

Course of

SUPERVISOR

CANDIDATE

Academic Year

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1.Introduction:

This thesis has multiple aims. The first is to define the political discourse. This means how the political discourse was historically conceived and its evolution in the era of audience democracy. Second, it aims to provide a definition of “woke” substantive and “wokism”. In order to do so, an historical introduction is provided to understand when the term appeared and the linkages with colonial past. The evolution of the ideology related to French theory is then aborded so as to grasp to what extent the social and political movements from US are actually inspired by French deconstructionism. Successively, it is treated to what extent the term woke became a catch-all substantive definable as “soft McCarthyism” employed by right and far right parties in France. This implies an analysis regarding the role of fear in the instrumentalization of the phenomenon, but also to what extent critiques present a lucid views on the possible risks related to minority tyranny. More precisely, to what extent “wokism” is a manipulated issue by far and right parties but also by left ones in order to create a cleavage useful to expropriate Macron’s electorate. These dynamics are analyzed in chapter three, in which the conceptions of “wokism” relative to the French political spectrum are operated by defining what do French political parties intend by “wokism” and which are the implications on the political discourse for the different parties. In chapter four, to better understand the means through which this cleavage is perpetrated, this work analyzes the discursive strategies adopted in the mediatic debate in order to discredit political opponents. Further, it is analyzed how mediatic debate current structure is detrimental to democracy and the strategies operated to polarize to create audience. This work also focuses very much on migration phenomenon as the latter constitutes the pillar of cleavage much more than LGBTQ+ questions, at least in the case of French political discourse. It provides an historical perspective by explaining French colonial past and how this past influenced the creation of polarized conceptions about multiculturalism, integration and assimilation processes. Chapter five is instead focused on exploring

the links between the concepts of cancel culture, woke ideology and social justice. Finally, chapter six focuses on the themes that create more controversy, fomenting political polarization detrimental to French democracy.

2. « wokism » and political discourse in France:

2.1: What is the political discourse? What are the differences with polemic discourse?

First, political discourse is an exchange of ideas. It is based on politicians' participation. It traditionally took place in the framework of political institutions but exported itself exponentially within medias and social medias as a result of the increasing audience captivated by those medias. The traditional aim of a political discourse was to make public actors think in order to have a debate.

The second component is the one of power and influence. This became more or less true with the appearance of "party democracy" and became even more than less true when it came to "audience democracy". Since when the primary goal became to convince. This differentiation is important because to convince you don't need to make the other think, you don't want the other to think. While with "party democracy" the idea was to convince by inducing the identification of people towards certain values, "audience democracy" aims at make people identify with one or more individuals that according to their subjective judgements embodies a certain set of ideas.

The last constitutive element of political discourse is action. More precisely such a set of actions would allow the creation of an ideal socio-political space for those politicians promoting a certain discourse (Charaudeau,2005).

The polemic discourse instead, is firstly based on aggressivity. The first finality is to discredit the opponent as a person, before discrediting his ideas. It is particularly employed in "audience democracy" era, as the attention is turned towards individualities. The idea is not to prove that a given point is valid by A+B. The departure point is rather the discreditation of the other. From this discreditation, the debater will then expose his points. As a spectator loses trust in an individual because discredited, it will then be very easy to make him comply with another vision despite its limitations. The polemic discourse not only is used by politicians, but it is also fomented by medias (as in the case of the debates analyzed later on) as it allows to captivate a greater audience.

2.2 Woke: origins of the movement and French Theory

Let's start with a few definitions of what is being Woke:

- ⇒ “Being woke is being aware of the dominations we are no longer used to see” (Tavoillot,2022)
- ⇒ “Not a purely polemic term or a term created by its detractors. It is first an auto-revendication” (Valentin,2022)
- ⇒ “A revolution of the logic, a revolution of the excluded alterity” (Badinter,2022)

In 1896, T. Booker Washington published “The Awakening of the Negro”, we will then have to wait for the mid twentieth century in order to observe a popularization of the expression being “woke”. In a first moment it was used to describe the awareness towards dynamics of domination impeaching the African American emancipation.

From these diverse definitions we observe as the main commonality the focus on social injustice as strongly and positively correlated with racial issues. The term “woke” is associated with a shift in perspective in the way an individual analyses the social ecosystem surrounding him. Shift departs from an alienating reality in which the individual is “asleep” towards social injustices. Referring to woke ideology, overpassing alienation implies empathizing with other ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities. Concretely, understanding the grasp of challenges these individuals are faced to in the everyday life such as employment discrimination; police violence; gender discrimination... .

In the beginning of the 20th century, social activism was already widely diffused among the Afro-American community. Marcus Garvey, a famous Jamaican philosopher known as a preceptor for Pan-Africanism diffusion, is remembered for his exhortations “Wake-up Ethiopia! wake-up Africa!” made in 1923. Furtherly, in 1938 the blues musician Lead Belly employs the expression “stay woke” in a conscious activist track. Some specialists even situate the apparition of the term during the 19th century but the written references to it were only episodic at the time. In the mid 1950's, Ralph Ellison publishes “The invisible man”. This book contains the whole essence of “wokism” and a sentence of it resumes it very well, namely “If I am invisible, it is because people refuse to see me”. In the 1960's, “wokism” initially took on a peaceful dimension with the appearance of non-violent civil movements. Their revendications will allow the entry into force of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and more importantly of the voting rights in 1965. From 1965 until the death of Martin Luther King in 1968 however, frustration will grow within African American communities, particularly in the Northern parts of the US, and every summer will be punctuated by violent riots, among which the famous example of Watts riots in 1965.

The 1970's constitute a turnover for the Woke movement with the exportation of French Theory in US university campuses. The leading authors of this movement are Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida. The movement assumes that "Every power, hierarchy, knowledge is source of social constructions sustaining the power in place, therefore we must deconstruct everything" (Derrida,1967). It is the idea promulgated by the Deconstructionism movement. The movement relies on the fact that history is taught under the prism of power dynamics, the same is true for languages. This assumption implies a necessity of systematically deconstructing to impeach the perpetration of inequalities. Therefore, these philosophers preach the dissolution of the "me", the suppression of identities. However, this is not the interpretation that US activists make of it. In fact, the impact will be the generation of a form of communitarianism for every minority. This deformation is originally proper to the US context. Already in the 1970's critiques appeared with regards to the deformation of being woke, one important book to this extent is "White dog" written by Romain Gary in 1970. The story talks about a dog who crosses the road of the author and his partner. They will quickly understand that the dog in question is from South states and that he was formed to attack black people. This originally disturbs the author recognized for his engagement towards the protection of African American rights, who is even tempted to put an end to the animal's life. Then, in cooperation with an African American working in a zoo, Gary will reeducate the dog. The book not only denounces racism of white people towards black but also of black towards white, and how the latter is instrumentalized by some white people who are not animated by the humanist values they pretend to defend but rather by personal interests. Anyway, let's get back to the deformation of French theory by US students. Successively, this deformed ideology rooted in French theory will be reexported to France forty years later with the obsession of the race, gender, and identity (Tavoillot,2022). With regards to race, what is told is the following: If you are not a white person you will be discriminated one day or another even if you have never been, it will happen sooner or later (Khan,2021).

Massive demonstrations in the streets but also coordinated mobilization through social media characterize the operational settings of the social movement. Even though the so-called "modern woke ideology" got popular due to racial issues, the diffusion of the ideology around the globe resulted in a diversification of the fights emanating from it. Namely, sexual and religious minorities progressively became central subjects. Woke ideology identifies inequalities as the consequence of structural issues and recommends a restructuring of culture and institutions in the optic of a less oppressive society towards minorities.

2.3 Wokism and political parties in France

“wokism” is a catch-all substantive. In fact, actions going in the direction of “wokism” can be legitimate riots, accusations either justified or not but also statues takedown or inclusive writing. The commonality of these actions is that they all concern minorities rights protection. While this element is often a priority for ecologist and progressive parties who see multiculturalism and inclusion as their core values, it is feared by the more conservatives. This is due to the fear of an increasing tyranny of the minorities and freedom reduction.

Due to its nebulosity, it is complicated to assess what is fictional and what is real about “wokism”. To elucidate the issue, let’s now focus on what “wokism” means for those who are not categorically opposed to it and at contrary are favorable to one or more fights related to minorities rights. Nathalie Grandjean (Philosopher and researcher at Saint-Louis university) tends to think that “wokism” is mainly fictional. To talk about an ideology there is the need of coordination in action which according to her is inexistent due to the great heterogeneity and incompatibility of agenda of the different groups, social movements identified as “wokists”. What is instead the real part according to her, is all the political conflict that is generated by discussions and polemics around minorities subjects. Therefore, she defines “wokism” as a debate phenomenon based on moral panicking embracing a radicalized discourse. Vincent de Coorebyter (professor of philosophy at Université Libre de Bruxelles) considers instead that the “wokism” has strong historical roots firstly among Afro-American militants in the first part of the 20th century, even though at the time to be “woke” was only relative to racial discrimination while today it has evolved. To a first extent because it is no longer the partisans of fight against racial discrimination that will define themselves woke but rather their detractors. Secondly, because the term “woke” as it sounds in the mouth of detractors now concerns a multitude of fights against discrimination. However, de Coorebyter considers that the existence of “wokism” doesn’t naturally imply a capital threat from the movement transforming society and to this extent he joins Nathalie Grandjean’s point by highlighting the willingness to instore moral panicking by those right and far right politicians.

Despite its internal incoherences and contradictions, the fight against “wokism” has become a main electoral campaign theme that brings to its detractors a considerable number of votes allowing *Reconquete* to perform a score of 7% and 41.5% when it comes to the *Rassemblement National* during the 2022 Presidential elections. Even though they didn’t make “wokism” fight their principal campaign theme, there are also critiques towards “wokism” from center and left parties. For center parties such as *En Marche*, the party of Emmanuel Macron, the principle of laicity and universalism

is the one that is the most threatened by “wokism”. To this regard, the party fears a systematic victimization of certain minorities that can bring up communitarianism and radicalization (e.g: Abaya illegalization examined later).

2.4. Is woke ideology a manipulated issue by far-right parties?

Eric Zemmour when criticized about his incapacity to bring French people together retorqued that a strong socio-political cleavage left/right is necessary to a functional democracy. After these statements we could be led to think that the party tries to invent reasons of cleavage to exist, inscribing itself in a long tradition of populist parties whose function is more about convincing than governing. In this section we will examine the instrumentalization of woke ideology and try to assess the veracity of critiques made to it by its detractors.

One of the main critiques made to “wokism” is that of underrating the impact of high permissivity towards religion in the public space. The debate about the veil at school took on disproportionate dimensions in the French political discourse. But also, the financing for the construction of mosques by foreign countries, then criticized to appoint preachers having a very orthodox view of Islam. Or a few years ago the question of halal lunches at school. About these matters, also moderated parties such as “En Marche” (Macron party) affirm to condemn religion in the public sphere as it could be the source of stigmatization for those individuals who manifest their religious attachment publicly. However, his position is different from the right parties one since he doesn’t condemn the use of veil at university and justifies it by the fact that at that moment “Shaping mind” process is concluded. By the other hand, the principal left party “France Insoumise” argues that wearing a given clothing or having a given regime is firstly due to culture before of religion. Therefore, if we adopt this perspective, we must respect the heterogeneity of culture and the issue is no more about laicity. With these two antagonistic social analyses it is impossible not to have cleavage and the willingness of political parties to create it is undeniable. To this extent, we can observe that the voters both from France insoumise and *Reconquete* are “communitarian” votes. In fact, more than 65% of the muslims who voted did so in favour of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. While at the opposite, Eric Zemmour voters are mainly people having strong nationalist, sometimes complotist beliefs, with an orthodox respect of tradition which is based on the assumption that multiculturality is impossible and that only one culture has to prevail, the “legitimate” one so to say with an attempt to bring together popular classes, especially from rural areas and a certain part of the bourgeoisie. As the condition of existence of these two parties is based on “communitarian” votes, their leaders and functionaries will be very much restricted in expressing ideas. They will privilege their

“communities” protection with a risk of over-zooming social reality (as in the case of the veil polemic) and not grasping the complexity of the real problems in the educational system such as the lowering number of available teachers as the economic incentives to exercise this profession in France are particularly low, especially during the first years where the gap with other European countries is huge.

Whether from a complottist nature or not, fear is remarkably important in *RN* and *Reconquete* statements. The fear of civilization decadence is used to propose policies to completely block the immigration process. The paradox here is that in the current geopolitical situation, migration proved to be a phenomenon way out of control of French political parties. Nowadays, migration is primarily due to a lack of development in migrants countries of origin and it is why it could be reasonable to try to focus on how to help improving the situation of underdevelopment affecting those countries instead of punctually organizing massive military operations when situation is uncontrollable. To this extent we can think to the Operation Barkhane in Mali ended a few months ago. While the army intervention managed to temporarily stabilize the country, the initiatives in favor of development elaborated later have been a waste of resources. Instead, *Reconquete* promises to block an unstoppable phenomenon. The example of USA/Mexico border perfectly illustrates the incapacity of stopping people escaping misery. By the other hand, Jean-Luc Mélenchon often denounced appropriately the state of stigmatization oppressing migrants. However, he has since now failed to provide solutions to facilitate the integration of a growing part of the population who feels abandoned and does not recognize the state as legitimate. The number of French people living under the soil of poverty is going up and so does proportional unemployment for those migrants coming on French soil.

In this context the *FI* define “wokism” as an invented phenomenon based on the systematic critique of those people engaged towards diverse forms of minorities oppression. The party revendicates a strong humanist nature according to which the fact of not supporting minorities would be contrary to human nature. The implicit question that comes up the most when a *FI* politician is confronted to his *Reconquete/RN* homologue is “How can you dehumanize a person to this point?”.

Reconquete/RN will argue that France identity subsistence is incompatible with immigration. Therefore, the question that emerges is “what is French identity?”. It is through this precise question that we identify the fragility and nebulosity of right and far right parties. When this precise question was formulated to Eric Zemmour, he replied that if you are originary from Poland for example, in order to be French, you need to “replace Polish kings by French ones”. This statement would imply

that the French identity is dictated by a necessary history knowledge. However, this necessity is not sufficient, as you must interiorize French history as it was yours. On the knowledge side, it could be argued that numerous French people who are on the territory from generations don't know their history because of inequalitarian access to quality education. When it comes to the second point, it is undefendable for the simple reason that it is not assessable. In fact, it is not comprehensible how the attachment to a foreign culture can be detrimental to the integration process in France.

2.5 Woke culture and social movements in France:

Born in the USA but particularly spread in France, BLM movement played a major role in “woking” the minds. It denounced systemic racial discrimination and a climate of social injustice that tended to be ignored until then. BLM non-authorized mobilizations have been organized during the pandemic. Before the pandemic occurred, Macron government was already faced to an historically unprecedented social mobilization. In fact, almost two of the three years preceding the pandemic have been subject to social mobilization. We cannot establish a connection between sanitary crisis and increasing social mobilization, neither between social mobilization and economic crisis period since as history proves, massive periods of mobilization as for example 1968 took place in a period of growing economy. However, the spreading and diversification proportion of social injustice denunciation through social media is undeniable, and it is the first element we are going to focus on in order to measure the impact of woke culture on social mobilization.

Social media is known to be efficient in terms of consequent and rapid mobilization of masses. As defined previously, mobilization is a crucial element to spread awareness towards social inequality. They become even more efficient in a period of social movements multiplication. All these movements composed by civil society actors have very specific and diverse revendications. Therefore, the possibility for mobilization increases, even more when we mobilize the concept of inequalities intersectionality which consist in a cumulation of stigmas for a person belonging to different minorities. The social mobilization capacity shown by diverse woke social movements, is particularly feared by right parties such as *Reconquete* or LR. These two actors denounce the danger of minorities tyranny. The coordination between multiple social movements is even more feared, since it increases the number of people contesting the current democratic system malfunctions under different angles.

What is curious is that the intersectionality mentioned in the last paragraph does not concern every minority. The most evident example to this regard is Judaism. According to social movements like

BLM in France Jews became the illustration of domination. This point of view can be particularly dangerous as it “justifies” antisemitism as a practice going in favor of deconstruction of a domination. It is preoccupying because in the last decades there has been an increase in antisemitic killings. A school in Toulouse has been attacked and three kids are dead because of it. But we can also mention the case of Mireille Knol, an 80 years old woman killed by two young people. Or even the case of Ylan Alemy , a twenty three years old kidnapped and tortured because of its religion.

Another critique to be mentioned is the one addressed to the *UNEF* (French students trade union) is the one of “anti-white” racism. Since the 1970’s, Evergreen University (USA) had one day in the year where minorities did not come to university to make their absence notifiable to the “dominant” culture. In 2017, this tradition was innovated by a day in which only minorities were welcomed, including sexual ones. Professor Brett Weinstein redacted a letter in which he said he was opposed to it and decided to show up. Videos were recorded that day showing the unwillingness of the students to discuss with him in the name of his “white privilege” and exhorting the professor to leave the campus for respect of anti-racism. This event was widely mediatized and exported to France to a certain extent. The UNEF organized meetings only reserved to black people with the justification that certain matters could only be discussed by those directly stigmatized by a given issue. This approach has been criticized by French medias and identified as a danger for democracy. It must be said that those “exclusive meetings” have not only organized when it comes to black people but also meetings reserved to women for the same reason.

2.6 Wokism: A revisited form of McCarthyism

The first mid of the 1950’s is known in the US as the McCarthyism period. The substantive is derived from General McCarthy, remembered for its strong anti-communist policies. This period is also qualified as the “witch hunt” which illustrates perfectly the blind censure emanating from it. Millions of Americans will be subject to judicial enquiries for a multitude of diverse reasons that could lead to think they sympathize with communism. The criteria for enquiries were not fixed as if there was a sort of hidden coordination among these individuals. Well, we can define “wokism” as a “soft McCarthyism” (Dubet,2022). The idea is that there could be strong motivations not to think about society in terms of domination dynamics or think that the intersectionality embodied by “wokism” is only partial. However, identifying all fights embodied in the “movement” as coordinated seems like a conspiracy theory. To illustrate my point, I provide in the next paragraphs an analysis of French rap and its constitutive elements. This example shows to what extent artists representing a given minority are not necessarily favorable to all the fights embodied by “wokism”.

Rap music is the most listened genre in France today. Artists like JUL or PNL attained levels of sales superior to the ones of French variety artists such as Charles Aznavour, Georges Brassens or even Jonny Haliday. This of course can be partially explained by the evolution of the music industry, requiring shorter tracks and frequent releases, but not only. Typically, the main theme treated in French rap lyrics is the one of marginalization of certain socio-economic groups due to their ethnicity. Second, political inactivity is widely denounced and the loss of confidence by the population derived from it. But rap music not only critiques, it also highlights the capability to live in a multicultural context and how cultures superposition is a richness for society. This element doesn't please right parties which base their electoral attractiveness on a project of assimilation. A project which considers cultures overlapping as a killer of society, as a source of civil war. Right parties are even more annoyed as French rap not only is listened in France but also across Europe. Roberto Saviano for example explained he listened to a lot of PNL when writing his book *000*. The Italian writer highlighted the duo capacity to illustrate that at the end of the day the problems in sensitive neighborhoods are the same across Europe. This implies the emergence of adopting migration policies at EU level to facilitate the integration of people that are going to come in any case. While right parties, who just a few years ago were for most very critical towards Europe, believe also that a European response should be opted to solve the problem, accepted that they think that this response should go in the direction of limitation and progressive suppression of migratory flows.

To this extent French rappers could be considered “woke” by right parties. However, there are not many rappers in France who denounce LGBTQ+ problematics or feminist ones. Oppositely, rappers with greatest number of streams tend to express anti-feminist lyrics and criticize implicitly or explicitly their contempt towards the LGBTQ+ community. I took the rap example to illustrate how much “woke” is actually a catch-all substantive and that there is not necessary a union between those protecting socio-economic minorities and those for example focusing on the protection of gender alterity.

3. What are French political scene positions over “wokism”?

3.1 *En Marche*

En Marche is the party of actual President Emmanuel Macron which can be identified as a moderate party by the average elector. The minister of national education under Macron government stated in one of his speeches that “wokism” is particularly detrimental for humanism which according to him is the fruit of secular maturation of French society. To this regard, an initiative for the establishment of a republican laboratory fighting cancel culture and woke ideology has been launched. It has to be mentioned that the reception of this decision has been mitigated among political sociologists. While some see this initiative as crucial, others estimate that the threat denounced is exaggerated underlining that the fear of change inherent to human nature is the real source of division.

For En Marche, the principle of laicity and universalism is the one that is the most threatened by “wokism”. The party fears a systematic victimization of certain minorities that can bring up communitarianism and radicalization. A recent example is the one of the interdictions of wearing an Abaya at school starting from September 2023. The Abaya is a traditional dress used in Arabic countries, some have an integrated veil which covers the hair but not the face and some have not. It created controversy as Macron opponents protested considering the Abaya to be first a cultural dress not necessarily reserved to Muslim girls. Macron didn’t really get in the debate on whether it has more a cultural or religious character and instead proposed directly the uniform solution in primary school and college. The idea is to reduce stigmatization and to confine religion in the private sphere until the “minds are shaped” giving then liberty to dress however one wants in university. Up to this point the solution proposed seems to be appropriate and finds partisans both in right and left parties. However, it has been heavily criticized by the France Insoumise who considers the initiative to be an attack to the multi-cultural society. In fact, the idea of a uniform proposed by Macron government would be constituted of a jean, t-shirt more than the traditional conception we have of a uniform. It is implicitly a policy of assimilation more than respect of multi-culturality as the uniform composition reflects dressing habits typical of western society. When girls wearing an Abaya are asked about why they wear it, the answer of not highlighting their shapes often comes up as some consider Western fashion industry to be a perpetrator of woman sexualization which they don’t want be accomplices. As En Marche often claims to be a party partisan of freedom, it should be interesting that they consider a uniform which takes into account those considerations which are not incompatible with the initial policy objective.

Now that we examined the threats to laicity and universalism let’s focus on the second main critique from En Marche towards “wokism”. It concerns the prioritization of identities, identities deconstruction and the relation towards alterity issues instead of focusing on socio-economic

problems. The question that emerges thereof is to what extent the focus on symbolic issues could also alleviate the impact of socio-economic inequalities. The point is that from a “captivating the audience” perspective it is way easier to say that a certain issue is more relevant than another one instead of trying to explain to the median elector all the interconnectivity among issues.

3.2. *Rassemblement National and Reconquete*

In this section, I resumed the positions of *RN* and *Reconquête* in a single section. I made this decision as their positions on the matter are identical. Even though, *RN* always wants to demarcate itself from *Reconquete* due to the fact that the latter is considered even more rightist by public opinion. If Marine Le Pen often accuses Zemmour of dividing the right electorate, she takes advantage of their presence as their arrival shifted the political spectrum. *Reconquete* is now considered the far-right party while *RN* is progressively obtaining a more moderate status. The party led by Jordan Bardella identifies “wokism” as their principal obstacle for *RN* accession to government. This is to say that woke tend to identify as major problematic ones that are not that relevant considered the whole socio-political scenario. *RN* also identifies a threat of limitation in the freedom of speech mainly generated by economic and political interests. They insist on the point that “woke” thought is an instrument to guarantee the rooting of cultural and political totalitarianism. Eric Zemmour, leader of the new party *Reconquete* accuses woke of using feelings not to fight ideas in the political discourse but to delegitimize the person they belong to.

Total opposition to immigration, rejection of the possibility of massive integration or even assimilation of migrants coming under the current immigration policies are the positions held by the parties. *Reconquete* militants believe that the *Grand Remplacement* (ethnic substitution) is ongoing in France. This theory initiated by the far-right author Renaud Camus (2010-2011) predicts that white people are progressively being replaced by minorities. It particularly stresses the fact that demography plays a crucial role due to theory correlation between the fall of nativity rate in Europe and growing migratory flows composed by large families. When questioned about international foreign policy, Zemmour states that the declining of the US combined with China’s ascendance will constitute a source of conflict of civilization issued from a will of revenge. He immediately compares this will of revenge with the one which according to him is embodied by migrants coming to France. He affirms that most of them hates France and wants to replace its civilization by the Muslim one as a revenge of the colonial past. *Reconquete* and *RN* also state that woke ideology is a tremendous threat due to the lack of cohesion it brings within society since it generates a univocal

way of thought particularly detrimental for individuals' freedoms. To this regard, the far-right parties' sympathizers are very critical towards medias which they accuse of being the ambassadors for woke ideology within the political discourse particularly in times of elections. The political polarization generated by "woke monopoly" is not a consequence of a divergence in ideas if we rely to *Reconquete* discourse. Instead, the polarization is simply the fruit of an unwillingness of interaction manifested by "woke" people towards other people that express ideas potentially detrimental for ethnic, racial, or sexual minorities. For the media defense it must be said that in the frame of French presidential election of 2022 the two most mediatic candidates were E. Macron and the same Eric Zemmour followed by Marine Le Pen. These three candidates don't identify themselves as icons of the woke movement and this tends to fragilize the first argument advanced by Zemmour insisting on the capital role of media for the diffusion of woke discourse.

When talking about woke culture impact, it is interesting to notify that Zemmour talks to two different electorates at the same time. By one side, to the extreme right electorate is playing on the fear of the "Grand Remplacement". On the other hand, he wants to attract the "moderate" right parties electorate by denouncing the impact over freedom of expression. Zemmour always manifested his interest in uniting the right parties and this theme is perfect for him to do so.

3.3 France Insoumise

Led by the emblematic J-L Mélenchon, *France Insoumise* defines itself as the last bastion of left engaged electors. If we take an external perspective, *FI* is considered as a far-left party by other factions. They are considered by most of the French political spectrum as being the responsible for woke culture perpetration. *RN*, led by Jordan Bardella affirms that *FI* employs a woke discourse in order to solidify and enlarge its electorate composed by "Islam-leftists". The main critique is the one of systematic prioritization of minorities allowing an uncontrolled massive immigration which can drive to a potential disintegration of the French culture. In response, on the ideological point *FI* affirms that France has been shaped by the interaction with those minorities which constitute the cultural richness of the country and that the transformation of a society by "creolization" (term explained later) is just the logical sequency of events. *FI* also adopts a more pragmatic point of response to anti-immigration parties. They emphasize the actual necessity of immigration to fight against the lowering fertility rate affecting France and Europe more widely. According to the party, "wokism" is a catch-all substantive instrumentalized by far-right parties in order to generate

division by means of fear. Every problematic relative to “wokism” should be treated singularly as we are not talking of coordinated issues.

3.4 *Les Républicains*

LR deputies often denounce the presence of “wokism” as subjacent to far left political discourse. However, they also denounce the exploitation of the theme by *RN* and *Reconquete* in order to create division. Valérie Boyer (LR deputy for the Bouche du Rhône department) denounced a “woke totalitarianism” within the political discourse. LR expressed multiple times the danger enhanced by rhetoric that does not allow liberty of expression and the possibility of having divergent opinions. They also dread the impact of cancel culture which according to them is translated in a veritable ostracization of controversial public opinions. This ostracization can take different forms but the most denounced by the party are cancellation of universities conferences, dismantlement of historical monuments with colonialism references and limitation of free speech for social and political actors.

Another argument which is however hardly quantifiable is the threat to universal republicanism relied on by LR. The party considers that certain debates based on gender or race are highlighted to create division in terms of social cohesion within the country. This division being the fuel for extremist parties which bet on it for their electoral campaign.

When it comes to immigration, LR denounces woke ideology as the root of inappropriate policies choices. At the end of August 2023, they asked to President Macron to envisage the possibility of a constitutional amendment subject to a referendum. This constitutional amendment would allow French people to choose a quota of migrants accepted every year. Eric Ciotti (LR President) stated that the edulcorated humanism presented by woke ideology led to intellectual laziness when it comes to choose who can come and who can't. LR partisans believe that the optic of “resignation” towards the migratory phenomenon has been harmful for the country in the medium term and that quotas are the only possibility to grant integration without fearing civilizational change. This point created skepticism as the natality rate of France, who has always been amongst the highest in Europe, is in heavy decline. This decline has been illustrated also by the controversial pension reform launched by Macron as the proportion of retirees becomes exponentially important from year to year. Despite these demographics' restrictions, Ciotti and LR believe that the response cannot come from migration. It is why LR want to supplement quotas with a strong politic aimed at encouraging a raising natality. Even though this could appear as a viable solution, it is arguably complicated to benefit from it in the short run. Moreover, the reform proposed by LR inscribes itself

perfectly in the era of “audience democracy” more than being a conviction motivated one. This is because France is signatory of numerous European and international treaties that would allow the country to choose migratory quotas only when it comes to economic migrants and students. First of all these two categories constitute a minority compared to the all migratory waves, as they constitute less than 50.000 arrivals every year. Secondly, these two categories are the most economically active among the totality of migrants and limiting their venue would be particularly detrimental to the economic system even if supplemented by a natality encouragement politic.

Contrarily to far-right parties, LR tend not to propose measures against LGBTQ+ minorities as this would damage their image to the extent that they could be identified as against the freedom provided by the Republic. Except for the case of migration, critiques formulated by the party are nebulous and denounce a whole system of intellectual censure in a very general way. This allows them to preserve their right bourgeoisie electorate without damaging the most “progressives” among their electors.

4. « woke » as an ideological claim to delegitimate political opponents

4.1 Debate in view of the Presidential elections: Discursive strategies adopted by Eric Zemmour to delegitimize the “wokism” embodied by J-L Mélenchon.

The 24th of September 2021 a debate between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Eric Zemmour took place in an atmosphere of future elections. The debate turned around one principal question which is: What is French identity? In the following section I will treat the discursive strategies employed by Eric Zemmour to discredit Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the personification of “wokism” . The role of the journalists under media directives is also very interesting to this extent. The “wokism” issue is at the chore of the debate and the following section aims at proving the nebulosity regarding the concept as well as its “catch-all” function.

First, it must be mentioned that strategies employed in a mediatic context are different than those employed in a strictly political one. This is because producers have specific objectives and journalists receive specific guidelines on what to ask and how. Second, the audience is in most cases passive. This implies that debaters must be aware of the type of audience, what the audience is supposed to know, what it finds acceptable and how to captivate their attention for the longest time. The last element that must be reminded of is that a media success is dependent on the

audience and therefore a mediatic debate would be framed with this commercial finality. The informative function that is supposed to be the principal one is subordinated to the capability to captivate the audience. This tendency is corroborated by the nature of questions asked. In fact, the debates analyzed are rhythmized by controversial questions to which the debaters are supposed to answer in an expeditive way as if the attention capability of the spectators was particularly low. When Mélenchon or Zemmour try to answer to questions by historical introductions to justify their positions they are exhorted to be more expeditive. Everything is done to limit the comprehension of the other debater. It illustrates a clear mediatic decline as the dynamic of the debate doesn't rest on understanding why a guest doesn't agree with the other, but rather to continually oblige the guest to prove that its political positions are not conciliable with the other. These debates are nowadays more like boxing games where discursive strategies replace punches. Articulate ideas is very complicated in that context and this explains the prevalent presence of extremist parties in the actual mediatic framework. This implies that when you have more articulated, complex positions on certain matters you tend to be excluded from these debates. During the last presidential elections Emanuel Macron didn't do a single debate before the second round with Marine Le Pen when he was obliged to. This choice was heavily criticized both by right and left parties as for them it represented an attack on democracy, to the capacity to debate and exchange ideas. However, as previously mentioned actual debates are structured not to allow the circulation of ideas. Therefore, deciding not to participate in it but rather to choose the interview format can be more interesting as your capacity to express nuances and articulate ideas without being constantly interrupted will be improved. That being said, political confrontation is a pillar of democracy, and a diminution of the former causes a decline of the latter. Henceforth, it is necessary to revise the architecture of mediatic debates to improve democracy, to facilitate the presence of moderated positions within it.

The first identifiable strategy is irony. When at the beginning of the debate Mélenchon says that Zemmour wants to expulse 5 million Muslims, Zemmour simply replies "Why not 10?". By doing so, *Reconquete* president wishes to discredit Mélenchon critiques by implying the latter doesn't know his program. However, in this specific case, irony is just a tool to use another discursive strategy which is caricature. The "why not 10?" implies "look at this leftist who portrays me as a monster, fascist as typically all leftist do". Caricature will once again be employed a few minutes later by Zemmour, as he affirmed the conception of democracy he has is at odds with Mélenchon one. He will supplement this polarization by "*It is your conception of democracy(...) in your side since centuries we don't debate, we guillotine. We don't make invectives, we ostracize, we put people in reeducation camps when not in psychiatric asylums*". A parallel is made here between French revolutionaries and *France Insoumise*. As if the left party was a sort of troublemaker

impeaching the functioning of democracy. It is contradictory because it is thanks to revolutionaries that France is a democracy today. Zemmour often affirmed his admiration for Napoleon and Louis XVI and frequently put into question the legitimacy of French Revolution. This sentence will please part of his electorate composed by sovereigntists and reveal the danger he represents for democracy.

Second, we have polemic. When the journalist asks Zemmour whether France has done enough to integrate migrants, the candidate refuses to answer. He will state that the question is not asked in a proper way, as it puts France in fault. He will eventually answer once he has polemicized the fact that media are politically oriented by systematically taking the defense of minorities due to the proliferation of “wokism” in the mediatic space.

4.2 What is the difference between creolization and ethnic substitution?

Let's first have a look at different definitions of creolization to grasp its defining components.

- ⇒ *“A linguistic process creating a Creole language from a source language through contact with other languages” (Moreau,1997)*
- ⇒ *“The blending of cultures that produces the unexpected” (Glissant,2003)*
- ⇒ *“Creolization does not mean turning a society into a Creole world in the sense of the West Indies, nor does it mean simple interbreeding. Creolization is when a mixture of cultures results in “the creation of a new and unexpected cultural entity (...) it is a historical process coupled with an anthropological process” “ (Céry,2021)*

From these three definitions the main commonality is that when we are talking about creolization, we are dealing with a process. Originally, the concept illustrated a linguistic process resulting both from France colonial past and current migratory situation. As French society is becoming exponentially more diverse through immigration, creolization is the creation of a new language as the encounter between French and other languages spoken by migrants. Nowadays, it is much more than just a linguistic process, Jean-Luc Mélenchon designates creolization as a political project. This project assumes that the creation of a common culture, considered the evolution of France demography, is the solution to unify the country despite cultural differences. The idea is to

transition from a multicultural society where people co-exist, to a society where our differences compose a richness to create a culture that federates.

The theory of the *Grand Remplacement* is a complotist theory by far-right parties introduced by Renaud Camus. The idea is that France and more largely European civilizations are being replaced by foreign antagonistic civilizations. The idea of a multi-cultural society is unthinkable for the theory partisans. In fact, cultures are pictured as always in a balance of power where one has to prevail over the other in order to exist. This dynamic is also illustrated by right parties when talking about the Jew community. Zemmour denounce the fact that Jews “escape” from cities as they are victims of antisemitism from the muslim community. When it comes to that point however, Zemmour doesn't use numbers to corroborate his point. He rather instrumentalizes his own story. Zemmour is himself an Algerian Jew whose family came to France in the 1970's. He is originary from a neighborhood which is today particularly sensitive due to the precarious socio-economic life conditions experienced by the inhabitants. Despite it, Zemmour says that the climate in these neighborhoods declined in the last thirty years and portrays the life in Seine Saint-Denis in the 80's in a very caricatural way. To explain the degradation of the public space in the suburbs Islam is once again instrumentalized. He denounces the raise of people wanting to conquer the public space using cultural habits incompatible with France. He for example criticizes the use of certain clothes either for men (*e.g: djellaba*) or women (*e.g:the hijab*) as mean to impose civilization. He also denounces the majoritary presence of halal boutiques, restaurants to the detriment of those representing “French” culture. This presumed voluntary conquest of public space, is according to him based on a rational choice made by individuals. As a result, people who “feel French” or jews are inevitably obliged to escape this social reality as they are prosecuted. While the *Grand Remplacement* theory was recognized by a minority originally, nowadays the concept is present in both *Rassemblement National* and *Reconquete* political discourse. For the latter, it is the most important subject to which French society is faced, and Zemmour stated multiple times that it was even more important than climate change.

The cleavage left/right in France is mainly based on different predictions about how the process of cultural change will affect society.

The first commonality among the two theories is that demography is changing and that nowadays our society is composed of multiple cultures. So, the basic observation on which the two theories are based is the same. Second, comes the fact that for both the phenomenon of cultural change is natural and will see the day if nothing is done in the political sphere.

Let's now focus on differences. The phenomenon of cultural change is welcomed by Jean-Luc Mélenchon who reminds it during the debate. The President of FI sees the creolization process as a cultural richness, an evolution for society. Far right parties instead see the cultural change in question as the end of France. Even though they don't make an explicit hierarchy among cultures, they denounce the upcoming death of France. To justify this "death", in the debate Zemmour denounces a willingness of Islam to conquer France. He also states that Islam is more than just a religion but is considered by Muslims as a civil code more important than French Constitution. So, by one side Islam is supposed to be the main enemy. By the other side when he says that in the last ten years almost four million migrants (either legally or illegally) came on the French soil, he omits to say that many of the Subsaharian countries from which they come from are Catholics or have multiple faiths. To summarize these two antagonistic views rely on the presupposition of identities cumulation capability. According to right parties the cumulation of identities is not possible, you are French, or you are a migrant and that is it. The only possibility for a migrant to become French is to make abstraction of what attaches him to his origin culture. Left parties find it very limited as having people originary from different cultural backgrounds is a richness and one can feel French without completely denying its origins.

It emerges therefore that the two theories have no possibility of ideological conciliation. It also appears that both parties don't want to reconcile as the creation of a cleavage is viewed as an opportunity to steal some voters to Emmanuel Macron. While the ideological incompatibilities are evident, the instrumentalization by both parties is as much evident. It serves to far right to identify an enemy "the Woke" and to the left to identify another which is Fascism.

5. The relationship between "woke ideology" and cancel culture:

5.1 cancel culture:

Cancel culture can be defined as a process of ostracization which is either applied to individuals or a set of behaviors. This ostracization is justified by the fact that public opinion estimates that those individuals and or behaviors can be detrimental to a part of the population. The tools employed to guarantee a successful cancellation result either from boycotting or from systematic unwillingness to debate with the concerned individual.

For the right liberal electorate, The origins of cancel culture are relatively recent since the term starts to gain influence at the end of 2010's. Social movements are considered the original proliferators of this culture, namely the "Black Lives Matter" and "Me too" movements are the most popular. In the case of BLM, the revindication to cancel certain public figures was a mean to fight against racial discrimination and social justice. In the case of "Me too" the idea was to eradicate or at least reduce sexual and domestic violences committed by men towards women by the denunciation of such behaviors on a forum. In these two cases, the intention is to attain a greater level of social justice by the sabotage of discriminatory action. While a great part of society agrees with the final objective of greater social justice, the means employed and particularly censure however generated important controversies within the public opinion, particularly in France where political polarization in the last decade increased consequently.

By the other hand, left electorate view cancel culture as a phenomenon caused by the increasing preponderance of far-right positions in the French political discourse. They denounce a suppression of sociological vocabulary by the right which minimizes the impact of certain inequalities. One of the concepts being an important source of debate is the one of *privilège blanc* or *racisme systémique*. These two expressions highlight the structural constraints weighing on minorities' shoulders and the social injustice it therefore generates. E.Zemmour or E. Macron electorate generally tends to think of these concepts as a pure invention from the far and moderated left in order to attract a given electorate. The problem is that such a diametral opposition related to society problems can generate fractures difficult to repair, fragilizing the national unity and the conception of social reality. During the presidential elections of 2022, never have we assisted to such a division of the country divided into three almost equal blocks constituted by FI, En marche and RN. The situation is even more preoccupying since the leaders of different parties seem to foment the reluctance of dialogue with other factions as if this division was a guarantee to maintain their electorate.

5.2 social justice as the bridge between Woke ideology and cancel culture:

The exchange of ideas and the quest for compromise in political discourse are the most important elements to improve democracy. It is the reason why this section is suggesting different paths to overcome the divergences in terms of conception of social reality from the different parties. The idea is to explain incomprehensions , voluntary or not, between polarized parties when it comes to minorities. The objective is to comprehend how the intersection of polarized conceptions of social realities is possible, favorizing therefore the circulation of ideas.

Let's first address the theme of migration which is particularly relevant to understand the capital importance of social justice. Left parties consider that migration is a phenomenon that can't be stopped contrary to right wing parties. Most of these migrants don't come to Europe by pleasure but because of multiple socio-political and socio-economic reasons that make life in their countries precarious, dangerous, almost impossible. Therefore, they will do everything they can to come over and no wall or other conservative restriction will impede it. So, as it can't be stopped it has to be managed among other things with important social assistance expenditures. The viable solution to prevent massive immigration waves in this case would be to invest on the development of the countries where these migrants are coming from.

Right wing parties tend to answer that what has been done in terms of social assistance is already too much. They tend to argue that the conditions of life here are considerably better than the ones those migrants would have if stayed in their origin country. Therefore, the only option for those people is to assimilate as fast as possible and start to live as a "real French". For moderate right parties this involves a strict separation between private and public sphere. For more extreme ones it implies also for these people to make French history theirs. For example, by giving a "French" name to avoid stigma. For those parties the systematic oppression of minorities is a myth. A myth that serves as the presupposition for the realization of a self-fulfilling prophecy by which the impression of being oppressed results in a systematic hate of France and a will to destroy it by replacing its civilization. There is no place for integration as multi-culturality is viewed as a childish utopian concept.

For left parties instead, such as Ecolos or FI, the system has never been so racist and the oppression and unwillingness towards multi-culturality is unprecedentedly clear. They explain the phenomenon by the proliferation of precarity. Nowadays, more than nine million French live in a situation of extreme poverty and are segregated in neighborhoods where life conditions are extremely hard. To overcome this segregation, FI suggest a pure restructuration of public space. Such a restructuring involves an architectural dynamic by which poorest are not systematically marginalized far of the city center and of the bourgeoisie. The reduction of marginalization would allow an improved integration of ethnic minorities. Therefore, the arguments of right parties would no more be "censured" but rather deprived of any sense as they would have no more reason to exist in the political discourse.

6. Are Civilization and identity issues the sources of political polarization or is political polarization due to systematic societal oppression?

6.1 Migration: A civilizational or a systematic oppression related issue?

Right wing parties in France insisted on the fact that civilizations incompatibility as the main source of " France decadence" and as a consequence of woke culture proliferation . Left parties insisted on systematic problems in institutions functioning and told that the civilization's incompatibility argument is a reheated one from the right to manipulate their electorate through fear. In this chapter I will try to assess to what extent these kinds of positions rely on fear and on a possibility to attract a greater electorate and to what extent they correspond to reality.

Let's go through a brief historical recap to understand French colonialism and the polarized conceptions of realities emanating from it.

We can divide France colonial past in two parts. The first part of the colonial empire takes place between 1530 and 1770. It comprised territories mainly situated in the American continent. Among which Canada, Louisiane, Nouvelle-France and Terre-Neuve in the northern part of the continent, Antilles in Central America, and Guyane in the Southern part of the continent. Also, Africa has been subject of colonization during this period, more precisely parts of the actual Senegal and La Reunion Island.

The second part of the colonial empire extension takes place between 1829 and 1963. During this period, parts of Algeria were conquered, Tunisia and Morocco. France successively focused on sub-Saharan regions such as Gabon, Ivory coast and Guinea. The colonization of Pacific Ocean islands such as Polynesia or New-Caledonia has also to be mentioned. Lastly, the Asian continent has also be contaminated by France presence, namely in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

After Great-Britain, France had the most extended colonial influence in history. For most of the thinkers favorable to colonization, this process was crucial for the subsistence and extension of French civilization. The creation of the United Nations and its principle of people self-determination have been a turning point for the progressive termination of French colonies over the globe. That being said, France still possess various territories all over the world, making of it the second country with the most extended maritime access.

To grasp the complexity of migratory phenomenon a first distinction must be drawn. The first generation of migrants don't face the same issues as second or third generation ones. For the former, it is easier to draw an interior distinction between the private and public sphere. This is because they still have the repairs to be attached to their culture of origin and therefore have the capacity to confine it in the private sphere while doing everything in public to be assimilated to the country they arrive in. For second and third generations, the situation is way more complex. As they go back to their origin country, they are perceived as strangers and more precisely as strangers from the country to which either their parents or grandparents have emigrated to. Paradoxically however, when they are in France (country in which they are born) they are perceived as strangers because of their origin. They can for example feel the stigmas of the origin country when looking for a job. Another example is the fact of living in neighborhoods where there tend to be a high rate of segregation. In such neighborhoods such as for example the Seine-Saint-Denis there tends to be mainly people issued from migration and socio-economic mixity is not a reality. The unemployment rate is among the highest in these areas and insecurity is therefore high. These two examples naturally will make feel those people as they have been relegated by French society in places where society can't feel them, can't hear them. Part of polarization in French political discourse comes from that point. What is interesting is that all factions agree to say that there is huge insecurity in those neighborhoods and that the situation is unlivable for most people living there. However, the left parties feel that this insecurity is due to state incapacity to create an environment prone to integration and multiculturalism. They view integration as a long-term process which worths to be invested in. According to them, decline in natality rate is the main concrete point which makes migration the most efficient measure to fight against the ageing of the average population and future state productivity. On the other hand, the right parties feel that the State already did too much for these people and that further help is only a waste of money. Polarization comes therefore primarily on opposite conceptions of human nature. Left parties having a positive view of human nature, they will tend to say that people issued either directly or indirectly from migration genuinely want to be integrated within society, that most of them already did so and that efforts must be intensified in order to create a social ecosystem where cultural belonging is indifferent for every human being part of that society. Inversely, rightist tend to have a negative view of human nature. There is the insistence on most of their discourses that migrants cannot be "faithful" to France since they belong to other civilizations contaminated by hate towards France due to their colonial past.

The riots occurred in July 2023 due to the death of the young Nael, a 17 years old killed by the French police while he tried to escape a police control is the perfect example to illustrate the

upgrowing polarization between parties. Important icons such as the famous football player Kilyan Mbappé (one of most followed person in the world) manifested their solidarity to Nael's family and fear towards the increase of such phenomenon.

The left parties warmly welcomed this type of tweet and highlighted that major legislation modifications to be operated to restrict the use of weapons by police officers. They also insisted on the fact that the "Inspection Générale de la Police Nationale", the organ responsible of assessing police responsibilities in these scenarios, was actually biased since it was an organ of the police itself. Lastly, the vice president of FI Anne Garrido denounced the systemic racism present in the police organ as the principal factor fomenting riots. To this regard, left parties insisted on the necessity to reform police formation.

Among the most virulent critiques towards woke ideology, principally from right parties, is the delegitimization of public order institutions. Eric Zemmour or Jordan Bardella considers police to be the scapegoat of French government from decades. It is for them the result of government incapacity to elaborate immigration policies and above all anti-immigration policies. First, they insist on the fact that French police is overwhelmed in number when they intervene in certain sensitive neighbourhoods. Zemmour goes further by defining many of these neighbourhoods foreign enclaves where the State has no control. It is curious to see that the approach adopted by "the left" is criticised by right parties when just a few years ago Nicolas Sarkozy reduced by 13.000 the number of policemen, and he was certainly not a socialist. Anyway, the second critique is addressed to the medias, even though *RN* and *Reconquete* often denounce with a "Trump style" the collusion between social medias and government. They criticise overemphasis on police violences as a result of woke "ideology", supposed to positively discriminate foreigners involved in violences episodes. Bardella declared that systemic racism in the police body was an invention. He went further when Nahel affair and the riots result ing of the boy death took place. The numbers in terms of damage communicated by Zemmour or Bardella (*RN* president) were up to 20% more significant than what communicated by the interior minister. Zemmour stated in an interview that the damages were up to one billion while the real number is around 700 million. The question they directly rise to their electorate is "who is going to pay?". He even went further by stating that more than 90% of the riots participants were originary from an African country, which is obviously not verifiable. All right-wing parties stated publicly that the only way to tackle this phenomenon was to retire the social assistance benefits to the families of those who participated in the riots. Furthermore, right parties wish to reform legislation in such a way to sanction minors and create detention centers, necessary according to them because of the increasingly younger age of people involved in delinquency activities. *RN* and *Reconquete* also wants to make a distinction among French people.

In such a way that a family living in France from two or more generations is not as French as someone whose family is on French territory since centuries. Even though the term “race” is never used, marking differences among French people could be the preamble for the coming back of such discourse which has never been so extreme-right oriented since the General Petain government during WWII. *Reconquete* affirms that the riots participants coming from a familial immigration background should be sent back to their country of origin. The *RN* is a bit more “moderated” to the extent they say this measure should only be applicable to recidivists. Both Bardella and Zemmour mention that the intervention of the army could be envisaged in this type of events since they consider the police is no longer respected by most of the population. They also propose the army to have a role of social re-insertion for these kids involved in acts which they consider to be “against the Republic”. This affirmation was heavily contested by left parties since the Republic of France is founded on the principles of Freedom, Equality and Fraternity. The question emerged therefore to which extent should the freedom of striking be restricted? Right parties replying that the actual socio-political scenario was similar to a civil war instigated by forty years of too permissive and blind policies in the field of immigration.

6.2 Gender identities related issues:

When thinking about minorities rights protection it is impossible nowadays not to mention the LGBTQ+ movements. Their revendications have created great controversy and division in the French political discourse.

The ecologist party and FI discourse on the matter tend to be favorable to the formation of new rights for these minorities, the recognition of new pronouns, the possibility of doing their sexual transition in a medically safe environment as well as measures to encourage the sensibilization of new generations to the existence of these new sexual identities.

As similarly mentioned in the previous chapter, once again right parties talk to people’s heart when it comes to LGBTQ+ rights. By that I mean that major political figures as Eric Zemmour or Jordan Bardella don’t hesitate to use the term fear when the subject comes up. Again, a fear of decadence with respect to the familial structure importance with regards to history, tradition, and identity of the French people. Zemmour often stated that transition paths lead in most of the cases to suicide, confusion about the identity, and regrets with regards to the person concerned. He was particularly vehement when he treated the subject of sexual identities sensibilization in schools. In the interview in question the discourse was sensitively like the one we can expect from Giorgia Meloni in Italy. His main point was that it was not the school’s role to address these matters with children because of their educational and not instructional character which he thinks the schools must be limited to.

7. Conclusion

As a conclusion, the impact of woke ideology on the French political discourse is nebulous. This is because we cannot define “wokism” as an ideology, as if it was a compact block united by decolonialism, Islamo-leftism and cancel culture (Dubet,2022). We must understand that this view propagated by the right parties is an over-simplification of social reality to cluster all political opponents in the same bucket. That being said, we can assess the impact of the singular phenomena included in “wokism”. By one side, the awareness towards racial inequalities allowed France to be the model child of multiculturalism in Europe. Civil society is very much involved and their activism, either intellectual or mobilizational, allowed a progressist relationship with gender and racial alterity also exported to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. However, the intersectionality of Wokism sometimes led to antisemitism actions justified because based on the deconstruction of a “dominant” group. While the defense of minorities rights and the awareness towards oppression are essential for a functioning society, the instrumentalization mostly operated by right parties led to an unprecedented division perfectly illustrated by the results of the 2022 presidential elections where three blocks are identifiable with very similar number of votes. Medias are equally responsible for this division as they structure political debates in France like if they were boxing matches. As I analyzed in the section including the debate between J-L Mélenchon and Eric Zemmour this structure facilitates the presence of catch-all substantives to delegitimize the opponent instead of debating with him. Conclusively, The French political discourse is becoming more aggressive and polarized because of audience democracy, not because of “wokism”. The latter is just the imaginary enemy invented by right parties based on the fear of alterity. The equivalent can be said about systematic racism when it comes to left parties, which of course exist but is overemphasized to impeach the debate with liberals. Audience democracy doesn’t allow the circulation of ideas and facilitates the stigmatization of the other, no matter the political faction you identify with. The primary function of political parties has always been the one of convincing rather than governing. The problem is that this capacity of convincing is no longer based on values but on the delegitimization of the other.

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