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THE MULTICHANNEL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY OF THE EU: THE R.I.C.S. FRAME. HOW THE EU HAS REACHED A DIPLOMATIC EFFICACY BASED ON THE EU GLOBAL CFSP STRATEGY OF 2016

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
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Figure 1 - Map of 1947 Europe

Europe Today

Figure 2 - Map of Today's Europe

INTRODUCTION

Today's international occurring have made me ponder about the international action of the EU and its efforts to influence and direct global affairs. Notwithstanding the economic and political side, the European Union is also involved in the protection of certain social rights, as well as cultural issues, which call upon the EU to enhance its international contribution to the development of a new global system.

Still, how is the EU trying to pursue this mega-objective and with which tools, are two major questions to be analysed. In fact, it is in my opinion that the channels, so to say the lines of action and communication, of the Union are determinant factors for this kind of analysis. Partly because channels are not only instrument per se but also addressee as well, and partly because it is a classic intuition that the more channels are *correctly* employed, the more possibility there exist for the Union to reach some degree of efficacy with respect to its priorities of foreign policy.

More specifically, the channels that I have decided to include in this analysis form what I have called the R.I.C.S. frame of understanding. The R.I.C.S. stands for: regions, institutions, corporations, and societies. These four channels are responsible to direct the messages, positions, policies and *political impetus* of the European Union worldwide. Whether this has been done, and will be, efficiently is a great interrogative. This thesis precisely relies on the willingness to settle this question up.

Still, in order for me to be able address such a complex issue, an innovative methodology is needed. My methodological intent is quite precise enough. First off, it is important to evaluate, under as many dimensions as possible (e.g., economic, socio-cultural, political, and legal) the context in which the analysis is done. In order to understand the grounds on which the feet of certain strategies, documents or statements live, it is important have a well-grasped contextualization of the past and the present history. This is what chapter I is entitled to run after.

In the second chapter, I will be looking at the normative form of understanding of the foreign policy of the Union. Via a (foreign) policy spectrum based on (i) directionality, (ii) channelity, and (iii) rationality, I have built a straightforward architecture of all kinds of policies pondered by the EU. Moreover, it is precisely here that lies the explanation of the R.I.C.S. The R.I.C.S. will serve as a filter especially in the third chapter.

In fact, chapter III will deal with the analysis of the strategic efficacy of the 2016 EU Global CFSP Strategy in relation to the R.I.C.S. filter. In this case, the R.I.C.S. is not just an explanatory instrument usable to understand the strategic application of EU foreign policy, rather it is used to value and place the external action of the Union and determine which condition(s) of efficacy could explain the failure or success of EU diplomacy. That is why, in

the case-study phase the R.I.C.S. is used as a filter, which will disentangle the single channels and features of each priority.

Still, where the R.I.C.S. filter does come from? Looking at the first chapter, in which a constitutional and historical development since the 50s up to the Lisbon times is given, it is possible to work out the different ways the Union has progressively adapted to its external affairs deploying and opening itself to new actors, as well as to new channels of action.

Foremost, in the first sub-chapter, from Rome to Maastricht treaty, there is little deepening by the Union in terms of foreign policy, and that is imaginable since the Rome Treaty was not pondered as to settle specific diplomatic issues, rather it was more about economics, trade and atomic power production. Then, it is serious enough to assume how the corporativist, and productive-private trading, channel was the predominant. Despite it was only an internal question, the Union (at the time the EEC) deployed this *leitmotif* also to its international relations, whereby economics is entitled.

However, with the advent of the Maastricht, the 'three-pillar Union' has developed a stronger position in terms of foreign policy and a wider outlook on diplomatic, security-related and defence issues which may influence, directly or indirectly, the security of the Union. Maybe due to the post-WWII international set-up, maybe due to the Cold-War blocs' diplomacy and dividend, or maybe to the vast international crisis in economic and military terms, e.g. in the Gulf, Africa or Middle East.

Still, the thinkers behind Maastricht had the idea of giving proper life to the CFSP pillar and create the figure of the HR/VP. This sensitive and quite delicate international condition pushed the Union to develop a stronger institutional channel of communication and action. Being represented, developing its own missions and diplomatic dialogues with third countries was essential to protect the Union's own foreign sovereignty against the too-broad influence of the US, and of NATO. The institutional channel was developed because of the need to respond to this international wider slump, and to indulge a *DeGaullean* aspiration of diplomatic detachment and foreign independence out of the allies.

The other two channels, namely the social and the regional, have developed along the Lisbon period. Still, the Amsterdam Treaty made a variety of references to the regional, or at least military regional, channel. However, the Lisbon treaty put into more explicit terms the importance of regionalism and its promotion worldwide as well as the involvement of the civil society. Since the 90s, it was the time of technological advancement and of a post-materialist socio-political progress. Therefore, the Union kept the chance to involve more its citizens, creating more legitimacy for its actions, internally and externally.

The R.I.C.S. filter is part of a wider methodology, which in this thesis will help me decode the reasons of efficacy, whether they exist, in relation to the five priorities of the 2016 Global Strategy for the Union's Common Foreign Security Policy. All these five priorities perfectly fit the R.I.C.S. The Union has not developed or thought of other channels and lines of action,

apart from those four. The Strategy, together with the Lisbon paradigm, follows the same objectives-setting thinking and agenda. Some light change in terminology and which measures to enact, but no substantial development in terms of which channel or agent to engage with.

Again, this thesis will flow a precise methodological design. As figured at the beginning of this introduction, after (i) having given a brief context of the constitutional and foreign politics of the Union, (ii) I will proceed by investigating and digging onto the different features of EU foreign actions (iii) in order to look at which forms of diplomacy the EU strategically sets and (iv) have a perspective on the possible future of EU diplomacy.

This pre-emptive analytical and theoretical work has created some diagrams and schematics, which depict and uproot the main features of EU diplomacy. I have, in fact, created a three-dimensional spectrum of EU foreign policy, based on the rationality (rational or identity-based), on the directionality (direct or indirect), and on the channelity (R.I.C.S.) of the policy. These three categories, or variables, constitute a well-thought spectrum, in which all EU foreign actions could be analysed also for future studies.

All this then ended with (v) the study of each priority one-by-one and of all the sub-priorities that each macro-priority contains, (vi) build a qualitative comparative analysis in which each macro-priority is scrutinized under the R.I.C.S., and after (vii) valuing the actual efficacy of each priority in relation to current affairs (viii) in order to finally get on which channel(s) may constitute the condition(s) of efficacy, or necessary condition, for EU diplomacy to work properly.

This is exactly the aim of the thesis. I want to answer a quite difficult, and of huge pertinence, question: if the EU does succeed in its foreign priorities and objectives, and above all, what determines this efficacy or contribute to the mis-working, or failure, of it. Efficacy in thesis is associated to channels, and their deployment. That is why channels, e.g. R.I.C.S., are the main evaluating tool used to determine the condition(s) of efficacy. Along the present work, it will be possible to find a lot of references to policy documents of the EU, foreign reviews, texts of authors dating back to the past century, and a plethora of scientific papers and contributions in terms of EU external action.

I hope my analysis may answer some unsettled questions and give some originality to the topic. This unique thematic required me to develop a unique methodology and filtrate a huge amount of literature and academic contributions. At the end, it may seem as I would have found a solution to EU (foreign) problems. Yet, my willingness is just to study, analyse and scientifically determine which causes and conditions may sway a correct foreign action, and permit the EU to adjust it.

CHAPTER I

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONTEXTUAL BASELINES

1.1 From Paris to Maastricht

What get into people's eyes when first looking at how the European Union (EU) has evolved since the beginning of its times is the strong integrative and transformative process that has occurred across -part of- the continent. But many people, a plethora, have somehow problems at identifying the correct historical development and collocation of events.

It is my very opinion that to better sight the correct development of EU politics, as the societal setting, it is crucial to look back at the founding treaties and constitutional happenings that have fertilized the European continent for the growing of the up-to-today biggest supranational organization of the planet.

The roots of the modern European Union are traced back after the Second World War. [1] From what today is recalled as the famous *plan* of the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman[2], what stands up is the willingness to constitutionally structure a European Union not more made on bits and pieces, but rather '*it will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.*'. Here it is the Shuman declaration, for when he -the Minister- revealed the plan underneath the first stamp of the European Union, that is to say the *European Community for Coal and Steel (ECSC)* that will be created with the Paris Treaty of 1951:[3]

"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point.

It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the

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[1] Jean Monnet: «Les nations souveraines du passé ne sont plus le cadre où peuvent se résoudre les problèmes du présent. Et la Communauté elle-même n'est qu'une étape vers les forms d'organisation du monde de demain», in «Mémoires», Fayard, Paris, 1976, p. 617.
[2] See the Declaration of Robert Schuman (Paris, 9 May 1950). A single version has been deposited in the official websites. Still, many versions, with some semantic variants, exist within books and magazines. However, the main significance seems to be well preserved and communicated.
[3] Schuman Declaration, website of the European Union, 3-5 paragraphs (emphasis added).

other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims."

Here above a peculiar passage of the declaration that perfectly frames the political plan underpinning the creation of the ECSC. In spite of the *large* ideological and political view envisaged by the Schuman plan, the Paris Treaty, with the creation of the ECSC, put the basis for the establishment of a new *supranational* idea of multistate governance[4]. The -for the time-peculiar structure of the ECSC with its supranational idea, comprised of a Commission, a Parliament, a Council, and a Court[5], was intended as to be exported within other fields. What began as to ease a Franco-German productive and economic partnership will soon become the beginning of a constitutional spin-off that would soon or later lead to a more and more -politically and constitutionally- integrated supranational Community.

Still, 'The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe'.[6] The second step would be that of enlarging this idea into new, wider, fields that would politically merge new states into a project of a new integration.[7]

The six founding member states, namely France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, have tried to expand this experience into the defence sector, with the *European Defence Community (EDC)*, after another declaration known as the *Pleven Plan,[8]* proclaimed by again a French Minister, René Pleven. However, a failure will attend the attempt of the founding countries. [9] The 1952 Paris Treaty, not to be confused with the 1951 treaty establishing the ECSC, proposed by the same six countries was discussing for an integration of defence force as to safeguard the Community's security.[10]

An anticipatory work of an ad hoc Parliament created by the Council of the ECSC as to facilitate and foster the works for the EDC proposed for the creation of an overall umbrella-institution, namely the *European Political Community*[11] that would include both the EDC and

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[4] For a good understanding of the interrelation between the process of integration and supranationalism of the EU see Garavini, G., 2012. After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South. Especially in relation to EU's foreign politics in the global South.

[5] Art. 7, Title II, The Institutions of the Community, Paris Treaty, 1951. With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 the name of the institution, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, did not change, and its power and dispositions were resigning within the first pillar. With the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the ones related to criminal law were transposed to the first pillar. The new name, the Court of Justice of the European Union, came with the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. In addition to the Court of Justice, a Court of First Instance (1951-2009) then the General Court (2009-ongoing) exists. Today the Court of Justice comprises one judge per each country and eleven advocates general, whilst the General Court is composed of two judges per country.

[6] See the Schuman Declaration, website of the European Union, mid of the paragraph #5.

[7] For a great account on the integration process over the century due to a Court-law approach, see (i) M. Huber, P., 2015. The Federal Constitutional Court and European Integration, and (ii) Mattli, A.-M. B. a. W., 1993. Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Integration.

[8] See the 'Pleven Plan'.

[9] On this a great account of the post-integration politics of the EU after the failure of the EDC, see The Treaty of Rome EEC and EURATOM, 1957, of Lucia V. Graziatti, 2017.

[10] Art. 2(2) of the EDC.

[11] The European Political Community, pdf version, CVCE.eu de l'Université du Luxembourg.

the ECSC. Still, the French Parliament was not inclined to ratify the second Paris Treaty of 1954, which in turn refused such an integrative solution proposed by the ECSC Council.

In spite of such a failure, that has had profound impacts against the famous Schuman project, a new form of *European* -constitutional- *Integration* had been though in light of returning back to the economic and productive logic. [12] That was the case for the creation of two parallel -to the ECSC- communitarian institutions: the *European Atomic Energy Community* (EAEC) and the *European Economic Community* (EEC). With the Rome Treaty of 1957, this new communities have been established. A particular attention must be devoted to the EEC, mostly for what concerns, also for the purpose of the present paper the historical development of EU diplomacy.

Even if the founding treaty of the EEC maintained a strict line in terms of economic and within-states commerce, it is possible to find within the document many references to a first form of foreign collaborative diplomacy, even if, for the purpose, in economic and trading propositions. Hence, a crucial objective of the EEC, as the treaty makes evidence of, is the 'maintenance of the internal and external financial stability of the member states'[13] not to be compromised by macroeconomic slumps and bad decisions. What very clearly can be understood by reading through the treaty is that some form of international cooperation in terms of foreign trade has been contemplated. Whether certain forms, or channels, have been preferable is not known, or previewed by the treaty. Logically, and for the time being, it would be likely for the member states of the EEC, as to respect the principles and objectives laid out by the treaty, to engage into international economic partnerships via governmental or corporative channels, not to take into accounts, for the moment, regions or societies.

Moreover, a new straightforward example in terms of common politics, and for the case of common economic diplomacy, is the preparatory and transitionary coordination of the economic relations of the member states with third countries as for to possibly implement a 'common policy in terms of foreign trade'.[14]

And, for finally capture the international and early diplomatic vein of the Community, the article 227(4) of the treaty was about to say that 'the provisions of this treaty shall apply to the European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible'[15]. Here a close link between diplomatic relations of the states and the economic and productive common position of the Community was established. A crucial foreign doctrine, a 227 Doctrine, that has adorned the foreign economic positions of the member states for the time. A crucial step for what would become the economic foreign outlook of the European Union.

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[12] A great hint on the process of integration, and the constant approach to integration by EU founding fathers, is the intergovernmental logic behind summits and conferences during the EEC period. See on this, The Role of Summitry in E.E.C. Decision-Making, A. Schlaim, 1972.
[13] Art. 6(2) of the EEC.
[14] Art. 111(1) of the EEC. Dispositions for the transitionary period.
[15] Art. 227(4) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.

However, the major important developments as to tighten the political bridges of the single states were not happening within the Community's institutions, as the EEC, but also outside. Four major developments are considered to have contributed to the constitutional passage from Rome to Maastricht. Still, for what concerns foreign policy determinants, two are of pivotal importance.

Many possibilities, during various summits, of cooperation were explored. In particular, with the Davignon Report, the possibility for the foundation of a 'European Political Cooperation'[16] especially within the foreign policy area was touched.[17] As figured out at the very beginning of the second part of the report, the objectives of the Davignon Report take a clear picture of the pivotal position of the realm of foreign affairs within the process of contextualization and integration of Europe, as it appears in the following:[18]

"Part Two

The Ministers propose that:

Being concerned to achieve progress towards political unification, the Governments should decide to cooperate in the field of foreign policy.

I. Objectives

This cooperation has two objectives:

(a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly;

(b) To increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable."

Here it is clear, as analytically seeing points *a)* and *b)* about the central position of foreign policy, as an early form of EU diplomacy,[19] within the process of harmonization, semantically proximate to the process of integration, of a futuristic version of a modern Union normative and institutional context.[20] What the European founding fathers have approached since the ECSC up to now. An instrument envisaged were the Ministerial meetings, which 'will meet at least once every six months, at the initiative of the President-in-office'.[21]

A second crucial exogenous -to the EEC- intergovernmental development for what concerns foreign policy and international affairs is the institutionalization of the European Council of Ministers. During the 1969 Hague Summit, which in itself represents another major out-of-

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[16] See the 'Davignon Report' (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970) pdf version, CVCE.eu de l'Université du Luxembourg.
[17] On the role of the EP in EPC foreign relations, see Challenging Intergovernmentalism and EPC. The European Parliament and Its Actions in International Relations, 1970-1979, U. Tulli, 2017.
[18] Davignon report, part two, objectives (emphasis added).
[19] See the website of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Diplomatic Service of the European Union, established by the Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010, on a proposal, number 8029/10, from the former High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (UK). The EEAS was inaugurated on 1 January 2011.
[20] A good reference to the process of diplomatic harmonization is Political economies of transnational fields: harmonization and differentiation in European diplomacy, M. Kuus, 2018.
[21] Davignon report, part two, Ministerial meetings.

the-Community development, Heads of State and Government were agreeing upon the importance of these summit meetings to jointly act and discuss and of the impulse such an institutional tool may give to the process of European integration. In the Final Communiqué of 1974 Paris Summit, the states were recognizing the following:[22]

"Recognizing the need for an overall approach to the internal problems involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe, the Heads of Government consider it essential to ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and in the work on political co-operation.

The Heads of Government have therefore decided to meet, accompanied by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, three times a year and, whenever necessary, in the Council of the Communities and in the context of political co-operation."

This represents a major attempt to harmonize a foreign, and diplomatic, approach as it figures when the document recognizes some importance with respect to 'external problems' to be commonly faced and approached.

Thanks to the proximity of the themes and topics covered within the various reports and summit meetings, an 'increasingly necessary rapidly to transform the European Community into a European Union of [the] federal type',[23] as pointed out by the European Parliament, was becoming more and more prominent.

The need for a European Union that would be in between of a monetary and political union, comprising all developments and common policy realms achieved until the period, was at stake. The European Council decided to parallelly institute two intergovernmental conferences, which in turn lead to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, namely the Treaty on the European Union, the (old) TEU. This treaty step, not only for transparent constitutional reasons but for political and institutional dynamics, represents a crucial passage in the development of the process of integration of Europe.

The main objective was to provide a common legal umbrella under which place a closer link between the Communities and the intergovernmental policies, namely Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Foreign and Security Policy (FSP) providing for a new organizational nature of the Union as follows:

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[22] Final communiqué of the meeting of heads of Government of the Community (Paris, 9 and 10 December 1974), paragraphs 2 and 3, pdf version, CVCE.eu de l'Université du Luxembourg.
[23] European Union Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 1990 on the intergovernmental conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for the European Union ([1990] OJ C 96/114), preamble B, French version, pdf version, CVCE.eu de l'Université du Luxembourg.

Figure 3 - Structure of the Maastricht Treaty

A temple structure. For in the first pillar to be present all the provisions on the existing European Communities, in the second pillar the CFSP, and in the third the JHA. Here what appears and firmly comes up is the importance recognized to the CFSP, for which a specific pillar has been devoted to.

Such a common policy realm, the CFSP, had specific objectives and reasons of life. From international cooperation, to safeguard the values of the Union, and from the Union's security up to peace and democracy promoting activities.[24] In fact, a very link seems to exist between the CFSP' and 2016 Strategy's objectives, which is the case study of the current thesis project. In fact, it must be said that the 2016 Strategy, even if it is a point of reference today, has been thought and written during an institutional thinking anthem of the Maastricht reform. This strongly supports the idea of an historical continuity between the contemporaneity and the past, especially when dealing with objectives and logics adherent to the European Union institutions and strategies. It is impossible, in fact, to analytically detach the legal and historical web from the strategic and empirical activity of the Union.

Along the document also some reference is made for what concerns the possibility for the Union to work and have a focus with respect to common positions within international organizations[25], and in particular to the United Nations. Here a new channel of foreign policy, with respect to the EEC, is established. A governmental and corporativist spirit of action was

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[24] Art. J.1(2) of the (old) Maastricht Treaty, 1992.
[25] Art. J.6 of the (old) Maastricht Treaty, 1992.

already proper of the EEC foreign action. Now, with the 1992 Treaty, the Union could count on another channel, namely the institutional one. The multichannelity of the Union diplomacy is enlarging.

From 1951 Paris Treaty, with the ECSC, up to the Maastricht (old) Union, it is clearly visible how the institutional structure and the diplomatic presence is evolving and occupying much more space. Up to now, three feasible channels of foreign action have been highlighted, in turn the intergovernmental, the corporativist and the institutional ones.

Still, as to have a complete picture of the evolution of the Union diplomatic experience and of the constitutional evolution of the legal roots of the Union, another important treaty development of the beginning the current century must be taken into consideration, in the next sub-chapter, after having looked at the historical overview of the EU diplomacy since the beginning the first half until the end of the second half of the XX century.

1.1.1 EC/EU Foreign Policy in between of 1951-1993

It has been crucial to study and witness the development of the constitutional provisions that have led the Union to have a peculiar behaviour on certain matters of foreign affairs, especially.

The period hereby intended to be contextualized, from the Paris to the Maastricht Treaty, then from July 1952 up to November 1993, is comprehensive of some major developments regarding the world history, in terms of politics, geoeconomics and social contingencies that have shaped the international order for decades[26].

Since the post WWII period, including the Union foreign role during the Cold War and the various US-Soviet nuclear and diplomatic crises, up to the fall of the Berlin Wall (11/9/1989) and of the USSR (12/8/1991). One may, in reality, argue that this is the most turbulent and full-of-anxieties period, in which Heads of State and Government were once for all protecting their states' security and integrity.

Still, due to the vastness of the happenings reverberant for the EU and world balance, it would be efficient to summarize and try to extract a perspective on the way the European Community has managed its foreign service institutions in the meanwhile of some of the crucial developments of the EU history. For this reason, three main moments will be taken into careful consideration: the Union's role during the post-WWII age, the developmental of the EU-

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[26] To take some account of the economic consequences see 'Keynesianism, Pennsylvania Avenue Style: Some Economic Consequences of the Employment Act of 1946' (J. Bradford De Long, 1996), for the political account see 'The Impacts of Post-WWII Migration to Britain: Policy Constraints, Political Opportunism and the Alteration of Representational Politics' (Anthony M. Messina, 2009), and for the societal see 'Governance as glue: Urban governance and social cohesion in post-WWII neighborhoods in the Netherlands' (K.K. Dekker, 2006).

transatlantic relations in light of the NATO formation and military policy, and the Maastricht CFSP in the early 1990s.

Since the WWII, the history and possible success of the project of a European integration, as that prefigured by Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, was misty and likely to encounter many obstacles for in its walk. Nonetheless, 'over the last half century, European integration has evolved from a primarily economic endeavour to one with a substantive political and foreign policy dimension'.[27]

In April 1948 the Marshall Plan[28] was undersigned. In April 1947 the US American Secretary of State, General George Marshall, was announcing in his speech at Harvard University a plan regarding some financial assistance to Europe after the war. It was about a (old) recovery plan.

The need for the Europeans to manage the amount of money received, 20 billion dollars, contributed, according to many, to the acceleration of the process of European integration. In this specific outlook, the plan set the bases for the political and psychological roots for the creation of the ECSC. It was the beginning of some form of solidarity that has brought the European powers, even the ones not so friends as Germany and Italy, to cooperate and recover the European economy.

It was an American attempt as to make the Europeans walk with their own legs and provide them with the necessary financial support to backward the communist and the soviet advance towards the Western European states. To provide the Europeans with the necessary capabilities as to counterforce the soviet Orientals, as it was for the incorporation and rearmament of Germany into the European defence framework. Of course, this contributed to the settlement of a European autonomous foreign, security and defence policy.

The European Defence Community's (EDC) attempt of creation, with the Pléven Plan, was a perfect example of the transatlantic pressures moving towards the formation of a common European army, of an American and intergovernmental stamp.

Still, there was a substantial abandonment, for what concerns military affairs, to the control of NATO. Despite the presence of the Western European Union (WEU), the very responsibility for military decisions was led to NATO as the WEU was 'recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters'.[29]

After the period of Paris and the ECSC, with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, two other supranational institutions were created: the EAEC and the EEC.[30] The EEC was created as to

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[27] See 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', Chapter II, publ. Palgrave Macmillan, ed. Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, 2008.
[28] See the Economic Recovery Act, known as the Marshall Plan, of 1948. The online transcript can be found in the US National Archives.
[29] See art. 4 of the Brussels Treaty on the Western European Union, Brussels, 1948.
[30] See the previous section as to remember what the acronyms stand for.

give a supranational tone to a common commercial and economic-bargaining power to the Community versus the external world.

By the beginning of the 1960s the EEC has engaged into the structuration of relations with African colonies; note the 1963 Yaoundé Treaty, before the Lomé Convention of 1975 and the 2000 Cotonou Agreements between the European Union and the Asia, Caribbean, and Pacific group of states (ACP). Another important example of the EEC foreign presence were the negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the GATT (ancestor of the World Trade Organization). In this context, it is possible to frame an institutional-priority foreign line of communication that the EEC was constantly implementing. It was the time, in fact, of when the EEC was becoming gradually a foreign policy actor of a certain magnitude.

This procedural form of organizing a private and stable diplomatic bridge between the United States and the European's external role in terms of defence and trade has contributed to the progressive shutdown of the diplomatic annoyances of the time between the West and the East. Still, the world has known a critic and sensitive period, post-WWII, long about half century in which two 'blocs' were recognizing in each other some hard hostility. In this, the EU was also present and had some play.

In this period, despite some fears and critics on the likely lack of some civilian support for common institutional-built foreign measures[31], the Union had some role in the shaping and well-functioning of the peace strategies that were at stake as to avoid the conflict. Since then, the EU has had a full interest into the non-collision of the two Western (USA) and Eastern (The Soviet Union) poles into open, or hidden, conflict.

It was, in fact, the willingness of the French Fifth Republic, under the leadership of the war-hero General Charles De Gaulle, to make the 'conflict', not be bipartite but, tripartite[32]. Charles De Gaulle's idea was about to foster European integration as to give to the Union a larger power of bargaining and greater independence of negotiating and having some weight on the West-East dispute. In particular, it was the will of developing, at the beginning of the 1960s, a French nuclear apparatus that had given the French, and the Europeans, the possibility of detaching from the American hegemony over the European affairs.

Not only De Gaulle, but also The German Chancellor Willy Brandt were seeing a Union third power in between the US and the USSR. The French for a stronger European Union's voice, the Germans for a unified Germany. But both were of the opinion for a less-infiltration of the American state into the decisions involving the future of the European security. More European integration, less American solidarity.

The Union remained for a peaceful settlement of the 'cold' issue. Hence, when the Reagan-Gorbachev arms control negotiations began, the European Union was welcoming the effort to

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[31] See European foreign policy since the Cold War: How ambitious, how inhibited? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, written by William Wallace, House of Lords, 2017.
[32] See Part II (3), Ian Jackson, The Cold War: The Western European Perspective, 47-67, of 'A Companion to Europe Since 1945', Ed. Klaus Larres, Wiley Blackwell.

put an end to the nuclear tensions.[33] No-one was inclined to get through a nuclear conflict. Were, in fact, the unification of Germany, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989, and the Gorbachev's geopolitical commitment to curb with the hostilities against the US that put an end to the Cold War.

At the end of this historical journey, it is possible to note the European role during the post-WWII period, in which the Community had to confront with the US' attempt to jeopardize Europe's voice and with the Cold War risk of being crashed in between the Western and the Soviet blocs. Not to mention its -of the Union- unilateral propensity to engage into foreign relations, be they economic or political, with other continents.

Apart of the Cold War, and the development of the EU-US relations in light of a transatlantic military and security cooperation policy, it is important to have a special, brief, look at the CFSP[34] realm and the geostrategic context, in which it developed in the early 1990s.

'The fall of the communist regimes in 1988-91, the reunification of Germany in 1990, military conflict in the Gulf following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the start of the Yugoslav crisis in 1991'[35] set the geostrategic conditions for the constitutional establishment[36] of a, stable, Common Foreign and Security Policy. In conjunction of a monetary community and supranational European Union, the CFSP was part of broader, integrative, and geopolitical scope.

Especially the Gulf War and the Yugoslav Crisis of 1990-1991 had created weighted problems of 'identity'[37] for the European Union. It was the occasion for the creation of a single external European, identitary, voice *à l'exterieur*. Was this identity-problem, exogenously, that had boosted the European Council Presidencies, *endogenously*, to adopt more conclusions in favour of more regional economic and strategic partnerships, as well as EU foreign policy positions.

The Barcelona Declaration at the first Euro-Mediterranean conference addressing for the first time social, human, cultural and common security questions with twelve MNCs[38] countries of the Southern Mediterranean, the 1977 tenth ASEAN meeting formalizing the EES-ASEAN informal relations with the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement of 1980 on commercial, economic and development cooperation[39], and, inter alia, the European Union's strategy towards Eastern Europe especially after the emergence of new Central-Eastern European countries with the early fall of the Berlin Wall of 1989 and the signing of the Minsk Agreements

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[33] Note the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis, or 1959 crisis due to the presence of US nuclear weapons in the Turkish soil.
[34] See the previous section for more notations on the creation and provisions' development regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, within the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In the next section, other details on the CFSP evolution.
[35] See 'The Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Illusive CFSP', Sub-chapter of the chapter 'European Integration and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview' of the book 'The Foreign Policy of the European Union', publ. Palgrave Macmillan, ed. Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, 2008.
[36] Art. J, Title V, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Treaty of Maastricht, 1992.
[37] See Art. 1(3), Part One, Substantive Amendments, Amsterdam Treaty, 1997. It will be retaken at the beginning of the next session.
[38] Final declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of November 1995. It was agreed between the EU and twelve Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs).
[39] See the Cooperation Agreement between Member Countries of ASEAN and European Community, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1980. Especially have a look at the preambles and at art. 1 regarding the most-favored-nation treatment provision.

in 1991[40], are all examples of the gradually increasing presence of the Union in the international scenario. It was the period of a tipping of a common perspective on regional and global affairs, with a day-on-day new CFSP with the development of new provisions out of the traditional approach, as it happened in terms of security after the military Yugoslav crisis.

To sum up, the EEC, and the EU, with its foreign actorness, has settled its opinion and views on the matters of the period after the WWII until the end of XX century, thanks, substantially, to the constitutional effort resulted into the giving of intergovernmental external powers to the Community in relations to foreign governments and, mostly industrial, corporations. The European Union has progressively augmented its foreign residence. Questions like identity, balance issues, security, and integration have been, certainly, the impetus for such changes and actions.

That is why in the section before a constitutional development has been proposed; as to give the legal ground of the foreign actions pursued by the EEC, and then EU, during for more than a half of the XX century.

1.2 From Maastricht to Lisbon

After having analysed the evolution of the legal roof[41] from the afterwar period up to the end of the XX century, it is crucial to reserve some room for discussion to the most recent Treaty Reform, which in turn contributed to the creation of the Union as we know it today. However, before passing to the 2007 Lisbon (Reform) Treaty, it is crucial to spend some words on the failure of the attempt of 2004 to create a single constitutional charter for the Union and even before to the minor, or maybe not, changes brought about by 1997 Amsterdam and 2001 Nice Treaty. Not much reference will be made related to the constitutional pure development and consequences of the texts. Rather, what matters in this context is the evolution of the *channelity*, within the treaties, of the Union's foreign competences.

After the Maastricht Union, a process of endless amendments-creation has coloured the constitutional development of the Union's charters during the end of the XX century. In particular, the question of the enlargement and of the democratic transparency were pressing on the Institutions to make changes. How was it possible to manage and organize -with twice of the members as prior to the Soviet enlargement- a huge, differentiated states' club? And how about more transparent and democratic governance? The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and the 2001 Treaty of Nice respond to these issues, respectively for the first and for the second.

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[40] See the European Union after Minsk and Maastricht, Nicole Gnesotto, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992.
[41] European Union Law, first chapter, second edition with Brexit Coverage, Robert Schutze, Cambridge Press.

For the diplomatic aspect of the Amsterdam text, it is useful to focus on the provisions and dispositions dealing with the development of the foreign policy area. First, within the substantive amendments[42] of the very beginning of the Treaty it reads as follows[43]:

"3. The existing ninth and tenth recitals [of the old Maastricht Treaty] shall be replaced by the following:

'RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence in accordance with the provisions of Article J.7, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world,

[...]"

Then, it is quite straightforward the willingness of the Union, and of the contracting parties, to build a CFSP -comprehensive of the common defence matter. Still, this time it is possible to read reference to a form of European 'identity' and of peace, security, and progress promoting-activities. A quite interesting novelty for the semantic expression of the charters have been analysed so far. Via a joint[44] approach of Communitarian action, 'the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy'.[45]

In the charter new objectives seem to figure out in terms of freedom, justice, and human rights[46] both within the internal and the external. In fact, in the flowing of the text it can be noted the adoption of a channel already consolidated with the Maastricht Treaty but with more specific references, which is the institutional one.

In fact, the Amsterdam put much more attention on crucial military or international entities: the Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Two different and well precise, and rooted in the future, plans about the relationship between the Union and these two crucial international counterparts are seen in an article of the treaty[47]:

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[42] See Art. 1, Part One, Substantive Amendments, Amsterdam Treaty, 1997.
[43] See Art. 1(3), Part One, Substantive Amendments, Amsterdam Treaty, 1997.
[44] Art. J.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997. Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
[45] Art J.1(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997. Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, the figure of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was created. Another major change proposed by the text was the split of the Maastricht pillars, of the third especially. All the provisions dealing with non-criminal matters were transported into the first pillar as forms of general provisions to be communally perceived, under a supranational conception. Asylum and immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters were inserted into the first pillar. The third pillar was about just judicial cooperation within the criminal field. Hence, it was called as the pillar of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters (PJCC).
[46] See the Part One, art. J.1(1) and K.1 and K.12(1b), Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997. Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters.
[47] Art. J.7(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997. Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

"The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework."

The WEU is an 'integral part of the development of the Union' and could glimmer a possibility for which 'the Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union'. In addition, for what concerns the matter of common defence, a specific reference is made in terms of compatibility to the NATO provisions. Then, to sum up, closer relations with the WEU and common defence compatibility 'clause' with the NATO defence requirements. A specific willingness to adapt the Union legal roof to an already established international legal order and a military regional context that has been evolving since the end of the Second World War.

In fact, with the Amsterdam Treaty it seems that a new approach of European integration is emerging. Not only a Europe willing to integrate itself in within, but a Europe to integrate this Communitarian project also in within the rest of the world's organizations and legal order. As it reads within the NATO Madrid Declaration of July 1997:[48]

"A new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this process."

Apart, then, of the importance that the Treaty of Amsterdam has represented for the balance of the 'regional and sub-regional cooperation'[49] in the economic and political fields and for the international 'new' image of the Union, in terms of alliance and of military capacities,

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[48] Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation (Madrid, 8 July 1997). Issued by the Heads of State and Government. Press Release M-1 (97)81.
[49] The European Union, Enlargement and Regional Cooperation, of Fraser Cameron. NATO Economic Colloquium, 1997. Conclusions, DG1A European Commission.

still an institutional comprehensive review of the Union's institutions was asked by the electorate and the European people.

In fact, in spite of missing an open referral to any regionalism or regional cooperation, the Amsterdam Treaty has given a major impulse to the institutionalization of bi-regional, or multiregional, relations between the Community and the rest[50]. The term, regional, and the formalization of the multiregional cooperation will be used and written in the Lisbon Treaty.

Here the Nice Treaty of 2001 has tried to give a response to this second major constitutional question of the post-Maastricht period,[51] namely the call for more transparent and democratic institutions. Still, not just for the unfruitful attempt made, but also for the peculiarity of the historical developments of interest for the present thesis, I prefer to leave to the reader the opportunity to personally be informed and have an outlook on the matter.[52]

The still-now heartfeltly failure of the 2004 constitutional attempt, as it has been the one of the European Political Community of the mid-fifties, has provoked deep concerns within the Community. This failure still will boost the European Bureaucracy up to a new Reform Treaty, known as the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. In 2004 there was the idea of creating a single constitutional personality unifying all provisions in a single codified bucket. However, as some of the legal procedures require, in some countries national referenda for the ratification were needed. Those referenda were rejecting the constitutional project in France and Netherlands, making it undoable.

Still, three years after in Lisbon the quasi-totality of the substance and provisions of the 2004 Community Constitution were maintained in a reforming treaty. The Lisbon (Reform) Treaty has been maintained.

The 2007 Reform Treaty, renamed as the 'Lisbon Treaty', entered into force in December 2009. The idea behind this amendment, as written above, was to resurrect the *substance* of the unratified Constitutional Treaty of 2004. Contrary to previous amendment techniques, the Lisbon Reform was thought to create two separated but unified texts that would both deal and entail the European Union. It was previously, in fact, that there were Community treaties and Union treaties, now it is the time for it to be subverted. Here it is schematically presented the (new) Union constitutional settlement, according to the 2004 Reform Treaty:

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[50] See art. J.8 on Provision on a Common Foreign Security and Foreign Policy, Amsterdam Treaty, 1997. Especially, reading art. J.14 it reads as follows: 'when it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organizations [...] the Council, acting unanimously, may authorize the Presidency, [...], to open negotiations to that effect'. This alludes to a Community internationally present, which must, of course, deal with regional realities.
[51] See the beginning of the present chapter, second paragraph, for a thematic refresh.
[52] Sugg.: see the full Treaty of Nice, 2001.

European Union	
EU Treaty	*FEU Treaty*
Title I - Common Provisions	Part I - Principles
Title II - Democratic Principles	Part II - Citizenship (Non-discrimination)
Title III - Institutions	Part III - Union (internal) policies
Title IV - Enhanced Cooperation	Part IV - Overseas Associations
Title V - External Action, and CFSP	Part V - External Action
Title VI - Final Provisions	Part VI - Institutions and Finances
	Part VII - General & Final Provisions

Charted of Fundamental Rights
37 Protocols
65 Declarations

Two treaties: The Treaty on the European Union, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union[53]. One more on the general understanding and guiding principles of the Union, the second more detailed with specific provisions on the 'functioning' of the European machinery.

Specifically looking at the development of the Union diplomatic approach, contained in the constitutional texts, the Lisbon Treaty also presents many new interesting points of reflection to be looked. In particular, it is preferable, after having resumed the legal change of the constitutional asset of the Union, to concentrate on the channels mentioned throughout the document. On the Chapter 1, for what concerns the Union External Action, of the text it read as follows[54]:

"The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional, or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations."

A new approach to make diplomacy here figures, the regional referral of action. The Union, as witnessed by the NATO reports on the regional cooperative efforts of the Union, is contemplating the possibility to understand a new form of External Action which includes the possibility to *diplomatically* discuss with regional and global actornesss.

Moreover, as for to finally conclude with the *channelity* of the EU diplomatic forms of actions, some space is reserved in this context for the civil society and for a more public form of diplomatic expression. In Title II of the document, on democratic principles, it appears the

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[53] Preamble 1(b)(b) of the art. 1 of the Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Reform Treaty, Lisbon, 2007.
[54] Art. 10A(1), Chapter I, General Provisions on the Union's External Action, Lisbon Treaty, 2007.

will of the Union to 'maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society'.[55]

In addition, to the possibility to have a dialogic relation between the society and Union's institutions in a top-down logic, there is an institutional mechanism that would ensure a bottom-up communication. Another provision within the Title III of the amendment provisions explicates that 'in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible'.[56] In this case there is the need to promote some form of participation of the civil society, a first approach to a bottom-up via of institutional communication.

It may be possible to argue in favor of a first sight of public diplomacy as the Lisbon Treaty is referring much on the quality of a good -judged and participated by its citizens- Union governance. In the public framework previously identified, a new form of institutional referral as to include the societal into the institutional is needed, that is why it could be possible to refer to the Lisbon Treaty as the constitutional basis-setting for the early forms of public diplomacy of the Union.

1.2.1 EU Foreign Policy in between of 1993-2007

As it has been analysed, the Amsterdam and the Lisbon treaties have given more room for an autonomous spin-off of the external powers of the Union. They, these two major constitutional alterations of the old (Maastricht) Union, have qualitatively allowed for more manoeuvre of action for the Union, in terms of external competences.

The two strongest innovative creations of the 1997 Treaty, the figure of the High Representative and the common system of foreign action, have given 'a face' and tool to compensate the difficulties of reaching a synthesis from within-member-states incompatible negotiating dispositions. In addition to the two, another major policy area was covered by the treaty which was previously not exposed to a supranational infection, that is to say the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)[57], and policy (ESDP). More military power, and less civilian power.

Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty has reinforced the relations of the Union with the WEU. The operational capabilities of the WEU were included in within the European apparatus. It was the moment of integrating the Union into the external circle of relations and games.

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[55] Point 12, Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 8B(2), Title II, Provisions and Democratic Principles, Reform Treaty, Lisbon, 2007.
[56] Point 28(a)(1), Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Title III, Provisions Having General Application, Reform Treaty, Lisbon, 2007.
[57] See the Declaration of Western European Union on the Role of Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, Introduction (1), Amsterdam Treaty, 1997.

All this constitutional change, despite some critics argue it to be 'minor', has, in my view, contributed to the substance of the 1998 Franco-British Saint Malo declaration between Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair[58]. The caption of declaration was reading as follows: 'the Heads of State or Government of the United Kingdom and France agree on the need to give the European Union (EU) the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises when the Atlantic Alliance is not involved'. It was a De-Gaulle's style of conducting the foreign policy, and a major development in the independence of the Europeans on regional, and international, affairs.

Actually, the EDSP moved the CFSP into an empirical action-driven force, instead of a merely declaratory and representative diplomatic tool. The European Union was autonomous at concluding its agreements[59], and at initiating peace-keeping operations with its own operational capabilities, and the ones of the WEU.

As for the matter of clearing, the Community relations with Latin and Southern America with the first bi-regional conference in 1999, and the Interregional Framework of Agreement with Mercosur monitor the new autonomy of conducting its own international relations, in accordance with the Union's schemes and interests. Compared to the external experiences the Union has processed in between of the years of 1951-1993, the events and declarations, as well as the agreements, now are turning into more empiricism-driven and security cooperative terms, which is somehow allowed by the constitution of the Amsterdam text and by the following of the events in the Middle East and Asia, as well as in Easter Europe.

Properly with the exportation of the new forms of terrorism from the of Iraqi, Iranian, and Afghanistan regions and the attacks happened at the heart of the some of the most sensible-to-CFSP capitals of Europe, in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), a new security agenda of internal protection and foreign strategy was being settled.

The shocks of the 9/11 US terrorist attacks, the Madrid and London attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 made available to the European public two new forms of terrorism: the religious-inspired, and the economic-history revanchist one. In addition, as any negative commonly perceived risk, has consolidated and fostered in some way the process of European, and foreign policy, integration[60].

It is crucial, in this historical moment, for the EU to present a new priority-based strategy, which becomes the 2016 European Global Strategy[61]. As J. Solana put himself, 'for the first time, the EU agreed on a joint threat assessment and set clear objectives for advancing its

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[58] See the Franco–British St. Malo Declaration, December 1998 between the Heads of State or Government of the United Kingdom and France.

[59] The Amsterdam Treaty is a major proof of the willingness of the Union to have more independence in the decision-making, especially for what concern the European and foreign affairs. In fact, before the 1997 Treaty, the provisions dealing with international agreements, within other Treaties, were about commercial, monetary, or technological ratio. With the 1997 Treaty, in art. J.14 e.g., the title V (Provision on a Common Foreign and Security Policy), there is the necessity to conclude international agreements not for economic purposes, but 'in implementation of this title', which speaks of values, and pure political principles.

[60] See European Integration: A Political History, Mark Gilbert, pub. By Rowman & Littlefield, first edition, 2005.

[61] See 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe'. A Global Strategy for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy, HR/VP Federica Mogherini.

security interests, based on our core values'. For 'a secure Europe', the strategy presents five main priorities: security of our Union, state and societal resilience in our East and South, an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the XXI century. More space will be reserved for the discussion of the Strategy and its implication to the EU diplomacy in the next sections.

Not only, after all, the European's trying to reinforce its military capabilities and assure more security are to be considered the major inputs for the integration project. It was, in fact, the period of the EU-China growing trade interchanges that have led to year-by-year EU-China summits for the regulation of massive commercial platforms. Moreover, in addition to the economic and commercial relations cultivated over the years of the previous EU foreign policy history section, the issue of migration has led the EU to develop free areas of trade and specific migratory international agreements. Then, also matters as economic cooperation and migration were pressing for more supranational coordination.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 has planted the seeds of new channels for the EU diplomacy: the regional and the civic, or *public*, channel. The civilian discourse, in reality, is already present in all the treaties since 1957. However, with the 2007 reform treaty, the role of the civic gets a new shape. More representation, communication, and involvement of the civilians, as discussed in the constitutional historical overview above.

With the birth of the European External Action Service (EASS) in 2011[62], it was the beginning for a more public division that would account the EU institutional to the public, via a multichannel strategy. It was, in fact, in 2010 with a Greek-sponsored white paper[63] on the enhancement of the EU's Public Diplomacy that the concept of Public Diplomacy became more contextualized and adorned with proper tools and monetary support.

Still, the issue of the public arose interest within the EU institutions much before the white paper of 2010. Into most of the political reports, as the 1970 Davingon Report, the Document on European Identity of 1973, the 1978 Klepsch Report, the 1980 Davignon-Greenwood Report, and the 1981 Delligent Report, various joint declarations of the EPC from the 1980s, as well as in the Maastricht treaty, the question of the enhancement of the 'EU visibility'[64] has held a special place. The historical happenings, from the Saint-Malo declaration to the reports analysed in the previous section, have set the political basis for the need of a Union more present on the (early) mediatic and public sphere.

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[62] See the website of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Diplomatic Service of the European Union, established by the Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010, on a proposal, number 8029/10, from the former High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (UK). The EEAS was inaugurated on 1 January 2011.
[63] European Commission white papers are documents that contain proposals for the Union's actions in specific realms.
[64] See The Concept of the EU Monitoring Missions, Political and Security Comitte, 2003.

Another major question is whether the intergovernmental character in the CFSP, or of the EPC, has hampered somehow the communicative efficiency of the Union in matters of diplomatic interests[65], but it is not the topic of interest of the present study.

As it has been carefully analysed in the section above[66], a second major innovative instance in the Lisbon Reform has been the regional channel of foreign policy[67]. Since the time, the regional diplomatic speak is institutionalized. Specific areas of action, as the environmental[68] or the humanitarian aid[69], are correlated with special requirements for the instalment of partnership relations with other regions of the globe[70].

It has been demonstrated the long-standing history of the EU relations with the Asia, Pacific and Caribbean countries (APC), as with parts of the Asian continent. Then, many other examples could be brought up to the surface to froze this will of 'regional'. The very European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) born well before the XXI century and the enlargement towards the East, the joint Africa-EU strategy of 2007 with various ministerial meetings and summits over the years, the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration on the EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership for then the EU to become a member of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 2012, and the EU-Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC) relations since the 2012 first 'region-to-region' agreement signed by the Union. And not for to mention the cooperative efforts with the Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), the Caribbean forum (CARIFORUM), the Pacific Alliance and others.

Looking carefully at the temporal evolution of events, the period of declarations and 'invitations' to act was initially prevailing. Then, with the reforming acts (be they of Maastricht, Amsterdam, or Lisbon, or even before), the EU gained more space into the institutional machineries of the regional organizations of most prestige.

The foreign doctrine of the Union has passed from a declaratory to a factual power over the decades. Precise historical and geopolitical dynamics pushed for constitutional changes (especially in 1993, 1997, and 2007) that have changed the external perspective of the Union.

It seems that the constitutional snapshots, since after Rome, have been used to formally codify frameworks and channels of action that, far before of the treaties, were contemplated

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[65] To take a brief account on the topic, see 'The Evolution of the EU's Public Diplomacy Tools: From Joint Declarations to Master Messages to Social Media', Stephanie Anderson (University of Wyoming) and Lucus Hansen (University of Wyoming), 2019.

[66] See the section 1.2, From Maastricht to Lisbon, for more accounts of dispositions and the constitutional evolution of the regional instance.

[67] Art. 10A(1), Chapter I, General Provisions on the Union's External Action, Lisbon Treaty, 2007.

[68] See Chapter V, B. Specific Amendments, Environment (Climate Change), point number 143, amendment of the article 174 of the Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, 2007. See also, for a more integration-sensitive issuing, Kulovesi, K., Morgera, E. & Muñoz, M., 2011. Environmental integration and multi-faceted international dimensions of EU law: Unpacking the EU's 2009 climate and energy package.

[69] See Chapter V, B. Specific Amendments, Humanitarian Aid, point number 168, amendment of the article 188J of the Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, 2007. Even if the humanitarian aid provides a pure international cooperative approach, the Union has developed this provision with regional, wider, subjective dimensions.

[70] Art. 10A(1), Chapter I, General Provisions on the Union's External Action, Lisbon Treaty, 2007. The second provision of the first comma reads as follows: 'the Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph'. There is a single regional criterion: to share the same constitutional principles of the Union at the time of signing.

onto the foreign doctrines of the Union. From the monetary and economic lines, with Rome's, and the public need, with the Maastricht's, to the regional and social channels, with the Lisbon's.

1.3 On the main concepts

This section is devoted to make specific reference to the contents and terminology of the thesis. It is crucial, in fact, to give some perspective on the development and significance of the most important and strategic, so to speak, lexical contained within this study. In addition, a literature trip will be entertained as to understand the scientific evolution of the topic(s) into investigation.

An organized list will provide the informative content necessary to place the concepts into the mind of the reader and well capture the rationale of the work and its empirical conclusions. As it may be easily perceived, by reading the title, among the most important terms the follows are figuring:

a. *EU diplomacy*: with the term EU diplomacy is, clearly, intended the external, international, service, power, and institutional representation of the European Union. As it may be falsely intended, the diplomacy of the Union does not include only the pure political dimension, rather it develops into the economic, cultural and the social. Many documents and declarations, as seen in the previous overview sections[71], have been redacted since the end of the second World War. The diplomatic evolution of the Union is of utmost importance, not only for a single national outlook, but, for most, to acknowledge the international positions and the economic and socio-political consequences that has been having the EU diplomacy for us all, be us Europeans or not. The diplomatic service, since 2001 been called the European External Action Service (EEAS), has specific temporal and historical collocations. As the website reads, 'Since 2011, the EEAS carries out the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy to promote peace, prosperity, security, and the interests of Europeans across the globe'[72]. Here it is a conceptual scheme of the external action of the European Union, according to the latest constitutional reform of 2007:

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[71] See sections 1.1 and 1.2 of the present study to have an account for it.
[72] See the EEAS website, About the European Exterznal Action Service, start caption.

Figure 2 - External Action of the Union, acc. to the Lisbon Reform of 2007 ('09)

Here there are two major circles, an 'internal' -to the EU- and an 'external' -to the EU- one. The internal groups all the foreign competences of the Union inscribed into the treaties and constitutional declarations. To the contrary, the one outside, still colliding in one point, is the set of the foreign strategic partners of the Union. There it figures the WTO[73], NATO and the UN, but many others are in relation with the EU. As it appears above, the diplomacy of the Union develops into a vastity of areas, not only foreign politics, trade or humanitarian and development aid[74].

b. *Foreign policy of the EU*: The set of practical activities, objectives, and directions, according to proper supranational mechanisms of decision-making of the Union, that proves the international action of the EU is called foreign policy[75]. Since the 1992 Maastricht amendments the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been established. Hence, the CFSP represents a specific part of the external competence of the Union, which it may be regarded as the most influential and, together with the Common Foreign Defence Policy (CFDP)[76], the most practical to me. Much space of the

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[73] On the WTO-EU relationship, especially in legal terms, it exists a quite extensive literature. Still, for the sake of the present work, in which foreign representation and EU action matter the most, a good paper on how the EU dealt with the accession to the WTO is Pescatore, P., 1999. Opinion 1/94 on "Conclusion" of the WTO Agreement: Is there an Escape from a Programmed Disaster?.

[74] For more details on the provisions dealing with the external competences of the Union, see Part V and Title V of, respectively, the TEU and TFEU.

[75] A great landmark in terms of theoretical and normative perspectives on the foreign policy of the Union is The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy, Volume I-II, ed. by Knud E. Jorgensen, Asne K. Aarstad, Edith Drieskens, Katie Laatikainen and ben Tonra, with a plethora of international academic contributions, 2015. This book will be referenced along the normative part of the present work.

[76] On to take a great account for the history and functionality of the CFSP and CFDP see *M. Merlingen* (EU Security Policy: What It Is, How It Works, Why It Matters, Boulder and Lynne Rienner, 2012) and *Michael E. Smith* (Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy: Capacity-Building, Experiential Learning and Institutional Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017).

study is devoted to explaining the constitutional and political significance of the CFSP. Still, the foreign policy of the Union gets many forms. Economic, cultural, political, and sometimes also ideological objectives adorn the external action of the Union. In art. 21 of the TEU, it is possible to read a set of general objectives and principles guiding the Union's foreign policy, and in particular its CFSP and CFDP. In the foreign realm, the treaties do not give specific policy fields, powers, and goals as it is for the internal system. By contrast, it gives some general directions, which of course depends on other international players, such as supporting democracy and preserving peace, or fostering sustainable economic, social, and environmental development and promoting effective multilateralism[77].

c. *R.I.C.S.*: Regions, institutions, corporations, and societies. These four terms identify four channels of action that the European Union, for certain, has encountered along its foreign policy history. Each of the four letters identifies a single channel. For the sake of completeness, by channel it is meant the structural, and in some cases the geographical, communicative line of action, in which the institution, as the EU, provides for some -in this case external- engagement. Channels could be diplomatic, cultural, or entrepreneurial and identify the final subject of the connection. What matters is that they identify some corridors of established communication, like points of contact.

d. *Diplomatic efficacy*: has the EU, in light of its strategies, plans of actions and funded services reached the objectives set throughout the Union's diplomatic planning? The concept 'diplomatic efficacy' responds to this question. Efficacy versus efficiency. Here does not matter the quantity of money or of forces employed to reach out the aims, rather whether the prefixed foreign objectives have been accomplished[78]. Another crucial point is whether, to the external world, the EU is seen as a power, in the military and diplomatic sense. Whether the EU's international opinions somehow matter and are taken into consideration by other international actors. The present work tries to root the causes of the international success and efficacy of the Union out.

e. *Multichannelism*: the employment of more than one channel of action to increase the probability of success of the goals and ends wanted by the Union, is a called

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[77] Art. 21 TEU. The listed directions are in para. 2.
[78] For to understand whether the EU has in some sort reached its goals, along various areas, see the various released reports, like the general report on the activities of the European Union of 2021, the summaries of EU legislations on development and cooperation, or the foreign affairs and security policy overview. These documents, available per topic, can be found in the official website of the European Union, key European Union achievements and tangible benefits.

multichannel strategy. Contrary to the *multidimensionalism*[79], I am not commenting the efficacy of employing many dimensions, as cultural and economic or hybrid, for predetermined goals. A multichannel approach may be applied to specific single objectives, as public presence, or cultural imposition strategies. Hence, the functional analysis of the application of more channels with respect to the 2016 global strategy by the European Union is the object of this academic work. Certainly, it can be said that the more channels are used, the more likelihood of success it manifest. Still, it must be ascertained whether some channels are preferable compared to others, or whether, contrarily, some channels could be considered strategically useless.

1.4 Why European diplomacy and 'multichannelism'?

The previous sections have served not only to give a constitutional and historical perspective on the external relations of the European Union, but also for to understand how interesting and interwoven the foreign history of the Union is and how many open questions does the process of European integration[80] leaves without any answer. The progressive integration approach, in legal as political terms, could well be defined using the following scheme:

Period	Fact	Consequences	
1948 ('48)	Treaty of Brussels	West European Alliance	I
1951 ('52)	Treaty of Paris	ECSC	N
1957 ('58)	Treaty of Rome	EURATOM (1st), EEC (2nd)	T
1986 ('87)	Single European Act	Amendments to EEC and EPC	E
1989-1991	Fall of Berlin Wall – decline of USSR	A 'blocked' Union, and conditions for CFSP	G
1992 ('93)	Treaty of Maastricht	Three-Pillars Union, CFSP, HR/VP	R
1997 ('99)	Treaty of Amsterdam	CFSP, CFDP	A
2001 ('03)	Treaty of Nice	Procedural changes	T
2003	EU Security Strategy	Three security aims	I
2004	Constitutional Attempt	Single fundamental text failed	O
2007 ('09)	Treaty of Lisbon	TEU-TFEU Union	N
2016	EU CFSP Global Strategy	Five CFSP priorities	
2021	EU Global Gateway	€300 mld. global initiative	
02/24/2022	Russia-Ukraine war	West-East opposition	

Figure 4 - Legal/Political History of the EU

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[79] See European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality? by Dieter Mahncke, P.I.E., Peter Lang, 2004. This book reveals the obstacles and the multidimensional nature of the implementation of the EU foreign policy. Focus on Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East.
[80] See The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945, by Derek W. Urwin, University of California, Longman, 1991.

I have given a brief treaty and external powers historical overview because, to me, it is crucial to have well kept in mind the development of the legal background and empirical flows of events in order to correctly comprehend the current foreign doctrines and policy-decisions of the EU.

Therefore, the complexity of the history and 'constitution' of the Union leaves a first-order question open: does all this work? By this I mean whether this constitutional-adaptative effort to change the legal umbrella of the Union according to the instances and geostrategic conditions that were pressing at the European Union has effectively better-placed the international position of the EU. Despite the Olympian question, I am careful at not touching a too broad argument which could leave space to emptiness and too much subjectivity.

The diplomacy of states has always been an interesting concept and study argument, which has redounded inside the heads of all Europe's leaders since the dawn of this continent. The diplomatic character has been a defining tract of a State and has determined, more than other forms of politics, the futures of many nations and continents. Also, the future we live.

Family-conduced villages, city-states, emperors, Popes, and kings: all had their own ambassadors or messengers, already in the VIII century, that had the duty to represent the king in foreign courts and deliver his messages and positions on certain matters, be their economic or about borders.

It may be easily argued that diplomacy has been the oldest form of politics and that has maintained itself at least since the birth of modern diplomacy, considered it to be during Italy's Renaissance in the XIII century[81]. Despite the institutional and legal changes, the classic character of representation and messaging has remained stable since those times.

I have always been attracted by paradoxes and complexity. And a paradoxical matter, to me, is the uniqueness of the European Union. The whole Europe (apart of Russia and Turkey) comprises five and half million square kilometres: less than two thirds of the square area of the United States, much below the area of China or of Canada, and similar only to the European portion of the Russian Federation. Demographically speaking, the estimated population of the Union roughly overpasses the United States' one, and it is a fraction of the India's or China's.

Still, despite these geographic or demographic inconsistencies, the European Union is the most bio-different, multi-language, history-rich and multicultural entity that has ever existed. Many history, political science, or social science giant scholars have attempted to decode the roots of the history and socio-economy of the European Union, and all give different versions. This attracts me indifferently.

Then, apart from the pure diplomatic and geographical characteristics of the Union, as a student of social sciences, with international aspirations, is of strong pertinence the study of the development and efficacy of the foreign doctrine of the supranational entity of the highest

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[81] See Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350-1520, Isabella Lazzarini, Oxford University Press, 2015.

lustre. The 'efficacy' of the oldest form of institutional foreign engagement applied to the most unique supranational organization ever existed makes a top-notch. Hence, combining the academic interest and complexity of the argument, it becomes an always-more interesting topic to be investigated.

In addition, the peculiar and specific international, and European, actuality must have its roots in the recent European past. Especially, if we think at the constitutional and historical change that have forced the EU to change its foreign doctrine and applications. The strident Russo-Ukraine war, the energy-crisis new management technique of the Union, the new China-US contraposition with the European Union always in the middle, the EU's foreign policy during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the economic crisis of most of the European stock-exchanges are examples that will, for their turn, force the Union to carry on producing other constitutional reforms and combat new foreign challenges.

The sections 1.1 and 1.2, on the Union's constitutional blooming, has witnessed the 'insolence' of the European bureaucracy to create an ever-more competent Union that could be autonomous in its decision-making and could have pivotal positions in foreign and internal matters, with no external influences. That is for scholars to continue studying the possible evolution, and correlation, of this internal constitutional adaptation to the outworld slumps. How will the Union evolve its internal and external -legal- response contingently to the external changes? The present work, hitherto, makes some evidence that this constitutional subduing to the history of the Union has certainly occurred in the past, is still occurring, and there are many possibilities for it to happen in the near future.

Instead, the sections 1.1.1 and 1.2.1 make evidence of the historical necessities and determinacies of the constitutional changes described in the previous sub-chapters. Discovering the efficacy and the motivations that underpin such procedural change is of crucial importance for researchers and policy-decisionism.

Describing the evidence produced by reading the provisions of the various treaties and the declarations that have 'made the history' of the Union and seeing how the foreign doctrine has changed along the centuries, I have decided to make an evaluation step beyond. To analytically study the effectiveness of the strategy-change, in terms of multichannel approaches, that the Union has made over the treaty reforms, since 1957. With specific attention to the European Union Global Strategy, of 2016. In these times the question of internal security is occupying top positions along the foreign agendas of the powers of at least half world.

Therefore, for the aforementioned academic and structural conditions of the European Union and its foreign politics, it is interesting to answer the question, which many political and European citizens are arising, if these strategic changes are, in terms of foreign competences, efficient in their objectives. And more importantly, with respect to the internal security issue, which represents a major question, whether there has been reached some degree of efficacy in this realm since then.

The next chapter will guarantee a theoretical framework to understand the various forms of diplomacy of the Union and the multichannel strategic application of a new form of a *sui generis* foreign doctrine, as only it is the Union's.

CHAPTER II

MULTICHANNEL AND DIPLOMATIC CONNECTIONS OF EUROPE

2.1 Research Design and Methodology. Hypothesis and variables.

The thesis is designed as to give clear explanation to the topic and question addressed along this work, and in the title. In particular, following established methodologic doctrines and practices, it seems to be of most utility to proceed by first trying to look at the history of the foreign policy of the Union, as to have a complete historical and constitutional background up to the 2003 year. This has been the work of the first chapter.

Then, I will proceed by explicating, in the present chapter, the theoretical frame of understanding of the paradigms of the foreign policy of the European Union. The EU has conducted four typologies of foreign policy based on some specific political categories and diplomatic characteristics. Finally, a comparative analysis is preferred, by which I schematize the foreign actions of the European Union and analyse them via the lenses of the R.I.C.S. frame[82] and try to capture some conclusions out of the historical-theoretical study put forward.

I have chosen the framing approach since, in my view, it makes it easier to identify and analyse certain phenomena under specific lenses, and frames. The R.I.C.S. will be used as a filter of my work. Filtering the foreign policy of the Union, temporarily collocated, with the R.I.C.S. will help me disentangle the single features of the Union foreign politics and unpack its natures and hidden rationalities. At the end, the single characteristics will be logically linked in order to present a unified and coherent interpretation of the strategic functioning of the EU external action, which is part of the concluding remarks of the next chapter.

After having defined the theoretical way of comprehending the external policies of the Union and having looked at the comparative intersection of all of them, it will be important to understand the channels through which the Union acts externally. In addition, the comparative analysis of the theoretical approach to the EU foreign policy gave birth to a Cartesian first and to a three-dimensional policy spectrum of EU diplomacy after, in which the R.I.C.S. and the policies natures jointly combine.

Me, I am referring to the 2016 EU Global Strategy, which goes on to five major priorities of the EU's CFSP or impeding issues to be tackled by the European Union. These five objectives are the following: the security of our Union, state and societal resilience to our East and South, an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the XXI century.[83] Then, it follows that the methodological analysis will be

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[82] R.I.C.S. stands for: regions, institutions, corporations, and societies. It is, as explained, a set of channels of diplomatic communication that the Union uses for its foreign policy. The significance and application of that frame will be explained in detail along the way, Chapter III.
[83] See the 2016 Global CFSP Strategy.

pursued according to the willingness of identifying which channels has been adopted, with respect of all the five aims, and trying to derive which channels may be found to be the sufficient or necessary condition to reach some degree of efficacy. Overall speaking, the entire analyses will be strongly supported by a schematic thinking and presentations of diagrams and figures, which deploy thoughts, events and theoretical understandings.

This purpose will be adorned by a specific methical approach, which is the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) that helps me figure, in a quite schematic and intuitive genre, the necessity or the sufficiency of the channels, and therefore of the plausible causes of diplomatic efficacy.

Clearly, in relation to the objectives listed above, it is possible to draft five main hypotheses. These five hypotheses reflect the probability conditions of holding out efficacy with respect to the aims of the 2016 strategy. Putting together efficacy and goals, the five hypotheses generated are the following:

1. The more channels are employed by the Union, the more efficient will the Union be in pursuing EU security purposes.
2. The more channels are employed by the Union, the more efficient will the Union be in addressing 'state and societal resilience in our East and South'.
3. The more channels are employed by the Union, the more efficient will the Union be in developing 'an integrated approach to conflict and crises'.
4. The more channels are employed by the Union, the more efficient will the Union be in contributing to 'cooperative regional orders'.
5. The more channels are employed by the Union, the more efficient will the Union be in promoting a 'global governance for the XXI century'.

In this logical approach, if every channel represents a certain degree of probability, the more channels are deployed, which makes a combination of more probabilities, the more likelihood of the events, namely the aims of the 2016 Strategy, to occur. It is a straightforward computational suggestion.

In addition, for the *chapter 2.6*, on the future of European diplomacy, I have decided to conduct a cross-impact analysis by looking at the conditional probabilities of the most likely scenarios and try to forecast, with some mathematical relying, a possible change in the diplomatic paradigm of the future European Union. This methodology will allow me to mathematically test which diplomatic policy paradigm is most likely to impact the future diplomatic strategy of the EU. Still, since I will be dealing with independent events the computational suggestion will be strongly influenced by the initial probabilities.

Moreover, I preview that some specific channels, or a single, are more determinant, and, therefore, they constitute necessary conditions for which the EU can assure a degree of foreign political efficacy. Others, to the contrary, are sufficient. In this respect, the sufficient channels may help grounding the policies put forward by the Union internationally, but do not add up anything to the certainty of the efficacy into investigation.

And, after having analysed the impacts of the political channels in relation to the objectives set out in the strategy, conclusions will be written. In overall, this chapter aims at unpacking (i) the natures and main features of the foreign policies of the Union, (ii) depict their relations and (iii) try to have an idea also of the diplomatic future of the European Union via a mixed methodology. All that has been written and thought is genuine of mine. The diagrams, schematics, approaches, and naming are fruit of my own theories and ideas.

2.2   A theoretical framework on the distinctive forms of EU diplomacy.

In this chapter of the thesis, I will start by looking at the definitions and the interactions of the various forms of EU diplomacy, which find theoretical grounds on the historical development, especially, after the First World War.

After having defined the general four natures of the Union's foreign action, which could also be applied to the acting of other international or statal agents, and having compared them with specific historical contexts, I will address their interactions and application in the international relations of the European Union.

This normative way of approaching the diplomatic practice of the European Union is of my invention. I have pondered on the two of the main, to me, questions and variables which determine the actions, especially the ones diplomatic, of the Union. Namely, the *function*, or rationality, and the *identity*, or constructivist degree, which develop each one into two single variants forming a total of four diplomatic variables.

Still, I have not provided for a complete historical outlook since it would require a single thesis project for it to be discovered. Nonetheless, I have relied on common and well-grounded historical developments since the First World War, which prove the truthfulness of the analysis given.

It is in my interest and hope to discover an efficient way of decoding the nature and motivations which form the diplomatic dialectic of the European Union. The following subchapters 2.2.1 and *2.2.2* will dig into the theoretical discovery.

2.2.1 Defining the schematics.

In order to better understand the diplomatic nature of the EU's external action I propose a conceptual, and quite schematical, approach of looking at the diplomatic deployment, say, of the strategic global, or local, actions of the Union. This general way of perceiving the EU diplomacy is inedited and tries to put clearance on some of the motivations and reasons of why the EU pursues certain strategies, preferred to others.

Particularly, this framework, which in turns contingently falls with the R.I.C.S. frame of understanding, is to identify which lines of thought the Union is pondering, and based also on the objectives and which strategy decides the Community to adopt.

Using a Cartesian diagram and the binary combination of two structural and two political variables, it comes with a four-dimension, or four-directions, schematic picture of the foreign policy's natures of the Union, in relation to specific political goals.

The structural, or functionalist, variables convey with respect of the *direction* of the foreign act, namely a direct or an indirect action. "Direct", as the word indicates, refers to the Union's acting with direct interlocutions and involvements to the matter. "Indirect", to the contrary, is about the Union trying to have some effect and impact on certain situations, but, this time, making use of other actors, also non-state ones or policy-fields (as trade of humanitarian aid policy), which pursue the Union's interests, indirectly and non-explicitly.

Instead, the other two political values refer to the pure substance and logic web which underpin the goal and the external movements of the Union. In particular, the two variants can be *rational*, or *identitary*. Explaining the two.

Rational diplomacy, in this work, stands for the institutional, classic, rules-based, and in-detailed-thought foreign doctrines. Most notably, tools and practices, inter alia, such as the conference and summit diplomacy[84], secret actions, stringent espionage as main source of information, non-involvement of the public, a little public-private cooperation apart of military-productive and security areas, classic Government-to-Government diplomacy, blocs-based diplomacy and so forth[85].

Historically speaking this face of diplomacy could be referred as a post-WWI diplomacy and for the times before. As the parallelism to the period makes noting, in rational diplomacy military interests, economic and trade priorities, world macroeconomic leading theories such as liberalization and national security host the most important places in the national agenda in terms of foreign politics.

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[84] Understanding the Distinguishing Features of Post-Westphalian Diplomacy. Ebru Oğurlu, European University of Lefke. On the institutionalization of post-WWI into summit diplomacy.
[85] A great account on the historic counter-face of the post-Westphalian geopolitics is Cooper, R., 2003. The Breaking of Nations.

To the contrary, the *identitary*, or constructivist, *diplomacy* is something more political and inscribed into a set of political and social values which perm the foreign action of the Union. It is well consolidated how the Union, via policy-fields and legal doctrines -as the doctrine of external unity[86] or of leal and sincere cooperation[87]- established by the treaties and the European Court of Justice, has contributed to form a diplomacy based on common values and social perceptions, in which the construction of the social and political reality, as it is in this era, is of utmost importance in determining the content of the EU's foreign action[88].

Are customs of this form of diplomacy deeds as the involvement of the public attention and of national politicians, the early promotion of modern multilateralism, the rejection of warrism as ultimate cause of conflict-resolution[89], identitary politics-based purposes, the in-touch relationship between top statesmen, international communitarian approaches, global governance and so forth. A scheme, in which cultural, social, civic, multi- diplomacy or security, parliamentary and city diplomacy[90] and hybrid forms as well, are practiced and institutionalized. This diplomatic experience may trace its roots back in the beginning of the quasi-détente period in between of the two world wars, for then to be reused after the fall of the Soviet Union, in the end of the 1990s.

In the period in between the end of the Second World War and the fall of the USSR it has been witnessed the return of classic blocs-based foreign positioning, in which little or no involvement of the masses existed.

Along this sequencing it is possible to plot these politically sensible variables according to specific historical collocations, as pointed out above:

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[86] A couple of court-law that makes understand the importance, for the ECJ, of the unity in the external relations of the EU: Opinion 1/75 (11 November 1975), The Geneva Act: Commission v. Council, COTIF II case, Code of Conduct on a UN convention on Persons with Disabilities. Here, in these judgments and opinions, the ECJ, as the EU in its institutions, backs on affirming the importance of pursuing the Union's interests in the foreign policy of each MS. For when exclusivity persists, the Union is entitled to take position lonely.

[87] Art. 4(3). Treaty on the European Union. The text reads as follows: "Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties."

[88] To have a quite complete idea of how MS settle their foreign action, Union's interests accordingly, see Cremona, M., 2009, Member States as trustees of the Community interest: participating in international agreements on behalf of the European Community.

[89] In this respect, national polities, and the domestic political discourse, play a pivotal role in determining which dispute-settlement tools to deploy during international conflicts. Have a look at: (i) "Domestic Politics and War" of Jack S. Levy, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1988, or (ii) "Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover" of Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, American Political Science Review, 2006.

[90] City Diplomacy: Another Generational Shift? Article in Diplomatica: A Journal of Diplomacy and Society, 2021. Written by: M. Acuto, K. Hartley, A. Kosovac. The post- WWII recovery and re-building and its consequence in transnational city cooperation.

Period	Form	Featuring
- WWI	Mostly Rational (Direct and Indirect)	Territorial blocs, security-centred diplomacy, GtoG, and so on.
WWI - WWII	Rational and Identitary (Direct and Indirect)	The League of Nations, espionage, military innovations, and so on.
WWII – USSR's fall ('90s)	Mostly Rational (Direct and Indirect)	West-East blocs, "war by other means", and counter-terrorism issues, and so on.
Mid '90s – today	Mostly Identitary (Direct and Indirect)	Involvement of the masses, public diplomacy, value-based external action, and so on.

Moreover, it is possible to observe as how moments of slumps put diplomacy into the foots of securitization and international antipathy. When the EU was living conditions of crisis and serious attempts to its stability it has decided to opt for a more classical deterrence diplomacy. Whilst, when moments of crisis are overpassed, there is the possibility or prioritizing the common good, the public involvement, the cultural power and so forth. Peace- and multilateralism-promotion has always stood at the core of many actions of the European Union[91].

In addition to the graphing made for the historical development of the politics-dependent variants of the EU diplomacy, it is important to frame, Cartesian accordingly, a schematic way of perceiving diplomacy both in its functionalist and constructivist logic. Then, the following bi-dimensional spectrum takes shape:


Figure 5 - Cartesian Diagram of the Different Features of EU Foreign Policy

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[91] See art. 21(2) TEU.

Strong policies of the kind as war, or military intimidation, against a state are direct rational policies. To the contrary, the funding of specific initiatives, according to certain management and substantial criteria set by the EU institutions, of private stakeholders for the outworld promotion of EU values and for capacity-building measures could be considered as indirect identitary policies. Indirect, but still with important indirect diplomatic consequences in the long vision.

These two are the opposite poles. Still, a plethora of other policies can be inserted into this bidimensional configuration. And, in the "0;0 point", which is what comes, in the next chapter, is the interception of the direction and the rationality of the policy into question.

I think this is a good straightforward way to look at the different distinctive foreign policies and directions of the Union. Despite the possible application to national polities too, the Union puts more effectively into the relationships with other regions or societies. But for this, it is important to continue reading the chapter.

2.2.2 Comparative analysis and application.

Another important step to make after having defined the different approaches to diplomacy that the EU, as other international actors, may have pursued, it is important to freeze the way the two variants, both functional- and politics-sensitive, interact each other and apply to the international scenario. This cross-selective work will form half of the policy spectrum, which will be analysed in the next chapter.

For me to do so it is as well important to make use of schemes and tables, which make the interaction easier to be bear in mind and understood. Hence, before entering into the detailed explication of the single combinations and their characteristics, I prefer to schematize the intersection of the politics-sensitive and functionalist variables in the following way:

Figure 6 - Intersecting the Variants

In this quadratic scheme, from the rationality it derives the choice of whether the action should be rational, or identity based. It seems like if the question of the direction matters the most, or at least comes first. After having pondered on the direction, it is the turn of the content and the aim of the action, which could be of a classic economic or military interest, or of a value-promoting alternative. Even if nothing prevents the opposite to be true too. Namely, the decision of the content before the direction.

Still, what remains out of this interaction is some space of action, which does not perfectly match with direct or indirect rational or identity policies, which are exactly the two triangular shapes and the right and left blank spaces aside. However, it is not in my interest to investigate and categorize all the kind of policies since it may result into a too much long cocktail of variables, stepping away from the main purpose of this analysis. That is to say a general theoretical framework of looking at the foreign politics of the Union.

Nonetheless, it may be very interesting to try to figure out which kinds of policies may fit the exact interception of the two big arrows. It is about neither a direct nor an indirect and neither a rational nor an identitary action. Then, it is reasonable to question: which kinds of policies fit that place? Maybe, upon that point stand policies that are somewhat impactless or are intended just to produce some general commitment by the Union, as conferences or policy review documents. Then, the 2016 strategy would suit that place, as a document intended to produce some effects, but *per se* seems not to have a large impact, apart that of exposing the view of the Commission and its plans. In addition, other documents as the action plans[92] or

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[92] The Council Conclusions on EU action plans are very common and are referred to specific strategic area framework of a certain timeline. Action plans are a set of concrete proposals, bilaterally or multilaterally, at the light of some arguments or partnerships. An example could be the 'Council Conclusions on the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, or the 'Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the individual measures in favour of the people of the Republic of the Sudan for 2023'.

the HR guidelines[93] are of the same account. They provide some general policy framework, for the implementation of future legal or diplomatic practices, of larger impact. Still, the 2016 document has served to change the security perception of the EU having some impacts into the planification of security objectives and strategies by the EU.

For the sake of synthesis, here it follows a diagram that explains the main features of the single foreign policy realms of the Union:

Table 3 - Intersection of the Four Diplomatic Variables

Rationality	Identitary	*Naming*	Features
Direct	*Rational*	Analytic (or Materialist)	GtoG, classic and rule-based diplomacy. WWI diplomacy.
Direct	*Identitary*	Distinctive	Classic GtoG value-based actions, public diplomacy, the role of culture.
Indirect	*Rational*	Divergent	The EU and other non-state actors, which in turn act in the Union's aims, which are classic domestic interests.
Indirect	*Identitary*	Deliberate (or Post-Materialist)	The EU and other non-state actors, which in turn act in the Union's aims, which are value-based and social sensitive interests.

In this schematic perception, the word "materialist" stands for a specific paradigm of action and thought. Particularly, materialism at the strength of a large literature[94] and culture, is something associated mostly with the 'old and past' and to an approach, which refers to self-expression and the refusal of single and absolute thinking attached to contemporary social transformation periods[95]. In this respect, confronting *Table 3* with *Table 2*, contemporary diplomatic history, especially of the EU, goes on to the direction of a post-materialist paradigm, in which self-expression, values-based approaches, quality-sensitive policies, subjective points of reference and others by-the-same-token arguments appear. And this, moreover, refers, to some extents, to a constructivist, or identitary, form of diplomacy, as well as of governing mechanism[96]. *Chapter 2.5* will address the continuation of future EU diplomacy at a level with the confrontation before made. Still, this is not only a diplomatic-susceptible question, rather it involves a whole range of social sciences' studies too.

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[93] EU guidelines are general demarches and policy frameworks, on specific area, that serve as directing the foreign, especially, action of the EU institutions, agencies, diplomats and so forth. An example of a guideline is the 'EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries', there exist 13 different guidelines on Human Rights' issues.
[94] See, for to take account on the environmental side, 'Towards sustainable society: from materialism to post-materialism', Arto O. Salonen and Mauri Ahlberg, International Journal Sustainable Society, 2013.
[95] For an account on the distinctive features of materialist and post-materialist trends see 'Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies', Inglehart R., Princeton University, 1977.
[96] For a great account on the motivations of a post-Westphalian change in constitutional and political terms, see Linklater, A., 1996. Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State.

2.3 EU Foreign Policy paradigmatic nature. A legal background.

The EU external action history has been determined by its internal law for long, and this is what it is expected in a system where the rule of law is prioritized. Still, what has been demonstrated in the first chapter, where the constitutional history of the Union has been briefly explained, the Union has frequently made use of economic and political externalities, in the neighbourhood and not only, to make some constitutional changes and reassert its own foreign politics.

Moreover, it is in my view extremely relevant to look at the treaty provisions, the court-law, and its caselaw, in order to understand the Union's current international doctrines and the (also legal) motivations that underpin the logic of the Union's foreign action. This is to give evidence of how, in practical terms, the Union establishes its relations. There could be no diplomatic channels to use without the correct legal basis.

In particular, I will put much more attention to the "principle of unity of international representation"[97] and the "duty of cooperation"[98], which are, in theory, the most important and driving principles that regulate the international action of the Union, and its members states[99]. Many other principles stem from the treaties, and the court-law, as the principle of coherence, of effectiveness, of autonomy, of institutional balance and others. In addition, it is interesting to note the constitutional procedures to conclude international agreements[100].

But why is it important to remark the legal background of the Union external action? The international agreements and the doctrines established by the ECJ, which are the major foreign policy tools of the Union, are essential not only to understand how the Union acts internationally, but, more importantly, to capture the motivations that push the Union acting in certain manners, and not in others.

It has been concretely, and statistically, asserted how the ECJ has the most times judged in favour of the supranational institutions[101], favouring the process of European integration

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[97] See Hendry, J., 2009. Legal Integration in the EU: the unitas in diversitate Conundrum and the Importance of Considering Culture, on the importance of how, despite so different and fragmented, the EU pushes for integration via unity defense, in the External field.

[98] Art. 4(3) TEU. It has been cited many times along the work.

[99] On the relation between member states and EU doctrines, see (i) Larik, A. D. C. a. J., 2011. The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External Relations? (ii) Merket, P. V. E. a. h., 2012. The Role of the Court of Justice in Ensuring the Unity of EU's External Representation, (iii) Neframi, E., 2010. The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations, (iv) Van Elsuwege, P., 2011. The duty of sincere cooperation (Art. 4 (3) TEU) and its implications for the national interest of EU Member States in the field of external relations.

[100] Art. 218 TFEU. The role of the institutional balance in order to conclude (ratify) international agreements in the EU.

[101] See Brittain, S. Justifying the Teleological Methodology of the European Court of Justice: A Rebuttal, 2016. On the way the ECJ favors, teleologically, the side of supranationalism and boost for integration.

sometimes silencing the single states in favour of a single, efficient, decisional harmony.[102] This is the very rational underlaying the exclusivity competence of the Union.[103]

The Court has many times established that in order to behave efficiently and not to distort the internal system of laws[104], some specific competences may become exclusive. Not only the ones listed: a) customs union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy. [105]

Doctrines and treaty provisions constitute what I call the *paradigms* of the EU external action. Paradigms because they form the legitimacy, and the *raison d'être*, of the foreign politics of the Union.

Referring back to the "principle of unity of international representation" and the "duty of cooperation". Article 4 comma 2 of the TEU reads as follows:

"3. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties."

From this (very important) provision, it is possible to deduce that members states are "obliged" to work *sincerely* with the Union and implement what the Union legislates and "dictates". This, normally, applies to the external sphere too. Internationally speaking, the Union and the member states must cooperate in order to promote the common interest of the Union, which is represented by the treaties and EU law.

Whichsoever action will be pursued by the member states, even if in their own relationships, must be in accordance with the interests and values of the European Union. This "duty" is the court-enlargement and subsequent expression of art. 4 of the TEU. In this context, it also comes the relevant question of the single states' own sovereignty for implementing and acting independently, which stems from the Westphalian very concept of sovereignty. Still, this is not the room for this discussion.

Apart of these principles and duties to the MS, it interesting to understand the way the Union concludes its international agreements and "communicates" internationally. Art. 218 of the TFEU is devoted to this.

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[102] Pars Pro Toto: The Member States' Obligations of Sincere Cooperation, Solidarity and Unity, Joris Larik, Leiden University.

[103] Art. 3(2) TFEU reads as follows: The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.

[104] Opinion 1/75 pursuant to art. 228 of the EEC Treaty, European Court of Justice, 1975. Here, the Court establishes that the CCP is exclusive since it must be used in order to defend the common interest externally (first dimension) and not to distort the internal market (second dimension).

[105] Art. 3(1) TFEU.

The article is too long to be cited. Still, what matters is the way the institutions balance each other and process the agreement until the final conclusion, made by a decision of the Council. The following figure well portrait the procedure, a bit simplified:


Figure 7 - Treaty-Making procedure Acc. to Art. 218 TFEU

In this processual approach, all the main institutions, namely the Parliament, the ECJ, the Council and the Commission are involved. Moreover, the parliament is involved and consulted. It must be "immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure"[106]. In addition, for some specific instances, such as association agreements or agreements involving budgetary implications and fields whereby the ordinary legislative procedure applies, the Parliament must give its consent[107].

This involvement, which is a major win for the strong supporters of more democracy across the institutions of the EU, is of great pertinence also for the present discussion. In this case, every agreement which pertains specific political issues which fall within the sixth comma of art 218 must pass through the Parliament. And the Parliament is the political representation of the member states, which seek for their own (international) interests.

All this legal deepening has been made in order to make the reader acquainted of the processual approach of the EU for what concerns its foreign policy and diplomacy. As viewed it is the Commission which makes recommendations for mainly non-CFSP matters.

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[106] Art. 218 (10) TFEU, on the role of the parliament in the treaty-making procedure.
[107] Art. 218 (6.a) TFEU, on the instances where the Parliament must give its consent.

To the contrary, the CFSP supposes the involvement of the High Representative, which, in this turn, submits (s)he recommendations to the Council[108]. This, therefore, means that the Union, for matters falling within the areas of security and defence, has larger space of action and presents more supranational unity compared to other forms of diplomacy, e.g. trade and economic or cultural, which follow a more "turbulent" institutional, and intergovernmental, process.

To sum it up, combining the way the EU concludes the agreements and the legal principles that guide the formality of the EU relations worldwide, it is possible to testify some (still low) degree of democratic accountability (with the involvement of the Parliament) and public involvement, a quite vigorous bureaucratic decisionism, and the politics of the effectiveness. The latter refers to the predominance of the common say, of the Union, to the single-state opinion. Hence, the principle of unity, and the prevalence of the Union's interests over the states' ones.

2.4   The R.I.C.S. frame of understanding and the policy spectrum of the EU diplomacy.

Here it comes with the most crucial theoretical part of the present work: the R.I.C.S frame of understanding. As highlighted in the subchapter on the methodology, the R.I.C.S. must be viewed as a filter for the interpretation of the EU's diplomacy, and of the five hypothesis this thesis is trying to find answer[109]. Still, every filter is composed of some wires, or technology that helps spinning off the materials of an ultimate product. My technology will be the single communicative channels, which are: the regions, the institutions, the corporations, and the societies. The acronym of R.I.C.S. Looking at the relation of the EU with each single "wire", I will decode the key to the effectiveness of the Union's diplomacy.

As previously said, R.I.C.S. stands for Regions, Institutions, Corporations and Societies. For *regions* it is intended the exact meaning of regional (supranational or inter-nation) organizations and institutions, e.g. regional development banks, regional economic communities and so on[110]. In this channel it comes the EU's capacity to build interregional ties, creating a Euro-driven international interregional community. By *institutions*, it is mainly meant national political and socio-economic institutions, e.g., governments, central banks, constitutional organs, parliaments[111] and so forth. Parliamentary diplomacy, GtoG relations,

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[108] Art. 218 (3) TFEU, on the involvement of the HR/VP for CFSP matters, or for joint actions in case of issues partially covered by the CFSP.
[109] See the very first subchapter of the second chapter: "Research Design and Methodology. Hypotheses and Variables".
[110] To have a look on the interregionalism vein of the EU see "Interregionalism as a New Diplomatic Tool: the EU and East Asia", Michael Reiterer, 2006 European Foreign Affairs Review.
[111] See "Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance", S. Stravidis and D. Jancic, esp. the chapter "World Diplomacy of the European Parliament".

and treaty-making place themselves into the institutional line, which is the oldest and most classic one. With the term *corporations* it is intended the set of private, and public, enterprises which provide every form of productive output, in the form of goods or services, to the general public, e.g. multinational companies, local SMEs, trade unions and so forth. The way the EU institutions deal with corporate governance also internally would lead to external entrepreneurial consequences, which are diplomatically tangible in terms of intra-state entrepreneurship dynamics[112]. Mechanisms of dispute settlement, certain chapters and conditionalities on trade with the EU is an example of corporate governance idea which has certain direct effects on personal trade activities. Lastly, with *societies* I mean all forms of communities, cultures, associative groups and tribalistic forms of organizations, e.g. religious groups, tribes, underdeveloped villages and so on. With the term it is also intended the escalation of the European narrative and culture along the international public[113].

These four are, in my eyes, the main channels of communication of every diplomatic agent internationally, but also internally. Moreover, it easily intuitive the "ensemble" character in the sense that each channel englobes the small following one. Into regions coexist institutions, corporations, and societies. Every state, or organization which has some degree of activity in the external world, must engage into some forms of relationships either with regions, or institutions, and (of same-degree or not) corporations, or societies. Passing from all channels, it gets the foreign policy strategy, in structural terms:


Figure 8 - The R.I.C.S. Funnel

Choosing which of the four channels to use, if not all or more than just one, is an inevitable step part of the strategic path which every state must engage with in order to exercise its proper foreign competences, which roots back to the very Westphalian era. This is what I will attempt

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[112] For instance, "Sustainable Development Chapters in Eu Free Trade Agreements: Emerging Compliance Issues" of Gracia Marín Durán, Common Market Law Review, 2020, shows the way the EU engages into some conditionalities in its international trading practice.
[113] To take account of the rising of the European socio-political narrative into a global scale see "Culture and International Society", Barry Buzan, International Affairs Journal, 2010.

to do in the next chapter: collocate the five hypotheses, and goals of the 2016 Strategy, in the funnel and understand which channel has been preferred by the Union. Still, apart from the history of Europe, the *channelity* and the *nature*, namely direction and rationality, are quintessential in determining the foreign policy of the Union and decrypt its functioning and efficacy.

The funnel is a sensitive instrument. Both as a funnel and filter, it can be used, and will be, to trump established doctrines on the efficacy of the Union's diplomacy and to uproot the inner inducements of the EU foreign politics. Imagining a governance system, this mechanism represents a de-governance institution, in which the EU plays its function internationally.

The reason why I have decided to present first the theoretical approach to the different kinds of foreign policies and then to the R.I.C.S. frame is because these two tools help me build a policy spectrum which covers all the possible policies of the Union.

Hence, combining the discussions of the subchapters *2.2.1* and *2.2.2* and the channelity issue of the present chapter, it is possible to construct the foreign policy spectrum of the European Union. Using a three-polar schematic, I managed at building the three dimensions of the EU foreign policy space. The following is a good way to look at it:

Figure 9 - Policy Spectrum of the EU

Policy "*x,y,z*" is a classic example policy to be used to explicate the function of the spectrum, which positions itself in a specific context. The variable "*x*" identifies the rationality of the policy, which in the specific case is somehow in the middle. Somehow in the middle, both rational and identitary purposes are involved. The "*y*" stands for direction, which in the example is about mostly a direct action. And then, lastly, the "*z*" is portraying an institutional addressed policy. Some words on the R.I.C.S. line. The line has been put in a descending format in order to make perceive the from the larger to the smaller bucket that will contain the foreign action; it is precisely the ensemble character discussed previously.

An example of this mixed, direct, institutional policy could be a conference between the EU and a foreign government, with possibly a final agreement to be signed, that involves both values and trade aims, for instance. The example looks very similar, for example, to the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP), in which the EU gives preferential trade tariffs to certain developing economies, sometimes with the condition that these countries ratify some UN conventions[114]. This is a classic governmental direct, favouring trade and UN values (close to the EU's) agreements and diplomatic undertaking. The Union makes a lot of it.

Which policy does fit the *0;0;0* position? It is an interesting question. A *0;0;0* policy is an unchanneled and impactless policy. Still, this point shall not be confused with point "P", which in *figure 8* is the perfect interception of the spectrum. In fact, as addressed in the *subchapter 2.2.2*, a policy that crosses the direction and rationality is policy trying to prove some general commitment, but without any serious thoughts behind it. With a rationality and direction being *0*, the policy would not be intended to have any particular impact, and therefore its necessity to be channelized would quash. Therefore, a proper "P" policy does exist per se. But it does involve specific features: a strongly identitary (x) and indirect (y) policy, which points at the core of a social community (z), or some individuals specifically (as individual sanctions). Hence, the coordinates of point "P" would be *-∞; -∞; 0*. By contrast, a *0;0;0* policy would be a mixed - in terms of direction and rationality- and a social-focus action.

How is it possible to assess the presence of each channel? Basically, looking at the foreign policy history and recordings of the EU external action. That is also why I have presented a brief constitutional overview of the developments of the foreign politics of the Union since the Treaty of Rome.[115] In order, then, to know how the EU has diplomatically acted up until 2016, which is the year of the Strategy into studying.

As for the sake of making an example, the post-Lisbon strategic developments of the Union in relation to the involvement of the public and the conditionality[116] and dispute settlement mechanisms into the quasi-totality of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) are examples of adopting for both direct and indirect identity-based approaches.

2.5 A cross-impact analysis on the future of the European diplomacy. Post-modernism or necessitarianism?

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[114] To take note of the programs with which countries and all the kinds of agreements been signed by the EU, it is possible to visit the website of the European Commission on how the EU helps emerging economies.
[115] See chapters 1.1 (1.1.1) and 1.2 (1.2.1) of the present work to get some idea on the history of EU diplomacy throughout the Paris-Lisbon period.
[116] See "The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?" of Karen E. Smith, Political Science Department of the European University Institute, 1997.

As pointed out in the methodology section at the beginning of this second chapter, in order to address the future of EU diplomacy I have decided to opt for a cross-impact analysis method. Firstly, I will give some hints on the methodology and the functioning of the latter.

The cross-impact methodology is a set of methods aimed at discovering the possible probabilities of some events to occur in relations to other already happened. In mathematical terms, this is called conditional probability calculus. In fact, the cross-impact analysis developed by Theodore Gordon and Olaf Helmer in 1966[117], in quantitative terms, is a comparison of conditional probabilities and it is the approach I have used in the first part of the futurology analysis of European diplomacy. The methodology is mostly used in order to test policies and define whether the precondition of some happenings may influence, and to what extent, future policies and situations. It a futurology approach.

In the second part I will proceed with a more theoretical interpretation of the numerical findings and try to depict a more normative approach to the future of the Union foreign action and will compare the qualitative to the quantitative findings. This shall give some degree of certainty to my computations and "prophecies".

Still, in classic numerical terms come diplomatic paradigms exclude the other one, by definition. By paradigm is intended the ensemble of direction and rationality of a policy, that creates the policy-paradigm. For instance, a direct rational and an indirect identitary policy do not overlap. Therefore, their conditional probability would be 0, excluding one the other. Therefore, it is no possible to construct a pure computational scheme since it would not numerically work in terms.

However, if I consider the intersection in terms of the set "direction" and the "rationality" set, some paradigms which share even just a single feature, either in terms of direction or rationality, are possible to be inserted onto our quantitative approach.

Hence, the four paradigms, stemming from the cartesian analysis of the different policies of the Union which for the sake of a probability analysis will be called as *event*, are:

Event A: more direct and rational, $P(A) = 0.25$
Event B: more indirect and identitary, $P(B) = 0.25$
Event C: more direct and identitary, $P(C) = 0.25$
Event D: more indirect and rational, $P(D) = 0.25$

According to the discussion in terms of the problems arising from intersection, in this very scenario, event A can be compared to C and D, event B can be compared to C and D, event C can be compared to A and B, and event D can be compared to A and B. All them share a direction or a rationality in their policy nature.

[117] Social Technology, Gordon T. and Helmer O., Basic Books, 1966.

To each, has been assigned a probability, i.e. P(x). Still, if, as in the above case, I suppose that every event has the same probability to happen, the conditionality scheme would be depicting a situation in which every situation has the same likelihood to occur, and that would have no help for our analysis.

By contrast, considering the changing world, which shifts towards more identity-based approaches, it is possible to change a bit our initial probabilities. In addition, since no specific slumps are occurring, it is reasonable enough to conclude that rational policies are less likely to happen.[118] Therefore, it is possible to select a new set of initial probabilities as for the following:

Event A: set of a more direct and rational policies, $P(A) = 0.15$

Event B: set of a more indirect and identitary policies, $P(B) = 0.30$

Event C: set of a more direct and identitary policies, $P(C) = 0.40$

Event D: set of a more indirect and rational policies, $P(D) = 0.15$

In this particular situation, we know that the set of identitary policies is preferred. In both their directions. Moreover, to the rational policies I have given, for the sake of having variants not to large and respect some degree of reality, the same probabilities, namely *0.15*.

Knowing that a conditional probability is computed with the formula $P(A|B) = P(A \cap B)/P(B)$, and considering, for simplicity, that each event is to be independent, it is possible to calculate cross-probability table using the formula $P(A|B) = P(A)/P(B)$. Still, the "independency condition" makes probabilities be settled in the same value they possess at the moment of the study, in fact:

Table 4 - Cross-Impact Detection, in Quantitative Terms

if they occurred:	the probability for them to occur:			
	A	B	C	D
A		0.0 (No overlap)	0.40	0.15
B	0.0 (No overlap)		0.40	0.15
C	0.15	0.30		0.0 (No overlap)
D	0.15	0.30	0.0 (No overlap)	

As viewed, $A|B$ and the opposite as well as $C|D$ and $D|C$ are not possible to be computed since their probability of intersection [be it $P(A \cap B)$, $(B \cap A)$, $(C \cap D)$, $(D \cap C)$] is 0. They are independent as well but share not intersection possible. Therefore, it is no possible to compute

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any bigger-than-0 probability. There is no overlapping between direct and rational and indirect and identitary policies. Each excludes the other one.

Theoretically informing that the Union is already conducting a direct and indirect identity-based foreign policy (*Events B and C*), *the most probable scenario is that the Union will continue that way.*

In particular, supposing that *Events B and C* already occurred, as it is historically demonstrated, then it comes, conditionally, that the event that would mostly occur is *Event C*. The latter is exactly a more direct and identitary policy performance, with a *0.40* probability index. Then, it is reasonable enough to suppose that in our current context the Union will point much more on direct identitary foreign policies.

Or in a bit less likely way, also *Event B*, with a *0.30* percentage points probability, is likely enough to happen. In fact, also the latter in theoretical terms means indirect and identitary policies, which is exactly what has been postulated: continuation on the identity grounds.

Using this methodology has been fruitful since it gave me a quite good understanding of the possibilities of future set of foreign policies of the Union, given some historical and constitutional background.

Then, to conclude, which future can we expect in diplomatic terms by the European Union? A post-materialist, as shown in *Table 3*, or just a necessity-driven diplomacy? This is a major question. What can be said, in my view, is that it is likely to observe a more severe constitutional and diplomatic shift, in its contents and structure, towards more identity and less rationality. This does not mean, however, that there is no rationality (in the classical sense) into the "identitarian" approach. To the contrary, identity-based politics contains its own rationality. Maybe it is a modern one, less prone to the ideas of warrism and classic interest diplomacy. A diplomacy that changes its hat and walks along shared -among the international community- ideas and customs.

In fact, Dag Hammarskjöld, UN secretary-general from 1953 to 1961[119], was convinced of the UN as "a complement to the normal diplomatic machinery of the governments" which are UN members. Not in terms of substituting, rather in terms of going with. It is not a question, in my view, of pointing on the pacific approach of the UN in its global mission[120], and not on its necessary supplementary character. Still, it is about the need for states to recognize the complementarity and the concession of some national powers to the UN, and its agencies and courts, which complements national own jurisdictions and powers. Is it a loss in the concept of sovereignty? Maybe yes, or not. However, global governance and international legal systems presuppose others to have a say on you and the rest.

In this respect, since the mathematic analysis in the case of independent policy paradigms conveys to some stable probability calculus based on the exact initial probabilities, it is possible

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[119] To get some hint on the management paradigm of Hammarskjold D., have a look at "Politics and Conscience: Dag Hammarskjold on the Art of Ethical Leadership", R. Lipsey, Shambhala Publications Inc, 2020.
[120] See art. 1(1,2,3,4), Chapter I, UN Charter.

to draw conclusions in terms of what provokes what. Not something in terms of strict events, rather of 'spirits'. Not spiritism or stuff of the kind, but as the Smith's invisible hand of the economic market, the social world may be governed by some sort of social spirit, which may overlap to the construction of a social reality and of contemporary political and economic issues, which shapes the content of policy frameworks, diplomatic actions, and so forth. The social spirit is just the coloured image of a changing society.

Returning to this new trend in a *complementary* (new form of) *diplomacy* may perfectly intend the *Event C* scenario: more identity (also in the share of equal values and powers) and less classic international activism (devolved to the international, or regional -as the EU-, community). This is a great investigation to be made, and much attention and study shall be granted to the thematic.

Then, to conclude, in my opinion, *Event C* scenario diplomacy, guided by the social spirit of the epoque, is what will determine the paradigm of the next EU foreign politics. In this regard, technological and sociological changes, geopolitical and structural transformations, demographic dividends, and all sets of current importance issues are to be taken into consideration in order to dig into the exact content of the next foreign doctrine of the Union. What can be ultimately said is that *contemporaneity* fills to the diplomatic tank, in substantive, constitutional (as viewed), and empirical concerns, whereas the Union will find its political impetus and generate policies and actions.

CHAPTER III

IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF EU PRIORITIES WITHIN THE 2016 STRATEGY.

3.1   The rationale of the document.

The EU global CFSP strategy, which also takes the soundly name of 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe', written under the Junker Commission by the Office of the High Representative Federica Mogherini represents the most recent example of strategic planning and application of EU principles and values certainly in light of some strategic CFSP priorities.

The document, as the title well depicts, enhances the capacity of the Union and maybe its strength, in unifying and taking for common actions, despite of the fragmentations of all kinds, and pursuing a shared, not common though, vision in order to take up on slumps and propose a stronger EU to the world. That is the intent, nonetheless.

According to Federica Mogherini, 'Our [the European] wider region has become more unstable and more insecure'.[121] Then, it must be duty of the European Union, and of its High Representative, to give a *shared* strategic outlook and which systems of priorities to assess in order to commonly approach this problem, which is even 'more true than the British referendum'.

Despite the economic, demographic and diplomatic capacity of the Union, to Mogherini's eyes 'we are not making full use of this potential yet'. And every goal or priority the Union sets up 'can only be achieved by a truly united and committed Europe'. Which seems to be the keyword to understand the political dialogue underneath the global strategy. Unity and common positions are the very cornerstone, which the EU potential sits on. Without shared action, the Union would merely be a well-organized representative regional organization, without any proper power to be exercised in order to change the order of the things in the international relations.

The global political conditions, in which the EU must juggle, are situations of fragility, uncertainty, instability and insecurity. This is a double-sided coin. Positively, the Union can take up on delivering solutions and play major roles, regionally and internationally. Negatively, instability, fragility and insecurity, especially in the neighbourhood, need to be considered quite carefully as they would deficit the capacity of the Union to supply appropriate security to its citizens and avoid conflicts, as well as political disasters, at borders.

What is then the necessity to write a document of such kind? In Federica Mogherini's own words 'the strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union', to

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[121] See the 2016 Strategy, Mogherini's foreword.

promote the common interest of the EU, as well as its principles and values to be spread worldwide. According to for-the-time Junker Commission and Mogherini, values, interests and principles had to be accompanied by a strategic outlook on five quite specific priorities, which in their turn, develop into other sub-priorities, or sub-objectives. The five priorities are: (i) security of our Union, (ii) state and societal resilience in our East and South, (iii) an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, (iv) cooperative regional orders, and (v) global governance for the XXI century.

It is interesting also to note how the Union reserves one, the first, priority to itself and the other subsequent four to the external. Particularly, neighbouring, South and East countries, which may be perceived as the ones more in danger of political upheavals or democratic deficits, having indirect consequences for the security of the Union.[122] Moreover, among the four priorities, one refers to South and East, one to regional cooperation which includes also the South and the East, the other two are on global governance and stabilization mechanisms.

How has the Commission thought to implement these proprieties, with which instruments, and according to which principles? 'By mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent and coordinated way' is the methodic approach the Commission is intended to entail.

First off, the coherency and coordination principles are crucial here, as they underline what the EU institutions have pointed on ever since Rome times: internal coordination and external consistency. To the EU institutions, words such as consistency, external unity, common positioning, coordination and the like are all cornerstones for EU international politics. Then, it is fundamental to build an internal well-grounded common space before *entering onto the external*. Here precisely relies on the idea of international 'credibility', which derives from internal dynamics and political apprehension. The Union must work on it.

Focusing much more on the concrete plans of the Union, the Commission points on soft power, improving EU partners' capacity to protect and co-work with the EU, mobilising resources by reaching the threshold of the 20% of defence budget on 'the procurement of equipment and Research & Technology', supporting EU-NATO collaborations and multilateral dialogues, threats-assessment mechanisms, investing in intelligence surveillance, research and reconnaissance satellite communications, and many other measures. All these measures will be taken into account during the analysis of the channels' presence in the document, whereby they identify some specific communicative, as well as of empirical and active, waterways.

In order to unpack the conditions that determine the efficacy of the Union in its foreign politics, I will use a quite straightforward methodological analysis. After having analysed each macro-priority disentangling it from its sub-priorities and having looked at the relations

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[122] See Apostolos G. Papadopoulos (2011) Migration and security threats in south-eastern Europe, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

between each sub-priority and the R.I.C.S. 'filter', I will assess which channels determine the sufficient or necessary conditions for this priority to be reached. Each sub-priority will be analysed, inserted into the R.I.C.S. and verified its effectiveness in contemporary affairs. Particularly, during the sub-priorities – R.I.C.S. analysis, those macro-priorities which own a particular channel in at least half of its sub-priorities will possess that particular channel, e.g. if the first macro-priority has 6 sub-priorities whereby only two present the institutional channel, the first macro-priority will not possess the institutional channel all at once for this analysis.

After this one-by-one method, I will proceed by comparatively analyse all macro-priorities, without their sub-ones, in relation to the R.I.C.S. and determine the *condition(s) of efficacy* of EU diplomacy in relation to the EU global strategy of 2016 using a QCA (qualitative comparative analysis) application.

3.2 Multichannelity in the document.

It is of utmost importance in my view to have a look at the priorities and their sub-ones and determine the presence of which channels characterize them. As the section will show, there is a high density of multichannel thinking into the design of the strategy. This comparation and schematic approach serves in order to have a better understanding of the *channelity* and nature of each priority, and how have they have been thought by the Commission and looked at their efficacy, also in relation to their prior political designment. These are the CFSP priorities, and their sub-priorities, of the European Union:

Macro Priority	Sub-Priorities						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
The Security of Our Union	Security and defence	Counterterrorism	Cyber security	Energy security	Strategic communications		
State and Societal Resilience to our East and South	Enlargement policy	Our neighbours	Resilience in our surrounding regions	A more effective migration policy			
An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises	Pre-emptive peace	Security and Stabilization	Conflict settlement	Political economy of peace			
Cooperative Regional Orders	The European security order	A peaceful and prosperous Med., Mid. East, Africa	A closer Atlantic	A connected Asia	A cooperative Arctic		
Global Governance for the XXI Century	Reforming	Investing	Implementing	Deepening	Widening	Developing	Partnering

Figure 10 - CFSP Priorities of the EU GS, 2016

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Clearly, each of these priorities has some specific features, apart from the single sub-orders, which by force entail certain lines of communication with specific entities creating special channels of actions. These channels are the main concern of this section: they must be investigated and comparatively analysed. And their efficacy to be valued too.

In particular, inspecting each priority singularly it is possible to capture the single features and functioning, which will, in turn, drive me to the discovery of which channels are necessary or have been thought to be ran across. This will be done priority by priority across the following sub-chapters. Whilst a comparative union of all analysis will be done in the last sub-chapter. Still, some general accountability can be given in this respect.

The first priority, namely on 'the security of our Union', develops specific analytical frameworks. Particularly, due to 'today terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and energy insecurity' issues the CFSP policy field of the EU must endeavour itself with a new task: to respond to new threats, which not only cover purely defence of political questions, rather economic, societal, energetic and environmental. It is expectable, therefore, an openness for a multi-channelled strategic application, and the building of regional, institutional, corporate, and societal channels.

The second priority, on 'state and societal resilience in our East and South', develops in order to combat the external fragility, which would affect the 'vital interests' of the European Union. As the document indicates 'resilience benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies'. Resilience in this regard is a proto-synonym for -direct and indirect- security, as well as political stability, for the neighbours and the EU, indirectly. Empirically speaking, the EU is willing to strengthen its partnership, promote sustainable development, a culture of trust in the institutions and good governance, conditional enlargement policy, investments in security and prosperity, reform EU membership criteria based (also) on civil society and political reforms, extend trans-European networks, humanitarian aid, and education for women and children in Africa, and other initiatives of the same nature. Societies, institutional and regions are for sure involved in this social and inter-statal project.

The third priority, on 'an integrated approach to conflicts and crises', responds to the global trends of violence, human sufferings, and democracy-decline. These crises are multidimensional in nature: 'from security to gender, from governance to the economy'. Conflict prevention, capacity-building, conflict management and resolution, avoiding premature disengagement, better equipment for EU peace-building measures, funding the emerging of local institutions for long-term peaceful settlement, under a 'multi-level approach […] acting at the local, national, regional and global levels', and others are the measures being dogged in. In this respect, the document openly reflects about regions and institutions, as well as on the involvement of the societal.

The fourth priority, on 'cooperative regional orders', focuses on a specific need to face 'global pressures and local pushback'; a glocalized conceptualization[123] of the problem. Moreover, as pointed along the strategy, a good regional governance offers more possibility of stability, peace, development, and security.[124] The EU will support regional organizations, a variety of multi-layered players, asserting and 'managing' the relations with Russia on Crimea's annexation according to the European Security Order and the international law, fostering intra-regional cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe, partnering with civil society, and so forth. This priority also seems very prone to deploy a variety of channels in it strategy. Especially, corporativist, social and regional.

The last, fifth, priority is on 'global governance for the 21st century'. According to the Commission, without any global, legal, governance system EU values are at risk, as well as all the effort put into play for peace, prosperity and security. The EU can act by committing itself into 'reforming' the UN institutions, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 'investing' in peacekeeping and mediation approaches, 'implementing' EU's commitments against climate change and for sustainable development, 'deepening' the European economic presence worldwide, 'enlarging' the bucket of multi- and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), *widening* the compliance to international norms, 'partnering' with 'states and organisations, but also with the private sector and civil society', and, finally, 'developing' multilateral governance as regulatory-based dialogues. All this very long commitment must entail a multichannel strategic methodology.

3.3 The R.I.C.S. and the way to address EU security purposes.

This subchapter, as every until the *3.7* one, will develop its analysis over a precise analytical flowing: first giving (i) a context of the priority before (ii) analysing the channels present into the sub-priorities of the priority, to finally get on (iii) whether the priority into consideration has been somehow achieved, which corresponds to the definition of efficacy provided for the present work.[125]

Hence, on the context of this priority pretty much could be reported as security and defence are probably the most salient priorities and objectives of most of the foreign agendas of the world's governments. Still, EU security and defence politics is somehow peculiar and presents specific constitutional, as well as political, turbulences, which I have already written of.

[123] See Ritzer, G (2003). Rethinking Globalization: Glocalization/Grobalization and Something/Nothing. Sociological Theory. Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 193-209 (17 pages).
[124] See Mumtaz Hussain Shah, Anum Gul Afridi (2015). Significance of Good Governance for FDI Inflows in SAARC Countries Business & Economic Review. Vol. 7, Issue 2, pp. 31-52.
[125] See Chapter 1.3, on the main concepts.

Strategy accordingly, the priority develops itself in a context that the Commission identifies as at risk of terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, environmental change, and insecurity. The current international scenario, under a multidimensional perspective, presents all these features. At the time of 2016, the Europol report on 'EU terrorism situation and trend report 2022'[126] specifies that from 2010 up to 2016 *1,239* terrorist attacks have been registered, be they jihadist or religiously inspired, of a right-wing or left-wing connotation, ethno-nationalist and separatist or non-specified.

At the time of the strategy, the EU was assisting a tragedy in its own house. The menace of hybrid terrorism and the evolving of terrorists' techniques was increasing. Not to talk of the global economic impact, which is declining though.[127] Yet, terrorism 'remains the main asymmetrical threat'[128] to EU security, as well as to NATO partners or developing countries.

Notwithstanding climate change and its socio-economic consequences, also in terms of social diasporas[129] and civic distress, economic volatility of the last century, as consequences of the multiple economic crisis of the mid-90s, have posed sever threats to EU security and stability in the region.[130] Economic growth represents not the only but a solid foundation for the building of a European political stability, as well as regional. Economic security and socio-political status-quo are in many respects positively corelated.

Hence, it follows that in this very complex planetary situation the EU tries to ponder on a reactionary response to these problems and secure its stability, growth and security. 'Others' security and stability is ours' too' resounds quite well in this context. Then, I must be looking at the channel-based approach the EU wants to use. In order to address the point it is important to refer to the strategy, and to the single sub-priorities. Let me proceed one by one.

Particularly on the security and defence realm, the EU strategy refers quite frequently to better equipment and to the necessary involvement of the military industry, as well of research and development institutions. Among the international organizations, the EU points much emphasis on the cooperation with NATO. Multilaterally speaking, the strategy speaks of 'multinational' cooperation, but no proper institutional approaches are inserted, neither any civic or public engagement, apart (maybe) of domestic educational or university contributions.

On the counterterrorist side, internal cooperation prevails. Externally, still, the EU points more on 'counter-radicalization' processes via cultural and education initiatives involving 'the civil society, social actors, the private sector'. Regionally approaching, the EU does not refer to any political regional organizations, rather it focuses on geographic areas on which little details are given in terms of institutional cooperative mechanisms.

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[126] See European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2022 (TE-SAT), EUROPOL, up. 13 Jul 2022.
[127] See the Global Terrorism Index of 2016, of the Institute for Economics and Peace.
[128] See the 2022 report on the evolving terrorist threat: adapting the allied response, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Jean-Charles Larsonneur (France).
[129] See 'Climate Conversations: A One Day Virtual Symposium on the Impact That Climate Change Has on the African Diaspora', a conference report, of C. M. Okpodu, B. J. Holmes, M. N. V. Williams, P. Waldron-Moore, P. Tyson and C. K. Twesigye, Environmental Sciences Proceedings, 2022.
[130] See the current Economic crisis of the Eu: Genesis, analysis and Solutions, D. Ramiro Troitiño, Baltic Journal of European Studies Vol. 3, No. 1, 2013.

For what concerns cyber security, the industrial sector again plays a central role in cyber-defence advancement and better information and communication technologies to EU agencies. Externally, the core partners seem to be the US and NATO, again. Then, externally what matters is just some EU-US bilateralism and more NATO's alignment.

On energy security, the EU will promote energetic diversification, which entails some dialogue with the private sectors. Moreover, here third countries are considered in terms of secure nuclear standards. Foreign institutional engagement also means infrastructural agreements to secure the supply of energy to the EU. Mostly, basically, it is about in terms of interinstitutional and public-private cooperation.

Having considered the sub-priorities one by one, and having given a global context, not only geographically but also politically, it is now the turn of condensing this analysis schematically and look at its functioning. Methodologically, I will consider that a channel will be correctly deployed in a single macro-priority if at least half of the sub-priorities present it. Then, the following diagram can be made:

The Security of Our Union		R	I	C	S
Security and defence			✓	✓	
Counterterrorism				✓	✓
Cyber Security			✓	✓	
Energy Security			✓	✓	
Strategic communications				✓	

Table 5 - R.I.C.S. and the First Macro-Priority

The table above shows the channels mainly deployed by the European Union, according to the EU Global Strategy of 2016. Namely, the corporative and institutional cooperation channels. The corporativist vein of this priority refers mostly on the industrial, R&D, and technological sector. While the institutional is more about bilateral, and multi-lateral, dialogues. In this strategy, the EU gives much more space on the 'internal' agency, instead of prioritizing its external role. Internally, in fact, there is much more emphasis on inter-institutional cooperation and public involvement.

Now it is the time of the question: has this priority been achieved? Despite being a relatively short-term span of time after the strategy, in today's times it can be analysed the functioning and efficacy of the EU strategy in relation to this priority and assess the work done until the moment of the analysis.

Looking then at current affairs and at the security of the EU, I can look at many different aspects. In overall, the EU is a very secure place. Apart of the terrorist and hybrid threats,

which have been declining from hundreds into some tens,[131] energetically and economically speaking the EU is not in the same splendid position. The Russian invasion in Ukraine has lifted the prices of gas up to unprecedented levels, the demand has dropped, and disruptions in energy supplies due to the subsequent geopolitical check. And also levered the percentages of cyber-attacks and increased the likelihood of more cyber war in the upcoming times.

Moreover, unemployment rates have been forming a mountain-like shape, with volatile median rates from 12.5 percent down to ca. 6 percent.[132] This has caused uncontrollable decline in GDPs and the real economy and people's purchasing power. Yet, these are average levels. The EU comprises countries, like Germany or the Netherlands, with unemployment rates between 5 and 7 percent, and states, like Italy, Greece and Spain, with rates going from 22 to ca. 30 percent. Chronicles across the European Union, especially within the latter countries, frequently speak of declines in real economic powers of the public and of labour crisis. Globalization, income disrupters, bad economic management and the geopolitics of today has confronted with states maybe not prepared.

Is overall the EU a secure place? Well, this is a very difficult question. Still, I think it can be acknowledged a certain degree of security in the Union, economically, energetically, politically, as well as militarily. However, in my view the EU could do more, especially on the energetic side (moving towards more autonomy) confronting more bilaterally and augmenting its international position, and also in the regional sphere not only relying on its neighbouring policy.

Still, something more shall be done in order to solve problems at the corners of energetic security and economic growth. It is needed, regionally and institutionally, to channelize globalization forces in a correct manner avoiding a too much destruction of domestic value to favour external production. Not paternalism, but defence. Trade, economic, energy, and production protection.

3.4 The R.I.C.S. and the way to pursue state and societal resilience in our East and South.

Here, the music is the same. This subchapter, as the previous, develops its analysis over a precise analytical flowing: first giving (i) a context of the priority before (ii) analysing the channels present into the sub-priorities of the priority, to finally get on (iii) whether the priority into consideration has been somehow achieved, which corresponds to the definition of efficacy provided for the present work.[133]

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[131] See EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE-SAT), EUROPOL, up. 14 Jul 2022.
[132] See Eurostat, unemployment rates, EU and EA, seasonally adjusted, January 2008 - February 2023, unemployment statistics section.
[133] See Chapter 1.3, on the main concepts.

The second priority, on 'state and societal resilience to our East and South', contextualises the external socio-political fragility which could impact the interests of the Union and have severe indirect, as well as direct, repercussions on the EU.

Why has this priority been focused by the Union? The invasion in Ukraine at the borders of the Union, the migratory flows from East and from the South, the pseudo-balanced political situation in Turkey, terrorism and organised crime coming into, Georgian internal turmoil, poverty and human rights issues at the borders, and other pictures of the kind are knocking at the doors of the European Union. And, if not enough, their consequences will impact directly on the Union's security and stability.

The pressing situation in Maghreb, the African coast, which continues to pose threats to the European South, e.g. with illegal migrations and fishing. Also, the role of the European Union up to the Central Africa, in which states such as Mali, Angola or Burkina Faso fundamental rights are not part of their cultural outlook on domestic politics and affairs.[134] Also, in economic and commercial terms, good institutions and rule of law, as for respect of fundamental rights, are fundamental in order for the Union to expand its market up to the central Africa and combat illegal migratory flows.

Resilient states are secure states and are prone to accept democracy and development in their life-course. Security, ultimately, as neighbouring stability is essential for the CFSP of the Union; especially when the war is at EU borders.

Particularly, in terms of enlargement policy and membership criteria, the Union is seeking to ground more attention on conditionality mechanisms into treaties and annexation acquis.[135] Looking, especially, at the Western Balkans and Turkey. The EU will monitor and seek for feedbacks from the Commission, member states, and civil society organizations in order to look at the progress and scrutinize which reforms have been made. In this specific sense, the EU points much on bilateral, as well as the (Balkan) regional, cooperation and societal involvement and monitoring.

With neighbours, the EU will deepen association agreements[136] and deep and comprehensive free trade areas with neighbouring countries, such as Georgia or Tunisia. In addition, special attention is devoted to social involvement in the form of 'enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges' as well as project-design and management cooperation between EU's society and third countries. In this context, society and institutions again perform much of the task.

On the surrounding regions, the Commission strongly believes that, for insecure and repressive states, well-functioning regions could be good nests of re-growing their stability and

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[134] A quite recent debate, especially in the diplomatic lines of Italy, has been raised in terms of whether and how the EU, and Italy, shall interact with countries non respecting the same values of the EU, or of Italy. See for instance (i) Sabbie mobili: L'Africa tra autoritarismo e democrazia, Amb. Giuseppe Mistretta, 2002, or (ii) Italy and Africa: "Value Oriented Diplomacy" in Action, Amb. Fabrizio Lobasso, 2021.
[135] See G. Sasse, 2008. The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours. Europe-Asia Studies, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Vol. 60, No. 2.
[136] See art. 217 TFEU, ex. Art. 310 TEC.

prosperity. Regional dialogue and support, human rights protection, capacity-building measures,[137] cooperating with the UN and NATO, supplying social security and services, public-private investments, sustainability chapters' conditionality into trade agreement, and others are attempts to be made. Moreover, the EU wants to strengthen its long-run relationships with the civil societies and human rights defenders, investing in cultural initiatives[138] and enabling the local societies make the institutions accountable and build resilient societies and states. On this the EU points more on regions, civil societies and institutional capacities.

For what concerns migration policies, the EU will focus on the improvement and local good management conditions, of the countries where migrations come from. Human rights promotion, investing again on education for women and youth, developing with the countries of origin tailored migrations' management mechanisms, improving internal asylum capacities, and by ensuring correct and safe humanitarian corridors for human mobility is the EU trying to set the migratory issue up. International and regional institutions and civil societies are the main driver of this priority.

Hence, an intense diagram dispatching the channels and the nature of each priority serves to continue my analysis. Continuing on the way of the previous sub-chapter, the diagram, based on the analysis of the document been made, is the following:

Table 6 - R.I.C.S. and the Second Macro-Priority

	R	I	C	S
State and Societal Resilience to our East and South	✓	✓		✓
Enlargement Policy	✓	✓		✓
Our Neighbours		✓		✓
Resilience in the Surrounding Regions	✓	✓		✓
A More Effective Migration Policy	✓	✓		✓

In this approach, on the surrounding and enlargement context, the Union has little encounter on the corporativist society. Still, in some respect, corporations must be involved in some respect. Especially, for instance, within the third sub-priority framework for supplying social security and services the private sectors, parallelly to the public associational one, is crucial in the production and delivering period.

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[137] See Italian Carabinieri's capacity-building missions over the African territory, e.g. MIASIT, EUCAP and MIADIT Somalia, EUCAP Sahel, the 'Sabaudia' Project and CoESPU, as well as others. EU-UN missions and the like, too.
[138] See 'Italy, Africa, Cultures' project promoted by the Italian MAECI and MUR.

What matters the most in this contextual analysis, is the involvement of the social and regional power and of the inter-institutional cooperation. Still, it seems how this approach, even being quasi totally multichannelled, seems not to have a concrete efficacy, up to now.

Not it comes the question of whether has been achieved, up to this actuality, the priority of this section. I think that today's instabilities, especially, in the African context and in the Eastern part of Europe may correctly testify how this strategic outlook has not functioned properly. Particularly, looking at the political stability index of the global economy website,[139] and at the social resilience index of the 'fund for peace', it is possible to frame this situation from Northern to Central Africa:

Table 7 - Stability and Resilience Indexes up to Central Africa

Country	PSI	SRI
Algeria	-0.88	4.0
Angola	-0.71	5.0
Benin	-0.30	4.9
Burkina Faso	-1.64	4.9
Cameroon	-1.41	4.4
Central African Republic	-2.1	3.6
Chad	-1.34	3.3
Congo Republic - Brazzaville	-0.61	3.9
Democratic Republic of Congo	-1.61	3.7
Egypt	-1.02	4.6
Equatorial Guinea	-0.29	4.0
Eritrea	-1.01	/
Ethiopia	-2.07	4.9
Gabon	-0.09	5.2
Ghana	0.07	5.7
Guinea	-0.97	3.9
Guinea Bissau	-0.28	4.3
Ivory Cost	-0.95	4.6
Liberia	-0.24	4.9
Libya	-2.37	4.0
Mali	-2.35	4.3
Mauritania	-0.67	4.1
Morocco	-0.40	5.3
Niger	-1.62	4.6
Nigeria	-1.78	4.4
São Tomé & Principe	0.60	/
Senegal	-0.17	5.3
Sierra Leone	-0.60	4.8
Somalia	-2.68	3.4
South Sudan	/	2.9
Sudan	-1.94	3.6
Togo	-0.80	4.4
Tunisia	-0.70	5.5
Western Sahara	/	/

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[139] 'The Global Economy.com serves researchers, business people, academics, and investors who need reliable economic data on foreign countries.' Link: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com

The Political Stability Index (PSI) of the global economy website provides for data from a variety of sources. The website reads that 'the underlying indexes reflect the likelihood of a disorderly transfer of government power, armed conflict, violent demonstrations, social unrest, international tensions, terrorism, as well as ethnic, religious or regional conflicts'. The index goes from -2.5 to 2.5 range.

Moreover, the Social Resilience Index (SRI), of the Fund for Peace,[140] is built on seven different variables, which measure the resilience of states. The score goes from 0, the lowest level, to 10, the highest level of resilience. These scores are the averages of the integers attribute to data corresponding to the (i) civic space, (ii) economy, (iii) environment and ecology, (iv) inclusion, (v) individual capabilities, (vi) social cohesion, and (vii) state capacity.

From the graph, it is possible to observe many interesting on the political stability and societal resilience of the central African zone. Particularly, on the political side the average, excluding South Sudan and Western Sahara, is -1.03. This value is somehow very low and signifies a loss in political stability. Hence, on the possibility of augmenting domestic tensions, violent demonstrations, social distress and internal terrorism, and conflicts. Moreover, Somalia presents the lowest value of PSI worldwide.

For what concerns the SRI, it is important also in this case to consider the average. the average of social resilience is 2.58. Again, in this social context the index shows a scarcity in the social resilience. A very low integer. Despite some spread relatively high, compared to the rest, as the values of Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal or Gabon, the average of the territorial scope seems to be also in this context quite low. Then, showing the low capacity of these states to socially include and confine, provide individual capabilities, and build states' capacities to their citizens.

To conclude on this macro-priority, data show how the political and social situation up to Central Africa is somehow inconclusive depicting an average instable and non-resilient socio-political scenario, which was the second priority of the European Union in the 2016 strategy. Notwithstanding the impossibility of a single regional organization to solve the problems of Africa, the Union, with respect to its strategy, has not asserted with the second priority. More regional cooperation, and private involvement is needed.

3.5 The R.I.C.S. and the way to pursue an integrated approach to conflict and crises.

As happened for the previous sections, this subchapter develops its analysis over a precise analytical flowing: first giving (i) a context of the priority before (ii) analysing the channels

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[140] See The Fund for Peace, NGO funded in 1957, which 'works to works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security'. Its programs and indexes are frequently cited by the US government, and US defence reviews.

present into the sub-priorities of the priority, to finally get on (iii) whether the priority into consideration has been somehow achieved, which corresponds to the definition of efficacy provided for the present work.[141]

The third priority goes on prioritizing the development of 'an integrated approach to conflicts and crises'. As for the others, this priority reflects the interest of the Union in defining international conflicts and crises and combat them in order to preserve internal stability, and do not have some indirect repercussions of them. Own security and stability are always the political engine of Union's strategies.

Here it comes the analysis of the motivation that induced the Commission insert this priority into the CFSP strategy of 2016. 'We increasingly observe fragile states breaking down in violent conflict. These crises, and the unspeakable violence and human suffering to which they give rise, threaten our shared vital interests': reads the document.

For the Commission, conflicts worldwide, as well as crises of different types, are a direct threat to the 'vital interests' of the Union. Economically speaking, conflicts or political upheavals in developing countries are causes of stop for the EU to expand its business and selling market,[142] as well for EU enterprises to settle their business, and have their economic rights ensured.[143] Politically speaking, especially at the borders, conflicts and slumps are cause of preoccupation for the European Union, since civil wars, or unstable government's decisions are likely to occur posing some threats to their development and long-lasting peace,[144] which is also Union's security.

For what accounts 'pre-emptive peace', the Commission was pondering on pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy. Hence, it means investing 'on prevention, monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change'. This pre-emptive form of diplomacy must be dealt by EU delegations and special representatives. Developing a specific 'political culture' of the kind, the EU is contemplating only a pure institutional approach. This, in my view, is a strong impediment of efficacy.

On the security and stabilization sub-priority, the Strategy goes on affirming the necessity of improving internal cooperation in order to provide for better defence and security capabilities. Economically, technologically, militarily, as well as politically. This shall be done using peace agreements, in cases of failures of pre-emption 'paving the way for capacity building'. Therefore, this strategic approaching seems to be more inclined towards the pure institutional, and of the military corporative sector.

Concerning the conflict settlement prioritization, a specific sociological as well as political engagement has been thought by the Union. Since 'each conflict country will need to rebuild

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[141] See Chapter 1.3, on the main concepts.
[142] See D. Johnson, C. Turner, European Business, third edition, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2016. Specifically, part III on 'inputs and factors of production': the importance of the perception of environmental risk to EU business.
[143] See M. R. Garfinkel, S. Skaperdas, Economics of Conflict: An Overview, Handbook of Defence Economics, Volume 2, 2007, Pages 649-709.
[144] See M. E. Sørli, N. P. Gleditsch, H. Strand, Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East? Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49 No. 1, February 2005 141-165.

its own social contract between the state and its citizens', the Union will work in order to rebuild the socio-political cornerstone. 'Through CSDP, development, and dedicated financial instruments' the Union will blend a bottom-up building mechanism of political participation, which find its roots in the local society. This must entail corporative engagement, institutional and financial dialogue, and the involvement of the civil society.

On the last sub-priority, namely on the 'political economy of peace', the Commission thought of a quite straightforward master plan. First off, by 'political economy of peace' is intended a legitimate, humanitarian-sensitive, and socially responsible economic outlook on the economic policies of the country. To the EU, humanitarian aid and development go hand in hand for this specific sub-prioritization. Health, education, access to basic services, basic goods, stability, and employment are all necessary outcomes of this sub-objective. Therefore, trade, synergic bilateral dialogues and implementations, and necessary restrictive measures are considered by the political direction of the 2016 CFSP. Then, also in this approach the institutional and corporative channels must be deployed. Institutionally dialoguing and cooperating against violations of international obligations, as well of combating illegal trafficking and imposing restrictive measures. Comparatively, the Union ponders on providing services, educational, as well as employment. Moreover, a possible intervention of the public could be intended. Still, no open reference has been made.

Hence, after this long analytical consideration of how the EU addresses its sub-priorities, the diagram which correctly condense the above policy evaluation is the following:

Table 8 - R.I.C.S. and the Third Macro-Priority

An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises		✓	✓	
Pre-emptive Peace		✓		
Security and Stabilization		✓	✓	
Conflict Settlement		✓	✓	✓
Political Economy of Peace		✓	✓	
	R	I	C	S

As the schematic shows, this priority previews no engagement at the regional level, and the quasi-absence of the societal apparatus. This may logically be intended as political economy issues are not at the decisional power of the civic or at the regional organizations; the EU is the only one whose law is supreme over the national's and more advanced in terms of compliance and implementation for and by its member states. Still, on the conflict settlement side the EU sees the role of the society, as the projects, both in post-conflict, pre-conflict and

in conflict, territories powered by the EU institutions that most of the times trailer the civil involvement.

At this turn, has the EU developed an integrated approach to conflicts and crises? Before analysing the reality of facts, the priority focuses on the EU making this approach and not specifically, or necessarily correlated, to the peaceful settlement of every global conflict and crisis. Rather, to the development of a strategic capacity to combat conflicts and crises economically and financially, socially, institutionally, and corporately.

Let me now turn back to the efficacy's analysis. In the past ten or fifteen years, the Union has played a greater role in the de-politicizing of certain conflicting issues transposing them into more technical questions. This 'neo-functional' interpretation of the EU in relation to international conflicts has been somehow appropriate, as in Serbia and Kosovo.[145]

Moreover, from 2003 to 2010, the European Union has engaged into more than thirty CSDP operations, as for EU delegations and special representatives been engaged into hundreds of peace negotiations and tries of conflict settlement.[146] The EU, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, awarded itself as having contributed to 'a more secure world'.[147]

It can also be acquainted the EU's willingness, and already established practices, to develop integrated, and integrating, strategies of peacebuilding ranging from economic development to civil society, and from good governance to climate change.[148]

Condensing all it up. The Union has, in many authors' views as well mine, contributed to the development of an integrated multi-factor strategy of peacebuilding and approach to conflicts and crises. Its internal functioning and own priorities are transformed into foreign paradigmatic ways of perceiving priorities and treaty clauses.

3.6 The R.I.C.S. and the way to pursue cooperative regional orders.

This subchapter, as the others on the R.I.C.S. filtering application to the macro-priorities of the EU GS of 2016, presents the following structure: first giving (i) a context of the priority before (ii) analysing the channels present into the sub-priorities of the priority, to finally get on (iii) whether the priority into consideration has been somehow achieved, which corresponds to the definition of efficacy provided for the present work.[149] It is the classic developmental approach to these subchapters.

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[145] See G. Visoka, J. Doyle, Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016 Volume 54. Number 4. pp. 862–877.
[146] See S. Blockmans, J. Wouters, T. Ruys, The European Union and Peacebuilding: Policy and Legal Aspects, T.M.C. Asser Press, the Hague, 2010.
[147] See European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, VP/HR Javier Solana, EU Commission, 2003.
[148] See S. Duke, A. Courtier, EU Peacebuilding: Concepts, players and instruments, Centre for the Law of EU External Relations working papers, 2009.
[149] See Chapter 1.3, on the main concepts.

The Commission, in the Mogherini's person, decided to insert this priority into the strategy since 'in a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore'. Therefore, the EU as most advanced supranational organization presents his vision and strategic approach to assess a strong and rule-based regional governance system.

The document reads: 'voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs'. That is the core point. The correction and management of world influence, as well as security concerns, are the pivotal interests of the Union in the preservation of a global, and especially European, order ascetic of negative external influences and indirect securitarian concerns.

With respect to the 'European Security Order', the Commission focused exactly on the points that I have focused on above. 'The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders and the peaceful settlement of disputes are key elements of the European security order', this is what the strategy outlines.[150] Still, Russia's violations of international law, and the conflict at the Black Sea region pose severe threats to EU security. A focus, therefore, is made on the EU-Russia relationships, in institutional as well as legal terms. Still, 'climate, the Arctic, maritime security, education, research and cross-border cooperation'[151] are also matters related to the interests of the Union.

Moreover, the Union is pondering on enhancing its cooperation and contributions to the Council of Europe and the OSCE, on a regional perspective. The societal is also involved: the Commission thinks of facilitating human mobility for students, civil society and business enterprises. Social, institutional, corporative, and (European) regional channels are deployed.

On the sub-priority 'a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa' the Commission has a quite precise and well-thought strategy: the title also witnesses this intuition. Peace and prosperity are at stake. Why these regions are important to the Union according to the Commission? The document responds by saying that 'solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, migration and climate change'. A quite straight-forward explanation, in my advice.

Regional and corporative dialogues seem to have a top place in the strategy. Still, to the Union the regional approach is not sufficient to address 'all relevant dynamics, and some reflect existing cleavages'. Therefore, involving the public and the civil society is necessary. The Commission names five lines of action, which diversifies according to their geographical positioning.

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[150] On the 'independence' issue, a great workpiece is Forowicz, M., 2011. State Discretion as Paradox of EU Evolution.
[151] See also Luis, D. S., 2012. Understanding European Cross-border Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis. This paper refers either to the socio-cultural, economic and political roots that may influence the differentiation of integration all over the European Union.

The first is about Maghreb and the Middle East: here is about financial multilateral cooperation, borders' management and security, combating illicit trafficking, counterterrorism, water and food security, infrastructure and energy. A specific role of the EU as supporting and negotiating actor on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is made.

Secondly, the crux is in this context Turkey, with which the EU wants to make the state complying to accession criteria and stabilize its international positioning, especially for what concerns Cyprus. Transport, energy and education are also important steps to undertake, for the Commission.

Thirdly, the 'EU will pursue balanced engagement in the Gulf' cooperating with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and multilaterally dialoguing. 'On areas such as trade, research, environment, energy, anti-trafficking, migration and societal exchanges' the Union will rapport itself with Iran and assure its transition to democracy in a peaceful approach.

Fourth line of action is concentrated on the cooperative interconnections between North- and Sub-Saharan Africa and between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. How? The Union, and the Commission, speaks of closer cooperation and linking with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel. A pure regional, and multilateral, approaching to the question.

Lastly, the fifth line is about Africa's peace and development. Also strengthening relations with other reginal and sub-regional organizations is a plus. The Economic Partnership Agreement with Africa, to the EU, can foster mobility and integration in the continent. The area of cooperation is vast, and it will develop into 'conflict prevention, counter- terrorism and organised crime, migration and border management'. Diplomatically, and trust funds are the solutions on this. That is a purely institutionally (also on the economic impetus) and regional cooperative thinking.

To what accounts the idea of a 'closer Atlantic' the Union has a precise perspective: 'a solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance'. In this respect, the Union thinks of a strengthened alliance between the EU and the transatlantic club. The US and Canada, in this, have a central role as they represent the states with which the union wants to engage into military and economically partnering in order to get over global governance mechanisms and international crises.

But also, Latin America, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) are targeted for cooperative scopes 'on migration, maritime security and ocean life protection, climate change and energy, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and countering organised crime and terrorism'. A Free Trade Agreement with Mercosur and the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba are at the window. Deepening socio-economic ties, involving the civil society and the relevant economic sectors, is what the EU wonders over

the ocean to do with its partners. Overall, social, regional, corporative and institutional channels are all taken into account in this context.

On the Asian account, the Commission reasons differently. Particularly, in terms of peace and security the two, Asia and the EU, are inter-related: 'we will deepen economic diplomacy and scale up our security role in Asia', the Commission proposes. Specifically, the Union wants to enhance the 2015 EU-China Connectivity Platform and fertilize EU-ASEAN relations. Still, maybe due to different political approaches and visions, the Union speaks of a relation more based on dialogues and supporting, rather than effective cooperation and co-working efforts.

Also states as Japan, Korea and Indonesia are in the target of the Commission as countries to which the Union must engage into more cooperation with. State-building in Afghanistan, non-proliferation promotion, help building an 'ASEAN-led regional security architecture'. All of this entails which channels? Basically, the regional is obvious. Still, apart from it, the institutional and corporative must be ensured in order to prove the efficacy of certain interventions on research, technological cooperation or military sectors.

On the Arctic, the Commission looked to a simplest approach. As if continentalisms are in order of priority: the Atlantic, the Asian and the Arctic. The African, apart from the prosperity-issue, is aside of a continental pure approach.

Coming back to the Arctic, the Union speaks of a strategic interest since 'three member states and two European Economic Area members being Arctic states'. The Commission refers to strong political and security cooperation with the Arctic Council on issues such as climate change, development, telecommunication, R&D, and some, not specified, forms of 'concrete cooperation' with the involvement of the local communities. On the Arctic side, the Commission has thought of a purely (multilateral) institutional, and regional account with some corporative and social commitment.

After the analysis it is the turn of the schematic explanation of the multichannelity-based approach by the EU to this fourth macro-priority according to the following:

Table 9 - R.I.C.S. and the Fourth Macro-Priority

	R	I	C	S
Cooperative Regional Orders	✓	✓	✓	✓
European Security Order	✓	✓	✓	✓
A Peaceful and Prosperous Med., Mid. East, Africa	✓	✓		
(i) Maghreb and Middle East	✓	✓		
(ii) Turkey		✓		
(iii) Gulf Region	✓		✓	
(iv) Africa – Middle East	✓	✓		
(v) Africa's Peace and Development	✓	✓		
A Closer Atlantic	✓	✓	✓	✓
A Connected Asia	✓	✓	✓	
A Cooperative Arctic	✓	✓	✓	✓

As the table shows, the priority addressed along this section develops a complete range of channels in order to promote regional cooperative efforts for the aims referred to in the very first part of the chapter. Still, I would have expected more corporative and social engagement, especially in the second sub-priority in which the corporative and the social shall constitute two preconditions for a correct integration process.

Has the Union really impacted the processes of regional integration and cooperation been mentioned in the strategy? That is a quite difficult question to measure and impact. Still, I have decided to look at the already regional cooperative degree of the regions mentioned and evaluate the development and possible positive adjustments that the Union, with its foreign policies, may have boosted. I will be focusing on the African continent as a whole (not focusing on single sub-regional integration dynamics), the Arctic, the Atlantic, and the Asian region.

Is the Africa continent in the verge of getting integrated and build a solid cooperative order? The African continent has many problems. Still, in my view since the birth of the Organization for African Unity, a lot has been done in order to foster regional and continental integration and inter-cooperation. The increasing of regional economic communities (RECs)[152] and of regional organizations[153] has contributed for fifty years to the development of an integration-sensitive narrative among the continental politics. A good à la carte view of African regionalism is depicted by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which depicts an integrated, sometimes overlapping, system of 8 RECs, two sub-regional security-centred groups, three

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[152] See S. Kayizzi-Mugerwa, J. C. Anyanwu and P. Conceição, Regional Integration in Africa: An Introduction, African Development Review, Vol. 26, No. S1, 2014, 1–6.
[153] See European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, Mapping African Regional Cooperation: How to Navigate Africa's Institutional Landscape. Amandine Gnanguênon, October 2020.

multilateral initiatives focused on regional integration involving thirteen states, and also another political initiatives and protocols not recognised by the African Union (AU).[154]

All in all, economically as well politically, the AU, the RECs, and other sub-regional initiatives are all cooperating in light of a more-integrated continent that could face new challenges and propose itself to the world as a new strong power[155]. The role of the EU in all this has been, in my view and of other authors, quite significant and inspiring. Partly because it is in the inherent DNA of the EU to transponder externally its internal politics, partly because it is in the European interests the promotion of regionalism, the EU has the unique experience and understanding on how to rule a proper regional integration.[156]

On the Arctic side, the Arctic Council is a special regional forum that combines science, multilateralism, intergovernmentalism and cooperation; as well as decision-making[157]. Moreover, since its creation in 1996 the Arctic Council has demonstrated a great ability to legislate and approach, as well as identifying, scientific and political problems in a correct and efficient way.[158]

Despite the Arctic community and its dynamics are not so complex and inter-webbed as in the African context, the Arctic experience presents its uniqueness and teaching role. Also in this case, the EU has had a role in regionalism-promotion[159]. Purely institutionally speaking, a stronger form of cooperation between the EU and the Arctic began in 1993 with the birth of Barents Euro-Arctic Region, and the after establishment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council (BRC). And cooperation has enhanced year by year on a variety of matters.[160]

For what accounts the Atlantic region, the dynamics are also somehow complex but doable of analysis and depiction. Despite the Atlantic regional context is somehow fragmented, and despite the US is alone its single actions, the Atlantic regional context is transiting towards a more practical form of regional form of organization[161].

Between the EU and the Atlantic region there is a long record of cooperation in a wide range of policy fields, from military cooperation to diplomacy and economic activity.[162] The EU has for sure, as in the African context, contributed to the settlement of a regionally organized framework. Especially, for matters which may fall in the middle between the Atlantic and the

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154 See Mapping African Regional Cooperation, European Council on Foreign Relations, Amandine Gnanguênon.
155 See A. Mbembe, Africa in the New Century, The Massachusetts Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring 2016), pp. 91-104, 111.
156 See V. Bachmann, J. D. Sidaway (2010) African regional integration and European involvement: external agents in the East African Community, South African Geographical Journal, 92:1, 1-6.
157 See P. Stenlund, Lessons in regional cooperation from the arctic, Ocean & Coastal Management, volume 45, Issues 11–12, 2002, Pages 835-839.
158 See P. Kankaanpää, O. R. Young (2012) The effectiveness of the Arctic Council, Polar Research, 31:1, 17176.
159 See P. Aalto, H. Blakkisrud, H. Smith, The Northern Dimension of the European Neighborhood, 2008, Centre for European Policy Studies. Particularly, Chapter I on 'Regional and Sectoral Partnership'.
160 See W. Hasanat, Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region in the Light of International Law, Yearbook of Polar Law, Vol. 2 (2010) 279-309.
161 See A. Ayuso, F. Matheis, E. Viilup, Regional Cooperation, Interregionalism and Governance in the Atlantic, 2016, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.
162 See S. R. Sloan, NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

European interests, as maritime[163] or military issues, cooperation and mutual advantage is adverted.

Lastly, on the Asian region I would put much attention on the main regional organization of the continent: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is probably the most advanced, in cooperative terms, regional organizations in the Asian continent. Since its foundation in 1967, the organization created much more commitment in the political-security, economic and socio-cultural dimension[164]. Enhancing cooperation was the main aim.

Particularly on the economic side, the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community ASEAN in 2015, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area witness the economic power of integration and the way, via the liberalization of goods, removing tariff barriers and allowing the crucial 'four freedoms' plus free movement of investments, the ASEAN community is getting more integrated and liberalizing its economy.[165]

Has the EU given some contribution to this still-on-going process of integration in the Asian continent? If not a direct help by the EU to the ASEAN Community, still the ASEAN organization has somehow emulated the EU in the institutional side emulating the EU's Committee of Permanent Representatives and the economic integration process.[166] Then, if not contribution, an institutional point of reference to look at and to take inspiration, if not all, from the pure institutional organization.

Therefore, after this careful analysis it is possible to affirm the power, and capacity of the Union to diffuse its model of regional integration, and institutional organization, throughout the world. Despite the economic, political or socio-cultural differences, the EU in different combined ways is trying to promote more regionalism and control to all globe's regions. From Africa to Latin America, and from the Arctic to Asia.

3.7 The R.I.C.S. and the way to pursue a global governance for the XXI century.

This subchapter, as the others on the R.I.C.S. applied to the macro-priorities of the EU GS of 2016, presents the following structure: first giving (i) a context of the priority before (ii) analysing the channels present into the sub-priorities of the priority, to finally get on (iii) whether the priority into consideration has been somehow achieved, which corresponds to the definition of efficacy provided for the present work.[167]

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[163] See J. L. Suárez-de Vivero, J. C. Rodríguez Mateos, Changing maritime scenarios. The geopolitical dimension of the EU Atlantic Strategy, Marine Policy, volume 48, September 2014, Pages 59-72.
[164] See the website of the ASEAN, about ASEAN, ASEAN Charter.
[165] See K. Ishikawa, The ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN economic integration, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 2021, VOL. 10, NO. 1, 24–41.
[166] See A. Jetschke, P. Murray, Diffusing Regional Integration: The EU and Southeast Asia, West European Politics, Volume 35, 2012.
[167] See Chapter 1.3, on the main concepts.

'Without global norms and the means to enforce them, peace and security, prosperity and democracy – our vital interests – are at risk', the Strategy reads. Basically, for the Union what matters the most, as the other sub-priorities analysed show, is the necessity to ensure and protect its security and stability, by promoting security and stability in the neighbourhood as well as in all continents of the world.[168] Particularly, law-based relationships, human rights, sustainable development and what the Union calls as 'the lasting access to the global commons',[169] are the conditions for Union's 'vital interests', namely security and stability, to continue being preserved.

This commitment is a very difficult one, since the Union is not seeking to preserve the 'system', rather 'this commitment translates into an aspiration to transform [...] the existing system'. In this approach, the Commission thinks of implementing a variety of lines of action, which shall include regions, multilateral and UN dialogues, state and non-state actors. In detail, the Union seeks to 'reforming', 'investing' on, 'implementing', 'deepening', 'widening', 'developing', and 'partnering' for a change in a new global governance system 'based on international law'. Going one by one on every action.

'Reforming' stands for the Union's commitment to reform, specifically, the UN in its Security Council[170] and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which have been established since the WWII. Since 'the EU will stand up for the principles of accountability, representativeness, responsibility, effectiveness and transparency', the UN must not be based on an ancient international order which demonstrates many times insufficient and inefficient. The EU, moreover, has the will to increase the cohesion and presence in the IFIs in order to present this different approach and view of international economic, legal and political governance.

On the 'investing' side, the Commission thinks of increasing the financial pool for 'peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding and humanitarian functions' of the UN. Also in this case what has to be reformed in the EU's eyes is the UN, and its multimodal machinery. Of course, the Common Security and Defence e Policy (CSDP) area of the Union will enhance its financial, capacity-building, training and operating capacity to UN missions of stabilization worldwide. Here there is a gain a pure institutional approach. However, operating capacity and increasing in budget expenditure must signify more involvement also of the corporativist channel.

The 'implementing' aspect of the strategy is more centred on the idea of own commitments. That is to say, the Union is reaffirming its willingness to carry out its international (also political) obligations, specifically in terms of sustainable development and climate change.

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168 See Chapter 3.6, on the 'regional cooperative orders' sub-priority.
169 See on global commons, the UN Environment Program magazine called 'Our Planet'. Particularly, A. Bouteflika, Z. Shengxia, A. Cropper, J. Sachs, J. Rockström, C. Reij, S. J Hall, M. Reinke, K. Levin and M. Bapna, report on 'Global Commons: The Planet We Share', September 2011.
170 On this respect, a good account could be N. Pirozzi, The European Union and the Reform of the UN Security Council: Toward a New Regionalism? of May 2011, IAI.

Moreover, the reference to the Cotonou Agreement[171] and to the EU Consensus on Development[172] makes it alluding for possible regional and social involvements, despite no mentions have been made in the document.

The 'deepening' function of this sub-priority is focused on the economic capacity and power of the Union. The Commission speaks of 'free trade agreements with the US, Japan, Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others as building blocks of global free trade' as well as maintaining the TTIP and CETA agreement with the US and Canada, which could help the Union deepen its position in the global supply chain effectively. A new approach to future free trade agreements, which focus on digitalization processes, energy and raw materials, services and easier access to natural resources.

Moreover, special attention and room is devoted to the growth of EU interests in the maritime sphere. More specifically, the Commission wants to 'exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca', as well as in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean, by providing security in those territories and educational capacity for a correct exploitation of biological resources in a context of a more opened, rules-based, blue economy.

The EU, on the 'widening' aspect endeavours itself 'to widen the reach of international norms, regimes and institutions'. That is really a big commitment, which maybe not even the UN and its Court can claim on themselves. Problems of 'proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems' must be addressed by promoting more implementation and regulatory frameworks against these problematics. Controlling, supporting export control authorities from third countries and banning certain exports or imports from and in the EU are measures pondered by the Commission.

On the institutional side, the Commission is after promoting more dialogue with the UN Human Rights Council, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. A justice- and dialogue-based approach to the widening aim, which seems to be a very harsh path.

Rules-development and access to global commons are the cornerstones of the 'developing' action of the sub-priority. The first thought of the Commission goes onto the digital and cyber space, where European assets must be protected and preserved. The cyber space as a global common regulated under international law, and sustainably exploited. Moreover, the Commission points on an international code of conduct[173], whereby states commit themselves to a fair and just behaviours in their space activities.

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[171] See the website of the European Council, Cotonou Agreement, 2000 in substitution of 1975 Lomé. The agreement has expired in November 2021. Still, in April 2021 the Post-Cotonou Agreement has been signed always between the EU and the same 79 Africa-Pacific countries.
[172] See the website of the European Commission, European Consensus on Development. The consensus in structured around 5 Ps: people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership.
[173] See the EU proposal for an international Space Code of Conduct, 2014 draft. European External Action Service website.

Energy-sensitive, the Commission is intended just to multilateral dialogue on sustainable access to energy suppliers. On health, the Commission wants a development in the legal sense that may boost further international cooperation against pandemics and in favour of common biotechnology systems. On the rest of issues, multilateralism and institutional dialogues seem to have the biggest weight. Hence, the 'developing' approach of the Union is based on dialogue for the common exploitation of global resources, and sustainable development. Not so much efficient, in my sentiment.

The last action of the Commission is the 'partnering' one. The Commission 'will partner with states and organisations, but also with the private sector and civil society', including a variety of actors that may be fruitfully engaged for cooperation. Everyone seems to have a place here: from the UN and the US, to Africa, Asia and the Americas, up to regional organization and civil society. Also non-state actors, as the industry, are regarded especially in the cyber-space. Still, no specific activity or reference is given in this context.

UN and its agencies, NATO and ASEAN are particularly considered for 'maritime multilateralism', which may intend all sorts of cooperation. Also some reference to counterterrorism and humanitarian action, which would include the same variety of organizations, institutions and non-state actors.

Therefore, after having analysed the actions that make the strategy up, it is possible to filter them accordingly to the R.I.C.S. frame of understanding and value their efficacies:

Table 10 - R.I.C.S. and the Fifth Macro-Priority

Global Governance for the 21st Century		✓		
Reforming		✓		
Investing		✓	✓	
Implementing	✓	✓		✓
Deepening	✓	✓	✓	
Widening		✓		
Developing		✓		
Partnering	✓	✓	✓	✓
	R	I	C	S

As the diagram shows, the Union in this priority subsidies most of its effort to the institutions. There is a very little presence of social and corporate involvement, as well as of the regional. In my view, this priority, being it very complex in its sake, must be addressed using more channels as possible. But, in order to get whether this approach has been

sufficient or not I need to understand the EU's contribution to the shaping of the contemporary global governance system[174] , which the EU in some sort criticizes.

To be honest, I have not found any specific concrete reference about how the European Union is willing or trying to change this systemic global mechanism. Apart from commitments, public statements or political intensions, there is not very much on EU's contributions to the re-shaping of global governance. Despite the Union continues spreading soft power, institutional dialoguing, or trying to be pushing for international agreements and politics of goals-achievement, it cannot be said that a lot has been made by the Union to construct a new form of global order. [175]

Moreover, it is somehow acquainted the complexity for the Union to decide who shall represent the EU externally. The Union, also in the Security Council of the UN, has manifested a strong propensity and participation in world affairs. Still, multilateralism, and all the global governance play, works along the consensus of single states. Therefore, a great account to reform global governance or its institutions, as the UN or the IFIs, must be a struggle co-partitioned by all, and not just the EU. This a battle of ideas for a politics of cooperation, for peaceful settlements of disputes, and for transnational justice, which must be shared by a variety of leaders and actors. The EU alone has not sufficient power to have a great impact on this reformatory attempt.[176]

3.8 A comparative analysis. What is missing in the EU foreign strategy?

I have analysed all five macro-priorities of the 2016 EU CFSP Global Strategy. Still, the work is not over. What I have to do is maybe the most important analytical part of this study. That is to say the comparative analysis of each priority with the R.I.C.S. and assess the necessary or sufficient conditions of the success of the priority, derived from the analysis of each priority one by one. Also in this section I will be using schematics, specifically a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) mechanism, that help me better frame my discourse and uproot these *condition(s) of efficacy* of EU diplomacy. I will also speculate a bit on possible consequences and motivations of inefficacies or possible solutions to them.

As outlined in the methodology at the beginning of the present chapter, and at the beginning of the second chapter, I will be addressing the relative position of each macro-priority in relation to the R.I.C.S. not taking into consideration anymore each sub-priority. The analysis

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[174] For a great account, see M. Koenig-Archibugi, Mapping Global Governance, in: Held, David and McGrew, Anthony, (eds.) Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003
[175] See Jens-Uwe Wunderlich, D. J Bailey, The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook, first edition 2011, Routledge, London.
[176] See F. Cameron, The European Union and Global Governance, Australian National University, 2004.

of the previous chapters on the sub-priorities has served me to understand in depth each macro-priority and have a more precise outlook on the channels they present, stressing the functions and actions inserted into each sub-priority.

The following schematic allows me to have a good visual, and conceptual, perspective on the multichannel character of each macro-priority in relation to their efficacy:

Table 11 - Macro-Priorities' Efficacy relation to the R.I.C.S. | QCA

Macro-Priorities	R	I	C	S	Efficacy
The Security of Our Union		✓	✓		YES
State and Societal Resilience to our East and South		✓		✓	NO
An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises		✓	✓		YES
Cooperative Regional Orders	✓	✓	✓	✓	YES
Global Governance for the 21st Century		✓			NO

The above graph has been made by summing all channels uprooted, from the *3.3 to 3.7 sub-chapters*, looking at the single sub-priorities that form each macro-priority. Using the methodology already explained and analysing each single macro-priority and determining its channels, it has been possible to condense an entire an analysis in the above table.

Looking at the graph it is possible to make some considerations. First off, it is easily understandable that the two macro-priorities not been achieved, namely the second and the fourth, do not present the corporativist channel. By contrast, the rest of macro-priorities present the corporativist line of action. The corporativist line of action is the blank square here; the *condition of efficacy* is found.

With respect to all others, it is possible to witness a pure institutional line of action in all priorities, and a social in two. Still, looking at the priorities not achieved, it possible to observe also a quite under-developed strategy. By underdevelopment I precisely intend the idea of putting minor efforts and attention to them, in spite of being very giant, global or continental, objectives.

The only priority that presents a complete multichanneled strategic approach is the 'regional cooperative orders' priority. Partly because it is in the EU's history the promotion of supranational derogation of powers and decision-making as well as of regional forms of political organizations. To the contrary, all others present much less effort.

The reasons of why those two priorities have not been achieved could be many. Maybe, the aims are too much broad and require to many resources which the EU in itself do not

possess.[177] Maybe, these objectives are too young and necessitate to implement other channels before displaying proper sings of efficacy.[178] Maybe, to the Union in reality they are not so pivotal: internal security, regional promotion, and approaches to conflict are more important. Maybe, what the Union is trying to do is getting prepared and confront itself with these huge challenges after having gotten enough international credibility and being capable of them.[179] Lastly, maybe the Union is not competent, or powerful, enough to pursue alone such continental-wide or global priorities;[180] more partnership is needed.

To what accounts the ones achieved, it is possible to speculate a bit on why the corporativist channel seems to be the condition of efficacy in EU's foreign politics. The corporativist channel is associated to the industrial sector, as well as any private sector which delivers some services or goods.[181] This entails the strongest link between the government and the private: the enterprise is in the medium between the citizen and the government. Moreover, the enterprise or the corporate, more generally, has the duty to connect the citizen to goods, services, or other functions that the state has to deliver. Corporates can deal with representation, employment, healthcare, supporting and monitoring activities, consulting, research and development, academic or research centres, think tanks, and so forth.

Hence, the establishment of EU corporate channels into foreign countries means the activation of powerful civilian, private, powers which can link the local government to local citizens and deliver to the latter services or goods. In some continent, as the African or part of the Asian, there is a luck of basic services, education and goods, which could be filled by the Union, locally. This also entails some form of cultural, or psychological, connection between the local employed (e.g., Africans, Asians) and the (EU) employer, which would certainly benefit the country, or region, of origin.

The establishment of national corporate activities externally has a strong power as it [the corporativist channel] entails the presence of the EU making the local benefitting not from a foreign government, or region, which has also its psychological effect, but by a foreign employer or corporate direction which comes from the EU.

Moreover, the corporativist narrative do not only refer to the presence of EU corporates in the foreign context, but also to the help of the EU to foreign corporates and to the EU dialoguing, supporting, monitoring, helping foreign corporates. Quite often, the literature tends to speak of the civil society apart from the corporate sectors. Still, to me, since this channel, in

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[177] On this respect a great piece could be 'European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World', by Karen E: Smith, 2003. There are many chapters, in which Smith analyses, throughout history, the willingness of the EU to compete on resources and augment them, still with some difficulties.

[178] A point on this issue is made along the 7th report, 'A Strategy for EU Foreign Policy', by the EU Institute for Security Studies. At the first chapter, there is note of the importance to the EU to be more effective in its objectives and develop different positions and characteristics of its foreign politics.

[179] On this respect, a very interesting paper is 'The European External Action Service and agenda- setting in European foreign policy', S. Vanhoonacker and K. Pomorska, Routledge, 2013. They focus on the need for the Union fist 'build credibility' and then 'gain attention' to their priorities and solutions.

[180] Have a look, on this respect, at the introduction 'Constraints, Opportunities, and Choices in the European Foreign Policy' by J. Zelionka, in J. Zelionka, Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. In the introduction, the editor points on the empirical needs of the EU for its foreign policy, which are difficult to be achieved due to the 'dwarf'-side of the Union.

[181] See Chapter 2.4, on the R.I.C.S. frame of understanding and the policy spectrum of the EU.

addition to the social character, brings with itself an economic potential of growth, especially for underdeveloped realities, it is the best expression of the civic potential both in- and out-state.

Considering, for instance, the second priority many points could be raised. The Union shall be looking from the point of reference of the country, or region, of delivery. Not from the EU's standpoint. Some suggestions could be (i) more partnering with the African Union and its agencies, as well as with the Regional Economic Communities,[182] (ii) less conditionality mechanisms,[183] (iii) Foreign Direct Investments' returns added up to the African GDPs,[184] and (iv) an approach based on the idea of multistakeholderism and more involvement of the African public sphere comprising the corporate. The EU, in its very case, is mistaking in its approach.[185]

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[182] A good account about the way of the Union to sue partnerships as ways of promoting regional cooperation and avoid memberships, due to obvious conditions, see The EU and 'Wider Europe': Toward an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation? of James W. Scott, 2005.

[183] A great paper on whether to use conditionality mechanisms or improving some economic and commercial links, causing indirect benefits in terms of domestic politics and provoking internal changes. The so called 'asphyxiation' or 'oxygen' dilemma. On this, see Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma, Franklin L. Lavin, 1996.

[184] See Impact of South-South FDI and trade on the export upgrading of African economies, A. Amighini and M. Sanfilippo, 2013. On the way FDIs, from developing countries (South), positively correlate to Africa's export development.

[185] According to S. Keukeleire, in chapter: Lessons for the Practice and Analysis of EU Diplomacy from an ' Outside-in' Perspective in Routledge: The Neighbors of the European Union's Neighbors, was of the idea that an 'outside-in' approach is needed by EU policies in order to have a greater degree of efficacy, especially in the different regions.

CONCLUSION

This work has been thought in order to give explanation and scientific grounding to the methods applied by the EU institutions, particularly the Commission, in the realm of foreign politics. Especially, regarding the 2016 EU Global Strategy, my intent is to look at the condition(s) of efficacy of the above strategy. By efficacy it is merely intended the achievement of the strategic priorities, compared to current affairs.

Moreover, it has been my profound willingness to introduce the reader to the topic using a mixed, particular, methodological design. Computationalism, qualitative discoursing, as well as a schematic analysis have all adorned my analysis on the ability of the Commission, and the Union overall, to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

At the beginning of the work I have presented a quite condensed evolution of EU foreign policy, from Rome to Lisbon times. Something around half century of history. Still, now what it is interesting is the way I am presenting a new diplomacy, which should be more direct and identity-based, or value-oriented. The latter is what I have called the *Event C Scenario*, which is the most probable scenario using a cross-impact analysis approach based on conditional probability calculus [*see Chapter 2.5*].

However, the very theme and intent of this analysis is not about previewing the exact future of EU diplomacy, or upon which rationality, directionality or channelity would it be based. What matters in this context is assessing the efficacy of the foreign strategy adopted and written down by the European Commission.

Hence, the five macro-priorities of the 2016 strategy are: (i) security of our Union, (ii) state and societal resilience in our East and South, (iii) an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, (iv) cooperative regional orders, and (v) global governance for the XXI century. Each macro-priority presents a variety of sub-priorities. In order, then, to look at the single channels of each macro-priority, I have paid attention to the channels of each sub-priority one-by-one. If at least half of the sub-priorities presented a determinate channel, then the entire macro-priority would have presented that channel either.

What has been quite impressing is how the Union, despite the continuous internal narrative, has little involvement in foreign terms of the social and of the regional character. Yes, for the Union regionalism-promotion and social issues are always at stake and present. Still, for what accounts foreign politics, social involvement (and not attention to the 'social') and regional interaction is not so common.

Table 11 explained this perfectly. Overall speaking, regionalism is only contemplated clearly in relation to the fourth macro-priority, which is about 'regional cooperative orders'. While, social involvement is attendant to the same priority, and of course to the second, which is about 'state and societal resilience in our East and South'. Apart from these two cases, the

other priorities present very little reference to the social and regional spheres. And that is, in my opinion, a strong strategic deficit.

After having applied the methodology, I have quite largely explained, it has been possible to me to have a final say on the condition of efficacy which, R.I.C.S. and current context accordingly, seems to be the *corporativist* one. Following a channel-based and contextual analysis, the corporative entities seem to bring with themselves the necessary character which would render efficient the strategy of the European Union.

The consequence, therefore, and suggestion for the Commission is to deploy more corporations along missions, and interlocutions worldwide. Whichsoever the thematic of the priority. The corporativist line of action brings with itself not only an economic potential per se, but also some psychological and cultural connection between the sending country and the country of origin. Or at least, between the helping country (EU) and the country of origin (addressee of the strategy).

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ABSTRACT IN ITALIAN

I presenti avvenimenti mondiali mi hanno fatto molto riflettere sull'azione internazionale dell'UE e dei suoi sforzi per influenzare e dirigere le questioni globali. Oltre all'aspetto economico e politico, l'Unione europea è coinvolta anche nella tutela dei diritti sociali e dei problemi culturali che richiedono un rafforzamento del proprio contributo internazionale finalizzato allo sviluppo di un nuovo sistema globale.

Tuttavia, come l'UE stia cercando di perseguire questo mega-obiettivo e con quali strumenti sono due questioni importanti da analizzare. A mio avviso, infatti, i canali, ovvero le linee di azione e di comunicazione dell'UE, sono fattori determinanti per questo tipo di studio. I canali, infatti, non sono solo strumenti di per sé ma sono anche destinatari delle azioni dell'Unione. È intuitivo, inoltre, che più canali sono correttamente impiegati, più possibilità e probabilità c'è per l'Unione di raggiungere un certo grado di efficacia rispetto alle sue priorità di politica estera.

Più specificamente, i canali che ho deciso di includere in questa analisi formano quello che ho chiamato il R.I.C.S. *"frame of understanding"* in italiano "quadro di riferimento" o comprensione. Questo quadro sta per: regioni (R), istituzioni (I), corporazioni (C) e società (S). Questi quattro canali sono responsabili di direzionare e recepire i messaggi, le posizioni, le azioni diplomatiche e gli impulsi politici dell'Unione Europea nel mondo. Se questo sia stato fatto e sarà fatto in modo efficiente è una questione importante. Questa tesi si basa proprio sulla volontà di rispondere a tale interrogativo e strutturare una risposta metodologica adeguata.

Difatti, per poter affrontare un tema così complesso è necessaria una metodologia innovativa. Il mio approccio metodologico è abbastanza preciso. Innanzitutto, per me è importante valutare, sotto il maggior numero possibile di dimensioni (ad esempio, economica, socioculturale, politica o giuridica) il contesto in cui si svolge l'analisi. Per comprendere le basi su cui poggiano le ragioni di certe strategie, documenti o dichiarazioni, è importante avere una contestualizzazione ben strutturata della storia, legale e sociopolitica, passata e presente. È questo l'obiettivo del primo capitolo.

Nel secondo capitolo, mi occuperò di analizzare sotto un profilo più teorico la politica estera dell'Unione; i suoi paradigmi e le peculiarità principali. Attraverso la

creazione di uno spettro tridimensionale di politica (estera) basato su (i) direzionalità, (ii) canalizzazione e (iii) razionalità è possibile avere un'idea concisa di tutti i tipi di politiche pensate dall'UE, specialmente se rivolte all'estero. Inoltre, è proprio qui che si basa la spiegazione del quadro R.I.C.S. Quest'ultimo servirà da filtro principalmente nel terzo capitolo.

Il terzo capitolo, perciò, si occuperà di analizzare l'efficacia della strategia globale dell'UE per la PESC del 2016 in relazione al filtro R.I.C.S. In questo caso, il R.I.C.S. non è solo uno strumento esplicativo utilizzabile per comprendere l'applicazione strategica della politica estera dell'UE, ma è piuttosto adoperato per valutare e collocare l'azione esterna dell'Unione. Così come per determinare quali condizioni di efficacia potrebbero spiegare il fallimento o il successo della diplomazia dell'Unione. Per questo motivo, nella fase di studio del caso (i.e., la strategia), il R.I.C.S. viene impiegato per distinguere e filtrare i canali e le caratteristiche di ciascuna priorità.

Ma da dove viene il filtro R.I.C.S.? Guardando al primo capitolo, in cui viene fornito uno sviluppo costituzionale e storico dagli anni '50 fino ai tempi della riforma di Lisbona, è possibile individuare i diversi modi in cui l'Unione si è progressivamente adattata agli affari esteri dispiegando e aprendosi a nuovi attori, e nonché a nuovi canali di azione.

Innanzitutto, nel primo sotto-capitolo, *da Roma al Trattato di Maastricht*, si nota una scarsa attenzione da parte dell'Unione in termini di politica estera, e ciò è immaginabile dal momento che il Trattato di Roma non si proponeva di risolvere specifiche questioni diplomatiche, ma riguardava piuttosto l'economia, il commercio e la produzione di energia atomica. In realtà, forse il periodo immediatamente successivo alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale non necessitava di particolari soluzioni a problemi securitari o militari. Quindi, è in qualche maniera preciso ipotizzare come il canale corporativista, o produttivo-privato, fosse quello predominante, durante gli anni Cinquanta. Nonostante si trattasse solo di una questione interna (quella economico-commerciale), l'Unione (all'epoca la CEE) dispiegherà questo *leitmotiv* anche nelle sue relazioni internazionali, in cui l'economia per l'appunto prevarrà.

Tuttavia, come dimostrerà questa tesi, nonostante il canale corporativista sia stato il primo approccio dell'Unione in termini di politica estera, sarà il meno utilizzato in tale ambito negli anni a seguire. È come se le imprese avessero

posizioni centrali rispetto alla politica interna, ma non rispetto all'approccio diplomatico della Comunità.

Ciononostante, con l'avvento di Maastricht, l'Unione 'a tre pilastri' ha sviluppato una posizione più forte in termini di politica estera e una visione più ampia sulle questioni diplomatiche, di sicurezza e di difesa aventi una certa influenza sulla sicurezza dell'Unione. La guerra fredda, il declino delle URSS e la caduta del Muro di Berlino sono fasi culminati che impongono all'Unione un'unità, in capo internazionale, necessaria al fine di mantenere un proprio posizionamento regionale e globale e proteggere i propri interessi. L'assetto internazionale del secondo dopoguerra, la divisione in blocchi durante la guerra fredda, o la vasta crisi internazionale in termini economici e militari, ad esempio nel Golfo, in Africa o in Medio Oriente, ha portato l'Unione a cambiare il proprio paradigma estero.

Ad ogni modo, i pensatori di Maastricht ebbero l'idea di dare vita al pilastro della PESC e di creare la figura dell'AR/VP. Questa condizione internazionale sensibile e delicata ha spinto l'Unione a sviluppare un canale istituzionale di comunicazione e azione più forte. Essere rappresentati, sviluppare proprie missioni e dialoghi diplomatici con i Paesi terzi era essenziale per proteggere la sovranità estera dell'Unione contro l'influenza troppo ampia degli Stati Uniti e della NATO. Il canale istituzionale è stato sviluppato per rispondere a questo crollo internazionale più ampio e per assecondare un'aspirazione *DeGaulliana* di distacco diplomatico e indipendenza estera dagli alleati.

Gli altri due canali, quello sociale e quello regionale, si sono sviluppati nel periodo di Lisbona. Il Trattato di Amsterdam conteneva una serie di riferimenti al canale regionale, o almeno militare. Eppure, era il Trattato di Lisbona che ha messo in termini più espliciti l'importanza del regionalismo e della sua promozione a livello mondiale, nonché il coinvolgimento della società civile. A partire dagli anni '90, l'UE e il mondo hanno attraversato un'epoca caratterizzata dall'avanzamento tecnologico e da un progresso sociopolitico post-materialista. Pertanto, l'Unione ha avuto la possibilità di coinvolgere maggiormente i suoi cittadini, creando una maggiore legittimità per le sue azioni, sia internamente che esternamente.

Quindi, considerando questa prospettiva costituzionale e l'importanza che l'Unione ha riservato a ciascun canale fino alla contemporaneità (l'ultimo capitolo si occupa proprio della contemporaneità), è possibile ricavare questo schema abbastanza intuitivo:

Figure 11 - R.I.C.S., time- ad weight-adjusted

Il filtro R.I.C.S. fa parte di una metodologia più ampia, che in questa tesi mi aiuterà a decodificare le ragioni di efficacia, qualora esistano, rispetto alle cinque priorità della strategia globale per la politica estera di sicurezza comune (PESC) dell'Unione del 2016. Tutte queste cinque priorità si adattano perfettamente al quadro di comprensione R.I.C.S. Sembrerebbe, inoltre, che l'Unione non abbia sviluppato altri canali o considerato altre linee di azione. Infatti, la strategia, così come il Trattato di Lisbona, segue lo stesso pensiero e approccio di definizione delle priorità e degli obiettivi. Si osserva qualche leggero cambiamento nella terminologia e nelle misure da attuare, ma nessuno sviluppo sostanziale in termini di canali dispiegabili o di nuovi attori con cui dialogare.

Questa tesi seguirà un preciso design metodologico. Come indicato all'inizio di questo abstract, dopo (i) aver fornito un breve contesto della politica costituzionale ed estera dell'Unione, (ii) procederò indagando e investigando a proposito delle diverse caratteristiche delle politiche estere dell'UE (iii) al fine di esaminare quali forme di diplomazia l'UE stabilisce strategicamente e (iv) avere quindi una prospettiva sul possibile futuro della diplomazia dell'UE.

Questo lavoro analitico e teorico preventivo ha infatti creato alcuni diagrammi e schemi che raffigurano e diradicano le caratteristiche principali della diplomazia dell'UE. Ho infatti creato uno spettro tridimensionale della politica estera dell'UE,

basato sulla razionalità (razionale o identitaria), sulla direzionalità (diretta o indiretta) e sulla canalizzazione (R.I.C.S.) della *policy*. Queste tre categorie, o variabili, costituiscono uno spazio ben congegnato, in cui tutte le azioni estere dell'UE potrebbero essere analizzate anche per studi futuri. In questo preciso contesto analitico, il R.I.C.S. non è né un filtro né uno strumento di analisi, bensì è una variabile che indica una caratteristica ben precisa di una determinata politica.

Ho poi concluso con (v) lo studio di ogni priorità e di tutte le sue sotto-priorità, e con (vi) la costruzione di un'analisi comparativa in cui ogni macro-priorità viene esaminata sotto il R.I.C.S. Tutto questo prima di (vii) aver valutato l'efficacia di ogni priorità in relazione all'attualità, al fine di (viii) arrivare infine a quale canale possa costituire la condizione di efficacia, o necessaria, affinché la diplomazia dell'UE funzioni correttamente.

Questo è esattamente l'obiettivo della tesi. Vorrei rispondere a una domanda piuttosto difficile e di enorme rilevanza: se l'UE riesce a realizzare le sue priorità e i suoi obiettivi in materia di politica estera e, soprattutto, cosa determina questa efficacia o contribuisce al suo cattivo funzionamento o fallimento. Nel presente lavoro, sarà possibile trovare numerosi riferimenti a documenti politici dell'UE, riviste estere, testi di autori risalenti al secolo scorso e una pletora di articoli e contributi scientifici riguardanti l'azione esterna dell'UE.

Spero che la mia analisi possa dare spiegazione ad alcune questioni irrisolte e dare una certa originalità all'argomento. Questo tema unico mi ha imposto la necessità di sviluppare una metodologia specifica e di filtrare un'enorme quantità di letteratura e di contributi accademici. Alla fine, potrebbe sembrare che io abbia trovato una soluzione ai problemi (esteri) dell'UE. Tuttavia, la mia volontà è solo quella di studiare, analizzare e determinare scientificamente le cause e le condizioni che possono influenzare una corretta azione estera, e di permettere all'UE di adattarsi di conseguenza.

Questo lavoro è stato pensato per dare spiegazione e fondamento scientifico ai metodi applicati dalle istituzioni dell'UE, in particolare dalla Commissione, in politica estera. In particolare, per quanto riguarda la Strategia globale dell'UE del 2016, l'intento è quello di esaminare le condizioni di efficacia di tale strategia. Per efficacia si intende semplicemente il raggiungimento delle priorità strategiche negli affari correnti.

Inoltre, è stata mia profonda volontà introdurre il lettore all'argomento utilizzando un design metodologico misto studiato appositamente per il presente lavoro. Computazioni probabilistiche, discorsi e analisi qualitative e l'approccio schematico hanno adornato la mia analisi sulla capacità della Commissione, e dell'Unione in generale, di perseguire i propri obiettivi di politica estera.

All'inizio del lavoro ho presentato un'evoluzione piuttosto condensata della politica estera dell'UE, da Roma a Lisbona, circa mezzo secolo di storia. Ciononostante, interessante è il modo in cui presento un nuovo approccio diplomatico, più diretto e basato sull'identità, o orientato ai valori dell'UE. Quest'ultimo è quello che ho chiamato lo Scenario *Evento C*, che è lo scenario più probabile utilizzando un approccio di analisi dell'impatto incrociato (cross-impact analysis) basato sul calcolo di alcune probabilità condizionali [*vedi cap. 2.5*].

Tuttavia, il tema e l'intento di questa analisi non è esattamente il futuro della diplomazia dell'UE, e neanche su quale razionalità, direzionalità o canalizzazione si baserebbe. Ciò che conta in questo contesto è valutare l'efficacia della strategia estera attuata dalla Commissione europea, e dall'Alto Rappresentante.

Le cinque macro-priorità della strategia 2016 sono: (i) la sicurezza della nostra Unione, (ii) la resilienza di Stato e sociale nel nostro Est e Sud, (iii) un approccio integrato ai conflitti e alle crisi, (iv) ordini regionali cooperativi e (v) la governance globale per il XXI secolo. Ogni macro-priorità presenta una serie di sotto-priorità. Al fine di esaminare i singoli canali di ogni macro-priorità, ho analizzato la *canalità* di ogni singola sotto-priorità. Se almeno la metà delle sotto-priorità presentavano un determinato canale, allora anche l'intera macro-priorità avrebbe posseduto quel canale.

È particolarmente interessante notare come l'Unione, nonostante la continua narrazione politica interna, sia poco coinvolta in termini esteri da un punto di vista prettamente sociale e regionale. Certo è che per l'UE la promozione del regionalismo e le questioni sociali sono sempre in gioco e presenti. Ad ogni modo, per quanto riguarda la politica estera Europea, il coinvolgimento sociale (e non l'attenzione al "sociale") e l'interazione regionale non sono così comuni. La tabella 11 [*vedi List of Tables*] lo spiega perfettamente.

In generale, il regionalismo è contemplato chiaramente solo in relazione alla quarta macro-priorità, che riguarda gli "ordini cooperativi regionali". Il coinvolgimento sociale è legato alla stessa priorità e, naturalmente, alla seconda,

che riguarda la "resilienza di Stato e sociale nel nostro Est e Sud". A parte questi due casi, le altre priorità presentano pochissimi riferimenti alla sfera sociale e regionale. E questo è, a mio avviso, un forte deficit strategico. L'analisi qualitativa comparata (QCA) delle macro-priorità ha generato la seguente tabella (n. 11):

Macro-Priorities	R	I	C	S	Efficacy
The Security of Our Union		✓	✓		YES
State and Societal Resilience to our East and South		✓		✓	NO
An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises		✓	✓		YES
Cooperative Regional Orders	✓	✓	✓	✓	YES
Global Governance for the 21st Century		✓			NO

Dopo aver applicato la metodologia, che ho ampiamente illustrato, mi è stato possibile definire in via definitiva la condizione di efficacia che, in base al R.I.C.S. e al contesto attuale, sembra essere quella *corporativistica*, come mostra la tabella di sopra. A seguito di un'analisi concentrata e contestuale, le entità corporative sembrano portare con sé il carattere necessario per rendere efficiente la strategia dell'Unione Europea. Per corporazioni intendo qualsiasi processo, o organizzazione, di confinamento sociale, in cui i suoi membri si associano per il perseguimento di comuni fini, siano essi sociali, sia di rappresentanza, sia economico-commerciali o altri.

La conseguenza, dunque, e il suggerimento per la Commissione è quello di impiegare un maggior numero di aziende, o di realtà corporative più in generale, nelle proprie missioni e interlocuzioni a livello mondiale, qualunque possa essere il tema della priorità. La linea d'azione corporativista porta con sé non solo un potenziale economico di base, ma anche un legame psicologico e culturale tra il Paese d'invio e quello d'origine, ossia tra il Paese aiutante (UE) e il Paese aiutato (destinatario della strategia).