



Course of

---

SUPERVISOR

---

CO-SUPERVISOR

---

CANDIDATE

Academic Year



## Table of contents

<b><i>Introduction and context</i></b> .....	<b>7</b>
Research question .....	10
Hypothesis.....	10
Plan of the research.....	11
<b><i>The State of the Art</i></b> .....	<b>12</b>
The dynamics of a political party and coalitions .....	13
The political defeat.....	20
After the defeat .....	23
<b><i>Case study : Argentina and Juntos por el Cambio</i></b> .....	<b>28</b>
The basic mechanisms of the argentinian party system.....	28
Peronismo and Kirchnerismo .....	30
The attraction for Juntos por el Cambio and what the coalition stands for .....	32
The role of Cambiemos in the change of Argentinian politics.....	39
Cambiemos and the social networks.....	45
<b><i>Methodology</i></b> .....	<b>47</b>
The performing of a lexicometric analysis.....	47
The analysis of media discourses.....	49
The lexicometry .....	52
The performing of interviews .....	54
<b><i>The lexicometric analysis</i></b> .....	<b>56</b>
The table of frequencies within the corpus.....	56
<b>Analysis of the cross-references and cooccurrences (annexe 3)</b> .....	<b>58</b>
The cross-references affiliated to Cambiemos .....	58
The cross-references affiliated to Juntos por el Cambio .....	58
The cooccurrences affiliated to Cambiemos .....	59
The cooccurrences affiliated to Juntos por el Cambio .....	59
<b>Analysis of the recurrences within the partitions</b> .....	<b>60</b>
The date partition (annexe 6).....	60
The diary partition (annexe 7) .....	60
<b>Factorial Analysis of the Cross-references</b> .....	<b>62</b>
FAC of the date partition.....	63
FAC based on axes 1-2 .....	63
FAC based on axes 1-3 .....	63
FAC based on axes 2-3 .....	64
FAC of the diary partition.....	65
FAC based on axes 1-2 .....	65
FAC based on axes 1-3 .....	66
FAC based on axes 2-3 .....	66

<b><i>The analysis of the interviews</i></b> .....	<b>68</b>
The « Porteña » vision, or the hegemony of Buenos Aires .....	70
The working inner-country and the historical political parties .....	72
Juntos por el Cambio, the secret recipe? .....	73
<b><i>What do we learn with the data gathered</i></b> .....	<b>74</b>
<b><i>Conclusion</i></b> .....	<b>77</b>
<b><i>Bibliography</i></b> .....	<b>81</b>
Books and articles.....	81
Other sources.....	90
<b><i>Annexes</i></b> .....	<b>92</b>
Annexe 1 : list of selected articles for the analysis .....	92
Annexe 2 : cleaning operations .....	100
Annexe 3 : key informations about the corpus used.....	101
The first 100 words of the corpus in frequency .....	101
Link to the table of cross-references .....	104
Link of the table of cooccurrences .....	105
Annexe 4 : acronymes .....	105
Annexe 5 : repartition of the diaries within the corpus.....	105
Annexe 6 : analysis of the corpus based on the date partition .....	106
Repartition of the number of words per articles.....	106
Indice of reccurences .....	106
Link to the table of specificities .....	108
Annexe 7 : analysis of the corpus based on the diary partition.....	109
Repartition of the number of words per diary .....	109
Indice of reccurences .....	109
Link to the table of specificities .....	111
Annexe 8 : the guide for the interviews.....	112
Annexe 9 : the research trip.....	113
Link to all the recordings of the interviews.....	117
Annexe 10 : the interveners.....	117
Annexe 11a: link to the recording of the interview of Miguel Angel Lentino .....	118
Annexe 11b: link to the recording of the interview of Frederico Ballan.....	118
Annexe 11c: link to the recording of the interview of Pedro Roulet.....	118
Annexe 11d: link to the recording of the interview of Mica Fuhr.....	118
Annexe 11e: link to the recording of the interview of Jose Corall.....	118
Annexe 11f: link to the recording of the interview of Esteban Iglesias.....	119
Annexe 11g: link to the recording of the interview of Marina Bordigoni.....	119
Annexe 11h: link to the recording of the interview of Nati Sanchez .....	119
Annexe 11i: link to the recording of the interview of Eduardo Depiante .....	119
Annexe 11j: link to the recording of the interview of Esteban Motta .....	119

<b>Annexe 11k: link to the recording of the interview of Lorena Ulieldin .....</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>Annexe 11l: link to the recording of the interview of Jose Felice .....</b>	<b>120</b>
Figure 1 : the « contrat de communication » (Charaudeau et al., 2002, p. 94) .....	49
Figure 2 : the « traitement journalistique » (Charaudeau et al., 2002, p. 176) .....	50
Figure 3 : FAC 1-2 of the date partition.....	63
Figure 4 : FAC 1-3 of the date partition.....	64
Figure 5 : FAC 2-3 of the date partition.....	64
Figure 6 : FAC 1-2 of the diary partition.....	65
Figure 7 : FAC 1-3 of the diary partition.....	66
Figure 8 : FAC 2-3 of the diary partition.....	67
Figure 9 : the young JxC.....	71
Figure 10 : the senior JxC.....	71
Figure 9 : the young JxC.....	76
Figure 10 : the senior JxC .....	76

## **Acknowledgements**

The completion of this undertaking could not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many people whose names may not all be enumerated. Their contributions are sincerely appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deep appreciation and indebtedness particularly to the following:

My Professors Mr. Louault and Mr. Orsina, as well as to all relatives, friends and others who in one way or another shared their support, either morally, financially and physically, thank you.

## Introduction and context

In the last Argentinean presidential elections, the way in which the evolution of the Juntos por el Cambio coalition affected the Argentinean political landscape was more than remarkable. Indeed, more concretely, Mauricio Macri, the then leader of the coalition, lost the elections; as the coalition's *raison d'être* faded, we could expect a disintegration of the coalition: this was not the case. From this observation, the question of how political competition takes place not within a country, but rather within a party system, arose. Indeed, how does the defeat of a leader affect the future of a political party? This is a question that many authors have already addressed, as we will see in the state of the art section. However, for our research, there is a subject that has received less attention. Indeed, the reason why we focused on intra-party changes in the first place is related to the fact that the scientific literature has focused mainly on changes within parties, and not within coalitions; particularly in a specific case such as Argentina, as studies on the subject have traditionally focused on Western countries.

Before going further into the case study, let us first detail the political and economic situation and set our context. In doing so, the general economic situation must be addressed, as Argentina is extremely volatile. As a first consequence, Argentina, which had a PPP close to the US and Western Europe in 1950, is now far behind. It is also important to note that Argentina is not in the high end of South American growth either; if Argentina had followed the average growth rate trend of South American countries, it would be 50% richer in terms of GDP (Banque Mondiale, 2022).

Nevertheless, Argentina has a lot of potential waiting to be tapped. It has significant mineral (such as gold and lithium) and water resources, but is also one of the world's largest producers of agri-food products. And it is not only rich in raw materials, counting on a quality education with several Argentine Nobel Prize winners and a growing high-tech industry (especially in software) as well as several regional champions (such as Mercado Libre). (Larousse, 2022) (Movistar, 2022)

Having said that, let's go back to 2018 to get the clearest possible view of how the situation has evolved. Thus, after a rise in the dollar, and the already difficult economic situation, inflation was 3.2% for the month of November. The main increases were in health (+5.7%), alcohol and tobacco

(+4.6%) and personal services (+4.4%). The food index was up by 3.4%. The total for 2018 was 48% inflation over the twelve months (Le Figaro, 2019) (Diamante, 2022) (USherbrooke, 2022)

At the societal level, poverty indices were also on the rise. Poverty affected 13.6 million Argentines, or 33.6% of the population. The index rose by some 5 points in 2018 alone, to around 2.179 million Argentines, the highest percentage since 2010, according to the press. Indigence had also increased from 5.6% to 6.1%, a total of 2.47 million Argentines. However, the most alarming figure was child poverty (under 17 years of age), which rose from 44% to 51.7%, an increase of around 1 million children, leaving 6.25 million children below the poverty line (USherbrooke, 2022) (Jueguen, 2022)

Despite this, popularity polls at the time showed the President, Mauricio Macri, strengthened. Indeed, his popularity rating had risen by 7 points in one month, due in particular to the successful outcome of the G20, bringing it to some 40%. The President's chances of re-election had therefore increased considerably, putting him in a good position to face his opponent Cristina Kirchner (Rivas Molina, 2022).

At that time, Cristina Kirchner was the only real opponent, at the head of the main Peronist party and the main opposition party, as she had not found another leader to carry this image. We also notice that movements such as the "Frente Renovador", claiming to be from the centre, have amplified their criticism of the government, while coming closer to the Peronist movement. The voting intentions are also telling, the President being closely followed by Cristina. It was during the PASOS, and following Macri's crushing defeat, that the observation was made. Indeed, the rout was such that many observers thought that the opposition would be just as divided as during Kirchner's mandate. Nevertheless, the former president managed to reach 40% in the general elections, despite a delicate situation, and impose his party-alliance (Juntos para el Cambio) as the biggest opposition to the new president since 2019. (Argentina.gob, 2022)

Nevertheless, it is particularly interesting to note the survival of the coalition, which could have simply disintegrated upon the news of the loss of PASO, but instead there was a real survival movement that developed within it and allowed it to perpetuate itself to become a symbol of opposition. This was despite the fact that the balance sheet of the parties forming the coalition was considered catastrophic. This is all the more true since Mauricio Macri's own party, PRO, has itself entered a phase of questioning its leader, in a movement typical of entrepreneurial parties, which we will define in the state of the art. This makes it all the more interesting to analyse the coalition



in its transformation process, in order to determine why and how it has managed to maintain itself, and how the stakeholders within it perceive the future.

## Research question

"By what elements of internal political sociology can the perpetuation of a coalition after the defeat of its founder and leader be explained, and what analysis can be made? A study of the Argentine case of "Juntos por el Cambio" after the 2019 general elections".

## Hypothesis

As for the hypotheses, we can think of three main ones:

- Either the formation of the opposition can be explained by the charismatic character of the ex-president.
- Or the formation of the opposition can be explained by a rebellion/rejection of Peronism on the part of a large part of the Argentine political world.
- Or, finally, the formation of the opposition can be explained by an increasingly strong polarisation of the population.

## Plan of the research

Let us now look at how we are going to work on our topic, as we will do a lexicometric analysis and interviews after doing a state of the art and describing our case study. However, before addressing them, it is necessary to justify the choice of focusing on media rather than political discourses for the lexicometric part. Two major arguments can be used in this sense:

- Firstly, we can assume that for the period under study and the desired topic, there is not enough material. Indeed, after extensive and thorough research, the question arose as to whether the material found would be sufficient for the production of a quality work;
- Secondly, following the same logic, Argentinean newspapers have been very prolific in their treatment of both partisan positions and speeches made. In this way, an analysis of media discourse would provide both an analysis of the overall political situation and a kind of initial analysis of the speeches made, which we will find in the texts we will study.

Having said this and argued the point, it should be remembered that, in addition to the lexicometric analysis, a qualitative analysis, via interviews conducted on the spot, will also be carried out and will make it possible to support the statements and still capture the feelings. In the end, we can reasonably hope that, thanks to the conjunction of the two analyses, the conclusions produced will be of as good a quality as was hoped for at the beginning of this work.

Therefore, we will first develop the theories around the subject, before developing the case study theoretically by articulating it with our state of the art. Once this has been done, we will dive into the analysis of the data based on our lexicometric collection and the interviews conducted. We will then summarise the main elements emerging from the analyses, before formally developing a response to our hypotheses in the conclusion.

## The State of the Art

This section should be broken down into several basic points of the theoretical framework necessary to formulate an answer to our research question.

- First, the theoretical foundations of party and coalition dynamics should be highlighted;
- Secondly, we will focus on the management of defeat;
- Finally, we will analyse how defeat translates into a party environment, and what this implies for internal transformations.

All these elements are intended to provide a better general understanding of the problem studied, and thus to deepen both the empirical and theoretical analysis.

## The dynamics of a political party and coalitions

First of all, it is necessary to agree on what an entrepreneurial party is. This concept is based on five fundamental characteristics: (1) the central role of the leader and his or her private initiative, (2) the party as a personal vehicle, (3) the crucial formative influence of a leader on the political project. Two other characteristics are related to the lack of social and institutional roots of the entrepreneurial party, which is neither the product (4) of a promoter/sponsor organisation or a social movement, nor the result (5) of a parliamentary split or the emergence of a new faction. (Vít H., Lubomir K. (2017a : 83))

There are also two other essential characteristics of the entrepreneurial party that relate to its founder: the fact that the original political entrepreneur owns a business, and can therefore dedicate all of its resources to the launch and operation of a political party; and the uncertain question of whether the party thus created will have sufficient territorial attachment/membership from the start. (Vít H. & al., 2017) Having said this, it is essential to remember that the key to a stable entrepreneurial party, like a mass party, is the combination of charismatic and organisational leadership in the person of the founder. (Arter D., 2013) Therefore, if the conditions are met, the party will go through three phases of institutionalisation: identification, organisation and stabilisation. Successful stabilisation helps to "facilitate an efficient and disciplined party organisation, 'accommodate the neutrality' of some important media, communicate effectively with voters and improve the economic situation". (Vít H. & Lubomir K., 2017b) To secure a place in the existing party system, the party must therefore evolve, including having a stable or gradually increasing membership and a developed branch structure, all while maintaining a strong leadership and loyal elites. (Brunnerová O., 2019)

For our research, it is also worth looking at the existing literature on the subject in relation to Italy, as there are significant reserves of voters who have chosen to vote for personalist parties and who may be attracted to other personalist parties in the future. (Pasquino, 2014) In fact, we can draw parallels between Macrism and Berlusconism, both of which can be categorised as an emulsion of populism and liberalism, as we will see in the dedicated section of this state of the art on Juntos por el Cambio. (Orsina, 2013)

Having said this, we can also point to the work done on Tom Pendergast, then mayor of Kansas City in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, he would not have given a second thought to the excessive price paid by the Kansas City public for the works, nor to the loss of the city's reputation. For him, the end justified the means, including his own self-aggrandisement. He would have been convinced that without him and the protection his machine offered to the needy, life for many in Kansas City, especially during the years of the Great Depression, would have been much worse. His long reign had made him forget that the purpose of public office was to serve City Hall, not to control it (Matlin, 2009).

Political parties, like any other association, need sufficient internal organisation to enable them to perform their functions and achieve their objectives. In this sense, we can refer to Laura Wills-Otero (2016: 758) who argues that the importance of a well-functioning internal organisation is such that it 'affects their (political parties') ability to respond and survive, especially in contexts of environmental change'. It is therefore easy to hear how the variation in internal party characteristics explains the different outcomes of their electoral performance. Furthermore, it should be noted that the performance of the parties' central organisation can be verified in a concrete way, via certain indicators that are recognised as being the following: firstly, their adaptation to the formal rules of the game; secondly, if we refer to Katz and Mair (1992: 6), their capacity to regulate internal conflicts, since indeed 'formal structures, rules and processes constitute one of the principal means by which internal conflicts are channelled, dealt with and ordered'. Similarly, these internal statutes, norms and rules are a consequence of the party's attempts at governance and reflect the permanent balance of power within the party (Abal Medina, (2006: 18)). Ultimately, this set of rules and norms establishes the type of interaction that should take place within parties and in relation to the environment (Alcántara and Freidenberg (2003: 15)).

Moreover, it is clear that the elements demarcated above must be understood in terms of various variations. Thus, the range of variation that we seek to determine envisages two possibilities: (a) the permanence of the formal rules of the game or (b) the change of the formal rules of the game. In the same vein, it is also necessary to consider who runs the party in order to determine whether we are dealing with: Michels' (1911) oligarchy, Duverger's (1951) inner circle or Panebianco's (1990) dominant coalition. In short, to identify the actors and groups that 'control the main resources of power and make the decisions that then affect the organisation as a whole' (Abal Medina (2006: 19)). But how does the power structure influence the internal organisation? To answer this question, we can simply refer to Panebianco (1990: 61), who states that 'to analyse the organisation of a party,

it is first necessary to study its power structure'. Therefore, it is logical to consider them from the point of view of Alcántara and Freidenberg (2003: 15) when they stress that parties 'are not uniform or homogeneous organisations. On the contrary, they are very complex and heterogeneous. Whatever their organic configuration, they are a sum of individuals who form constellations of rival groups with specific interests but with the will to overcome differences and articulate these differentiated interests in the pursuit of a greater goal'. In more detail, it is the specific characteristics and *modus operandi* of the factions that clearly have implications for the evolution of parties.

Exploring their development and evolution allows, in the words of Kim Bettcher (2005: 355), a better assessment of changes in the organisation and behaviour of parties as complex entities. Note that Huntington's (1968) categories of internal party divisions, which analysed political groups into cliques, factions, parties, etc., are already classic; as are Sartori's (1976) categories of faction, faction and tendency; or Panebianco's (1990) categories of tendencies and factions. We can therefore safely assume that parties are inevitably divided into factions. From this premise then follows the range of variation according to several characteristics: (a) whether factions act consociatively with other internal groups or, at any rate, (b) whether they act conflictually. The intensity of party life is also important: Duverger (1951) had already proposed a twofold approach to understanding the internal life of political parties, an analytical look at (i) their organisational structure and (ii) their intensity and type of internal life (Bartolini, 1998). With regard to their organisational structure in general, Alcántara (2004: 43) has pointed out that Latin American parties have a continuous structure and infrastructure throughout the national territory for their functioning.

In this sense, the literature seems to have prioritised the study of formal organisational structures to the detriment of the 'real functioning of parties, which has often been relegated to a less exhaustive level of analysis or consideration', making the analysis of the internal life of the party, the intensity of citizen participation, an important challenge (Ruíz Rodríguez (2006a: 147-148). In fact, we can restrict our objective to observing the level of participation and activism in the parties analysed, based on the perception not only of the party elite, but also of the leaders and activists interviewed. Ultimately, the range of variation we seek to determine in this indicator considers three possibilities: (a) high, (b) medium or (c) low level of party life, and whether the change is gradual or progressive.

For this part, we can draw observations on political parties according to their double level of action: both in the executive and in the legislative. From this perspective, we deal first with the ideological coherence of the party: analyses of party coherence provide an important picture of the party by

studying the attitudes and predispositions of its members (Ruíz Rodríguez, 2006b: 90). To this end and to some extent, Michels (1911) pioneered party coherence studies after examining the German SDP and finding some tensions between the party elite and the rest of the party members. Years later, Duverger (1951) and Huntington (1968) also addressed the phenomenon, pointing out that political parties with a significant level of ideological and programmatic coherence can lead to stability not only of the party system but also of the political system in which they operate. Party coherence 'measures the degree of agreement among members of the same political party on different issues' (Ruíz Rodríguez & Otero (2013: 41)).

Therefore, a high level of coherence is synonymous with a high degree of agreement among party members and, conversely, a low level of coherence is synonymous with a low degree of agreement within the political party. Nevertheless, we should clarify that we understand the degree of ideological coherence as the measure of 'intra-party similarities in the definition of the ideological location of party members' (Ruíz Rodríguez and Otero, 2013: 41). We are therefore interested in whether or not the transition from government to opposition and vice versa is conducive to higher levels of ideological consistency within political parties. For this question the range considers three possibilities: (a) high, (b) medium or (c) low levels of partisan ideological coherence. Nevertheless, we cannot deal with ideological coherence without dealing with party discipline in parliamentary blocs: party discipline is part of a broader debate around the idea of party cohesion, which means nothing more than 'the study of the behaviour of political parties based on the voting habits of their legislators' (Ruíz Rodríguez and Otero, 2013: 50). This idea of partisan cohesion (or not) has its roots in the early conceptualisations of Stuart Rice (1925), although it has subsequently been widely extended over time in party studies. This indicator aims to differentiate itself from the previous one (partisan ideological coherence) since the latter observes the unity of behaviour, while the former observes the unity of attitudes. In this way, party discipline is related to 'the action or actions that are carried out to achieve unity of behaviour' (Ruíz Rodríguez and Otero, 2013: 51). This is the capacity of the dominant coalition to ultimately control the votes of parliamentarians.

Moreover, the objective is to know whether parliamentary groups become more disciplined or, at least, undisciplined with the transition from government to opposition and vice versa. Again, we are dealing with an indicator that considers three possibilities: (a) a high, (b) medium or (c) low level of party discipline. Finally, a last element in cohesion would be cabinet strength correlation: this indicator seeks to determine whether governing parties perform their governance functions exclusively with groups or factions of the winning party or, at least, whether they enter into



coalitions or incorporate factions of the opposition party into the cabinet. This makes sense as the parties studied are highly factionalised and the way the government is organised (one-party or coalition cabinet) can potentially affect the dynamics of the correlation of forces within the dominant coalition. This indicator considers two possibilities: (a) a single-coloured party cabinet or (b) a coalition cabinet.

It is the second possibility that interests us: the coalition firm. To develop this we will first look at Budge and Laver (1992), who have carried out a critical analysis of classical theory on the subject. Thus, returning to the influential 'theory of political coalitions', they argue that the intrinsic rewards of office are generally conceived as the package of ministerial portfolios, a fixed prize to be shared among the winners of the coalition game. For this reason, the famous 'minimum gain' proposition suggests that coalitions comprise no more than the minimum number of players needed to secure a position. Any 'surplus' player would consume some of the spoils of office without having contributed to winning it. Further, the minimum win proposal has been tested many times, and it would make accurate predictions in about 35% of all governments they analysed. Given the simplicity of the theory, which is extremely simple and is used internationally in complex negotiation environments, this is a fairly high prediction rate. The theory performs much better than pulling possible coalitions out of a hat, given the huge number of coalitions that are arithmetically possible after an election in a typical European party system. Despite this, much remains to be explained (Budge I., Laver M. J., 1992)

To explore the subject further, therefore, it is worth looking at the assumption that politicians are designed exclusively to be elected, given that coalition theorists now generally assume that they are also motivated by politics. Initially, policy-seeking models of coalition behaviour included sets of proposed additions to the theory of minimal gain, but these were not models driven, from the bottom up, by policy-seeking motivations. In general, they considered only minimum-gain coalitions and predicted that those with the smallest ideological distance between parties would be preferred. Thus, we find the thrust of theories that combine statements about party policy with a minimal victory criterion based on a presumed office-seeking motivation in Budge and Laver's (1992) article that emphasises that an actor seeks to create a winning coalition in which he is included and which he hopes will adopt a policy as close to his own as possible. (Budge I., Laver M. J., 1992)

Thus, in most coalitional theories, assumptions about political gains for politicians have been used to constrain the coalitions that parties seek to win, thereby improving the match between the

expected formation of minimal winning coalitions that actually form. In another paper by Budge and Laver, they consider the policy maximisation hypothesis itself, an assumption that may influence parties to opt out or invest in variable combinations. Conversely, the search for office may exclude criteria or combine with them in various ways. Because this model characterises party relationships as variable rather than assuming that office-seeking will predominate, it accommodates problems that previous theories ignored, such as frequent minority governments. (Budge I., Laver M., 1986)

Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that many previous theoretical analyses of the behaviour of multi-party coalitions have been based on either a one-dimensional political model or a constant-sum game interpretation. It is therefore worth considering Schofield's paper, which focuses on a two-dimensional competitive model. In this model, parties are concerned with political outcomes but choose party positions both for electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political core is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The core is either the core of the political game or determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions, it is possible to demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium in the choice of party positions. The model suggests that parties can be categorised as strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorisation of parties implies a typology of party systems, which provides a theoretical basis for the emergence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many post-war European countries (Schofield N., 1993).

Now that we have established the basics of intra-coalition competition, it is appropriate to analyse its conditions in a presidentialist conception. In coalition theories, the presidentialist conception establishes a framework of basic conditions that operate in the context of complex systems, with specific and changing structures depending on the basic institutional matrix and the conjunctural movements in which political productivity operates, the configuration of the agenda and the axes of conflict, the governance, the pattern of cooperation and competition of parties and other participants, in cycles of moderation and cycles of polarisation, in axes of compromise, patterns of alliances, formulae of coalition. From this perspective, a given species gives rise to different types of presidential regimes, different modes of government, variations within the same framework, with different stages and logics. Current critics usually refer to a single, uniform model, focusing on certain minimal defining elements without conceiving distinctions on the table.

Nevertheless, like parliamentary regimes, presidentialisms are diverse and classifications can be made in a task that has already undergone important developments: focusing on the nodal relations between the executive and the parliament, the president's power table, the electoral regime and the party system. Studies of presidentialism can achieve greater density if other institutional magnitudes are incorporated and the liveliness of political productivity is brought to the fore, approaching a more classical, broad and flexible approach. Weighing the conjunction of the above-mentioned factors (which make the specificity of a given system), highlighting the silhouettes of democracy that they compose, and taking into account in particular their degree of pluralism as an institutional structure and as a mode of government, without prejudice to other illustrations, presidential systems can be placed in an indicatively ordered spectrum on the basis of two typical sketches: on the one hand, majoritarian systems; on the other hand, pluralist systems. (Lanzaro J., 2001)

En termes impressionnistes et schématiques, on peut dire que dans les systèmes fondés sur la règle de la majorité, celui qui gagne gouverne, et les mécanismes politiques sont essentiellement conçus pour qu'il en soit ainsi. Dans les systèmes basés sur des règles pluralistes, de jure et de facto, ceux qui gagnent partagent d'une certaine manière leur triomphe et sont obligés de négocier les produits du gouvernement. En général, les majorités ne sont pas "fabriquées" mais doivent être politiquement construites par un régime d'échanges, de transactions et de partenariats. Dans le premier cas, nous pouvons avoir des images de "suprématie présidentielle". Dans le second, nous pouvons avoir des relations de plus grande coordination - des compromis et des coalitions reliant l'exécutif aux chambres législatives et aux autres organes de l'État, reliant à leur tour les partis et les fractions de partis. Le cadre posé, nous pouvons définir les régimes gouvernementaux : gouvernement de parti ou de "parti unique", régime de compromis, gouvernements minoritaires et différentes formules de coalition. (Lanzaro J., 2001)

Thanks to all the theoretical elements put forward in this section, we now have a very clear vision of what to expect in the Argentine case, or at least what to expect. Indeed, we have developed in a particularly extensive way all the elements necessary to understand the internal functioning of coalitions, how they are perceived by political parties as such and what is the particularity of them in a presidential type regime. Now that we have laid the foundations for inter-party and coalitional interactions within the political regime under study, we can move on to develop the ways in which political defeat occurs and is managed by the different actors.

## The political defeat

In order to move forward with the present work, it is clear that it is important to first determine the conditions and main reasons for political defeat before studying its effects. Indeed, how can we hope to analyse a defeat if there is no knowledge of what led to it in the first place? With this objective in mind, we will focus on three main areas: voter confidence in politics, the economic situation and the political situation.

Thus, the definition of trust at the political level can be found in the Oxford University Press reference book (Uslaner, 2018), which can be perceived according to 2 theories; the 'Bottom-Up' and the 'Top-Down':

- The Bottom-Up theory is said to be "...associated with social rather than psychological or genetic causes, most notably education, income, social class, happiness, work satisfaction, ethnic and religious background, majority and minority group membership, and life experiences such as divorce, unemployment, and serious illness.<sup>1</sup> They also point out that small, homogeneous communities (1)...." (P.39)
- While the 'top-bottom' is defined as "...a strong association between trust and social homogeneity, national wealth, income equality, lack of corruption, and various qualities of democratic government. (2) " (P.39)

In this theory, it is interesting to note that trust is also linked to more 'macro' factors, such as the national economy or corruption. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the community aspect remains essential. Trust as discussed in our work is therefore influenced by both (1) and (2), leading to the fact that although individuals will be more or less trusting depending on their background, the general state of the state, real or perceived, will influence their reaction. Thus, the fall in confidence can be attributed to a lack of political leadership, leading to a kind of immobility that is unable to respond properly to crisis situations. With regard to clientelism, the question of the use of public and private funds is central. Indeed, the issue of the use of these funds for electoral support is essential to grasp the full dimension of the problem. This leads to the legitimate question of whether clientelism is

not a brake on democracy, given the limits it places on citizens' ability to hold politicians to account and to make informed and considered choices. (Gonzalez-Ocantos E. and Oliveros V., 2019)

At the economic level, voters' assessment of their performance is clearly a major indicator of voting. However, it should be noted that we are talking about the perceived performance of a certain candidate, not the performance of the economy in general. Thus, the more polarised and divided the party system is, the more important a candidate's perceived economic record will be in terms of re-election or disaffection. (Torcal M., 2014) Notwithstanding, it is understandable why the economic question is essential, and inevitable, when it comes to the assessment, or criticism, of an election at any level.

Finally, at the political level, let's come first to the role of trade unions, which should not be minimised in the electoral competition. Indeed, trade union mobilisation and the labour movement have very often been instrumental in protesting against authoritarian regimes or organising organised protests against any government, even democratically elected ones. In doing so, it is essential for an elected official wishing to reform, or to gain strong public support, to have the support of the trade unions in his or her enterprise. (Collier R., Mahoney J., 1997) This is especially so as trade unions are mass mobilisers, and satisfaction with a regime decreases as its absolute population increases. However, this effect can be counteracted by increasing cooperation between the different levels of power and jurisdiction. In concrete terms, this implies that satisfaction will increase if the central authorities cooperate with local and intermediate authorities when it comes to the realisation of public and economic policies related to the development of the territory or the management of the population. (Holzinger K. & al., 2011) Notwithstanding all that has been said, we should not forget that the strategies of the parties themselves are also to be taken into account in the way they prioritise the different levels of power, and will therefore try to ward off defeat, or not. The example of Canada (centred on Quebec) speaks for itself in this logic, teaching us that it is clear that political parties can envisage abandoning a local election in favour of the federal election, and vice versa. Everything depends on the perspective of the political parties in question. (Simard Pierre, 1991)

Now that we have determined what leads to defeat, it is time to draw up a typology in order to define it all the better, and further on in this work to be able to correctly determine which one corresponds best to our analysis.

Thus, there are three types of electoral defeat: founding defeats, positioning defeats and withdrawal defeats. In identifying and analysing these different types of defeat, it is essential to look at the rhetoric of defeated politicians. In doing so, it can be determined what their relationship to politics is, observe professional mobilities and the influence that defeat can have on the career of politicians. (Louault F., 2011) Defeats are also an integral part of learning the political profession, and therefore of the lives of politicians. The question that arises is above all that of the management of potential defeat and its repercussions on individual careers. (Tran T., 2016) Thus, the essential element when defeat comes is to have the capacity to keep partisan cohesion and the alignment of local elected officials intact. In many cases, the defeat of party leaders also implies a disorganisation, on several possible scales, of the parties involved. (Langston J., 2003) Let us not forget, on the side of civil society, that the support of the regime by citizens following an election depends on the general belief that the electoral competition has been resolved in a legitimate manner. (Nadeau R., Blais A., 1993) This support, more or less strong, will have an influence on the way in which the losers will manifest themselves, but also on the way in which the intra-partisan factions (which we will discuss elsewhere) will organise themselves.

## After the defeat

Following a defeat, the opposition position towards the winning party is inevitable. This is also why it is essential to delimit it, identify it and determine the consequences that will interest us most. First of all, let us define it: political opposition is "any position of opposition, criticism, reservation expressed in the public sphere; by mobilised actors; through different non-violent modalities; the targets of their opposition and criticism can be the government in place and/or its policies and/or the political elite and/or the political regime as a whole". (Weinblum S., Brack N. (2011: 22)) This renewed definition is essential given that an ever-increasing proportion of the vote is taken up by parties that are, once the proportional calculation is done, of quite relative importance on the national parliamentary scene, it is logical to see an increase in extra-parliamentary organised opposition.

In doing so, the opposition is generally more fragmented than the majority, resulting in governments only partially fulfilling their representational role but still retaining significant room for manoeuvre thanks to the fragmentation of the potential opposition. (Best R., 2013) Therefore, in order to ensure an effective and functional democracy, two central elements must come into play. First, ensuring that political parties themselves practice some kind of intra-party democracy, so as to ensure that they are guarantors of a rights-based democracy and good governance at the national level.

Secondly, it is essential that civil society actors fulfil their role of aggregating the popular will and translating it into a coherent policy proposal, and that these same actors are the guarantors of democratic control and good governance in accordance with the rights of all. (De Russell D. & al., 2011) The actors in this civil society are often the minority supporters of a political party. They will be more likely to have stronger protest responses than those affiliated with the majority. Moreover, protest will be all the more important in the case of a political defeat in a newly democratic country. Defeat thus has an amplifying effect on political protest among the minority. (Anderson C. & al., 2005) We can therefore be sure of one thing; whether one is in the majority or the minority significantly affects the perception of the government and its actions. However, it is important to emphasise that these attitudes do not affect people's effectiveness as political actors. (Anderson C., Tverdova Y., 2001)

Now comes the question of what happens after defeat. Indeed, if there is a political defeat, does not a political readjustment of the party seem inevitable? In order to determine this, we must first admit that a political readjustment of a political party is above all a collective action. A collective action takes place when the members of a group act in the light of a co-commitment marking the intention to perform an action as a group. This implies that a collective can be morally responsible, and that the responsibility of a collective has no logical implication for the moral responsibility of one (or more) of the individuals who make up the collective. (Gilbert M., 2008) In this logic, one can even admit several potentials for collective action, as political parties are not a single homogeneous group and are plagued by factionalism. There are three forms of factionalism: cooperative, competitive or degenerative. Based on this, it is understood that the source (of factionalism) is primarily a process of partitioning subgroups in response to incentives. (Boucek F., 2009) This being said, what impact does public opinion have on readjustment? All the more so as the media allow a voyeurism of political failure and are a source of its amplification, to the point of interfering with the normal exercise of citizenship by increasing the negative effects for the loser tenfold. (Abélès M., 2006) Nevertheless, even if it is clear that parties adapt to public opinion, this will be especially true if it moves away from their political position. In this way, a defeat, in the sense of a public opinion sanction, is not to be considered as a real engine for a potential political repositioning of a party (Adams J. & al., 2004).

However, inducing intra-party change is much easier and faster after a defeat. Indeed, party elites will be less inclined to change if they do not have sufficient incentives to do so, especially if there is no reason or obvious threat to their re-election. (Ágh A., 1997) However, change does not happen on its own, or at least in the continuity of the life of a political party, and is necessarily induced by "a change in leadership, a change in the dominant faction within the party, and/or an external stimulus for change". (Harmel R., Janda, K., 1994) Therefore, what primarily influences party positions is the dominant faction/the dominant person in the party, not the electoral results. One can therefore expect a stronger political change if the leader changes (Harmel R. & al., 1995). This is all the more so as for intra-party change, the ability of the dominant faction to control its coalition is, however, crucial. Indeed, it is not only motivation that is needed, but also and above all the resources to initiate change. (Harmel Robert & Tan A., 2003) In the end, we see how a defeat is not a driving force but an incentive for a political readjustment, offering the necessary window of opportunity for a faction other than the dominant one to assert itself and take the ascendancy within the party.



First of all, it should be remembered that parties act at different territorial levels (national and supranational) and also at different institutional levels (executive, parliament, etc.). Moreover, these actions in different arenas or media take place in two political moments: either being in government or being part of the opposition. Political parties may have different levels of performance, strategies and incentives depending on whether they are in government or in opposition. However, there is a dearth of work in the partisan literature that explores and studies what happens to party organisations once they are in government or in opposition. Among the classics of the last century, Duverger barely touched on some aspects of government and opposition parties, albeit with an emphasis on the separation of powers and mostly from a systemic view of parties (Duverger, 1951)

Others, such as Samuel J. Eldersveld (1964), Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner (1966) or Giovanni Sartori (1976), did not elaborate on the behaviour of parties (or what can be expected from them) in government and in opposition. Therefore, we have to turn to Panebianco (1982), who was one of the first 'classical' authors to study the course of parties in which the facet 'party in government' and 'party in opposition' was not absent. He suggested that control of the national government in the hands of the ruling party is 'a powerful factor capable of inhibiting strong organisational development' (1990: 215). In this sense, he argues that the more public resources party leaders have, the less interested they are in strong organisational development. He also argued that - regardless of whether they are in government or opposition - dominant party coalitions will be more stable and cohesive if they operate in different arenas alone (without alliances) against each other. This leads to the preservation of organisational stability and functions as 'a barrier against destabilising pressures due to the presence of one or more competitors on the scene' (Panebianco A., 1990: 412).

As for the opposition, he said that time was a factor in the organisation of parties. According to him, parties that have spent a long time in opposition need a much stronger and more solid organisation, as they cannot rely on the state bureaucracy, nor can they use the state for partisan purposes, let alone receive financial support from state interest groups. They have no choice but to 'rely on their own strength', by strengthening the party and effectively organising the mobilisation of supporters, in order to reverse the disadvantage of not having the state apparatus at their disposal. On the other hand, parties in government have at their disposal a 'multiplicity of public resources that can be used in political competition' (Panebianco A. 1990: 139). Alan Ware (1996) devoted a section of his classic book on parties and party systems to 'parties in government', but with a focus on the external

party environment. According to him, being part of a government opens up a multitude of possibilities for both individual politicians and the political party itself. He suggested that control of the government promotes the implementation of public policy and also strengthens the party itself as it has the possibility to place, for example, its supporters or leaders in key positions. He pointed out that these means or incentives offered by the government (ease of imposing public policies and distributing positions) vary according to two circumstances: (i) the type of democratic regime and (ii) the length of time a party remains in power once it has achieved it (Ware, 1996: 529-531). Another author, Maurizio Cotta (2001), has studied in depth the relationship between party and government, assuming that parties have different components (or faces) and therefore different strategies. In doing so, he separated the different parts of the party and analysed their different interactions with both the government and the opposition. He argued that in presidential systems (where the executive does not depend directly on the legislature), the party in the legislature is stripped of its direct influence on the executive, although this frees parliamentarians from discipline and loyalty. The two will have different functions: (i) the ruling party will try to get resources from the government for the next parliamentary elections (bills, funds and positions), and (ii) the government will also try to get as many resources as possible from the ruling party in its administration. On the other hand, the greater the autonomy of the party in the legislature (specialisation, seniority in committees, close links to economic and pressure groups), the more possibility its members have to challenge the ruling party (Cotta, 2001: 205-206).

Therefore, focusing exclusively on the ruling party, Cotta (2001: 211-213) argues that, within the government, party members usually get a ministerial position. However, a 'shadow cabinet' or 'potential sector of the ruling party' could also exist within the opposition, even if it does not strictly speaking control the state bureaucracy and is only a 'distant approximation of the real ruling party'. Another variable incorporated in his analysis is the 'duration of party control of government', according to which parties that have been in power for a long time will have a higher degree of 'reality', where the bidding for government leadership positions will be intense and fundamental among party members. In contrast, in parties that are in power for a short period, an executive position is only an accident (and party struggles are therefore activated in other areas).

Finally, in an attempt to study the balance of power between the different facets of party organisation, Cotta pointed to the - ideal - existence of different types of parties: either a party with a long tradition of opposition, with a large mass of affiliates, a determined ideology, a controlled internal bureaucracy and a loyal electorate, in which the organisation and its affiliates will prevail

over the party in the legislature, even over those who hold a certain position in the government, and a party whose members are in government, which will ensure it a leading position vis-à-vis the affiliates. The dominance of the 'ruling party' can become overwhelming when the party has been in power for a long time and this situation is expected to continue, leading the leadership to no longer consider the members as a necessary resource because of the resources provided by the government (Cotta, 2001: 213-215).

However, it is essential to complement this with a review of the literature on the trajectory of opposition party organisations, while it is true that 'opposition' as an object of study is relatively recent - with its roots in the midst of the Cold War and the authoritarian wave (Vairo, 2017: 275) - analytical approaches have focused more on issues related to democracy, the political system, forms of opposition and types of opposition, etc. Francisco Reveles (2006), in his insightful analysis of partisan oppositions, pointed out that analyses of political parties - in their actions as government or opposition - can be carried out in two general dimensions: either in the dimension of the political system or in the dimension of the party as a unit. His work (and certainly much of the literature) was in the first dimension. That is, to observe the opposition party as an independent variable of the political system (and not as a dependent variable, especially of the party organisation). Having said this, however, we can conclude that there is a lack of opinion within the political party.

## Case study : Argentina and Juntos por el Cambio

Now, thanks to the different theories developed in the state of the art, we will be able to confront and detail the context of the case study. The aim of this part is to articulate the political theory with the Argentinean reality to ensure an optimal understanding of the subject and how it should be treated when analysing and carrying out the different parts of the methodology.

### The basic mechanisms of the argentinian party system

Our aim in this part is to expose the mechanisms and logics found in the Argentinean democratic system. Indeed, this step is essential to determine with the greatest precision which processes are applicable in our case of analysis, especially as Mauricio Macri has relied heavily on logics of affiliation to a national imaginary.

First of all, let us remember that Argentina is the example par excellence of populism, and Peronism is no longer in need of presentation. Since the founding of the Partido Justicialista by Juan Perón in 1945, the Peronists have governed for 35 of the 73 years as president, have obtained between 30 and over 60% of the vote in presidential and parliamentary elections, and have governed many provinces and cities throughout the country. Personalism, anti-institutionalism, anti-elitist or anti-establishment views, clientelist redistribution, popular support and political mobilisation are key features of the movement. Nevertheless, the movement's programme remains extremely flexible, constantly changing according to the economic situation of the country: indeed, Peronism was developmentalist and nationalist under Perón, neoliberal under the neopopulist Menem, and developmentalist and nationalist again under the left-wing Kirchner governments. This economic adaptation is explained by the fact that the social base of Peronism is mainly among the poor, linked by two central linking mechanisms: clientelistic redistribution to supporters and identity politics, which created a special political culture of the Peronist working class. (Wolfgang M., 2019) This economic adaptation is all the more important as the Argentine political system was deeply impacted by the crisis of 2001, when Nestor Kirchner expressed his wish for Peronist revivals in the 2003 elections. Indeed, the Kirchnerists mixed progressive ideas, particularly the defence of human

rights, with those of the Peronist tradition. However, the precarious situation that allowed all sectors of society to cohabit quickly dissipated and, at the same time, rivalries were reaffirmed. (Sidicaro R., 2009) Nevertheless, unlike in 2003, the Argentinean presidential election of 2007 brought few surprises. The Peronist candidate Cristina Kirchner - nominated after her husband, Nestor, chose not to stand for re-election - won easily. This victory was due to both the good performance of Nestor Kirchner's government and the weakness of the non-Peronist opposition. The Kirchnerist stranglehold on Argentine politics can be explained by the collapse of the opposition parties and the continuing weakness of political and economic institutions. (Levitsky S., Murillo M.-V., 2008) In doing so, after the 2011 elections, Cristina Kirchner began her second term in office with the support of 54.11% of the vote and with a difference of almost 38% compared to her closest competitor. Even though two years later the Frente Para la Victoria (FPV), the government party, lost the legislative elections in the most important districts of the country, and in 2015 lost the presidential elections to Mauricio Macri, Peronism (or Kirchnerism) remains an essential component of Argentine political life, with which every political party and body must be able to evolve (Rodríguez, D.-A., 2015).

At a less ideological level, in the conditions and practices of democracy, one of the major components of Argentine politics is the purchase of votes through minor benefits (food, money, etc.). Indeed, this strategy proves to be very effective in mobilising an economically more fragile electorate, but also and above all in keeping it under control and potentially 'punishing' an unfavourable vote after receiving benefits. (Brusco V. & al., 2004) Even if unemployment has fallen today, career paths remain very unstable. Jobs are more qualified than in the past, but they do not mean better living conditions. And all this despite the modernisation of society and the increasing share of the technological sector in employment. (Prévôt-Schapira M.-F., 2011) Thus, the concept of 'federalised party systems', which refers to systems composed of national and sub-national party sub-systems, is essential because the realities are fundamentally different between different provinces, and even between districts (Gibson E., Suarez-Cao J., 2010)

## Peronismo and Kirchnerismo

The left, centre and right are relevant political tools and reference points in Argentine politics, but they do not encompass a whole dimension of how politics is organised, in terms of political appeals and positions, in this society. Indeed, the political forces in Argentina are arranged along a double political spectrum, constituted precisely by the axes that define the two-dimensional political space - socialists and liberals - but also by the axis of the Peronists, who stand out for their style and the type of emotions they arouse. Nationalists and liberals are labels that, from the particular position of political ideologies (and even from a particular selection within political ideologies) capture only part of the divide (and especially for ordinary Peronists). The divide between Peronism and anti-Peronism combines the culturally popular with the culturally localist (or nativist, "de aqui"), and always plays with the "gut". Outside Argentina and even Latin America, other societies have experienced political mobilisations in the contemporary period (including, not to say especially urban) on a terrain that combines the culturally popular with the culturally localist (or "de aqui") in forms that are very different, and even more so in Argentina, from those taken by the typical forces of the left or centre-left (socialism, social democracy, communism). In the Middle East, to take a region of the world culturally very different from Latin America but also situated in the semi-periphery, the political success of socially radicalised and militant forms of Islam, not so much in its religious aspect but as a combination of socio-economic redistributionism (and real aid) with the culturally popular and "national" (or rather "very local") has been remarkable, even in such a secularised society as Turkey (Ostiguy P., 1997)

The political divide between top and bottom (i.e. the Peronism/anti-Peronism divide in our case) is often linked to a social and (socio)cultural divide, which is not expressed in terms of left and right. It is not even necessarily the same social cleavage from one case to another. In Uruguay, Herrera's Blancos, and later Nardone's, found political success in campaigns against a Europe-oriented Montevideo. Peron and the urban Peronist workers, were rhetorically identified with the barbarism and localism of the Sarmiento dichotomy. Rhetorical operations and interpellations play, on an affective level, a role in shaping political axes in this socio-cultural dimension, to repeat, of a

culturally popular-and-here as opposed to a well-educated-(fine and/or well-read)-and-cosmopolitan person. The evolution of politicians in this space, as well as the relative political importance of each position over time, can therefore be easily traced. (Ostiguy P., 1997)

In short, Peronism and anti-Peronism, as political identities with a long history in Argentina, do not only refer to economic policies and electoral programmes, but, underneath a rationalist discourse on the economy that is far from always corresponding to class interests, has a marked socio-cultural component, not only very perceptible to the outside observer, but also one that more than one Peronist and anti-Peronist apparently feel and to which they often react on a rather visceral level. (Ostiguy P., 1997)

In this context, Kirchnerism is actually a deviated form of Peronism. Kirchnerism is the word that designates a set of conditions for carrying out a "war of positions" or (if we want to avoid this Gramscian notion) a dispute about social meanings, a radical "dispute" (according to a term favoured by Ricardo Forster) that involves the whole of culture, the most relevant effect of which is an activation of popular forms of thought, the generation of new capacities for social transformation and the conception of other possibilities of living together. It is in this context that the question of socialism arises. (Balsa J., 2013)

## The attraction for Juntos por el Cambio and what the coalition stands for

As we have been able to analyse, Peronism and the Kirchnerists have a place of choice in the Argentine political system. Therefore, how to explain that Cambiemos could have such a great importance? This is what we will try to support in this part, in order to have a clearer idea of the current political context.

As for this part, which is based on a common work of the authors that we will quote, we can start with the contribution of Gabriel Vommaro, who analyses the frameworks of PRO (PRO being the party at the heart of the movement Juntos por el Cambio and the party of origin of Mauricio Macri) under a first perspective that is that of political sociology. Thus, on the one hand he analyses the social worlds of belonging in which the party is inserted, and proposes a conceptual definition of the idea of social worlds of belonging as spaces in which the political force finds worldviews and formats of action, frameworks of meaning that organise the internal interactions and hierarchies and the public presentation of PRO, as well as where it recruits activists and candidates according to the definition of principles of justice from these social worlds. In this sense, it shows how PRO is rooted in the world of business and professionalized volunteerism, and the consequences of this rootedness for party life. On the other hand, it studies the party cadres according to their moment of entry into political activity and classifies them into political generations that allow us to understand a different type of relationship, in each case, with the activity and with the party organization (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (dir.), 2015)

The second perspective, ethico-political, has been developed by Sergio Daniel Morresi, who works on the ideas and discourses of PRO's leaders and political cadres to show why (and in what senses) it can be said that PRO is a party belonging to the right-wing camp and what the implications of this affiliation are. Indeed, it is essential to integrate that the ideas defended by some important actors of PRO are close to liberal, conservative and neoliberal traditions. Nevertheless, the way in which PRO develops these right-wing ideas (a way that is to a large extent the product of its relationship with other actors in the Argentine political space) is compatible with a high level of commitment to democratic institutions, a development that bodes well for the continuity of the polyarchic system, but does not in itself represent a reconfiguration of the Argentine political system. In continuation, Luciana Arriondo looks at how PRO became, from its inception, a space for the renewal of the



militant commitment of former UCeDe Liberal Youth activists, who had been part of its student wing, the Union for the Opening of the University (UPAU), at the Law School of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). The focus in this case is on the social networks that allowed these activists to maintain themselves as a group and, more than ten years after their youthful experience, to reactivate their political commitment in a new organisation, and the ideological tensions of these activists, whose training was both more programmatic and more militant, and who had to deal with an ideologically flexible party that rejected much of the traditional militant repertoire. (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (eds.), 2015)

Juan Grandinetti also provides some interesting insights into the place of youth in the movement, analysing PRO youth activism in two ways: on the one hand, with regard to the construction of youth and youth as a moral value within a party that defines itself as new and for which the idea of change and renewal is central. This demonstrates the tensions between these values and the subordinate role that the Young PROs have in the life of the party. It is therefore necessary to analyse the meanings of youth activism in this political force, the reasons for political commitment and the type of practices that they develop according to a certain vision of politics and the way of doing politics that places PRO in this place of tension in relation to the tradition of the Argentine party, in which it is both recognised - as a party in a plural system - and rejected - as a party of foreigners who 'enter politics'. (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (eds.), 2015)

Another important component of the partisan aspect remains the way in which these are mobilised. To this end, it is worth looking at the writings of Prati (2018) and her analysis of Macri's and Kirchner's forms of communication. Thus, if the appearance of the pronoun 'he' in Cristina Fernández's presidential swearing-in in 2011 inaugurated a process of political sacralisation of the figure of Néstor Kirchner, the author asks what process favours the replacement of patriotism by honesty in Macri's swearing-in, and what signs are found in the functional moment of the administration that prefigure certain characteristics of the future government. In an attempt to answer these questions, he proposes a philosophical and phenomenological journey in which the differences between patriotism and honesty are highlighted. Analysing Macri's public speeches allows us to reflect, on the one hand, on the ethos and the construction of the presidential figure as that of a 'common man' and, on the other hand, on the ways in which Macri constructs his political opponent, the 'heavyweight legacy'. Through discourse analysis, the author recognises the ways in which proximity has been activated through political practices such as door-to-door canvassing and phone calls made by the president himself to different citizens, the formation of 'teams' as a way of

doing politics - at a clear distance from Kirchnerism - and the way in which meritocracy has been constituted as the individual solution to social problems. It is also worth looking at the much-talked-about 'crisis of democracy', suggesting that it merely expresses the irresolvable contradiction between two traditions and two forces within it: democracy and liberalism. (Prati J., 2018)

The evocation of the crisis of democracies forces us to ask ourselves who is stating it, to what type of democracy it refers, and to try to discover what strategic objectives serve this statement which, more than a declaration, is the delimitation of the battlefield. Under the slogan "crisis of democracies", feelings about the state, citizenship, politics, economy, society, the collective, the individual, equality and freedom are contested. In this sense, Florencia Rovetto looks at the so-called "fourth feminist wave", with the aim of detecting some elements that bring together part of its historical genealogy and update its political agenda. These elements include the transnational, plural and massive nature of feminist struggles, the heterogeneity of the subjects and discourses that embody them, and the circulation of feminist meanings in a counter-hegemonic key. Indeed, the author wishes to reflect on some of the aspects that make up these elements, examining the current dynamics of demands and claims, the tensions and shifts that they stage, making visible bodies and subjectivities that energize and expand the political subject that involves them. (Prati J., 2018)

Further on, Sebastián Castro Rojas (2013) proposes to address the transformation of the link between the state/government and the citizen based on the way social networks have been used since Macri became president of the nation. The main result of his research is the emergence of a new bond, produced in the digital sphere where politicians and citizens move around, share their ideas and experiences with each other and dialogue in a familiar way. As a result, it can be observed that the supremacy that the mass media held at the end of the twentieth century in the construction of opinion in the public sphere has faded and been lost, ceasing to permeate the behaviour and opinions of the public. Indeed, for Sebastián Castro Rojas (2013), the construction of current ties is crossed by digital mediatization and digital platforms.

It is interesting to look at the writings of Juan Bautista Lucca (2019), who analyses Cambiemos as a political force, focusing on its material and discursive practices, including the public positioning of its main leaders. In this sense, the author argues that, although it presents itself as a party 'of the new', the comparison and historical record show that its political ideology is not unknown and shows nothing. To return to the main party of the coalition, PRO, it is composed of dissimilar pieces, thus showing itself as a heterogeneous party. Vommaro and Morresi (2015) distinguish factions that

compete for the favours of the leader (Mauricio Macri) and seek to consolidate their own spaces of power. Among these factions, they distinguish five types. Each of them, from its ideological bases, contributes and recovers its own vision of political reality, thus resulting in a conglomerate of ideologies (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (eds.), 2015). In this regard, they describe the PRO, in the first place, as a right-wing faction, 'formed by some minor parties of conservative or federalist popular origin (such as the Buenos Aires Democratic Party, PDBA), some declining liberal parties (such as AR) and small conservative parties' (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (ed.) (2015: 38)). Another faction corresponds to the world of NGOs, which, according to the authors, are 'young professionals from foundations, think tanks and non-governmental organisations related to research and promotion of public and social policies' (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (ed.) (2015: 39)). Then there is the businessmen's faction, which are leaders from the business world, 'characterised by their solid experience in technical and financial positions and their close ties to the PRO leader' (Vommaro G., Morresi S. (ed.) (2015: 39)); another faction is the radical faction, which includes individuals from the UCR; and the last one, the Peronist faction, made up of members of the PJ porteño (Justicialist Party Porteño).

Moreover, the ideological diversity among the PRO factions suggests that the party oscillates between pragmatism - especially in its role as administrator - which is clearly predominant, and more doctrinaire positions, linked to conservative liberalism and Argentine neoliberalism. At the same time, and because the PRO is trying to build its own political identity, its leaders are carrying out a series of operations aimed at re-signifying its positions by proposing different demarcation lines from those of the traditional right. In this way, it can be seen that PRO differs from other right-wing forces that have developed in Argentina, not only in its commitment to democratic forms, but also in other distinctive features, 'its vocation to be a managerial party, its pragmatic character, its internal heterogeneity and its attempt to place itself above the socio-political cleavages that divide citizens between right and left' (Vommaro G., Morresi, S. (2015: 55)). The idea of management is present in much of the discourse of PRO officials and can be understood, as the authors argue, in the sense that 'the tendency to empty the signifier of progressivism has allowed it to be detached from a centre-left discursivity and linked to that of management' (Vommaro G., Morresi, S. (2015: 54)). On the other hand, they understand that 'Macri tried to make his leadership credible by installing his party as a brand and showing that his ideas took precedence over his personal ambitions' (Vommaro G., Morresi, S. (2015: 45)). Another notable feature that the authors record is that 'there are no categories that represent the party, and that, according to its leaders, if there were, it would be that of the first party of the twenty-first century' (Vommaro G., Morresi, S. (2015: 58)).

In doing so, when in 2015, running towards a national political race, PRO embarked on a front for the presidential elections, they put forward a certain political strategy, deciding to reconfigure its name into Cambiemos and articulating between Mauricio Macri (PRO), Elisa Carrió (from the Coalición Cívica ARI), and Ernesto Sanz (from the Unión Cívica Radical). It is worth mentioning that in this electoral platform, the three leaders clashed, which resulted in Macri's victory and, consequently, his nomination as candidate for the presidency of the nation. (Prati J., 2018)

In doing so, Cambiemos has included members of other parties than PRO or the Radical Civic Union, such as the Progressive Democratic Party, the Popular Conservative Party and the FE Party, whose leader was the trade unionist Gerónimo Venegas. The main political figurehead of Cambiemos, however, to whom we have been referring since the beginning of this work, will remain Mauricio Macri, a civil engineer and businessman. Mr Macri is a former president of the club Boca Juniors and comes from a well-known business family (Macri Group). His political career began in 2005, as a national deputy of the autonomous city of Buenos Aires representing the Republican proposal, and then he obtained the position of head of government of Buenos Aires for two consecutive terms (2007-2011 and 2011-2015). After an experience in the business world, Macri embarked on the path of politics in 2005. In 2005, he was a candidate for the head of the government of the city of Buenos Aires, representing the "Frente Compromiso para el Cambio" (Commitment to Change Front), composed of the Partido Justicialista porteño, the Partido Demócrata Progresista and Acción por la República, among other minor parties. Already in 2005 he was one of the founders of the Compromiso para el Cambio (CPC) party, which changed its name in 2008 to Propuesta Republicana (PRO). In an interview with Mauricio Macri, published in the newspaper Perfil, he expresses his definition of the PRO: Interviewer: How do you define the PRO ideologically? Mauricio Macri: It is a post-modern proposal from ordinary people who are fed up with the politics of the state Les guitarreros, who want "bread for bread and wine for wine", and who are not linked to any ideological current. It is committed to finding practical solutions to all problems. It is a post-modern party, so it cannot be defined ideologically. Ultimately, having already achieved a political career, he therefore ran for president in 2015, leading the electoral alliance Cambiemos. He won the presidency in November of the same year. (Prati J., 2018)

Another of Cambiemos' political leaders is María Eugenia Vidal. She is a political scientist and has done most of her professional training in state administrative activities in the autonomous city of Buenos Aires (she has worked at ANSES, the Ministries of Social Development of the Nation, Foreign Affairs and Worship, and at PAMI). Her political career began in 2007, when she was

elected deputy of Buenos Aires, a position she held for six months until the recently elected head of government, Mauricio Macri, appointed her Minister of Social Development of the Buenos Aires city government. In 2011, she was part of the PRO ticket for the capital alongside Mauricio Macri, in which the head of government was seeking re-election. The ticket won the elections, and so she took up her post as deputy head of government of the city of Buenos Aires. With the support of a political track record, in 2013 she began to 'go around' the province seeking to position herself as a gubernatorial candidate for the Republican proposal to support Macri's presidential bid in the 2015 elections. In those elections, Vidal won 39.64% of the vote and beat Frente para la Victoria candidate Aníbal Fernández by more than four points, becoming the governor-elect. On 10 December 2015, she took office as governor of the province of Buenos Aires, becoming the first woman to govern that province and the first non-Peronist governor in 28 years (Prati J., 2018).

Among the other leaders and founders of Cambiemos, we can note figures like Elisa Carrió, Ernesto Sanz and Marcos Peña. Carrió is an Argentinean politician known mainly for having been a presidential candidate on several occasions. She is currently a national deputy for the city of Buenos Aires, a position she has held since 2005. Ernesto Sanz, on the other hand, is considered another 'heavyweight' political leader and has twice been president of the national committee of the Radical Civic Union. Finally, Marcos Peña is considered Mauricio Macri's 'right-hand man', a label he obtained after leading his presidential campaign in 2015. (Prati J., 2018) We thus have here a clear and ample vision of the coalition and its core group, especially its leaders and their background, which gives us the necessary keys to understand more easily how Cambiemos won the 2015 elections in the first place.

Therefore, we should remember that the main factors that converged towards the electoral victory of the Cambiemos coalition in 2015 in Argentina were the result of a long process of mobilisation and politicisation, led by PRO (the main party of the alliance) and its entourage. Indeed, the origin is deep and the process of political construction of PRO had already started to take shape in 2001, and deepened in 2008, in a context of growing social polarisation. The crisis of 2001 provoked the involvement of sectors of the elite who felt called to enter politics to resolve the social issue. In 2008, it was the fear of 'capsizing' and state Jacobinism, represented by Kirchnerism, that allowed the political formation to find appropriate ways to mobilise, organise and translate into political energy. (Vommaro G., 2017a) Thus, the emergence and consolidation of the PRO can be understood as a successful response of some sectors of the Argentine economic elite to a situation characterised by the absence of any viable strategy to defend their interests through the armed forces; the changes

that the economic crisis of 2001 brought about in the party system; and the perception of a growing threat generated by the Kirchner governments. (Monestier F., 2019) victory of the Cambiemos alliance in the 2015 presidential elections thus saw a pro-market government at work, emerging from a ballot that it narrowly won, and facing the challenge of reorienting public policies in line with its project of 'cultural change' while dealing with the demands and resistance of a mobilised society. (Vommaro G., 2017b)

In this context, and in view of Cambiemos' strategy and its project of 'cultural change', it is clear that national identity is given pride of place. Indeed, an essential point is to refer to an appeal to the emotivity of the 'national being' so as to raise the necessary resources to keep an anchorage in the electorate. (Vautier C., 2019) Indeed, since Cambiemos, there has been a shift in the role of the public media. Indeed, public broadcasters have moved from a complementary and dominant role to a subsidiary and marginal role within the media system. (Linares A., Mallimaci M.-A., 2019) This is explained by Cambiemos' political communication, which functions in an original way with the new media landscape, marked by the culture of connectivity and the convergence of different media systems. (Dagatti M., Onofrio M.-P., 2020) Concretely, Cambiemos is based on a vision of managerial modernisation of politics and the state and of controlled economic deregulation. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that it has had to deal with economic imbalances and structural social struggles, as well as governing with a parliamentary minority and without control from most provincial governments. (Vommaro G., 2019).

## The role of Cambiemos in the change of Argentinian politics

In order to continue, it was necessary to look at a more specialised and specifically Argentinean literature. In doing so, we have analysed the main articles contained in Iglesias and Lucca's (2019) book, so every author cited comes from this reference work. We can begin our reflection on this subject with the writings of Diego Julián Gantus, who questions why a government whose performance has been so unsatisfactory for the vast majority of the population retains its electoral chances. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019) In this context, it is necessary to gather some interpretations of the role of the state, politics and the Cambiemos administration, in order to elucidate the not-so-obvious reasons why the governing coalition will have a candidate in the 2019 election, and what has been the impact of the coalition on Argentine society. To do so, we can refer to several authors and the ideas they have developed:

- Rita Grandinetti, who analyses all the transformations that have taken place, and those that have been experienced, in the field of public institutions and organisations. It attempts to reflect on the processes underway that bear the mark or imprint of Cambiemos in order to identify their orientations, tensions, achievements and results in Argentine public administration. All this, in a framework where this political force has given a central place to the idea of modernising the state with refounding tones and based on a vision of managerial modernisation of politics (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Mariana Berdondini, who discusses how Cambiemos has handled the abortion debate, one of the controversial issues that has shaped the legislative agenda. Given the unusual and paradoxical nature of this decision, the hypothesis she develops is based on the changes and tensions between liberalism, conservatism and some reactionary edges that have increased since Mauricio Macri became president, accentuating his dogmatism and pragmatism in heterogeneous ways. In this sense, she argues that the resulting right-wing profile seems more willing to sacrifice its cultural ethical and political positions than the socio-economic positions and interests it represents. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Melisa Campana Alabarce, who proposes a reflection on four shifts that define the degradation of the state public system of social protections in contemporary Argentina,

namely: from the right to protection to the possibility of credit; from collective to individual; from equality to equity; and from citizenship to meritocracy. It seeks to show these changes in certain areas of the national public-state spectrum, taking as its analysis certain measures illustrative of the setbacks indicated. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)

- Andrea Delfino and Lucía Kaplan, on the other hand, analyse the political dimension of the new (dis)balance in the capital-labour relationship and the role played by the state in this process through the direct regulation of the labour market. In this sense, they elaborate on the ways in which the Cambiemos government has implemented measures with the aim, on the one hand, of creating a new institutional framework for labour on the assumption that labour standards function as mere instruments of interference in the adjustment capacity of markets, and on the other hand, Finally, the aim is to promote "entrepreneurship" and "self-employment" as new work logics that aim to "disengage" large sectors of the workforce and reconceptualise the working subject within the parameters of the classical liberal subject, the self-made man. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Esteban Iglesias, for his part, describes the main characteristics of collective action during the Cambiemos electoral coalition government. To do this, he proposes a typology of the set of interactions between the political force that took power and the trade union organisations and social movements. This typological construction allows him to determine certain new characteristics of the collective action, which are based on the reactivation of a social condition which strongly emerged in the 1990s in a political context combining Peronism and neo-liberalism: having a job and being poor. On this basis, an unprecedented political articulation was structured, consisting of contesting the political orientation of the CGT and opposing government initiatives. In this sense, the alliance between the Corriente Federal de los Trabajadores and the Triunvirato de San Cayetano constitutes a relevant political space, which has gained political notoriety insofar as the alliance between formal workers, workers in the popular economy and the unemployed challenges the political orientation of the CGT. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Melina Perbellini and Norma Valentino, then, analyse the effects on workers of the main economic policies of the Cambiemos government. They point out that devaluations, indebtedness, opening up to imports, deregulation of the capital market, layoffs and closure of productive establishments, etc. have structured a scenario in which the protagonists of the



world of work have been the main victims. According to the authors, the "reintegration into the world" generated by the Cambiemos government has had an impact on the sphere of work in its three essential functions: as a material condition of one's existence and that of one's family (real salary); as a possibility of "dignified" social insertion and source of identity (unemployment and underemployment) and, finally, as an organiser of social life, through an ethic that prevents the blurring of the boundaries between the moral and the immoral, the legal and the illegal, i.e. the recognition of the other as a fellow human being. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)

- Martín Carné, on the other hand, analyses the phenomenon of 'cuentapropismo' in a context where the Cambiemos government claims it on the basis of the idea of 'entrepreneurship'. Thus, from the comparison of the EPH bases -3th quarter of 2016 and 2018-, it emerges that this is a workforce with a medium-high level of education, precarious health coverage, whose work capacity is used inefficiently and which, in its great majority, performs tasks that require operative qualification. In addition, three out of ten people work in direct marketing and construction. Consequently, he argues that self-employment does not seem to be the occupational position capable of providing adequate thresholds of material (and symbolic) well-being with which to structure an acceptable cohesive bond between members of society. In a context - such as the current one - of prolonged recession, it does not seem to be a sufficient strategy to sustain the country's economic recovery. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Mario Lattuada, María Elena Nogueira and Marcos Urcola, on the other hand, reflect together on the institutions of the state in the field of rural development and, in turn, on the socio-political configuration of the subject that has been called the family farmer, showing the transformations that have taken place since Mauricio Macri became president of the nation. In this sense, they highlight the construction of an institutional framework different from the one that was underway between 2004 and 2014, due to the incorporation of production into global markets without the mediation of differences in productive, economic and social capacities. At the same time, they emphasise that the fundamental subject of the actions is no longer the family farmer as a 'social subject', but is conceived as an individual 'entrepreneur', whose personal 'qualities' will serve as a guarantee for his economic integration. The result of this process, according to the authors, is the appearance of a new

institutionality that reverses the process of hierarchisation promoted in previous years. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)

- Anabella Busso reflects on the main reasons for the poor performance of the foreign policy of the government led by Mauricio Macri, focusing on Cambiemos' worldview of foreign relations as well as on a set of concepts important for its design. As a result, the author demonstrates that the coupling's foreign policy based on a strategy of pro-Western insertion and by reputation has not yielded positive results. Her observation shows that Western allies, beyond their ideological consonance with Macri's proposal, have not encouraged investment flows, nor facilitated the Mercosur-EU agreement or Argentina's accession to the OECD. For the author, this exacerbates the negative consequences of the neoliberal development model, as Macri's government has an optimistic reading of globalisation. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Esteban Actis and Julieta Zelicovich continue in the same vein by analysing the foreign policy of the Cambiemos administration on the basis of two concepts: international visibility and external influence. They examine the areas in which the administration sought to gain visibility, how it did so, and to what extent this resource was used to induce changes in the preferences of actors identified as crucial to the country's international insertion. As this was an eminently economic foreign policy, the study focuses on international economic relations. The conclusions outline a typology of situations based on the conceptual pair studied that contributes to the reflection on the conditions that affect developing countries, as is the case of Argentina (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)
- Carla Morasso and Gisela Pereyra Doval, on the other hand, argue that the content of Argentina's foreign policy can be synthesised into three central variables that explain the autonomous or dependent orientation of each government: the development model, the alignment with developed countries and the level of relations with developing countries. This chapter discusses the third variable, related to Southern linkages. They assume that links with the South in logics of autonomous international insertion are likely to be more cooperative than in logics of dependence, where horizontal relations tend to be more lax and distant. In this sense, they consider that during the Cambiemos administration, South-South cooperation has undergone a process of retraction according to the analysis of four key issues representative of the links with the South: the bilateral relationship with Brazil, the

integration and consultation processes, the policies implemented in relation to the Falklands and the place occupied by Africa (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019).

- Finally, Emilse Calderón approaches the defence policy as a public policy that promotes the security of the States in an integral perspective in a context of international anarchy. In this sense, the author proposes to examine the Cambiemos administration, indicating its main guidelines and whether these have brought about a change in relation to the pre-existing situation. An attempt is made to answer the question of whether the Macri government has addressed to some extent the structural problems of the sector, including the role of the armed forces, and whether the international insertion of the country in the strategic-military dimension of international relations has improved. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)

This being said, the analysis shows that, alongside the dialogical and fully inclusive consensus proposals, in Cambiemos' discourse about its future, there is a purely ideological element which is the addition of the kirchnerist identity established as the constitutive exterior in existential hostility of the whole society, thus being challenged in its right to participate in politics. The polemical intensity in Cambiemos' discourse thus brings antagonism and a form of exclusion into 'the time of dialogue' (Argentina, December 2015-October 2017) In this sense, despite the promise of a conflict-free order, Cambiemos has fragmented society not only through state policies that have increased social inequalities (sectors previously included by Kirchnerist governments), but also by transforming the political divide of Kirchnerism into a moral divide, that is, in the construction of an enemy that has no right to be part of the political community. (Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B., 2019)

This particularity of Cambiemos has allowed the construction of a representative link that has naturalized the hierarchical privileges between the representatives and the represented. Cambiemos is not only a symptom of the individualised society, but also an actor with the capacity to reinforce it. Cambiemos represents and, at the same time, deepens a long process of rightification, "hyper-individualisation" and polarisation of society. In short, Cambiemos has become an active symptom of Argentine society (Stroppiana T., Weinbaum V.-S., 2020) In doing so, the Cambiemos government originates from a democratic right capable of building a new political hegemony; That is to say, a government with a decision-making halo and a repressive tinge, which aspires to replace the market as the organiser of the social fabric, without this implying the collapse (as in the 1990s) of the positions of the state, but, paradoxically, without granting the latter new resources for its reinforcement, which implies letting it die slowly of starvation instead of "operating without

anaesthetic". Macri's government can be compared to the lineage of the cool right à la Emmanuel Macron, in which post-materialist values such as the defence of the environment and a Buddhist and post-modern halo in which any political search for subjects begins as private and individual. (Lucca J.-B., 2019)

Ultimately, it was the government's inability to deliver on the economic front and a realignment of the opposition, marked by the unexpected absence of Cristina Fernández as a presidential candidate, that largely explain why Mauricio Macri could not be re-elected. (Garriga A.- C., 2020) However, the Cambiemos government's weak reformist performance is associated with the conditions that PRO had to face in order to build a competitive force in a country where right-wing parties are historically weak. These conditions are of two types: internal, related to the structure of the political coalition; and external, associated with the conditions of origin and performance of the government. The former, observed in the programmatic divergences between the members of the governing alliance. The latter, through the structure of interests linked to the political legacies of the previous period, and the weakness of Cambiemos' electoral and legislative power. (Vommaro G., 2019) It is therefore clear that nothing is decided for the future of the coalition, and that its impact on Argentine society and politics in the long term is immense.

## Cambios and the social networks

Cambios' political strength is also its ability to make use of networks. During the 2015 presidential campaign, Cambios made available a series of images composed of political and civil bodies, private spaces and everyday objects, as signs of contemporary Argentine nationality. Their visual/audiovisual representation has crossed all the propaganda devices of the ruling coalition. (Vommaro G., 2017c)

These elements were then representative of a new phase of the mediatisation of politics, still in progress but at that time acting as a novelty, which implies the interweaving of politics with social media and consequently, the processes of digitalisation, as well as the multiple relationships between media, between media logics, politics and those of social media. In order to analyse the discourses of politicians/candidates on social media, it is therefore necessary to take into account the processes of interaction with the mass media and the occupation of urban space. Of particular note in recent years is the exponential growth in the use of Instagram. (Slimovich A., 2020)

In doing so, in continuity with its campaign strategy in 2015 and from its electoral defeat in October 2019 until the inauguration of the new president, Alberto Fernandez, in December, the Juntos por el Cambio coalition deployed a set of communication devices aimed at establishing a reading of the causes of the defeat and a narrative about the four years of Mauricio Macri's government. Similarly, the government sought to project Macri as the leader of the opposition. (Slimovich A., 2020) All these elements allow us to highlight the importance of media discourse and manipulation in the rise of Juntos por el Cambio and the way in which the coalition constructed its narrative as well as shaped its responses to potential external attacks that could jeopardise its survival. (Annunziata R., Ariza, F. and March, R., 2018)

However, it is worth looking at the ways in which various types of ties are formed on digital platforms in relation to the forms of sociability that foster these ties, so as to best understand and analyse the phenomenon. Thus, in addition to the distinctive modes of use and regularities in the postings or tweets of the Argentine presidential candidates in 2019 in digital platforms, we argue that it is digital cultural consumptions such as brands and registrations on platforms that are of

greater importance in the construction of new sociotechnical networks that permeate and shape the social organisation as a whole. (Castro Rojas S., 2013)

To take an older but still relevant reference, it is also worth looking at the use of Twitter by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Ricardo Alfonsín, the two presidential candidates in 2011 for Peronism and Radicalism, respectively. Indeed, this is the first massive use of social networks for a presidential election, and it provides answers as to how alternative media use impacted Argentine politics in its early stages. Therefore, based on a study by Navarro (2012), which follows a qualitative and exploratory methodology, an analysis of the privileged typology of tweets, the use of non-verbal multimodal resources (photographs and videos) and the most frequent processes can be extracted and used. Thus, where the radical candidate uses more agenda tweets, which are characterised by the description of the candidate's location and movements through spatio-temporal markers and material and relational processes, by the inclusion of various political actors and by the fact that they are complemented by documentary images of low technical quality that produce effects of spontaneity the Peronist candidate favours platform tweets, which are characterised by the description of her own positions through abstract evaluations and processes, by the erasure of the positions of political opponents and by the fact that they are complemented by posed protocol images of high technical quality. The approach followed thus allows us to identify a candidate in constant movement who follows a map of dates, places and social actors with whom she interacts, and an institutionalised candidate who describes and evaluates her ideological position in a unidirectional way (Navarro F., 2012).

Thanks to these elements of the first use of networks, we can thus understand why the Cambiemos coalisation made a massive and intensive use of networks during its first campaign of 2015 (mixing both aspects of use of the radical candidate and the perionist candidate in 2011), and in what way it has thus learned from the mistakes made in the past by the candidates of the parties forming this same coalition. Furthermore, this analysis of the use of networks, and more generally of media networks as a carrier of their project, their ideas but also their actions on the ground, has made it possible to highlight the importance that they have in the eyes of the coalition leaders and their essential place in the proposal of values and an alternative society.

## Methodology

### The performing of a lexicometric analysis

Now that the factual and theoretical foundations have been laid, how will the analysis be conducted? This will be done in two stages; firstly, an analysis of the discourses around the readjustment of the party in question, and then through interviews with local elected representatives in order to grasp the deep meaning and the perception that they may have of the elements that we will have previously analysed via the discourse analysis. Indeed, as we have seen previously, the discourse and its formation have an important, if not essential, place in the way the coalition has defined itself and propelled its values. Not to do this type of analysis would therefore be highly detrimental to the articulation of a quality study on the subject we are dealing with.

First of all, it is essential to note that in the framework of a discourse analysis, it is indeed the capacity to put linguistics and social conflictuality into dialogue that interests us. Indeed, since metaphor allows us to construct and articulate language as a living thing, this means that the articulation of the link between discourse and society is central to our research (Husson A.-C., 2016). We will refer here to the definition of discourse as being a form of action; interactive; contextualised; taken over by a subject; governed by norms; caught up in an inter-discourse and having a socially constructed meaning. (Maingueneau D., 2014) Since this definition refers to discourse as a mirror of social constructions, which is what we wish to study, it reinforces our desire for a discursive approach to the subject.

In the course of our readings, we have been able to determine that the theoretical approach to discourse that is most appropriate for our research is that of Patrick Charaudeau, which focuses on "semio-communication", i.e. communication through signs and symbols, within media and political discourses. According to him, the creation of discourse is the product of two elements: the strategies of the subject of discourse and the constraints imposed in the creation of the latter. In this framework, as the strategies put in place are not the core of our analysis but rather the discourses as such, we will focus here on the constraints of creation in order to better grasp the societal issues

(Angermuller J., Maingueneau D., Wodak R., 2014). All the constraints of political and media discourses inform us both on the position of the writer, his or her importance and the institutionalisation of the subject, this actually allows us to determine the different perceptions of actors according to their social provenance.

Moreover, as texts are produced to convey messages, ideas or beliefs, they will not only lead people to do certain things, but also to think or act in a certain way. Hence, newspapers, which are the product of a compilation of articles, are essential communication tools of discourse (Maingueneau D., 2014). This is why, since we are interested in the values and the imaginary conveyed by discourses, the analysis of texts produced by the written press appears to be the best avenue to explore. We will therefore pursue the theoretical deepening through the literature on media discourses (Bonnaïfous S., Temmar M., 2007).



## The analysis of media discourses

Let us recall that media discourse, in its essence and its construction by the media, is a mixture between credibility (telling the truth) and capture (dramatizing); therefore, the justification for transmitting the facts is done through commentary, certainly in a reasonable proportion, but which nevertheless justifies the existence of the media as transmitters of the truth (Charaudeau P. & al., 2002). Moreover, as the media act as structuring actors of the social space, they will report the facts under three fields of activity: political, citizen or daily civil activity; themselves divided into several subsections (political, economic, social, cultural, sports and practical); and divided according to criteria of notoriety, representativeness, expression and polemicity (Charaudeau P. & al., 2002). In order to make the process of media treatment more intelligible, we refer to the figure of the "communication contract" in annexe 6 (Figure 1), which illustrates it perfectly. This figure also allows us to understand why we focus on the press. The work of transaction, and especially of interpretation, being much more advanced, and making that in fine we can carry out a much more concrete analysis on the perception of the subject by the society, or at least the fringe of the society which is targeted by the analysis.




Figure 1 : the « contrat de communication » (Charaudeau et al., 2002, p. 94)

It is moreover this possibility of more sophisticated interpretation that allows the written press to target readers precisely, each article being written along a very precise and determined editorial line. Charaudeau explains this mechanism in great detail, making the difference between the press 'before' and 'now'. Furthermore, it is important to be aware that these differences in the print media itself actually affect the rate of engagement, the quality of writing and the values conveyed. In this sense, Figure 2, taken from Charaudeau's book, tells us about the different types of journalistic treatment that can take place. In our work, we will therefore focus on what is closest to the press 'of now', as it conveys values much more clearly and produces a more accurate picture.




Figure 2 : the « traitement journalistique » (Charaudeau et al., 2002, p. 176)

"In the press, the genres are also evolving, but more slowly than in television. However, a distinction can be made between the press of the past, with long articles on the news of the day, a mode of writing that is intended to be a piece of literary choice, little visibility of announcements and news, and little breakdown of points of view; and the press of the present day, with a tendency to present short articles, to multiply points of view (internal and external) and to increase visibility by means of a layout that plays on typography, boxes, colonisation, etc. Differences that testify to the way the media see their readership, popular/cultured/elite, young/old, male/female, etc." (Charaudeau & al., 2002, p. 199)

Consequently, in the written press, reality, fiction and the virtual are combined within the narrative, giving rise to a kind of hyper narratology. It is therefore clear that, as D. Maingueneau (2009), "The medium plays a fundamental role in the emergence and stabilisation of a genre" (Maingueneau D., (2009 : 44)), which can also be extended to fashion phenomena. Finally, we will dive into the lexicometric analysis of newspaper articles in the course of our work. (Eurrutia Cavero M., 2013)

## The lexicometry

In the continuity of discourse theories, we had to make a choice in the way of carrying out the analysis, and this choice was made on lexicometry. This method, which we are going to apply with the help of the TXM software, is quite appropriate in our case for several reasons: first of all, the use of software is essential to process a corpus that is sufficiently significant to produce convincing results (Mayaffre D., 2005). Secondly, the digitisation of the documents used allows us to use the software in a relatively simple and quick way, speeding up the process (Mayaffre D., 2005). Finally, the lexicometric tool allows us to make comparisons and to go back and forth with our corpus, so that interesting information emerges very quickly from the processed corpus and allows a quantitative and qualitative analysis (Leimdorfer F., Salem A., 1995). All these elements justify the use of the tool, which is all the more relevant as we already have research leads, and we therefore know exactly what we are analysing for, making its quantitative processing all the more useful and relevant. (Leimdorfer F., Salem A., 1995)

In view of the theoretical elements provided, it seems clear that the methodology of data collection will have to follow two main axes: a lexicometric analysis for the quantitative side and the realisation of interviews for the qualitative side. This can be explained in several ways:

- First, after analysing the Juntos por el Cambio / Cambiemos movement and the way it communicated with its voters, we were able to highlight that social networks, but in general the relationship with the media, were central to the coalition's strategy. It is therefore necessary to analyse press articles to fully understand the movement and the way it seeks to distinguish itself and be perceived;
- Secondly, regarding qualitative data collection, it is clear that if we want to study the perception of the coalition, we must first and foremost look at the members and small hands. Indeed, in this way it will become clearer how the evolution of the party is perceived and how this evolution has been perceived (positively or negatively) by the voters - the militants and the local elected representatives being the closest to the field;
- Finally, in the continuity of the elements put forward above, we justify the relevance of carrying out a quantitative and a qualitative analysis jointly by the fact that a purely quantitative analysis

would only provide us with internal elements of response, and that a purely qualitative analysis would only inform us on external perception.

Thus, for the various arguments cited above, we believe that proceeding in this way ensures a sufficiently high quality and relevance of the research to be able to draw conclusions and make observations in a properly argued and justified manner.

In the context of our lexicometric analysis, we will rely on the TXM software. Note that we have used the Alceste method to clean our corpus. This section aims to give a general presentation of the corpus and to explain the analyses we wish to carry out on it.

Thus, our spicilège is composed of 113 press articles from March 2018 to March 2022 from 41 different newspapers, the distribution of which can be found in annexe 8. However, three main newspapers form the bulk of our corpus: La Capital, Clarin and La Nacion. This is because Clarin is notoriously pro-Kirchnerist, La Nacion pro-Macrist and La Capital is in between. In doing so, the aim was to have a diversity of political representation in the main sample base. That said, in the interests of diversity in the analysis and of representing opinions as broadly as possible, we also selected articles from smaller, regional newspapers, as well as foreign newspapers, to provide an external view of the subject.

To return briefly to the temporal dispersion, we justify this by the fact that our 'pivotal' date is the Argentinean presidential elections, in October 2019. Therefore, we selected articles analysing the political period before, during and after this pivotal date. Also, if we went as far back as March 2022, it is because the last major elections (PASO 2021), which saw Juntos por el Cambio emerge as the winner, took place in November 2021.

In fine, the objective of our corpus is to allow a broad analysis over the duration of the evolution of Juntos por el Cambio / Cambiemos from the end of Mauricio Macri's mandate until the last major elections. All of this is treated in a fair and politically balanced way, both at the national and international level.

## The performing of interviews

For the interviews, we selected three types of stakeholders (the list can be found in Annex 6):

- Politicians of different levels (1);
- Activists (2);
- Researchers specialising in the subject (3).

(1) What we mean by politicians of different levels is politicians holding the same type of position but at different levels. Thus, we have among the speakers the presidents of municipalities, selected both from the 15 municipalities in the urban area of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA) and from the medium and small towns and villages in the province of Santa Fe, the second province that voted most heavily for Juntos por el Cambio. In the same vein, we also have speakers who have held or currently hold a position of representation in a parliament (i.e. deputies), both national and provincial.

(2) As for the activists, following the same logic as the politicians, they were selected both in the CABA area and in the province of Santa Fe.

(3) With regard to the specialist researchers, an interview with Dr Esteban Iglesias, director of the Comparative Politics Research Centre at the National University of Rosario and a CONISET researcher specialising in domestic politics, was planned prior to the trip, and exchanges with other members of the research centre were scheduled to compare the preliminary findings for the follow-up of the lexicometric analysis.

With this in mind, it should also be noted that the stakeholders selected from the province of Santa Fe all live within a reasonable perimeter around the city of Rosario, following the line between the cities of Rosario and Córdoba, as it is within this area that the most Juntos por el Cambio voters, or those who voted for Mauricio Macri in the 2019 elections, are concentrated.

It is understood that an interview guide was produced (which can be found in annexe 7) as part of this research. This interview guide is divided into three groups of questions: perception, feeling and management. This is justified by the fact that we are going to focus on defeat and repositioning, so we need to know how the defeat was perceived and felt in the first instance in order to better understand how it was managed and potentially transformed into a transformative opportunity. The questions were adapted according to whether the interviewee was a politician or an activist, but no specific questions were planned for the exchanges with the researchers and Dr Iglesias. We explain the non-planning of questions for the researchers in advance of the trip and the exchanges by the fact that our aim in this case is to confront the preliminary results and the content of the state of the art, as well as to clarify our research. In doing so, we consider it a potential bias to prepare questions in advance that could lead to discussion and thus interfere with the desired exchange.

## The lexicometric analysis

In the list of 113 articles, there are three types of newspapers: the two largest national newspapers, La Nacion and Clarin, on the right and left of the political spectrum respectively, and a selection of articles from other national and international newspapers that are positioned on the rest of the political spectrum. This list will serve as a basis for the lexicometric analysis in order to highlight the main elements related to our topic. The list of articles can be found in Annex 1, the cleaning operations in Annex 2 and the distribution of the number of words per newspaper can be found in Annex 5.

## The table of frequencies within the corpus

We chose the first 100 full forms of the lemmatized hierarchical frequency table to represent a first vision of the results obtained by the lexicometric analysis of the selected press articles. The choice of 100 allows us to have a general representation of the most represented forms in the corpus without selecting too many, which could distort the results. It is therefore possible to interpret the frequency of these lexical forms without putting them into context. Firstly, in a relatively expected way, we notice that the occurrences of "Macri" and "Kirchnerismo" are among the most frequent forms. The vocabulary associated with them is also very present, such as 'Macrismo', 'Cambio' and 'Cambiamos' for Macri and 'Fernandez', 'Presidente' and 'Oposicion' for Kirchnerismo.

In doing so, we can point to the following words that can be directly related to the theme and are part of the first 100 lexical forms: "elecciones" (rank 21, appears 168 times), "peronismo" (rank 23, appears 106 times), "coalicion" (rank 20, appears 135 times), "cambiamos" (rank 49, appears 75 times), "derrota" (rank 69, appears 57 times), "oficialismo" (rank 65, appears 65 times), "jxc" (rank 62, appears 72 times), "macri" (rank 1, appears 421 times), 'kirchnerismo' (rank 38, appears 87 times), 'cambio' (rank 3, appears 289 times), 'fernandez' (rank 4, appears 224 times), 'presidente' (rank 5, appears 220 times), 'oposicion' (rank 17, appears 140 times), 'juntos' (rank 2, appears 317 times) It is also worth noting the lexical form "macrismo" which does not appear in the list of the first 100 lexical forms but can be affiliated to the lexical form "macri".



Therefore, we can already affirm that the corpus will provide us with the elements we are looking for in the framework of this research, and that it corresponds to the theme studied and to the case study. Indeed, in view of the classification of these frequencies, it is clear that we will be able to analyse exactly how 'Juntos por el Cambio' has been able to transform itself in the collective imagination and how its relationship with its direct opposition has evolved, as well as its relationship with the initiator of the coalition and former President Mauricio Macri. The analysis of the lexical table also allows us to confirm the words selected for the concordance and co-occurrence analyses and to conduct these with the certainty of their relevance to our research.

## Analysis of the cross-references and cooccurrences (annexe 3)

This part will be dedicated to the study of the corpus through co-occurrences and concordances. In the course of our reflection, we have put forward hypotheses as well as questions on the interpretation of lemmas put back into their context. In each case, we will try to provide clarifications, explanations and answers in order to arrive at interpretations by giving meaning to the lemmas studied and by determining their co-occurrences. According to Emilie Née (2017, p. 113), the principle of co-occurrence is "to determine in a given corpus the words, groups of words, lemmas, and categories that attract each other, i.e., that tend to appear together in the same environment (sentences, paragraphs, chapters, or any other contextual window determined by the researcher), or that repel each other (that appear elsewhere rather than in the vicinity of the form chosen as a pole). Concordances, on the other hand, are simply the study of the sentence elements that occur before and after a word, in order to study its context. It should be noted that the concordances and co-occurrences were carried out on the basis of the words "macri", "fernandez", "oposicion", "cambio", "kirchnerismo", "cambiemos" and "macrismo".

We will therefore deal with this part of the analysis according to a distinction that is the name of the coalition. Indeed, Cambiemos is the name of the coalition studied before the 2019 campaign and Juntos por el Cambio was only introduced after the 2019 PASOs. In doing so, it is relevant to study which are the main concordances and co-occurrences related to the two names, as well as how the coalition reflects more of an affinity with Macri or a real element of opposition to Kirchnerism as time goes by.

### The cross-references affiliated to Cambiemos

In the analysis of the concordances related to Cambiemos, we notice a rather strong reference to Macri, and in direct link with Kirchnerism as ideological opposition.

### The cross-references affiliated to Juntos por el Cambio

In the analysis of the concordances related to Juntos por el Cambio, we can identify several elements; Firstly, there is a clear link with the opposition vocabulary, which makes sense given that the coalition took this name only shortly before losing to Frente de Todos, however what is interesting to highlight is that the opposition vocabulary does not only refer to the government, but also to Macri as such. Secondly, in continuity, there is a direct reference to internal power issues within the coalition, in terms of deciding who will take the leadership. Finally, an element that may appear to be a detail but is in fact of some importance is that there is a reference to opposition not to Kirchnerism, but to Alberto Fernandez, which may lead one to think that there is less ideological pressure.

#### The cooccurrences affiliated to Cambiemos

In the analysis of co-occurrences related to Cambiemos, we notice that there is a clear proximity between the words 'Macri' and 'Presidente', as well as 'Macri' and 'Kirchnerismo'. Where the first element is, again, not surprising, we can note how the conclusion of having Macri and Kirchnerismo close allows us to infer the same elements as in the concordance analysis.

#### The cooccurrences affiliated to Juntos por el Cambio

In the analysis of the co-occurrences related to Juntos por el Cambio, we note three main elements; namely a proximity with the words 'oposicion', 'interna' and 'coalicion'. In doing so, we can argue that Juntos por el Cambio is strongly linked to ideas of opposition and coalition, which is not surprising given the history already developed above, but more surprisingly the name is also strongly linked to the idea of 'interna', which implies an internal competition within the coalition and therefore a leadership that is not crystallised and has yet to be determined.

## Analysis of the recurrences within the partitions

In order to make the results easier to read, they will be presented in the form of a list of the most significant texts and newspapers according to the words we have chosen to focus on for our analysis. Significance is determined according to the logic that representation between "1" and "-1" in the software is normal, and from "2" (upwards) or "-2" (downwards) is abnormal. Thus, all the newspapers or texts represented have a representativeness index of "2" or more or "-2" or less. What is interesting in this case is to determine the specificities and then compare them with the CFA results in order to draw useful conclusions.

### The date partition (annexe 6)

In this case, we have selected the texts in which the words are both most and least represented, as this allows us to determine the variation in the use of the word according to date.

- The most significant texts for the word 'macri' are: 6, 10, 28, 41, 48, 52, 45, 55, 75, 90.
- The most significant texts for the word 'fernandez' are: 41, 45, 53, 72, 80, 85, 97.
- The most significant texts for the word 'oposicion' are: 38, 47, 99, 111.
- The most significant texts for the word 'cambio' are: 31, 41, 52, 66, 75.
- The most significant texts for the word 'kirchnerismo' are: 2, 10, 47.

### The diary partition (annexe 7)

In this case, we have selected only the newspapers in which the words are most represented, as this gives a clearer idea of which newspaper covers the topic in which way, and therefore a more detailed idea of the media coverage of the topic according to the political orientation of the newspaper.

- The most significant newspapers for the word "macri" are the following: Clarin, Es Global, Seul.
- The most significant newspapers for the word 'fernandez' are: DW, El Diario, El Pueblo, El Puebla, El Puebla and El Puebla: DW, El Diario, El Pais, Es Global, Reuters.


- The most significant newspapers for the word 'oposicion' are: Ambito, Clarin, IProquio, Seul: Ambito, Clarin, IProfessional.
- The most significant newspapers for the word 'cambio' are: La Capital: La Capital.
- The most significant newspapers for the word "kirchnerismo" are: CIDOB, Clarin, IProfessional: CIDOB, Clarin, IProfessional.

## Factorial Analysis of the Cross-references

To begin with, we will use Factorial Analysis of the Cross-references (FAC) because it gives us an idea of the structuring dimensions of our corpus (Née, 2017). Thus, through this first image, we will be able to identify the demarcation lines among our texts. Having chosen to carry out a comparative analysis, the methodology with which we selected our articles allows us to establish a main hypothesis vis-à-vis FAC.


We have chosen to group all occurrences as lemmas in order to lighten the reading and to make the understanding of FAC clearer. We have removed all punctuation, articles such as "the", "the", "of", or "of", prepositions "to" or "in", pronouns "that" and the conjunction "and". These detracted from the clarity of the FAC and were not relevant to the analysis of this topic. These actions finally resulted in spacing the points and defining more distinct lemma clouds without changing their distribution. Finally, in order to carry out a more precise study, we used the "zoom" function to visualise more specifically the lemmas in their cloud. Whatever the axis displayed, 1, 2 or 3, we observe a significant dispersion of many lemmas and it seems that a clear meaning emerges from each axis. This allows us to identify which texts contribute most to the total variation in the corpus, and thus determine which themes and treatment are most significant for the analysis. In doing so, we will determine which terms are more significant in the variation of each axis and then make an analysis that will give us a more precise idea of the treatment of our subject and the orientation of our research.

It should also be pointed out that we have decided to carry out the FAC on partitions of the corpus and not on the corpus as a whole. Indeed, our objective is to determine the way the coalition is treated according to the newspaper in order to determine, firstly, if a nuance exists according to the presumed political orientation of the newspaper, and secondly, to determine what the changes are according to the publication date of each article. Thus, our aim in conducting two separate FACs on two separate scores is to be able to determine precisely whether there has been a change in discourse between the pre- and post-election 2019, and whether the alleged change in discourse has different levels of treatment and narrative depending on the newspaper. In fact, it is with this same logic that the lexicometric data set was analysed.



*FAC based on axes 2-3*

### Plan factoriel de l'analyse des correspondances de CORPUS-MEMOIRE/Partition date/@word $\geq 2$ /200



64



## FAC of the diary partition

Within the newspaper partition, axes 1, 2 and 3 structure 26.77% of our corpus. Axis 1 is significant at 9.90%, axis 2 is significant at 8.66% and axis 3 is significant at 8.21%. What the FAC of this partition will allow us to verify are the themes addressed by our selection as well as the general balance of the corpus with regard to the ideological level of the newspapers.

*FAC based on axes 1-2*

On the basis of the analysis of this FAC, we can already see that two groups stand out according to certain newspapers, one of which may be affiliated to Juntos Por el Cambio and the other to Frente de Todos. This leads us to believe that, indeed, there is a privileged focus on one or the other depending on the newspaper we are interested in. Having said this, it is also relevant to note a relatively balanced distribution between the groups, supporting the fact that our corpus is correctly balanced.




Figure 6 : FAC 1-2 of the diary partition

*FAC based on axes 1-3*

On the basis of this FAC, we do not notice any additional specific provision.




Figure 7 : FAC 1-3 of the diary partition

*FAC based on axes 2-3*

This FAC allows us to highlight three more or less distinct groups in the centre, suggesting that the three main themes dealt with by the newspapers are the Frente de Todos, Juntos Por el Cambio and the oppositional relationship between the two blocs, as well as the main points of friction (in this case the IMF).



## The analysis of the interviews

The logic behind the interviews was, in the first instance, as follows: the interview guide was divided into three groups of questions: perception, feeling and management (Annexe 8). This is justified by the fact that we wanted to focus on defeat and repositioning, as we needed to know how the defeat was perceived and felt in the first instance, in order to better understand how it was managed and potentially transformed into a transformative opportunity in the second instance.

In order to have the most complete and diversified vision possible, we decided to interview political leaders, but also their collaborators or activists (Annexe 10). It is relevant to focus on local politicians because they have a different vision of the defeat of the party at the national level (see annexe 9 for details on the research trip and the logic followed). Indeed, while the broad trends in the upper echelons of the parties and the coalition can be studied through quantitative discursive analysis, it is much more complex to determine how this was handled and presented by local representatives, who are much closer to their constituents. The activists are all members of one of the coalition parties. Their intervention is relevant to our research as their position is not only different, but they are also unaware of all the dealings that may take place internally. Moreover, as seen in the theory, defeat is seen much more strongly among them.

Having clarified these points, we must now carry out the actual analysis of the interviews. This analysis will be carried out in two stages, divided according to the answers given by the speakers from Buenos Aires and the answers given by the speakers from the province of Santa Fe (representing the vision of the interior of the country). Why did you choose speakers from the province of Santa Fe? Especially for the experience of the Frente Progresista. The Frente Progresista is a unique experience at the provincial level in Argentina, a coalition that governed the province for 12 years and brought together all the forces in opposition to Peronism (i.e. radicals, socialists and democrats). What makes the interviews with local politicians from this province all the more interesting is that they have a point of view on Juntos Por el Cambio that is not just influenced by a centre/periphery tradition, but also by an experience of coalition government that makes their analysis more advanced and technical, especially on possible evolutions.

In order to go a little further in the preliminary analysis, reference should be made to the interview with Miguel Angel Lentino (Annex 11a), which tells us three essential contextual elements to go further: Argentines have a tradition of oppositional voting; there is no real communist or socialist force in the country, these having been superseded by Peronism; Peronism is not a movement in opposition to capital, and Peronists can be found in parties such as PRO, which advocates the free market and a neo-liberal system. This being said, we can begin the analysis of the interviews.

## The « Porteña » vision, or the hegemony of Buenos Aires

For this part of the analysis, we will rely on the analysis of interviews with Frederico Ballan (Annexe 11b), Pedro Roulet (Annexe 11c), Mica Fuhr (Annexe 11d) and Jose Corall (Annexe 11e). We will first describe the relevant elements put forward by Frederico Ballan and Jose Corall, in their capacity as 'tenors' of the coalition parties, and then we will describe more the vision of Pedro Roulet and Mica Fuhr as representatives of a 'younger' view of the situation.

Thus, we first learn from Corall what we can call the biggest flaws of the Macri presidency; first of all, there was a clear lack of governance because he did not want to ally himself with a part of Peronism that could have brought him a majority in Congress: he preferred to negotiate with the Governors, despite the financial cost and the political uncertainty. Moreover, Macri's government was composed almost exclusively of members of his own party, and was therefore composed almost exclusively of people from Buenos Aires who had no knowledge of the reality of the interior. This lack of cohesion, the incessant spending and the unfavourable international context meant that, in the end, Macri's strategy of relying on foreign investment to support the national economy and reforms was a failure. It is therefore easier to understand the derailment of the government from 2017 onwards, and the growing mistrust even within his own camp. Nevertheless, the coalition managed to recover quite impressively from the loss of PASO, which Ballan will explain by the 'si se puede' movement, which consisted of a popular impulse that the coalition will use to its advantage to revalue itself. This was translated into a strong grassroots campaign, but which used radically different arguments between Buenos Aires and the interior; that is, in the capital, the memory of Macri's good management of the city was used more to call for his re-election, while in the interior it was conducted more as a battle of values, "us or them", and by the fear of seeing Kirchnerism in power again. As for the post-election 2019, both Ballan and Corall agree that the coalition is no longer dominated by PRO, and is much more balanced.

Let us now turn to the 'younger' view of the coalition. Let's first look at Roulet, who sees a bi-partisanship in which JxC would participate. Indeed, he argues that JxC has more electoral weight than the aggregation of party scores alone. Moreover, even if he is the president of the PRO youth, not only does he say that he identifies first with the coalition and then with the party, he repeats quite often that there is a real will between the youth of the coalition parties to collaborate, even to

create a common movement. Fuhr, for her part, sees the coalition above all independently of Macri's presidency, which she has experienced as extremely frustrating in view of the promises made for the 4 years of his presidency. For her, at one time Macri could represent the coalition, but today he no longer even represents his own party. In doing so, she shares Roulet's vision of the possibility of bi-partisanship, especially as the young activists and members of the coalition parties today still only have their party as a member of the coalition, and she notices a growing movement of rapprochement.

As a result of these interviews, what I also saw emerging was a real dichotomy between the perception of the coalition by the younger generation and the perception of the coalition by the senior parties. In both cases, a funnel image is present, but not in the same direction, which could be represented as follows:



Dans ce cas, JxC est au sommet, et les partis en découlent comme des sous-organismes de la structure. (vision Fuhr et Roulet)

*Figure 9 : the young JxC*



Dans ce cas, JxC est une base commune qui reprend des éléments de chaque parti indépendants de celle-ci. (vision Ballan et Corall)

*Figure 10 : the senior JxC*

## The working inner-country and the historical political parties

For this part of the analysis, we will base ourselves on the analysis of the interviews with Marina Bordigoni (annexe 11g), Nati Sanchez (annexe 11h), Eduardo Depiante (annexe 11i), Esteban Motta (annexe 11j), Lorena Ulieldin (annexe 11k) and Jose Felice (annexe 11l). We will first describe the elements put forward by Bordigoni, Sanchez and Depiante as representing the most local level, the city, before moving on to the elements described by Motta, Ulieldin and Felice, which are at the provincial level.

It is thanks to Bordigoni that we will have a clearer vision of how JxC is perceived in the interior: indeed, the JxC brand, as she calls it, would be an opportunity to bring all the parties together in a big "Frente de Frente" (a term used to mean that the coalition must be amplified in the interior by changing some elements to convince the reluctant). She goes on to say that the problem for JxC, even now, is the shadow of Macri, and a renewed coalition is needed to effectively remove him. The fear of Macri is linked to the fact that the parties in the coalition are mainly afraid of finding themselves in the same situation as in 2015. That said, JxC has entered a real movement of perpetuation and amplification at the local level, the coalition started from the national level but is now present in the localities, the provinces. Sanchez confirmed Bordigoni's words, adding that in her opinion the only way to win the elections is to amplify JxC (frente de frente) because the coalition has become a symbol even in the eyes of the voters, especially as JxC is much more balanced today, so that even she who was reluctant at the beginning perceives it as a real alternative force since 2021. Depiante reminds us, however, that JxC is more a coalition of interests than a real governing coalition and that within the coalition PRO has more power in CABA and the radicals in the interior. Another interesting point he will make is that, in reality, it is in CABA that JxC acts most like a party, while in the interior the coalition is really only perceived as a 'brand'.

Coming back to the 'Frente de Frente', which is an idea put forward for the provincial level first and foremost, Motta tells us that JxC actually became a possibility after the death of the former socialist governor, which led to an internal crisis in the partido socialista and the then ruling coalition Frente Progresista, even though the latter was already thinking about it beforehand because the coalition had become frequent since 2021. Furthermore, Ulieldin confirms that, at the national level, there is indeed a dichotomy between the Kirchnerists and JxC, which could eventually lead to a bi-partisan



system. However, according to Felice, the condition at the provincial and even national level for an alliance with the Socialist Party will remain to really form a government alliance and not just an electoral alliance. Thus, one of the great weaknesses of the coalition at the moment is a lack of long-term vision caused by the power struggles that are increasing as the 2023 elections approach.

### [Juntos por el Cambio, the secret recipe?](#)

First of all, let us note the contribution of Esteban Iglesias (annexe 11f) in understanding the elements identified by the two previous parts of the analysis. Thus, he specifies that CABA is anti-Peronist and the interior anti-Kirchnerist; moreover, in the pillars of ideological conflicts, the conflict between capital and interior as well as Peronism anti-Peronism is stronger than the left-right distinction. Therefore, in view of the ideological and historical conflicts, the main difference between the Frente de Todos (the Kirchnerist coalition) and JxC is that JxC solves its problems internally and does not depend on the figure of one person, which makes the coalition more balanced and stable but also more serious in the eyes of the voters. In this way, we can better understand one of the elements Depiante brought to the interview, namely that JxC is used as a kind of vote box that the parties compete for, i.e. the candidate who wins the PASO will have the legitimacy to claim the leadership of the coalition for his or her party and to lead the party's programme into government. In the end, we can therefore question the real cohesion within the coalition, which is in line with what Ulieldin and Felice said about the real long-term vision carried by the coalition.

## What do we learn with the data gathered

From now on, our objective is to link the data collected in the different sections in such a way as to bring them into dialogue in order to determine the main response trends. In doing so, we can recall the following elements as the main trends identified in the course of the analysis:

Thus, through the analysis of the concordances related to *Juntos por el Cambio*, firstly, we were able to identify several elements; Firstly, there is a clear link with the opposition vocabulary, which makes sense given that the coalition took on this name only a short time before losing to *Frente de Todos*, however what is interesting to highlight is that the opposition vocabulary does not only refer to the government, but also to Macri as such. Secondly, in continuity, there is a direct reference to internal power issues within the coalition, in terms of deciding who will take the leadership. Finally, an element that may appear to be a detail but is in fact of some importance is that there is reference to opposition not to *Kirchnerism*, but to *Alberto Fernandez*, which may lead one to think that there is less ideological pressure. Secondly, in the analysis of co-occurrences related to *Juntos por el Cambio*, we have noted three main elements; namely, a proximity with the words 'oposicion', 'interna' and 'coalicion'. In doing so, we can argue that *Juntos por el Cambio* is strongly linked to ideas of opposition and coalition, which is not surprising given the history already developed above, but more surprisingly the name is also strongly linked to the idea of 'interna', which implies an internal competition within the coalition and therefore a leadership that is not crystallised and has yet to be determined. The concordances and co-occurrences have therefore highlighted the different imaginaries linked to *Juntos por el Cambio*, imaginaries that can be either linked to an idea of opposition and variety in leadership, or linked to Macri and a much more vertical management. Thus, the coalition is affiliated either to vertical management or to horizontal management, depending on which words are closest to it. It is clear that in this context Macri presents a particularly important divisive element.

It is by continuing with the FAC analysis that we were able to determine when and why this shift occurred. Indeed, we can note the existence of two sub-groups within the corpus: one before and one after the elections. In addition, they have allowed us to highlight three more or less distinct groups in the centre, suggesting that the three main themes dealt with by the newspapers are the

Frente de Todos, Juntos Por el Cambio and the oppositional relationship between the two blocs, as well as the main points of friction (in this case the IMF). Therefore, the FAC made it possible to confirm when the changes in treatment took place, and already have an outline of the arguments as to why this change had taken place. It should also be noted that the FACs were confirmed by the analyses of the scores. Indeed, the significant texts and newspapers correspond to the conclusions we were able to draw thanks to the FAC, and thus confirm the elements put forward for the lexicometric analysis as such. This being said, we have thus confirmed that there is indeed an evolution between Cambiemos and Juntos por el Cambio.


In the end, what the lexicometric analysis allowed us to do was above all to confirm our basic hypothesis that there was indeed a change in treatment between the 2019 PASOs and the elections. This change could be verified according to the treatment of Macri's figure and his place in the coalition, which is not insignificant, as we could see in the analysis of the interviews.

As for the interviews, they allowed us to highlight the more concrete elements of how the change was made, and how it allowed the coalition to endure over time. Having said that, what are the things we should take away from this? First of all, and we think this is the main thing, there was a distancing of Macri from the coalition. This distancing has allowed two things: for the coalition to distance itself from his presidency, and for it to forge its own identity as an opposition. In doing so, given the ideological and historical conflicts already developed, the coalition was able to fully appropriate the other side of the Peronist-anti-Peronist divide from the Frente de Todos, and thus appear as a real 'opposition brand'. Moreover, since JxC solves its problems internally and does not depend on the figure of a single person, the coalition is also more balanced, stable and serious in the eyes of the voters. One of the points Depiante made in his interview is that JxC is used as a kind of vote box for the parties to fight over, i.e. the candidate who wins the PASO will have the legitimacy to claim the leadership of the coalition for his or her party and lead the party's programme into government. In the end, one may wonder about the long-term future of the coalition, especially in view of the fact that two main visions are clashing, as we have been able to describe in the analysis of the interviews in the capital and as we have summarised in the diagrams below:



Dans ce cas, JxC est au sommet, et les partis en découlent comme des sous-organismes de la structure. (vision Fuhr et Roulet)

*Figure 11 : the young JxC*



Dans ce cas, JxC est une base commune qui reprend des éléments de chaque parti indépendants de celle-ci. (vision Ballan et Corall)

*Figure 12 : the senior JxC*

These diagrams allow us to more clearly represent what lies ahead for the coalition and how it is perceived, namely that the vote bank as described above could fit with JxC's vision as a common base, but not as a top. There is thus a real possibility of bi-partisanship that has developed as the coalition has become more sustainable, sustainable because the coalition itself has become more balanced and has increasingly brought together parties in opposition to Kirchnerism. This bi-partisanship would result in a strengthened coalition that would bring together all the opposition parties, functioning as the sole reference point for the opposition in the eyes of the citizens at the time of the various elections, at any level of power that might be put into play. This is thanks to a political youth that, in reality, has only known and militated through the coalition, thus serving to perpetuate it and to bring the parties closer together ideologically.

## Conclusion

In order to conclude this dissertation, it should be remembered that the main objective was to highlight the mechanisms that allow a political structure to endure over time, even after the defeat of the leader and during the transition from government to opposition. Within this framework, we studied the case of Juntos por el Cambio, formerly Cambiemos between 2015 and 2019, whose leader was Mauricio Macri, Argentine president from 2015 to 2019. Our case study focused on how the coalition saw itself being redefined after the 2019 PASOs and Mauricio Macri's defeat in the October 2019 general elections, so as to survive this defeat to become an opposition coalition and perennialise itself within it. Thus, the question that emerged for this research was:

"By what elements of internal political sociology can the perpetuation of a coalition after the defeat of its founder and leader be explained, and what analysis can be made? A study of the Argentine case of "Juntos por el Cambio" after the 2019 general elections".

To this question, we had therefore developed three hypotheses: either that the formation of the opposition can be explained by the charismatic character of the ex-president, or that the formation of the opposition can be explained by a rebellion/repulsion effect of Peronism on the part of a large part of the Argentine political world or, finally, that the formation of the opposition can be explained by an increasingly strong polarisation of the population.

In order to answer the research question and the different hypotheses, a strict methodology of both quantitative and qualitative data collection was followed. Indeed, on the quantitative side we conducted a lexicometric analysis of press articles surrounding the coalition before and after 2019 (113 articles were selected for this purpose), in order to determine and verify whether there was indeed a change in treatment, and what the main themes related to the coalition were before and after the key periods of 2019. On the qualitative side, we conducted a series of interviews (12) with politicians and activists, both local, provincial and national, and from the capital and the interior of the country, in order to analyse in more detail what enabled the change and how the perception of the coalition may have evolved over time. Thus, through these data collections our aim was to

ascertain whether there had indeed been change within the coalition, and what the nature of that change was, as well as the dynamics around it. Let us now turn to the answer to our hypotheses.

Firstly, the assumption that the formation of the opposition is explained by the charismatic character of the ex-president is false. In fact, the coalition has tended to strengthen and forge its own identity precisely because Mauricio Macri was no longer its leader, and the divisive figure he presents in the ranks of the opposition no longer existed. It should also be added that his distance from the coalition also allowed for an opening up of the competition for the leadership of the coalition, and thus a complete rebalancing of the coalition in terms of the different parties that make it up and the power relations between them.

Secondly, the hypothesis that the formation of the opposition is explained by a rebellion/repulsion of Peronism on the part of a large part of the Argentine political world is true. However, this hypothesis should be qualified by highlighting the difference between Peronism and Kirchnerism as explained in the theoretical part of this work. Indeed, the political elites of the capital and the interior were pushed by a common political enemy to ally themselves, but in the capital it was Peronism as a whole, while in the interior it was more Kirchnerism. The difference is essential, because the opposition to Peronism pushed the anti-Peronist parties to ally themselves in a much more advanced way than in the interior of the country, thus forming a kind of hard core coalition in the capital. In this way, Juntos por el Cambio is much stronger and more united in the capital than in the provinces, where the spirit of opposition to Kirchnerism is less prevalent.

Finally, the hypothesis according to which the formation of the opposition is explained by an increasingly strong polarisation of the population is nuanced. Indeed, as we pointed out in the response to the second hypothesis, it is above all an opposition to Peronism/Kirchnerism that is driving the coalition. That said, it is true that the coalition is increasingly perceived as the other side of political life, and has thus achieved a certain recognition by the population as representing anti-Peronism/Kirchnerism. In doing so, what also drives the strengthening of the coalition is not only an internal party movement and a common opposition, but also the fact that the coalition is perceived as a 'brand' and has almost become a must for any major election.

To these hypotheses, we can add some observations made. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the fringe of the coalition present in the capital is much more united and active than the others, and even has a much more bi-partisan vision of Argentinean politics. This makes it possible to

understand how, in a country where political power dynamics have always been directed by the capital, it is possible for the coalition to maintain itself so strongly and even penetrate other levels of power and the unconsciousness of voters. Moreover, from the parties' point of view, this position of 'opposition brand' and 'vote bank' presents an exceptional opportunity for the coalition parties at the moment, because in view of the new balance each party has the possibility of imposing its solution at the head of the coalition for the next presidential elections and thus benefit from the vote opportunity that Juntos por el Cambio represents.

Finally, to the question "What elements of internal political sociology can explain the perpetuation of a coalition after the defeat of its founder and leader, and what analysis can be made of this?", we can answer that the perpetuation was achieved thanks to three important elements, all of which are intertwined:

- Firstly, the defeat of the leader in this case did not lead to the disintegration of the coalition because the fact that he distanced himself from the coalition allowed it to have its own identity and not to be identified with the leader's failures;
- Secondly, the fact that the natural leader of the coalition and the main party lost power, but also their central place in the decision-making processes of the coalition, allowed for the emergence of a competition between the parties and a balancing of the balance of power making it more frequent and sustainable in the long term;
- Finally, the fact that the coalition has taken on its own identity and opposed the new government as a bloc has made it all the more likely to be perceived as a viable alternative, and a kind of 'brand' in the eyes of the voters, making it more likely that the parties will keep the coalition alive to fight for the votes it can garner rather than disintegrate it and return to a state of plural competition.

As for the limitations that this work might suffer from, they are multiple. Firstly, in terms of the data for the analysis, there is always the possibility of adding more data and making an ever more detailed analysis. Secondly, with regard to the stakeholders, we only interviewed people in the capital and in the province of Santa Fe, so there is scope for interviewing other stakeholders in the other provinces, and thus multiplying the points of view. Finally, we could also have conducted a

broader study, from 2015 to the present, mainly with regard to the lexicometric analysis and the selection of press articles.

In terms of future research, we propose two possibilities, always taking into account the limitations:

- Firstly, an analysis of the 'Frente Progresista' in the province of Santa Fe, a unique experience in Argentina of a coalition that governed the province for 12 years, should be carried out.
- Secondly, the same analysis should be made of the aftermath of the next elections in 2023, in order to determine whether there has been a positive evolution in the number of parties adhering to the coalition or whether the coalition's capacity to survive is in question.



## Bibliography

### Books and articles

- Abal Medina J.-M. (2006), “El surgimiento de los partidos políticos, una propuesta interpretativa”, in Abal Medina J.-M. (dir.) ; *Los senderos de la nueva izquierda partidista*, Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.
- Abélès M. (2006), « De la communication en négatif : l'échec politique », *Le Temps des médias*, 2(7), pp. 151-160.
- Adams J. & al. (2004), « Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies : Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results ? », *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(4), pp. 589-610.
- Ágh A. (1997), « Defeat and Success as Promoters of Party Change. The Hungarian Socialist Party after Two Abrupt Changes », *Party Politics*, 3(3), pp. 427-444.
- Alcántara Sáez M. (2004), « ¿Instituciones o máquinas ideológicas? Origen, programa y organización de los partidos latinoamericanos », Barcelona: ICPS.
- Alcántara Sáez M., Freidenberg F. (2003), « Partidos políticos de América Latina. Cono Sur », *México: Fondo de Cultura Económica e Instituto Federal Electoral*.
- Anderson C. & al. (2005), « Learning to Lose : Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential », *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(1), pp. 91-111.
- Anderson C., Tverdova Y. (2001), « Winners, Losers and Attitudes about Government in Contemporary Democracies », *International Political Science Review*, 22(4), pp. 321-338.

- Angermuller J., Maingueneau D., Wodak R. (2014), *The Discourse Studies Reader. Main currents in theory and analysis*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Annunziata R., Ariza, F. and March, R. (2018), « 'Gobernar es estar cerca'. Las estrategias de proximidad en el uso de las redes sociales de Mauricio Macri y María Eugenia Vidal », *Revista Mexicana de Opinión Pública*, 13(24), pp. 71-93.
- Arter D. (2013), « When new party X has the 'X factor': On resilient entrepreneurial parties », *Party Politics*, 22.
- Balsa J. (2013), « Discurso, política y acumulación en el kirchnerismo », Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires : Centro Cultural de la Cooperación Floreal Gorini - Bernal : Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, *Pensamiento crítico*, 7.
- Best R. (2013), « How Party System Fragmentation has Altered Political Opposition in Established Democracies », *Government and Opposition*, 48, pp. 314 – 342.
- Bettcher K.-E. (2005), “Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy. The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism”, *Party Politics*, 11(3).
- Bonnafeux S., Temmar M. (2007), *Analyse du discours en sciences humaines et sociales*, Paris, Ophrys, Les Chemins du discours.
- Boucek F. (2009), « Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism », *Party Politics*, 15(4), pp. 455-485.
- Brunnerová O. (2019), « Not all political entrepreneurs are created equal: The institutionalisation of entrepreneurial parties in Central Europe », *Central European Journal of Politics*, 5(1), pp. 100–124.
- Brusco V. & al. (2004), « Vote Buying in Argentina », *Latin American Research Review*, 2(39), pp. 66-88.

- Budge I., Laver M. (1986), « Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory », *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11(4), pp. 485-506.
- Budge I., Laver M. J. (1992), « Coalition Theory, Government Policy and Party Policy », In M. J. Laver, I. Budge (Éds.), *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*, pp. 1-14.
- Castro Rojas S. (2013), « Redes, vínculos digitales y política. Revista Razón y Palabra », Vol. 17, N°83, pp.454-464.
- Charaudeau P. & al. (2002), *Dictionnaire d'analyse du discours*, Paris, Éd. du Seuil.
- Collier R., Mahoney J. (1997), « Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe », *Comparative Politics*, 29(3), pp. 285-303.
- Cotta M. (2001), “Sobre la relación entre partido y gobierno”, en *Desarrollo Económico*, Vol. 41, No. 162.
- Dagatti M., Onofrio M.-P. (2020), « Political visions. The imaginary system of Cambiemos (Argentina, 2015-2018) », *Cuadernos.Info*, (44), pp. 79–98.
- De Russell D. & al. (2011), « Political Parties and Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy ».
- Duverger, M. (1951), *Los partidos políticos*, México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Eldersveld S.-J. (1964), « Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis », Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Eurrutia Cavero M. (2013), « La société contemporaine et les nouveaux genres discursifs : le récit médiatique », *Thélème. Revista Complutense De Estudios Franceses*, 28, pp. 105-124.

- Garriga A.-C. (2020), « Es (casi) siempre la economía: desempeño económico y realineamiento político en Argentina en 2019 », *Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)*, 40(2), pp. 137-161.
- Gibson E., Suarez-Cao J. (2010), « Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina », *Comparative Politics*, 43(1), pp. 21-39.
- Gilbert M. (2008), « La responsabilité collective et ses implications », *Revue française de science politique*, 58.
- Gonzalez-Ocantos E., Oliveros V. (2019), « Clientelism in Latin American Politics ».
- Harmel R. & al. (1995), « Performance, Leadership, Factions and Party Change : An Empirical Analysis », *West European Politics*, 18(1), pp. 1-33.
- Harmel R., Janda K. (1994), « An integrated theory of party goals and party change », *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6(3), pp. 259-287.
- Harmel R., Tan A. (2003), « Party actors and party change : Does factional dominance matter ? », *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), pp. 409-424.
- Holzinger K. & al. (2011), « Minimizing the losers : regime satisfaction in multi-level systems », *Constitutional Political Economy*, 22(4), pp. 303-324.
- Huntington S.-P. (1968), « Political Order in Changing Societies », New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Husson A.-C. (2016), « Dialogisme et conflictualités sociales dans les discipline du discours », *Études de communication*, 1(47), pp. 91-110.
- Iglesias, E., Lucca, J.-B. (2019), « La argentina de Cambiemos », Rosario: UNR Editores. 424 p.

- Katz R., Mair P., (1992), « Party organizations. A Data Handbook », London: Sage Publications.
- Langston J. (2003), « Rising from the Ashes?: Reorganizing and Unifying the PRI's State Party Organizations after Electoral Defeat », *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(3), pp. 293–318.
- Lanzaro J. (2001), « Tipos de presidencialismo y modos de gobierno en América Latina », *Tipos de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en America Latina*, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, Buenos Aires.
- Lapalombara J., Weiner M. (1966), « Political Parties and Political Development », Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Leimdorfer F., Salem A. (1995), « Usages de la lexicométrie en analyse de discours », *Cahiers des Sciences Humaines*, (1)31, pp. 131-143.
- Levitsky S., Murillo M.-V. (2008), « Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner », *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2), pp. 16-30.
- Linares A., Mallimaci M.-A. (2019), « Los medios estatales de Argentina a partir de la asunción de la alianza Cambiemos en el gobierno nacional (2016-2018) », Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Instituto de Investigaciones en Comunicacion, 1(61), pp. 1-19.
- Louault F. (2011), « Les défaites électorales : le cas du Parti des travailleurs dans le Rio Grande do Sul (Brésil), 1982-2008 », thèse soutenue à l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris sous la direction de Olivier Dabène, 545p. ;
- Lucca J.-B., (2019), “¿Por qué?: La rápida agonía de la Argentina kirchnerista y la brutal eficiencia de una nueva derecha”, *Temas y Debates*, (37), 185-187.
- Maingueneau D. (2009), *Les termes-clés de l'analyse du discours*, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, collection « Points », type « Essais », nouvelle édition.

- Maingueneau D. (2014), *Discours et analyse du discours*, Paris, Armand Colin.
- Matlin, J. (2009), “Political party machines of the 1920s and 1930s : Tom Pendergast and The Kansas City democratic machine”.
- Mayaffre D. (2005), « De la lexicométrie à la logométrie », *Astrolabe*, pp. 1-11.
- Michels R. (1911), « Los partidos políticos », Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
- Monestier F. (2019), “The successful building of a conservative party in Argentina”, *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, (108), 175–191.
- Nadeau R., Blais A. (1993), « Accepting the Election Outcome : The Effect of Participation on Losers’ Consent », *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4), pp. 553-563.
- Navarro F., (2012), « Discurso político y redes sociales. El uso de twitter en la campaña presidencial argentina 2011 ». in VIII congreso ALSFAL, Uruguay, pp-597-605.
- Orsina G. (2013), « Il berlusconismo nella storia d'Italia », Marsilio, 239 p.
- Ostiguy P. (1997), « Peronismo y antiperonismo : bases socioculturales de la identidad política en la Argentina », *Revista de ciencias sociales*, (6), pp. 133-215.
- Panebianco A. (1990), « Modelos de Partido. Organización y poder en los partidos políticos », Madrid: Alianza.
- Pasquino G. (2014), « Italy : The Triumph of Personalist Parties », *Politics & Policy*, 42.
- Prati J. (2018), « Análisis de la campaña electoral de “Cambiamos” en las elecciones de Argentina en el año 2015 : los casos de Mauricio Macri y María Eugenia Vidal », thesis defended at the Universidad Nacional de Rosario under the supervision of Irene Gindin.

- Prévôt-Schapira M.-F. (2011), « L'Argentine des Kirchner, dix ans après la crise », *Editions Choiseul*, Problèmes d'Amérique latine, (82), pp. 13-32.
- Reveles Vazquez F. (2006), “Oposición y democratización: tres enfoques”, *Estudios Políticos*, 8.
- Rice S.-A. (1925), “The Behavior of Legislative Groups”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 40.
- Rodríguez D.-A. (2015), « Argentine: l'érosion du capital politique présidentiel », *Union Europea; Telos*, 4.
- Ruíz Rodríguez L. (2006a), “La organización de los partidos latinoamericanos: niveles de vida partidista”, in Alcántara Sáez, Manuel (ed.), *Políticos y política en América Latina*, Madrid: Fundación Carolina y Siglo XXI de España Editores.
- Ruíz Rodríguez L. (2006b), “Coherencia partidista: la estructuración interna de los partidos políticos en América Latina”, en *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 14.
- Ruíz Rodríguez L.-M., Otero F., (2013), « Indicadores de partidos y sistemas de partidos », Madrid: CIS.
- Sartori G, (1976), « Partidos y sistemas de partidos », Madrid: Alianza.
- Schofield N. (1993), « Political competition and multiparty coalition governments », *European Journal of Political Research*, 23, pp. 1-33.
- Sidicaro R. (2009), « Désarticulation du système politique argentin et kirchnerisme », *Mutations des gauches latino-américaines*, 71, 69p.
- Slimovich A. (2020), “Instagram y política. Mediatización y circulación en los perfiles de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner y Mauricio Macri”, *Cuadernos Del Centro De Estudios De Diseño Y Comunicación*, (112).

- Stroppiana, T., Weinbaum Valerio, S. (2020), “¿Cambiamos? La batalla cultural por el sentido común de los argentinos”, in Paula Canelo (2020), *Sudamérica : Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 0(13), pp. 323-326.
- Torcal M. (2014), « The Incumbent Electoral Defeat in the 2011 Spanish National Elections: The Effect of the Economic Crisis in an Ideological Polarized Party System », *Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties*, 24, pp. 224-242.
- Uslaner E. (2018), “The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust”, Oxford University Press.
- Vairo D. (2017), “Oposición partidaria y (des)lealtad democrática en América Latina (1978-2010)”, in *POSTData*, 22(1).
- Vautier C. (2019), « Imaginarios del “ser nacional” en Cambiemos: una construcción desde la emotividad », *Universidad Nacional de La Plata*, actas De Periodismo Y Comunicación, 5(1).
- Vit H. & al. (2017), “Political Entrepreneurs and Their Parties: Conceptual and Typological Issues”, *Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science*, 24, pp. 83-91.
- Vit H., Lubomir K. (2017a), « Different Ways of Institutionalising Entrepreneurial Parties: Czech Public Affairs Party and ANO », *Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science*, 24, pp. 92-115.
- Vit H., Lubomir K. (2017b), « Entrepreneurial Parties: A Basic Conceptual Framework », *Politologický časopis - Czech Journal of Political Science*, 24, pp. 83-91.
- Vommaro G. (2017a), « La larga marcha de cambiamos: La construcción silenciosa de un proyecto de poder », *Siglo XXI Editores Argentina*, *Sudamérica : Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 0(9), pp. 248-251.



- Vommaro G. (2017b), « Argentina: The Year of Cambiemos », *Revista de ciencia política (Santiago)*, 37(2), pp. 231-254.
- Vommaro G. (2017c), « La centroderecha y el "cambio cultural" argentino », *Fundación Foro Nueva Sociedad*, Nueva Sociedad, (270), pp. 4-13.
- Vommaro G. (2019), “De la construcción partidaria al gobierno: PRO-Cambiemos y los límites del “giro a la derecha” en Argentina”, *Colombia Internacional*, (99), 91-120.
- Vommaro G., Morresi S. (2015), “*"Hagamos equipo": PRO y la construcción de la nueva derecha en Argentina.*”, Los Polvorines, Prov. de Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones UNGS, Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento.
- Ware A. (1996), « Partidos políticos y sistemas de partidos », Madrid: Istmo, S.A.
- Weinblum S. & Brack N. (2011), “'Political Opposition': Towards a Renewed Research Agenda”, *Interdisciplinary Political Studies*, 1.
- Wills-Otero L. (2016), “The electoral performance of Latin American traditional parties, 1978–2006: Does the internal structure matter?”, *Party Politics*, 22(6).
- Wolfgang M. (2019), « Populism in Argentina : A Comparative Perspective”.

## Other sources

- Argentina.gob (2022), « Elecciones 2019 », consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/interior/dine/resultados-y-estadisticas/elecciones-2019>
- Banque Mondiale (2022), Argentina, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=AR>
- Diamante S. (2022), « La inflación en 2018 fue del 47,6%, la cifra más alta en los últimos 27 años », published the 15/01/2019, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/dolar/inflacion-diciembre-2018-indec-precios-nid2211091/>
- Jueguen F. (2022), « Pobreza: llegó al 32% y hay casi 2,7 millones de nuevos pobres », published the 29/03/2019, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/pobreza-indec-2018-nid2233000/>
- Larousse (2022), « Argentine : activités économiques », consulté le 09/04/2022, [https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Argentine\\_activit%C3%A9s\\_%C3%A9conomi ques/186994#:~:text=Les%20r%C3%A9serves%20de%20p%C3%A9trole%20et,%C3%89tats%20DUnis%20et%20la%20Chine.](https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Argentine_activit%C3%A9s_%C3%A9conomi ques/186994#:~:text=Les%20r%C3%A9serves%20de%20p%C3%A9trole%20et,%C3%89tats%20DUnis%20et%20la%20Chine.)
- Le Figaro (2019), « Argentine : le taux d'inflation en 2018 a atteint 47,6% », published the 15/01/2019, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2019/01/15/97002-20190115FILWWW00368-argentine-le-taux-d-inflation-en-2018-a-atteint-476.php>
- Movistar (2022), « caso de éxito », consulté le 09/04/2022, <https://negociosdigitalesmovistar.com/caso-de-exito/mercado-libre-lidera-el-comercio-electronico-en-america-latina/#:~:text=Mercado%20Libre%20fue%20fundado%20en,poner%20en%20marcha%20la>

[%20web](#)

- Rivas Molina F. (2022), « Queríamos el cambio que Macri proponía, no el que hizo », published the 10/09/2018, consulted the 09/04/2022, [https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/09/argentina/1536501249\\_312152.html](https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/09/argentina/1536501249_312152.html)
- USherbrooke (2022), « Perspective monde », consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=ARG&codeStat=FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG&codeTheme=2>

## Annexes

### Annexe 1 : list of selected articles for the analysis

"El Rayo Macrizador", una de las armas del oficialismo argentino para seguir en el poder - AméricaEconomía – 08/2019

"Juntos por el Cambio" reemplazará a Cambiemos como nombre del frente electoral oficialista – Infobae – 06/2019

"Juntos por el cambio": así se llamará la alianza del PRO, UCR, ARI y Pichetto - Perfil – 06/2019

¿El crecimiento de 2019 llegará a tiempo para influir en las elecciones? - LA NACION – 07/2019

¿Quién ganó, quién perdió y qué se jugó en las elecciones argentinas? – Lacunza – 11/2021

¿Y ahora quién manda en Juntos por el Cambio? - Política y Medios – 09/2021

El peronismo, al rescate de una Argentina asfixiada en la era Macri - Esglobal – 08/2019

El fracaso del experimento “gradualista” en argentina devuelve al peronismo al Poder – cidob – 11/2019

A un mes de las PASO: Mauricio Macri se acerca a Alberto Fernández y pelean voto a voto en todas las encuestas – clarin – 07/2019

Acuerdo con el FMI: oficialismo y oposición acordaron el cronograma de discusión en el Congreso - la capital- 03/03/2022

Alerta K: la elección se hiper polarizó y Mauricio Macri recortó dos puntos en 15 días – clarin – 07/2019

América Latina: cambios políticos en tiempos volátiles e inciertos | IDEA – 17/09/2019

Angelini: Es una mejor elección de la que esperábamos (la capital) – 11/08/2019

Argentina: "Juntos por el Cambio" pide al Gobierno aceptar la derrota | boliviaentusmanos – 15/11/2021

Argentina: Juntos por el Cambio pide al Gobierno aceptar la derrota | Argentina | DW | - 16/11/2021

Argentina: escrutinio oficial confirma triunfo electoral del peronismo | Las noticias y análisis más importantes en América Latina | DW | - 08/11/2019

Boleta completa: Juntos por el Cambio y su fuerte campaña en las redes (la nueva manana) – 14/07/2019

Bullrich: Fue una derrota digna, dejo el cargo con la frente alta (la capital) – 28/10/2019

Cambiamos Con Ganas propone experiencia de gestión y nueva energía para Juntos por el Cambio (la capital) – 25/07/2021

Carolina Losada se impuso en una ajustada interna de Juntos por el Cambio (la capital) – 13/09/2021

El fracaso del experimento “gradualista” en Argentina devuelve al peronismo al poder – CIDOB – 11/2019

Comenzó el año electoral: los desafíos del oficialismo y la oposición - (rio negro) – 02/01/2021

Corrientes: Juntos por el Cambio redujo la brecha - LA NACION – 29/10/2019

Decenas de miles de argentinos salen a las calles para pedir mejoras en sueldos y subsidios a Macri - Reuters – 16/08/2019

Declaración de los partidos de oposición en defensa de la paz de Colombia – Indepaz – 13/03/2019

Desesperado pedido de Macri y Vidal para las Paso: No nos suelten las manos - (la capital) – 09/08/2019

Diputada de Juntos por el Cambio se muda al peronismo y abre un conflicto con sus ex socios - (la capital) – 02/06/2021

Dudas en Juntos por el Cambio por el proyecto que fue al Congreso - Política y Economía - (el día) – 05/03/2022

El equipo de Vidal: el gran capitán, los estrategas y el jugador satélite - (letrap) – 22/07/2019

El funcionamiento de las coaliciones en Argentina no funciona - Perfil – 05/02/2022

El futuro imperfecto de Juntos por el Cambio - LA NACION – 20/09/2019

El macrismo suspendió las peleas internas en medio del dilema por su futuro - LA NACION – 22/09/2019

El oficialismo cargó contra Juntos por el Cambio - (la capital) – 13/10/2020

El progresismo busca reagruparse de cara a las elecciones de 2019 - (la capital) – 12/03/2018

El rol de Macri agita la interna de Juntos por el Cambio en Santa Fe - (la capital) – 02/09/2021

Elecciones 2019. Santa Fe: remontada y ligera ventaja para Juntos por el Cambio - LA NACION – 28/10/2019

Elecciones 2021: ¿Qué ponen en juego el Frente de Todos y Juntos por el Cambio? - Página12 – 25/07/2021

Elecciones legislativas: La oposición en Argentina recibe con cautela los llamados del Gobierno peronista a un diálogo - (el pais) – 16/11/2021

Elecciones provinciales 2019: Así llegamos a las PASO nacionales - (cippec) -

Emiliano Yacobitti: "Juntos por el Cambio debe seguir como un frente amplio" - LA NACION – 06/10/2019

En Santa Fe, Macri le ganó a Alberto Fernández - (la capital) – 27/10/2019

Es cierto que Macri fue el más votado entre los argentinos en el exterior y que Fernández ganó entre los presos – Chequeado – 05/11/2019

Facundo Manes: Debemos construir una nueva mayoría, más amplia que Juntos por el Cambio - La Voz del Interior – 18/03/2022

FMI: tras la pelea peronista, ¿viene una fisura en la oposición? - (iprofesional) – 02/02/2022

Halcones y palomas en la interna de Juntos por el Cambio en Santa Fe - (la capital) – 03/06/2021

Mauricio Macri, en su peor momento: ¿cómo hacer campaña tras el golpazo? - (clarin) – 12/08/2019

Jorge Lanata, sobre el resultado de las PASO 2019: "Nadie se lo esperaba" - (clarin) – 12/08/2019

Juntos por el Cambio aceptaría con condiciones el llamado a un acuerdo político - (ambito) – 12/11/2021

Juntos por el Cambio deberá reinventarse y aprender a ser oposición - El Economista – 20/11/2019

Juntos por el Cambio debutó con nueva fórmula, negociaciones y fotos - (la capital) – 13/06/2019

Juntos por el Cambio dio vuelta el resultado de las Paso para Diputados - (la capital) – 28/10/2019

Juntos por el Cambio fue la fuerza más votada pero perdió adhesiones en CABA y Provincia - (telam) – 15/11/2021

Juntos por el Cambio le reclamó al Gobierno que "asuma con dignidad que ha perdido la elección y deje de hacer negaciones" – elDiarioAR – 15/11/2021

Juntos por el Cambio le sacó 10 puntos al Frente de Todos y ganó en 14 departamentos de 19 - (la capital) – 13/09/2021

Juntos por el Cambio no puede caer en el cuanto peor, mejor - (la capital) – 05/02/2022

Juntos por el Cambio recuperó terreno y se impuso en distritos clave – UNCUYO – 13/09/2021

Juntos por el Cambio tendrá que ser "una coalición con distintas identidades" - BAE Negocios – 13/09/2021

La batalla por el corazón de Juntos por el Cambio – Seúl – 16-01-2022

La coalición oficialista tiene nuevo nombre: Juntos por el cambio - LA NACION – 12/06/2019

La indagatoria a Macri volvió a dividir aguas en Juntos por el Cambio - (la capital) – 31/10/2021

La oposición argentina Juntos por el Cambio afianza su triunfo en las elecciones legislativas – Deia – 16/11/2021

La oposición celebra su triunfo en legislativas de Argentina con miras a 2023 - (swissinfo.ch) – 15/11/2021

La oposición de centroderecha derrota al peronismo en las legislativas en Argentina, según los resultados provisionales - BBC News Mundo – 15/11/2021

La oposición se impone en los comicios legislativos de mitad de período en Argentina - Diario Financiero – 14/11/2021



La oposición se mantiene en silencio y balconea la crisis en el gobierno nacional - (la capital) – 17/09/2021

La polarización levantó a Mauricio Macri: se acercó a los Fernández en las PASO y hay empate para un balotaje - (clarin) – 28/06/2019

Larreta, el único triunfo en Juntos por el Cambio - (la capital) – 12/08/2019

Las canciones que los militantes de Juntos por el Cambio difunden para las marchas de Macri - LA NACION – 27/09/2019

Las diferencias entre los socios agudizan la interna en Juntos por el Cambio - (la capital) – 06/06/2021

Las luces de alerta que no vio el macrismo - (la capital) – 12/08/2019

Macri convocó a cambiar la historia de la Argentina para siempre - (la capital) – 24/10/2019

Macri dijo que si el Presidente le acerca a Juntos por el Cambio "propuestas sensatas", las van a "acompañar" - Diario La Prensa – 14/09/2021

Macri insistió con que su gobierno terminó económicamente el 11 de agosto - (la capital) – 15/10/2020

Macri tendrá un vertiginoso cierre de campaña que incluirá Rosario - (la capital) – 22/07/2019

Macri: El futuro del país se define yendo a votaren las Paso - (la capital) – 02/08/2019

Macri: Los argentinos pusimos primera y no volvemos atrás - (la capital) – 18/07/2019

Macri: No hay que caer en las falsas promesas de aquellos que nos defraudaron - (la capital) – 24/10/2019

Macri: Se puede dar vuelta el resultado de las Paso - (la capital) – 24/09/2019

Macri: Si Perón estuviera acá diría yo me anoto en Juntos por el Cambio - (la capital) – 25/03/2021

Macri: Tenemos que vencer la resignación, el cinismo y la desidia - (la capital) – 08/08/2019

Macri, a la reconquista de los desencantados - LA NACION – 02/06/2019

María Eugenia Vidal y Horacio Rodríguez Larreta: las cartas fuertes de la oposición argentina de cara a 2023 - La Tercera – 16/11/2021

Mario Negri y Ramón Mestre ratificaron que se unen en Juntos por el Cambio - LA NACION – 14/06/2019

Massa: Mientras ellos llaman a la destitución, nosotros seguimos queriendo el diálogo - (la capital) – 03/09/2021

Mauricio Macri le pidió "responsabilidad" al kirchnerismo y dijo que no habrá cambios en el gabinete - (clarin) – 12/08/2019

Juntos por el Cambio: "Que el gobierno asuma que perdieron, viven en un mundo paralelo" - Nuevos Papeles – 15/11/2021

Oposición argentina pide al Gobierno aceptar la derrota y cambiar de rumbo - (swissinfo.ch) – 15/11/2021

Oposición argentina pide al Gobierno aceptar la derrota y cambiar de rumbo - (telemetro) – 15/11/2021

Oposición horizontal y sin liderazgo único - (la capital) – 04/11/2019

Opositor Fernández se encamina a la presidencia con aplastante golpe sobre Macri en primarias de Argentina – Reuters – 12/08/2019

Para Macri, la base electoral de Juntos por el Cambio ya supera el 41 por ciento - (la capital) – 10/11/2020

PASO 2019: Comienza a definirse si sigue Mauricio Macri en el poder o vuelve el kirchnerismo - (clarin) – 11/08/2019

PASO 2019: Cristina Kirchner celebró la victoria y afirmó que "las cosas deben cambiar porque así no estamos bien" - (clarin) – 11/08/2019

PASO 2019: el clima de derrota y el desánimo vació de referentes y candidatos el búnker de Juntos por el Cambio - LA NACION – 12/08/2019

PASO 2019: el gobierno de Nicolás Maduro guarda silencio tras la victoria kirchnerista - (clarin) – 12/08/2019

PASO 2019: los resultados de las elecciones en todo el país - (clarin) – 12/08/2019

PASO 2019: Mauricio Macri admitió que Juntos por el Cambio hizo "una mala elección" - (clarin) – 11/08/2019

PASO 2019: ningún encuestador previó una brecha tan grande para los K - (clarin) – 12/08/2019

PASO 2019: votó Mauricio Macri y dijo que esta elección "define los próximos 30 años" - (clarin) – 11/08/2019

Pichetto aseguró que a Alberto Fernández lo vio agresivo y arrogante - (la capital) – 14/10/2019

Presupuesto 2022: la oposición rechazó el proyecto en la Cámara de Diputados - (la capital) – 17/12/2021

Qué resultado de las elecciones generales obliga a que haya ballottage - (la capital) – 25/10/2019

Qué será de Juntos por el Cambio en la oposición - El Economista – 28/10/2019

Quienes gobernaron hasta 2019 deberían tener una actitud más prudente - (la capital) – 22/01/2021

Quiénes son los referentes de Juntos por el Cambio que podrían disputarle a Macri el liderazgo de la oposición – AgroLink – 29/10/2019

Radicales definen autoridades y van por más protagonismo en Juntos por el Cambio - (la capital) – 21/11/2021

Sería inaudito e insólito que se revirtiera el resultado de las Paso - (la capital) – 26/08/2019

Sin Macri en las listas, el objetivo es evitar la dispersión y refundar el discurso - (la capital) – 13/06/2021

Terminó el escrutinio definitivo: cómo quedó la diferencia entre Alberto Fernández y Mauricio Macri - (clarin) – 29/08/2019

Toniolli: Quiero discutir de política con Juntos por el Cambio pero no se les cae una idea - (la capital) – 22/08/2021

Tras la derrota del oficialismo en las Paso, José Pablo Feinmann elogió a Mauricio Macri y criticó al Frente de Todos - (la capital) – 15/09/2021

Tras un encuentro con Macri, la oposición comienza a definir su rumbo en el Distrito - El Digital – 09/03/2020

Una campaña electoral marcada por la inestabilidad política y económica - (la capital) – 08/09/2019

Vista de Las elecciones 2019 en Argentina en clave subnacional - PolHis. – 06/2020

## [Annexe 2 : cleaning operations](#)

We used the Alceste method to clean the corpus, i.e. :

- Registration of titles for TXM: \*\*\*\* \*text\_XXX \*journal\_XXX \*date\_XX/XX/XXXX
- Removal of authors' names, dates, dates of modification of articles, places of publication and hyperlinks. Spelling and grammar check. Uniformity of inverted commas. Removal of inclusive writing to avoid errors with the TXM software. Removal of capital letters, checking of "a" and "e".
- Convert "word" document to ".txt" format. Inserting the ".txt" document into the TXM-0.8.1 software

Obviously, the changes were made on the basis of the Spanish language.

### Annexe 3 : key informations about the corpus used

#### The first 100 words of the corpus in frequency

Colonne1	Colonne2
Macri	421
Juntos	317
Cambio	289
Fernández	224
presidente	220
Frente	181
país	176
votos	170
elecciones	168

Alberto	155
Todos	150
gobierno	148
pero	148
nacional	146
Mauricio	145
Argentina	143
oposición	140
política	140
Gobierno	137
coalición	135
elección	119
electoral	119
peronismo	106
político	94
todo	94
Vidal	94
año	93
son	93
Cristina	92
esa	92
nos	92
porque	92
donde	91
esta	91
PASO	90
PRO	88
frente	87
kirchnerismo	87
campaña	86
quien	86
Larreta	84
candidatos	83

contra	83
poder	83
candidato	82
hasta	77
Kirchner	77
Santa	77
Cambiamos	75
primarias	73
Voto	73
Fe	72
octubre	71
Pichetto	71
primera	70
Cámara	69
derrota	69
resultado	69
UCR	68
ciento	67
durante	67
diferencia	66
hoy	65
jefe	65
oficialismo	65
vuelta	65
nivel	64
hacer	63
provincias	63
resultados	63
Rodríguez	63
JxC	62
lugar	62
triunfo	62
Es	61

tras	61
va	61
será	60
dirigentes	59
mayor	59
solo	59
acuerdo	58
cada	57
menos	57
crisis	56
hizo	56
lista	56
María	56
partido	56
Congreso	55
espacio	55
fórmula	55
opositora	55
tanto	55
argentinos	54
Diputados	54
Córdoba	53
fuerza	53
gestión	53
mejor	53

[Link to the table of cross-references](#)

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e4fnipSbYHax5Ye3cQ64PsbYaqTG187i/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=114573898342571645402&rtpof=true&sd=true>



Link of the table of cooccurrences


<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1tzsdaIrSn9ekPLhsep3l34Jl1UwDJhrE/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=114573898342571645402&rtpof=true&sd=true>

## Annexe 4 : acronymes

FAC : Factorial Analysis of the Cross-references


JxC : Juntos por el Cambio

## Annexe 5 : repartition of the diaries within the corpus






## Annexe 6 : analysis of the corpus based on the date partition



### Repartition of the number of words per articles



### Indice of reccurences








[Link to the table of specificities](#)


<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jddbLFeT0ixfuvVSm4lkZCGyK1xAq9ib/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=114573898342571645402&rtpof=true&sd=true>



Annexe 7 : analysis of the corpus based on the diary partition



Repartition of the number of words per diary



Indice de reccurences







[Link to the table of specificities](#)

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1DmJHDtSzRN-RqVFGwo0FXdqTwplAI7le/edit?usp=sharing&oid=114573898342571645402&rtpof=true&sd=true>

## Annexe 8 : the guide for the interviews

### Guide for the interviews

This interview guide is divided into three groups of questions: perception, feeling and management. This is justified by the fact that we are going to focus on defeat and repositioning, so we need to know how the defeat was perceived and felt in the first instance to better understand how it was managed and potentially turned into a transformative opportunity.

### Questions to political men and women affiliated to Juntos por el Cambio

It is relevant to look at local politicians because they have a different view of the party's defeat at national level. Indeed, while the broad trends in the upper echelons of the parties and the coalition can be studied through quantitative discursive analysis, it is much more complex to determine how this was handled and presented by local representatives, who are much closer to their constituents.

<b><u>Perception</u></b>	
	Au fil de la présidence de Mauricio Macri, avez-vous changé de position vis-à-vis de son leadership politique ?
	Comment interprétez-vous les déboires économiques de son mandat ?
	Comment avez-vous réagi à l'annonce de l'accord avec le FMI ?
	Suite aux PASO et à l'entre-élection, avez-vous revu votre position/avis vis-à-vis de Juntos por el Cambio et de Mauricio Macri ?
<b><u>Ressenti</u></b>	
	Vous êtes-vous senti trahis au fur et à mesure de la Présidence de Macri ?
	Comment avez-vous interprété la défaite des PASO ?
<b><u>Gestion</u></b>	



	Comment avez-vous géré, au niveau de la politique locale, la défaite de Juntos por el Cambio ? Cela a-t-il eu un impact sur la manière dont vous définissiez le parti ?
--	---

### Questions to the activists

The activists are all part of one of the coalition parties. Their intervention is relevant to our research because their position is not only different, but they are also unaware of all the dealings that may take place internally. Moreover, as seen in the theory, defeat is seen much more strongly among them.

<b><u>Perception</u></b>	
	Au fil de la présidence de Mauricio Macri, avez-vous changé de position vis-à-vis de son leadership politique ?
	Comment interprétez-vous les déboires économiques de son mandat ?
	Comment avez-vous réagit à l'annonce de l'accord avec le FMI ?  Suite aux PASO et à l'entre-élection, avez-vous revu votre position/avis vis-à-vis de Juntos por el Cambio et de Mauricio Macri ?
<b><u>Ressenti</u></b>	
	Vous êtes-vous senti trahis au fur et à mesure de la Présidence de Macri ?
	Comment avez-vous interprété la défaite des PASO ?
<b><u>Gestion</u></b>	
	Comment avez-vous géré, au niveau du militantisme local, la défaite de Juntos por el Cambio ? Cela a-t-il eu un impact sur la manière dont vous définissiez le parti ?

## Annexe 9 : the research trip

## Research trip to Argentina

### Practical details:

- For economical and logistical reason, I first had to flight from Rome to Brussels (13th of April) and after from Brussels to Buenos Aires (arriving the 15th of April), with a connection in London (14th of April). For similar reasons, I had my flight back home from Buenos Aires to Brussels (departing the 28th of April), with a connection in London (29th of April) and came back to Rome in the afternoon of the 29th.
- The purpose of the stay was to perform interviews and exchange thoughts within the scope of thesis. My research and contacts there was supervised by the Research Center of the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the National University of Rosario.
- Given how big the country is, and the limited possibility of movement, my trip has been divided in 4 main moments: 4 and a half days in Buenos Aires, 2 and a half days in Rosario, 4 days in the countryside and 2 last days in Buenos Aires. From start to end, I've always kept close contact with the Research Center of the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the National University of Rosario, to organize the interviews and provide a quick answer to potential problems.

### Two main elements must be clarified:

- Given my history with the country, I was able to find easy and free accommodation in all the places I had to visit, which explains the fact that I don't have expense proof for it. Nevertheless, food was not included. Also, for economic reasons and given the present state of the Argentinian economy, most of the needed expenses were done in cash. (That can be explained by the fact that the exchange rate if one pay with a credit/debit card is at +- 120 pesos for 1 euro, where the exchange rate if one brings cash is at +- 238 pesos for 1 euro)
- Travelling within the country was **necessary** for the good performing of the planned activities. As I had to interview entrepreneurs, business men and women, political activists, and politics, I could not reasonably have asked them to travel to Rosario to perform the

interviews because of the distance. (For example, Buenos Aires is approximately 500km away from Rosario and the towns that were visited in the countryside are approximately 300km away)

#### The organization of the stay:

- Landing the 15<sup>th</sup> of April and installation in the city of Buenos Aires;
- I have confirmed and formally organized the stay the 16<sup>th</sup> of April;
- 17<sup>th</sup> of April : interview of Miguel Angel Lentino (an Argentinian historian and writer that provided me with a more general vision of Argentinian politics);
- 18<sup>th</sup> of April : interview of Frederico Ballan, President of the Comuna 6 of Buenos Aires;
- 19<sup>th</sup> of April : interview of Pedro Roulet during the morning, President of the Youth of the PRO party, and interview of Mica Fuhr during the afternoon, Speaker for the City of Buenos Aires;
- 20<sup>th</sup> of April : interview of Jose Corall during the morning, ex-President (still in charge during the Macri presidency) of the Union Radical Party, and travel to Rosario during the afternoon to arrive there around 6PM in order to organize the stay there;
- 21<sup>st</sup> of April : interview of Esteban Iglesias, researcher at the Research Center of the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the National University of Rosario, and first in person meeting with the research team;
- 22<sup>nd</sup> of April : stay in the Research Center of the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the National University of Rosario to exchange on my first conclusions and the subject of the research;
- 23<sup>rd</sup> of April : travel to the city of Carlos Pellegrini (Santa Fe) during the morning and interview of the City Mayor, Marina Bordigoni, during the afternoon;
- 24<sup>th</sup> of April : Adaptation of the questions and organization of the coming week;
- 25<sup>th</sup> of April : Travel to the city of El Trebol (Santa Fe) during the morning to interview the City Mayor, Nati Sanchez, followed by the travel to the city of Las Rosas (Santa Fe) to interview the Chief of Cabinet of Nati Sanchez, Eduardo Depiante;
- 26<sup>th</sup> of April : Travel to the city of Piamonte (Santa Fe) to interview Esteban Motta, Secretary of the Parliamentary group of the Radical Party in the Parliament of the Province of Santa Fe, and travel to Carlos Pellegrini during the afternoon to interview Lorena Ulieldin (MP of the Parliament of the Province of Santa Fe) and Jose Felice (her chief of cabinet). Travel back to Buenos Aires during the night to arrive there the next day in the morning;

- 27<sup>th</sup> of April : informal meeting with various young activists of the coalition governing the city of Buenos Aires;
- 28<sup>th</sup> of April : organization of all the material, preparation of the trip back to Europe and take off.

*Apart from all the activities and interviews listed above, unformal discussions have been performed with other activists/politicians that are both within the coalition or opposing the coalition.*

What was the purpose of the interviews and how the way interviewees were selected has an impact on the research?

- First, there is a clear difference between how the coalition is perceived in the city of Buenos Aires and in the rest of the country, therefore it was important to have both points of view;
- Second, the choice of the province of Santa Fe is not random : the province has a long tradition of being governed by a coalition (Frente Progresista), in a way that makes it a unique experience in Argentina (before the apparition of Juntos por el Cambio which is our case study). Therefore it explains why it was more relevant to be hosted by the National University of Rosario and to exchange and meet with researchers from that university;
- Finally, it was necessary to interview not only people from big cities like Buenos Aires or Rosario, but also from little towns like Carlos Pellegrini and El Trebol as the realities and the way the coalition is perceived are totally different.

*In total, approximately 10h15 of interviews has been recorded and the average length of the interviews was at about 3h counting the informal talks before and after the recording as well as the time taken to travel back and forth from the meeting point.*

How this trip helped my research and was necessary to gather material?

- First, Argentina is a country where direct contact between people matters. Indeed, lots of the opportunities I had there were made possible thanks to my pre-existent contacts in the country;
- Second, related to the first point, being able to meet the interviewees in person really helped me when coming to making them feel comfortable to speak. It also gave me the opportunity

to meet them in their environment, which helped when coming to the informal discussions and the information that they would be willing to give me;

- Third, being able to constantly discuss with several people there before and after every interview helped me to rethink my approach and the way I perceived the subject in the first place;
- Finally, having around 10 interviewees has always been my plan, but it couldn't have been practically feasible if I didn't have the opportunity to make contacts in person and, therefore, had the possibility to meet some of the interviewees in last minute (like Eduardo Depiante or Esteban Motta). Indeed, some of the planned interviews before the trip have been canceled in last minute but the fact of being physically present in the country allowed me to make new contacts (even more interesting than the ones that were previously planned).

*In the end, that trip was essential to help me fully understand the complexity of the subject and of Argentinian politics, as well as its particularities. I come back with a clearer approach towards my subject and a more precise research question, as well as specific scientific material that I could not have found if I had stayed in Europe (for example analysis of the party system, the political situation etc...) as some of the authors of reference there are unknown, or not enough put under the lights, compare to what we usually publicize in the western research scheme on political sciences.*

[Link to all the recordings of the interviews](#)

[https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1E\\_36DHNzyfxti\\_mJ1ZZrHzHioBR6Xuf9?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1E_36DHNzyfxti_mJ1ZZrHzHioBR6Xuf9?usp=sharing)

## [Annexe 10 : the interveners](#)

- a) Miguel Angel Lentino, Argentinian historian and writer;
- b) Frederico Ballan, President of the Comuna 6 of Buenos Aires;
- c) Pedro Roulet, President of the Youth of the PRO party;
- d) Mica Fuhr, Speaker for the City of Buenos Aires;
- e) Jose Corall, ex-President (still in charge during the Macri presidency) of the Union Radical Party;
- f) Esteban Iglesias, researcher at the Research Center of the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations of the National University of Rosario;

- g) Marina Bordigoni, City Mayor of Carlos Pellegrini (Santa Fe);
- h) Nati Sanchez, City Mayor of El Trebol (Santa Fe);
- i) Eduardo Depiante, Chief of Cabinet of Nati Sanchez;
- j) Esteban Motta, Secretary of the Parliamentary group of the Radical Party in the Parliament of the Province of Santa Fe;
- k) Lorena Ulieldin (MP of the Parliament of the Province of Santa Fe);
- l) Jose Felice (Chief of Cabinet of Lorena Ulieldin).

Annexe 11a: link to the recording of the interview of Miguel Angel Lentino

[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1chOLAC\\_TJIzYoZPLefqNB7-oxMQ7zADk/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1chOLAC_TJIzYoZPLefqNB7-oxMQ7zADk/view?usp=sharing)

Annexe 11b: link to the recording of the interview of Frederico Ballan

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Bzws7Q50kO8W3V9Xjvaxg-nScMRGkds/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 11c: link to the recording of the interview of Pedro Roulet

[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1te\\_7u9gOm4EQCPSu7gghiEr149cBDu0C/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1te_7u9gOm4EQCPSu7gghiEr149cBDu0C/view?usp=sharing)

Annexe 11d: link to the recording of the interview of Mica Fuhr

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/10bxC1r8Ckn1Sindb7S4Cutr7DaH3m1J6/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 11e: link to the recording of the interview of Jose Corall

[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B73Q-iWUF5JaOt30Y5cKzXpioJ\\_ys5N4/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B73Q-iWUF5JaOt30Y5cKzXpioJ_ys5N4/view?usp=sharing)

Annexe 11f: link to the recording of the interview of Esteban Iglesias

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pD98ZQq0zklkV4ZufdZOIVyh3AZY1LLW/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 11g: link to the recording of the interview of Marina Bordigoni

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y2MdZlzP-o02SlnknLZ8044jyOqVa1YW/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 11h: link to the recording of the interview of Nati Sanchez

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iQmRlaZusEYo18RewCa1hnZvxt1jk0v/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 11i: link to the recording of the interview of Eduardo Depiante

[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SBoNq89iL-3lNh\\_oCiKcRjOSNcjGCOwL/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SBoNq89iL-3lNh_oCiKcRjOSNcjGCOwL/view?usp=sharing)

Annexe 11j: link to the recording of the interview of Esteban Motta

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tv7Wj3isp8jEbg07B7ZWKtepxJRTN7rT/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 11k: link to the recording of the interview of Lorena Ulieldin

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HOV3t96Q8AznnPjH7EgDi3an4nr8b4Ag/view?usp=sharing>

Annexe 111: link to the recording of the interview of Jose Felice

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HOV3t96Q8AznnPjH7EgDi3an4nr8b4Ag/view?usp=sharing>





Course of

---

SUPERVISOR

---

CO-SUPERVISOR

---

CANDIDATE

Academic Year



## Table of contents

<b><i>Introduction and context</i></b> .....	<b>4</b>
Research question.....	6
Hypothesis .....	6
How the research was conducted.....	7
<b><i>Methodology</i></b> .....	<b>8</b>
The performing of a lexicometric analysis .....	8
The lexicometry .....	9
The performing of interviews .....	10
<b><i>Conclusion</i></b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b><i>Bibliography</i></b> .....	<b>16</b>
Books and articles .....	16
Other sources .....	16

## **Acknowledgements**

The completion of this undertaking could not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many people whose names may not all be enumerated. Their contributions are sincerely appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deep appreciation and indebtedness particularly to the following:

My Professors Mr. Louault and Mr. Orsina, as well as to all relatives, friends and others who in one way or another shared their support, either morally, financially and physically, thank you.

## Introduction and context

In the last Argentinean presidential elections, the way in which the evolution of the Juntos por el Cambio coalition affected the Argentinean political landscape was more than remarkable. Indeed, more concretely, Mauricio Macri, the then leader of the coalition, lost the elections; as the coalition's *raison d'être* faded, we could expect a disintegration of the coalition: this was not the case. From this observation, the question of how political competition takes place not within a country, but rather within a party system, arose. Indeed, how does the defeat of a leader affect the future of a political party? This is a question that many authors have already addressed, as we will see in the state of the art section. However, for our research, there is a subject that has received less attention. Indeed, the reason why we focused on intra-party changes in the first place is related to the fact that the scientific literature has focused mainly on changes within parties, and not within coalitions; particularly in a specific case such as Argentina, as studies on the subject have traditionally focused on Western countries.

Before going further into the case study, let us first detail the political and economic situation and set our context. In doing so, the general economic situation must be addressed, as Argentina is extremely volatile. As a first consequence, Argentina, which had a PPP close to the US and Western Europe in 1950, is now far behind. It is also important to note that Argentina is not in the high end of South American growth either; if Argentina had followed the average growth rate trend of South American countries, it would be 50% richer in terms of GDP (Banque Mondiale, 2022).

Nevertheless, Argentina has a lot of potential waiting to be tapped. It has significant mineral (such as gold and lithium) and water resources, but is also one of the world's largest producers of agri-food products. And it is not only rich in raw materials, counting on a quality education with several Argentine Nobel Prize winners and a growing high-tech industry (especially in software) as well as several regional champions (such as Mercado Libre). (Larousse, 2022) (Movistar, 2022)

Having said that, let's go back to 2018 to get the clearest possible view of how the situation has evolved. Thus, after a rise in the dollar, and the already difficult economic situation, inflation was 3.2% for the month of November. The main increases were in health (+5.7%), alcohol and tobacco (+4.6%) and personal services (+4.4%). The food index was up by 3.4%. The total for 2018 was 48% inflation over the twelve months (Le Figaro, 2019) (Diamante, 2022) (USherbrooke, 2022)

At the societal level, poverty indices were also on the rise. Poverty affected 13.6 million Argentines, or 33.6% of the population. The index rose by some 5 points in 2018 alone, to around 2.179 million Argentines, the highest percentage since 2010, according to the press. Indigence had also increased from 5.6% to 6.1%, a total of 2.47 million Argentines. However, the most alarming figure was child poverty (under 17 years of age), which rose from 44% to 51.7%, an increase of around 1 million children, leaving 6.25 million children below the poverty line (USherbrooke, 2022) (Jueguen, 2022)

Despite this, popularity polls at the time showed the President, Mauricio Macri, strengthened. Indeed, his popularity rating had risen by 7 points in one month, due in particular to the successful outcome of the G20, bringing it to some 40%. The President's chances of re-election had therefore increased considerably, putting him in a good position to face his opponent Cristina Kirchner (Rivas Molina, 2022).

At that time, Cristina Kirchner was the only real opponent, at the head of the main Peronist party and the main opposition party, as she had not found another leader to carry this image. We also notice that movements such as the "Frente Renovador", claiming to be from the centre, have amplified their criticism of the government, while coming closer to the Peronist movement. The voting intentions are also telling, the President being closely followed by Cristina. It was during the PASOS, and following Macri's crushing defeat, that the observation was made. Indeed, the rout was such that many observers thought that the opposition would be just as divided as during Kirchner's mandate. Nevertheless, the former president managed to reach 40% in the general elections, despite a delicate situation, and impose his party-alliance (Juntos para el Cambio) as the biggest opposition to the new president since 2019. (Argentina.gob, 2022)

Nevertheless, it is particularly interesting to note the survival of the coalition, which could have simply disintegrated upon the news of the loss of PASO, but instead there was a real survival movement that developed within it and allowed it to perpetuate itself to become a symbol of opposition. This was despite the fact that the balance sheet of the parties forming the coalition was considered catastrophic. This is all the more true since Mauricio Macri's own party, PRO, has itself entered a phase of questioning its leader, in a movement typical of entrepreneurial parties, which we will define in the state of the art. This makes it all the more interesting to analyse the coalition in its transformation process, in order to determine why and how it has managed to maintain itself, and how the stakeholders within it perceive the future.

## Research question

"By what elements of internal political sociology can the perpetuation of a coalition after the defeat of its founder and leader be explained, and what analysis can be made? A study of the Argentine case of "Juntos por el Cambio" after the 2019 general elections".

## Hypothesis

As for the hypotheses, we can think of three main ones:

- Either the formation of the opposition can be explained by the charismatic character of the ex-president.
- Or the formation of the opposition can be explained by a rebellion/rejection of Peronism on the part of a large part of the Argentine political world.
- Or, finally, the formation of the opposition can be explained by an increasingly strong polarisation of the population.

## How the research was conducted

Let us now look at how we worked on our topic, as we have done a lexicometric analysis and interviews after doing a state of the art and describing our case study. However, before addressing it, it is necessary to justify the choice of focusing on media rather than political discourses for the lexicometric part. Two major arguments can be used in this sense:

- Firstly, we can assume that for the period under study and the desired topic, there is not enough material. Indeed, after extensive and thorough research, the question arose as to whether the material found would be sufficient for the production of a quality work;
- Secondly, following the same logic, Argentinean newspapers have been very prolific in their treatment of both partisan positions and speeches made. In this way, an analysis of media discourse would provide both an analysis of the overall political situation and a kind of initial analysis of the speeches made, which we will find in the texts we will study.

Having said this and argued the point, it should be remembered that, in addition to the lexicometric analysis, a qualitative analysis, via interviews conducted on the spot, will also be carried out and will make it possible to support the statements and still capture the feelings. In the end, we can reasonably hope that, thanks to the conjunction of the two analyses, the conclusions produced will be of as good a quality as was hoped for at the beginning of this work.

Therefore, we will first develop the theories around the subject, before developing the case study theoretically by articulating it with our state of the art. Once this has been done, we will dive into the analysis of the data based on our lexicometric collection and the interviews conducted. We will then summarise the main elements emerging from the analyses, before formally developing a response to our hypotheses in the conclusion.



## Methodology

### The performing of a lexicometric analysis

The analysis has been done in two stages; firstly, an analysis of the discourses around the readjustment of the party in question, and then through interviews with local elected representatives in order to grasp the deep meaning and the perception that they may have of the elements that we will have previously analysed via the discourse analysis. Indeed, as we have seen previously, the discourse and its formation have an important, if not essential, place in the way the coalition has defined itself and propelled its values. Not to do this type of analysis would therefore be highly detrimental to the articulation of a quality study on the subject we are dealing with.

First of all, it is essential to note that in the framework of a discourse analysis, it is indeed the capacity to put linguistics and social conflictuality into dialogue that interests us. Indeed, since metaphor allows us to construct and articulate language as a living thing, this means that the articulation of the link between discourse and society is central to our research (Husson A.-C., 2016). We will refer here to the definition of discourse as being a form of action; interactive; contextualised; taken over by a subject; governed by norms; caught up in an inter-discourse and having a socially constructed meaning. (Maingueneau D., 2014) Since this definition refers to discourse as a mirror of social constructions, which is what we wish to study, it reinforces our desire for a discursive approach to the subject.

In the course of our readings, we have been able to determine that the theoretical approach to discourse that is most appropriate for our research is that of Patrick Charaudeau, which focuses on "semio-communication", i.e. communication through signs and symbols, within media and political discourses. According to him, the creation of discourse is the product of two elements: the strategies of the subject of discourse and the constraints imposed in the creation of the latter. In this framework, as the strategies put in place are not the core of our analysis but rather the discourses as such, we will focus here on the constraints of creation in order to better grasp the societal issues (Angermuller J., Maingueneau D., Wodak R., 2014). All the constraints of political and media discourses inform us both on the position of the writer, his or her importance and the institutionalisation of the subject, this actually allows us to determine the different perceptions of actors according to their social provenance.

Moreover, as texts are produced to convey messages, ideas or beliefs, they will not only lead people to do certain things, but also to think or act in a certain way. Hence, newspapers, which are the product of a compilation of articles, are essential communication tools of discourse (Maingueneau D., 2014). This is why, since we are interested in the values and the imaginary conveyed by discourses, the analysis of texts produced by the written press appears to be the best avenue to explore. We will therefore pursue the theoretical deepening through the literature on media discourses (Bonnafeux S., Temmar M., 2007).

### The lexicometry

In the continuity of discourse theories, we had to make a choice in the way of carrying out the analysis, and this choice was made on lexicometry. This method, which we are going to apply with the help of the TXM software, is quite appropriate in our case for several reasons: first of all, the use of software is essential to process a corpus that is sufficiently significant to produce convincing results (Mayaffre D., 2005). Secondly, the digitisation of the documents used allows us to use the software in a relatively simple and quick way, speeding up the process (Mayaffre D., 2005). Finally, the lexicometric tool allows us to make comparisons and to go back and forth with our corpus, so that interesting information emerges very quickly from the processed corpus and allows a quantitative and qualitative analysis (Leimdorfer F., Salem A., 1995). All these elements justify the use of the tool, which is all the more relevant as we already have research leads, and we therefore know exactly what we are analysing for, making its quantitative processing all the more useful and relevant. (Leimdorfer F., Salem A., 1995)

In view of the theoretical elements provided, it seems clear that the methodology of data collection will have to follow two main axes: a lexicometric analysis for the quantitative side and the realisation of interviews for the qualitative side. This can be explained in several ways:

- First, after analysing the Juntos por el Cambio / Cambiemos movement and the way it communicated with its voters, we were able to highlight that social networks, but in general the relationship with the media, were central to the coalition's strategy. It is therefore necessary to analyse press articles to fully understand the movement and the way it seeks to distinguish itself and be perceived;
- Secondly, regarding qualitative data collection, it is clear that if we want to study the perception of the coalition, we must first and foremost look at the members and small hands. Indeed, in this way it will become clearer how the evolution of the party is perceived and how this evolution has been perceived (positively or negatively) by the voters - the militants and the local elected representatives being the closest to the field;

- Finally, in the continuity of the elements put forward above, we justify the relevance of carrying out a quantitative and a qualitative analysis jointly by the fact that a purely quantitative analysis would only provide us with internal elements of response, and that a purely qualitative analysis would only inform us on external perception.

Thus, for the various arguments cited above, we believe that proceeding in this way ensures a sufficiently high quality and relevance of the research to be able to draw conclusions and make observations in a properly argued and justified manner.

In the context of our lexicometric analysis, we will rely on the TXM software. Note that we have used the Alceste method to clean our corpus. This section aims to give a general presentation of the corpus and to explain the analyses we wish to carry out on it.

Thus, our spicilège is composed of 113 press articles from March 2018 to March 2022 from 41 different newspapers, the distribution of which can be found in annexe 8. However, three main newspapers form the bulk of our corpus: La Capital, Clarin and La Nacion. This is because Clarin is notoriously pro-Kirchnerist, La Nacion pro-Macrist and La Capital is in between. In doing so, the aim was to have a diversity of political representation in the main sample base. That said, in the interests of diversity in the analysis and of representing opinions as broadly as possible, we also selected articles from smaller, regional newspapers, as well as foreign newspapers, to provide an external view of the subject.

To return briefly to the temporal dispersion, we justify this by the fact that our 'pivotal' date is the Argentinean presidential elections, in October 2019. Therefore, we selected articles analysing the political period before, during and after this pivotal date. Also, if we went as far back as March 2022, it is because the last major elections (PASO 2021), which saw Juntos por el Cambio emerge as the winner, took place in November 2021.

In fine, the objective of our corpus is to allow a broad analysis over the duration of the evolution of Juntos por el Cambio / Cambiemos from the end of Mauricio Macri's mandate until the last major elections. All of this is treated in a fair and politically balanced way, both at the national and international level.

## The performing of interviews

For the interviews, we selected three types of stakeholders (the list can be found in Annex 6):

- Politicians of different levels (1);
- Activists (2);
- Researchers specialising in the subject (3).

(1) What we mean by politicians of different levels is politicians holding the same type of position but at different levels. Thus, we have among the speakers the presidents of municipalities, selected both from the 15 municipalities in the urban area of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA) and from the medium and small towns and villages in the province of Santa Fe, the second province that voted most heavily for Juntos por el Cambio. In the same vein, we also have speakers who have held or currently hold a position of representation in a parliament (i.e. deputies), both national and provincial.

(2) As for the activists, following the same logic as the politicians, they were selected both in the CABA area and in the province of Santa Fe.

(3) With regard to the specialist researchers, an interview with Dr Esteban Iglesias, director of the Comparative Politics Research Centre at the National University of Rosario and a CONISET researcher specialising in domestic politics, was planned prior to the trip, and exchanges with other members of the research centre were scheduled to compare the preliminary findings for the follow-up of the lexicometric analysis.

With this in mind, it should also be noted that the stakeholders selected from the province of Santa Fe all live within a reasonable perimeter around the city of Rosario, following the line between the cities of Rosario and Córdoba, as it is within this area that the most Juntos por el Cambio voters, or those who voted for Mauricio Macri in the 2019 elections, are concentrated.

It is understood that an interview guide was produced (which can be found in annexe 7) as part of this research. This interview guide is divided into three groups of questions: perception, feeling and management. This is justified by the fact that we are going to focus on defeat and repositioning, so we need to know how the defeat was perceived and felt in the first instance in order to better understand how it was managed and potentially transformed into a transformative opportunity. The questions were adapted according to whether the interviewee was a politician or an activist, but no specific questions were planned for the exchanges with the researchers and Dr Iglesias. We explain the non-planning of questions for the researchers in advance of the trip and the exchanges by the fact that our aim in this case is to confront the preliminary results and the content of the state of the art,

as well as to clarify our research. In doing so, we consider it a potential bias to prepare questions in advance that could lead to discussion and thus interfere with the desired exchange.

## Conclusion

In order to conclude this dissertation, it should be remembered that the main objective was to highlight the mechanisms that allow a political structure to endure over time, even after the defeat of the leader and during the transition from government to opposition. Within this framework, we studied the case of Juntos por el Cambio, formerly Cambiemos between 2015 and 2019, whose leader was Mauricio Macri, Argentine president from 2015 to 2019. Our case study focused on how the coalition saw itself being redefined after the 2019 PASOs and Mauricio Macri's defeat in the October 2019 general elections, so as to survive this defeat to become an opposition coalition and perennialise itself within it. Thus, the question that emerged for this research was:

"By what elements of internal political sociology can the perpetuation of a coalition after the defeat of its founder and leader be explained, and what analysis can be made? A study of the Argentine case of "Juntos por el Cambio" after the 2019 general elections".

To this question, we had therefore developed three hypotheses: either that the formation of the opposition can be explained by the charismatic character of the ex-president, or that the formation of the opposition can be explained by a rebellion/repulsion effect of Peronism on the part of a large part of the Argentine political world or, finally, that the formation of the opposition can be explained by an increasingly strong polarisation of the population.

In order to answer the research question and the different hypotheses, a strict methodology of both quantitative and qualitative data collection was followed. Indeed, on the quantitative side we conducted a lexicometric analysis of press articles surrounding the coalition before and after 2019 (113 articles were selected for this purpose), in order to determine and verify whether there was indeed a change in treatment, and what the main themes related to the coalition were before and after the key periods of 2019. On the qualitative side, we conducted a series of interviews (12) with politicians and activists, both local, provincial and national, and from the capital and the interior of the country, in order to analyse in more detail what enabled the change and how the perception of the coalition may have evolved over time. Thus, through these data collections our aim was to ascertain whether there had indeed been change within the coalition, and what the nature of that change was, as well as the dynamics around it. Let us now turn to the answer to our hypotheses.

Firstly, the assumption that the formation of the opposition is explained by the charismatic character of the ex-president is false. In fact, the coalition has tended to strengthen and forge its own identity

precisely because Mauricio Macri was no longer its leader, and the divisive figure he presents in the ranks of the opposition no longer existed. It should also be added that his distance from the coalition also allowed for an opening up of the competition for the leadership of the coalition, and thus a complete rebalancing of the coalition in terms of the different parties that make it up and the power relations between them.

Secondly, the hypothesis that the formation of the opposition is explained by a rebellion/repulsion of Peronism on the part of a large part of the Argentine political world is true. However, this hypothesis should be qualified by highlighting the difference between Peronism and Kirchnerism as explained in the theoretical part of this work. Indeed, the political elites of the capital and the interior were pushed by a common political enemy to ally themselves, but in the capital it was Peronism as a whole, while in the interior it was more Kirchnerism. The difference is essential, because the opposition to Peronism pushed the anti-Peronist parties to ally themselves in a much more advanced way than in the interior of the country, thus forming a kind of hard core coalition in the capital. In this way, Juntos por el Cambio is much stronger and more united in the capital than in the provinces, where the spirit of opposition to Kirchnerism is less prevalent.

Finally, the hypothesis according to which the formation of the opposition is explained by an increasingly strong polarisation of the population is nuanced. Indeed, as we pointed out in the response to the second hypothesis, it is above all an opposition to Peronism/Kirchnerism that is driving the coalition. That said, it is true that the coalition is increasingly perceived as the other side of political life, and has thus achieved a certain recognition by the population as representing anti-Peronism/Kirchnerism. In doing so, what also drives the strengthening of the coalition is not only an internal party movement and a common opposition, but also the fact that the coalition is perceived as a 'brand' and has almost become a must for any major election.

To these hypotheses, we can add some observations made. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the fringe of the coalition present in the capital is much more united and active than the others, and even has a much more bi-partisan vision of Argentinean politics. This makes it possible to understand how, in a country where political power dynamics have always been directed by the capital, it is possible for the coalition to maintain itself so strongly and even penetrate other levels of power and the unconsciousness of voters. Moreover, from the parties' point of view, this position of 'opposition brand' and 'vote bank' presents an exceptional opportunity for the coalition parties at the moment, because in view of the new balance each party has the possibility of imposing its solution at the head of the coalition for the next presidential elections and thus benefit from the vote opportunity that Juntos por el Cambio represents.

Finally, to the question "What elements of internal political sociology can explain the perpetuation of a coalition after the defeat of its founder and leader, and what analysis can be made of this?", we can answer that the perpetuation was achieved thanks to three important elements, all of which are intertwined:

- Firstly, the defeat of the leader in this case did not lead to the disintegration of the coalition because the fact that he distanced himself from the coalition allowed it to have its own identity and not to be identified with the leader's failures;
- Secondly, the fact that the natural leader of the coalition and the main party lost power, but also their central place in the decision-making processes of the coalition, allowed for the emergence of a competition between the parties and a balancing of the balance of power making it more frequent and sustainable in the long term;
- Finally, the fact that the coalition has taken on its own identity and opposed the new government as a bloc has made it all the more likely to be perceived as a viable alternative, and a kind of 'brand' in the eyes of the voters, making it more likely that the parties will keep the coalition alive to fight for the votes it can garner rather than disintegrate it and return to a state of plural competition.

As for the limitations that this work might suffer from, they are multiple. Firstly, in terms of the data for the analysis, there is always the possibility of adding more data and making an ever more detailed analysis. Secondly, with regard to the stakeholders, we only interviewed people in the capital and in the province of Santa Fe, so there is scope for interviewing other stakeholders in the other provinces, and thus multiplying the points of view. Finally, we could also have conducted a broader study, from 2015 to the present, mainly with regard to the lexicometric analysis and the selection of press articles.

In terms of future research, we propose two possibilities, always taking into account the limitations:

- Firstly, an analysis of the 'Frente Progresista' in the province of Santa Fe, a unique experience in Argentina of a coalition that governed the province for 12 years, should be carried out.
- Secondly, the same analysis should be made of the aftermath of the next elections in 2023, in order to determine whether there has been a positive evolution in the number of parties adhering to the coalition or whether the coalition's capacity to survive is in question.



# Bibliography

## Books and articles

- Angermuller J., Maingueneau D., Wodak R. (2014), *The Discourse Studies Reader. Main currents in theory and analysis*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Bonnafeux S., Temmar M. (2007), *Analyse du discours en sciences humaines et sociales*, Paris, Ophrys, Les Chemins du discours.
- Husson A.-C. (2016), « Dialogisme et conflictualités sociales dans les discipline du discours », *Études de communication*, 1(47), pp. 91-110.
- Leimdorfer F., Salem A. (1995), « Usages de la lexicométrie en analyse de discours », *Cahiers des Sciences Humaines*, (1)31, pp. 131-143.
- Maingueneau D. (2014), *Discours et analyse du discours*, Paris, Armand Colin.
- Mayaffre D. (2005), « De la lexicométrie à la logométrie », *Astrolabe*, pp. 1-11.

## Other sources

- Argentina.gob (2022), « Elecciones 2019 », consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/interior/dine/resultados-y-estadisticas/elecciones-2019>
- Banque Mondiale (2022), Argentina, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=AR>
- Diamante S. (2022), « La inflación en 2018 fue del 47,6%, la cifra más alta en los últimos 27 años », published the 15/01/2019, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/dolar/inflacion-diciembre-2018-indec-precios-nid2211091/>

- Jueguen F. (2022), « Pobreza: llegó al 32% y hay casi 2,7 millones de nuevos pobres », published the 29/03/2019, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/economia/pobreza-indec-2018-nid2233000/>
- Larousse (2022), « Argentine : activités économiques », consulté le 09/04/2022, [https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Argentine\\_activit%C3%A9s\\_%C3%A9conomiques/186994#:~:text=Les%20r%C3%A9serves%20de%20p%C3%A9trole%20et,%C3%89tats%20D'Unis%20et%20la%20Chine.](https://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Argentine_activit%C3%A9s_%C3%A9conomiques/186994#:~:text=Les%20r%C3%A9serves%20de%20p%C3%A9trole%20et,%C3%89tats%20D'Unis%20et%20la%20Chine.)
- Le Figaro (2019), « Argentine : le taux d'inflation en 2018 a atteint 47,6% », published the 15/01/2019, consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2019/01/15/97002-20190115FILWWW00368-argentine-le-taux-d-inflation-en-2018-a-atteint-476.php>
- Movistar (2022), « caso de éxito », consulté le 09/04/2022, <https://negociosdigitalesmovistar.com/caso-de-exito/mercado-libre-lidera-el-comercio-electronico-en-america-latina/#:~:text=Mercado%20Libre%20fue%20fundado%20en,poner%20en%20marcha%20la%20web>
- Rivas Molina F. (2022), « Queríamos el cambio que Macri proponía, no el que hizo », published the 10/09/2018, consulted the 09/04/2022, [https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/09/argentina/1536501249\\_312152.html](https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/09/argentina/1536501249_312152.html)
- USherbrooke (2022), « Perspective monde », consulted the 09/04/2022, <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?langue=fr&codePays=ARG&codeStat=FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG&codeTheme=2>