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Chair of Japan in International Affairs

Why Has Japan's Security Strategy Shifted From "Passive Pacifism" To "Proactive Pacifism" in the International Context? A Study of Its Evolution Over the Years.

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Introduction

0.1 Background of the Topic

Ever since the end of World War II, Japan, like any other ordinary nation, made pragmatic changes to the "trend of time" and "the given environment" to maintain its own security and attain its prosperity.

The U.S.-China strategic competition is intensifying, and security worries about China, North Korea, and Russia are putting Japan in the face of unprecedented security problems. The security situation in East Asia has been conceived to be progressively worse by the majority of Japanese people and, effectively, there are currently poor relations between Japan and each of its neighbors (China, Russia, North Korea and South Korea). Japan's fundamental strategy for improving the efficacy of its security policy has not changed in the last 70 years, and it is expected to remain unchanged in the near future: to increase the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, to increase its own defense capabilities, and to create security alliances with nations that share its values. Japan's ability to formulate and implement security policy has been consistently limited by several factors, such as the constitution and its pacifism, democratic change, financial limits, and diplomatic roadblocks resulting from historical concerns.

Pacifism has been an esteemed element of Japanese identity since the end of World War II. The postwar pacifism of Japan, having its roots in its constitution, has affected postwar strategic culture preventing individuals from directly and independently addressing old security concerns, and also making the concept of a Japanese military role to nearly become taboo.

Japan has maintained a pacifist constitution, one in which Article 9 states that land, sea, and air force, together with other war potential, will never be maintained, and that Japanese people vehemently reject both the use of force to resolve international problems and war as a matter of national sovereignty. The majority of Japanese have never opposed using force to defend their nation; rather, they have opposed Japan's own unrestrained use of force.

Over the course of the postwar era, the most controversial topic in Japanese domestic politics has mainly been that of national security since many Japanese people have a profound aversion to war as a result of their country's tragic defeat, and the worry that Japan would unintentionally become involved in hostilities was frequently stated, particularly during the Cold War era. Since history demonstrates that Japan has begun the majority of the wars in which it has participated, it is possible that detractors of deterrence made the implicit assumption that the country won't be able to enjoy long-lasting peace unless it avoids involvement and starting wars. The Socialist Party of Japan finally supported the Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the Japan-U.S. Security arrangements, despite

the fact that Japan has been dealing with a challenging security environment in the region since the conclusion of the Cold War.

The Japanese government has taken steps to become more "normal", in that it has lifted restrictions on military operations.

The population of Japan has steadily become more receptive of a more aggressive defensive posture, moving away from its original pacifist position. However, this change has been incremental rather than being a fundamental one. Since 1992, Japan has granted the SDF permission to take part in non-combat capacities in international U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), including the coalition led by the United States in Iraq. The SDF's rules of engagement have been modified by the 2015 security legislation to permit more aggressive operations and equivalent participation in non-U.N. PKOs.

In December 2012, a more assertive and riskier foreign and security strategy was developed in Japan as a result of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's return to power in the December 2012 landslide election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in the December 2014 triumph. The performance of Abe's first administration in 2006-2007 and his reputation as an outspoken "revisionist" ideologue suggested that he would unavoidably harbor plans to steer Japan towards a more radical external agenda, one that would be characterized by a defense posture free of prior anti-militaristic restrictions, a more integrated U.S.-Japan alliance, and a focus on "value-oriented" diplomacy with East Asian countries and beyond.

Over the past year, also the administration of Japan's current Prime Minister, Kishida Fumio, has made significant adjustments to the country's security posture. In December 2022, Tokyo published a New National Security Strategy (NSS) and two other strategic defense publications. It is evident from the documents that Japan is quite concerned about changes in both regional and international security. According to the National Security Strategy, Japan is actually coping with what is defined as the most severe security environment since the end of the World War II. Tokyo believes that other countries may also be undermining the current international order in the Indo-Pacific or East Asia in light of Russian's assault against Ukraine. Moreover, China, North Korea, and Russia, three nuclear-armed countries, are stepping up their military preparations and operations close to Japan, which they immediately flank.

0.2 Research question

Given the background of this study, its research question is easily deductible.

This study aims at exploring the main causes of Japan's security strategy evolution and why it changed throughout the most significant historical periods in respect to its foreign security. Indeed, it

shifted from a "passive pacifism" approach to a more "proactive pacifism", due to factors and dynamics of different nature, being them both internal and external to the country itself.
Ideological orientations did not play a role in Japan's foreign policy. Rather, the challenge Japan faced was to ensure its survival in an international system created and dominated by more powerful countries.
Therefore, this research employs the following research question:

"Why has Japan's security strategy shifted from "passive pacifism" to "proactive pacifism" in the international context?"

This question serves as the writer's primary guide when analyzing the research. The design of the study will be focused in addressing the research question.

0.3 Research Objective

This research covers various periods, from historical to more contemporary ones. In order to explore all the main causes that led to Japanese security strategy's evolution over time it is essential to dig deep into history and draw a timeline to more contemporary periods for arriving at an in-depth analysis of how Japan has moved from "passive pacifism" to "proactive pacifism". The research starts from the Cold War years and its peace constitution, where the main goals of the country were its reconstruction and its economic recovery, and security guarantees were sought from the United States. It then moved to the post-Cold War era, when Japan revised its security strategy and enabled increasing participation in the global security environment as a response to new external threats, until arriving to the post-9/11 years, when it was recommended that Japan should have gone beyond a solely defensive posture and should fundamentally revise its force structure.
More recent times saw the emergence of the first National Security Strategy under Abe Shinzo's administration in 2013, stressing that China's growth and its challenge to the "status quo by coercion" necessitated a "rebalancing" of U.S. policy towards the Asia Pacific, since it had caused a shift in the region's balance of power. In addition to this, Abe promised to the world that Japan would have kept its plan of proactively contributing to peace partly by developing the concept of Japanese collective self-defense.
At the end of the timeline, there are our times today, in which Japanese security climate has strongly deteriorated. The three new documents provided in the current Kishida administration and belonging to the renewed National Security Strategy of 2022 offer insights into how Tokyo intends to address the new issues. Japan is dealing with a hostile security environment, perhaps the most severe since

the end of World War II, due to several external threats that are challenging the current international order in the Indo Pacific or East Asia: Russia and its aggression against Ukraine, China and North Korea, three nuclear armed nations currently expanding their military capabilities and actions.
Therefore, through this research, the author investigates and analyses the most salient challenges and dynamics of the matter in order to answer the above-mentioned research question.

0.4 Literature Review

This discussion concerning the evolution of Japan's security strategy in the international context has been driven by, and relied on, a wide range of studies conducted by expert analysts and researchers who have contributed through their academic articles, scholarly essays, and books to explore the various dynamics and the most salient aspects of the covered subject matter.
Of particular relevance are Japanese origin's academic sources (provisionally translated in English), such as the 2013 and 2022 National Security Strategy documents provided by the National Security Council, or written by Japanese authors, which have allowed for a more detailed and accurate analysis by those who live firsthand, and have a more established experience, regarding changes in their country's security policy.

Before tackling the analysis of the various subjects covered in the research, some general considerations regarding the notions of foreign policy and national security must be dealt with, by making reference to the existing literature on these specific topics. As well, a final consideration on the "Gaiatsu" concept of Japan's foreign aid will be addressed in order to enter into this reality and conduct a linear study on Japan's security policy.

0.4.1 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is one of the most important facets of international relations, attracting significant attention from academics and decision-makers as it describes a state's plan for pursuing its domestic goals and international ambitions.
Foreign policy is an interdisciplinary field that incorporates ideas from history, economics, political science, and international relations, whose main goal is understanding how nations engage with one another and non-state entities within the international system. When the realist school of thought first appeared in the early 20th century, foreign policy began developing as an area of study in which realists asserted that nations acted in a way that would increase their power and security in the international sphere as they were the main actors in international relations.

A variety of theoretical viewpoints and methods are used in the foreign policy's study. These theoretical frameworks aim to explain state behavior in the international system and offer a lens

through which researchers can examine and comprehend the complexity of foreign policy decision-making (Garrison et al., 2003).

However, the study of foreign policy depends on various fundamental ideas in addition to theoretical viewpoints. These ideas offer a framework for examining and comprehending state behavior in the global system (Smith, 1986). The most crucial ones are power (the capacity to sway other nations and non-state entities), security (the capacity of a state to defend its people and territory against outside threats), diplomacy (engaging in negotiations and communication with other governments and non-state actors), and international cooperation (advance states' shared goals and combat global issues).

Finally, a state's foreign policy is influenced by a number of elements. Depending on the state's history, culture, and geopolitical context, these factors may be internal or external, and they can vary (Csurgai, 2021). For instance, domestic politics is conceived as a significant internal aspect that influences international policy, and more specifically, elections and public opinion constitute domestic political factors that might affect a state's choice of foreign policy.

However, external causes can also influence a state's foreign policy. The international system is one significant example (University of York, 2022). The structure of the international system, including distribution of power and the existence of international institutions, can powerful impact a state's foreign policy choices.

0.4.2 National Security

National security has no universally agreed-upon definition among academics and professionals as the overall picture of security lacks clarity. Indeed, everything that has to do with security depends on the ideals that an individual, a group, or a state itself pursues.

On these days, there are many different types of "national securities". In addition to health, women, and food security, they also cover economic, energy, and environmental security (Holmes, 2015).

A state must be aware of its real issue in order to find an effective solution to protect its national security, as the term "national security" can be dangerously ambiguous when used without context (Baldwin, 1997).

Some academics have claimed that security is an "essentially contested concept". This statement must be addressed for three main reasons: first off, it is not really clear what this entails. Second, security might not meet the criteria to be labeled as a "essentially contested concept". Third, the implications for security studies might not be appropriately defined even if security were to be so classified.

However, it is unclear if security is in the category of fundamentally challenged concepts. Two of the several prerequisites for such a classification are particularly suspect in terms of security. The idea must first be "appraisive", meaning that it denotes or accredits some kind of valued achievement.
The importance that states attach to security greatly depend on them, and some may be so unsatisfied with the current situation that instead of protecting the values they already possess, they are more interested in acquiring new ones. According to this viewpoint, stating that one state has greater security than another does not imply that state is superior to another.
A second prerequisite for identifying a notion as fundamentally contested, referring to the distinguishing feature of such concepts, is that it must really give rise to severe disagreements about the circumstances in which it can be used and the concept's nature.

Overall, both internal and external security must be maintained. Military threats, economic threats, and ecological threats are the three types of threats that can jeopardize national security (Buzan and Hansen 1983). In addition, military threats include territorial takeover, invasion, occupation, overthrow, and policy manipulation. In this aspect, the issue raised by this research is partially related to military threats if a reference is made to the Senkaku Islands conflict, which serves as a military threat to Japan's national security.

0.4.3 The "Gaiatsu" Concept of Japan's Foreign Aid

Japan's influence in overseas aid is a truly remarkable one. Back in 1992, its official development assistance (ODA) was nearly equal, in terms of size, to that of West Germany, half of that of France, and one-fifth of that of the United States. However, compared to other national account items, Japan's ODA spending increased at a faster rate throughout the 1980s. This budgetary boost, which was made possible by the yen's value, contributed to close the gap between Japan and other advanced industrial countries in terms of the size of its ODA program. Indeed, for the first time in post-World War II history, Japan surpassed the U.S. in 1989 to overtake it as the largest giver of international aid in the world.
However, since 1992, as a result of the protracted recession brought on by the burst of the bubble economy, Japan's ODA budget has drastically decreased, but given the steeper budgetary reduction and acute "aid fatigue" in other advanced industrial countries, Japan was conceived to maintain its top donor status in the future.
The goal of Japan's ODA steadily changed as it rose to become the greatest aid giver in the world. Reparations payments gave rise to Japan's postwar foreign aid program, which was largely created to support Japan's industrial capacity rebuilding and reestablish economic relations with its pre-war "Co-Prosperity sphere" in Asia.

The most striking feature of Japan's foreign aid policy is the role played by external pressure, especially the American one, known as *gaiatsu* (Miyashita, 19999).

The gaiatsu framework contends that Japan uses foreign aid as a resource to assist the U.S., the hegemonic power, in maintaining openness and stability in the international system (Tuman and Strand, 2006). This is a variation on the neorealist idea of hegemonic stability. The decision to advance U.S. interests in Japanese foreign economic policy is presumed to be sensible for the Japanese state, mostly because gaiatsu protects the interests of Japanese multinational corporations, which depend on solid bilateral ties with the U.S. and ongoing access to its market (Anderson, 1993). Theoretically, Japan provides ODA to governments that advance the security and economic interests of the U.S., according to studies that have applied this framework to Japanese ODA.

Japanese aid decisions are allegedly linked to the advancement of specific U.S. economic policy agendas, according to analysts who concentrate on responses to U.S. pressure (Katada, 1997).

The U.S. has attempted to exert pressure on governments in Asia and other developing regions to enact market-oriented reforms since the advent of the debt crisis in 1982 and the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (Smith, 2000). These measures, referred to as structural adjustments programs (SAPs), include cutting social spending, eliminating domestic manufacturer subsidies, lowering tariffs, dereglementing markets, and removing obstacles to foreign direct investments (FDI).

The U.S. government supported structural adjustments based on a broad commitment to international openness and the belief that U.S. multinational corporations would be able to benefit from market-oriented economic changes. The U.S. aimed at maintaining domestic political support for change by requesting more Japanese ODA to countries undergoing reforms while lessening the effects of adjustment. The 1992 ODA Charter specifically acknowledged, in part as a response to this pressure, that "Japan will provide support to structural adjustment, so that the entrepreneurship and the vitality of the private sector in recipient countries can be fully exerted in the market mechanisms" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) adjustments programs were seen as being consistent with Japan's new commitment to structural adjustments by aid authorities. Beyond official statements, there is conflicting anecdotal evidence that Japan supports IMF programs. Indeed, according to a number of studies, Japan increased ODA to nations during the early stages of their IMF adjustments programs in response to U.S. pressure.

1 Chapter I – The Historical Foundation of Japan's Security Strategy

Japan's national security policy is rather difficult to identify, as it is only possible through the collection of the statements provided by Japanese leadership, multiple official documents and legislative actions. The widespread assumption deriving from these revelations is that Japan's national security strategy can be separated into three major periods: the Cold War era, the post-Cold War, and the post-9/11.

Essentially, the outside world is the first source searched by the country itself to identify Japan's security. Indeed, in post-World War II, it was expected that a primary role in seeking the world's peace and security would be played by the United Nations (UN), but when it became clear that such perception was highly optimistic, Japan still did not put a greater emphasis in security policy when reorienting its national security policy.

The "Japanese way" of preserving its security stance against nuclear weapons was founded by Japan's strategic culture of "anti-nuclearism" and "anti-militarism", which has existed since 1945. The dominant aspect in this context, thought frequently stated in Western assessments of Japan's security policy toward nuclear weapons, is not Japan's strategic culture, rather, it is the nature of the security relationship between Japan and the US, which has expanded to the extent that it rendered ironic how Japan has come to be protected by the US nuclear umbrella since the US atomic strike in 1945.

This chapter mostly aims at investigating the origins of Japan's security policy foundations, which can be dated back already to the Cold War era, during which the country's approach was purely pacifist, until arriving to the shift in Japan's security policy in the aftermath of the Cold War period. Finally, specific attention will be devoted to the post-9/11 era, which drastically modified Japan's approach toward its security by revising its essential security policy priorities.

1.1 Japan's National Security Policy during the Cold War: A Pacifist Approach

Japan's place in the world order has its roots in agreements which resulted after the Second World War. After losing the war, the Allies – primarily the U.S. – occupied the country, disarming and demilitarizing it, and imposed upon it a new constitution in 1947, which had never been changed since that moment.[1] As a consequence to this, the Japanese people would pursue peaceful coexistence with all peoples, renounce war forever, and never keep military forces or any sort of war potential, according to this so-called "peace constitution" (Article 9, Constitution of Japan). The importance of

[1] However, in 2007, the Diet drafted a bill which is generally conceived as the first step for a possible future amendment.

the constitution is clear when considering how pacifism has dominated Japanese foreign policy since 1947, as it established the fundamental framework on which these were to be built.

However, it would be oversimplified to believe that Japan's constitution impacted its foreign policy all by itself. Indeed, other considerations also played a role.

The Yoshida Doctrine had a major influence on Japan's foreign and security policy in the decades that followed. According to this theory, Japan's main goal was to reconstruct the country and focus on economic recovery, while its position in international affairs would be secondary and kept to a low profile, and security guarantees would be sought from the United States.

The Yoshida Doctrine permanently affirmed itself as the most significant approach on which the direction of Japanese foreign policy was based during the majority of the Cold War, though it was occasionally modified to account for changing circumstances.

1.1.1 The Yoshida Doctrine

The Yoshida Doctrine is generally defined as an approach, initiated by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the 1950s, to Japanese foreign policy, and later established by several politicians, particularly Eisaku Satō and Hayato Ikeda, who succeeded Yoshida in the 1960s (Hiroyuki, 2022).

The Yoshida Doctrine is generally conceived to be based on three main pillars: security provided by Japan's alliance with the US, low level of expenditures and military armaments, and an emphasis on economic growth and recovery (Nishihara, 1978; Nagai, 1985; Pyle, 1987; Kōsaka, 1989; Nakanishi, 2003; Soeya, 2008; Sugita, 2016). The connection between these three pillars is not concurrent. The US-Japan alliance initially resulted in Japan having few weapons, which supported economic growth and fostered economic recovery.

However, two more pillars may be added as a noteworthy characteristic of the Yoshida Doctrine, closely related to the previous ones: expansion into international markets, especially the Asian market, and staying out of international politics.

Japan's decreased military spending in the twenty-first century (approximately 1% of its GDP) was unprecedented worldwide.[2] Its widely publicized rapid rate of economic growth as a result of its expansion into foreign markets led some academics to draw parallels between these two salient characteristics of post-war Japan. The Yoshida Doctrine's underlying tenet is that the Yoshida administration started these causal relationships after taking over the post-war government.

Researchers on Japanese foreign policy agree that essays realized in the middle of the 1960s by Masataka Ksaka, an associate professor at Kyoto University, are where the idea of a Yoshida Doctrine

[2] The proportion of GDP expenditure on the military fluctuates over time, as it is relative. During the Cold War, Japan's expenditures were low, and spending 1% of GDP on the military, in the 1990s, proved the nation's status as a normal military power.

or Yoshida Line arose (Nakanishi, 2003; Soeya, 2008). Shigeru Yoshida, who continued to be unpopular with the public after leaving office, was given a favorable revaluation in a journal article from 1964 (Kōsaka, 1968). Kōsaka based his viewpoint on how Yoshida focused on economic recovery while rejecting vehement requests for Japan's rearmament by the USA.

In both US-Japan negotiations, Yoshida rejected American proposals for Japan's rearmament. Kōsaka, however, avoided using the expression "Yoshida Doctrine". It was first used by Political scientist Nishihara to refute claims that Japan lacked a "diplomatic strategy", saying that the country had one "even though the foreign ministry does not like to accept", and that Yoshida had established it (Nishihara, 1978). This plan, according to Nishihara, should be known as the "Yoshida Doctrine" because it was developed by Yoshida and carried on by his political successors, and it included expanding the domestic market abroad (particularly in Asia), spending for its own defense no more than the bare minimum, and refraining from interfering in foreign political conflicts. In 1978, a statement of a Japanese foreign policy theory was formulated soon after the "Fukuda Doctrine" was finalized and announced by the government of Takeo Fukuda in talks with the Association of Southeast Asian States.

According to the opinion of Japanese scholars, the Yoshida Doctrine's influence on foreign policy did not increase during the Yoshida's presidency or immediately afterward; rather, the process started six years later (Kōsaka 1968; Iokibe, 1989; Hatano and Satō, 2004; Nakajima, 2006). The "honor students at the Yoshida school", Hayato Ikeda (1960-1964), are regarded as the founding fathers of the Yoshida Doctrine. It was thus inherited in Japan's foreign policy during the 1960s, following the administrations of Ichiro Hatoyama (1955-1966), Tanzan Ishibashi (1956-1957), and Nobusuke Kishi (1957-1960), who conceived themselves political enemies of Yoshida and rejected his political philosophy.

Moreover, there is general unanimity that Japan was directed by the Yoshida Doctrine until revisionists Junichiro Koizumi and Abe Shinzo came to power (Chai, 1997; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007; Izumikawa, 2010; Soeya, 2017; Dobson, 2017; Kallender and Hughes, 2019).

Japan was able to keep defense spending to less than 1% of its GDP, although opinions on the real strength of the Japanese military vary. Unlike other countries, Japan was pursuing economic centrism and, in this sense, was dubbed realism (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998; Green, 2003). Consequently, the Yoshida Doctrine is thought to have been, for more than 40 years, the guiding force in Japan's foreign policy.

1.1.2 Article 9 of Japanese Constitution

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution contains a peculiar and specific clause, the so-called "No war" clause (Haryana High Court, 2008). It went into effect on May 3, 1947, immediately following World War II. According to the article's language, the Japanese government legally renounces its right to declare war and rejects the use of force to resolve differences. According to the article, military units with a propensity for war will not be retained.

Some key expressions can be extrapolated from the text, underlying the real nature of Article 9:

"*We, the Japanese people, … proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people …*" and

"*We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want*." (Constitution of Japan, 1947)

A worldwide system of security could only be successful if states agreed to some restrictions on their national sovereignty with regard to their right to go to war. This insight came as a result of the League of Nations' collective security system failing.

Under the occupation following World War II, Article 9 was added to the Japanese Constitution, being similar to the 24th Article in the post-war German Constitution that favored collective security by delegating or limiting sovereign powers.

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution also bars Japan from establishing an army, navy, or air force, in addition to prohibiting the use of force to resolve international issues. Because of this, the Self Defense Forces are an extension of the national police force, in strictly legal terms, instead of an army, navy, or air force. The effects on foreign, security, and defense policy have been significant.

In a May 2007's poll of a Japanese national daily with the second-highest circulation in the country, the Asahi Shimbun daily, approximately 80% of respondents agreed that "Article 9 has helped sustain peace in Japan", and even though approximately 60% of respondents indicated that a reform to the constitution is necessary, less than 20% favored the concept of creating a Self-Defense Army by amending Article 9. Instead, about 50% of respondents voted to keep Article 9 untouched, while 30% favored modification in this particular case.

However, Article 9 is the plea for an end to that horrific, predominantly masculine obscenity known as war from not only Japan but from the entire human race. In a metaphor, Article 9 is seen as emerging from both the tragedy of World War II and the radioactive ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Article 9 serves as Japan's pledge to those countries in East and Southeast Asia that the globe would never again be subject to this militarist scourge, and constituted an apology to all these countries that were harmed by its militarism before and during World War II.

International civil society organizations have acknowledged Article 9 is significant in relation to human rights, disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons, preventing conflicts, development, the environment, globalization, UN reform, and other international issues.

However, the planet is threatened by the persistence of bloody wars, the spread of weapons, and environmental damage. In this circumstance, to handle such global problems, Article 9 opens the door for the development of non-violent solutions. This action so illustrates that this is not only a Japanese domestic problem, as the article has direct worldwide implications.

This expanding global movement of support demonstrates that Article 9 is valued throughout the world as a goal for which everyone should strive and as a guide for action.

The Article 9 Campaign illustrates Article 9's practical relevance and suggests approaches for maximizing its potential. In order to achieve this, the Campaign connects Article 9 to other international standards and organizations, particularly the United Nations, whose Charter calls for reductions in military spending and the redistribution of scarce resources to combating poverty and safeguarding people from war and violence.

1.1.3 The Japan-US Security Alliance

The relationship between the United States and Japan is now referred to as "the most significant bilateral partnership in the world" by those who shape American foreign policy. In this way, they are trying to say more than just the usual affirmations of steadfast friendship between the two. As a matter of fact, it is the reassuring confirmation of a long-standing strategic and political arrangement. The most crucial bilateral relationship in the entire globe is based on fundamental military concerns that no matter how bad they might be, economic conflicts have not yet been able to overturn. It is one of the cornerstones of post-war American foreign policy.

The period from the start of 1947 to the end of 1951 was a critical one as a bilateral security agreement between the US and Japan was signed, marking the end of a half-decade of quick and astounding change that saw the US repeatedly shifting its attitude toward its former enemy. However, security had triumphantly risen to the top of a contended hierarchy of policy objectives and values at the end of this reconfiguration process. A more thorough analysis of the hows and whys of that

procedure is warranted, so, in many respects, the final result was only a small portion of a deadly serious conflict that took place within the U.S. Government.

While the drama was undoubtedly influenced by the tenor of the moment and its concerns, the future's shape and course, far more than final policy directions and judgements, was ultimately set by the character of this conflict, its winners and losers and its compromises and failures.

A conflict of the mind – of ideas and beliefs at odds with the rest of the world – was present at the broadest, most overarching level, affirming that the fight over Japan's proper place in the world took many different forms over the course of several years and covered a wide range of topics with the most serious ramifications. Absolute surrender was viewed as an opportunity to rid the world of the evil of militarism.

The American occupation of Japan was based on a tradition of Wilsonian idealism, underpinned by a liberal faith in the democratic institutions, and its early optimism was merely a reflection of a paternalistic belief in men's ability to realize their utopian aspirations by acknowledging the futility of war and arms.

However, what could not be changed by moral principles was politics, and the balance of power was not altered. Indignation and moral crusade were undoubtedly there throughout the Cold War as well, but rather than being goals in and of themselves, they were merely accessories to the inflexible realities of power politics and national self-interests.

The aspirations of the past and the pressing needs of the present collided, and as the vision of Soviet strength intruded more and more on American perceptions, Japan's role in the Pax Americana was rebuilt from the ruins. Yet, portraying the conflict as a hard opposition between the ranks of "idealists" and their "realists" adversaries would be inaccurate and oversimplified. The evolution – or even revolutions – of American policy toward the Japanese were largely the result of a fierce power struggle within the U.S. government's bureaucracy over who would have the authority to rebuild a destroyed and complacent country.

When it was still military occupied by US forces, on September 8, 1951, Japan signed the US-Japan Security Treaty, consenting to the continued stationing of US military forces under duress. The treaty also gave US military permission to keep contributing to Japan's domestic security (Green, 2007).

This first draft of the Security Treaty was not really fair, as Japan agreed to give the U.S. military bases as part of the "Far East Article". On the other hand, the Treaty specified, but this was not a requirement, that the US Forces in Japan under the Japan-US Security Treaty "may be deployed" for the defense of Japan in the post-peace treaty period. Furthermore, the Treaty allowed the Japanese government to request the mobilization of the U.S. Forces in Japan in the case of domestic unrest,

and this “internal disturbances clause” was also viewed negatively. Furthermore, despite the fact that treaties typically have one, the old Security Treaty lacked legality period.

It did not call for consultations between the United States and Japan prior to significant movements of military forces into and out of American facilities in Japan or while making equipment improvements, preventing it from becoming an equal state’s signed treaty. In light of this, Japan eventually asked the United States for a Security Treaty adjustment, since disagreement was expressed on aspects of the security relationship between Japan and the United States that came to the fore as a result of the treaty, in addition to the content of the agreement. Indeed, The Nobusuke Kishi administration sought for a revision to the security pact in an effort to address this injustice and establish domestic sovereignty.

First and foremost, even after the peace accord was signed, there was resentment at the American forces’ ongoing presence in the area, and despite the end of Japan’s occupation and the restoration of its freedom, there was discontent about the continuing presence of several foreign soldiers. In contrast to now, there was more opposition to the ongoing presence of foreign military in Japan.

Second, there was an issue with the organizational structure of the National Police Reserve, since former career military officers were fired, and high police positions were filled by ex-police officers after its creation in 1950. Unit structure and training methods were based on those of the U.S. Forces, with instructors from those forces offering advice. However, those who believed that the National Police Reserve was a mercenary of the American Military criticized this arrangement.

Japan would permit the US to keep bases there for the security of the Far East, but the 1954-established Japanese Self-Defense Forces would take care of domestic security until assistance from the US and/or the UN was required.

Although this change to the US-Japan alliance now seems sensible, it was highly divisive at the time among Japan’s pacifist people. Prior to the treaty’s approval by the Japanese Diet (parliament) in 1960, massive protests on the streets of Tokyo occurred, even postponing a trip to Japan in which U.S. President Eisenhower had to force Kishi to resign as Prime Minister. Hayato Ikeda, his successor, rapidly diverted the issue by pledging to quadruple Japan’s gross domestic product in ten years. He accomplished such aim in five years, and the debate around Japan’s partnership with the US temporarily subsided for a time.

1.1.4 The Implementation of Japan-Self Defense Forces

Japan was still under Allied Powers ruling in June 1950, when the Korean War started (Arakawa, 1997). General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

(SCAP) in Japan, ordered the formation of a 75,000 men National Police Reserve Force and approved hiring 8,000 more people for the Maritime Safety Agency.

The domestic objective of the National Police Reserve Force was to maintain public order and peace, and although the U.S. Army served as its model, the Japanese Army's organization and reconstruction had a unique structure, as a nation that preferred peace over militarism.

Initially, it was generally forbidden to join this force for ex-military officers.

The National Safety Force (NSF) was created when Japan's occupation came to an end in 1952, combining the Coastal Safety Force and the National Police Reserve Force. However, the objective of the NSF remained the preservation of the domestic public peace, and when the occupation ended, the peace treaty with the country was signed by forty-nine nations and the U.S. The Japan security treaty was negotiated, setting the basis for the structure of the Japanese defense posture.

Moreover, within two years, Japan also experienced the foundation of the National Safety Academy (later, National Defense Academy) for the training of future officers, as well as the sign of the U.S. – Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the establishment of the Japanese Defense Agency and Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). Besides this, an air component, the Air Self-Defense Force was added to the JSDF, as its mission also included external aggression, and the Joint Staff Council was developed with the most senior general selected to chair the council.

As the Self-Defense Forces Law (SDF Law) has been amended throughout the past 60 years, it can be seen as a history of the growth of the SDF's size and power within the confines of Article 9 of the postwar Constitution (Eldridge & Katsuhiro, 2019). The SDF Law, which went into effect on July 1, 1954, outlined the SDF's objectives, regulatory framework, organizational structure, unit makeup, activities, and personnel administration. As clearly stated, the SDF's primary mission was to "defend our nation from direct and indirect aggression in order to protect its peace and independence and preserve its security". In addition, it was to "maintain public order when necessary" (SDF Law, Article 3).

In Chapter Two of the statute, a framework for SDF oversight of these operations was developed, where the Prime Minister retains overall command and management authority over the SDF, while the director general of the Defense Agency now serves as the SDF's chief of staff. The director general's authority over SDF units was to be exercised through the chiefs of staff of the SDF, who would oversee and manage all units and people while performing their tasks.

Chapter Three dealt with the structure and makeup of each SDF branch. When the SDF was established, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) was composed of regional divisions (*kankutai)*, armies (*hōmentai*), and other units directly under the director general. Initially, the Ground Staff Office (*Rikujō Bakuryō Kanbu*) was in charge of one army and six divisions. In the same way, the

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), which initially consisted of the Self- Defense Fleet (*Jiei Kantai*), and five district fleets under the command of the Maritime Staff Office (*Kaijō Bakuryō Kanbul*), was to include the Self-Defense Fleet (*Jiei Kantai*), district fleets (*chihōtai*), and those units directly under the direct command of the director general.

The subordinate SDF bodies were governed by Chapter Four. It set up hospitals, supply hubs, schools, and temporary liaisons offices.

In Chapter Five, the rules for SDF personnel were laid down, and it also set rules for voluntary reserve SDF members in addition to specifying the appointment, responsibilities, and treatment of people. Instead, the SDF's operations were governed by Chapter Six, which also set forth the different acts it was permitted to conduct while doing its tasks. Defense operations (*bōei shutsudō*) to defend Japan were outlined as the SDF's main goal. Secondary missions were defined as public security operations, marine security, disaster assistance, and responding to foreign aircraft violating Japanese airspace.

Chapter Seven incorporated the regulations pertaining to the SDF's right to possess weapons and employ lethal force during defense operations, while also establishing the authority of individuals in charge of upholding other inside the SDF and the use of force to protect the weapons and gear of the SDF. Many rules might be found in Chapter Eight, which outlined defensive burdens including the SDF's expropriation of materials and use of public telecommunications during defense operations, and it gave the SDF the secondary objectives of mine clearance and civil engineering. Penalties, on the other hand, were the topic of Chapter 9. The Defense Agency Creation Law, the other defense law put into effect at the same time as the SDF Law, established the Joint Staff Council (*Tōgō Bakuryō Kaigi*), five subordinate bodies, the three branch staff offices, SDF units, and the number of SDF personnel and other employees. The National Defense Council was also established within the cabinet. The Defense Agency Founding Law set the SDF's size at 152, 115 at the time of its founding in 1954.

The SDF Law has been amended several times since its entrance into force in 1954.

The majority of the significant changes up until the 1980s were focused on increasing the SDF's unit composition. The Western Army, two mixed or composite regiments (*konseidan*), along with an air wing for the ASDF, were first established for the GSDF in the 1955 revision to the SDF Law. A mixed regiment and an air wing were established for the GSDF and ASDF, respectively, in the 1956 amendment. The 1957 amendment established a training flotilla for the MSDF and an air division with two air wings for the ASDF. The 1958 amendment created a mixed regiment for the GSDF.

Control Training Command (*Kansei Kyoiku Shūdan),* Transport Wing (*Yusō Kōkūdan*), Air Defense Command (*Kōkū Sōtai*), and an air defense force were all established. The ASDF's air division was also reformed. The Northeast, Eastern, and Central Armies were added to the GSDF in the 1959

amendment, which also established the ASDF's Flying Training Command (*Hikō Kyoiku Shūdan*). The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan was signed in January 1960, and the internal opposition to the treaty's adoption grew more fervent.

Although it was seriously studied, the new treaty finally took force on June 23 without the requirement being put into practice.

Six regional divisions (*kankutai*) and four mixed regiments of the GSDF were reconfigured into thirteen divisions in the 1961 amendment (shidan). The Self-Defense Fleet's composition was reorganized into the Fleet Escort Force (*Goei Kantai*), Fleet Air Force (*Kōkū Shūdan*), and other minor units, and the MSDF's Air Training Command (*Kyōiku Kōku Shūdan*) was founded. The Western Air Defense Force (*Seibu Kōkū Hōmentai*) of the ASDF was also established.

The amendment also provided that directives for joint operations from the director general of the Defense Agency would be received and carried out by the chairman of the Joint Staff Council. Therefore, in the early 1960s, ten years after the National Police Reserve was first founded and following multiple revisions to the SDF Law, the SDF presented a precise composition: the GSDF was made up of five armies, thirteen divisions, and various units directly under the control of the JDA director general; the MSDF was made up of the Self Defense Fleet, Air Training Command, five district fleets, the Training Squadron, and other units controlled by the JDA director general (Eldridge & Katsuhiro, 2019).

After Okinawa was returned to Japanese control the previous year, later modifications made during the Cold War included the addition of the Fleet Submarine Force (*Sensui Kantai*) to the Self-Defense Fleet in 1980 and the creation of the ASDF Southwestern Composite Air Division (*Nansei Kōkū Konseidan*) in 1973. Some minor adjustments to the three branches' organizational structure were made in the 1988 modification, including as the creation of the Air Support Command (*Kōkū Shien Shūdan*) by merging the ASDF's Air Rescue Wing (*Kōkū Kyūnandan*), Transport Wing, and Air Traffic Control and Weather Wing (*Hoan Kansei Kishōdan*) (Eldridge & Katsuhiro, 2019).

The 1978 Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes (Daikibo Jishin Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochihō) included earthquake disaster prevention to the list of SDF operations, but that was it. Also established in 1978, the U.S.- Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (the U.S. – Japan Guidelines) sparked discussions and training exercised for joint U.S. – Japan operations in case of emergencies. The fixed size of the SDF as specified by the Defense Agency Creation Law peaked in 1988, close to the end of the Cold War, at the peak of 273, 801.

1.1.5 The Origin of the Basic Policy of National Defense

The goal of national defense is to thwart direct and indirect aggression and, in the case that it occurs, to repel such aggression in order to maintain Japan's independence and peace, which are based on democratic ideals (Arakawa, 1997). The Japanese government hereby established the following guidelines in order to fulfill this goal:

1) To encourage international collaboration and support United Nations initiatives, which will help bring about world peace.
2) To create the solid foundation necessary for Japan's security by enhancing national pride and stabilizing public welfare.
3) To gradually build up the effective defense capacities required for self-defense, while taking into account the nation's resources and the current internal situation.
4) To respond to external attack based on the security agreements between the United States and Japan, pending future improvements in the UN's ability to discourage and repel aggression.

The Japanese government's choice to adopt a minimum strategy in the development of its defense capabilities is a demonstration of Japan's adherence to the idea of keeping the role of military power limited. Japan's decision is demonstrated by the Basic Principles of National Defense (*Kokubo no Nihon Hoshin*) from 1957 (Tatsumi, 2008).

Japan's national security approach remained fundamentally unchanged in its emphasis on non-military elements as a mean of preserving peace for Japan, while Yasuhiro Nakasone attempted to emphasize the need for Japan to improve its autonomous defense capability between 1982 and 1987 as prime minister. As a result of Japan's choice to limit the military's participation in its security strategy, the country has an unusually tight reading of the constitution that governs when it may use force against enemies. First, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution declares that Japan would not use war to resolve international conflicts and will forsake both the right to possess military forces and the right to engage in belligerence, but when Japan created the Japan Self-Defense Forces, this became a problem.

To defend the U.S.-Japan alliance in front of the Diet and the Japanese people, the government also used this restriction on the right to collective self-defense and other similar justifications. According to Article Five of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which outlines both nations' pledges to the defense of Japan and the territory under its control, the Japanese government maintained that its obligations under the treaty would not obligate Japan to use the right of collective self-defense. The

Japanese government went so far as to claim that the JSDF's use of force to defend American military outposts in Japan was an act of individual and collective self-defense on the grounds that if such bases were physically endangered, Japan would be directly attacked militarily. In accordance with Japan's self-imposed prohibition on the right to collective self-defense, even Japan's support for American efforts to maintain peace in the Far East – the situation outlined in Article Six of the US-Japan Security Treaty – was justified.

The third tenet of Japan's national security strategy was primarily illustrated by using non-military ways to grant its security in the attempts to dominate global economy.

Such an endeavor began at home, where Japan concentrated on reviving its economy by combining an export-driven trade policy with an industrial policy that emphasized the advancement of modern technology. Japan's economy grew dramatically thanks to the help of these initiatives, as Japan's exports increased by 114 times from 1955 to 1987, and the Japanese government sought to take advantage of the nation's economic expansion to raise Japan's standing abroad. It accomplished this by expanding its financial support for global organizations including the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Also, it significantly raised its formal development assistance and foreign aid by 1990 in addition to being the largest creditor in the world.

Even within the UN dimension, Japan has risen to the position of second-largest donor after the U.S., covering roughly 11.5% of the UN budget.

To ensure that its military maintained a low profile, in addition to these fundamental guidelines, Japan self-imposed additional constraints, and the long-lasting effects of three of these limits on Japan's national security strategy should be recognized. The first is the ban on exporting weapons. It started off as a small collection of guidelines. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law of Japan only stipulates that the Minister of International Trade and Industry must approve the export of weapons (now the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry).

The Three Principles of Arms Exports, which were enacted by the Sato Cabinet in 1967, forbade the transfer of weaponry to communist nations, sanctioned nations, conflict-ridden nations, and nations that are likely to become involved in conflicts. Ever since the Maki Cabinet was held, Japan has practically been prohibited from exporting weaponry, as the Japanese government decided that Japan should refrain from extorting arms to nations that would not comply with the Three Principles of Arms Exports, this prohibition was further reinforced.

The prohibition on using space also started out as a non-binding guideline. A non-binding resolution enacted by the Japanese Diet in 1969 restricted Japan's use of space to "non-military objectives". At that time, the Japanese government has refrained from conducting reconnaissance and

surveillance missions in space for reasons of national security. When the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA*, Uchu Kaihatsu Jigyodan*), the organization in charge of space development in Japan until 2003, was founded in June 1969, the principle was codified. The agency was given a mandate to develop satellite technology for Japan that is only to be used for "peaceful purposes". As a result, Japan's space policy was constrained of the realm of pure scientific research without consideration for national security.

The term "information-gathering satellite (ISG)" is used by the former Japan Defense Agency to minimize the level of involvement in the program (JDA, now the Ministry of Defense, or MOD), despite the crucial role imagery analysts seconded from the JDA to the Satellite Intelligence Center have played in its ISG operation. Japan has had an indigenous reconnaissance satellite system in operation since 2003. Until the 2008 adoption of the Basic Law for Space (Uchu Kihon Ho) by the Japanese government, this division between space development and national security persisted. According to the law, the Japanese government program must take national security concerns into account.

Finally, Japan has established the idea that it will not obtain nuclear weapons by judgements taken regarding legislation and policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the fact that nuclear weapons with defensive features would be considered constitutional in Japan, the then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, had chosen a policy of not developing nuclear weapons.

Ownership of nuclear weapons is seen as constitutional in Japan. Japan's adoption of the US-Japan Cooperation Agreement on Nuclear Power in 1955 formalized its commitment to refraining from developing nuclear weapons. With Japan's ratification of the US-Japan Cooperation Agreement on Nuclear Power, the country announced its commitment to use nuclear energy only for "peaceful purposes" in the Nuclear Power Basic Law (*Genshi-ryoku Kihon-ho*) of 1955.

In his 1968 policy speech, former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato outlined the "four pillars of Japan's non-nuclear policy", which included:

1. Three Non-Nuclear Principles (no nuclear weapon possession, production, or introduction);
2. Nuclear disarmament and arms control;
3. Reliance on US nuclear deterrence;
4. Peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Japan ratified in 1974, further cemented its non-nuclear stance.

Due to these limitations, Japan's post war security strategy has placed a strong emphasis on limiting the use of its conventional military strength.

1.2 After the Cold War: a starting shift for Japan's security policy

Both in regional and international affairs, Japan's security role has experienced a shift from the type of approach it has been used to play during the Cold War (Singh, 2002). In that period, Japan adopted a peculiar isolationist regional strategy of one-country pacifism which was based on two main pillars: first, while avoiding any kind of political role in international political affairs, Japan pursued economic diplomacy; and second, Japan relied on the United States for its stake in regional security (Midford, 2000).

Japanese security policy's shift was guided by a key event, being Tokyo's embarrassing and unsuccessful experience during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Indeed, its reluctance to dispatch non-combat personnel to the Gulf was exposed to criticism from both the West and the Arab states. The Gulf War constituted a significant experience for the country because it pushed Japan to go beyond defending its borders and take part in creating new regulations for the post-Cold War international security situation. Second, the Persian Gulf showed Japan that military might still have a substantial influence on international relations, even in the post-Cold War era, and that in dealing with military crises, Japan might have been ill-equipped.

After the Gulf War, the importance of security in Japanese foreign policy increased, since Japan revised its security strategy to enable a major participation in the global security environment in response to the rise of new external threats. It achieved so in several ways: initially, Tokyo enabled Japan to take a more active role in international security by contributing more to UNPKOs after passing the International Peace Co-operation Law in 1992. The successful deployment of 1,800 Japanese troops to Cambodia in 1992 as a part of an UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission was made possible by the passage of this Law.

Second, Tokyo revised the National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO) in 1995, highlighting that Japan would play a bigger role in UNPKOs and that the Self-Defense Force (SDF) would deal with threats with low intensity, such as terrorism. Thirdly, in 1996, the Japanese government decided to hold negotiations with the United States to provide new energy to the alliance and make it more applicable to the post-Cold War world. Both nations announced an agenda for a bigger role for Japan in the newly enlarged defense cooperation, including defense strategy, research and development, missile defense, and diplomatic relations with China.

Japan's omission from the conceptualization of a "normal state" is no surprise at all for many Japanese observers. This is due to Japan's instability in the economic versus security spheres globally

since the post-war years. Indeed, while it had reached the position of being the second largest economy in the world, it still avoided taking any major political initiative in international affairs. This attitude is also supported and perpetuated by internal controls, such as the Peace Constitution, the limitation of defense expenditures to one per cent of the gross national product (GNP), social and legal norms that restrict the role of its military, and Japan's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles.

At the basis of the relationship between Japan's post-Cold War security policy and the concept of normalization there are significant changes in Japan's security policy. The aforementioned changes are:

- Revisions to the U.S. – Japan security alliance
- Japan's participation in the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) project in partnership with the United States
- Increasing Japan's military prowess and intelligence gathering capacity
- Potential changes to the sacred Peace Constitution, and
- Japan's desire for a permanent place on the UN Security Council

1.2.1 The Persian Gulf War

The Japanese government took its time before the Gulf Crisis to adjust to the changes in the balance of power that occurred in the late 1980s and made Japan a significant player in the world order. Given that Japan emphasized "low politics" (or the politics of a "trading state") and was a major beneficiary of the former U.S.- led, cold war economic and security order, the government's reluctance to pursue a more assertive style of diplomacy seemed reasonable (Rosecrance, 1987). A sizable majority of Japanese people were also opposed to Japan's more active role in global security's matters, both because of the economic success a "trading-state" policy had given to Japan, as well as the legacy of WWII, which had rejected Japan's initial attempt to gain a "respect place in the world" by force (Purrington, 1992).

As a result of the end of the Cold War, the Japan-U.S. security alliance, the principal framework for Japan's integration into international society and for the U.S.-led international economic order, was also losing significance. Through a gradual expansion of the Nichibei partnership into a global relationship, Japan cautiously began a post-cold war strategy of supporting a declining U.S. hegemon, since no other country (Japan included) was yet prepared to play the type of leadership role the U.S. played in the international security and economic affairs during the Cold War. But prior to the Gulf War, Japan was still ill-prepared and unwilling to take an active part in international affairs in the domain of "high politics" (security issues).

Although crucial in terms of giving the U.S.-led multinational troops much-needed financial backing, Japan's contribution to the Gulf crisis was very minimal in determining how the fight turned out, while the crisis' effects on Japan's domestic political system and foreign policy were more pervasive. The crisis acted as the trigger for an emerging agreement that Japan must play a more aggressive political role in foreign affairs, comparable to its international economic might, in addition to partially resolving the "allergy" of the Japanese people and opposition parties to military problems.

Foreign Minister Nakayama met with Secretary of State James Baker in Washington on the eve of the U.N.- mandated January 15 deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. They discussed a wide range of issues. The main goal of the tour was to publicly endorse American foreign policy as a potential war with Iraq loomed.

Nakayama agreed that Japan would bear all yen-based costs of stationing American troops in Japan, increasing its share of the maintenance costs to about 50% by 1995, in order to lessen growing U.S. criticism of Japan's role in the Gulf Crisis and improve relations within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.[3] During a press release, despite the fact that $2 billion had already been sent, it was declared that Japan would consider additional financial support for the multinational forces.[4] Actually, it seemed that Nakayama, despite the country's diplomatic support, was not precisely informed about the exact U.S' dictated war plans.

The following day, Nakayama returned to Japan to attend an emergency meeting, along with cabinet officials, for discussing the crisis. The government decided to convene its Security Council to strengthen its weak crisis management system by discussing specific measures which were conceived as fundamental to cope with developments in the Gulf. Eventually, a Gulf crisis headquarters was established within the cabinet.

The Kaifu government reacted immediately as a response to the outbreak of the war, and it claimed full and instantaneous diplomatic support for the decision to attack Iraqi forces provided by multinational forces. At the same time, the government also considered other types of support to grant to the U.S.-led multinational forces.

However, the Gulf War severely impacted Japan's foreign policy, as the crisis showed the unpreparedness of Japan's foreign policy to satisfy the exigencies of the post-cold war world. Japan had to face several international pressures to be more involved in the international affairs, commensurate to its status of economic superpower, as a response both of structural changes in the international system's distribution of power and the end of the bipolar world.

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[3] Around 1992, Japan payed for approximately 40 percent of the costs of U.S. forces in Japan.

[4] See Purrington and A.K., "Tokyo's Policy Responses During the Gulf Crisis," *Asian Survey*, vol. 31, no. 4 (April 1991), pp. 307-23 for a deeper analysis of Japanese diplomacy in the crisis preceding the outbreak of the war.

Before the crisis, the then Vice-Foreign Minister Kuriyama and other leaders demanded a more active Japanese role in the emerging post-cold war order. The issue was that, despite the large incongruity between Japan's political influence in the world and its economic power, most Japanese were uncertain, some of them even indifferent, towards Japan's behavior in international affairs.

The government increased its burden-sharing responsibilities in response to pressure from the United States due to the lack of international consciousness. However, the Gulf crisis did not demand for a less reactive style of diplomacy, rather, for a more proactive and imaginative one: a type of style which required Japan to be more supportive, through initiatives, on the international security order, in which the U.S. was no more capable of dealing with all the costs.

The so-defined "Iraqi Shock" consisted in the realization that the country, in response to the new international system which demanded Japan to play a leading role, was not prepared at all, and that there was the need for Japan to continue supporting the United States (still the most important actor in the evolving international system) and to rely on its Nichibei partnership with the aim of providing with Japan's comprehensive security in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, the idea that Japan should have a more active role in the international affairs was given by the fact that the number of incidents during that period increased. First of all, the multinational forces' victory against the Iraqi army caused a reassessment of the U.N.'s potential and of a global police force. Second, a strong U.S. criticism provided Japan's self-indulgent attitude during the crisis. Third, any attempt to profit from postwar reconstruction in the Middle East by Japanese companies was perceived as hostile, and finally, Japan suffered the exclusion by the U.S. and its allies from postwar diplomatic functions celebrating the allied victory. Indeed, unlike his European counterparts, Foreign Minister Nakayama was not invited to visit Washington immediately after the conclusion of the war. Japan was also not mentioned in a public letter of gratitude from the Kuwaiti government, unlike other friendly nations which were thanked.

One key takeaway from the battle was that Japan needed to find a substitute for its excessive reliance on "checkbook diplomacy" in order to avoid global isolation and deteriorating bilateral ties with a resurgent post-Gulf War America. In other words, Japan cannot continue to be a political midget and an economic powerhouse in world politics. Contrary to worldwide crises during the Cold War, Japan's broad support for American goals was insufficient for it to be seen as a dependable ally of the Western alliance. Additionally, "checkbook diplomacy", a different diplomatic tactic that Japan had employed throughout the 1980s in response to American demands for increased alliance burden sharing, was not used. Another realization was that other countries regarded "one-nation pacifism" as "selfishness".

Thus, in a system where maintaining adherence to the "Yoshida Doctrine" is out of date, and where full membership in the international community necessitates Japan making significant contributions from which it has been largely exempt since the end of World War II, it became apparent that Japan must try to adjust to a new international order.

Changes in the domestic political context went hand in hand with shifts in Japanese perceptions of their place in the world. While those who opposed actively assisting the U.S-led multinational forces were seen as the biggest losers, the biggest winners were those who supported the U.S. The Social Democratic Party (SDPJ), formerly known as the Socialist Party, was one of the biggest losers because in the spring local elections, candidates supported by the SDPJ suffered a significant electoral loss, while those supported by the LDP easily won. While the SDPJ experienced a resurgence in the 1989 Upper House and 1990 Lower House elections thanks to the popularity of its chairwoman, Doi Takako, real reform of the party – which was required even during the Cold War era – had received a temporary remission by several scandals involving LDP politicians. This allowed the party to maintain the illusion that no significant reforms were required.

However, to demonstrate the party's growing marginalization within the Diet, the LDP, DSP, and Komeito worked together to pass the second fiscal 1900 supplementary budget. This, together with the shocking string of electoral losses of the party in the local elections of 1991's spring, made it clear that the party needed to be subject to several reforms in order to continue as a major party in the twenty-first century. The party chairperson resigned as a result of the influence obtained by the "Doi boom's" symbolic conclusion, and right-wing reformers, led by Tanabe Makoto[5], who took over as party chairman in July 1991. Members of the LDP who supported American diplomacy, such as Ozawa Ichiro, were perceived as big winners from the crisis, in contrast to Doi.[6]

1.2.2 Incurring Threats: Russia

Historically, Japan and Russia (previously the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or USSR) have only had sporadic interactions despite they have been neighbors for a very long time (Hirose, 2018). This is mostly due to the fact that the Sea of Japan divides the two nations, and that Russia's historical core has been to the west, far from Japan.

Relations between the Russian Empire and Japan were usually good throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, even though the Russo-Japanese War was sparked by disagreements not only over the Korean Peninsula and Manchukuo, but also on Russian expansionism, which began to constitute a menace to Japan's security. Japan's triumph over Russia in 1905 cemented its status as a significant

[5] Tanabe was a close friend of LDP "kingmaker" Kanemaru Shin.

[6] After his resignation as LDP secretary general, Ozawa's career benefited, but some young Turks within the party perceived his "sacrifice" to be made in order to indirectly pacify the U.S.

modern state in East Asia; yet World War II strained relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics. Once the war ended, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was violated by the USSR which invaded Japan and a few other Asian nations that were ruled by the Japanese. Later, Japan formed an alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War and was started to be regarded as a "Western" nation. In the meantime, at the end of WW2, the Northern Territories were under USSR control and while Japan attempted to reclaim them discussions proved challenging, and a resolution was more difficult given the Cold War atmosphere.

The USSR's demise at the end of 1991 made the economic and political situation in Russia worse. Moscow's position on nations outside the former Soviet Bloc grew contradictory and Japanese officials believed that Japan was given a chance by Russia's weakness to resolve the territorial dispute, especially when President Boris Yeltsin promised to talk about the future of all four islands. The Tokyo Declaration, signed in October 1993 by Yeltsin and former PM Morihiro Hosokawa, recognized the validity of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, which had pledged to return two islands to Japan, and the geographical conflict would be settled by negotiations, as both parties promised. This implied that two of the four islands, Habomai and Shikotan, might be given back.
The fundamental reason Japan finally failed to take advantage of the Russian vulnerability was its own political illogicality.

After Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000, Russia's period of weakness came to an end. However, the Irkutsk Statement, which was signed in March 2001 by President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, was made possible thanks to the Tokyo Declaration, which served as its foundation for future negotiations between the two leaders. To sum up, three main pillars are provided for Japan's fundamental diplomatic approach to Russia. Tokyo has first worked to strengthen relations between Japan and Russia in order to create a suitable partner in the Asia-Pacific area. Second, a variety of spheres, including politics, economy, security and defense, culture, sports, and global society were influenced for Japan's reinforcement of ties with Russia. Third, in order to resolve the Northern Territories issue, Japan attempted to reach a peace treaty with Russia. Political negotiations and trust-building between the PM and president (and foreign ministers) is the key for Japanese officials to make progress on these issues, who are also strongly convinced that improving relations with Russia would profit substantially Japanese interests.

Japan's "Russia policy" has long sought to avoid other topics, such as Russia's foreign affairs, internal problems, democratic issues, and human rights concerns, focusing primarily on negotiations regarding the Northern Territories. Tokyo believed that the Northern Territories were illegally captured by Russia and remain the inherent territory of Japan, hence all four islands must be returned

to Japan[7]. This limited Tokyo's choices for discussing the territorial dispute. Although Japanese officials occasionally consider the possibility of returning two islands, and the Abe government had embraced a novel strategy, this fundamental position had not altered.

Putin has appeared to be in favor of settling the international dispute, despite his occasionally critical demeanor. For instance, he has stated that he cannot talk to a nation that is actively sanctioning Russia. Putin has the political clout to guarantee acceptance for such a measure, despite the fact that resolutions concerning the reduction of territory would be divisive in Russian internal politics. Putin has advocated for dividing the disputed land in 50-50 so that all sides benefit equally. This is known as the "Hikiwake" principle.[8] In the past, Russia used this method to settle territorial conflicts with nearby nations like China and Norway. Although there are at least three choices, the specifics of a 50/50 split are not straightforward. The first plan is to divide the islands equally by number, giving Japan the Habomai and Shikotan islands and Russia the rest. A second suggestion is to give Japan back three islands – Habomai, Shikotan, and Kunashiri – since Habomai and Shikotan are very tiny. The four islands can also be divided by their square mileage, which would result in Japan recovering more than three (3+) islands.

The Yoshiro Mori administration also researched the idea of returning two islands, which is based on the Joint Declaration of the Soviet Union and Japan from 1956.[9] The Japanese government does not perceive this as a 50/50 division despite the two islands are substantially smaller than the rest of the Northern Territories; however, some former diplomats and researchers see this as a workable option. As a result, Taro Aso and others, claim that restoring three islands would be necessary for a 50-50 agreement.

Japan's attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Russian side for years proved difficult in part because Japanese government tend to be short-lived. The Japanese government intended to reclaim at least some of the Northern Territories during Putin's term in power. Among former Prime Ministers, only Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe were able to stay in power for long, which is necessary for negotiations. When Putin first rose to power, negotiations of the territorial dispute were therefore challenging. When visiting Japan with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on November 14, 2004, Lavrov declared that his country, which succeeded the Soviet Union, accepted the 1956 Declaration and was prepared to negotiate with Japan on this basis. The Japanese government sought

[7] The return of all four islands was long shared by the Japanese people and constitutes a very old demand. There is no clearness of when the Japanese government adopted its official opposition, but the idea was firstly proposed officially when it was put forward by Nemuro mayor Ando in 1945.

[8] In Japanese, *Hikiwake* means "draw". Putin has explained, "A *Judo-ka"* (Judo player) must take a brave step forward not only to win, but also to avoid losing. We do not have to achieve victory. In this situation, we have to reach an acceptable compromise".

[9] Such as the Russo-Japanese summit meeting in 2000

to recapture the Northern Territories, and this speech increased public expectations in Japan that this would happen.

1.2.3 Incurring Threats: China

The impact of concerns with national identity, political legitimacy, and distributive justice on China's internal stability has a significant impact on how the Japanese view China's security. The acquisition and/or protection of "rank, respect, material possessions, and special privileges" are just as important to security in Japan and China as national independence and territorial integrity are today (Drifte, 2003). How each country perceives the other's consideration of the extent to which national self-extension is necessary for national-self-preservation is the actual question. In Asia, as opposed to Europe or the US, the concept of security has incorporated economic strength and resilience for a considerably longer period of time. China has embraced, since the economic opening, the idea of comprehensive national security that has been used by Japan since the early 1980s.

The 1990s brought significant shift in the Japanese vision and perception of China's security strategies. The conclusion of the Cold War not only caused strategic uncertainty over China's development and US security commitments to Asia, but also shifted Japan's security worries to other concerns, different from the Soviet Union. Since 1989, China has significantly increased its defense spending and has stepped up its efforts to advance a multipolar world and has once more shown a strong ambivalence for the security measures Japan deployed in response to the aforementioned. Domestically, the prior cautious approach to China, which had been widespread since the end of the 1970s, has been undermined by generational shifts in Japan's political and bureaucratic leadership and Japanese self-assertiveness.

However, global security cannot be discussed within a Japan-China framework because of the strong ties between Japan and the U.S, and China's primary concerns with the U.S. in its assessment of such security. China will need to encourage Japan to become more independent from the U.S. and to have a security policy in line with its economic power because China opposes US predominance in Asia and the alliances on which this preponderance is based (while also ideologically opposing the dependence for security of one country on another).

Furthermore, having good relations with a thriving Japan should be vital since it is China's second-most significant economic partner after the U.S. and because China depends on Japan to restore its rightful rose as a great power.

However, as Realists, they also believe that great economic powers inevitably develop into great military powers, even though Japan's emergence as a major global civil power challenges this historical determinism due to the disparity between Japan's economic performance and military

ability. China, obviously, does not want to follow its own Realist recommendations in Japan's case, and support Tokyo's independent military development (the 1980s anti-hegemonic struggle was somewhat an exception); nor does it want to speed the realization of its historical determinism regarding Japan's future course because of its own national ambitions, its deep mistrust of Japanese people, and its worry that strong ties between Japan and the United States will impede the emergence of a multipolar world. However, by working to undermine the Japanese American security alliance and/or threatening Japan with a rapid and covert buildup of conventional and nuclear military forces, as well as with destabilizing actions to assert its territorial claims, China runs the risk of either a stronger Japanese American military alliance or a stronger independent Japanese military power.

Overall, it is difficult to draw any conclusion about China's perception of Japan's new place in the "new world order" in general terms. Furthermore, Chinese predictions of Japan's future course depend on presumptions regarding the relative power of China, Japan, and the US at the national level as well as on whether they take a regional or global perspective. Japan looms as the longer-term threat if Chinese analysts are correct in their prediction that the U.S. will eventually decline, and that Japan would no longer accept U.S. hegemony. The peaks and valleys in perception of U.S. strength and Japan's worsening economic difficulties in the 1990s tempered this notion. Japan appears larger on the former depending on whether one is concerned with the regional or global levels.

The significant increases in China's military spending and its lack of openness were Japan's longstanding security concern during the 1990s. Without China's astounding economic growth and the apparent link to "comprehensive national power", Japanese concerns would have been far less significant regarding China's rapid and ambiguous military buildup and security strategy.

The consistency and rapidity of China's budgeted increases for military expenditures had already prompted the first public criticisms by top government officials before the LDP lost power in 1993, the first time since 1955. Furthermore, Chinese criticism linked Japan's ODA to China's willingness to boost defense spending, raising issues that went to the core of Japan's engagement strategy and its political base.

Concern over China's military budget persisted in the public sphere and was also brought up in bilateral discussions. Japanese comments have drawn attention in particular to the opaque nature of China's military spending, which is rendered more concerning by the country's erratic political environment.

Another Japan's security concern in the middle of the 1990s consists in the restarting of nuclear tests, in addition to emphasizing the presence of weapon system that Japan cannot directly counter.

China conducted a total of 39 nuclear tests between May and September 1992 and in October 1993, and additional rounds of testing were carried out in June and October of 1994. Although these tests drew condemnation in both Japan and the U.S., the criticism was limited to formal declarations of remorse (Jiang, 1999). But with the beginning of a new Chinese nuclear test series in May 1995, the situation reached a critical stage.

The tests took place to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system and they increased the negative effects of China's growing military spending, bringing the attention to China's expanding nuclear deterrence and missile exports. Because of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War, nuclear weapons have always been an extremely emotive topic in Japanese domestic politics, but a contradiction emerged between a more active anti-nuclear weapon policy desired by the public and the government's real nuclear-deterrent-based defense policy, resulting from the official policy, as part of the Japan-U.S. security alliance that marked Japan under the USA's nuclear arsenal.

The development of China's nuclear deterrent has been further motivated by the U.S.-Japan missile defense plans. Japan does not appear to be covered by China's vow not to use nuclear weapons against governments without such weapons (Urayama, 2000). When the U.S. and China agreed to avoid using nuclear missiles to attack one another's countries in the summer of 1998, a senior U.S. official participating in the negotiations was quoted as claiming that the agreement only applied to long-range missiles, not U.S. sites in Japan. This suggests that China would continue to strike U.S. bases in Japan with its medium-range DF21 ballistic missiles (180 km range).

Japanese were particularly irritated by the timing of the nuclear testing restart on May 15th, 1995. First of all, the tests were against the 1992 ODA criteria, which demand that ODA be reevaluated in the event of the manufacture of weapons of mass devastation. Japan, meanwhile, has since only expressed sadness when China conducted nuclear armament testing.

Japan has also grown concerned about China's exports to North Korea, as well as other sensitive nations in South Asia (Pakistan) and the Middle East (Iran, Libya, and Syria), of machinery and technology connected to weapon mass destruction.

China also began to emphasize more vehemently its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea at the beginning of the 1990s, as if to make the Japanese aware of the potential motivation behind rising defense spending and bolstering its nuclear arsenal. The safety of its maritime routes to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and its oil and fishing interests in the East China maritime were all mentioned as security issues for Japan and as a result of this. Territorial conflicts have the most significant effects on security relations since maintaining territorial integrity is at the core of every

national security strategy. National pride as well can play a decisive role in democratic and autocratic regimes.

Given their proximity to as-yet- unquantifiable seabed-based energy sources, raw materials reserves, and fishing interests, economic interests have taken on more significance in the territorial disputes between Japan and China. In the case of oil and gas reserves, even as China's demand for energy continued to rise, these interests are made more apparent by the fact that the production of the world's major oil suppliers (primarily in the Middle East) was predicted to peak between 2010 and 2020. China's economy became net importer of oil in November 1993, even though it is expanding quickly but is still mostly based on highly polluting coal, and it is now in a critical need of developing its oil and gas reserves.

However, what has mostly influenced Japan's evolving security assessment of China was China's military drills and missile tests surrounding Taiwan in 1995-1996. These incidents drew attention to China's missile force and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they raised concerns about China's willingness to use military force (and the US's willingness to respond), and they highlighted the role of the unresolved Taiwan issue in Japanese Chinese relations.

Given the deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations that followed the U.S. allowing the president of Taiwan, Li Denghui, to attend a Cornell University alumni reunion in June 1995, as well as Chinese pressure on Taiwan to sway the island's first presidential elections in March 1996, it is important to understand the military drills and missile tests conducted around Taiwan in 1995-1996.

On July 18, 1995, in order to protest the U.S. action and deflect accusations that it was neglecting China's goal for reunification, the Chinese leadership ordered a week-long series of military drills, followed by a second round in August, while in North of Taiwan, the Chinese military launched M-9 missiles into the East-China Sea. The missile tests received no response from the U.S., and in November 1995 China conducted a third round of military drills, right before the Taiwanese parliamentary election. The U.S. allowed the Nimitz aircraft carrier to pass across the Taiwan Strait in December, ostensibly because it had to reroute due to bad weather.

While officially the government tried to keep a low profile and only voiced their hope of a peaceful conclusion to the conflict, the crisis' culmination with the missile launches in March 1996 garnered significant media attention in Japan. The missile test cleared to the Japanese people just how close to home the Taiwanese issue is, and how any escalation could compromise their security.

Although it appeared calm on the surface, the Japanese administration was worried about the numerous consequences of the crisis. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) received 257 inquiries about repatriating the 10,000 permanent Japanese residents and 10,000 Japanese tourists currently

residing in Taiwan, what would happen to Japanese oil tankers transiting the Taiwan Strait, and how to respond to potential U.S. demands for military assistance.

The PRC's occupation of at least one of the smaller Taiwan-controlled islands off the coast of China was not disregarded by the Cabinet Research and Information Office or the Defense Agency in an effort to compel the Taiwanese government to hold its first democratic presidential elections while martial rule was in effect.

The incident showed once again how much dependency the Japanese government was experiencing on the U.S. intelligence. The U.S. embassy in Tokyo and neither the Gaimusho nor the Defense Agency were informed about the deployment of the aircraft carrier Nimitz reasonably early before the deployment, causing Japanese government's complaint to the U.S about this matter. Additionally, there were almost any policy discussions between the U.S. and Japan throughout the crisis in March 1996, let alone emergency consultations or the sharing of military intelligence. Both parties concurred that the crisis in March was not serious enough to warrant the "prior consultations" described in the bilateral security treaty.

Funabashi Yoichi was informed by a high-ranking PMO officially involved in crisis management that the government was unable to recognize the gravity of the situation because, if they did so, a Chinese attack on Taiwan or another disastrous scenario could have occurred. In addition, the Japanese government made it obvious that it was in a weaker position that the U.S., and Prime Minister Hashimoto even expressed the wish that "the U.S. will exercise self-control".

The Japanese government remained circumspect throughout the month of March 1996 and there were no threats to reduce ODA. Another indication that Japan was downplaying events was the governments' assertions that the deployment of U.S. forces from Japan in the crisis did not require prior consultations as provided in the mutual security treaty. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)'s official event went far as to claim in the Upper House on March 13 that U.S. naval forces were engaging in "regular exercises". On March 12, the press secretary for MOFA stated that Japan did not anticipate any military conflict to result from the exercises and that it agreed in principle with China's right to conduct military training on the high seas "so long as such operations will not interfere with other nations' use of international waters". He refuted press rumors that Okinawa's SDF had been placed on notice.

In general, being sponsored by the Taiwanese side, mutual visits and conferences had grown to facilitate information sharing and advance Japanese security considerations of Taiwan. Conservative strategies in Japan are now more open to cooperating with Taiwan due to its concern about China's strong security measures.

1.2.4 Incurring Threats: the Koreas

Between Korea and Japan, there is a long history of animosity and resentment (Ilpyong, 1998). Samurai troops brought back rare porcelain from the Japanese invasion of Korea on 1597, as well as innovative metal printing type and the noses and ears they had amputated from several Korean people's corpses. The Japanese made multiple unsuccessful attempts to invade and occupy Korea during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Japanese influence in Korea eventually grew as a result of their victory over the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War of 1814-1895. The Choson dynasty was overthrown by the Japanese invasion of Korea at the beginning of the 20th century. From 1910 until 1945, when the Japanese Empire was slain in World War II, Japan resigned over Korea.

At the end of the war, Korea was freed from Japanese colonial rule, but it was unable to gain independence and sovereignty, and at the 38th parallel, the peninsula was split in half, with the North being under Soviet rule and the South coming under American rule. Nevertheless, the Korean people still harbor animosity for the Japanese.

Both prejudice against Japanese people and discrimination against Koreans still exist in South Korea and Japan, respectively. Because of their intense animosity for one another, their issues may be difficult to resolve, and the two nations should negotiate a number of political and economic difficulties. As a result, Japan is seen as a force that seeks to rule the Korean peninsula through a "divide and conquer" plan and that one day will try to invade Korea once more.

However, after the conclusion of the Cold War, the communist regime in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe fell apart. Nevertheless, Japan continues to view North Korea as an enemy and is against any attempt to unite the two Koreas. The U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, which were created by the two nations in 1995 but have not yet been approved by the Japanese Diet, are seen in South and North Korea as a sign of the resurgence of Japanese militarism and an indication that Japan intends to once more attack the Korean peninsula.

The majority of people in East Asia and the Pacific were concerned that the new U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines might be paving the way for a potential remilitarization of Japan. They are more of concern to North Korea because they specifically target China and North Korea. The strategic goal and strategy of the reactionaries in the United States and Japan is to invade and rule Asia. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is their first intended victim. The guidelines are criticized by observers in both North and South Korea in unison, and they call for a united front to defend the peninsula because they are thought to be intended to revive Japanese militarism and enable invasion by eventually withdrawing American troops and replacing them with Japanese forces.

Before the two Koreas are united into a strong and powerful Korea that could endanger Japan's security, the Japanese have taken attempts to improve relations with the DPRK in response to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and animosity toward the new defense collaboration.

Early in October 1997, the Japanese government volunteered to send food to North Korea to help with the starvation brought on by two years of floods and drought. On October 12, 1997, Japanese Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizo asserted that this action had enhanced North Korea's perception of Japan, stating that the DPRK media had stated that the help was "a clear signal of the changes in North Korean attitudes toward Japan." Additionally, he emphasized that the Korean Central News Agency (KNCA) cited Ryutaro Hashimoto's name and position, which also suggested a change in North Korea's reporting in Japan. In light of this, the foreign minister emphasized that "Japan will strive to begin its dialogue with the DPKR for the normalization of diplomatic relations".

In 1995, Japan gave North Korea 500,000 tons of rice, but negotiations between the two nations halted as a result of the kidnapping of Japanese nationals in the country and the contentious return of Japanese women who had wed North Koreans.

In September 1997, North Korea and Japan met in preparation for normalizing their diplomatic ties, and during this meeting, North Korea agreed to allow married Japanese nationals to travel to Japan. On November 11, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the Sakikake Party sent a nine-person delegation to Pyongyang for a three-day discussion on the normalization of diplomatic ties between the DPRK and Japan, according to NHK report.

The team was scheduled to meet with Kim Yong Soon, head of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP)'s department for international relations, and other DPRK government officials to discuss ways to strengthen ties between the two nations. A meeting with Kim Jong II, the KWP's general secretary, was requested by the Japanese delegation, but a time was not set.

Ports will act as export processing bonded zones for consumer goods, while other DPRK officials confirmed plans to convert Wonsan and Nampo into bonded-processing export zones rather than a free-trade zone like Najin-Sonbong during the recent World Economic Forum meeting in Hong Kong. Businesses in bonded processing zones are able to bring in raw materials from other countries and process them for re-export without having to pay customs fees or local taxes. Financial services are made available to businesses operating in free trade zones, enabling them to conduct intermediary commerce.

On the Korean peninsula, while upholding its 1992-established strategic interest in relation with the DPRK and its economic interest in dealings with the Republic of Korea (ROK), China's foreign policy goal is to preserve stability and peace. However, Japan's main goals in Korea are to improve relations with the ROK despite issues with technology transfer and trade imbalance as well as

growing resentment toward the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, and to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK by offering compensation. All this is carried out in order to balance out growing Chinese influence in both North and South Korea.

1.2.5 SDF Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

As already stated previously in the chapter, the end of the Cold War reevaluated the importance of the U.S-Japan security framework, whose main focus had been the USSR. Additionally, a wave of disarmament began to spread, starting with Europe, as the fictitious opponent, the Soviet Union, obviously weakened and eventually collapsed, prompting Japan to start thinking about decreasing its own self-defense capabilities. In other words, the end of the Cold War provided the circumstances that pushed Japan to radically reexamine its security strategy and the acceptable level of national self-defense. The Gulf Crisis/Gulf War, which broke out a year after the Cold War ended, actually led to a significant disagreement within Japan about whether or not to send the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as a part of international cooperation. Thus, the reassessment of the SDF's function, based on the concepts of "scaling down" and "expanding duties to include international contributors" emerged as a significant post-Cold War concern (Sado, 2015).

Since it was admitted to the UN in the 1950s, Japan had been involved in peacekeeping operations. When Japan joined the UN in 1956, it listed "UN-centrism" as one of the "three principles of Japanese diplomacy", but its handling of the Congo Crisis and the Lebanon Crisis put into doubt the content of "UN-centrism". When the UN requested that Japan send personnel to join the UN Observation Group in Lebanon during the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, Japan declined. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in Japan began to discuss how to expressly carry out "UN diplomacy".

A de facto remilitarization was carried out under the postwar Constitution, which forbade war and the maintenance of the ability to wage war, in the form of the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai), the National Safety Forces (Hoantai), and then the Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai). However, due to Japan's prewar military despotism, which resulted in the strategic war in the Asia Pacific, the SDF's overseas.[10]

In the meantime, as a result of its transformation into a significant economic power, Japan was becoming a more significant player in the international community. Japan was now expected to contribute internationally to accordance with its economic power as a nation with significant political

[10] The resolution passed on June 2, 1954, by the plenary session of the House of Councillors, stated as follows: "On the occasion of the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, the House hereby reconfirms, in the light of the relevant articles of the Constitution and the Japanese people's earnest devotion to peace, that no SDF troops will be dispatched overseas. It has been so resolved."

and economic sway and in light of the fact that its economic activities had benefited from the peaceable global community. The official development aid (ODA), which increased significantly in the 1970s, served as the first representation of the exact content of that international contribution. The second issue, which was again the subject of discussion inside MOFA, was Japan's contribution to global peace and security, particularly the PKOs.

In the 1980s, the decision to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf as a result of the Iran-Iraq War prompted discussions over whether to deploy the SDF overseas in a situation distinct from that of the PKOs in the 1980s. As the conflict continued on, the mines that had been planted in the Persian Gulf started to pose a significant threat to the safe passage of oil tankers. Due to its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, this was having an effect on Japan specifically. The Reagan administration then requested the Nakasone government's assistance in clearing mines in the Persian Gulf in 1987, when advancements in U.S.-Japan security cooperation had improved relations between the two countries. The SDF would have been sent abroad for the first time for a purpose other than training if Japan had granted this request. The MOFA and Prime Minister Nakasone both supported sending the SDF to the Persian Gulf. Masaharu Gotoda, the chief cabinet secretary, was adamantly opposed to the idea because there was no legal basis for dispatching the troops and there was a risk that the SDF might become involved in conflict in the absence of a cease-fire. As a result, Japan ultimately decided to delay making the decision, and when the Nakasone cabinet was replaced by the Noboru Takeshita government in November 1987, it was anticipated that the topic of Japan's contributions to the world would make significant headway. More specifically, the "three pillars of Japanese foreign policy" were presented when the Takeshita cabinet took office. This strategy, which pushed for a "Japan that contributes to the world", made "cooperating for peace, enhancing economic cooperation, and promoting international cultural exchange" its three main tenets and aggressively strove to advance them. Among these, "cooperation for peace" was proposed with PKOs in mind and was the outcome of the foreign ministry's advice to Prime Minister Takeshita that Japan must actively participate in the process of peacebuilding in the region given the changes occurring in the Cold War with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev (general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). It was anticipated that PM Takeshita would hold office for a significant amount of time because he had developed strong relationships with members of the opposition parties and was skilled "at consensus-building politics". In light of this, it was revealed that the "three pillars" would allow form advancement on the outstanding issue of Japan's participation with international peace.

The issue of the relationship between PKOs and the SDF, however, once more stayed within the parameters of MOFA and was never taken to the level of formal government debates. The Defense Agency, which was in charge of deploying the SDF, had not yet started formal discussions on matters

like taking part in UN activities, and its position on this matter plainly differed substantially from that of MOFA. Furthermore, the political controversy known as the "Recruit Scandal" made the Takeshita cabinet short-lived, which prevented the anticipated advancement on the problem of global peace cooperation.

The issue of what to do with the status of any SDF members who would be deployed abroad was at the center of the government's discussion about sending the SDF. Simply speaking, there were two opposed viewpoints: the Defense Agency insisted that personnel receive a "dual commission" and maintain their positions in the SDF, whereas MOFA claimed that because of the political considerations and the constitutional restrictions of the "dovish" sentiments expressed by the then-Prime Minister Tokishi Kaifu's, "SDF members deployed abroad should be separated from the SDF in terms of "secondment" or a "leave of absence" (Sado, 2015). When the Gulf War broke out, Takakazu Kuriyama, who was vice foreign minister at the time, recalled that many people in the foreign ministry, including himself, were apprehensive about sending the SDF "as is" to take part in activities abroad both because of constitutional restrictions and public opinion, and for the effect on relations with Asian nations, particularly with China and Korea.

The Defense Agency, on the other hand, emphasized that without status as SDF members, it raised issues like the inability of personnel to operate ships or aircraft belonging to the SDF, command during the operations of troops, the handling of small arms, and so forth. They also expressed concern that sending people to dangerous regions by simply changing their status would give rise to various issues concerning the insurance system and the interests of other SDF personnel. As a result of criticism from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) side following Prime Minister Kaifu's announcement that the troops would be deployed as "contracted work", uncertainty eventually resulted, and they chose to implement the "dual commission" that the Defense Agency had requested. Additionally, uncertainty surfaced during Diet talks of the hastily created UN Peace Cooperation Bill, including contradictions in government explanations. As a result, the bill was abandoned after about a month of discussions. The SDF was ultimately not sent to carry out peacekeeping missions.

Gulf War effects were primarily felt in terms of altered public perception. In particular, it caused skepticism among the general people regarding the debate in Japan over the "military". It may be argued that the creation of a multinational force during the Gulf War provided a means of carrying out the UN's mandate for collective security at a time when doing so would have been incredibly challenging. The tone of the argument was noticeably critical of the U.S., which was at the center of the multinational force, while Japan only reacted to the use of military force. What was seen as common sense worldwide trumped Japan's post-war political language, which declared that "the military is bad, the armed forces are bad" regardless of the cause. The idea that Japan's overseas

cooperation should not only be financial but also involve people contributions and, depending on the circumstances, the dispatch of the SDF was effectively eliminated by this, breaking a taboo that had previously existed. However, such understanding did not emerge right away following the Gulf War; it took some time before people became aware of the post-Gulf War talks within the international community. The success of a real case of sending the SDF abroad gave that growth even more momentum.

Even more than the minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf, what really impressed the Japanese people were the operations in Cambodia. Japan, which participated actively in the peace process in Cambodia, learnt from the experiences of the Gulf War and established a policy of active involvement in things like the conducting of elections to elect a new government in Cambodia, local recovery efforts, and other things.

Japan's participation in the PKO was strictly regulated. The following are the five guidelines for PKO participation:

1) There must be a ceasefire in effect.
2) The operations must have been approved by the conflicting parties.
3) Complete impartiality must be maintained throughout the activities.
4) If any of the aforementioned conditions (1)-(3) are no longer met, participation may be discontinued and, if not immediately resumed, may be canceled.
5) A member of the unit may only use force as much as is required to defend his or her own life or the lives of other unit members.

The impact of the imposition of those restrictions was mainly related not only to the fact that the Cambodian peace negotiations and PKO efforts were remembered for years to come as a triumph of Japanese postwar diplomacy, but also that the SDF's participation was highly praised by the international community and served as a major catalyst for subsequent PKO activities as it became known within Japan.

Since the successful deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf and Cambodia, the SFD's operations have received high commendation from other countries, and Japan has been sending troops abroad more frequently. More specifically, compared to other countries that are engaging in PKO activities, there are still many limits on the use of firearms, and several SDF officials with international experience have raised doubts about the SDF members' ability to defend themselves.

Additionally, after the terrorist attacks, on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the deployment of SDF personnel has expanded to include foreign support for anti-terrorism operations rather than being restricted to PKO missions.

1.3 Post-9/11: a Shock for the International System

The international community was stunned by the 9/11 terrorist strikes on the United States. The extent of the carnage that a loosely coordinated international terrorist organization could inflict upon the world's lone superpower astounded everyone. This episode brought to light the dangers of non-traditional threats including terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), as well as the significant challenges nation-states have in addressing them.

1.3.1 The Changing Approach to Security Issues

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, significantly changed the way the United States views security concerns by enlarging the categories of security challenges that are covered in national security (Tatsumi, 2008). For instance, before to 9/11, while the threat of terrorism was undoubtedly acknowledged, it was primarily viewed as a domestic security issue under the purview of law enforcement agencies. Following 9/11, not only was terrorism recognized as a national security issue, but also other problems that were historically not seen as national security threats (such as energy and the environment) began to be addressed in this light. Concerns dealing with transnational security difficulties such as weapon proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, manipulation of technology, non-proliferation, and failed states have grown, also given the harm they could cause if these components would fall into the hands of terrorist organizations,

In such a setting, Japan started significant internal processes to (1) review the evolution of the global security environment in the years following 9/11 and (2) reevaluate the direction of Japanese security policy priorities. The Council of Security and Defense Capabilities, more popularly known as the Araki Commission in the United States led the initial deliberations in the process.
Former senior defense officials, senior SDF officers in retirement, business executives, and academics with sway in Japan's security policy discussions made up the Commission. The Council delivered its report, Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defense Capability, to Prime Minister Koizumi in October 2004 following several months of deliberations.

The Araki Report stood out from earlier task force reports of this type, such as the 1994 Higuchi Report, in a number of ways. A multi-layered security strategy should be developed by Japan, according to the report, by creatively combining three different strategies: building up Japan's own

defense capabilities; collaborating with its ally, the United States; and working with the larger international community.

It is important to note that the report was more forthright in stating that Japan may be at a turning point where the limitations on its military capability should be reexamined, even though the task force's discussions did not go beyond the boundaries of the current constitutional framework.

The report, for instance, not only emphasized the need for Japan to develop "multi-functional and flexible defense capability", but also made a case for perhaps altering Japan's longstanding export-control policies.

Some of the fundamental concepts advanced in the Araki Report were integrated into the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), which was accepted in December 2004. By outlining the fundamental tenets of Japanese security strategy for the first time, it was similar to the Araki Report. For being Japan's biggest security problem in the post-9/11 security environment, it also demanded special attention to "new threats and various situations (i.e. terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). The level of significance given to SDF participation in foreign operations is what stands out most about 2004 NDPG. The 2004 NDPG addressed SDF participation in foreign activities as a mission with similar relevance to defending the homeland and maintaining a strong U.S-Japan alliance, in contrast to the 1995 NDPO where it was of secondary importance.

Additionally, for the first time, the significance of cooperation with nonprofit organizations and interagency coordination was recognized. Japan should have defense capabilities that are "responsive, mobile, flexible, and multi-purpose" and are backed up by "high technological and intelligence capabilities", according to the 2004 NDPG, and the former also stipulated that Japan needed defensive capabilities to counter not only threats from ballistic missiles but also other security threats, like as guerrilla strikes, attempts to seize remote islands, incursion attempts, and major disasters.

For the first time in Japan's postwar history, the 2004 NDPG recommended that Japan go beyond a solely defensive posture. It vehemently argued that Japan advocated for the creation of a "multi-functional, flexible and effective force with a high level of readiness, mobility, adaptability and multi-purpose capability, in order to revise its force structure.

Japan started a parallel initiative to improve its alliance relationship with the U.S. The U.S-Japan alliance underwent a phase of reinvention and reaffirmation in the middle of the 1990s, and bilateral efforts centered on giving the alliance a new purpose. The two countries made another step to broaden and deepen the U.S-Japan alliance in an effort to turn it into a global partnership after the alliance's role was redefined as the stabilizer of the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) published three texts between February 2005 and May 2006 that lay out the vision and specific steps the two nations should take to achieve that aim.

When considered collectively, these policy developments all seemed to hint to Japan ultimately reevaluating its guiding concepts based on Cold War national security policy. In other words, Japan finally started to show, as the core of its national security strategy, signs of being willing to give its military more room and prominence, but it definitely did not imply that Japan would want to develop an independent forceful military power, rather, it appeared to indicate, at the very least, that Japan was more willing to make the JSDF one of the main "faces" of its national security strategy, employing it more forcefully in the context of national defense, its alliance with the U.S., and global initiatives to address global transnational security threats.

Shortly after taking office in September 2006, Prime Minister Abe made a number of significant moves to support the general trend of reevaluating the use of military force in its national security strategy. Soon after taking office, Abe established three advisory commissions, and each of them was extremely important to how Japan develops its national security policies, how it puts them into practice, and what kind of constitutional constraints the government would face in the future.

To investigate how the prime minister could have stronger policy-and decision-making support independent of the bureaucracy, Abe established the Committee on Strengthening the Function of Prime Minister's Executives on National Security (*Kokka Anzen Hosho ni kansuru Kantei Kinou Kyouka Kaigi*) in November 2006. He also had the function of committee's chairman.

The Council on Strengthening Intelligence Function (*Jouhou Kinou Kyouka Kentou Kaigi*) was founded by Abe in December 2006 to look into how prime minister and staff could create a more efficient and effective intelligence community inside the Japanese government. The committee's chairman was chosen to be the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Finally, in order to genuinely consider the possibility of Japan modifying its present ban on exercising its right to collective self-defense, Abe established the Council on Re-establishment the Legal Foundation for National Security (*Anzen Hosho no Houteki Kiban no Sai-kouchiku ni kansuru Kondankai*) in April 2007.

Additionally, Japan passed the so-called National Referendum Law under Abe's leadership to set up the precise process for constitutional amendment. By getting the National Referendum Law enacted by the Diet, Abe gave Japan the opportunity to debate the specifics of a constitutional amendment.

1.3.2 How Japan Revised Its Security Policy Priorities

The international community has positioned counterterrorism as one of its highest priority areas since the terrorist attack in the U.S. On September 11, 2001 (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006). In a number of contexts, including multilateral organizations like the UN and Group of Eight (G8), regional cooperation like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and bilateral

collaboration, agreements and confirmations have been made to strengthen counterterrorism measures.

Internationals terrorists are using most of the features of contemporary society, such as the internet and global transportation networks, to create activities that endanger the daily lives of the civilian population given the flow of people, goods, money, and information deriving from increasing technology advancements. In these circumstances, it is crucial for the international community to work together to take a strong stance against terrorism, prevent terrorists from setting up bases for their activities, deny them access to money, weapons, and other resources necessary for committing acts of terrorism, address the vulnerabilities of facilities and institutions that could be targeted by terrorists, and assist developing nations with insufficient counterterrorism resources.

Residents' economic well-being in sectors like investment, tourism, and trade in addition to posing a threat to the security of a nation and its citizens, are also deeply impacted by terrorism. Recognizing that terrorism poses a threat to civil society, everyone must work together to avoid it.

Japan intends to continue strengthening vigorously counterterrorism measures in cooperation with the international community in a wide range of areas, including the provision of assistance to other countries and reinforcement of the international legal framework, as it views counterterrorism as its own security issue basing on its stance that it cannot be justified or tolerated for any reason.

The terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, which were considered a threat to global peace and security under UN Security Council Resolution 1368, led to the creation of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, in part.

Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO) is being carried out by the U.S., the U.K., France, and other nations with the aim of blocking or suppressing the maritime transportation of terrorists and related supplies, such as weapons and explosives, across the Indian Ocean. Japan has been offering assistance since December 2001, which includes the actions of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) warships to refuel ships from the U.S., U.K., and other nations taking part in the maritime interdiction operation.

Japan enlarged the duration of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law's validity in November 2003, adding two more years to it. In order to increase the effectiveness of the maritime interdiction operation, it was decided to change the content of cooperation and assistance activities at the time of the extension of the basic plan in October 2004 to include the refueling of naval vessels as well as the helicopters carried on board, the vessels themselves and the supply of water. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law also extended for an additional year in November, taking into account the fact that the international community has continued its consolidated efforts for counterterrorism under

such operations as OEF since the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. This decision was also based on the outcomes of the G8 Gleneagles Summit in July and the Security Council Summit in September.

Overall, Japan places high priority, as part of global counterterrorism cooperation, on helping developing nations enhance their capability. Japan uses ODA to implement capacity building support, particularly in the Southeast Asian region, and in particular, the country has been hosting seminars in the following fields and welcomed 355 trainees in total in 2005: (1) immigration regulation; (2) aviation security; (3) port and maritime security; (4) customs cooperation; (5) export control; (6) law enforcement cooperation; (7) combating terrorist financing; (8) countering chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism; and (9) international counterterrorism conventions and protocols. As a result, Prime Minister Koizumi's declaration of Japan's capacity-building aid for counterterrorism at the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2002 is being diligently followed up.[11] Japan recently established Grant Aid for Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism and Security Enhancement in the amount of 7 billion yen under the FY2006 budget in order to further increase assistance to promote public security measures like counterterrorism and anti-piracy. These are crucial for developing countries as they work on the socioeconomic development of their countries and are directly related to the security of Japan.

In addition, counterterrorism financing projects are being pushed in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia under the Asian Development Bank (ADB)'s Cooperation Fund for Regional Trade and Financial Security Initiative (FRTFSI), to which Japan has donated US$1 million. In addition, Japan provided the most-up-to-date tools and dispatched document inspection experts to Thailand to help improve the immigration control system in accordance with the Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism, which was enacted on December 10, 2004.

Regarding efforts on a bilateral level, mostly at the level of the ambassador in charge of international counterterrorism cooperation, Japan has continued conversations with a number of nations on the state of the world's terrorism and counterterrorism cooperation, and in this concern, the U.S., Australia, and Japan counterterrorism talks took place in Tokyo in October 2006. The first bilateral counterterrorism talks between Japan and India took place in Tokyo in July of the same year. The Program of Actions in the Field of Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism was drafted by Japan and Russia on the occasion of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Japan in November 2006. Furthermore, Japan and ASEAN decided to hold the Japan-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Dialogue at an early point in 2006 at the Japan-ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in December.

[11] The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, hosted the Seminar on Prevention and Crisis Management of Biological Terrorism in July.

2 Chapter II – Internal Factors: Japan's Security Strategy under the "Abe Doctrine"

2.1 The Passage from "Yoshida Doctrine" to "Abe Doctrine"

A more assertive, high-profile, and risky foreign and security strategy has reemerged for Japan as a result of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's return to power in the December 2012 landslide election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in the December 2014 triumph. Abe's performance of his first administration in 2006-2007, and his resulting reputation as an outspoken "revisionist" ideologue, suggested that he would unavoidably develop plans to create a more radical external agenda for Japan, one that would be characterized by a defense posture without any previous anti-militaristic restrictions, a more integrated U.S.-Japan alliance, and a focus on "value-oriented" diplomacy with East Asian nations and beyond. In fact, Yoshida Shigeru's famous doctrine, which determined Japan's entire post-war international trajectory, has been famously challenged by Abe's "diplomatic agenda" (Abe Gaikō), which has been so distinctive and forcefully articulated. The "Yoshida Doctrine", developed in the wake of Japan's complete defeat in the Pacific War, has long emphasized for Japan the need for a practical and low-profile foreign policy, a highly constrained defense posture, reliance but not over-dependence on the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and the expeditious rebuilding of economic and diplomatic ties with East Asian neighbors. These ideas contrast with Abe's more forceful international agenda (Pyle, 2006).

The "Abe Doctrine" has always had the capacity to change Japan's course in the world (Pyle, 2007). However, many analysts continued to emphasize the similarities to prior policies after Abe's return to premiership for a second term (a feat for a Japanese leader previously only accomplished by Yoshida in the post-war period). Abe's critics and detractors in Japan have laboriously refuted any suggestion that he was a dangerous nationalist, emphasizing that his goal was simply to address the domestic and global barriers that have prevented Japan from moving beyond its historical torpor in foreign and security policy (Kenichi, 2013; Hiro, 2013). A variety of other commentators who predicted that Abe would prioritize the consolidation of his domestic political support in his second premiership have supported this view of him as essentially pragmatic and able to restrain his more radical instincts. This is especially true considering that his first administration failed due to apparent inattention to the basic management of domestic politics, an overactive foreign policy, and ultimately failure to deliver on security promises (Curtis, 2013; Doak, 2013; Penn, 2014). In order to match the straight majority won by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Lower House in the December 2012 elections, Abe was thought to wait until he won a working majority in the Upper House elections

in July 2013 before implementing any radical changes to Japan's foreign policy (Park, 2013).[12] Even then, it was assumed that Abe would be cautious about advancing his most revisionist agenda out of concern for upsetting the LDP's moderate New Kōmeitō coalition partner, for worsening already tense relations with China and South Korea, and even out of concern for alienating the U.S. because it did not want to see Japan upending the strategic landscape at a time when it was engaged in a "rebalance" towards the East Asia region. Instead, it was believed that Abe's policy of "Abenomics" and its associated "three arrows" of significant quantitative easing, fiscal stimulus, and economic restructuring were to be the country's primary focus in terms of radicalism and international risks (Mochizuki and Parkinson Porter, 2013).[13]

For the first six months of Abe's presidency, these forecasts about his program were mostly accurate. Despite Abe's stated intention to review the Japanese government's position on the "comfort" women (jūgun ianfu) issue at the start of his administration – a goal carried over from his first premiership – his government ultimately abandoned this plan in early 2014 because of the unfavorable domestic and global response. The Prime Minister also skipped the contentious Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 2013, the anniversary of Japan's loss in the Pacific War, despite the fact that Abe's Cabinet was stacked with prominent right-wing conservatives, three of whom had gone. Instead, he was pleased to highlight his credentials as a revisionist while posing for pictures inside a main battle tank from the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) and a trainer jet from the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF).[14]

In order to project Japan's international presence in contrast to China, despite maintaining a tough stance towards the country in the ongoing tensions in the East China Sea over the territorial dispute concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu, and maritime security's matters, Abe also started to engage in vigorous diplomacy with the U.S. and other East Asian states. However, his administration did not pursue the strict security measures hinted at in the LDP's election manifesto. Abe frequently emphasized Japan's commitment to a revised definition of "proactive contribution to peace" and urged communication with China. Abe's ostensibly controlled statesmanship received praise both

[12] On December 16, 2012, Abe won the House of Representatives election, giving the LDP an absolute majority of 294 MPs in the 480-seat house. Following the LDP's own humiliating loss to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the previous 2009 election, this signified a gain of 176 seats. The LDP secured a 325-seat majority in partnership with the New Kōmeitō Party and its 31 seats. The LDP increased its seat count by 31 in the House of Councillors election of July 21, 2013, giving it 115 total seats. The so-called "twisted" or divided National Diet, which had impeded the DPJ's legislative agenda, was abolished when Abe's coalition administration won a working majority in the 242-seat house with the addition of the 20 seats of the New Kōmeitō. On December 14, 2014, Abe announced a hurried election for the House of Representatives. As a result, the coalition maintained its majority despite the LDP losing three members and the New Kōmeitō gaining four.

[13] Abe himself attempted to convince the international media that the economy would be his number one priority.

[14] When it was pointed out that the ASDF T-4 trainer jet's 731 identification number brought to mind the infamous Unit 731 that investigated biological and chemical warfare during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1932-1945, Abe's photo opportunity in the aircraft on May 12, 2013, unintentionally sparked controversy in some parts of East Asia.

locally and abroad. For his efforts to revive the Japanese economy, The Economist featured him as a Superman-like figure on its cover in May 2013 (The Economist, 2013). At the June's Group of Eight (G8) conference in the UK, Abenomics received positive feedback. Overall, it seemed like Abe's catchphrase, "Japan is back", was quite genuine (Shinzō, 2013).

However, since autumn 2013, the full extent of Abe's goal of revision, and the probability that Japan would rely on a new, radical course in foreign and security policy, have been precisely clear. The U.S-Japan alliance and Abe's initiative for a new defense doctrines and capabilities in Japan were the first indications that a revisionist agenda was coming together, as many critics had predicted (Oros, 2013; Tisdall, 2013).

Exactly one year after taking office, on December 26, 2013, Abe's decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine showed that his revisionism was gaining momentum and that there were fewer barriers standing in the way of the Prime Minister's ambitions as a whole. However, policymakers and commentators in China, South Korea, the U.S., and even the wider international community were shocked by the visit and strongly criticized it as for being a highly provocative action that could have had serious repercussions for Japan's international standing in a regional stability.

Once Abe's "true colors" (*Abe-iro*) and revisionist intent had finally come to light, questions regarding the significance of Japanese foreign and security policy have started to become more prevalent. While arguing that Abe's breaking of taboos was necessary for Japan to overcome its malaise in responding to pressure from China and North Korea, as well as expectations for a wider commitment to global security from the U.S. and the international community, the Japanese government has continued to conduct troubled attempts to downplay Prime Minister Abe's nationalist or militaristic tendencies and to emphasize the continuity with previous policies.

In the meantime, Abe's detractors have intensified their claims that he was pursuing a reckless campaign to lift post-war restrictions on Japanese military might, which would only deteriorate security ties with China and alienate South Korea and other East Asian friends. There can be no doubt that Abe's administration was fundamentally revisionist and nationalist in outlook, and that in fact it was already shifting Japan towards a radical trajectory. However, despite the rewind to a pre-war ultranationalist past, neither the apologist nor critical views of Abe as a figure of post-war continuity were entirely accurate. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Security Council (NSC), the State Secrecy Law, the Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers, and most significantly, the violation of the prohibition on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, are all examples of how quickly security policy has changed. Abe provided initiatives in U.S.-Japan relations to support the US's "rebalancing" to the region, such as the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma within Okinawa, Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and

the first revision of the Defense Guidelines since 1997. Abe's diplomacy in East Asia has sought to assemble a group of like-minded nations to aid in the covert encirclement of China, but the policy was ultimately counterproductive to Japan's national interests in the medium to long term because it was strategically shortsighted and difficult to sustain, despite the fact that the "Abe Doctrine" was undoubtedly leading to a more proactive foreign policy in Japan and had led to some "quick wins" in increasing international profile and influence.

The final conclusion is that the "Abe Doctrine" was probably so riddled with internal contradictions that, rather than creating a new and clear strategic paradigm for Japan or returning to the earlier practices of the Yoshida Doctrine, it was more likely that it would have reinforced a prominent and long-term trend in Japanese foreign policy marked at various times by obduracy, antagonism, and hostility toward regional neighbors and even the U.S., or what might be called as a new "Resentful Realism".

2.2 The "Abe Doctrine's" Historical Development and Ideologies

Although allegedly nationalistic, the Abe Doctrine was both practical and realistic, and Abe's foreign policies were both desired and realistic from a Japanese point of view.

During his first tenure as Prime Minister, where he advocated for "value-based diplomacy", Abe also advanced the "normalization" of Japan's projective potential, making every effort to establish the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) for purported "Indo-Pacific stability". Moreover, he created Japan's National Security Council (NSC) in 2013, and put forward a military law in 2015 that authorized the participation in larger collective security operations for Japan Self-Defense Forces. By revising its security guidelines to take a more proactive stance, Japan increased its "proactive contribution to peace". Abe's security-related measures might be seen as leading nationalism and Japan's militaristic mindset together.

The high-profile and assertive multilateral diplomatic and security tactics of Japan seemed to overshadow the actual practical activities of its military reforms. Japan's defense spending climbed by 13% less under Abe's leadership than the overall inflation rate from 2012 to 2020, measured in contrast U.S. dollars. Abe founded and was active in a number of regional "China-Containment" organizations, but he "adopted" a less strident approach on China, especially when compared to Junichiro Koizumi, his predecessor (Zhang, 2022). Abe Doctrine's core tenet, which was traditional Japanese realism or pragmatism, but not nationalism, was cleared by the contradiction between Japan's forceful diplomatic language and conservative actions. In other words, Abe was Yoshida's successor, not that of his grandpa, Nobusuke Kishi. Therefore, the Abe Doctrine's impact on Japanese foreign policy did not come from nationalism displacing the previous realism and pragmatism, but rather from Abe's successful modification of the Japanese realism tradition.

Japan's relative power change demonstrated Abe's alteration of the country's historic realism. Japan was surprised to see China's astounding economic and military rise during the past ten years as the world order changed with an unprecedented rate of speed. China's economy first overtook that of Japan before quickly tripling and then doubling its GDP. China also swiftly overtook Japan's naval force in terms of both quantity and quality. Japan trembled in the face of the new and precarious international order, much like its surrounding countries. The isolationism and entrapment-avoidance theories of the Yoshida Doctrine were thought to no longer meet Japan's security requirements. Abe's assessment of China's geopolitical threat forced Japan to look for a new security system.

Abe made the decision to preserve Japan's required deterrence capabilities to restrain the emerging giant and regain a sense of security, since Abe's objective was to develop Japan's deterrence capability through his understanding of "cooperative deterrence", in contrast to what nationalists had enthusiastically anticipated. No country can secure its own peace alone by itself, as the Japanese cabinet declared in 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). Abe made the decision to create collaborative security frameworks and solid Japan-U.S. relations based on his view of national security. As a result, the Abe Doctrine maintained coherence with the "military realism" concept first put forth by Takuya Kubo and Hisahiko Okazaki in the 1970s (Mochizuki, 1982).

Endowments for upholding Japan's collective security camp and tying the nation to the U.S. in terms of security changed as a new era of bipolarity approached. The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernization has had the unintended consequence of increasing the cost of conventional deterrence for the United States in the Western Pacific. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security did not worry Japan that it would have been forced into an unfavorable war, but rather that its American partner might have turned on it in the future. Japan's military realism doctrine should have been also modified due to the country's increasing fear of abandonment in order to reassure the U.S. of Japan's dependability in matters of joint security. Abe, however, opted for a relatively moderate and thrifty strategies as opposed to a nationalist radical rearmament policy to demonstrate his continued commitment to the alliance, which was backed up by assertive diplomatic gestures, ongoing institutional reforms, and active participation in joint security organizations. The Abe Doctrine's guiding ideas were grounded in realism and pragmatism, which were highlighted by Japan's preference for a variety of strategies.

2.2.1 The End of the Post-war Regime and the Restoration of Great Power Status

The Yoshida Doctrine concentrated on Japan's cautious passage through the post-World War II international system as a defeated and low-profile power; in contrast, the Abe Doctrine was fixated on the recognition of Japan's position as a first-rank advanced industrial democracy and,

consequently, the rightful restoration of its place among the great powers, even if this calls for attempts to adjust rather than adapt to the current international system. Abe's vision for Japan was rooted in a tradition of revisionism, whose ideological and organizational roots ultimately went back to Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, that permeated much of the LDP's Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai faction (Fukuda Takeo-Abe Shintarō-Mori Yoshir faction), and the Machimura Nobutaka faction. As a former bureaucrat involved in the industrial growth of Japanese-controlled Manchukuo, later Minister of Munitions during the war, and thus involved in the Japanese colonial project for the integration of the region under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Kishi, was initially detained under the post-war Allied Occupation as a "Class A" war crimes suspect (Yoshihisa, 1995). Kishi was able to return to politics, establish his faction, and finally win the position of premier from 1957 to 1960 once the occupation ended. This allowed him to avoid being tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Several right-wing nationalist and anti-communist politicians joined Kishi's faction and adopted his brand of conservatism.

Kishi positioned himself as a Cold War warrior to support U.S. security policy in the area and around the world and worked hardest to start restoring Japan's national autonomy as a great power. He desired to revive Japan's vision as the leader of a new Asianism (Aija no meishu), and in particular the leader of a more integrated Southeast Asia, in a way that somehow reminded of the Pan-Asianism ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He did this to show the U.S. that Japan was not an isolated state that was incapable of taking on international initiatives and deserving of more equal status (Suehiro, 1999).

The Kishi faction was largely kept out of power by the Heisei Kenkykai/Tsushima (Sat Eisaku-Tanaka Kakuei-Takeshita Noboru faction) and Kōchikai (Ikeda Hayato-Ōhira Masayoshi- Miyazawa Kiichi faction; currently Kishida Fumio faction) factions of the LDP for the remainder of the Cold War period. The so-called 1955 system (gojūnen taisei) of uninterrupted LDP one-party rule and a pragmatic concentration mostly on domestic economic growth and upholding the Yoshida Doctrine line in foreign policy were firmly consolidated by the LDP "mainstream" at that point.

The dissolution of Japan's post-war "1955" system, rising political unrest, and the attempt to seize power by the descendants of the Kishi faction on the right of the political spectrum have given Koizumi, and then Abe, opportunities to start carrying out their long-held ideological program for changing Japanese domestic and foreign policy. While many praised Koizumi for his willingness to overcome past obstacles to enable actions like the dispatch of the JSDF to support U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, it can be argued that his foreign policy was less ideologically oriented and more opportunistic, seeking to use these issues to foster international legitimacy to advance his true ideological agenda for the Japanese economy and political system composed of neoliberal reforms.

Abe, in comparison, is arguably less ideological when it comes to economic policy, merely using the opportunity to experiment with "Abenomics" as a way to obtain the domestic political support required to give him the freedom to follow his actual ideological agenda in foreign policy the second time around (Katz, 2014). Abe's political philosophy and goals, including the pursuit of recognition for Japan's Tier One status among capitalist powers, the restoration of its independence as a global player, recognition as a key U.S. ally and regional leader, were similar to those of his grandfather in many ways, also comprising the confrontation of authoritarian regimes that were operating under the cover of China and North Korea.[15]

He stated his desire to put an end to the legacy of the occupation and restore Japanese autonomy in his book "Toward a new country", as he promised to end Japan's protracted sense of servitude to the system led by Americans and to "take back Japan". The Japanese population has been prosperous for far too long without having the "clear awareness that the lives and treasure of the Japanese people and territory of Japan must be protected by the Japanese government's own hands." (Abe, 2013). He frequently referred to "an end to the post-war structure" (rejimu) and "recovery of independence" (dokuritsu no kaifuku) as his objectives. According to Abe, this initiative to restore Japan as a great power can only be successful by eliminating the historical restrictions placed on Japanese freedom of action abroad. For Abe and his supporters, Japan cannot begin to rebuild its national strength and autonomy until it releases itself from this so-called masochistic (jigyaku-teki) history and leaves the post-war (sengo dakkyaku) regime, which is essentially a regime of defeat (Winkler, 2011; Yoshinori, 2010). Abe has spoken of Japan regaining its feeling of patriotism for its country and placing new emphasis on promoting the ideals of democracy, a liberal market economy, and the rule of law – all values that are implicitly but purposefully contrasted with the authoritarianism of China and North Korea (Shōtarō, 2013).

The birthplace of conservative nationalism was the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. It should not be shocking that a conservative response would occur given the breadth of the occupation's reforms. That it took so long to arrive was the actual surprise, as it was put on hold by Cold War politics. Abe was beloved by a large number of new conservative organizations that opposed the enforced constitution, its liberal social values, the hegemonic alliance, and most importantly, the winners' interpretation of history that centered blame for the Asia-Pacific War on Japan. They held the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in contempt, believing it to be a court of victors' justice that rendered unfair and biased judgements. They claimed that the Japanese militarism was not the only cause of the Greater East Asian War. The West's Initial incursion into Asia was what prompted Japan to arm

[15] Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, two of Washington D.C.'s most infamous "Japan handlers", wrote a 2012 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies that discussed the need for Japan to remain a "Tier One" power. Abe uses this terminology when he talks about Japan never becoming a "Tier-Two" country.

itself and grow in order to defend itself. Even though the violence committed by the Japanese military against its Asia neighbors was widely supported by conservatives, they still reacted angrily to their neighbors' attempts to influence how the Japanese spread their own history. Nippon Kaigi (the Japan Council or Conference), which was established in 1997, was the group that garnered the greatest media attention due to its size and prominence among the policy elite. In 2016, it claimed to have 38,000 members, headquarters in each of the 47 prefectures, 240 local chapters, 1,700 members of the local assembly, and 281 members of the Diet, with Abe and his deputy prime minister Taro Aso serving as special advisers. Its objective included amending the constitution, instituting patriotic education, fortifying the national defense to play a proactive role in maintaining international security, and fostering a favorable perception of Japanese history to replace the findings of the war crimes trials. A sign of a new generation of LDP politicians who were less likely to take a defensive stance in response to China's and South Korea's constant calls for an apology, and expressions of regret for Japan's atrocities during World War II, could be seen in the huge number of Diet members who belonged to these groups.

Abe has been Japan's most active post-war leader in his desire to bring the country back to great-power politics, noting to the Diet that in his first five years in office, he "visited 76 countries and regions and held 600 summit meetings." (Abe, 2018). Building a matrix of cooperative security and economic links among Asian nations was the project to which Abe was most dedicated (Pyle, 2018). As a counterbalance to China's aspiration for regional hegemony, he has pushed for strategic ties with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia and India. Japan views marine problems like free commerce and freedom of navigation as being of the utmost importance given that it is an island nation without any natural resources and is heavily reliant on international trade.

One of the Abe's most important foreign policy proposals was his idea of an Indo-Pacific security system for the twenty-first century. In a 2007 speech to the Indian parliament that he gave during his first term, he introduced the idea under the title "Confluence of the Two Seas", envisioning a "broader" or "expanded Asia" made up of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Abe, 2007). The region's maritime democracies shared a similar interest in maintaining free and open sea passages. At the start of his second term in 2012, Abe brought up this subject once more.

Abe and Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister who entered office in 2014, grew close on a personal level, leading to their decision of a "special strategic and global partnership" based on the economic and geopolitical requirements of their respective countries. This quickly led to a number of agreements that highlighted India's status as Japan's top assistance recipient. Japan provided a very advantageous $17 billion loan and technology for the construction of India's first bullet train to

connect Mumbai and Ahmedabad, in Modi's home state of Gujarat, as one prominent aid initiative (Jain, 2015). A civil nuclear agreement that was reached in November 2016 and permitted Japanese companies to transfer atomic technology to India was by far the more significant development. Abe overcame significant domestic resistance to obtain this arrangement because India was not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There are relatively few military faces to the Japan-India relationship. The Indo-Pacific framework emphasized Abe's activism, his emphasis on Asian leadership, and his goal to lessen Japan's reliance on the bilateral relationship with the United States. The relationship between Japan and India was still in its infancy – both nations traded significantly more with China than with one another – but because of their complementary interests, there was hope for its future growth.

2.2.2 Revising the Constitution

For Abe, systematically removing historical and externally imposed structural barriers was necessary for Japan to restore its national identity and global presence. The 1946 Constitution, which is viewed as having been foreign imposed during the Occupation and thus foreign to Japanese political traditions, and which is seen to restrain national ambition both psychologically and practically, was the ultimate revisionist objective for Abe and his supporters (and has been included in the LDP platform since the party's formation in 1955).

Since it is believed to have stripped Japan of its fundamental sovereign right to provide for its own defense and to have made it susceptible to coercion from other countries, Article 9 of the Constitution, sometimes known as the "pacifist clause", was the Revisionists' top target.

Again, it is believed that Japan's sense of national pride and international dynamism are being sapped by the deliberate elimination of provisions for the emblems and promotion of "patriotic education" in the Constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education from 1947. These Occupation-related legacies, in turn, are only viewed to link to and compound domestic and foreign narratives that portray Japan as a colonial aggressor, giving hostile powers a historical faction with which to beat Japan and stifle its global influence.

As a result, the ideology and revisionism that underpinned Abe's domestic political program were integral to and drove the philosophy of his foreign policy. As a result, Abe decided to attack the vestiges of the post-war order as the first step in implementing his foreign policy. Japan Rebirth (Sōsei Nihon), a group of National Diet members working to "rethink the postwar order", "establish a new political order based on the principles of a true conservativism", and "protect Japan's national interests and make Japan a country respected by international society", was founded by Abe himself. In order to protect national interests, regional communities, and family ties, the group also supported

other conservative nationalistic policies that included opposing the grant of voting rights, in local elections, for permanent foreign residents and the retention of maiden names in marriage. Abe has also held the position of Deputy Chief Secretary of the Japan Conference Diet Members' Advisory Group (Nihon Kaigi Kokkai Giin Kondankai), the political branch of the Japan Conference (Nihon Kaigi).

Since he joined the cross-party Diet Members' Alliance for Promoting the Assessment of a New Constitution (Kenpō Chōsa Suishin Giin Renmei) and served as an adviser for the more LDP-centric New Constitution (Shinkenpōsei Giin Renmei), Abe has long been an advocate for constitutional change. Abe maintained his support for constitutional modification as a central LDP platform during his time in the political wilderness following his ouster from office in 2007 and assisted in shaping the party's plan for a rewritten Constitution presented in April 2012. With a focus on a more particularistic understanding of Japanese history and culture and a revived reverence for the nation and family, the draft incorporated a number of recommended amendments to create an autonomous constitution (jishu kenpō). The Constitution was drafted after World War II with the goal of democratizing and demilitarizing Japan, and as such, it contrasts with the more universalistic ideas that were emphasized at that time. The document evoked pre-war Japanese national identity. The draft asserted that the Japanese people had a responsibility to work with the government for national defense and that the government had a responsibility to protect national territory and resources. It also gave the prime minister national state of emergency powers in the event of a foreign attack or a major natural disaster, a sentiment that was reminiscent of the pre-war era (Mulgan, 2013). The revision of Article 9 to explicitly state the rights to individual and collective self-defense, as well as the existence and renaming of the JSDF to become the National Defense Force, were the draft's two most important significant proposals for Abe and the revisionists. These changes would finally restore Japan's capacity to act as a sovereign state by formulating its own security strategy.

After retaking office in 2012, Abe made clear his desire to implement constitutional reform by first pursuing changes to Article 96, which oversaw the revision process. For constitutional amendments, Article 96 required a two-thirds majority in the House of Councilors upper and House of Representatives lower houses of the National Diet, followed by a national referendum needing a straight majority. The LDP's determination and authority to seek formal constitutional change were boosted by Abe's landslide victory in the 2012 election. Abe's objectives were hindered by the New Kōmeitō's continued opposition to official modification, therefore he was compelled to attempt informal revision through a new interpretation of earlier constitutional restrictions on security.

On July 1, 2014, news of Japanese historical cabinet's intentions of "reinterpreting" its 1947 constitution, never touched before, in order to provide the nation with access to collective self-defense

(CSD) for the first time, pushed the UN Charter to authorize the right to use force to defend an ally who was being attacked. This anticipates a concept, that of collective self-defense, which will be later analyzed in the chapter, but is of great importance in order to end the debate concerning Article 9 revision.

Sixty years of authoritative government interpretations prohibiting the exercise of CSD on the basis of the constitution were reserved by this contentiously unprecedented, divisive decision driven by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The controversy over the Abe administration's efforts to allow Japan to conduct CSD without officially amending the infamous Article 9 "peace clause" of the constitution served as a telling focal point for the most recent, fierce debate over fundamental concerns resonating throughout Japan's post-World War II domestic politics. These topics varied from extremely delicate internal political concerns including civil-military ties, Japan's democratic institutions, and even national identity to the legitimacy and proper function of Japan's de facto military and alliance with the United States. The political climate was extremely flammable. Abe's allegedly unprecedented assault on Japan's democratic principles and constitutionalism drew widespread domestic and international criticism. At the same time, opposition parties decried bills of codifying the reinterpretation as "war legislation" (senso hoan), which they claimed would inevitably trap young Japanese in wars "on the far side of the world" (Liff, 2017).

Significant policy changes required prior strategic and political conditions and needed to be presentable as faithful to Article 9's fundamental principle of nonaggression. They were not susceptible to the whims of Japan's postwar leaders. On the other hand, once made, new interpretations are difficult to change.[16] Inaction of policy, such as refusing to send the JSDF on a mission, was, however, fundamentally within the prime minister's purview.

Strategic ups and downs. Most fundamentally, perceived strategic imperatives in the 1950s, particularly the escalation of the Cold War and the start of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, had an immediate impact on early changes in Japan's defense posture, which were reflected in significant about-faces regarding Article 9 by the occupation's two most important political figures: General Douglas MacArthur, who oversaw the occupation and was the deciding voice, fundamental to the 1947 constitution, in the demilitarization and democratization processes, and Shigeru Yoshida, prime minister during much of this period. According to MacArthur's 1950 statement, "Article 9 is based upon the highest of moral ideals, but by no sophistry of reasoning can it be interpreted as complete negotiation of the inalienable right of self-defense against unprovoked attack." (MacArthur, 2012).

[16] Tomiichi Murayama, the prime minister of a coalition government in 1994, was forced to renounce his party's long-held stance that the JSDF was unconstitutional in and of itself.

After North Korea invaded South Korea, which was backed by the U.S., in June 1950, MacArthur ordered the formation of the National Police Reserve (keisatsu yobitai), which served as the JSDF's forerunner. Harry Truman signed a memo in September of that year stating that the upcoming San Francisco Peace Treaty "must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan's inalienable right to self-defense in case of external attack, and to possess the means to exercise that right." (Acheson, 1950).

John Foster Dulles stated at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 that "to deny to Japan the inherent right of collective self-defense and permit only a token right of individual self-defense would be a fraud in this kind of peace, in this kind of world.". According to him, under such restrictions "Japan would be so subject to the menace of surrounding power that Japan would in fact not be able to lead an independent existence" (Foster Dulles, 1951).

This claim emphasizes the close connection between alleged regional risks and several justifications for the acceptance of CSD as an existential necessity, thus satisfying the bare minimum requirement. Despite their failure until 2014, these arguments have influenced the conversation ever since the first ten years of the constitution. The 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty specifically acknowledged Japan's "right to enter into collective security arrangements" and its "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense". The San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was ratified by 48 countries, as well as the 1956 Soviet Japanese Joint Declaration, both explicitly recognized Japan's UN Charter-guaranteed "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense". Thus, highlighting Japan's ability to exercise CSD under international law was not just a self-serving American endeavor.

Japan was able to exercise its right to individual self-defense because of the official 1954 reinterpretation of Article 9 by the Japanese government. It convincingly asserted the creation of the JSDF as a strategic need in a post-occupation, unstable Cold War setting, as was discussed above. The Japanese government left the door open for future effective reinterpretations in reality, even if not in words, by clearly restricting minimal essential capacities on strategic vicissitudes. The LDP's repeated electoral victories after 1955 changed the focus of the policy debate from determining whether Japan had a right to self-defense to define the appropriate means of and limitations on its exercise in light of the strategic context (and shifting political winds). This was true despite ongoing opposition criticism on the JSDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as unconstitutional.

Institutional elements. Political leadership was a requirement, but it was not enough. Although sometimes in the background, Japan's distinctive system of checks and balances on constitutional questions nevertheless played a significant impact. In particular, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) and Japan's Supreme Court have independently worked to create effective interpretation (and reinterpretation) of Article 9. The Supreme Court of Japan, as stated in Article 81 of the Constitution,

"is the court of last resort with the power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act." (Constitution of Japan). As a result, it has the authority to rule on any matter pertaining to Article 9, which includes all matters pertaining to self-defense in general or to the growth or employment of the JSDF in particular. In reality, however, the Supreme Court has adopted a stance of "judicial negativism" – not making decisions on constitutional matters unless it is absolutely necessary – in spite of several related lawsuits at lower levels (Umeda, 2006). Other courts have acted in a similar manner. For instance, the Sapporo High Court stated in 1973, when it overturned a lower court's ruling that the JSDF was unconstitutional, that "the choice of means of defense is nothing other than a determination of the most fundamental national policy, requiring both a high level of specialized technical judgement and a high level of political judgement." (Umeda, 2006). It was implied that the constitutionality of the JSDF fell outside the purview of judicial scrutiny and that the related concerns were essentially political/policy ones.

In essence, the Supreme Court of Japan has refrained from overtly ruling on Article 9- related issues unless compelled to do so by district court judgements that went against Japanese government policy. Because the Supreme Court refrained from making a direct judgement on Article 9, the CLB was able to assume the contentious position of "a quasi-constitutional court with a de facto monopoly on interpreting the constitution." It was made up of about twenty legal specialists seconded from the majority of ministries (including the National Police Agency).

On the other hand, even on fundamental military concerns, the CLB has occasionally been susceptible to political pressure.

Prime ministers like Yoshida, Kishi, and Yasuhiro Nakasone, who were keen to change policy during the Cold War, usually ignored them when it came to matters involving core policy questions that arose during periods of perceived external threat. The JSDF's constitutionality, the use of "defensive" nuclear weapons, and specific military exports in the 1980s are examples of successful prime ministerial coercion. In fact, Yoshida exerted "strong pressure" on the author of the ground-breaking 1954 interpretation of the CLB that allowed for the creation of the JSDF.

Nakasone's top cabinet secretary just stated that "policy review" does not fall under the CLB's purview with regard to arms exports. Following the Cold War, subsequent administrations progressively relaxed restrictions on JSDF employment without changing Article 9 or even informally reinterpreting it. The 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, which permitted the first of numerous JSDF deployments abroad, served as a significant turning point. Some more relevant examples are the expansion of joint exercises with the U.S. and other countries (like Australia), ongoing antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the JSDF's operations of replenishment and air transport in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In fact, the discrepancy between the original

meaning of Article 9 and its actual interpretation was obvious and growing well before the July 2014 cabinet decision. Despite these modifications, however, the exercise of CSD was repeatedly regarded as going above what was "minimum necessary" and, so, unconstitutional.

2.3 Japan's National Security Policy Under Abe

Japan's determination under Abe to break free from the domestic and global restrictions of the post-war regime has been designed to facilitate the fundamental revision of national security policy. The establishment of a more muscular military posture was seen as Japan's overarching objective to reclaim its national autonomy and great power status and to do so, to fend off the challenge from a rising China.

Abe has started a number of procedures to comprehensively reformulate and coordinate Japan's national strategy, security doctrines, and JSDF capabilities for the first time since the post-war era (Yoshihara, 2014).

2.3.1 The Implementation of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Programme Guidelines, and State Secrecy Law

One of Abe's first actions after assuming office in February 2013 was the creation of a plan for Japan's first National Security Council (NSC), whose idea had been in development since Abe's first government and later under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The NSC was officially constituted in December after the National Diet passed NSC legislation in November and the Advisory Council duly reported back in May. The new NSC was based on the U.S. and UK counterparts, and it was led by Yachi Shtar, a former Administrative Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Abe's top foreign policy advisor. It was composed by the prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary, and the foreign and defense ministers, and was intended to serve as the new control tower (shireitō) for Japan's foreign and security policy, merging data from important security agencies to overcome previous inter-ministerial sectionalism and enable better security crisis management.

Abe also established the Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, which met beginning in September and was presided over by Kitaoka Shinichi, a former professor at the University of Tokyo and deputy permanent representative to the UN. To coincide with the NSC's formation in December, the panel created Japan's first National Security Strategy (NSS). Abe's idea of making "proactive contribution to peace" and upholding an international system "based on rules and universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law" served as the cornerstone of the NSS (Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi, 2013). According to the NSS, China's growth and its challenge to the "status quo by coercion" have caused

a general change in the balance of power toward the Asia-Pacific, leading to the need of "rebalancing" the U.S. policy towards the region. Related or emerging dangers, according to the NSS and listed by it, were the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, access to the global commons, particularly the marine and cyberspace, and the stability of the global economy. The statement urges Japan to respond by stepping up diplomatic efforts within the UN and other international organizations, supporting ongoing development aid, and participating in UN peacekeeping operations. However, the strategy's main objective was mostly of a military nature, as it focused on bolstering Japan's individual national deterrent capabilities to support territorial integrity, maritime security, and cyber security; improving the U.S.-Japan alliance's interoperability, particularly in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), ballistic missile defense (BMD), maritime, and cyber security; and developing security alliances with South Korea, the ASEAN states, India and Australia.

The documents that described Japan's national defense policy and the necessary military capabilities, being the revised NDPG of 2014 and Mid-Term Defense Programme (MTDP) of 2014-18, were released at the same time as the NSS by the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD). The NSS's strategic analysis was largely reaffirmed by the NDPG, which also discussed the "multipolarization" of the international system, the relative reduction of U.S. dominance, and the shift in the balance of power brought about by China's growth. In the 2010 NDPG under the DPJ, the Basic Defense Force (BDF) doctrine was abandoned in favor of the new Dynamic Defense Force (DDF) concept, overturning earlier defense doctrine (Ministry of Defense Japan, 2010). Initially created during the Cold War, the BFD was intended to keep the minimal military posture required to aid in repelling a Soviet ground invasion, therefore, the JSDF's force posture was constrained to the static defense of Japanese territory and the mobilization of strong ground forces. The new DDF, in contrast, prioritized a more proactive JSDF posture on and around Japanese territory, with growing deployments of units southward and capable of power projection. The 2013 NDPG sought to create a "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" in order to increase cooperation between the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), ASDF, and MSDF, as the new DDF was conscious of the North Korean and Chinese threats.

The 2014 NDPG emphasized the development of a JSDF characterized by "full amphibious capability" for the recapture of remote Japanese islands that are vulnerable to invasion, as well as Japan's establishment of superiority in ISR to respond to regional contingencies, improved command and control for the JSDF, strengthening of BMD, and cyberspace response capabilities. Plans to upgrade the JSDF's equipment have been matched by the Abe administration's steadfast pursuit of a more muscular defense strategy. By promising to raise the destroyer fleet from 48 to 54, the new NDPG and MTDP replaced the 2010 NDPG. With the addition of two more Aegis-equipped destroyers to the current four Kong-class and two Atago-class ships, Japan's destroyer fleet has

grown, greatly enhancing its BMD capabilities. The promise construct two additional 25DD Akizuki-class multi-mission destroyers was still present in the updated NDPG. The MSDF would add two 27,000-ton 22/24DDH Izumo-class helicopter carriers to its existing two 19,000-ton 16DDH Hyga-class helicopter carriers, each of which can accommodate up to 11 helicopters. This would give the MSDF a very strong anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability and highly adaptable naval assets. The purchase of the P-1, a replacement for the P-3C with an 8,000-kilometer range capable of patrolling and ASW operations far into the South China Sea, would enhance the MSDF's air fleet.

The updated NDPG and MTDP continued the 2010 NDPG's expansion of the MSDF submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats and introduced the Sry-class submarine platform offering cutting-edge technologies in air-dependent and fuel-cell propulsion and operation. As a result, the MSDF's own submarine capabilities had been significantly increased. The JMOD's budget request for 2015 indicated plans to enhance the MSDF's assistance for amphibious operations, including upgrading the hull and landing dock ramp of the three Sumi-class transports for using amphibious vehicles and allocating funds to study the acquisition of a multi-purpose command, transport, and air operations vessel for amphibious tasks, which was apparently capable of embarking amphibious vehicles, hovercraft, transport, and attack helicopters.

The ASDF's purchase of 42 F-35A fifth-generation fighters and Japanese research into the Advanced Technology Demonstration-X fighter – possibly an independently made aircraft to replace the F-2 or F-15J –were both maintained in the amended NDPG and MTDP. Japan might have been interested in creating an offensive counter-air (OCA) doctrine for the ASDF given its emphasis on the F-35A's stealth capabilities and its better associated strengths as an air defense penetration fighter, as opposed to an air superiority fighter. With the F-35A and the ASDF's already-purchased precision-guided joint direct attack munitions (JDAM), Japan may be able to attack North Korea missile facilities and even the Chinese mainland in an emergency, signaling a significant shift from the country's traditional defensive posture. The ASDF is continuing to purchase C-2 transports with a 6,500-kilometer range to increase Japan's airlift capacity, Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 batteries for BMD, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), most likely the Global Hawk, to help patrol Japan's extremely expansive airspace, coastline, and isolated islands.

By forming a force with 3,000 members that is similar to a marine corps, the GSDF will begin developing its amphibious capacity for the goal of retaking outlying islands. The U.S. Marine Corps' (USMC) AAVP-7 was being tested by the GSDF, and the new unit was provided with 52 amphibious armored personnel carriers as well as 17 MV-22 Osprey aircraft. The GSDF has increased training with the MSDF for interoperability in amphibious operations and has been taking part in Exercise Iron Fist at Camp Pendleton in California every year since 2006 with the USMC. In August and

September 2012, the GSDF and USMC also held a practice on Guam for the defense of outlying islands (Goldman, 2013).

The new NDPG and MTDP continued the pattern of placing more and more emphasis on the deployment of JSDF resources southward. The ASDF established an E-2C squadron at Naha in Okinawa after previously committing to double the number of F-15J squadrons there. The westernmost inhabited islands in the Japanese archipelago and only 108 kilometers from Taiwan's coast and roughly 150 kilometers from the Senkaku Islands, Yonaguni Island in Okinawa Prefecture, was where the GSDF was instructed to send a coastal observation unit under the updated MTDP. The GSDF had already refurbished three ground-based radar installations on the Miyako and Okinoerabu islands, north of Okinawa's main island, and installed mobile radar equipment on Yonaguni, Miyako, Ishigaki, and Iriomote-Jima, the largest of Japan's southernmost islands. The GSDF established two fast deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades in order to respond to attacks on uninhabited islands, while the updated MTDP instructed the GSDF to maintain surface-to-ship missiles, specifically the Type-88 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), currently mounted on trucks, and the Type-12 ASCM, which was developed and had a 150-kilometer range. These weapons could be employed to stop Chinese ships' arrival in Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. In April 2012, while a North Korean missile launch was approaching the JSDF practiced deployments to the southernmost islands, saying that the islands needed to be protected against the possibility of falling rocket debris, Miyako, Ishigaki, and Yonaguni received PAC-3 units from the ASDF and 500 personnel from the GSDF, respectively. The U.S. assisted the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF in conducting a combined exercise in Honsh in December 2011 that was based on the scenario of the retaking of one of the southern islands. As a result, Abe's military plan for Japan maintained the emphasis on improved readiness, mobility, and jointness for the JSDF to fend off potential Chinese assault. As a type of access-denial, the JSDF sometimes responded asymmetrically by developing tools like ASCM and BMD to block China's extensive naval and missile installations.

Some of Japan's military build-up was symmetrical and more toe-to-toe with China, for example the acquisition and expansion of fifth-generation fighters, submarines, and helicopter carriers.

Additionally, to fully fund Japan's military expansion was one of the aspects on which the administration seemed more eager than its forerunners. Abe declared in January 2013, shortly after assuming office, the first rise in the defense budget in 11 years, with the goal of reversing the long-term stagnation in military spending. The JMOD was successful in winning 2.2% increase for the defense budget in fiscal 2014, and in 2015, the JMOD requested a 2.4% increase but only received a 2% increase. Japanese authorities contended that these increases were modest, only halt the budgetary deterioration in Japan, and insignificant in comparison to China's ongoing double-digit military

spending growth. However, the Abe government has stopped a trend of virtually stagnating defense spending which lasted for a decade and raised them until making them comparable to the high watermark spending of the late 1990s, to levels of 5 trillion yen. The Abe administration's willingness to engage in a "slow motion" action-reaction arms race in the region was demonstrated by Japan's renewed determination to fund its defense policy despite ongoing fiscal difficulties and its emphasis on the types of procurements that were primarily designed to counter China's expanding maritime and air power in the East China Sea. The administration of Abe has looked into alternative strategies for enhancing Japan's military and security capacities.

On December 14, 2013, the contentious State Secrecy Law was passed by the government, entering into effect a year later, and placing tight limits and sanctions on the handling of sensitive information for the first time. Moreover, it gave the bureaucracy the power to withhold sensitive material that was deemed secret to imprison anyone who leaks or seeks out information that was classified for reasons of national security. Because they are housed under the Cabinet Office, the oversight mechanisms for ensuring that the law operated in the public interest had come under fire as being inefficient and lacking in independence. The new law was intended to reassure the U.S. and other partners that information passed to Japan would be secure, as well as opening the door for Japan to have better access to U.S. intelligence networks and to become involved in joint operations for international security.

2.3.2 The Realization of Collective Self-Defense

Constitutional change continued to be Abe's most ambitious goal for changing Japan's defense stance. Abe's plan had been put on hold as the National Diet and the LDP's New Kōmeitō coalition partner opposed formal revision. However, this has prompted him to try informal revision by reinterpreting the 1954 ban on exercising the right to collective self-defense that the Japanese government had in place. Japan's security ideals are outlined in the Preamble of the Constitution:

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. […] We recognise that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

"The Renunciation of War", Chapter 2, Article 9 of the Constitution states as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

Since the 1950s, successive administrations have maintained the stance that, while Article 9 of the Constitution does not forbid Japan from taking action in the event of threats to peace, security, or the survival of the nation, resulting in Japan retaining the right to self-defense (jieiken), on the other hand, it is forbidding Japan's use of force to settle international disputes and from engaging in hostilities. In turn, starting in the 1960s, Japanese governments started to clearly distinguish between the right to self-defense as consisting of individual self-defense (kobetsu-teki jieiken) and collective self-defense (shūdan-teki jieiken). Although Japan could not be said to have the right of collective self-defense in the sense of sending forces to the defense of a state with which it maintains close relations, Prime Minister Kishi stated in the National Diet in 1960 that this did not mean Japan did not have the right at all and its exercise could include actions like providing bases or economic support. Japanese government has kept its position that although Japan, along with all other sovereign states, had the right to self-defense under Chapter 7 of Article 51 of the UN Charter, it was not allowed to go beyond the necessary level of force and violate the constitution by exercising that right.

Japanese administrations have held the position that Japan was prepared to fulfil its obligations to international society to the extent that these did not conflict with or go beyond the Constitution as the supreme law of the state. This was in regard to Japan's participation in collective security under resolutions of Article 42 of the UN Charter. As a result, since Article 9 of the Constitution forbids the use of force to resolve international conflicts, the Japanese government has adopted the position that participation in collective security operations that involved the use of force was itself illegal.

According to Abe, collective self-defense can be used in order to re-establish its independence as an international actor, improve the mutuality of the security treaty, serve as an equal alliance partner of the U.S., and be accepted as a partner with other states and a member of the global community. In addition to being a top goal for internal political regime change, Abe has come to see collective self-defense as a promise to the world that Japan must keep to contribute in a proactive way to peace. In April 2014, President Obama and Prime Minister Abe held a joint press conference in Tokyo where they applauded Japan's inquiry into the use of collective self-defense (Office of the Press Secretary White House, 2014). In order to facilitate the growth of a security collaboration between Japan and NATO, Abe underlined the necessity for Japan to reconstruct its

legal foundation for security and review its restriction on collective self-defense during his speech to the North Atlantic Council of NATO on May 6, 2014 (Shinzo, 2014).

Tokyo's efforts to reinterpret the collective defense clauses allowed by Article 9 of the Constitution, which freed Japanese policymakers to consider novel avenues for strategic engagement with allies, emerged from signing of a formal partnership agreement with NATO that year. There were several perspectives on the partnership pact that Japan and NATO inked in 2014, and the "Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program" (IPCP) between Japan and NATO was the resulting agreement, which showed that both partners saw value in developing their relationship. It already dated back to the early 1990s, and included a variety of practical cooperation in peacebuilding, crisis management, cyber defense, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and involvement in a variety of military activities.

However, via the political system of Japan, the topic of collective self-defense has farther advanced. In 2014, the second report from the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security was drafted, deriving from that created by Abe in April 2007. The new report provided for a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution with the aim of incorporating the possibility of collective self-defense under certain conditions. A series of restrictions surrounding the right to collective defense was intended to make the shift appear to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Despite Abe was still focused on trying to achieve the level of domestic political unanimity necessary for the move to take effect, the intention of reinterpreting Article 9 was another indicator of the success of Abe's push to make Japan a "normal" actor in the Asia-Pacific, and it came on top of a number of earlier Abe-driven modifications.

After three years, on July 6, 2017, at the NATO headquarters, Abe met with Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO. They confirmed that Japan-NATO cooperation was progressing in areas such as maritime security, cyberspace, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, women, peace, and security, basing themselves on the IPCP agreed upon in 2014. Furthermore, they also shared the opinion that they would promote further cooperation.

Abe specifically stated that Japan agreement to send a liaison officer to the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) in the UK was suggested by the NATO side in order to further strengthen Japan-NATO cooperation in the area of maritime security, and also Japan's serious intentions of opening a Mission of Japan to NATO emerged in response to a request from the NATO side.

However, in 2020, the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme that was agreed upon in 2014 was renewed as well. These accords established the groundwork for the practical collaboration that exists today on a variety of topics, including non-proliferation, maritime security, humanitarian aid, and cyber defense.

Japan is one of the nine nations outside the Euro-Atlantic region that NATO has recognized as "partners across the globe", and NATO's top leadership has frequently referred to Japan as a "natural partner" over the years. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has also participated in two joint exercises with NATO fleets in Europe in recent years.

While NATO shifted its focus to Asia on a strategic level with the impeding release of its 2022 Strategic Concept, which for the first time addressed global concerns coming from China, it is not doing that physically. The fact that China's coercive policies are on the Madrid agenda, drafted during the Madrid Summit of 2022 where Japan participated as one of the major NATO's partners, shows how worried NATO is about events in Japan's neighborhood. Japan is pushing on behalf of NATO members, both in theory and in fact, for stronger cooperation and presence in Asia by specifically requesting that NATO nations send military delegations to Japan and expressing interest in holding cooperative drills in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this regard, Japanese Self-Defense Forces have lately conducted exercises in the Pacific with forces from Canada, the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands in addition to cooperation with their key security ally, the U.S.

2.3.3 Radical Precedents of the New Security

All the same, Abe appeared destined to use his control over the National Diet to advance the laws required for collective self-defense and to further realize his goal of exiting the post-war era and placing Japan on a new security trajectory. The effects of Abe's actions, especially long-term ones, are still up for serious dispute, and to reassure the Japanese public about the risks of entrapment, the Abe administration itself has made an effort to downplay the significance of the reinterpretations. It has emphasized that the breach of the ban only permits "limited" exercise of the right and also stressed that there has not been any reinterpretation of the Constitution in its "Q and A" document that adds explanation to the Cabinet Decision. Instead, it claimed that the government's position had simply been rationalized within pre-existing interpretations, as stated in the formal name of the Cabinet Decision, and this was agreed by other commentators, arguing that the Abe administration's recent move towards collective self-defense represented only a gradual reinterpretation of the Constitution to exercise an already recognized right; that they did, in fact, only represent a "limited" exercise of collective self-defense with obvious restrictions and that eliminated the option of participating in UN-mandated or US-led wars outside of the country; and that the real issue was the process of reinterpretation itself. Thus, it followed that Abe's changes were proportionate and did not endanger the safety of the area or the world (Green and Hornung, 2014). Others argued that Abe's violation of the prohibition on collective self-defense portended a potential fundamental reworking of Japan's role

in international security (Reinhart, 2013). The Cabinet Decision marked the first official reinterpretation of constitutional prohibitions on the post-war era, which is the first thing to highlight. The previous dispatches of the JSDF to take part in international operations like the UN Peacekeeping Operations and collective security-type operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, as well as the accompanying legislative frameworks to support these, were all made possible within the stretching but never the formal reinterpretation or breach of existing constitutional restrictions (Wakefield and Martin, 2014). As a result, the Abe administration's capacity to openly disregard earlier constitutional readings created a new precedent and gave succeeding administrations more leeway to increase Japan's participation in collective self-defense and other international military operations. Undoubtedly, the violation of the moratorium marked a break from earlier restrictions on Japan's military posture.

The second related argument is that the nature of the reinterpretation itself cannot necessarily be understood as "limited", given that it has given the JSDF access to a potentially new sphere of international action in favor of not only the U.S. but also other nations. Despite its attempts to portray the use of collective self-defense as a natural and incremental change still in line with previous traditions of Japanese security policy but now required by a changing security environment, or even to conflate its use and "the three new conditions" with earlier limitations on the use of individual self-defense, the Abe administration has actually opened the door for Japan to use force under a completely different set of circumstances.

For what concerns the third argument, it deals with the concept that Japan's violation of the embargo was perhaps less constrained by the extra restrictions that the Abe administration has purported to place on the right to undertake collective self-defense than previously thought. As a "hadome", the "three new conditions" are debatable, and one may argue that they contribute very nothing, that is particularly innovative or constrictive for Japan and are basically common sense for any use of armed action by any state. Furthermore, the "three new conditions" still impose no specific geographical delimitations on JSDF dispatch or the states that Japan can defend, even though support for the U.S. and contingencies on the Korean Peninsula are likely to be the most likely immediate scenarios for collective self-defense.

The Abe administration's goals and method of reinterpretation suggested that, if the political will exists, there was considerable room to further broaden Japan's participation in collective self-defense and collective security operations. This brings us to our fourth related issue. Political leaders are now more firmly in charge of constitutional reinterpretation than ever, as seen by Abe's strategy and capacity to violate the restriction. The prime minister was able to neutralize CLB, bureaucratic, and political party objections and to overcome popular skepticism about the plan. Abe used an

advisory body made up of his supporters, six weeks of coalition-internal deliberations, and a Cabinet Decision to lift a nearly 60-year-old restriction on Japan's use of military action.[17]

Abe's success and the ease with which reinterpretations can be made were likely to inspire his administration and other political leaders to either expand the Cabinet Decision's already-loosely-restrictive definition of collective self-defense and collective security or simply make more precedent-setting Cabinet Decisions. Abe emphasized in May 2014 that Japan would not participate in foreign wars, but this and his political feeling seemed to be only real restrictions. In June, Abe had already started to insist on the prospect of sending JSDF troops to the Gulf to assist protect Japanese energy supplies. In fact, Abe is well known for being a fervent supporter of Japan's involvement in an extended version of collective self-defense similar to NATO. Many other LDP members take an even more radical stance, including Ishiba, who supports the possibility of infinite collective self-defense. Therefore, Abe had effectively opened the door to much more expansive types of collective self-defense and collective security alternatives.

2.4 The Dilemma Concerning the "Abe Doctrine"

Without a question, Abe has continued his aggressive foreign and security policy from his first administration and further developed it throughout the last two years of his second one, earning the right to be referred to as a prospective new doctrine. The Yoshida Doctrine is opposed by the doctrine's explicitly stated ideology and inherent revisionism, as it was previously dominated and characterized by expediency and subdued caution. In terms of its security posture, U.S.-Japan relations, and Japan-East Asia relations, Abe has started to steer Japan in new, radical directions. For much of his second term in office, as the prime minister has sought to challenge taboo after taboo, both domestically and internationally, this agenda has seemed unstoppable.

However, these were indications that Abe Doctrine might have not proven to be long-lasting. The first item on Abe's agenda for security policy advanced quickly, but there were indications that domestic opposition partners, and popular opinion over collective self-defense were beginning to gradually take hold. The second objective of improving U.S.-Japan relations has proven more challenging, with security ties improving but showing hints of trouble on Okinawa, slower progress on the TPP, and U.S. anxiety at Abe's revisionism and the impact on its "rebalance" and East Asian stability.

[17] Abe seemed to believe that as prime minister, he could influence the outcome of the collective self-defense decision even before the process began. Insinuating that he had "supreme responsibility" for reinterpretation as the general election winner in the National Diet on February 12, 2014, Abe raised concerns by suggesting that he would seek informal constitutional reform on his own initiative.

The third goal of Japan-East Asia ties has made the slowest advancements. Despite Abe's major plans to reassert regional leadership and encircle China, the ASEAN states have only been partially engaged in this effort because they saw China's containment as the real goal; South Korea has strategically shifted away from Japan and towards China; and China itself has simply refused to engage in useless dialogue with Japan, strengthened its position in the region, and in some ways encircled it. The three arrows of Abe's foreign and security policy ran the risk of becoming equally inaccurate and having the same impacts as "Abenomics".

2.4.1 The Doctrine as a "Passive Revolution"

What characteristics did Abe's outer passive revolution have, and how did it work as a plan to re-establish LDP hegemony?

When Abe returned to power in 2012, it was a stark contrast to his unsuccessful year-long tenure as Prime Minister in 2006-2007 attempting to govern from the right while emphasizing security and foreign policy. Abe rebuilt his reputation by focusing on the social and economic crises that Japan was experiencing and asserting that he possessed the solution in a package of policies that even took his name: this is a reference to the already-discussed "Abenomics". Nevertheless, notwithstanding how successful its branding may have been, Abenomics received plaudits from a variety of economic and social policy experts from the center-left and center-right, further enhancing its legitimacy (Carroll, 2021).

When viewed from the viewpoint of passive revolution, "Abenomics" can be seen to have been focused on two goals: (1) regaining public support and confidence in the LDP through Keynesian economic policies meant to encourage middle class consumption and employment; and (2) re-establishing the prerequisites for successful capital accumulation through inflation targeting and neoliberal reforms. However, the first of these goals was not created with the intention of furthering the political empowerment of workers, unions, or other underprivileged socioeconomic groups, despite the fact that they may have been created with the idea of regaining popular support for the LDP through policies framed in the interests of the working and middle class. Abenomics can be viewed in this light as a passive revolution strategy solving the political and economic aspects of Japan's organic crisis by re-establishing public support for or consent to LDP dominance through popular policies, and also re-establishing the conditions for continued stable capital accumulation without meaningfully ceding power to those subaltern class interests. However, Abe's larger goal included more than just this consent-based passive revolution tactic. In fact, it was inextricably tied to a series of coercive actions that represented its internal face.

While the aforementioned economic policies that represented the consent-based side of Abe's passive revolution attempted to appeal to a wide range of stakeholders and partially succeeded in framing his overarching agenda as in the interests of the entire country, these policies were combined with a variety of strategies and techniques designed to advance a number of conservative, militaristic, and soft authoritarian political prerogatives covertly. In this way, it was clear how a coercive, if covert, campaign to advance otherwise contentious conservative policies and stifle potential oppositional forces was essential to Abe's success. This was in addition to the image his social and economic policies created of a unifying approach to resolving the economic and social crisis in the interests of a broad range of social forces.

The failure of Abe's first term (2006-2007) was partially caused by concerns that contrasted sharply with public opinion, such as his overzealous attachment to constitutional revision and historical revisionism. Abe was long known as a defense hawk who supported re-militarization and minimized the extent of Japan's wartime aggression, and after seeming to have learned from these errors, when he regained power in 2012, he adopted a more nuanced approach to defense and foreign affairs. During his first term, Abe proposed Constitution's Article 9 revision, which firstly forbid the development of a military and the use of force against other nations. These would have been abolished under Abe's proposed reforms, which would have instead permitted the development of a fully functional military. However, after winning a second term in office, Abe's proposal for constitutional modification consisted solely of an explicit declaration of the legitimacy of Japan's already existing SDF, without altering Article 9 (Murakami, 2019). Even while Abe was eventually unable to implement this more modest modification while in government, its tone undoubtedly assisted in tamping down the perception of Abe being out of touch with national interests and doing nothing to discredit the one he established through his Abenomics agenda. However, if we dig a little further, we can find that this appeal for a moderate approach to constitutional revision has been followed by less visible moves in defense policy that were more forceful. Abe oversaw the construction of Izumo and Kaga, Japan's first post-war helicopter destroyers (Easley, 2017), and announced a broadening of the legal definition of SDF activity that is permitted within the parameters of "self-defense" beyond what was previously anticipated (Khilji, 2015). As a result of Japan's reliance on Middle Eastern energy, Abe also approved the de facto creation of a permanent base for the SDF in Djibouti from which to launch operations in the Persian Gulf and abroad (Evron, 2017). Finally, efforts to change public discourse and popular understandings of Japan's wartime past must also be regarded as a component of this passive revolution, going beyond narrowly defined foreign policy to the way the Japanese nation and its position in world history are defined and portrayed in schools. Abe specifically sought to advance a revisionist interpretation of history covertly through education reforms that

require the teaching of "patriotism" (aikokushin) in schools as well as by subtly encouraging the adoption of history textbooks that minimize Japanese wartime aggression (Bamkin, 2018).[18] In all of these respects, given the sustained popularity of Article 9, Abe's militaristic program was politically possible while also bringing about a significant shift in Japanese foreign and defense rhetoric and policy.

Abe's attempt to maintain control over the bureaucracy was a second aspect of his passive revolution. This was partially sparked by the erratic interactions between the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the government during its brief three-year rule from 2009 to 2012. The LDP under Abe found it relatively simple to rebuild a cordial relationship with the bureaucracy after taking back power in 2012, and it still had all the relationships with the bureaucracy that had been established over its previous fifty years in office, despite having been out of power for three years.

However, starting in 2014, the administration pushed through significant changes to the National Public Service Law that significantly shifted the balance of power between the government and bureaucracy (Mishima, 2017). A significant power shift toward the Cabinet and PM and away from the bureaucracy was achieved as a result of these reforms, which also included measures to broaden the Prime Minister's control over bureaucratic appointments. Earlier governments had never been able to do this. These actions, which were started under previous LDP governments in the 1990s and 2000s and were attempted unsuccessfully by the DPJ, were carried out to strengthen cabinet and PMO control of the bureaucracy and were frequently seen as necessary steps to increase accountability in Japan's political system, thus reflecting generally held concerns about the issues with excessive bureaucratic power in Japan's political system. The 2017 unfolding of two scandals showed a totally different, darker objective, which might be regarded as another component of Abe's quiet revolution, despite the seemingly sensible appearance of these administrative reforms. First, with the Moritomo Gakuen scandal which exposed how high-ranking bureaucrats had intervened to keep secret sensitive information about Abe's wife's participation in the 86 percent discounted sale of public land to a private, conservative, kindergarten, where she was appointed honorary principal (Japan Times, 2018). Then, as a result of the Kake Gakuen incident, it came to light that some officials had been coerced into approving a new veterinary science department at a college managed by a close ally of Abe. Although Abe's direct involvement in swaying administrative decisions for the benefit of friends was not established in either of these instances, the question of whether such influence actually occurred is almost irrelevant. After the National Public Service Law revision, the Prime Minister's authority over top bureaucratic appointments has grown so strong that, rather than enhancing bureaucratic

[18] Abe, well-known on the right and a prominent player in the nationalist, conservative, and historical revisionist organization Nippon Kaigi, was successful in retaining base support despite his subtle tactics.

accountability through democratic (i.e., Cabinet-based) control of appointments, bureaucrats were under increasing pressure to win the Prime Minister's favor because they understood that their future career opportunities depended just as much on the Prime Minister's personal endorsement. Overall, the two scandals and the top bureaucrats' willingness to support Abe at all costs showed how successfully the government, through the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, rearranged the relationship between the cabinet and bureaucracy. This "passive revolution" was more about turning the bureaucracy into a brigade of partisan sycophants than it was about giving the cabinet more executive authority.

The way Abe tried to change the relationship between the government and the media is the final aspect of his passive revolution. These efforts amounted to a carrot-and-stick strategy intended to stifle opposition while promoting pro-government viewpoints through a variety of strategies, including policy changes and more finely intimidating approaches. Abe made a concerted effort to win over supporters in the media as well. In 2013, for example, he appointed three board members and the new chairman of the national broadcaster NHK who shared his conservative nationalist viewpoint (Japan Times, 2013; Mulgan, 2015).

At the same time, the government frequently utilized a coercive tactic to silence critics in the media and academia. The government passed the Specially Designated Secrets Protection Law in 2013, a broad and nebulous law that threatens to put journalists and government whistle-blowers in jail for disclosing "state secrets". This action was sharply criticized for limiting journalists' ability to look into stories that might be harmful to the government (Facker, 2016). The government also attempted to stifle media criticism by using legal means in addition to public reprimands.

Abe attempted to exercise influence over the media in all these ways, rewarding loyalists and punishing adversaries. Because of this, Japanese journalism has been characterized by an increasing propensity among journals and media to try to appease politicians by providing positive coverage, another instance of sontaku (together with the bureaucracy) (Facker, 2016). The government's divide and rule policy were further aided by journalists' loyalty to the businesses that employed them rather than to their profession. This has prevented media corporations from refusing to bow to the government.

2.4.2 Three Great Contradictions

Fundamentally, difficulties for the implementation of present-day policies and relations were provoked by the tensions stem from the Abe Doctrine's fixation on trying to escape the post-war order and the insults to national pride imposed during that period, as well as the fact that these impulses frequently only cause Japan to become more mired in the past.

The Abe Doctrine's claim that it is based on the promotion of universal and liberal ideals in order to maintain the status quo of the international order is the first major contradiction. The reality of Abe's foreign and security policy is that it is fundamentally revisionist in nature, and that its emphasis on undoing the reforms imposed by the Occupation, the rulings of the Tokyo War Tribunals, and Japan's prior historical pronouncements directed at the region, challenge accepted international law and norms. Therefore, while Japan may counter that China is seeking to upend the international order, the Abe Doctrine forces Japan to occasionally be included in that group as well, showing that Japan's claims of leadership based on universal principles are not only untrue and ineffective in the East Region, but also at odds with the views of many other countries, not the least of which is the U.S., which established the current international order of the post-war era on the basis of these very liberal principles.

If the claims made by the Abe Doctrine to uphold liberalism can be said to be frequently fundamentally illiberal and conflictual, then its second major contradiction is the idea that the post-war order can be ended by repeatedly revisiting, and in some cases unilaterally reinterpreting, past history because this once more causes regional tensions and prolongs Japan's predicament of being caught in the confines of the past. Abe and the revisionists appeared to believe that, by abandoning these taboos and ensuing restrictions on Japanese foreign policy by persistently challenging historical interpretations of the colonial past, Japan would eventually achieve a watershed moment of domestic and international acceptance or acquiescence. The Abe Doctrine's emphasis on revisiting the colonial past and Occupation period, however, only helps to exacerbate regional animosities over history and territory and to diplomatically isolate Japan, according to all available data. This effectively prevents the Abe Doctrine's goals for regional leadership to be achieved and prolongs Japan's post-war period of national anger and restrictions.

However, the third and possibly biggest contradiction of the Abe Doctrine was the idea that Japan may ultimately regain its genuine autonomy and independence in the post-war era through growing dependency on the U.S. Abe sees Japan as reclaiming its place as a top power alongside the U.S. by intensifying bilateral collaboration, but this conception is fatally flawed, not only because Abe's Japan is already having trouble delivering on key policy cooperation commitments, but also because the revisionism of the doctrine actually presents the bilateral relationship with fundamental ideological and value incompatibilities that undermine the potential for cooperation from the outset. The first issue with the bilateral relationship within this contradiction is that Abe's ambitions for closer relationships with the U.S. on an equal footing cannot, by definition, materialize as long as Japan continues to lock itself into dependence on the U.S. in a variety of political, economic, and security matters. Abe's efforts to boost Japan's great power status by further integrating it into the

military alliance can only be interpreted as dependency. Instead of constructing true military autonomy, Japan is aligning its security concepts and capabilities in the new NDPG, violating collective self-defense, and the revised Defense Guidelines. The solution of the Abe administration to keep the FRF in Okinawa and the continued presence of U.S. foreign troops in Japan point to a dependency relationship, as does the administration's ongoing demand for security assurances from the U.S. about the Senkaku Islands. Therefore, the Abe Doctrine is, in many respects, eroding Japan's autonomy in international affairs, and this could only be worse with the doctrine's revision, which further isolates Japan in East Asia and leaves it without any viable regional allies. As a result, rather than reversing this tendency, Japan will simply grow more vulnerable to U.S. pressure, raising worries about abandonment and entrapment as well as potential hostility towards the U.S.

The second issue within the third great contradiction is that the Abe Doctrine may actually be continuing to cede Japanese autonomy to the U.S., and this relationship is still likely to be fraught with other difficulties caused by ideological incompatibilities and tensions even if Japan may be willing to accept the vulnerabilities and the resentment that this relationship creates for its security benefits. The Abe Doctrine's illiberalism and infatuation with revisionism in Japan have the potential to cause real conflict between Japan and the U.S. This dynamic was already evident in the U.S.'s displeasure with Abe's attempt to modify the Kōno Statement and its desire to exert pressure on Japan to change its position. The Abe Doctrine's pursuit of autonomy and status through the bilateral alliance has the unintended consequence of further entangling Japan in the U.S. alliance, further integrating it into the post-war system, and possibly rekindling feelings of resentment toward Japan's fundamental subjugation to the U.S. (zokkoku). In reality, this process has increased Japan's dependence on the U.S. while also increasing ideological incompatibilities between the U.S. and Japan.

3 Chapter III – External Factors: The New Japanese National Security Strategy

The government of Japan's current Prime Minister, Kishida Fumio, has implemented significant changes to Japan's security strategy over the past year. In December 2022, Tokyo released a New National Security Strategy, together with two additional defense-related strategic documents. They contained a number of decisions made by the government, including considerably raising Japan's defense spending to 2% of its GDP by the end of the 2027 fiscal year. Japan and the United States explored opportunities for deeper cooperation during bilateral alliance meetings in mid-January 2023 and evaluated the implications of the new strategic documents since Tokyo is attempting to address a rapidly deteriorating security environment by making significant decisions, including the purchase of so-called counter-strike capabilities. Even while some of the actions that have been announced in the documents are truly crucial for Japan, they have been up for discussion for some time now and, therefore, they might be considered as a part of the ongoing evolution of Japanese security policy.

Nearly ten years after the country of Japan unveiled, under the then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, its first-ever national security strategy in 2013, the country published its most recent version. In order to improve coordination between ministries and agencies in policymaking, Abe founded the National Security Secretariat in the same year, and it was crucial in developing the 2023 plan. The new document offers insight into how Tokyo intends to address the new issues of the time, since the security climate in Japan has significantly deteriorated from when the original strategy was released. Abe Shinzo had a significant role in advancing changes to Japan's security strategy over the past ten years, and he kept up his influence even after stepping down as Prime Minister in 2020. The new strategy paper thus plots the direction of Japan's security, standing in the post-Abe era, following his passing in July 2022.

The National Defense Strategy and the Buildup Program complement the new National Security Strategy, mainly serving as a plan for the buildup of military capabilities over the next five to ten years, and they constitute two defense-related policy documents that were simultaneously published. The three volumes, which total over 130 pages in English, provide in-depth analyses of Japan's strategic course.

The new documents make it quite clear that Japan is highly concerned about developments in regional and global security and that Japan is really dealing with the "most severe and complex security environment" since the end of World War II, as the National Security Strategy states (Sakaki, 2023). Tokyo feels that given Russia's aggression against Ukraine, other nations may also be challenging the current international order in the Indo-Pacific or East Asia. Three nuclear-armed

nations, China, North Korea, and Russia are expanding their military capabilities and actions near Japan, which they immediately flank.

The People's Republic is described as the unprecedented "greatest strategic challenge" in the new document, as opposed to the 2013 strategy, which expressed "concern" about China.

In the months prior to the strategy within Japan's governing coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the junior partner Komeito had been engaged in a heated political debate over the use of the word "threat". Komeito, which has historically maintained close ties with China, was heard when speaking out against Japan and emphasizing that it should work toward a stable bilateral relationship. Indeed, in order to avoid rising tensions, the policy mentions the objective of establishing a "constructive and stable relationship with China".

Although China's actual spending on defense is likely even higher in light of Japan's new defense strategy, China's official 2022 defense budget is almost five times larger than Japan's. China is acting more assertively on the outside and stepping up its military operations close to Japan. In-depth discussion of Beijing's aggressive stance toward Taiwan is also included in Japan's new security materials, while Taiwan was only briefly referenced in the 2013 security plan, as it was written when Beijing and Taipei's Kuomintang-led administration had better relations. North Korea is referred to as an "even more grave and imminent threat" in Japan's new security plan, because even though Tokyo had already characterized the regime's developments as worrisome in the 2013 document, the increased frequency of North Korea's missile launches, and the technological advancements, have led to Tokyo to this view. Around 100 missiles launches were carried out by North Korea in 2022, including one that saw a missile sail over the Japanese islands for the first time in five years. Concern over North Korea's growing capacity to obstruct or evade missile identification, tracking, and interception – whether through the use of road-mobile launch vehicles or solid-fuel propelled missiles with erratic trajectories – is reflected in Japan's defense strategy in light of North Korea's weapons technology advancement.

In addition, a clear violation of international law was seen by Japan regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which threatens the basis on the international system. It is appropriate that the new security plan makes no mention of the appeal made in the previous one for greater cooperation with Moscow. Instead, it focuses on Russia's escalation of its military presence in the Far East, particularly in the disputed Kuril Islands. Tokyo is especially concerned about Russia and China's strategic collaboration, including combined air and naval exercises. However, the policy makes distinctions between the security environments in Europe, where Russia poses a "significant and direct" threat, and the Indo-Pacific, where Tokyo has "strong […] concern.".

Thus, the chapter aims at analyzing how these various external factors have led to the drafting of a new Japan's National Security Strategy, in response to the current issues related to both regional and global security.

3.1 The Drafting of Three New Documents

Japan released three documents in December 2022 to outline its security strategy for the following ten years: a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a Defense Buildup Program. Tokyo's security strategy has undergone an evolutionary and critical phase over the last ten years (Liff, 2015). The sequence of security reforms carried out over the past ten years have set the way for the facilitation of a more integrated military alliance with the United States by strengthening Tokyo's decision-making process and removing some of the odd legal restrictions on the use of force in Japan. These developments are further accelerated by the recently released documents, which offer suggestions for deepening both institutional and strategic cooperation between the two allies, but also attention has been drawn to Japan's growing investments in national security, in terms of financial and new military capabilities. However, material advancements by themselves do not guarantee powerful military might. The focus should be on whether and how these security reforms improve Japan's total military capability, particularly in light of its partnership with the United States (Matsuda, 2023). First, it appears that discussions about alliance politics need to diverge from the frequent arguments about burden-sharing and financial concerns because the security environment in the Western Pacific is becoming more fluid. The U.S.-Japan alliance is entering a completely new phase for escalating great power rivalry, one in which actual warfighting capabilities and combat effectiveness have become increasingly important, especially as the U.S. executes its idea of "integrated deterrence". Second, despite the fact that Japan has taken a more proactive part in global security, the call for this improved position has come at a challenging moment given the country's economic stagnation, if not decline, during the previous three decades, and concerns about social security might easily eclipse those discussions as Tokyo deals with one of the world's fastest-aging populations.

Both the academic and policy sectors have given Japan's more proactive approach to regional security the attention it deserves over the past ten years (Yuichi, 2020). How Tokyo's goals, such as the security reforms and higher defense budget, may be turned into a workable and successful strategy will be the key question for the coming ten years. A closer look at Japan's security documents reveals methods for moving the conversation away from financial issues like burden-sharing and toward more specific strategy-making through alliance politics in order to create military force efficiently and cooperatively. The implementation of the new military strategies, however, may be hampered by

a number of obstacles, such as lack of manpower and financial or political limitations, as some commentators have pointed out.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is developing into a mature military alliance that participates in joint war planning and also pursues deeper military integration, which is reflected in Japan's new security policy. The fact that Japan is planning to increase defense spending to two percent of GDP shows how important burden-sharing politics remain to allied governments, and the concrete step taken to promote institutional and strategic integration with U.S. military forces also serve as a reminder of how the alliance is refocusing its efforts on developing more potent military capability and strategy. The publications assist to update our general knowledge of alliance politics and international security in two significant ways, notwithstanding the fact that the alliance is probably still in a transitional phase. In order to ensure that alliances support preparing for potential future conflict, they first move the conversation about the function of alliances in U.S. foreign policy to actual strategy-making from issues like scrutiny over the costs and other political ones they impose, and in order to address the particular difficulties of contemporary great power rivalry, the texts outline various strategies to update fundamental ideas such as deterrence, credibility, and military efficiency in the context of alliance politics.

In addition to this, in contrast to the scant attention Tokyo has given to national defense since 1945, Japan has started to embrace military might as a significant aspect of its national policy in the last ten years. The recently revealed security documents that outline enhanced defensive strategies are the result of numerous security changes carried out over the previous ten years, and not a one-time occurrence. The recently released 2022 National Security Strategy for Japan sees China as the "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge" and notes that the strategic environment in Tokyo is at its "most severe and complex since the end of World War II" (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2022). In contrast, the 1976 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) described the international system's structure as stable for the foreseeable future, and as a result they determined that Japan simply needed to maintain a "minimum-necessarily level" force in order to prevent the emergence of a power vacuum in the region (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 1976). The reasons for the radical shifts in Tokyo's national security strategy are shown by these divergent interpretations of the strategic environment around Japan. Japan benefited from a peaceful environment during the Cold War and far into the 21st century as an island state, because of the strategic immunity provided by the huge bodies of water that surround it and U.S. naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. This exceptional circumstance was further strengthened by U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific after World War II, where an alliance with Japan allowed U.S. naval primacy to be a key enabler for power projection while simultaneously exercising restraint by avoiding entanglements in continental Asia

due to the Chinese Civil War. Meanwhile, during most of the Cold War, Chinese naval might was limited at best.

The United States was able to preserve the so-called "command of the commons" in the Western Pacific thanks to its military presence in Japan (Posen, 2003). Tokyo was able to shift its resources and focus away from military dominance and toward economic development during the Cold War by taking advantage of these favorable circumstances and delegating responsibility for security to the United States (Lind, 2004). This advantageous environment, influenced my maritime geography, also encouraged a bilateral-based alliance structure as Tokyo tried to stay out of local Cold War flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. This defensive edge, which helped to keep East Asia's major powers mostly at peace, remained a cornerstone of the region's stability long into the twenty-first century (Twomey, 2000).

However, Japan's long-held strategic immunity is now quickly vanishing. In two different ways, the growing naval imbalance between China and Japan as a result of Beijing's maritime expansion has begun to cast doubt on Tokyo's long-term viability as a sovereign state. Chinese maritime expansion began by explicitly challenging Japan's administrative control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which has significant strategic ramifications for maritime control as well as the future of Taiwan (Patalano, 2014). Japan's survival has deepened heavily on maintaining access to the sea lines of communication because it is a trade nation surrounded by enormous bodies of water. The island state's vulnerability to economic warfare, such as blockades that not only impede trade but also prevent access to resources, is best shown by its experience during World War II (Pape, 1993). Tokyo's most fundamental and distinctive security challenge as an island state has been renewed by Chinese maritime pressure. The deterioration of the strategic immunity that the surrounding oceans formerly offered was one of the most significant changes to the strategic environment, and it forced Japan to undertake security and defense reforms that also allowed for a greater collaboration with the United States.

Some critics contend that Japan's long-standing pacifist policy, particularly the 2015 reinterpretation of the Constitution to permit the use of the right to collective self-defense in certain situations, was abandoned as a result of Tokyo's security reforms throughout the 2010s. Despite being a significant turning point, it is unhelpful to link this change to a modification in Japan's foreign policy's ideology. Realist calculations in response to the strategic environment have determined both the minimalist approach to national defense throughout most of post-war Japan and the more proactive stance on national security over the past decade, as shown by Tokyo's divergent assessment of the surrounding environment between 1976 and 2022 (Kawasaki, 2001). The recently made public documents must

be further unpacked, but they basically show how Japan's security assessment has developed over time.

3.1.1 The National Security Strategy (2022 NSS)

In the field of Japan's own military capabilities, the new National Security Strategy (NSS) includes a number of ground-breaking and extremely ambitious projects. Japan should promptly review its military force in light of the current tense security environment, primarily caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the tension over the Taiwan Strait, and a more confrontational North Korea's nuclear and missile ambitions. The NSS represents a fundamental change in Japan's national security strategy and demonstrates how the Japanese people are beginning to perceive threats more seriously.

However, rather than the "fundamental principles and policies", it will be how the strategy papers' objectives are carried out what will cause the dramatic transformation. In actuality, the fundamental three pillars of national security policy have largely not changed. The NDS makes clear the objectives: (1) "to strengthen Japan's own architecture for national defense"; (2) "to further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance"; and (3) "to reinforce collaboration with the like-minded countries". The military buildup's fundamental design also does not change. In accordance with the NDS, "Japan will fundamentally reinforce the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through further accelerated efforts". As a result, the current deterioration in the security environment has caused an acceleration of the prior course of action, and not a fundamental change in the trajectory of Japan's national security policy. In this view, the drastic change is an evolution with a huge jump rather a revolution.

Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Japanese government already began reviewing its 2013 NSS, although the security condition on the region had deteriorated before that (Hideshi, 2023). This tension was exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which made Japanese people far more security-conscious than before. Geographically speaking, Japan is situated in a special security setting, with three military totalitarian nations – North Korea, China, and Russia – that encircle it. It is unlikely that North Korea will give up its nuclear arsenal, as is clear that it no longer adheres to the commitment for disarmament. It voted against resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine and it is even said to have supplied the Russian Wagner Group with weapons in order to help Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Zolan, 2022). The country continues to launch ballistic missiles, including ICBMs, in defiance of sanctions and UN resolutions. China and Russia are working together, and Japan is under threat from their coordinated maneuvering in the area as China is rapidly expanding its military. Additionally, the China Coast Guard (CCG) is

enhancing its capabilities. The CCG is not a legitimate law enforcement agency, and it also has military objectives. In the South China Sea, they terrorize Southeast Asians, while in the East China Sea, they frequently trespass into Japanese territorial seas near the Senkaku Islands. The three nations are harming the liberal, rule-based international order by attempting to change the status quo by coercion and force.

Furthermore, due to Taiwan's proximity to Japan geographically and to the two countries' close bilateral relations, Japanese worries about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are growing. A month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a poll in Japan found that 77% of respondents were worried about how the attack may affect Taiwan's status (Nikkei, 2022). In another survey taken at almost the same time, 79% of Japanese respondents said they thought the Russian invasion of Ukraine jeopardized their own national security (TV Asahi, 2022). Finally, according to a survey performed by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 88% of Japanese people believed that the security of East Asia was now more in danger (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). This served as the setting for creating the new strategy materials.

The new NSS indicates drastically different threat assessments in contrast to its predecessor, as even though both the 2013 and 2022 NSSs acknowledged changes in the balance of power, and the 2013 NSS saw North Korea as a greater threat than China, in the NSS of 2022 the rankings were flipped, and Russia was not even mentioned in the edition from 2013's threat perception pages.

It is obvious that how people view China has changed. China was only "an issue of concern" in 2013; by 2022, however, it had become "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge" and is also obvious how attitudes against Russia have changed. In 2013, Russia was viewed as a security partner, but as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, which has rocked the very foundations of the international order, Russia is now a major security issue. The way that North Korea is perceived as a danger has also changed noticeably, since now North Korea's military actions "pose an even graver and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever", according to the new NSS. This change was primarily brought on by North Korea's increased missile capabilities and regular firing of missiles in 2022, thus, due to its close ICBM compatibility, it is no longer simply a regional threat but a global one as well.

Global threats like pandemics and climate change also pose a threat to Japan. To address these non-traditional concerns, international collaboration is essential, but it is becoming more challenging due to weak global governance and leadership and heightened rivalry between the great powers. The value of international cooperation has been demonstrated by the success of counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, but it is difficult to generalize the benefits of these operations to other fields and places at this time.

Moreover, the new NSS emphasizes the significance of climate change: “Climate change is a security issue that affects the very existence of humankind. Extreme weather events due to climate change significantly impact Japan’s national security in various ways, including more frequent and severe natural disasters [and] increased responses to disasters.” As a result of this acknowledgement, it views “climate change measures” as one of the strategic means of achieving Japan’s national security goals. Because of Japan’s propensity for natural disasters, the new NSS places a strong emphasis on climate change challenges.

Although it is debated whether climate change should be considered a security issue, it has an impact on both global security and Japan’s national one. At the very last, addressing climate change and adapting to it must be treated as a crucial security problem (Hideshi, 2022). But getting great powers to work together to combat climate change is difficult, since in order to obtain and process the minerals and resources needed for the main renewable energy technologies, competition will increase, and China is well-positioned to contend since it presently holds more than half of the world’s processing capacity for many of these minerals, including polysilicon for solar panels and cobalt, lithium, manganese, and graphite for electric car batteries. Therefore, it can process these minerals more cheaply and they can readily be made into weapons.

Therefore, according to the new NSS, international relations now involve a complex interplay between conflict and collaboration because these several circumstances influenced how Japan developed its security plan.

Generally, each of the three following components makes up a strategy. You should first evaluate your current situation, then select where you should go, and then, plan your route. The NSS’s stated goals – national sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, citizen safety, prosperity, a free and open international order, etc. – remain largely unchanged. In any international setting, it is still worthwhile to pursue these general national interests. However, the world of today is very different. Japan now has more tools at its disposal, such as the ability to change the way its constitution is interpreted in order to recognize the right to collective self-defense, and it may develop a new route to the same target by sharpening its tools and better combining them. In comparison to earlier paths, Japan’s is a completely different one. This is the main idea behind the 2013 NSS revision.

The new NSS contains a number of noteworthy changes, however they are not all fundamental ones. They signify the development of policy. Although Japan’s defense budget is rising fast, it would be inaccurate to state that the 2022 NSS eliminated the famous ceiling of 1% of GDP for defense spending. It had been eliminated in 1987 because the needs for defense should not be determined by an economic indicator.

Although not new, the reformed NSS adopts a whole-government strategy. The 2013 NSS likewise used that to accomplish its goals in terms of national security. Due to the fact that counterstrike is essentially a new application of earlier capabilities, it is not even necessary a new one.

Japan's national security strategy was built on three pillars after the Cold War, being its own defense initiatives, alliance collaboration with the U.S., and global security cooperation. The foundation of Japanese national security and defense strategy continues to be these three pillars. Just recently, each pillar grew larger and more durable, as the first pillar is stronger due to the increased defense expenditure. Japan needs to urgently increase its military capability as military pressure on it has risen in recent years, and the new NSS gives priority to the military endeavor because of this. Today's challenge to Japan, however, are not merely military but also highly complex, for instance, in the face of numerous threats, it is necessary to step up efforts to support supply chain resilience, prevent the weaponization of natural resources, energy sources, and food, safeguard critical infrastructure from outside interference, and safeguard sensitive technologies and data. Although they are now classified in the new NSS as economic security measures, these sectors are not actually entirely new.

3.1.2 The National Defense Strategy (2022 NDS)

The core of Japan's national security lies in the Government of Japan's duty to courageously defend to the bitter end the lives of Japanese citizens and their right to an unhindered way of life, as well as Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace (National Defense Strategy, 2022).

Japan has maintained peace and security for 77 years since the end of World War II by strengthening its diplomatic strength and defense capability, and expanding and deepening cooperation with other nations, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the key pillar. This has been done, in addition to the Cold War, also for the dramatic changes in the security environment that followed its ending. By doing so, Japan has secured civilian control of the military and adhered to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles while sticking to the Constitution's fundamental tenets of maintaining a solely defense-oriented policy and refraining from becoming into a military force that poses risks to other nations. Under these fundamental tenets, Japan will never veer from its path as a nation that values peace.

As demonstrated by Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the world community is facing significant difficulties and has erupted into a new crisis, with Japan being its member. China keeps making unilateral alterations to the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea by using force, while North Korea intensifies its operations while continuing to further miniaturize its nuclear arsenal and launching ballistic missiles at an unprecedented rate. While its military endeavors in the Far East have been escalating, Russia has started an aggression against Ukraine. Given the aforementioned, it is possible that significant events could occur in the future East Asia and the Indo-Pacific area that

could shake the foundation of the peaceful post-war international order. Given that Japan is at the forefront of these trends, it is not overstated to claim that the future direction of Japan's security and military strategy will directly affect regional and global peace and stability.

Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has started an aggression against Ukraine, and this shows us that Japan can maintain its own sovereignty and independence through independent and voluntary efforts, and that it is crucial to increase the role Japan can play to prevent inviting foreign aggression. No nation can currently maintain its security on its own in the current environment, as it is crucial for Japan to strengthen cooperation and coordination with its ally and like-minded nations with whom it shares universal values and strategic interests while challenges to the post-war international order continue.

Japan must confront the harsh reality and fundamentally strengthen its defense capabilities and new forms of warfare in order to protect the lives, especially the peaceful way of life of its citizens, in the most challenging and complex security environment since the end of World War II. In order to better integrate its numerous sources of national power, Japan must also strengthen its national defense infrastructure. Japan should promote these two lines of work together as a cohesive whole, thinking strategically. This initiative paves the ground for strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and Japan's deterrence capabilities going forward and serves as the cornerstone of security cooperation with other like-minded nations.

Japan and the U.S. should therefore coordinate their respective strategies and advance defense cooperation in a coordinated manner. Based on this acknowledgment, the Government therefore adopts the National Defense Strategy (referred to as the "NDS"), which fully outlines the defense goals of Japan as well as the strategies and tactics used to achieve these goals. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which were developed six times since 1976 and served as Japan's fundamental guidelines for the development, maintenance, and operation of defense capability with the Self-Defense Forces as its core, are replaced by the NDS.

The government's decisions regarding the necessary defense capabilities' reinforcement and its supportive levels of defense buildup made through the NDS and "Defense Buildup Program" (DBP), mark a significant turning point in post-wat defense policy. The Government will work to increase the Japanese public's knowledge of the significance of this important turning moment by developing this Strategy, which offers mid-to-long-term directives and a breakdown of the strengthening of military capabilities.

The most important factor in ensuring Japan's security is defense capabilities, as threats won't be able to reach Japan because of it, and if they do, they will be disrupted and annihilated, providing Japan's commitment and capacity to defend itself to the bitter end.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has constantly vowed to strengthen its defense capabilities in a conservative and effective manner. Particularly since the creation of the NDPG in 1976 (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976), the goal of Japan having its own defense capability has been presented as preventing Japan from becoming a power vacuum and, as a result, a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan, rather than to counter specific threats. The SDF's tasks and missions have grown since the end of the Cold War to include a wider range of scenarios, such as large-scale international and domestic catastrophe responses and activities for international peace cooperation. According to the 2010 National Defense Policy Guide, the growth of defense capabilities will no longer be based on the "Basic Defense Force Concept", which prioritized the deterrent effect of having defensive capabilities in place, while the following 2013 NDPG, advocated for a direct confrontation with the reality of an increasingly dangerous security environment and the development of a defense capability that was actually effective. The security of Japan and the region is at risk as a result of the neighboring nations' sharply increased military power, rapid expansion and escalation of missile launches, and coercive military operations.

It is very challenging to foresee when and how intentions will shift and unilateral changes to the status quo by force will take place when these activities intensify. Russia's aggression against Ukraine makes it abundantly clear that imposing a unilateral change to the status quo through force results in significant material and human loss, as well as disruptions to the economy, the energy sector, and maritime and air traffic that have a significant impact on people's daily lives both locally and globally. In light of this situation, Japan must unequivocally state its intention that it will never accept unilateral attempts to change the status quo through force, but to do this, it must substantially strengthen its defense capabilities, with an emphasis on its adversaries' capabilities and methods of waging war, and actively adapt to new modes of conflict. Japan needs strong cooperation and collaboration with its ally because it cannot do this work alone. In order to ensure that all efforts are done in an integrated manner, this strategy aims to clearly identify Japan's defense objectives and propose approaches and precise measures to attain those objectives.

The goals of Japanese defense are as follows:

The first goal is to create a security environment that forbids unilateral use of force to change the status quo;

The second goal is to prevent such attempts that endanger peace and security of Japan by working in cooperation with their ally and other like-minded nations. If such a scenario arises, the goal is to act quickly and, in any way, necessary to bring the situation under control as soon as possible to prevent an invasion of Japan;

If deterrence fails and Japan is invaded, the third goal is to swiftly respond to the invasion in a seamless and tailored manner; to assure primary responsibility for dealing with the aggression; and, with assistance from the ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion.

U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrent at its center, is crucial in addressing the nuclear weapons threat. Through a combination of its own efforts to accomplish the first, second, and third defense objectives, extended deterrence, and other measures given by the United States, Japan will defend itself to the very end in every circumstance.

3.1.3 The Defense Buildup Program (DBP)

As anticipated, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its "Multi Domain Defense Force", through the synergy of organically integrated capabilities including space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, according to the National Defense Strategy. This force is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases, from peacetime to armed contingencies, focusing on the capabilities of their opponents and new ways of warfare (Defense Buildup Program, 2022). By five years from now, or FY 2027, the "Transportation Improvement Program", Japan will have improved its defense capabilities to the point where it can handle assaults against its country on its own, disrupt and eliminate such threats while winning the backing of its allies and others, and it will also make additional efforts in about 10 years to better achieve this defense goal and strengthen its defense capabilities to the point where it will be possible to thwart and defeat invasions against its country much earlier and at a longer distance.

Based on the aforementioned guiding principles, the Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (MOD/SDF), will construct, maintain, and run defense capabilities in an effective and efficient manner using the following program guidelines.

First and foremost, Japan needs to prevent invasion from happening in the first place, thus, it must have the ability to thwart and defeat invading armies over great distances, and consequently to improve its "integrated air and missile defense capabilities" and "stand-off defense capabilities".

Second, should deterrence fail, and Japan be invaded, in addition to these capabilities, it would need to assure also asymmetric advantage by utilizing manned as well as unmanned assets and gaining an advantage across domains including subsurface, surface, and air. To achieve such objective, Japan will reinforce "cross-domain operation capabilities", "unmanned defense capabilities", and "command and control/intelligence related functions". Finally, in order to make the enemy abandon its invasion, Japan would also need to act quickly and persistently, and for doing so, Japan will strengthen "capabilities for mobile deployment/civil protection" and "sustainability and resiliency". Japan will also place a focus on areas like the human resource basis that supports our defense

capability as well as the defense manufacturing and technology base, which is described as being a virtually vital aspect of a defense capability.

When purchasing equipment, MOD/SDF will effectively secure the required and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capability by correctly balancing the introduction of new, high-performance equipment with life extension and upgrading of current equipment. In order to improve cost-effectiveness, particularly throughout its research and development activities, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout the equipment life cycle, and gradually accelerate the deployment of defense equipment, which is urgent and important from a policy standpoint since it could have a direct impact on the SDF's present and future modes of combat by merging cutting-edge civilian technologies.

Moreover, the MOD/SDF will vigorously support numerous measures to strengthen the human resource base due to Japan's aging population, declining birth rate, and lack of prospects for an increase in recruits. These measures include stepping up recruitment efforts, utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel and others, encouraging women's participation, raising the retirement age for uniformed SDF personnel, and using diverse and distinguished personnel, including retired uniformed SDF personnel.

In relation to cross-domain operations, Japan will encourage collaboration in order to further strengthen the joint deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated way, including those in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. Additionally, Japan will step up efforts in the areas of information security and cybersecurity as well as equipment and technology cooperation to encourage information sharing between Japan and the United States through strengthening the infrastructure that will support effective joint response capabilities in all phases. Additionally, steps will be gradually taken to facilitate the stationing of American forces in Japan, for example, it will continue to support the establishment of policy frameworks like the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), General Security of (Military) Information Agreement (GSOMIA/GSOIA), and Transfer of the Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement while also promoting defense cooperation and exchange. This is in line with the vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which is to strategically promote multifaceted and multi-layered security operations.

Finally, Japan will significantly strengthen SDF's organizational structure, authorize strength, and equipment while adhering to the "scrap and build" strategy. Additionally, Japan will continue its efforts to improve procurement efficiency, which have already resulted in significant cost savings. Japan will vigorously pursue automatic, labor-saving measures, and optimization in order to take into account the country's aging population and dropping birth-rate.

3.2 New Approaches for National Security Maintenance

In the 2022 NSS, four principal measures are proposed to safeguard Japan's sovereignty, territory, and citizen's safety within the heightened security situation: (1) pro-active diplomatic initiatives to promote universal values (freedom, democracy, basic human rights, rule of law, and market economy); (2) bolstering Japan's defense posture and systems; (3) strengthening defense cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. alliance and deepening security cooperation with ally countries; and (4) ensuring Japan's security through a comprehensive strategy that ensures the availability of resources, food, and energy.

The 2022 NSS proposes to reach a proactive diplomacy promoting a free and open international order based on the rule of law through strengthening the engagement of like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific, including nations in Central and Eastern Europe like the Czech Republic, and the establishment of multilayered networks.

In order to accomplish that goal, Tokyo will increase military cooperation based on the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which permits aligned partners to share sensitive military information, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which permits mutual exchange of ammunition and rations during training, and the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which streamlines various procedures to visit each other for mutual benefit. Additional crucial steps to deepen the alignment include joint defense equipment development, capacity-building assistance, strategic communications, and other operations with its allies.

Tokyo also hopes, by reviving commercial and personnel exchange between Japan and China in a way that boosts Japan's economic security, to urge China to adopt a responsible and constructive role befitting of its international influence. This approach also involves establishing a "Japan-China security dialogue" and a hotline, by the spring of 2023, between defense officials that will be operational, as was essentially agreed upon at the Kishida-Xi summit in November 2022. It is crucial to understand that this is not merely a "military buildup" disguised as a response to the China threat idea.

3.2.1 The Creation of a Favorable International Environment for Japan

As the international community faces an era-defining changes and challenges, Japan must progress diplomacy to realize its own aims while collaborating with other nations and areas.

As already stressed in the previous chapters, since the end of World War II, Japan has persistently walked the path of a peace-loving country, promoting stability and peace throughout the Asia-Pacific and the global world, and it has addressed global issues, including the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), by leading international rulemaking and supporting building capacity in

developing countries. This is in addition to providing developing cooperation based on the principle of human security. Additionally, Japan has supported international efforts to promote nonproliferation, disarmament, and peace and its diplomacy today is supported by the "trust" that it has gained from the rest of the world as a result of these actions. The international community has worked long and hard to establish the international order, but current Russian aggression against Ukraine threatens its basic foundation. Japan and the world could experience the worst crisis of the post-war era, depending on how events play out, but this and other forcible, unilateral modifications to the status quo must not be accepted anywhere. The future direction of the international order will be dictated by the deeds and the decisions of the international community, including Japan.

Russia's assault against Ukraine in February 2022 challenges the core values of the international community that unilateral modification of the status quo through force is inadmissible. Japan will band together with the G7 and the world community to call on Russia to withdraw its soldiers and stop all conduct that are illegal under international law, and also, by enacting penalties in conjunction with other Nations, Japan will demonstrate that Russia's string of acts has a significant cost. The Northern Territories problem is the main source of tension between Japan and Russia. Even after more than 75 years since the end of World War II, it has not yet been resolved. Japan's stance on the Northern Territories issue and its commitment to heed the requests of the elderly former residents of the islands remain unchanged. But given Russia's aggressiveness against Ukraine, it is not the right time for Japan to discuss the likelihood of peace treaty discussions. Japan strongly urges Russia to respect international law, quickly withdraw its forces, and take the international community's censure seriously.

The Kishida Cabinet's Basic Policy states that Japan will promote diplomacy and security with the following commitments on the basis of this "trust": the commitment to fully defend universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; the commitment to fully defend Japan's territory, territorial waters, and airspace; the commitment to contribute to humanity and lead the international community by addressing global issues; and the commitment to fully defend Japan's territory, territorial waters, and airspace (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2022). Through this, Japan will expand the scope of its diplomacy while maintaining a stable and balanced stance and a high level of responsiveness in the face of the world's increasingly serious and complicated circumstances, and it will step up efforts by the international community to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force and deepen its support with allies who uphold universal values.

The foundation of Japanese diplomacy and security relies on the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is crucial in maintaining peace and prosperity on a regional and global scale. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is more crucial than ever as the security environment surrounding Japan becomes more severe and unclear.

Japan and the U.S. continued to regularly coordinate policies at a high level from the start of the Biden administration in January 2021 until the end of February 2022, holding eight summit meetings (including three phone calls and one teleconference meeting), 15 meetings of foreign ministers (including nine phone calls), and two "2+2" meetings (including online meetings). Japan and the United States are more connected than ever. In addition to bolstering the Japan-U.S. Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will work closely with the U.S. on issues like COVID-19 and climate change while also realizing a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" and responding to COVID-19.

In light of this, Japan and the U.S. will continue to closely coordinate with regard to the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko, in order to minimize the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces in Japan. In addition, Japan's own military capabilities must be significantly strengthened in order to adapt to the challenging security situation that the country is in, so it is crucial to update the Medium-Term Defense Program, National Defense Program Guidelines, and National Security Strategy.

However, as the U.S. and China's ties move into a more competitive phase, both must manage the policy balance of conflict, rivalry, and cooperation, since a poor combination of these policy components for the U.S. might potentially speed the U.S.'s fall, allowing China to quickly seize control of the Asia-Pacific and putting the region's allies in danger of being coerced by China's military and economic might. A comprehensive reevaluation of trilateral cooperation is required due to the nature of the challenge posed by China, the economic interdependence in the area, and severe concerns about U.S. leadership. The two most significant U.S allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, must be treated fairly for U.S. policy in the region to be effective. Although alliances are one of the most valuable advantages the U.S. has over China, South Korea and Japan are especially significant because of the shared values, dynamic economies, expanding military capabilities, influence the region, and geostrategic location. However, the U.S. can only benefit from these friends' inherent advantages if it reaffirms its commitment to the area and to fostering and maintaining these long-standing alliances, as the cooperation between the U.S, Japan and South Korea to deliver prosperity to the Asia-Pacific region is, in fact, the great tale of the past fifty years. They promoted human rights and free trade in the area, enjoyed economic prosperity together, and contributed to the forty-year peace in Asia. But despite this, three new phenomena are currently requiring a reevaluation of the fundamental tenets of these alliances and their function in the Asia-Pacific region (Ichiro et al., 2021). First, a discussion on the role the U.S. ought to play globally is being forced by the surge in the number of Americans who support restraint in American foreign policy. Second, since regional

leaders have long been concerned about the worsening political polarization within the U.S. public and government and its impact on U.S. foreign policy, the policies of former U.S. President Donald Trump's administration exacerbated long-standing concerns about American credibility and commitment to the region in Japan and South Korea. Third, Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, are raising concerns over China's rise and increasing aggressiveness in the region and globally. Japan is more willing to challenge China in important areas of interest because it is less economically dependent on China, while instead South Korea's economy is heavily dependent on the latter, making it more open to Chinese economic pressure.

In this concern, it has been predicted that the historic summit at Camp David between the leaders of the U.S, Japan, and the Republic of Korea on August 18, 2023, will usher in a new age of trilateral cooperation between the three allies (Cha et al., 2023). Modeled after the G7 and NATO leaders' summits, a Joint Statement and a Statement of Principles pledged a regular schedule of trilateral annual meetings between leaders. Annual trilateral discussions will also be held involving the national security advisers, foreign ministers, and other cabinet-level officials, where Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo will work together on a variety of areas, including an annual series of trilateral military drills under a specific name, contingency planning, missile defense, economic security, supply chains, new technologies, development assistance, and debunking misinformation. Therefore, according to reports, the trilateral statement will discuss not just security coordination but also economic and development cooperation as well as people-to-people interactions that will bind the three nations more closely than any other cooperative arrangement that already exists in Asia. It would be intended as a booster shot for the two seven-decade-old bilateral alliances that are facing strong headwinds in the face of potential Chinese economic coercion and China's political aspiration of regional centrality (Snyder, 2013). Bureaucratic energy and government budgets would be redirected toward institutionalizing trilateral coordination.

In addition to being the center of global vitality and home to more than half of the world's population, the Indo-Pacific area has also witnessed complex country power dynamics and significant changes in the balance of power within the region. By constructing a free and open system founded on the rule of law, it is imperative to ensure peace and prosperity throughout the entire area and beyond. In light of this, Japan has been actively supporting initiatives to establish FOIP based on the rule of law in collaboration with other like-minded nations. The United States, Australia, India, ASEAN, the EU, and European nations have all recently shown support for this idea, and different consultations and cooperative efforts are currently underway. As we go into the post-COVID-19 age, this vision's significance and value are only growing. In order to further advance efforts toward the

realization of the vision, Japan will take advantage of possibilities for different bilateral and multilateral talks, including the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) dialogue.

It is essential for Japan to establish solid ties with its neighbors to ensure its security and development.

Japan and China are neighbors, there are a number of topics that are of significance to both nations, thus any unilateral efforts to alter the current situation in the East China Sea, particularly the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, are wholly unacceptable, and Japan will continue to handle the matter with restraint and resolve. The stability and prosperity of the region, as well as the global community, depended on Japan-China ties, which are crucial for the two nations as well as for the region as a whole. In addition to cooperating on issues of mutual interest, Japan will adamantly maintain and enforce its position and demand that China take appropriate measures, since it is crucial that both China and Japan work to establish these positive and long-lasting ties.

At last, regarding relations between Japan and North Korea, the Japanese government has been working to normalize those ties by conclusively resolving pressing problems, such as the kidnappings, the nuclear missile crisis, and the unresolved past in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration between Japan and DPRK. Japan will continue to work with the U.S., the ROK, and the international community to fully execute pertinent UNSC resolutions and pursue North Korea's complete denuclearization, and the sovereignty of Japan, as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals, are at stake in North Korea abductions. At the same time, these violations of fundamental human rights are a global concern for the international community. Japan has prioritized the resolution of the abductions issues and would continue to use all reasonable efforts to ensure the prompt return of all abductees while collaborating closely with relevant nations, including the U.S.

3.2.2 The Achievement of "Counterstrike Capability"

Since World War II, Japan had long before made the decision to forgo having long-range strike capabilities that could be used against enemy bases. The New National Defense Strategy, which included a promise to acquiring a so-called counterstrike capability, forced the Japanese government to shift direction in December 2022 (Hirao and Sasaki, 2023). However, Tokyo needs to go beyond what the NDS suggests if it wants this new approach to deterrence and changing the country's defensive position as the "shield" in its alliance with the United States. The NDS claims that by having the ability to counterattack, "Japan will deter armed attack itself", but is not assured as things currently stand.

The present deterrence strategy adopted by Japan combines "deterrence by denial" and "deterrence by punishment" in the right proportions to counter a variety of threats. As seen by the recent

placement of new SDF units in Japan's southwestern islands to thwart the increasingly frequent intrusions by Chinese ships, police and the Self-Defense Forces can be mobilized to respond to threats in the low intensity "grey zone". Japan would defend itself from a ground invasion if the situation reached the "red zone" by fully mobilizing the SDF and employing missile defenses to shoot down a constrained number of long-range missiles. To manage nuclear threats in the "black-white zone", Japan relies on U.S. extended deterrence.

The degradation of East Asian regional security, however, poses a challenge to the effectiveness of Japan's deterrence in the "red zone", since China's and North Korea's missiles are becoming more numerous and advanced, and they could get past Japan's missile defense system. It should be able to stop a "cheap shot" from the enemy, such as a few missile attacks meant to scare the people and end a war on the terms of the foe, even though its goal is not to defend against hundreds of missiles. By striking the enemy's missile launchers and command-and-control systems, Japan's new counterstrike capabilities would help deterrence by lowering the number of missiles coming from the continent and making it easier for missile defenses to intercept them. These counterstrike capabilities, however, remain primarily defensive because the NDS reiterates that attacks against enemy missile bases are only legal following a first assault against Japan, and targets must also be military-related. U.S. strategic troops are to be entrusted with carrying out attacks against the enemy's towns or populace, often known as counter-value strikes.

More comprehensive counterstrike capabilities, missile defense, and civil protection would need to be improved if Japan wanted its new counterstrike capabilities to go further and contribute to deterrence by denial at the point where the enemy threatens nuclear strikes. Improvements to the SDF's Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile, the creation of high-speed glide missiles for island defense, and the acquisition of U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles with the "stand-off" capability to engage an opponent at a larger range are all planned to increase counterstrike capabilities. However, it is unclear if the Tomahawk is still quick enough and maneuverable enough to get past the most recent missile defense systems. The missiles might not even succeed in destroying their target once they get there, for instance, after U.S. forces attacked a Syrian airport in 2017, the airstrip was quickly repaired and resulting from this, Japan cannot be certain that its Tomahawk capability will be sufficient to eliminate the enemy's fixed missile launch locations, subterranean command centers, or other military facilities. It would be difficult to increase the Tomahawk's and the other missiles' destructive power.

However, if Japan were to have cruise missiles that could pose a direct threat to mainland China, Beijing would be compelled to bolster its air defenses, which would complicate its strategic calculations.

It is useful, in order to discuss Japan's own missile defense system, to underline how the NDS outlines plans to upgrade surface-to-air guided missiles, warning and control radars, and ships with Aegis combat systems but Tokyo must do more, such as strengthen the resilience of its essential infrastructure and bases to withstand the impact of an enemy missile. The NDS does not have any specific plans for protecting airstrips and ports from attacks of for fast bringing any that have been damaged back online. Additionally, Japan's current missile defense system can only prevent strikes from ballistic missiles, so it has to develop the ability to stop other kinds of missiles as well, such cruise missiles. To counter them, Japan must also build medium-and-short-range surface-to-air-missiles and prepare airborne countermeasures.

Last but not least, Tokyo's public protection strategy must go beyond what the NDS suggests, since its present objectives include strengthening civil protection training, developing evacuation plans for use by ships and aircraft, and enhancing the country's early warning system. However, this is modest in comparison to U.S. civil protection policies during the Cold War. Although the strategy states that "Japan will facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents, when an invasion of Japan is predicted", it would be very challenging for the SDF to conduct combat and evacuation operations at the same time if a residential area turned into a battlefield. A function in public protection could, admittedly, turn out to have two sides. Finding the correct balance is difficult because while military troops get more prepared the more evacuation training, they receive, they also become more worried.

In light of this, the Japanese government should still take additional action, particularly to prepare for an evacuation in the case of a blockade of Japan's southwest. People in the area can go on living even if supplies are interrupted by strengthening the procedure of hoarding food and medicine.

Resulting from this, it is accurate enough to claim that Japan has chosen to have a basic form of counterattack capability.

Although minimally plausible counter-strike capabilities to thwart opponents' conventional warhead missile launch sequences have been allowed, pre-emptive first strikes have been debated among the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 2020 (Yoichiro, 2023). More than ten different types of missiles are part of Japan's development, upgrade, and procurement plans. The United States' Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are launched from ships, will probably be the most recent acquisition of intermediate-range ground assault weapons. Among other new domestic innovations, the upgraded Type-12 ground-to-surface and ASM-3- air-to-surface missiles will improve Japan's anti-ship defense around the Okinawan chain of islands.

Japan's investment in counter-strike weapons aims to discourage China from conquering Taiwan as well as increase deterrence against foreign attacks on its territories. The second scenario would have

significant effects on Southeast Asia. South Asian countries have not reacted strongly to Japan's muscularity. Instead, the lack of coherence among ASEAN's members to maintain the group's centrality in face of Japan's transformation into a normal power appears to be the main source of concern. This is not surprising given how well Southeast Asia has reacted to Japan's increased involvement in regional security in recent years. Japan is seen to be the most trustworthy major power in the region according to the 2023 State of Southeast Asia survey. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian nations might need to pay closer attention to scenarios that could arise sooner and necessitate a more powerful Japan. Japan's investment in counter-strike weapons aims to discourage China from conquering Taiwan as well as increase deterrence against foreign attacks on its territories, having significant effects on Southeast Asia. The publication of Japan's new defense plan comes as Sino-American tensions over the Taiwan Strait are increasing. Even while Prime Minister Kishida continues to be ambiguous regarding Japan's position toward Taiwan, other significant Liberal Democratic Party figures are increasingly acknowledging and discussing the necessity of Japanese engagement in a Taiwan contingency. Japan has the right to retaliate with "use of force to the minimum extent necessary" in the event that China launches an attack against SDF or American bases in Japan.

Southeast Asia would be severely impacted if a battle between the U.S. and China over Taiwan erupted, as certain ASEAN members would be drawn into it. Southeast Asia countries should think about their future defense and security interactions with Japan in this perspective.

3.2.3 Enhancing Integrated Operational Capabilities and Ensuring Economic Security

The response to threats employing also new and different domains such as cyber, space, maritime, and electromagnetic spectrums in a combined manner, in addition to the traditional ones including land, sea and air domains, is necessarily achieved by collecting information on all of them, analyzing and coordinating the information, and then operate in an integrated manner. This is in contrast to collecting data for operations run separately by the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, but in this regard, it was agreed to establish a joint command of SDFs by FY2027 and to conduct joint missile defense operations using Maritime SDF (SM-3 Block IA/IB, IIA) assets for the top layer and Ground/Air SDF (Patriot PAC-3) assets for the bottom layer (Takashi, 2023).

In addition, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is reportedly thinking about transferring the integrated operational control authority of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) from the Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii (USINDOPACOM) to the USFJ headquarters at Yokota Air Base in Japan. This is due to the fact that coordinated and integrated actions between the SDF and the USFJ are essential for making timely decisions. Due to a constitutional interpretation that limits integration with the use of force by

other countries, Japan finds it challenging to integrate operational commands such to the one that exists between the U.S. and South Korea because it is anticipated that an upgraded Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan and a strengthen Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) will be used in place of full “integration”.

Furthermore, including 4,000 specialized personnel (currently 890), it was decided to increase the total number of SDF personnel to engage in cyber warfare to 20,000 by 2027, and to introduce a “active cyber defense posture”. Japan officially joined the activities of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallin in November 2022, and it took the first decision ever to construct a satellite for Space Domain Awareness (SDA) in response to threats in the space domain. The Air Self-Defense Force will be given a new name that will contain the word “space”, in order to better reflect the growing significance of security in that area. The possibility of invoking Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was discussed by “Japan-U.S. 2+2” security talks, which specifies U.S. defense commitments, because an attack in space clearly poses a threat to the security of the alliance. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) will be under control of the Minister of Defense in the event of an emergency, according to Article 80 of the Self Defense Forces Law, so it was decided to upgrade its resources and strengthen cooperation with the SDFs in response to rising maritime hybrid threats. In addition, it was determined to increase ammunition and spare component stocks in light of the lessons acquired from the Ukrainian War and it was specifically selected to build a new ammunition store in Okinawa since the Kyushu Logistics store in Saga Prefecture, which is 1,000 km away from the Nansei Islands (including the Senkaku Islands near Taiwan), is now the ammunition station that is closest to the islands. Additionally, to improve survivability, the 15th Brigade’s Naha City, Okinawa, headquarters will be relocated underground. Additionally, improved transportation capabilities are intended to speed up the presently one-month-long deployment of Ground SDF units from eight places across Japan to the Nansei region and to make it easier to evacuate civilians from the Nansei Islands. As a result, plans are being made for a Taiwan contingency.

In addition to this, it is important to notice that a new idea for the strategic use of official development assistance (ODA) and the creation of new government financial support for military aid are both laid out in the 2022 NSS. A new financial aid framework for each country’s military will be formed in addition to the existing ODA funding for enhancing connectivity through education and high-quality infrastructure, capacity-building to safeguard maritime security, the rule of law, economic security etc. The construction of military infrastructures as well as the provision of tools and supplies for each nation’s armed forces are both covered under this aid program. This represents a significant departure from ODA’s earlier tenets, which restricted its usage to nonmilitary ones only.

The Kishida administration, which views the transfer of defense equipment with its allies as a “important policy tool”, also proposed in the three documents to evaluate the operating rules for the three-defense equipment transfer principles developed by the Abe administration in 2014. The idea is to uphold the three tenets while allowing Japan to deliver equipment to nations that have been forcibly occupied, but Tokyo also made the decision to help the Japanese defense-related sectors by setting up a fund of 40 billion yen ($306 million USD) for public-private partnerships to transfer defense equipment to like-minded nations, together with the decision to finance the research and development of a high-powered railgun program as well as ten other standoff weapon types.

Moreover, the Kishida administration has so far placed more emphasis on economic security than military security, because Japan’s ability to actively participate in rulemaking as an economic power is constrained by the terms of the postwar Peace Constitution and other self-imposed restrictions. As a result, in May 2022 Tokyo passed the “Economic Security Promotion Act”, which combines several pieces of legislation into a single bill: the stabilization of the supply of some essential products; the bolstering of the protection of essential infrastructure; the promotion and protection of the development of essential advanced technologies; and the protection of information through measures to preserve patent information.

In order to resist the threats and intimidation of authoritarian states, Yasutoshi Nishimura, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, declared at CSIS in January 2023 that Tokyo would cooperate with the U.S. and other nations to advance economic security and deterrence. He emphasized that China is endangering the military superiority of the United States by developing Al and other advanced weaponry using high-performance Logic ICs and advanced Graphics Processing Units (GPU) developed in the West. He also declared Tokyo’s determination to work with the United States and its allies to assist the development of “dual use of technologies” for the advancement of cyber, space, and Al. To combat China’s “Military-Civil Fusion”, or MCF policy, cooperation is essential.

3.3 A Dramatic Shift in the Perception of Threats

About ten years ago, Japan was much more aware of the security threats posed by China than most of the rest of the Western world. Indeed, since Japan’s initial national Security Strategy was created about a decade ago, in 2013, a lot has changed in the international security landscape that Japan was trying to investigate. As a result, Japan used cautious language, focusing on worries about China’s military activities and “lack of transparency in its military affairs and security policy”, and caveated with statements about the significance of stable and beneficial relations based on shared strategic interests “in all areas”, including economics, people-to-people exchanges, and human rights (Galic, 2022).

China's posture is included in the new NSS section on China, which is significantly longer and more blunt, and it is assessed as "unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation with [the United States], like-minded nations".
The emphasis on stability and engagement has also increased, but there is a clear distinction between a more open approach to security, centered on a more cautious approach on economics and people-to-people exchanges as well as global problems, and on improving communication "to nurture a relationship of trust" and "establishment of a framework for avoiding and preventing the occurrence of unforeseen situations with China".
The statement on Russia is also noteworthy because it represents such a significant change. Japan called for "cooperation with Russia in all areas", including engagement for resolutions on dispute islands in Japan's north, in 2013, seeing Russia as a potential asset for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Russia is now viewed by Japan as a potentially harmful spoiler whose "aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order", and in addition to being the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region, Russia's interactions with China and its actions near Japan are of strong security concern.
As well, according to the expanded language on the threat that Pyongyang poses, North Korea's military activities "pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before". This is because of Pyongyang's quick development of missile-related technology. Taiwan is now referred to as a precious friend of Japan, in addition of an important partner, with whom Japan has close economic and personal ties and shares many of its values including democracy, while Japan's stance on Taiwan is still the same.

In comparison to the 2013 National Security Strategy, the actual threat perceptions of the 2022 National Security Strategy have experienced substantial modifications. As an illustration, whereas the number of times North Korea is referenced in the 2013 and 2022 NNS has remained constant at 15, China's and Russia's mentions have climbed respectively from 14 to 21, and from 1 to 15. North Korea has long posed a concern to the region due to its active development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, which include long-range missiles, and China's military buildup and efforts to unilaterally alter the status quo in all areas, including through economic coercion, are currently causing significant alarm. The new perceptions also mark a significant change from the Abe administration's accommodative policy toward Russia, which was intended to help resolve disputes for territories between Japan and Russia over the Kuril Islands, to the Kishida administration's tough stance on Russia following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

A stronger description of China as "a serious source of concern for Japan and the international community, and the greatest strategic challenge it has ever posed" (NSS, 2022, p.9) has taken the place of the previous statement that it is "a source of concern for the international community, including Japan" (NSS, 2013, p.11). On the other side, the New Komeito (NKP), the ruling coalition party which wants to keep good relations with China, objected to the LDP's initial insistence for a particular statement of "threat", and it was not included in the 2022 NSS. The statement was shortened to "launching missiles into Japan's EEZ was perceived as a threat by local residents" (NDS, 2022, p.4).

The description "North Korea's missile development, miniaturization of nuclear warheads, and attempts to mount them on missiles pose a threat to the security of the region, including Japan" (NSS, 2013, p. 11) has been changed to "North Korea's rapid development of missile-related technologies poses an even more serious and imminent threat to our nation's security than before" (NSS, 2022, p.10).

Additionally, the conciliatory description of Russia has changed from "promoting cooperation with Russia in all areas is extremely important for ensuring our country's security" (NSS, 2013, p. 22), to "Russian aggression against Ukraine is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and is an act that shakes the very foundations of the international order. Russia's external actions and military trends, coupled with its strategic alignment with China, are strong security concerns" (NSS, 2022, p.10).

Key members of the Biden administration responded to the three documents with words of high admiration and approval, calling them "a historic step forward" (Jack Sullivan, the president's national security advisor) and "momentous" (Rahm Emanuel, the U.S. ambassador to Japan) respectively. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, vehemently rejects what is regarded as slander against the country and describes it as "an attempt to create an excuse for [Japan's] own military buildup and expansion by exaggerating the Chinese threat". The North Korean Foreign Ministry also criticized Japan for implementing a new defense strategy that permits Japan to launch preemptive strikes against other nations, claiming that this has triggered a large conflict in the Korean peninsula, as well as in East Asia. The North Korean Foreign Ministry also argued that North Korea has the right to take firm decisive action to defend its fundamental rights. The three documents were also attacked by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which stated, "Russia responds to Japan's abandonment of the postwar pacifism". However, it should be noted that Japan is the only nation in Northeast Asia without a variety of ballistic and cruise missile system.

On the other hand, the South Korean Foreign Ministry requested that the reference of the Takeshima Islands – known as Dokdo in Korean notation – as Japan's inherent territory in the 2022 NSS be removed without mentioning the "counterstrike capability".

Possibly in response to pressure from the Biden administration, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol said, "Tokyo cannot allow North Korean missiles to fly over Japan". He also indicated that his stance on Japan was more moderate than that of the previous Moon Jae-in administration. Additionally, Seoul unveiled its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

3.4 How Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Changed Japan's Approach to National Security

On February 24, 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine took place precisely as Japan was starting to draft the "Three National Security Documents". As a result, the conflict had a significant impact on the policymakers in Tokyo who worked on the creation of the NSS, NDC, and DBP. To put it simply, Japan received a painful wake-up call from Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Tatsumi, 2023).

For starters, Russia's attempt to invade Ukraine showed the limited ability of international law to allow for collective action in reaction to such a situation, being the first instance in postwar history that war against a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was conducted by a permanent one. This served as both a timely reminder of the value of global standards and values like the rule of law and an impetus for Japan to step up its support for UN reform, especially the reform of the UNSC.

More importantly, the world community came together to assist Ukraine as a result of Ukrainians' strong and unwavering determination to defend their nation and the democracy that has contributed to its wealth, and at the same way Japan must be able to show a similar willingness to protect itself and build the skills necessary to do so. The need to invest in the resilience of the Japan Self-Defense Force and revive the nation's collapsing domestic influence was particularly highlighted by Russia's failure, mostly due to weakened supply lines and logistical capabilities, to secure an immediate victory. Finally, after the Biden administration ruled out direct military intervention by the U.S., Russia's attempt to intimidate NATO members by raising the possibility of using nuclear weapons sparked new worries about becoming overly reliant on American extended deterrence. In fact, this led to a renewal of the discussion around Japan's nuclear future.

Japan considered that the security environment around it had significantly deteriorated during the previous years, even before the conflict in Ukraine, because of the Chinese threat concerning Taiwan and the North Korean provocations. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia only made Tokyo's assessments of its own security situation worse, and as a result, these elements helped to fuel the internal debate in Japan about the policy topics that had previously been viewed as "taboo" because

of the country's high level of political sensitivity, such as raising defense budget and acquiring counterstrike capabilities. More generally, they helped the government to have a dialogue about adopting a whole-of-government strategy to provide efficient solutions in fields including cybersecurity, space exploration, and economic security.

A response to how Japan will react to the Russo-Ukrainian War and refocus its national security policy approaches is given by the "Three National Security Documents" of Japan.
They collectively set Japan on a route to acquiring new capabilities, such as counterstrike capability, that have long been seen as "taboo" in the domestic discourse on national security policy. Another illustration of how Japan is overcoming the self-imposed limitations in its postwar national security policy is Tokyo's avowed interest in revitalizing its domestic defense industry and its intention to nearly quadruple its defense spending in the next five years. Moreover, the three documents also adopt a more expansive view of national security. Particularly noteworthy is the NSS's emphasis on economic security, which not only paid attention to pressing economic issues – like supply chain resilience – but also to long-ignored (or given only lip service) issues like protecting the purchase of essential infrastructure, data/information protection, and industrial security.
However, Tokyo must overcome significant obstacles to implement these new policy initiatives. Japan requires a strong leader with a clear vision to carry out such a transition, from an increase in the defense budget to the restructure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

3.4.1 A "Critical Juncture" in Japanese Defense Policy Making

The fact that 2022 was anticipated to be a pivotal year for Japanese security strategy preceded Russian invasion of Ukraine. For months, the next National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines, and Medium-Term Defense Force Program have been the subject of public discussions and internal wrangling. However, the conflict in Ukraine may herald a "critical juncture" in the development of Japanese defense strategy, giving the government a chance to make significant adjustments that might not have been feasible in the past (Govella, 2022).
In terms of overall military spending, Japan is ranked ninth in the world, but its defense spending has remained constant for many years. Japan self-imposed restrictions on its security strategy following World War II, including a cap of defense spending at 1% of GDP. Due to worries about a more assertive China and an unreliable North Korea, spending has risen gradually since 2010, reaching a record level for defense spending for the fiscal year 2022 that exceeded the 1% cap.
Before the Ukraine War, several Japanese politicians were already calling for higher defense spending. Nobuo Kishi, Japan's defense minister, emphasized in May 2021 that Japan must go beyond its GDP ceiling and develop its defense capabilities at a "radically different pace than in the past".

The political backdrop around these recommendations was altered in various ways by the invasion of Ukraine that followed in February. First, it sparked a heated response from the Japanese public and government, as Tokyo took an exceptionally prompt measure to denounce Russia's actions and impose penalties alongside the U.S. and EU. Second, the war changed the conversation in Japan about defense spending by highlighting the danger of inaction, leading to the LDP Research Committee on Security's advice, in April 2022, that Japan should make preparations to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP during the ensuing five years. Japanese PM Kishida expressed his desire to obtain a significant increase in Japan's defense budget in a joint statement with U.S. President Joe Biden on May 23, 2022, although he did not provide a precise dollar amount. Third, a populace that us often hesitant about security matters has seen a considerable increase in popular support for defense spending as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Japan's awareness of the dangers in their own backyard, notably the threat posed by China, has increased as a result of the conflict.

As a result, the conflict in Ukraine is producing a crucial turning point that could give the LDP a chance to implement a major increase in Japan's defense budget, even though with some restrictions. There are still opposing viewpoints in Japan, for instance, the leader of Komeito stressed that 1% cap should be cherished, while opposition party as well have expressed concerns. Although it appears likely that the LDP would increase Japanese defense spending, these objections could limit the magnitude of any increase of prolong the time it takes to occur. Additionally, a rise spending may not always translate into better security for Japan; it all depends on how the administration decided to employ the extra funds. The idea of Japan acquiring new long-rage strike capability to strengthen its military deterrent has drawn a lot of public attention as it is a contentious decision which could expand the scope of what Japan has historically regarded as required for its self-defense. Tokyo also intends to create a new fighter plane to replace the F-2, and this project may account for most of the increased defense spending that is being suggested.

Finally, the effectiveness and viability of any rise in defense spending will also be significantly influenced by the state of Japanese economy as a whole. The impact of raising military spending to 2% of GDP will be lessened if the economy struggles or if the Japanese yen continues to depreciate. In addition, Japan's aging population will make it difficult to defend defense spending in the face of skyrocketing healthcare and pension costs.

After the July Upper House election, the Japanese government is anticipated to start talking more openly and specifically about its defense preparations. It appears likely that 2022 will be significantly more crucial than previously thought for Japanese security strategy. If the ruling LDP can deftly handle domestic political issues at this upcoming crucial juncture, the elements are in place for a dramatic transformation in defense policy.

If policymakers are successful in converting the Japanese public, they will then need to carefully tailor their external messaging to neighboring countries, particularly those that harbor concerns about Japan's military objectives or who still suffer from the trauma of its recent wars.

3.4.2 Military Expenditures and Counterstrike Capabilities

Under the direction of Prime Minister Kishida, Japan is aiming to strengthen its military capacity and increase its defense spending, as already stressed.

The Ukraine war and increasing Chinese aggressiveness toward Taiwan force the resuscitation of Japan's Self Defense Force as a genuine deterrent after 75 years of having its arms tied behind its back by a pacifist constitution.

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, 2022, Kishida declared that he is resolved to fundamentally strengthen Japan's capabilities over the next five years and secure the large increase of Japan's defense budget needed to effect it. Japan "will not rule out any options, including the so-called "counterstrike capabilities", and will realistically consider what is necessary to protect the lives and livelihoods of our people", the PM said at the security summit attended by defense ministers and senior military figures from the United States, China, Southeast Asia, and Europe.

For Japan to achieve specific capacities to repel invasions, the presence of counterstrike capabilities is crucial. The interceptor missile defense system now in place in Japan is not very effective at thwarting North Korea missiles. Furthermore, it is claimed that using counterstrike capabilities is legal because it would be done in response to an impending enemy attack. However, opponents believe that since the same weapons can also be used offensively, this would go against Japan's idea of a pacifist constitution. Such worries have been allayed by the Kishida administration by insinuating that the new approach forbids pre-emptive strikes. In addition, Japan views counterstrike capabilities as a potent conventional deterrent against nations that have advanced their missile-related technologies. The counterstrike capability would also improve Japan's tracking and interception capabilities, preparing it for an integrated air and missile defense system.

According to Japan's security plan, defense spending will increase to roughly 2% of its GDP, or about 43 trillion yen. With this spending goal for defense, Japan's annual budget would be close to 10 trillion yen. Along with the development of hypersonic weapons, Japan plans to purchase Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles and Tomahawks developed in the United States,

Additionally, Japan has made the decision to protect cyberspace for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the defense sector, which will support the successful launch of long-rage cruise missiles. After China and the United States, Japan would become the third-largest military spender in the world with this five-year plan to increase defense spending (Walia, 2022).

3.4.3 Turning Point for Regional Security

Japan has faced a number of strategic obstacles as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While contending with the shifting power dynamics between Russia and China, with the latter emerging as a senior partner in all dimensions, Tokyo has been forced to forego any last-ditch efforts to reach a peace treaty with Russia and instead impose harsh economic sanctions on the country. Tokyo's sober realization that the rules-based international system on which Japan has relied for decades is now seriously threatened may be seen in the National Security Strategy, which was adopted in December 2022.

The document reads:

"Japan security environment is as severe and complex as it has been since the end of World War II. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia.".

In a similar vein, Kishida stated in his speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2022 that "Ukraine today might be East Asia tomorrow". Many Japanese citizens have been reminded of the value of security and defense by the conflict in Ukraine.

Tokyo's response to the continuously deteriorating security situation in the region and around the world has been based on three pillars: strengthening the alliance with the U.S., improving its own security and defense posture, and interacting with other like-minded nations, primarily "middle-powers" in the region and beyond.

Over the past ten years. Tokyo has sought out other like-minded allies to build closer strategic connections, most notably Australia, the United Kingdom, France and India. Significant growth has also been seen in the alliances with NATO and the EU. This does not mean that Japan is cutting ties with the U.S. and it should not be interpreted as Tokyo's efforts to diversify its security and defense relationships and lessen its reliance on the U.S. In view of the regional security situation, the importance of the alliance with the U.S. will strengthen, rather than reduce, through the creation of an "additional layer" deriving from the cooperation with other U.S. allies in the region and abroad. In this way, Tokyo is attempting to strengthen its relationship with the U.S; not least of all, European NATO partners. As a result of the growing interconnectedness between the two regions, it is about "bridging" allies from the Indo-Pacific and Europe (Tsuruoka, 2023).

The introduction of the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) involving Japan, the UK, and Italy – all close U.S. allies – is a prominent recent example of Japan's growing collaboration with other like-

minded nations. The goal of this collaborative effort is to create the newest fighter jets which will replace the outdated F-2 fleet in Japan. Tokyo initially planned to collaborate with the U.S., but the plan did not materialize because the two countries' technical requirements and development timelines did not align properly, particularly in light of the "black boxes" problems related to U.S. technology. Regardless of the program's beginnings, the GCAP will be of strategic importance because the relationship based on it between Japan, the UK and Italy, as well as possibly other nations that may purchase GCAP fighters, will last for decades or, at the very least, the duration of the aircraft's lifecycle. Additionally, the U.S. has an interest in seeing its friends cooperate closely, especially under the Biden administration, as in February 2022, the U.S. announced its Indo-Pacific Strategy, stating that "we will build bridges between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic". As part of the burden-sharing by U.S. allies, the idea of "integrated deterrence" can also be used in this context. From Tokyo and Canberra's perspectives, by easing the U.S. burden and creating conducive conditions, their actions will ensure that the U.S. remains firmly involved in the area. In this framework, it also makes strategic sense for the UK and France to collaborate more.

Both a spark and a hindrance in this regard may result from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. On the one hand, the threat to the rules-based international order has been highlighted by Russia's invasion, and the idea that "Ukraine today may be East Asia of tomorrow" is now more widely acknowledged. However, many European nations, as well as those involved in the Indo-Pacific, will need to devote more assets and resources to bolstering deterrence and raising the defense posture against Russia, which may make it difficult to maintain the same level of engagement in the region. In light of the latter, Japan's attempts to encourage Europe's sustained involvement in the Indo-Pacific area will be more crucial in the months and years to come.

Conclusion

The dominant objective of this study, analyzed throughout the research in the previous chapters, was to investigate the main reasons why Japan's security strategy and policy has evolved over the years, substantially modifying its approach from a form of active pacifism to one of proactive peacemaking. The investigation showed that such a radical change occurred as a response to internal factors within Japanese government such as Japan's "peace constitution" and the different administrations carried out by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and current Prime Minister Fumo Kishida. However, external causes played a relevant role as well, being mostly related to the constantly changing international environment and its threats that Japan must face, namely contemporary Russian aggression against Ukraine, China's increasing competition and North Korea's serious security dangers.

To finally pull the strings of the topic, it is of vital importance to remember some basic aspects. Under the Constitution of Japan, drafted in 1947 after the end of World War II, the Japanese people would strive for peaceful coexistence with all peoples, renounce war forever, and never maintain military troops or any type of war potential. Given that pacifism has dominated Japanese foreign policy since 1947, the constitution was crucial in that it created the foundation upon which these policies were to be based. Security only became more significant in Japanese foreign policy after the Gulf War. In response to the emergence of fresh external threats, Japan changed its security strategy to permit greater participation in the international security environment.

With the election of PM Abe Shinzo, Japan's foreign and security policy has once again become more forceful, prominent and hazardous. The "Yoshida Doctrine", which originated in the wake of Japan's total defeat in the Pacific War, has long emphasized for Japan the need for a sensible and low-profile foreign policy, a highly restrained defense posture, reliance of the U.S.-Japan security treaty without becoming overly dependent on it, and the rapid restoration of diplomatic and economic ties with East Asian neighbors. These viewpoints go against the Abe's more assertive diplomatic agenda because the "Abe Doctrine" had the power to alter Japan's trajectory in the international arena. Abe repeatedly highlighted Japan's dedication to a new interpretation of "proactive contribution to peace". For the first time since the post-war era, Abe begun a variety of procedures to completely reformulate and coordinate Japan's national policy, security doctrines, and JSDF capabilities. One of Abe's first acts after taking office in February 2013 was the drafting of a strategy for Japan's first National Security Council, whose concept had been in development ever since Abe's first administration and later under the Democratic Party of Japan. The creation of Japan's first National Security Strategy followed,

whose cornerstone was Abe's belief in proactively contributing to peace and sustaining a global order based on universal values (freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law) and rules.

However, revising the constitution remained Abe's most audacious ambition for altering Japan's defense policy. Abe contends that Japan must engage in collective self-defense in order to regain its independence as a major player in international affairs, strengthen the mutuality of the security treaty, act as an equal ally of the U.S., and be accepted as a member of the international community and a partner with other nations. Despite its success in overturning the New Kōmeitō initial rejection and establishing the violation of the prohibition, Abe's government was nevertheless wary of the necessity to continue with some caution about collective self-defense. Abe was able to essentially ignore the opposition in his decision-making since they were either generally in favor of the issue or internally divided, as was the case with the DPJ.

Concerning today, the three national security documents of 2022 are now being implemented, even though with some difficulties for the future. To start, Japan has to strengthen its partnership with the U.S. One of the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine is that no nation can successfully attain its national security on its own. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance for regional stability and national security in Japan.

Japan has more than 50,000 U.S. troops stationed there as part of the alliance's cooperation, as the country serves as the homeport for the "Ronald Reagan" U.S. aircraft carrier and its combat group. The Indo-Pacific region is being covered by operations of the U.S. military stationed in Japan in addition to the country itself and Japan has also consistently offered one of the most reliable stationing environments in the world for U.S. soldiers, both monetarily and in terms of its industrial capacity. Japan will need to build a new, more expansive framework of collaboration with the U.S. as it increases its military role and capabilities.

Second, international security and cooperation with like-minded nations, including Australia, India, the ASEAN nations, South Korea, and NATO allies, is more crucial than ever for the creation of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Alliance cooperation and various types of partnerships are blending together, due to the Asia-Pacific region's hub-and-spokes system of alliances, which is centered on the U.S., evolving into a web-like multilateral network, as well as the emergence and integration of several new mini-lateral frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad.

In order to maintain regional security in the Indo-Pacific, both efforts to deepen the alliance and ties with nations who share similar views are necessary. Indeed, the new NSS states that the alliance between Japan and the U.S. is of vital importance.

In order to build the rules-based liberal international order in the Indo-Pacific, Japan must deepen its relationships with nations that share its vision and collaborate with them to meet both conventional and novel difficulties. The Government of Japan should clarify its FOIP vision in terms of security in order to achieve this. Concerning this, Prime Minister Kishida's policy speech in India of March 2023, "The Future of the Indo-Pacific-Japan's New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific", is of extreme importance as it defined the FOIP vision better. It wants to "enhance the connectivity of the Indo-Pacific region, help the region grow into a place that values freedom and the rule of law, and is free from force and coercion, and make it prosperous" (Kishida, 2023).

The new strategy outlines four areas of cooperation: norms for prosperity and peace, Indo-Pacific problems, multi-layered connectivity, and extending security and safe maritime and air practices.

Coordination with the U.S., Australia, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Europe, and India is certainly of massive importance. Greater connection is crucial in three significant regions: Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands. Military cooperation is part of the security's efforts. South China will be a focus of attention since it connects the second-and third-largest oceans in the globe and serves as the economic artery for the entire planet.

Obviously, uncertainty exists about the three national security documents' implementations as the documents take several audacious choices. The Japanese people appear to view the documents favorably so far, but it will take a lot of time and money to put them into practice. Constant, ongoing, and unwavering efforts are required, also because the tax rise won't be well received, and the local communities may be opposed to the deployment of new capabilities. It is uncertain whether other pertinent ministers and organizations, like the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), will continue to work together to support the deployment and efficient operation of Japanese and American personnel.

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine has increased popular concern in Japan about its national security, it is unclear if this knowledge and the Japanese people's readiness to take action will last for very long. It will be difficult for the Japanese administration to keep the momentum going by garnering more resounding public support.

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