Lefka, Morphou, Nicosia, Famagusta and the other smaller areas in the northern part of Cyprus; the second case was related to a division based on cantons, proposed directly by Gunes, that needed to be accepted on the spot by both Greece and Cyprus. On the 13th of august 1974, when Mavros and Clerides asked for thirty-six hours to deliberate with the corresponding governments, yet Gunes declined the request[165]. The conference, on the 14th of august, ended and since no agreement was reached, and the requests of Turkey were not carried out, the Turkish military forces began operations to bomb towns and cities. Its forces had occupied the territories that were protected through the implementation of the first Geneva talks, plus it occupied another 3%, reaching a total control of 37%, creating the *Attila* or *Sahin* line, that was concretely separating the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus[166].

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[158] United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
[159] Mirbagheri, F. *Cyprus and international Peacemaking*, Hurst & company, London, 1988, pp.89
[160] Ibid, pp. 89
[161] Callaghan, J. *Social democracy in transition*, Dartmouth, Digitalized by the Internet Archive in 2012, 1987, pp.349
[162] Clerides temporarily assumed the duties of the President of the Republic, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution
[163] Former president of the North of Cyprus
[164] Panteli, S. The history of modern Cyprus, Herts, England, 2005, pp. 286
[165] Panteli, S. The history of modern Cyprus, Herts, England, 2005, pp. 287-289
[166] Ibid, pp. 287

The security council was forced to issue new resolutions (8 since the 20th of July), requiring prompt cessation of all the military operations carried out by Turkey, the retirement of all the troops and the recommencement of talks. Once again, in this occasion Turkey was avoiding any confrontation and acceptance of the resolutions proposed by the Security Council, a specific instance that better explains this reluctance of Turkey was when the General Assembly adopted the resolution 3213 (XXIX), that had been adopted on the 1st of November 1974, approved by 117 votes, that however had been completely ignored by the Turkish representatives[167].

CYPRUS AFTER THE COUP: DE FACTO PARTITION

It has been estimated that around 180.000 people, representing one-third of the total population of Cyprus, became refugees during the fighting. The safeguarded zone between the two cease-fire lines occupied by the UNFICYP, denoted the total isolation of both the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities[168]. At the beginning of this forced coexistence, the tension was very high. Intermittent exchanges of artillery were fired across the borders and there was a sporadic infiltration of Turkish patriots in the territories granted to the Greek Cypriots. By 1978, the United Nations had proclaimed that the lines were almost completely secured[169]. Just a few hundreds of Greek Cypriots fled from the territories of Turkey, and in 1989, only 611 Greek Cypriots lived under the occupation of the Turkish forces, mainly grouped in the Karpas Peninsula; only 100 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south. However, the persistent presence of Turkish immigrants, the illegal appropriation of private property and the hidden circumstances of more than 1600 Greek Cypriots that had been missing since the end of the fights in 1974, complicated drastically the peaceful settlement to end the division of the island[170]. Starting from 1976, a series of talks had been initiated by the UN, and as late as 1990, they all failed to achieve a plausible solution to the tense situation.

There are three possible solution that both. Turkey and Greece can pursue in Cyprus: maintain the status quo, unilaterally change that status quo, in their respective realms through political, military and economic means, and reach a bilateral solution[171]. the first

[167] Panteli, S. The history of modern Cyprus, Herts, England, 2005, pp. 288-289
[168] Solsten, E. *Cyprus: A country Study*, Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army. US. G.P.O,1993, pp. 220
[169] Solsten, E. *Cyprus: A country Study*, Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army. US. G.P.O,1993, pp. 221-222
[170] Ibid, pp. 221-222
[171] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.7

solution preserves the state of affairs, without peace and without war; the status quo is unaltered; the second solution could increase the risk of a direct confrontation of the two parties on the Island; the third option seems the be only suitable solution: this is perceived to be a win-win option, however it is only attainable, when each of the two party will not perceive this confrontation a disadvantage vis a vis the other political party[172]. However, it is not possible to find these conditions on the Island today, as long as the Greek Cypriots are continuing to impose embargos on the Turkish Cypriot, and as long as the international community is allowing injustices, no peaceful agreement can be reached.

I believe, also, that it is worth looking at the U.S policy towards Cyprus, to understand the diplomatic difficulties it created. The American leadership has been crucial and remained pivotal for the stabilization of the Balkan area[173]. The United States have played an essential role also in the rapprochement between Greece and Albania, and Between Greece and the FYROM[174]. With the signing of the Dayton peace accord, the United States could have launched a new effort to solve definitely the Aegean problematic however it is unlikely, that any solution could be achieved, if the Cyprus issue is not resolved[175].

Resolving the issue over Cyprus has been reported to be difficult, mainly because of the tensions over Imia[176], however a glimmer of hope seemed to be achieved. The first one was related to the pragmatic Greek policy launched by Karamanlis and his new political party, the second one was the accession to negotiations launched by the European Union, within six months after the end of the EU intergovernmental conference (ICG), that began in 1996[177]. These seemed to change the dynamic element to Cyprus and could have induced the Turkish Cypriot leadership to find a solution that could accommodate the will of both parties involved. On this matter, the Aegean territories and problematic could have been used as a measure in reducing the tensions between Greece and Turkey, Similar paths had been taken, for example, In the relations between the Bulgarians and the Turks, and the US and the Soviet Union. In both cases, indeed, the confidence building measures alleviated the threat perceptions, and helped in creating an atmosphere that facilitated the exchange of

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[172] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.8

[173] Graham, T. *The Greek Paradox: promise vs. Performance*, MIT press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997, chapter 3.

[174] former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Larrabee, S. *Greece & The Balkans: Implications for Policy*, chapter. 9, The MIT press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 111

[175] Ibid, pp. 111

[176] The incident in Imia, with the Turkish ships Greek entering into the territories that belonged officially to Greece, which increased the tensions between the two parties involved

[177] Graham, T. *The Greek Paradox: promise vs. Performance*, MIT press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997, chapter 3.

informations and the resolution of broader security issues. Few hypothesis had been taken into consideration: an arrangement between the demobilization and disbandment of the Turkish Fourth Aegean army, and the disbarment of the Greek military forces, the signing of an open skies agreement, similar to the case of Romanian -Hungarian case, that improved the political relations and opened the dialogue between the two parties involved, and lastly a direct discussion on security issues between the Greek and Turkish military can also be taken into consideration[178]. The last hypothesis has been rejected by many Greek Military officers, because of the difference of the status that both military corpses have internationally.

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[178] Kalypso et al. *What is the Greek Paradox*? Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, pp. 1-23

DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE GREEK STATE

Within a broader universe of social sciences, the analysis of regime changes emerged particularly in the 1970s. While the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the Southern hemisphere suggested both cultural and structural interpretations spanning from Veliz's centralist argument to O'Donnell's bureaucratic authoritarian model, the southern easter experience focuses its attention on the delicate task of re-establishing competitive politics and the forces that derive from it[179].

When looking at the democratic transition of the Greece starting from 1974, two major faces can be pointed out: the first one is defined as the transition *stricto sensu,* that focus its attention strictly on the politics of the regime change and regime instauration, and the second one defines as the consolidation phase, which focuses its attention on the micro-aspects of the transition taking into consideration the strength and the weaknesses of the new democratic regime[180]. The analysis of the Greek transition, is useful to understand the quality of the democracy achieved, taking into consideration the political coloration of the funding coalition. Recent studies have shown that transitions presided over by moderate, center and center -right coalitions tend to have a better chance of having a successful future, and therefore minimizing the chances of involution from the right or a radicalization from the left, that will constitute a more propitious beginning for the coadunation of an eventual regime[181]. Before analyzing the democratization process of Greece, a final remark needs to be pointed out: a concern on dynamics of transitions and of consolidation. Greater emphasis should be placed on actors and conditions, that affected in a way or another the final outcome. For example, the relative external condition and the threat of war that affected the regime change in Greece, and the internal constraints, facilitated Karamanlis to play an immense role and being facilitated, while the opposition found it favorable, to cede the initiative to govern and to play a more passive role in the democratization process[182]. These factors will be taken into consideration during the subsequent analysis.

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[179] Schmitter, O'Donnell. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1970, pp. 337-363

[180] Pridham, G. *Securing Democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in southern Europe*, Routledge London and New York, 1984, pp.52

[181] Herz, H. *Conclusions*, in John H. Herz (ed.), op.cit., 1976, pp. 272-292

[182] Casper, G. *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian rule*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996, pp.53

THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN 1974

Granted that the events of November1973, at the Greek National Technical college, lead to the substantive *terminus ad quem* of the authoritarian regime of the colonels, the events of July in 1974, related to the crisis of Cyprus, signaled the formal end of the Junta and the terminus a quo for the democratic successor[183]. The 1974 crisis portrays the most important factor that influenced the actions of the actors, limiting the choices available, imposing a specific course of actions and precluding other parties during the disintegration and the dissolution phase of the authoritarian regime, and during the first phases of democracy. The downfall of the authoritarian regime had been attributed to the self-inflicted scars triggered during their regime and the failed coup against the Greek-Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios, in a desperate attempt to force the Island of Cyprus to become part of Greece (Stern, 1975). The consequences of these events proved to be complicated for the regime to resist to the internal and external pressures. As the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus, the junta found themselves not prepared enough to respond to the crisis, and it was forced to cede the power to an assembled civilian government (Chilcote, 1990, pp. 132). The junta, more practically, starting from the 20th of July, precipitated in a series of crucial decision that ended the regime: firstly, it ordered a general mobilization used to serve as a warning signal for Turkey, however it backfired since the military power was not prepared enough, and as expected, there was, as shown by reservists, an antiregime sentiment among the civil population pointing out to the grave consequences and dangers in the implicit attempt of the regime to put the lid down on civil society[184]. Secondly, directly linked to the first attempt, was a public response to the threat advanced by the civil society; they would seek any "political solution", in order to stop the domestic disorders and internal crisis[185].

The portmanteau of the conditions stated earlier, served as the direct cause for the authoritarian regime to crumble, although it also laid the conditions for the instauration of the new democratic political order. The movement of national solidarity that grew considering the possibility of an imminent war with Turkey, fastened the abrogation of the

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[183] Casper, G. *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian rule*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996, pp.54

[184] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, 11-19

[185] Casper, G. *Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian rule*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996, pp.11-19

colonels, the self-restraints among mass actors and that fueled the freedom movements within the civil society.

The democratization process of 1974 gains its significance when contrasted with the 1967 military solution. The acceptance of the authoritarian regime in 1967, seemed to the be best opportunistic way to maintain a certain control over the political life of the Peninsula. In contrast, the 1974 political solution was a maneuver whose objective was the legitimation of the new Greek model of development – directly benefiting the bourgeoisie – under the pretense of democracy[186]. The latter, however, used ideological means to take over, rather than repressive means, facilitating the transition from a harsh regime to a more subtle. The democratic system instituted in 1974, can be still considered to somewhat of an authoritarian regime because of the concrete actions taken by the new political leaders: state control of the broadcast media, the control and approval of bourgeois, and the administration of most of the larger newspapers and media. To render these actions to the civil society, some concessions needed to be vouchsafed to the dominated classes: there was a slow re-introduction of the trade unions, the legalization of the banned communist party, the termination of censorship, and the drafting in 1975 of a new "just state" constitution, based on a welfare state undertone. The constitution, in this case, had been used as a tool to attain social consensus and cohesion with the civil society[187].

The transfer of power from the military and authoritarian, to the civilian involves two distinct, but equally important significant phases that occurred in the few hours between the 23rd and the 24th of July 1974. The first one saw the old military leadership meeting with selected civil servants to discuss about the ways in which the power would be transferred. The eight members were representing a spectrum of political leaders, that ranged from the pre-1967 Centre Union party on the left, to the legitimate pro-royalist political party embodied by Petros Garoufalias and Spyros Markezinis on the right[188]. The newly created political group, which was definitely more right than center, under the initial proposal of Ghizikis, suggested that regime's transition strategy, was that of transferring power to that specific segment of the civilian leadership, which could be the mean through which formal democracy could be achieved, with minimal changes in the political system of the country;

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[186] Hadjiyannis, S. *Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece*, Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp.8
[187] Manesis. *Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece*, Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp.8
[188] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp.54

if successful, the system would help retrieve the eminent role of the armed forces, which in the spam of time going from 1946 to 1949, skillfully combined formal parliamentary rule, with the severe exclusion from the participation to the political life[189]. Even though the premises were promising, the two leaders representing the two major parties, the Centre Union and National Radical Union (ERE), unanimously rejected the proposal of Ghizikis for the retention of the occupants of the sensitive ministries; there was also a bitter reaction to the Suggestion proposed by Markezinis, that pushed for a non-political government directed by the ultra-conservative diplomat Christianos Xanthopoulos – Palamas[190]. These complications are symptoms of the complicated political life of Greece, which remained uncleared for the time being.

The second phase, of the transfer of power, took instead place in the early hours of the 24th of July 1974, that involved the official appointment of Constantine Karamanlis – the former leader of the National Radical Union (ERE), who since 1963 lived in a "self-imposed" exile in Paris - as prime minister. Karamanlis was chosen to be the new leader of Greece, by a maneuver of Averoff-Tossizza, a loyal lieutenant who enjoyed the confidence of the military and on the other side, he was support4ed by the regime's leadership[191]. The transition involved a last-minute change in the formula proposed: originally the idea was that of placing the transition in the hands of the two major political parties with Kanellopoulos, head of ERE as prime minister and Mavros, leader of the Centre Union, as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. This solution was taken based on the assumption that Karamanlis, in exile in Paris, could not be present physically in the decision making process, however his credentials were incomparable to the other leaders: he exiting stainless form the demise of the parliament in 1967, he enjoyed the appeal of a wide spectrum of the population, he also appealed to the military on the account of his anti-communist past, and due to this he also had the support of the non-royalist right, and was ready to be entrusted with the delicate role of "manager" of the transition, and as an observer of the whole process of the democratic restoration[192]. There was an implicit assumption that Karamanlis was the best candidate to create a liberalized version of the postwar exclusivist

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[189] Ibid, pp.54

[190] Pridham, G. *Securing Democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in southern Europe*, Routledge London and New York, 1984, pp.54

[191] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp.54

[192] Ibid, pp.55

system, explaining the *carte blanche,* that lead to the process of democratization initiated and implemented by the new leader.

THE TRANSITION STRATEGY OF CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS

The differences between the two strategies mentioned earlier, are complicated to distinguish because of the numerous overlapping both theoretically and temporarily, however it still appears that on the 17th of November 1974[193], the day of the national elections, there was a turning point in the move from transition to consolidation. What characterizes the strategy of Karamanlis, between the 24th of July 1974 to the 17th of November 1974, that gave him popularly derived legitimacy and independence from the other political parties, was his effort to maximize as much as possible the *carte blanche* that was entrusted to him[194]. He attempted this though the personalization of crisis management, the maximization of his freedom of movement and the minimization of commitments to both collective and individual actors. Karamanlis mainly wanted to achieve three main objectives: the preservation of the unity of the founding coalition, and the feeling of national solidarity derived from the failure of the crisis in Cyprus and the sense of euphoria over the fall of the military dominance, he tried to distance himself from the rebellious and ultraconservative values of the right political wing, and lastly the need to relieve that part of the public opinion that favored a radical democratization of the postwar political system[195]. Karamanlis' strategy had been perceived and described by many as a conglomeration of continuity and change, starting from the early days of his administration; his role was further supported by the political figures, representing mainly the right and center-right, that were sworn in the civilian cabinet on the 25th and on the 26th of July. However, the new cabinet completely excluded the center-left forces that were represented by Andreas Papandreou of the Centre Union, along with the traditionalist left, personified by George Alexander Mangakis, that had been "anointed" by his resistance activities during the years of the colonel's authoritarian regime, and in general all the men that had had an anti-junta feeling, because it was thought to be important on symbolic and substantive grounds[196]. The first devious

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[193] First anniversary of the Polytechnic student, which marked the beginning and the end for the colonels' authoritarian regime
[194] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp.9-11
[195] Macridis, C. E*lections and political modernization in Greece*. 1981, See also Penniman, 1981
[196] Hadjiyannis, S. *Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece*, Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp.8-11

decision taken by Karamanlis, was that of breaking free from the fractious anti-communist right, and to find a new balance in the newly created political system, in which the new center of gravity would lean more towards the center rather than the right[197]. In November of 1974, Karamanlis stated that "All parties are free to develop their activities within the framework of the democratic institutions, without any discrimination […] as long as they respect the country's law"[198]. It was the beginning of the legalization process of the communist party after almost twenty-seven years, a political development that was underlining the new liberal approach towards Communism[199]. To follow up with his decision, he announced on the first of august, the necessity of returning to the constitution created in 1952, as the interim law of the land: the objective was that of suspending the articles related to the monarchy, to maintain General Ghizikis as interim head of state, while publicly stating that the role of the head of the state would be settled in the future either by popular referendum or thought the constituent assembly, and finally to choose for the constituent assembly as the opportune organ for the creation of a new constitution, while restricting the its role to that of a revisionary body[200]. Furthermore, he decided to move back to the legality that was characterizing the pre-junta period, through a series of constituent acts interwoven to the judiciary, the universities, the civil service and concurrently granting freedom to the political prisoners, declaring a general amnesty for all the political crimes committed, and by affirming publicly that all the restrictive legislations promulgated during the period of was and civil war, were no longer in force. Additionally, he rendered legal all the political parties, allowing the left party to operate, for the first time since the civil war, openly and freely, and more generally to be included legally and formally in the political system[201].

 The decisions taken by Karamanlis can be defined to be perfectly timed, in the approach adopted in the promulgation of these drastic changes, and most importantly in the willfully slow pace used to approach all the most sensitive and perilous popular demands: the purges of the military, the state bureaucracy, the future of the universities, the secret security forces and most importantly the necessity of persecuting the actors and the leaders involved in the 1967's coup d'état, that lead to the suppression of the Polytechnic and the systematic usage

[197] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp. 57
[198] Ibid, pp.7
[199] Kavakas, D. *Greece and Spain in European foreign Policy*, Taylor & Francis, 2020, pp.67
[200] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp. 57
[201] Pararas, P. *To chronicon epanodou eis ten Demokratian'*, Syntagma, 1975, pp. 55-62

of torture and violence of prisoners[202]. Karamanlis' approach was not only guided by the necessity of safeguarding his position, but also because he was fearful of a military reaction in the event of a coup.

The gradualist approach of Karamanlis enclosed three further suppositions: firstly, that these issues did not have to be openly addressed until after the first election, when the licitness of the newly appointed civil government would be placed in a better position to frontage the external pressure, secondly to treat those delicate issues , measures needed to be taken to secure civilian control of a certain number of agencies and institutions, whose trustworthiness would have been imperative in the uneventful handling of an emotion-lead coup, and thirdly, for the success of the strategy a line had to be quickly drawn between the retiring, and therefore isolating, all the officers that had been involved with the former regime and, seek redress for the various offences[203]. These guidelines had been carefully observed by Karamanlis up to the 17th of November. In connection with these statements, it is important to point out that the only criminal prosecutions that were carried out prior the elections were carried out privately and did not involve any government initiative. Proportionally compelling, the case was not tried until almost nine months later, long after the astounding political victory of Karamanlis, granted with legitimacy and independence vis-a-vis other political actors, and backed by an overwhelming two-thirds of all seats in the parliament. Actions were later taken only after a failed military coup in 1975, when Karamanlis moved harshly against the adherents and supporters of the previous regime, and to finally eliminate all the residual sympathizers and to cancel major potential resistance[204]. At this point in the democratic transition, the gradualist approach was abandoned to adopt a more decisive and credible path. This shift was necessary to heighten the legitimacy for the new democratic regime, to delegitimate the predecessor, and to shun the any negative repercussion[205]. At the same time, in order to maintain the control of the military, Karamanlis understood that some representatives of the army needed to be present in the new political system; many key civilian positions were, such as ministries of Defense and public order, given to famous lieutenants like Averoff, who retained the confidence of a

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[202] Hadjiyannis, S. *Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece*, Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp.8-11

[203] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp. 57-62

[204] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 206-209

[205] Hadjiyannis, S. *Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece*, Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp. 11-13

many officer corps; and Solon Ghikas, a retired general with a strong anticommunist past[206].

All things considered, the tactics used were working because of Karamanlis's personal prestige between the elites and the Greek civilians, but also because of the traumatic experience of the military, especially looking at the absurdity of Cyprus. The main objective was that of provide reassurance, while receiving obedience of the new rules implemented by the democratic leader. Thus, securing some parliamentary democracy, it meant taking steps to neutralize antiparliamentarian elements in the army and punishing all the leaders that had participated in the Junta. This burden was left in the hands of the defense minister, Averoff[207]. In 1974, the influence and strength of the army was still present, and many conspiracy theories about the possibility of the junta regaining the power, were spreading between the voters. By April of 1975, all the officers that had been involved and responsible for the 1967's coup, the violence in the Athens Polytechnic Institute in 1973, and the torture of the political dissidents, were all prosecuted with heavy sentences[208].

To avoid dangerous consequences within the civil society, Karamanlis decided that the three death penalty that had been given to the three leaders of the previous regime, George Papadopoulos, Stylianos Pattakos and Nicholas Makarezos, were to be immediately commuted to life in prison; the new regime stated (to support this decision): "in the fair state, the work of justice is completed by the final procedure […] which permits the reduction of sentences; the this final phase, a high sense of political responsibility must prevail"[209]. Therefore, by the end of 1975, regardless of the accusations the oppositions in regard to the commutation of the life sentence, the new Greek democracy had successfully dealt with the "legacy problem", vital to the definition of a successor democratic regime's self-image, and for the unmasking of its predecessor[210].

The legacy problem of the new regime, ended with the conclusion of the trials, however further actions were taken by Karamanlis, are worth noting to underline the importance of this issue: there was an immediate banning of all the symbols, allegorically attached to the authoritarian's regime; there was the forbiddance of all the references to the "revolution "in school textbook, used as a term to define the coup of 1967; the appointment of representatives known to be anti-junta, in the ministry of education, the removal of junta

[206] Pridham, G. *Securing Democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in southern Europe*, Routledge London and New York, 1984, pp. 60-63

[207] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.64

[208] Tzortzis, I. *Greek democracy and the junta: regime crisis and the failed transition of 1973*, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020; see also Rodakis, 1975, pp. 289-293

[209] Fact on file, 1975, pp. 637

[210] Herz, H. *Conclusions*, in John H. Herz (ed.), op.cit., 1976, pp. 275-291 and 3-11

appointees from the educational Greek system and lastly, official and unofficial pronouncement concerning the freedom of the press[211]. The alternance of continuity and change, of gradualism and swiftness, is what made Karamanlis's transition successful. Less obvious, however, but equally imperative were related to the need of maximizing the benefits given by the transfer of power to the center right, and consequently to contain the opposition of the left. Karamanlis took advantage of the carte blanche that was given to him, he exploited the timid opposition of his leftist opponent, George Mavros's Centre Union, and most importantly, he called for elections sooner rather than later[212]. He understood that an early election, would not have allowed, the freshly emerged Communist party and the PASOK[213], to mobilities and to create a political platform to defeat him. It also gave to the whole event a plebiscitary flavor, though the usage of the slogan "Karamanlis or the tanks", crucial for his success, and facilitate him to advance with the fulfillment of this consolidation strategy[214].

KARAMANLIS'S CONSOLIDATION STRATEGY

Karamanlis's approach to the new political system needed to assure consolidation through a democratization of the political system, taking into consideration the deep changes that were affecting Greece after the authoritarian rule of the Junta. The new political system has been facilitated by five major factors: firstly, the national reconciliation feeling and the end of the civil war period, facilitated the creation of an exclusivist state; secondly, the decision of redistributing the political power, among all the political parties present in Greece, thirdly, the democratization process initiated by the right wing party, to facilitate the transition and be perceived as a positive role and example to follow, fourthly, the liberalization of the left, to participate in the new political arena, in order to further legitimize and contributing to the long-term consolidation, and lastly, the formulation of new institutions qualified to accommodate all the new political forces, and the establishment of certain type of rules to facilitate the democratization process and to create an inclusive political system[215]. The main objective of Karamanlis and the new political

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[211] Pridham, G. *Securing Democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in southern Europe*, Routledge London and New York, 1984, pp. 58-59

[212] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp. 57-69

[213] The Panhellenic Socialist Movement, known mostly by its acronym PASOK, is a social-democratic political party in Greece.

[214] Macridis, C. E*lections and political modernization in Greece*. 1981, See also Penniman, 1974- 1981

[215] Genevoix, 1972, quotes taken by statements of Karamanlis

system was that of disassemble all the legal, historical and institutional *liaison* of the postwar period. During the civil war period many impairments were used to slow down the political forces, identified merely with the left, but also with the liberal center, facilitated with the creation of a "paracontitutional" order that split the Greeks into those defined nationally minded and those who were suspects, that believed that the leaders of Greece should be those who were considered to be victors in the in the civil war[216]. Karamanlis succeeded in breaking free from the old system in two main ways: through legislative acts, there was an end to restrictive legislation originating in the civil war years; more specifically on the 23rd of September 1974 act, there was a legalization of all the political parties, and officially ended the law 509/1948, considered to be the last sample of the discriminatory law of the civil war period[217]. Karamanlis's approach and semantic, before and after the elections also helped in detaching the "new" Greece from the old one, by denouncing publicly the vile practices of the recent past, and to use it as a tool to create a new future based on the failure of the past political system[218]. As mentioned, earlier in the chapter, the change directly came from the involvement of the leftist political parties, however, on a more subtle level, Karamanlis understood that there was the necessity of handling and controlling the armed forces; following the election, and the failed coup of February 1975, the new leader's strategy was that of assuring the civil servants that the military would not be aggressive once again. Karamanlis obtained so by engaging himself in reminders about the negative effects of the military involvement in politics, that could lead back to the authoritarian rule[219].

Another issue that needed to be addressed: the monarchy. The elections were followed one month later by a referendum on the future of the monarchy. King Constantine imprudently did not return in Greece, after his forced exile. The left parties barnstormed against his return to his homeland, but Karamanlis decided to maintain an attitude of neutrality[220]. It worth noting that the monarchy had played a pivotal role in the twentieth century, because it constituted a critical element in the operation of the postwar anticommunist state and acted on numerous occasions as a medium with foreign interference. When the junta

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[216] Pridham, G. *Securing Democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in southern Europe*, Routledge London and New York, 1984, pp. 60-62

[217] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp. 50-72

[218] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.58-59

[219] Diamandouros, N. *The politics of Democratic Consolidation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1984, pp. 50-72

[220] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 169

collapsed in July 1974, caused by the continuous political and economic problems and the threat of a possible war against Turkey and the failed coup in Cyprus, Karamanlis held a new and free referendum about the future form of Greece in December of 1974: 69 per cent of votes, voted in favor of its elimination[221]. Its elimination, represented, thence, a successful democratization of the new political system, and made possible a redistribution of power in favor of the civilian segment[222].

THE NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY IN GOVERNMENT: PERFORMANCE AND IDEOLOGY

When the authoritarian regime of the junta collapsed in 1974, one might have expected a surge of leftism, similar to the PASOK in 1941. Unexpectedly, it did not happen. The success of the right-wing party in 1974 can be reconducted to three main factors: first Karamanlis's charisma and the respect that the Greek had towards his figure since he was perceived the only figure that was able to restore the democratic values in Greece; second there was the ERE[223]'s uncompromising stand against the dictatorship between 1967 and 1974, that divided the democratic and undemocratic political parties, and third the decision of creating a new political party, of a center-right democratic orientation, that demonstrated that Karamanlis was expanding his political view[224]. Once the monarchy, had been officially eliminated, Karamanlis understood that the right wing he represented needed to be modernized to keep up with the continuous changes of the Greek political system. His quick response to these demands, was the creation of a new political formation, named New Democracy, which he guided from the 1974 to 1980. The modernization process wanted to be obtained through a three-layered strategy: on the ideological level, Karamanlis wanted to create a new political identity that delegitimized the sterile anticommunism, which characterized the right fir almost forty years; the new political party in the form of the New Democracy needed to be liberal, reflecting the image of the modern conservatives' parties in Western Europe[225]. On the organizational level, the New Democracy was foretoken and perceived to be the new era for the Greek political parties and needed to be characterized

[221] Markesinis, B. *Recent political and constitutional developments in Greece*, parliamentary affairs, 1974, pp. 261-277

[222] Clogg, R. *A concise History of Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 169 see also Meynaud, Clogg, pp. 166-199, 105-133

[223] National radical union

[224] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57

[225] Kalaitzidis, A. *Europe's Greece: a giant in the making*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 35-59

by an abandonment of the traditions that were attached to the old Greek bourgeois. Karamanlis' new pollical party had been created to be a modern mass party, structured following democratic valuers, and capable to react quickly and successfully to the modern struggles of Greece[226]. The last layer is directly related to the recruitment of new affiliates, taken socially including young educated and sophisticated professionals, that could reinforce the new identity; and politically there was a need of including young technocrats who had studied abroad that could improve organizational and managerial experience, and internally the right wing needed to find itself as a center-right force, by modernizing itself[227].

IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN THE GREEK CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT AND THE EXTREME RIGHT, FROM THE INTERWAR YEARS TO 1977

Conservative Movement			Antidemocratic Extreme Right	
Center right	Broad right	Narrow right	Authoritarian right	Totalitarian right

People's party (1944–1952)

Greek Rally (1951–1955)

National Radical Union (1956–1967)

New Democracy (1977)

Metaxas Dictatorship (1936–1940)

Dictatorship of the Colonels (1967–1974)

National Democratic Union (1974)

National Camp (1977)

Penniman, 1981

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[226] Ibid, pp. 35-50
[227] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3.

On September 26 of 1974, Karamanlis publicly announced to the Greek civil servants, the creation of a New political formation: The New Democratic Party. According to Panayiotis Papaligouras, who was the minister of coordination in the New Democracy governments between 1974 and 1977, Karamanlis openly stated that he had four objectives: to confront internationally the crisis in Cyprus, to reinstall and strengthen the democratic values and rule in the Peninsula, to give the country a strong and central government and to render a powerful moderate party a force in Greek politics[228]. The main objective of the newly created political party was that of presenting itself as a new political movement – not ERE under another name[229]. Differently from ERA, the New Democracy party had discarded the simplistic anticommunism feeling of the ERE; it, in fact, adopted a more radical socioeconomic policy, with a more liberal and moderate attitude toward not only the leftist party, but also the other political rivals (Loulis, 1981, pp. 59). The reinvention of the political party was tangible, when looking at the rejuvenation of the vast majority of its member (127), had run for office for the first time only in 1974, while the minority (68), had run for ERE, or had run with the Centre union[230]. The spokesmen of the New Democracy stressed its will to fight against "every form of totalitarianism", the dedication to the "idea of the Greek Nation", its respect for the individual, and the faith to achieve a balance of freedom and order[231]. The New democracy was also pushing for a pro-western outlook and, they strongly believed in a united Europe[232]. There was also a strong stress over economic development and social justice, and in order to succeed, the New democracy would not hesitate to "widen the economic sphere controlled by the state"[233].

The important issue that needs to be further analyzed is the position of the party in the political spectrum and arena in Greece. The spokesmen asserted that, the classical labels of right, center and left are deceptive, but it did not further specify what kind of epithet to use[234]. Subsequently, a member of the New Democracy, suggested to differentiate between the Greek political parties by analyzing whether or not they are democratic or antidemocratic, modern or outmoded and, eventually, Marxist or non-Marxist[235]. Another

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[228] Penniman, R. *Greece at the polls: the national elections of 1974 and 1977*, American enterprise institute, 1981, pp. 10

[229] Nea Dimokratia, 1975, pp.4

[230] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 59-60

[231] Oi ideologikes Arhes tis Neas Dimokratias, pp. 6-10)

[232] Ibid, pp. 12-13

[233] Ibid, pp.7

[234] Ibid, pp.5

[235] Diamandouros, N. *Parties, Politics, and democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, see also Kallias, 1976, pp. 84

representative of the party stated openly that the ND was not a Marxist power, but it also concluded by saying that it would not totally accept "either solely the views of the Social democrats, or solely the views of the other democratic parties in Europe"[236]. Another statement described the New Democracy as a progressive party of the center; rightist when confronting national issues, and a leftist party when tackling with social issues[237]. In order to clarify publicly the ideologies of the New Democracy, the prime minister, Karamanlis, emphasized six points, in his discussion with the party congress in April 1977[238]. The first one was the party's belief in the "idea of nation", to justify the position of the new democracy as "outside and above the binding and misleading labels of the right, center and left" since the only objective of the new political party was that of serving the nation and its interests. Karamanlis idea was that of setting and positioning the ND above other parties, that only occupied the left-right spectrum, a view that has been defined to be paternalistic and arbitrary (Loulis, 1984, pp. 61). The other points were mainly related to the party's belief in parliamentary democracy, social justice, a free democratic economy and "peaceful" coexistence[239]. In connection with New Democracy's policies related to the economy of Greece, Karamanlis reported that: "A free economy exists when it combines justly and with measure individual and public welfare, […] (he believed) in the creative zeal of the individual, free competition, but also the necessity of state intervention in order to balance social and economic conflicts and to reduce inequalities"[240]. However, really confusing was the approach of the economy, whether or not it would be free-market oriented or state interventionist[241]. In contrasting the New Democracy with the ERE, it is clear that the ideologies are far more sophisticated, and it created a concrete political platform; however, to detach itself from its past, the New democracy, refused to acknowledge itself as a center-right party[242]. The new political party carefully refused to associate itself with the term "conservative", fearing that it would associate it with words such as "reactionary" and "progressive"; he then added that the New Democracy only "retains and conserves from tradition only what time has proved to be correct and valuable"[243]. The ideological

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[236] Mehlhausen T. *European Union Enlargement: Material Interests, community Norms and Anomi*e, Taylor and Francis, 2015, see also Papaligouras, 1975, pp. 11-12).
[237] Averoff's speech, 1977
[238] Karamanlis, 1977, pp. 21-28
[239] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 61
[240] Ibid, pp. 25-30
[241] Ibid, pp.61
[242] Koliopoulos, J. et Al. *Modern Greece: a history since 1821*, Wiley publisher, see also Gennimatas, 1976, pp. 5-7
[243] Clogg, R. *Parties and elections in Greece: the search of legitimacy, Duke university press*. 1987, see also Nea Dimokratia, chapter, 5. 1977, pp. 11

principles promulgated by the political party, had never been looked at with a critical eye, and the informations given to the public by the party representatives, were only repeated senselessly as party slogans[244]. The election of 1974, the election was the New Democracy with a 54.4 percent of the votes and was able to be granted huge support across the country. The statistics of the urban/rural dissection shows the average of votes for the New Democracy political party:

District type	Average ND percentage
Urban	54.8
Semiurban	47.1
Semirural	57.2
Rural	56.6
Aegean Islands	52.6

Census of the population and dwellings, 1977

The extreme-right party, the National democratic Union, that an ultraconservative leadership, received only the 1.2 percent of the votes[245].

For what concerns the stand of the New Democracy toward the referendum for the monarchy, it decided not to campaign for either cause (republic or monarchy), while the left strongly campaigned in favor of the republic. The approach of Karamanlis underlined the new strategy in the conservatives' attitude[246]. The parliament later ratified the new constitution on the 11th of June 1975, and proceeded to elect Constantine Tsatsos, a New Democracy representative, as Greece's first president of the republic (Politika Themata, 1975, pp. 27-48). A small parenthesis is worth opening on Karamanlis's view of the constitution, since he helped in the drafting process. His main concern was that of the executive power be adequate to face economic and social developments promptly in a period of drastic change, and about this topic he stated that it was necessary to "reinforce the executive power (without) weakening the power of Parliament"[247]. The first cabinet was primarily composed of experienced politicians and some nonelected personalities. The most

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[244] Penniman, R. *Greece at the polls: the national elections of 1974 and 1977*, American enterprise institute, 1981, pp. 62

[245] Penniman, R. *Greece at the polls: the national elections of 1974 and 1977*, American enterprise institute, 1981, pp. 77, see also Vergos, 1977.

[246] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 63

[247] Minotos, M. *The content of the Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Archive: its European dimension*, Revista General de Informacion y documentacion, 2008, pp 12-13

important party leaders were Papaligouras, Rallis, Averoff and Papakonstandinou, respectively minister of coordination, minister to the president, minister of defense and president of parliament[248]. The objective of Karamanlis was that of moving younger people to positions in power, in order for them to transfer and transit the ideologies of the New democracy. Another important change was that of appointing as minister of education George Rallis, who launched a bold educational reform successfully.

During the first three years in government between 1974 to 1977, the New Democracy focused mainly on four points: bolster and invigorate the Greek democracy, attain socio-economic progress, developing a new structure for the domestic educational system, and face the foreign policy issues, mainly those related to the Greek-Turkish relation, the entrance of Greece in the European Community and, inevitably, the Cyprus question[249]. Karamanlis believed that the greatest problem that was affecting Greece since the transitional moments in 1974, was that of "securing the smooth functioning of democracy, with a stable and efficient government of the country"[250]. In order to understand how successful, the new democracy in Greece, there is an observation that had been made by the London times in July of 1977, that declared: "Today the Greeks enjoy more democracy than they have ever had. And for all the grumbling and complaining, which is the daily reminder that this cherished freedom exists, Greece has become an oasis of tranquility in a world plagued by conflict and coercion"[251]. For what concerns the socioeconomic front, the New Democracy was forced to face heavy problems. When the ND won the elections, Greece was going through a harsh crisis: the inflation was as high as 27 percent, an economic downtrend was also apparent in 1974[252]. In the same year, the balance-of-payments deficiency was roughly 1,212 millions of dollars[253]. The ND has succeeded in bringing the inflation down to 13.3 percent, during the years of 1975 and 1976; it helped with the rise of the industrial production by 4.4 percent in 1975, and roughly 10.6 percent 1976[254]. For what

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[248] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 63

[249] Ibid, pp. 64

[250] P. Tzermias, *He Politiki Skepsi tou Konstantinou Karamanli* [The Political Thought of Konstantinos Karamanlis], Athens, 1990, p. 138.

[251] Modiano, Times London, July 25th, 1977

[252] Clogg, R. *Parties and Election in Greece: the search for legitimacy*, C: Hurst, 1987, see also for reference Apologismos, pp. 14) + GNI (gross national income) declining at a rate of 3.8 percent annually, investment at 25.6 percent, industrial production at 1.6 percent

[253] Papalogouras's speech

[254] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 65

concerns the balance of payments, the deficit was decreased to 1,091 millions of dollars in 1976[255].

The New Democracy's ideologies, promoting liberalism and its preference to fight the communist party with definite arguments, rather than using oppressive policy measures that had been used in the past, and in concomitance with its "antjuntist" policies, it drew massive critiques from the archconservatives and the extreme right[256]. *Eleftheros, Kosmos* and *Estia*[257], were accursing the new political party and its leader of persecuting patriotic officers, and trying to appease with communism, whose aim was that of spreading its ideologies, especially in the universities[258].

In the field of education George Rallis, as an active member of the New Democracy, created and enacted massive reforms: firstly, the language of the simple Greek man, is now used as official language, to avoid any misinterpretation of what is said by the government, and also to avoid the artificiality of the *katharevousa*, language that was used and forces by the junta[259]. The measure adopted, was not welcomed in the extreme-right lines, and it actually cost Rallis, a number of votes in the elections that were held in 1977 (Estia, 1977). The other measures presented were mainly related with the planning and promotion of technical education, the reconstruction of general education, the modernization of school texts that would include present facts, the construction and re-construction of schools, and the establishment of the Center for Educational Training and research[260]. The sense of liberalism crucial for the New Democracy, was also implemented and encouraged in the universities, provoking continuous outbreaks in the extreme right factions[261].

KARAMANLIS'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS STRATEGY

In 1974, an important concession had also been made in its foreign affairs, deciding to withdraw from NATO; "We belong to the West" Karamanlis was continuously stressing[262].

[255] Ibid, pp. 30-31
[256] State department, Zierler, D. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980*, Government Printing Office, see also Rallis, 1977, pp.7
[257] Political journals in Greece
[258] Kosmos, Greek weekly nationalist newspaper, owned by Dimitrios Zaphiropoulos, 1977
[259] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 67
[260] KEME + Rallis's speech, articles, speeches, interviews, Athens: Ermias, 1977
[261] Featherstone, K. *Prime ministers in Greece: The paradox of Power*, OUP Oxford, 2015, see also for reference as an author Rallis, pp. 38-42; 44; 52-53
[262] Chourchoulis, D. et Al. *Greece during the early Cold War View from the Western archives: documents*, 2015, university of Macedonia, Politikes Theseis Karamanli, pp. 23

Two reasons were given for this bold move: firstly, most of the Greeks were certain of the partnership and relationship of the United States in helping the Junta in getting the control over the Peninsula[263]. The United States always rejected that claim, stating; *"congressional attempts to suspend military assistance to Greece, and despite congressional recommendations that the continuation of friendly relationships with Greek dictatorship could permanently damage long-term U.S interests in Greece should the military government be overthrown, the policy decision (by Nixon administration) was to conduct business – as -usual"[264]*. Secondly, most of the Greeks had interpreted the junta's error to invade Cyprus as inspired by the United States. As Turkey openly attacked Cyprus, the absence of any response by the Military forces of NATO, agitated and perturbed the Greek civil society[265]. The new democratic government could not ignore the popular demand to free themselves from the foreign control, thus the withdraw from the NATO (later rejoined in 1979) calmed the spirits and supported the legitimacy of the regime[266]. In the next years, he reinforces his decision by stating: "the withdrawal from NATO was not only justified but necessary. The fury of the Greek and Cypriot people was so great at that time that the only alternative would have been war"[267]. Karamanlis further clarified that: "[NATO] had only proven incapable of stopping the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but also tolerated such an action"[268]. Karamanlis also believed that the only solution for Greece, would be that of promoting and creating an independent, but not aligned policy: Greece had to be part of an alliance, but one as such that would "promote policies serving its own interests"[269].

Following the previous claim, the new democratic elites decided to turn to Europe. Karamanlis perceived the EEC not only to be a potential accomplice for security matters, but also, he understood that as a leader of a small country, that recently exited from an authoritarian regime, the vicinity with Europe, would help Greece to be considered a strong democracy, not only within the country's boundaries, but also internationally[270]. According to Karamanlis, the importance of Greece entering the European Community, was crucial

[263] Tzortzis, I. *Greek Democracy and the Junta: Regime Crisis and the Failed Transition of 1973*, 2020, I B Tauris & Co Ltd for reference Stavrou, 1977, pp.173

[264] Craig, W. *Democratization and human rights in Cyprus: objective measures and the populations' perceptions*, 2008, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8:1, 33-49, pp.14

[265] C. Hitchens, *Cyprus*, London, New York, Quartet Books, pp. 80-85

[266] Hadjiyannis, S. *Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece*, Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp. 8-10

[267] Karamanlis, 1978, quote to the New York Times

[268] Karamanlis, 1978, quote to the New York Times

[269] Ibid, New York times

[270] Couloumbis, T. *Five theories regarding Kissinger's Policy toward the Cyprus Crisis*, International studies notes, 2, No.1, 1976, pp.14

not only at a political level but also for an economic one[271]. The liaison of Greece with the European community was so important that the New democracy leader, of the fifteen trips he had organized, nine were in countries that were part of the European Community; in addition to that Karamanlis stimulated Greece's relationship with the Balkans[272].

Greece's efforts to enter in the EEC can be looked at from three different perspectives: psychologically, economically and politically. The latter was directly related to the necessity of Karamanlis to mainstay Greece to the West and avoid the reoccurrence of the military dictatorship in the peninsula and, consequently, detach itself from the past associations[273]. Psychologically, scholars have defined it a *solution de rechange[274]*. When Greece gave its dependence to the USA, it had triggered a psychological necessity, in which Greece needed a new umbrella that could be used as a protection. For what concerns the economic side, Greek agricultural interests are antagonistic to those of France, therefore the only advantages that Greece could receive from entering the EEC, have to be looked at and assessed based on particular agreements regarding Greece's economic development and growth, the consequential protection of the industries, to facilitate the agricultural sector[275]. The last attempt in his foreign policy strategy, was that of traying to reconnect with Turkey, and improve their relations. He attempted to do so by avoiding the temptation to embrace the popular ultranationalistic policies and slogans, the same ones that had been used by the opposition parties, especially the PASOK[276]. The prime minister stated in one of public speeches that: "Greece, believes in Greek-Turkish friendship, however such friendship […] depends on whether Turkey will restore justice in Cyprus and will end its many provocations"[277]. When he talked about the aforementioned provocations, he is articulating about the disputes on the Aegean Seabed, which reached its climax in August of 1976, when the Turkish ship Sesmik I, scrutinized the seabed areas that had been granted to Greece[278]. Consequently, Greece decided to appeal to the United Nations Security Council, as a moderate and responsible approach of the new leader, Karamanlis, and the newly created

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[271] Ibid, pp.76

[272] Clogg, R. *Parties and Election in Greece: the search for legitimacy*, C: Hurst, 1987, see also for reference Apologismos, pp. 20

[273] Tsoukalis, L. *Greece and the European Commu*nity, London, 1979, pp. 147

[274] Alternative

[275] Karamouzi, E. *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1970*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, see also for reference Tsoukalis, 1979, pp. 147

[276] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 68

[277] Chourchoulis, D. et Al. *Greece during the early Cold War View from the Western archives: documents*, 2015, university of Macedonia, Politikes Theseis Karamanli, pp. 26

[278] Sotiropoulos, D. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek politics*, Oxford University Press, 2020, pp.57; see also Loulis, 1975, chapter 3, pp. 68

political party[279]. It is also worth noting that the major journals in Greece namely Eleftheros, Kosmos and Estia, were very vocal about the foreign policy of Karamanlis towards Turkey (Estia, March and April 1977).

GREEK – CYPRIOT LIAISON AFTER 1974: A NEW AND REALISTIC APPROACH

The assessment of a successful remedy to a conflict depends, and it is evaluated on the diagnosis of the causes, the consequence and the dynamics of that specific conflict. When looking at the liaison and the descriptions about Cyprus and Greece after the 1974 invasion, two major statements have been analyzed and, later discarded because considered inaccurate and inadequate: the first one reads that the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots decided to describe the Cyprus's issue as one resulting from the "invasion", "occupation" of the Northern part of the divided island by the Turkish army in 1974; the second statements reports that in the years of Renewal, Henry Kissinger when talking about the Cyprus issue as "the forerunner of conflicts between ethnic groups"[280].

It is, thus, after the analysis done in the previous chapters, to describe the Cyprus problem as a chain of Greece-bred confrontative issue with Turkey; in particular starting from the 1963, and spiraling to new democratic resentment in the Greek military coup on the 15th of July 1974 and, even more recently, since the provocative policies of the Greek Cypriot side and Greece[281].

Many scholars argue that the cause of the Cyprus conflict, can be reconducted the irridentism of the nationalistic feeling of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Kissinger stated, on multiple occasions, that the continuous exposure of Cyprus and the Junta threatened the restoration of a conservative democracy in Athens[282]. After the restoration of the civilian government and the creation of a new democracy in 1974, the situation in the Greek part of the island seemed to be under control, and the relations between the republic and the government in Greece was re-established. The objective of the new leader, Karamanlis, was that of creating a normal and closed coordination of foreign policy, focused mainly on

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[279] Penniman, R. *Greece at the polls: the national elections of 1974 and 1977*, American enterprise institute, 1981, pp. 10 see also for reference Epikentra, 1976, pp 22-30
[280] Couloumbis, T. *Five theories regarding Kissinger's Policy toward the Cyprus Crisis*, International studies notes, 2, No.1, 1976, pp. 192
[281] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.2
[282] C. Hitchens, *Cyprus*, London, New York, Quartet Books, pp. 80-85

winning support for resolutions in international relation and from Greeks abroad. The new government of Karamanlis was, also, apprehensive to construct a good relationship with the United States, following the consensus that had been created over the 1950s and 1960s. The decision to connect with the US was also driven to deal with the public opinion that looked at the Americans, as enemy since they seemed to have supported the junta and having favoritism towards Turkey[283]. Furthermore, the two-track policy would have succeeded in appeasing the international relations, if the United States would have shown any interest in disciplining Turkey or in reunite the island of Discord. The issue of Cyprus, thus, became crucial for the implementation of a good democratic system and a successful international foreign policy. Greece decided to give publicly the support to policies adopted by the republic of Cyprus and promised openly not to interfere with the domestic Cypriot politics (Library of U.S congress, 1991). The two governments concurred that the Greek Cypriot participation in the settlement of the disputes was crucial, and they further agreed to detach the matters related to the Cyprus issue from the other Greek- Turkish feud, mainly related to those of the Aegean Sea territories[284]. Nonetheless, the governments' priorities were distinct. The Greek prime minister Karamanlis, preferred a less drastic, and a more moderate conciliatory stand in Cyprus, contrasting it from the necessities of both Makarios and Kyprianou, who campaigned for a long struggle, in response to the Turkish inflexibility. The Greek government was also pushing to return to NATO, which indeed happened in 1981, in order to reduce and ease the tensions with Turkey though an international body. There was an ulterior approach of Karamanlis, that had been proposed in 1978, with the tripartite pact, the ABC Plan (American-British-Canadian plan), though not approved by the Greek Cypriots as a framework for negotiations, since they were rejecting the intermission of an external actor in their domestic affairs[285].

When in 1981, the socialist government had been elected under the guidance of Andreas Papandreou, the foreign policy of Greece shifted. Differently from Karamanlis, he showed less devotion to NATO and other international organizations, his objective was that of render the Cyprus settlement more international, and openly started a confrontational approach to a bilateral difference with Turkey. This led to a split of competences between the republic and Greece: with the former bringing the issue of the Turkish troops to NATO,

[283] Ibid, pp. 130-131
[284] Solsten, E. *Cyprus: a country study*; The library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Department of the Army, 1993.
[285] Solsten, E. *Cyprus: a country study*; The library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Department of the Army, 1993.

and the latter involved in intercommunal talks[286]. There is no doubt that the issue of Cyprus is what actually led the leftist party of Papandreou to the political victory. It has always been Cyprus that caused in changes In Greece: the ambitions over Cyprus helped the junta to power, it was Cyprus that helped them sustain the power, it was Cyprus to end the control of the Junta, and it was Cyprus that led the left to open[287]. The new prime minister Andreas Papandreou set a more decisive position on the Cyprus question; he was the first Greek prime minister to visit the island. He defined the Greek problem as being of invasion and occupation, rather than one of intercommunal relations. He further declared that his Greece would perceive any further attack to Cyprus, as an attack on itself[288]. Cyprus was re-connected to the problematics between Greece and Turkey, moving as far as Papandreou stating that no further talks could be possible between the two NATO allies: he offered Greek financing for a larger intervention of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, only if they would force the Turkish army to leave the island[289]. This procedure was temporarily suspended when Papandreou and the Turkish prime minister Özal, initiated some talks recognized to be the Davos process, in order to better and enhance the ties through measures related to the Aegean territories. However, the attempts of cooperation had been postponed due to an illness that affected the Greek prime minister, and for most of 1989 and early 1990, Greece was guided by a provisional government, that did not take any steps in the foreign policy fields, even though the election of the Cypriot activist Vassiliou, tried to give some new vigor and interest to the consultations between the two governments (Library of U.S Congress, 1991). These initiatives aggravated by the tensions in the Aegean territories, an increase of regional arms race, and the Turkish declaration of independence singed on the 15th of November 1983, created international instability, even more concerning than the crisis of 1974.

One year later, in 1990, Greece's power returned in the hands of the New Democratic Party, and the new prime minister, Costantinos Mitsotakis, promised to resume the Greek efforts to solve definitely the Cyprus question. The two governments decided to form a joint committee, administered and directed by their foreign ministries, to share the informations and policies related decisions, in order to avoid any kind of twist that could slow or alter

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[286] Ibid, pp. 1-2
[287] C. Hitchens, *Cyprus*, London, New York, Quartet Books, pp. 131
[288] Ibid. pp.135
[289] Solsten, E. *Cyprus: a country study*; The library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Department of the Army, 1993.

any solution to the Cyprus problem[290]. In the same year, the Greek Cypriot side unilaterally and unlawfully decided to apply for the European Union membership, in order to have a protection, and to strengthen its hand against Turkey[291].

Many Greeks have been reported to be drained by the Cyprus issue. It has been affecting the stability of Greece for too long, and has provided too many occasions for internal destabilization, and external menaces. It is perceived to be always on the verge of a Graeco-Turkish war, and it is economically draining to Greece[292]. Even though the negative aspects seem far more present then the positive, it is impossible for Greece to drop Cyprus, as the Island represents the past: the Turkish domination of the Greek world. It also represents the present, looking back at the junta period, and it represents the future: it represents the escape of Greece from the Balkan country dependent on America, and to become a respected and protected member of the European community. However, the ancient rivalry with Turkey, is what represents the impediment to resolutions of the conflict in Cyprus[293].

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[290] Solsten, E. *Cyprus: a country study*; The library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Department of the Army, 1993.
[291] Olgun, M. *Cyprus: a new realistic approach, Journal of international affairs*, Volume IV- Number 3, 1999, pp.5
[292] C. Hitchens, *Cyprus*, London, New York, Quartet Books, pp. 135
[293] Ibid, pp.13

<u>DEMOCRACY IN GREECE: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?</u>

The Greek transition to democracy was completed on the 9th of November 1974 following the elections and the referendum that abolished the monarchy, successfully opened the Parliament and appointed Karamanlis as prime minister. In the 142 days of the transition, started with the crumble of the military and the opening of the parliament, all the impediments to democracy were removed (Linz et al, pp. 112). The new leader had been active in conniving in the exclusionary legislation that had been affecting Greece since the beginning of the civil war in 1967 "[…] put an end to Law 509/1948, the last major piece of civil was discriminatory legislation" [294].   He further announced that an elected parliament, would modify the existing constitution, restoring civil liberties that had been missing since the civil war, and more significantly he ended the proscription of the Communist party. Thusly, the Greek transition had been completed.

My objective in this chapter is to analyze the quality of the Greek democracy in 1975 using statistical scores. A quality democracy is defined to be a "good democracy", the definition reads: "a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms"[295]. Furthermore, a good democracy has to be liberal, representative, responsive, participatory, deliberative, associative, egalitarian and lastly, of good governance[296]. The qualities that are taken into consideration, as professor Morlino explains, are merely grouped in eight dimensions: the first procedural quality is the rule of law, the second and third and merged in the two forms of accountability (electoral and inter-institutional), the fourth and fifth one are participation and competition, the sixth and seventh are defined to be substantive in nature, taking into consideration the range of freedoms and the implementation of political, social and economic equality. The final dimension involves the responsiveness of the system to the needs and request of the citizens of a certain country[297].

The first section relates to whether or not Greece has been a democratic country in the period that goes from the 1974 to 2009, merely through the study of two measures of democracy previously stated: the freedoms and the political institutions. The data set has

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[294] Gunther, R. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspectiv*e, Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 112-113
[295] Morlino, L. *The impact of the economic crisis on south European Democracies*, The Palgrave MacMillan, ISBN: 978-3-319-52370-5, 2011, pp. 5
[296] Ibid, pp. 5-6
[297] Ibid, chapter. 8-9

been gathered through the *freedom house* and the *database of political institutions* (DPI). The first one attempts to evaluate the domestic freedom of 193 countries, and 15 contended territories on an annual basis[298]. The main objective is reflecting both non-governmental and governmental actions resulting in the real world of rights and freedoms; it examines two broad evaluation: political rights and civil liberties based on a seven-point scale that ranges from 1 to 7 (1 describing the highest level of freedom and, consequently, 7 the lowest level of freedom). Each analysis is based on the average between the political rights and the civil liberties (Bui, 2009, pp. 1). It distinguishes between *free (*score of 1.0-2.5), *partly free (*average score 3.5 -5.0) and *not free* (score 5.5-7.0); they can also be altered by upward and downward trends arrows, given to indicate positive and negative trends, however they are not significant enough to alter the ratings of freedom[299].

The Database of Political Institutions, is a practical database that focuses its attention on 177 countries, examining its political and institutional characteristics, and their variation over time[300]. The main objective of the database io to determine the democracy by election outcomes in a multi-party-political environment based on a seven-level-scale. At least a level of six is required for the labelling of democracy[301]. It is worth noting that the DPI evaluated a unanimous victory, 100 percent of the seats, of one party as being equivalent with unfree and unfair, similarly a single party winning 75 percent of the seats implies a suspicious election. In the first case, the DPI perceives the system to be undemocratic, in the latter it is not necessarily an undemocratic regime[302].

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[298]https://www.google.com/search?q=freedom+house&rlz=1C5CHFA_enIT893IT893&oq=freedom+house&aqs=chrome.69i57j4 6i199i465i512j0i512l8.2434j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8; Freedom house, 2011

[299] Puddington, A. *Freedom in Retreat: is the tide turning? Findings of Freedom in the world*, Research Gate, 2008

[300] Bui, K. *Democracy in Greece, 1974-2009: Comparing the Database of Political Institutions and Freedom House,* German National Library, GRIN Verlag, 2009, pp. 2

[301] Beck, T. *New Tools in comparative political economy: the database of political institutions,* World Bank economic review, 15 (1) see for reference Keefer, 2006

[302] Panizza, F. *Conceptualizing Comparative Politics*, Taylor & Francis, see also for reference Bogaards, 2007

Scale:	No legislature	1
	Unelected legislature	2
	Elected, 1 candidate	3
	1 party, multiple candidates	4
	Multiple parties are level but only one party won seats	5
	Multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more than 75 percent of the seats	6
	Largest party got less than 75 percent	7

(Keefer et al. 2006)

Table 3: Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness

| Scale:	No executive	1
	Unelected executive	2
	Elected, 1 candidate	3
	1 party, multiple candidates	4
	Multiple parties are level but only one party won seats	5
	Multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more than 75 percent of the seats	6
	Largest party got less than 75 percent	7

(Keefer el al. 2006)

FREEDOM AND DPI IN GREECE

For what concerns the freedom house measures, Greece during the period between 1974 and 2009, it has been characterized as Free with the average score of 1.79 (Freedom House). More specifically from 1974 to 1979, Greece had maintained the score of 2 in both political rights and civil liberties. Particularly, political rights had experienced an improvement in 1980, moving from 2 to 1, reducing the average to 1.5[303]. The positive trend initiated with the election of Karamanlis as prime minister however did not last long: in November 1984, the Greek political rights fell back to 2, and this score had been safeguarded till 1989. Since 1990, Greece had advanced positively in political rights, scoring 1 in the following 19 year. For what concerns the civil liberties, Greece has been reported stable from 1974 to 1992, with the score of 2. Nevertheless, from 1993 to 2001, Greece had a slight contraction of civil liberties, when the score had dropped to 3. Even though, there had been a reduction of the civil liberties, Greece could be still defined as free with an average score of 2. In 2002,

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[303] Bui, K. *Democracy in Greece, 1974-2009: Comparing the Database of Political Institutions and Freedom House,* German National Library, GRIN Verlag, 2009, pp. 2

the civil condition improved, returning to a score of 2, with an average score of 1.5, however the trend did not last, when in December 2008, there was a descending tendency in the Greek freedom[304]; however, the crisis of 2008, was not harsh enough to set back the rating[305]. For what concerns the fairness of the electoral system, since November of 1988, the parliamentary system has been acknowledged as free and fair by the freedom house, classifying It as an electoral democracy[306].

For what concerns the database of political institution in 1974, Greece had successfully carried out multi-party election, after years under the authoritarian regime of the military junta, with the participation of 81.5 percent of population to the polls. Elections signaled the triumph of the new democratic party with 54.37 percent of the votes (inter-parliamentary union, 2009). When analyzing the DPI's Indice of Electoral Competitiveness in the 1974 election, Greece achieved a level 7, and thereupon certify it as a democracy. From 1975 to 2006, Greece had been classified by the DPI as democratic with a level value of 7[307]. With the victory of New Democratic and Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), in 2007 and 2009, with 41.84 percent and 36.64, Greece against maintained the level 7 of electoral competitiveness and, again, is considered to be a democracy based on the scale[308].

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[304] Puddington, A. *Freedom in Retreat: is the tide turning? Findings of Freedom in the world*, Research Gate, 2008
[305] Bui, K. *Democracy in Greece, 1974-2009: Comparing the Database of Political Institutions and Freedom House,* German National Library, GRIN Verlag, 2009, pp. 1- 2
[306] Freedom house database, 2009
[307] World Bank database
[308] Ibid, pp.2

Therefore, since 1974 up till 2009, Greece had been considered a full democracy according to the scale of the database of political institutions.

Table 4: Legislature and Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness of Greece, Period 1975 - 2006

Year	LIEC	EIEC
1975	7	7
1976	7	7
1977	7	7
1978	7	7
1979	7	7
1980	7	7
1981	7	7
1982	7	7
1983	7	7
1984	7	7
1985	7	7
1986	7	7
1987	7	7
1988	7	7
1989	7	7
1990	7	7
1991	7	7
1992	7	7
1993	7	7
1994	7	7
1995	7	7
1996	7	7
1997	7	7
1998	7	7
1999	7	7
2000	7	7
2001	7	7
2002	7	7
2003	7	7
2004	7	7
2005	7	7
2006	7	7

(World Bank 2009)

Based on the indicators previously reported few statements can be drawn Greece can be defined as a successful democracy during the years oscillating from 1974 to 2009. The Freedom house reports possess superiority in comparison to the DPI[309]. The fact that Greece

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[309] Bui, K. *Democracy in Greece, 1974-2009: Comparing the Database of Political Institutions and Freedom House,* German National Library, GRIN Verlag, 2009, pp. 15

has been a democracy since the arrival of Karamanlis in 1974, however is found in both databases, and recognized in both measures. However, the Freedom house success in providing a more detailed and definite picture, because it takes into consideration political rights, civil liberties and electoral democracy status.

To further analyze the quality of democracy in Greece few other factors have to be taken into consideration.

The Global state of democracy indices, illustrate democratic trends, taking consideration one's country, regions and globally across a wide range of features of democracy from 1975 to 2020. It has been producing specific data related to democracy in over 165 countries worldwide[310]. The scoring of this specific data set ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing the lowest achievement in the samples and, wherefore, 1 representing the highest score. Similarly, to the system explored by Professor Morlino, with his TODEM, the Global state of democracy evaluated the democracy of a specific country based on 116 indicators developed by scholars and int4ernational organizations[311].

To evaluate Greece and the quality of its democracy, further considerations have to be taken into consideration: through the GSoD, five main democratic idiosyncrasies are taken into consideration: representative government, fundamental rights, checks on government, impartial administration and participatory engagement[312]. Each of the five attributes have several sub attributes, worth mentioning when analyzing Greece: the first one includes, clean elections, inclusive suffrage, free political parties and elected government; the second one includes access to justice, civil liberties and social rights and equality; the third one includes effective parliament, judicial independence and media; the fourth one includes absence of corruption and predictable enforcement and the last subgroup encompasses civil society participation, electoral participation, direct democracy and local democracy[313].

In my analysis I will take into consideration the year following the appointment of Karamanlis (1975), the 1980s, with the change in government, and to give continuity with the data previously analyzed of the freedom house and the database of political institution, I will also analyze the year 2009. Moreover, I will compare the same years with the other countries of the European Union in order to have comprehensive knowledge of democracy In Greece.

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[310] IDEA database, 2020, pp.3
[311] Global State of Democracy database, 2020, pp. 3
[312] IDEA database, 2020
[313] Ibid, 2020, pp. 2-3

International Idea, 2020.

Through the IDEA[314] prospects of Greece, few things can be pointed out when analyzing its democratic system: the participatory engagement and representative government have a score that can be described to be of a "high performance of democracy", the result of this positive trend can be directly pinned to the class reforms promoted by Karamanlis, and the inclusion of all the political parties that had been banned since 1967, increasing the competitiveness. By looking at the values of the V-dem, through which the IDEA gathers its data, we can say positively that the score representing the democratic state in Greece, it is approximately around 0.6, making it, a country of mid-range performance. Something that struck my attention was the low performance of "direct democracy" that subsisted since the 1975. The direct democracy is, as previously explained, a sub attribute, and it denotes to what extent citizens can participate in direct popular decision making[315]. It takes into consideration the result of a combination of scores for each type of popular vote. This trend of low direct democracy is low, since 1975 for a simple reason: the last nationwide vote on a substantive issue dates back to 1974, when the Greek civil society had to decide how to substitute the military regime, opting for the republic[316]. In the graph of 1975, there has been also an increase of fundamental rights, thanks to the creation of a new constitution

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[314] Institute for democracy and electoral assistance
[315] IDEA database 2020
[316] Kaufmann, R. et Al, *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites and Regime Change*, Princeton University Press, 2020

granting basic liberties and rights to the Greek citizens, that, due to years under the junta, were accustomed to the lack of any type of rights. Another value that is constant from 1975 to 2009 is the mid-range performance of the data related to the impartial administration which related to fair and predictable public administration. It usually overlaps with the concept of rule of law, and it is rooted in the tradition that emphasizes all the liberal aspects of democracy[317]. In particular, between 1974 and 1986, the weakest institution is the checks and balances, that in the new era of democratic transition have failed to be implemented successfully, therefore the elites of the new democratic Greece, mainly those of a hereditary nature, used this weak situation of public administration to their advantage by occupying the best political position in the country, unchecked and without any deterrent. By simply analyzing the data gathered by the V- dem, the 1980's have a value that characterizes the quality of democracy with 0,7 and in 2009 the value of democracy was roughly 0,76. We can positively say that since the election of Karamanlis in 1974 firmly initiated a good trend of democracy in Greece.

Finally, through the previous examination would seem that Karamanlis's transition and the democratic consolidation strategy, analyzed in the previous chapter, have been singularly outstanding. The former political system was based on a center and center-right founding coalition, while the latter system received support from the total political spectrum[318]. The new democratic system had been constructed, through policies of continuity and transformation, to depart from the past political patterns, to sustain the new parliament and to safeguard the system's activity and endurance. However, all the positive aspects that I analyzed, raise inevitable questions on whether the positive democratic trends that had been initiated by the prime minister, have been sustained. Kirchheimer[319]'s conceptualizing analyses, questioned the confining conditions to the long-term consolidation of democracy in Greece, that could affect the present regime. In these context three conditions have been taken into consideration: firstly, the political importance that the petit bourgeoisie have gathered over the years, secondly, the weakness of the Greek industrial classes, that reflect deficiency of the Greek capitalism and thirdly, the failure of the modernization process of Greece, regardless of the attempts made by Karamanlis[320]. It is, therefore, the nature and

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[317] IDEA database, 2020

[318] Pridham, G. *Securing Democracy: Political parties and democratic consolidation in southern Europe*, Routledge London and New York, 1984, pp. 605-70

[319] Otto Kirchheimer was a German jurist of Jewish ancestry and political scientist of the Frankfurt School whose work essentially covered the state and its constitution

[320] Diamandouros, N. *Parties, Politics, and democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, see also Kallias, 1976, pp. 65-66

the potential and ideological volatility, that might have created an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy. After Karamanlis's attempts of harnessing these obstacles, a new charismatic appeal has been attempted by Papandreou's personality, and the new movement the PASOK; provided ideological shelter to these tendencies and, since the 1980's they played a role in creating a positive trend for the consolidation of democracy[321]. Howbeit, there has been a persistence of these restricting conditions that seemed to be interfering with the consolidation of Greek democracy, it would be completely unfair to state that what has been achieved in the country since 1974, is a failure. The system implemented is, to the highest degree, the most open, inclusive and democratic regime in modern Greek history.


The global state democracy Indices (IDEA)

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[321] Diamandouros, N. *Parties, Politics, and democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, see also Kallias, 1976, pp. 65-66

The global state democracy indices (IDEA)

1981

The Global State Democracy Indices (IDEA)

2009

Greek democracy has been tested mainly on two occasions: firstly, in 1981 and secondly in 2010 – 2012, and it was not to found wanting in terms of legitimacy of electoral procedures and political stability[322]. However, despite the challenges that Greece was forced to face, it was able to survive and react promptly to the tests. The first challenge took place in 1981 when, for the first time in the history of Greece, the leftist party of the PASOK, was an

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[322] Sotiropoulos, D. et Al. *The Oxford handbook of Modern Greek Politic*s, Oxford Handbooks Online political science, 2014, pp. 10

absolute majority of the parliamentary seats and formed a single majority government. The military power did not react, and the former Prime minister, Constantine Karamanlis, in concomitance with Andreas Papandreou, contributed to a smooth transition to democracy [323].

The second challenge occurred between 2010 and 2012, when the socialist government of George Papandreou took power, and instead of implementing the Keynesian policies that he had promised during his campaign, he resorted to an external help, coming from the International monetary fund, the European Community and the European central bank. The external aids, however, did not leave room for maneuver to the socialist government, which then led to a sudden, hard and unbalanced austerity measures that worsen the already bad situation of the poor and the unemployed citizens, that then moved to the middle class[324].

In view of what has been stated we can conclude that it would be inaccurate to ignore the complicated road that Greece had to go through, since the end of the second world war, to its entrance in the European communities. It left behind and survived a civil war since 1946 to 1949, a military dictatorship of the junta from 1967 to 1974, and a motionless economy. All these events have shaped Greece into the successful democracy that it is nowadays, of course, it is still working to overcome the economic crisis, and it is attempting in conveying with the EU member states' standards for what concerns environmental protection, gender equality, and other standards, that in the European Union are worth leading.

Similarly, to Italy, the political parties of Greece are dominant. Once in power, a specific political party tends to reinforce centralization and command subnational levels of administration and government[325]. In this specific system the local governments tend to be fragmented, fragile and highly dependent on the center. With the election of PASOK in 1981, some form of reforms over the political decentralization tried to be implemented, however even those, were only incompletely implemented both by the socialists and the conservative Nea Demokratika, which was opposed to decentralization[326]. The membership of one's country in the European Union, has had an effect of setting up of a regional level

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[323] Sotiropoulos, D. et Al. *The Oxford handbook of Modern Greek Politics*, Oxford Handbooks Online political science, 2014, pp. 10-11

[324] Sotiropoulos, D. et Al. *The Oxford handbook of Modern Greek Politics*, Oxford Handbooks Online political science, 2014, pp. 10-11

[325] Loughlin, J. *Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities*, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 286

[326] Loughlin, J. *Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities*, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 286

of administration and has clarified to Greece his inadequacies to meet the challenge of the membership.

CONCLUSIONS

"Greece is being reborn, Greece will accomplish great things, Greece will live forever"[327]. The history of Greece since the end of the Second World War, saw a sequence of political alternances, mainly characterized by instability that facilitated the intrusion of authoritarian ideologies, since 1967 to 1974, and that later facilitated the transition to democracy. When analyzing Greece, events in the immediate surroundings played a major role in democratization process. Throughout history the relations between Turkey and Greece have always been precarious. For this reason, the independence of Cyprus from the British forces, in 1960, the tensions for the control of the population and the nation grew drastically. The political tensions between Greece and Turkey, facilitated enormously the establishment of the Junta in 1967, it was in fact one of the factors that pushed the Colonels to overthrow the, unstable, democratic system. The objectives laid out by the authoritarian regime, thus, were to threat the communism from Greece, solve the Cyprus problem and potentially return to democracy under the guidance of the Colonels. The resistance efforts, the protests that were taking place not only in Greece, but also internationally, had an extensive impact on the fall of the Junta in 1974, however the real turning point was the Cyprus situation that ended definitely the authoritarian regime of the Colonels. Strangely enough, the actions taken by the Junta to solve the crisis in Cyprus, actually lead to their disruption. The coup's goal, *enosis,* became the main issue between the Greek colonels, represented by Papadopoulos, and the Turkish government, as they were constantly fighting over the occupation of the island.

The Cyprus situation not only led to the continuation of the frictions between Greece and Turkey, but also resulted in the fall of the colonels, facilitating the restoring of the democratic system. From the fall of the Junta on the 22nd of July 1974, the powerful army officers signed a petition to "demand the formation of a national salvation council to be headed by Karamanlis"[328]. With his appointment as prime minister on the 24th of July 1974, with his new political party, New Democracy, he could initiate the democratization process of Greece. The objectives of Karamanlis, that I analyzed plenty in my thesis can be summarized in four points: to face the national crisis of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the reestablishment of a successful democracy, the development of a strong government and to

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[327] Mauzy, C. et Al, *Agora Excavations, 1931-2006: A Pictorial History*, American School of classical studies at Athens, see for reference in the book Mikedakis, 2000, pp. 84
[328] Veremis, T. *Historical dictionary of Greece*, Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1997, pp. 170

"make a powerful moderate party a force in Greek politics"[329]. The democratization process in Greece, was helped by the previous democratic system that was in place before the authoritarian regime of the Colonels, Karamanlis was in fact, able to restore the 1952 constitution, after having declared the constitution of 1967 null and void. There was a legalization of all the political parties, most importantly the communist one, that had been distanced from the political arena by Colonel Papadopoulos. On the 17th of November 1974, Karamanlis won the elections held in Greece in over seven years. His appointment also led to a referendum to decide whether or not Greece would retain its monarchy. The civil society decided to abandon the monarchy and accepted the establishment of an official republic. This helped with the progression of Greece, to an "independent foreign policy within a Western Framework"[330], that would facilitate the relation between Greece and Turkey, though not restored completely.

The transition to democracy from the authoritarian regime was quick. The fall of the Colonels was influenced by the events that took place throughout the years of the junta and underlined clearly that the best way to serve the Greek people was the instauration of a government with democratic values. By analyzing the climate in which the junta was established, there was no real way for the military dictatorship to last, as the needs of the civil society and those of the colonels were too far apart for them to coexist peacefully. However, without the colonels it would have continued to be a democratic rule under the monarchy, that was however reflecting the old-style Greek politics and old-world views. Through the colonel, consequently, and the strive to retain the Hellenism of the country, it was possible for Greece to progress into a political structure that reflected the changing international climate and national identity.

It is clear that the democratic developments in Greece since 1974, include and must have a wide focus, taking consideration not only the progress and improvement in the state structure, but also the deep social trends. By focusing our attention on the role that had been played by the leaders and their political parties, it is possible to see also a partial part of the changes in Greece, however the attention should be broadened to consider attitudes and emotions that are secluded beneath the immediate *façade*. In the analysis of the democratization process of Greece three main themes had been analyzed: the first one is related to the political parties that emerged in 1974. They had used the state machinery as

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[329] Pridham, G. *Securing democracy*, 2012, Taylor & Francis, for reference see also Katsoudas, 1988, pp. 60
[330] Ibid, pp.56

a tool to extend their hegemony, though the usage of intervention and incorporation. This tactic has had a huge impact and effect on the civil society. The Greek political tradition that is both paternalistic, and elitist, has never changed. After 1974, the interventionist ideologies were still present, and despite the promises that had been made by PASOK, to decentralize the political spectrum, the party itself found it very difficult to break free from the past practices. The second theme relates to the democratic success of the new parties: they have been limited by the weakness of the social structures that were independent of the state and by the preservation of conventional attitudes and practices. The structures that possessed all the democratic values that I analyzed have been, however impaired by the inability of developing strong pluralistic forces and the continuation of hidebound, corrupted behaviors. However, the third point of my analyzes, states that the situation had been changed: the problematics explained earlier, did lead to a process of change, with the traditions of the past protected. This movement is that of "modernization", that served to consolidate the democratic transition in the post-1974 regime.

Furthermore, in my thesis, through the statistical analysis of the Greek Democracy data for the period starting in 1974 to 2009, I had the possibility top answer to few questions: Does democracy make any significant improvement in public life and public trust in political institutions? What are the implications for future progress of democracy? In order to get a satisfying answer to these questions, the databases used had been crucial for the correct assessment of the democratic quality of Greece. In my thesis, specifically in the fourth chapter, I decided to use different sources, such as the Institute for Democracy and Electoral assistance (IDEA), Freedom House, World Bank, the Global State of Democracy database, and the database of political institutions, the objective of this section was that of basing the evaluation of the Greek democracy on few factors that scholar have reported as being characteristics that shape one's Country; in particular my study, examines Greek democracy through the lens of eight possible dimensions or qualities: The basic procedural characteristic is the rule of law. The second and third procedural features are two forms of accountability (electoral and inter-institutional). The fourth and fifth are conventional participation and competition, respectively, although they have a distinct theoretical perspective. The sixth and seventh dimensions have a substantial nature. The first is total respect for rights that are enlarged as a result of achieving various liberties. The second objective is to attain more political, social, and economic equality throughout time; The last, eighth component is the system's responsiveness or concordance to the needs of

citizens and civil society. From the statistical data gathered few things can be concluded: it would be wrong to ignore the tough path Greece has had to take since World War II's end in order to join the European Union. It had left behind and survived a civil war from 1946 to 1949, a military administration led by a junta from 1967 to 1974, and a sluggish economy. All of these events molded Greece into the successful democracy that it is today; of course, it is still striving to solve the economic crisis, and it is seeking to communicate to EU member states the European Union's standards for environmental preservation, gender equality, and other norms. The events that have shaped Greece, had given it the possibility of assessing the past problematics and transform them into positive assets to use in the political setting. I strongly believe that the crisis of both Cyprus and Greece is what facilitated and help the political parties in the peninsula to create a new system based on the democratic values above mentioned, to safeguard themselves not only from the intromission of the international actors in the Greek affairs, but also to finally have the possibility to create their own political agenda, face their necessities and break through from the years of submission, war and political stability.

To conclude my thesis, I also wanted to include a testimony from a Greek citizen that had lived through the tumultuous years that characterized the peninsula over the years ranging from 1967 to 1974. a Dr. med. Athiná Vassiliadou. In my interview with her, I asked her about hers an her family perceptions of democracy in 1974, the impression that the civil society had that of the authoritarian regime, how was the democracy perceived in 1974 when Karamanlis became prime minister, I asked her if the situation in 1974, really changed dramatically, or if it was a process that can be described as gradual, the perception that her family, and herself had of the crisis in Cyprus, and how it affected the political life in Greece, starting from 1974. At the beginning of the interview, she told me what the perceptions of her and her family was, of Karamanlis as a new leader in 1974. She described him as a talented politician, that took back democracy to a country that needed peace and stability. He was liberal, and thanks to the many experiences in Europe, he had an open minded that permitted him to have a direct dialogue with the civil society, and to implement in the Greek system revolutionary ideologies. She also underlined that the democratic transition to was gradual, because a break with the past would have been too complicated for the Greeks to handle. In the second segment of our dialogue, she also wanted me to comprehend that the authoritarian rule, had his negative aspects such as a limitation of the fundamental right and freedoms, but it was perceived as a stability that had been missing in the peninsula since the end of the second world war. As for what concerns her perceptions

of the international community, she defined it as: "betrayal". The response of NATO and the United Nations to the crisis in Cyprus, failed the expectations that Greece had. She stated: "we were a country in need of help, but they turned their back on us. Their omission of help in Cyprus was abominable". In her eyes Cyprus and Greece are one nation. Their liaison is that of a patriotic feeling, that links them like Italy and its regions. The autonomy that Cyprus wanted was a burden to Greece and to this feeling of community that attached them traditionally and historically. They needed to obtain the trust of Cyprus, not only because Greeks were represented in the island, but also because of its economic importance internationally. To conclude the dialogue, I asked her about her perception of democracy in Greece, Dr. Vassiliadou answered: "Greece, and in particular Athens, is the cradle of democracy. It started as a forced sharing in the *agora* of all the problematics related to the *demos*. The discussion of the problems with the citizens was necessary for the functioning of the democracy. The one of 1974 was thus perceived by us a success. The traditions had passed on, and the arrival of Karamanlis permitted us to be open with the representative of the state".

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SUMMARY

Of the countries of the South Easter Europe, Spain, Portugal and Greece, the latter had the longest and most painful transition to democracy. In 1940, Mussolini's troops invaded Greece, however the resistance group successfully thrown back the Italian forces. The Duce's humiliation was so harsh that it came back with Germany invading the country in April 1941. King George II escaped while the collaborationist government and the general Georgios Tsolakoglou came to power. Thereafter, the country was occupied by German, Italian, Bulgarian forces and partitioned between the three forces, with the German troops taking Athens and its hinterland, nonetheless the Italians were granted control of much of the country. The Germans devastated the country, disrupted transportation, farming and terrorized the people. The Greek economy collapsed, and Athens found itself in the grip of famine. Facing such occupation, many Greeks join the resistance and, in September 1941 the Communists established the National liberation front (EAM), with a military branch, the National's People's Liberation Army (ELAS). Other non-Communist resistance organization also sprang up and fought the Germans. They were to some extent supported by Britain, but Churchill was reluctant to show his support openly, because of the image it gave in the eyes of the King George II, whom he wanted to return to the throne. Although the resistance in Greece was divided, unlike wartime in France, it had quite some success on the military side and possessed a political force. EAM/ELAS counted around half a million members at its pick and it also had the strong backing of many non-Communist adherents, who were fighting for the same objective: slave off the foreign invaders. In October 1944, as Germany began withdrawing from Greece, Churchill famously bargained with Stalin, offering influence in Romania in exchange for British predominance in Greece. Stalin accepted but the corporation broke down as the resistance refused to disarm. By December 1944, open conflict broke out between the ELAS forces and the British forces protecting the newly formed government: Civil War had begun. In this period of hostility that erupted within the borders of Greece, The US Intervention was the only possible solution for the appeasement of both parties. The British-supported government had elections in March 1946, while the Communists, as a sign of protest, boycotted. Predictably, the rightist party won. In September of the same year, the government held a plebiscite on the monarchy and people voted in favor of the return of the King. In late 1947, as a response,

the Communists, who were controlling unlawfully most of the country and, that still a major military force, declared provisional democratic government.

Nevertheless, the Greek Civil War became tangled up in the emerging US-Soviet conflict in Europe. Moreover, Britain informed the United States that it could no longer bear the financial burden of maintaining an army in Greece. The US immediately seized on the Greek case as an example of Soviet – sponsored subversion of democratic governments in Europe. In March 1947, the Truman doctrine aiming to provide military and economic aid to any government faced with internal or external threats to its liberty was promoted. For the US, the stakes were high: bordered in the North by the Communist Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Greece was a western niche in the Balkan Peninsula. The US started channeling aids to Greece and, of course, the Communists couldn't compete against such largesse. On the top of that, Tito closed Yugoslavia's border with Greece and cut off aid to the rebels. By 1949 the government could declare victory over the insurgency and there was a phase of almost-stabilization occurred. However, this decade of war left Greece in a shamble, with a really unstable regime, characterized by lots of political division between the parties.

German occupation was harsh. The country was looking for peace and stability. With the conclusion of the Civil War, a right-wing government provided for peace under the leadership of former general Alexandros Papagos. He promulgated a new constitution, re-established basic democratic procedures, brought Greece into NATO, secured further US loans and credits, however, in this period of time, the Communist party and ideology were strongly prohibited. During these years Greece became an authoritarian regime, with an influent role of the military army and the Church.

This conservative and authoritarian stability started to decline at the beginning of the 1960s. On one hand, the economic boom started to end (which never reached the same level of the other European countries); plus, the long-lasting hegemony started to be challenged. It has to be stated that the conservative hegemony of the right was only possible because of the weakness of the liberals and socialists, that did not manage to face the political strength and influence that the rightist had in Greece. Upon the death of Papagos in 1955, Constantinos Karamanlis became premier and continued his predecessor's policies. Greece under Karamanlis. His first term in power was characterized by ideologues that were strongly anti-Communist, he used forceful measures to deal with dissent and give the police significant powers to monitor the left. The Greek economy was slowly ameliorating, and Greece

enjoyed its first period of sustained growth during the 1950s. Tourism and shipping emerged as two leading industries in Greece. The economy was also hobbled by rampant corruption and business cronies dominated the banking shipping and construction sectors. These were the ingredients for longer domination by the right of Greek political life. Georgios Papandreou, who took office in February 1964, organized a coalition of liberal-center parties, which were previously affected by internal fractures. In 1965, his party, the Central Union Party obtained the majority. His political campaign promoted a program of democratic renewal, and as he came back from exile, he became prime minister of the provisional government, from which he later resigned. Greece's hard-won political stability began to fall apart in the early 1960s for two main reasons: the first one was a growing dissatisfaction with the domination of political parties of the right, since both part of the former government and of the army didn't agree with the program promoted by Papandreou which involved cutting expenditures to the army; the second was the emerging problem of Cyprus, who was influencing the internal stability of the peninsula.

It is, thus, important to analyze in depth the question of Cyprus. It was ceded to Britain in 1878 by the Ottoman Empire and it became a British colony in 1925. Greece wanted to unite with this island composed by a majority of Greek people, however Britain never accepted it as Cyprus was considered a fortress for British interests in the Near East. In 1955, the National organization of Cypriot Struggle began terrorist attacks on the British forces in Cyprus which triggered the process of decolonization. Nevertheless, British people didn't want to leave because Turkey was a member of NATO and was strongly against this union, since they were fighting, similarly to Greece, for the Turks minorities in the Island.

In 1959, a compromise was crafted that gave Cyprus independence, ruled out the union/enosis, and assured the Turks on the island of 30% of parliamentary and government posts, also the power to veto legislation. The leading voice of the enosis movement, Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III, was elected president and the island became independent in August 1960.The power-sharing deal between Greeks and Turks never worked, and by December 1963 the two communities were in open conflict across the island, with the Turks now calling for an outright partition. Only an UN-sponsored peacekeeping force averted military intervention by Greece and Turkey.

As a consequence, Georgios Papandreou, the prime minister of Greece, while undertaking a reformist program, faced a growing hostility of the right and the Conservatives of his own coalition too due to administrational problems in Cyprus. He also had to deal with the

problematic of the King, mainly because Papandreou wanted to relegate Constantino II to the margin; moreover, on the succession of the leadership of the party, he favored his firstborn and, consequently, internal dissention arose within the civil society and the political arena. After a scandal involving his son, he was forced to resigned in July 1965, leading to mass social protest. This led, unfortunately, to two years of political chaos and instability, to which the king tried to find a replacement until, in April 1967, new elections were scheduled. While a major victory from Papandreou's reformist party was expected if he agreed to rule with the Socialist Party, a group of army officers led by Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos organized a coup d'état and seized control of the government. The decision to seize the power using violent means, had been explained as they were afraid of the potential coalition between Liberals and Socialists. Starting from the 1967 to 1974, Greece laid in the grip of a military dictatorship. Officially, it was to prevent an imminent seizure of power by Communists, but quickly Greece was provided with a new constitution; political parties were abolished, strikes made illegal, and most of the government were controlled. Political enemies were arrested. In 1973, the monarchy was abolished and after a sham election Georgios Papadopoulos was elected president. He also relied on the KYP, the Greek central intelligence service, to round up left-wing sympathizers and intern them, resorting sometimes to torture. This brutality triggered some resistance: for instance, university students occupied the Athens Polytechnic but were brutally repressed. While Papadopoulos feared he would lose his nerve, the head of the military police, General Dimitrios Ioannidis, deposed him in order to control and maintain the power of the military Junta.

The final undoing of the regime came in Cyprus. Ioannidis and the junta, conniving with Cypriot extremists, launched a coup against Makarios, in 1974, who fled the country. As a reaction Turkey launched an invasion on the 20th of July 1974, protecting its minority, fearing the possibility for the Athens regime to have full control of the island. Ioannidis called for the mobilization of the Greek army to fight Turkey, but the army refused to abide to the directives given, and the Greek civil society called for the return to civilian rule. On the 24th of July 1974, Konstantinos Karamanlis agreed to return to Athens and take control of the government, beginning the process of restoration of the democratic rule. As a liberal conservative politician, he was appointed in the elections held in 1974 and he became prime minister of the provisional government in 1974.

This was not perceived to be a revolution. The junta collapsed from within and it was replaced by a conservative government. Karamanlis proceeded carefully to dismantle the worst aspects of the dictatorship with great skill. He immediately freed the political prisoners, amnestied certain political crimes, freed the media and restore the rights of the banned political parties including the Communist Party. He secured a ceasefire with Turkey over the conflict in Cyprus and asserted control of the military. In November 1974, parliamentary elections were held that gave Karamanlis's party, called New Democracy, a victory. He organized a popular referendum for the restoration of the monarchy, and the outcome was the unexpected as the Greek people voted against. In December 1974, Greece was proclaimed a democracy. From 1974 onwards, the government continued to liberalize Greece, also signing an agreement with Cyprus. In 1977, new elections were held. Karamanlis' party won the elections, but the Socialists party become the second party. In 1981 the son of Papandreou succeeded in making the Socialists win the election, and a period of alternation occurred. Karamanlis's objective was that of securing the entry in the European community of Greece. They had successfully negotiated the entrance of the Peninsula in the EC in an association in 1961, however the coup of 1967 put the Greeks membership on hold as they were not meeting the democratic qualities promoted by the European Community. Back in 1974, Karamanlis was more convinced than ever that EC membership would secure Greece a role in Europe, dampen down neutralist sentiment and counterbalance the strong anti-American sentiment. The accession was signed in 1979 and in 1981 Greece join the EC. The same year, the socialist Andreas Papandreou took office with his party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), and promised the voters a series of economic reforms that would increase wages and socialize certain industries. However, his stewardship of the economy was a disaster. If EC membership had brought certain hardships, it also enabled Greece to obtain significant development aid and later on even to make it into the European monetary union in 2001. These transitions of democracies, in Southern Eastern Europe can be explained above all by internal events. These regimes were not anymore able to manage the requests of the population and they were not efficient from an economic point of view. The members of the EEC requested democratization as an accession requirement for these regimes.

I further address the methods for identifying and analyzing democratic qualities in Greece within a process of deepening and weakening. It offers a definition of quality in terms of method, substance, and outcome, as well as a definition of good democracy, and linkages between normative definitions and empirical characteristics. It includes a method,

substance, and result definition of quality, as well as a concept of good democracy and links between normative definitions and empirical features. The main goal of this third section is to investigate the macro-process of deepening by identifying the many traits of democracy, their more particular elements, and the relationships between them. In this spirit, we might begin by noting that one of the most repeated issues in political study has been: "What is the ideal form of government?" since Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics. The established procedural features connected with each product determine quality; thus, a 'quality' product is the outcome of an accurate, regulated process carried out according to precise, repeating techniques and timing; the focus is on the procedure in this case. Quality refers to a product's structural qualities, such as its design, materials, or functionality, as well as other aspects; thus, the focus is on the content. A product's or service's quality is derived indirectly from the customer's satisfaction, as evidenced by their repeated requests for the same product or service. According to this definition, quality is only determined by the outcome. A 'good' democracy is one that is of high quality. A good democracy is first and foremost a broadly legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens, as defined by the definition: "a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms." Furthermore, additional aspects of democracy were given in the chapter, including the most significant normative definitions of democracy, such as liberal, representational, responsive, participative, deliberative, associative, egalitarian or social democracy, and good governance. My analysis, however, analyzes the Greek democracy on a basis of eight possible dimensions or qualities: The rule of law is the primary procedural quality. The two types of accountability are the second and third procedural characteristics (electoral and inter-institutional). The fourth and fifth are traditional participation and competition, but they have a unique theoretical position. The substantive character of the sixth and seventh dimensions is evident. The first is complete respect for rights that are extended as a result of the attainment of a variety of liberties. The second goal is to gradually achieve more political, social, and economic equality. The system's responsiveness or concordance to the demands of citizens and civil society is the last, eighth dimension. Through the usage of databases such as Institute for Democracy and Electoral assistance (IDEA), Freedom House, World Bank, the Global State of Democracy database, and the database of political institutions, I could point out that in terms of the Freedom House measurements, Greece has been classified as Free between 1974 and 2009, with an average score of 1.79. (Freedom House). More precisely, Greece maintained a score of 2 in both political rights and civil

freedoms from 1974 to 1979. Political rights, in particular, had improved in 1980, falling from 2 to 1, lowering the average to 1.5; In terms of the database of political institutions, Greece successfully had a multi-party election in 1974, following years under the authoritarian rule of the military junta, with 81.5 percent of the people voting. The new democratic party won the election with 54.37 percent of the vote (inter-parliamentary union, 2009). When the DPI's Indice of Electoral Competitiveness in the 1974 election was examined, Greece received a level 7, certifying it as a democracy. From 1975 through 2006, Greece was rated as democratic by the DPI, with a level rating of 7. When analyzing Greece's democratic system through the IDEA prospects, a few things stand out: participatory engagement and representative government have a score that can be described as "high performance of democracy," and the result of this positive trend can be directly attributed to Karamanlis's class reforms and the inclusion of all political parties that h Looking at the values of the V-dem, which the IDEA uses to collect data, we can estimate that the score indicating the democratic state in Greece is around about 0.6, putting it in the middle of the pack. Finally, it appears from the preceding study that Karamanlis' transition and democratic consolidation approach, as discussed in the previous chapter, have been particularly remarkable. The earlier political system was founded by a center-left and center-right alliance, but the latter had support from across the political spectrum. The new democratic system had been built through strategies of continuity and change in order to break away from previous political patterns, sustain the new parliament, and ensure the system's activity and durability. However, few things need to be added: In this context, three conditions have been considered: first, the political importance that the petit bourgeoisie has accumulated over the years; second, the weakness of the Greek industrial classes, which reflects the deficiency of Greek capitalism; and third, the failure of Greece's modernization process, despite Karamanlis' efforts. As a result, the nature of democracy, as well as its potential and ideological instability, may have posed a barrier to its consolidation. Greek democracy was put to the test primarily twice: first in 1981 and again in 2010–2012, and it passed with flying colors in terms of electoral legitimacy and political stability. Despite the difficulties that Greece was forced to endure, it was able to survive and respond quickly to the tests. The first challenge occurred in 1981, when the communist PASOK party won an absolute majority of parliamentary seats and created a single majority administration for the first time in Greek history. The military did not retaliate, and the former Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, worked with Andreas Papandreou to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy. The second challenge occurred between 2010 and 2012, when George

Papandreou's socialist government took power, and instead of implementing the Keynesian policies he promised during his campaign, he sought external assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the European Community, and the European Central Bank. External help, on the other hand, did not give the socialist government much leeway, resulting in a rash of harsh and imbalanced austerity measures that exacerbated the already dire circumstances of the impoverished and jobless population, which subsequently spread to the middle class.

Based on what has been said, we can infer that it would be incorrect to disregard the difficult route that Greece has had to travel since the conclusion of World War II in order to join the European Union. It left behind and survived a civil war from 1946 to 1949, a junta-led military government from 1967 to 1974, and a stagnant economy. All of these events shaped Greece into the successful democracy that it is today; of course, it is still working to overcome the economic crisis, and it is attempting to convey to EU member states the standards for environmental protection, gender equality, and other standards that exist in the European Union. Greece's political parties are prominent, like they are in Italy. Once in power, a political party's tendency is to further centralization and command subnational levels of administration and governance. Local administrations under this system are often fragmented, weak, and too reliant on the central. With the victory of PASOK in 1981, some sort of political decentralization measures were attempted, but even these were only partially implemented by both the socialists and the conservative Nea Demokratika, which was opposed to decentralization.