

# LUISS



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## The involvement of the civil society in the resolution of internationalized conflicts

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## **ABSTRACT**

The present dissertation is aimed at the investigation of the involvement of the civil society in the resolution of what can be regarded as “internationalized conflicts” focusing on the current meaning of what constitutes the civil society and what is and can further be the support provided by the actors involved in conflict areas to civil society.

The topic has been selected as a consequence of the increasing necessity to find new legitimate resolutions to conflicts, particularly focusing on the concept of “human security” that is nowadays becoming central in international dialogue but yet not practically applied in a world still dominated by a classical realist vs liberal thinking in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, although with an applied development of their traditional components.

The dissertation will therefore be structured in four chapters investigating the meaning of the concepts of “human security” and “civil society”; existing security models and the failures occurred due to their application; and finally, an analysis of a case study, namely Syria, together with two examples of successful involvement of the civil society. The aim of the present work is to provide an analysis of an alternative politically legitimate track for peace building and conflict resolution that is at the present time still underestimated and poorly researched.

Expected findings are based on the concept of “islands of civility” expressed by Professor Mary Kaldor in her book “Global Security Cultures” (Polity Press, 2018). Such “islands” are under the control of civil society actors and provide an example of peace survival in conflict areas that, if supported by the international arena, can become a legitimate political model for conflict resolution.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

3RP - Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan

APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture

Art. - Article

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASIFU - All Sources Information Fusion Mission

AU – African Union

AUMF - Authorization for Use of Military Force

CCSR - Civil Society Support Room

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

COIN – Counterinsurgency, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance strategy

COSO - Conflict Society Organization

CRP - Conflict Research Programme

CSA – Civil Society Actor

CSO – Civil Society Organization

CSSDCA - Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African Countries

ESS – European Security Strategy

EU – European Union

FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

FSA - Free Syrian Army

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNI – Gross National Index

GNP – Gross National Product

HDI – Human Development Index

HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HRW – Human Rights Watch

IBC – Iraq Body Count project

ICC – International Criminal Court

ICIS - International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty  
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross  
ICT - Information and communication technology  
IED - Improvised Explosive Devices  
IHL – International Humanitarian Law  
ILO – International Labour Organization  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
INGO – Intergovernmental Organization  
IS - Islamic State  
ISG - Iraq Survey Group  
ISIL - Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant  
ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria  
ISSG - International Syrian Support Group  
KFOR - Kosovo Force  
KKK - Ku Klux Klan  
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army  
LAC - Local Administrative Councils  
MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali  
MNLA - Movement for the Liberalization of Azawad  
MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NEPAD - New Partnership for African Development  
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization  
NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty  
OAS – Organization of the American States  
OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
OPHI - Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative  
OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe  
PDRC - Peace and Development Research Centre

PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers' Party)  
POS - Political Opportunity Structure  
PPP – Purchasing Power Parity  
PRIO - Peace Research Institute Oslo  
R2P - Responsibility to Protect  
RENAMO - Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana  
RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs  
SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
SAMS - Syrian American Medical Society  
SCM - Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression  
SEMA – Syrian Expatriates Medical Association  
SEO - Syrian Expatriates Organization  
SSDF - Somali Salvation and Democratic Front  
SWOT - Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats  
TNC - Transnational Corporations  
UK – United Kingdom  
UN – United Nations  
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme  
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly  
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo  
UNOHCHR - United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights  
UNSC – United Nations Security Council  
UNSMIS - United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria  
UNTFHS - United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security  
US/USA – United States of America  
USC – United Somali Congress  
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction  
WW2 – Second World War

## INTRODUCTION

### Relevance

Since the conclusion of the second World War, and particularly, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the number of what has officially been regarded as “wars” (inter-state conflicts) has decreased. Nevertheless, as declared by the United Nations, the overall number of conflicts has been drastically rising. Such conflicts, which do not officially figure as wars, are mainly intra-state in their nature, involving an increasing number of non-traditional international actors: non-states, terrorists, organizations, rebels etc. They have been the cause of severe worsening conditions for a great part of the world’s population: “In the past 15 years, more than half of the world’s population has lived in direct contact or proximity to significant political violence.”<sup>1</sup>

The increase in the number of the mentioned conflicts, given the interconnectedness and globalization of the world, has had an impact not only on the society living on the territorial space where conflicts are occurring, but has also involved a great number of multiple actors, including other states and great powers, and international organizations. This has made such conflicts “internationalized”, as the consequences and the involvement are spread all around the world.

The parties involved in the conflicts, especially the state-actors, have presented diametrically different interests and proposed uncorrectable solutions, as well as, in many cases, the perpetration and enlargement of the conflict, making it increasingly difficult to find long-term solutions. It is therefore becoming more perceived the necessity to involve the “civil society” in the resolution of such conflicts setting “human security” as a priority. In order to do so, it is of great importance, the analysis of what is meant by “human security” and what elements constitute the practical basis of this approach; what is the “civil society”, in what ways is it currently collaborating to the resolutions of conflicts, and, given the evident failures on many occasions, what can be done more to reach successful agreements.

The relevance of the present dissertation is determined by multiple factors. First of all, today’s world is evolving, and the conflicts that are increasingly spreading and influencing the globe are diversifying in their nature. There are new forms of wars and conflicts, and it is not anymore possible to reduce them to the mere military sphere, as the interests involved are manifestly more disparate, and this is exemplified by the increase importance attributed to the concept of “human security”. The United Nations, as well as the great powers involved in the resolutions of these conflicts, have met obstacles and limits in finding agreements and long-term solutions, and it is therefore time to consider possible further options which see the involvement of agents that are undeniably becoming increasingly

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<sup>1</sup> Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, database. Available at <https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard>



influential and that are regarded as what constitutes the “civil society”: NGOs, INGOs, Social movements and so on.

The second factor which confers relevance to the present work, is the actual explanation of what constitute the civil society, or better, the current “global” civil society. Such term does not have an official definition under international law and therefore a theoretical explanation is needed in this regard, as well as research on what is the role of such civil society in the world and especially their voice and power in the resolution of global issues and conflicts. The civil society is a fundamental element to be taken into consideration and involved in peace-talks as it is the only true basis for legitimation of any long-term resolution.

Thirdly, the focus of this work covers a topic that is changing at an incredibly fast rate. As it will be analysed in the following chapters, the advent of the “civil society” as a recognised international actor in the meaning currently attributable, has been conferred following the first anti-war manifestations during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which was the first evidence of a global public opinion having an influence on governments. However, it will be analysed that the number of active civil society organizations and the scope of their actions has been enlarging in the past decades since the end of the Cold War at an increasing growth rate, and it is for this reason, given the ever growing interconnection attributable to the globalization’s phenomenon, that it is of great relevance the investigation on what contributions and benefits could this provide to the resolution of global issues, and particularly conflicts, of whose first and primary victims are civilians.

The relevance of this topic is further increased by the outbreak of the crisis between Ukraine and Russia on February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022. The conflict has indeed led the major powers and institutions to go back to a logic of Geo-Politics and race to the arms which seems to disregard other forms of resolution and create new blocs in the international arena. In this context it appears even more important to adopt a logic of human security and involve the civil society in the process of resolution as only real legitimate source of solution and long-term stability.

The purpose of this thesis is therefore the exploration of what is the current theoretical knowledge on human security and civil society and a deeper investigation on the past and current experience in conflicts’ resolution in order to be able to propose new solutions and stress the importance of the civil society in the resolution of conflicts for the benefit of the whole world.

## **Literature Review**

The theoretical starting point of the present analysis is to be found in a wide range of literature in the field of human security and the study of civil society, as well as its transformation into a global,

powerful, and influential entity. Before highlighting the main theoretical framework, it is important to stress the fact that the field this research is focusing on an ever changing topic and it is a very unexplored area explained but the speed at which globalization is influencing the power attributable to non-state actors, and, therefore, the civil society.

It is nevertheless possible to draw the beginning of this inquiry starting from a theoretical explanation of what constitutes the civil society and its philosophical and sociological evolution throughout the decades. In the analysis made by Krishan Kumar in his *Global Civil Society*<sup>2</sup>, the original theoretical theorization is traced back to illustrious philosophers such as Marx and Engels<sup>3</sup>, Kant,<sup>4</sup> and Hegel<sup>5</sup>. The following chapters will analyse in detail the descriptions provided by these authors and the differences in the scope and interests of the groups which were regarded as part of the active “civil society”. Starting from the three different lines of thought proposed by the philosophers, it is possible to follow the evolution of the concept employing the use of literature by Habermas<sup>6</sup> and Gramsci. Different ideas have been developed by these great minds on what constitutes the civil society and what are the interests and principles involved in its definition, whether merely political, or sociological, or economic, according to the line of thought represented by the above-mentioned authors. Related to the definition attributed to civil society, is subsequently its role in shaping the society.

The evolution of the “primordial” theorization of civil society, can be found in following decades and authors. As previously mentioned, given the fast change in the current world, especially as a consequence of globalization and its trends, it is of no surprise that the topic is constantly reposed and evaluated, adding to the civil society the “global” component, which currently describes its essence, and can be seen as source of its power and influence. It is for this reason that to the list of authors to be taken into consideration are to be added articles by John Keane; Ernest Gellner; Perez - Diaz; and finally, and most importantly for the purpose of the present document Helmut Anheier, Glasius and Mary Kaldor, and their analysis of civil society’s trends in the globalization era, following the 2003 Iraq’s invasion.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Kumar K., (2007). *Global Civil Society*; in *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 413-434; Cambridge University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Marx K., Engels F., (February 21, 1848). *Communist Manifesto*

<sup>4</sup> Cfr “perpetual peace” and “cosmopolitanism”

<sup>5</sup> Cfr civil society as middle point between family and state

<sup>6</sup> Cfr “global public sphere”

<sup>7</sup> Kaldor M., Anheier H. Glasius M., (2003). *Global civil society in an age of regressive globalization: the state of global civil society in 2003*. In: Kaldor, Mary, Anheier, Helmut K. and Glasius, Marlies, (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2003*. OUP, Oxford, UK, pp. 3-33.

Particularly important for the development of the research thesis is Mary Kaldor's literature.<sup>8 9</sup>  
<sup>10</sup> Fundamental is the description of "New Security Cultures" in her book *Global Security Cultures*.<sup>11</sup>  
The book will be presented in a deeper analysis of its content in the following chapters, but it is important to stress the idea, that the current security threats cannot anymore be identified in the traditional way, focusing by principle on the military aspect that was prevalent during the Cold War. There are, by contrast, new "security cultures" that must be taken into consideration when inquiring the current ongoing conflicts: Geo-Politics (the traditional/ cold war vision of international relations' management); Liberal peace (embedded in the western "exportation" of liberal values and democracy in non-west countries through "humanitarian interventions") ; War on Terror (the US policy in response to the 9/11 terroristic attack) ; and New Wars (which see non-state actors as the new protagonists). As it will be analysed and demonstrated during the evolution of the present thesis, such cultures can coexist in the same scenario, and all present weaknesses which have rendered the long-term resolutions of conflicts unsuccessful. In the same book, the author proposed the idea of "islands of civility": oasis growing up in conflictual areas, thank to the effort and support to the local civil society.

A fundamental component of civil society is represented by NGOs, INGOs, and social movements. It is for this reason that part of the analysis will be dedicated to the role of such entities in the global context, and specifically in the contribution provided to the resolution of conflicts, as described in articles and books published by Ebrahim<sup>12</sup>, Cristescu,<sup>13</sup> and Marchetti.<sup>14 15 16</sup>

Finally, official documents, analyses and reports published by UN agencies and organs will be cited in order to testify the ongoing action and projects in conflictual areas and the growing importance attributed to the topic, yet the long way that still has to be done in order to give a powerful voice to local civil society.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Kaldor M., (2016). *Global Security Cultures: A Theoretical Framework for analysing Security in Transition*. Working Paper; LSE International Development.

<sup>9</sup> Kaldor M.; (2012). *New and Old Wars: organized violence in a global era*; Polity Press.

<sup>10</sup> Kaldor M., (2003). The Idea of Global Civil Society; in *International Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 3 pp. 583-593. .

<sup>11</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*; Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

<sup>12</sup> Ebrahim A. (2003). *NGOs and Organizational Change: Discourse, Reporting, and Learning*; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>13</sup> Cristescu R.; (2010). *Engaging with civil society in conflict areas – the role of international organisations*; Conference European perspectives in the context of Eastern Partnership; Yerevan.

<sup>14</sup> Marchetti R. & Tocci N.; (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.

<sup>15</sup> Marchetti R.; (2016). *Civil Society in Conflicts; Russia in Global Affairs*.

<sup>16</sup> Marchetti R. & Tocci N.; (2011). *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights*; United Nations University Press.

<sup>17</sup> UN Security Council (September 20, 2005). Meeting Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007, The role of civil society in conflict prevention and the pacific settlement of disputes.

The result of this theoretical framework will be the provision of instruments necessary to the development of further research and solutions. The policy recommendations that will be the result of the analysis of available material, will be applied to the case study of the Syrian Conflict. It will therefore be necessary an attentive understanding of the socio-political and economic situation of the country in order to assess the theoretical findings to the situation.

### **Depth and Scope of the Analysis**

The analysis of the historical development of what constitutes the civil society, what represents a conflict, what can be regarded as security, and how the latter can be reached through the support of the first, will create conditions for new recommendations and proposals for conflicts' resolution.

It is in particularly the goal of the present thesis, to assess the current situation in Syria, by analysing in depth its parameters and the current civil society's involvement. Given the undeniable effort, yet unsuccessful, of the past decade in the search for cooperation in the region and a long-term agreement between the parties involved, it is now necessary to propose new solutions. Such proposals would lack fundamentals without the analysis of what have been previously described from a theoretical perspective. Therefore, the present dissertation will be built on a logical construction: starting from the currently available data and research, pointing out new trends and developing the concepts, analysing the previous experiences in the field, and finally making proposals for the application of the new findings to the selected country – Syria and some other case studies.

### **Object of the Research**

The object of the research is the phenomenon of global and local civil society as developed within concepts, theories and doctrines of human security.

### **Subject of the Research**

The subject of the research is the involvement of civil society (both global and local) into the resolution of internationalized military conflicts (with the use of case study methodology).

### **Goal and Tasks of the Research**

The goal of the research is to figure out the role of the civil society (both global and local) as an actor of world politics in the resolution of internationalized military conflicts, both at the conceptual and practical levels.

The research tasks are as follows:

- To give an overview of conceptual and practical approaches (doctrines) of human security, to understand where this concept can be applied,

- To give a definition of civil society from different theoretical perspectives and analyze the phenomenon of global civil society within the concept of human security,
- To figure out the patterns of functioning of the global civil society as one of the actors of world politics,
- To present the concept of security cultures in order to better understand the role of civil society in conflict resolution,
- To study cases of successful or failing projects in the resolution of conflicts, including the case of Syria,
- To figure out the patterns and results of the involvement of civil society in the resolution of the internationalized conflicts,
- To formulate policy implications on the basis of several case studies

### **General Scientific Hypothesis**

**The research question is: can the global civil society be helpful in the resolution of internationalized military conflicts?**

The initial scientific hypothesis is that given the failure of non-local based solutions, local civil society must be recognised as the one true source of stability in a country. Civilians are the true victims of conflicts, and it is therefore their primary interest the resolutions of such. Moreover, local entities know the conditions of the country they operate with and have therefore an expertise that very hardly could be reach by foreign organizations, which would, anyway, export their own interests. For this reason, supporting local civil society in peace-talks and project is the basis for the resolution of conflicts and this can be done starting from the concept of “human solidarity”.

### **Theories and Research Methodology**

The theoretical background of the thesis is presented in chapter 1-3. It is the liberal paradigm of International Relations with the focus on concepts of human security, global and local civil society. The research is mainly qualitative in its scope supported with cases studies. Using strategic analysis’ techniques, future scenarios will be considered and questioned. A wide range of sources will be employed: academic articles from the field of international relations, security studies, as well as economic data on the country object of the case study analysis, and legal materials in order to define the current situation under international law, and what else could legally be done.

### **Scientific Innovation and Practical Significance of the Research**

The innovation of the research stands in its proposal of new possible ways to reach the

resolutions of conflicts, in areas under the eye of the whole global community. The topic of civil society's importance is increasingly becoming predominant in the international studies, and it is therefore of great relevance the analysis of such and the contribution to the topic of resolutions through these entities, given the dynamisms of the current world. The significance is further testified by the fact that this is a topic that involves the whole world, as part of a whole global civil society with different positions and interests but still part of humanity.

### **Structure of the Dissertation**

The dissertation will be developed as follows:

A first theoretical chapter providing definitions of human security and its evolutions in the international arena as a priority for global security and its long-term stabilization. Such definitions will be taken from international organizations, first and foremost the United Nations, individual scholars that have contributed to the topic, regional organizations, and state-powers. The scope will be to define the basic approach to be applied to enhance long-term and stable peacebuilding and development.

A second chapter describing the theoretical framework of the topic: notions and meaning of concept of civil society both in a sociological and legal perspective according to the literature previously reviewed. Analysis of the problems met in international relations' studies to find a common understanding of what constitute a civil society and why it is so important to focus on them in finding long-term resolutions to conflicts (as it is the real damaged part during a conflict).

A third chapter on the analysis of bad management of internationalised conflicts through the imposition of western values and "democracy" even when non-applicable. Current ongoing or past projects that represent, on the other hand, examples of well governance in the management of internationalized conflicts through concentrating efforts on the civil society.

A fourth chapter representing the case study to which the finding will be applied: the Syrian civil war. Analysis of the conflict, possible further resolutions and recommendation in such context particularly through the involvement of the civil society by applying the theoretical framework previously described.

Finally, a conclusion presenting a view on the global situation in a long-term perspective by implementing the suggested resolute measures in internationalized conflicts, therefore generalizing, as much as possible, recognising that it is not possible to find a "one-size-fits-all" solution, the findings and the recommendations provided by the previous analysis.

## **CHAPTER 1: HUMAN SECURITY FROM CONCEPTS TO DOCTRINES AS GROUNDS FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CONFLICTS AND INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETIES INTO CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

The scope of the present work, as provided for in the introduction, is to investigate and analyse new forms of peacebuilding and stabilization through the involvement of civil society. In order to contribute to an understanding on the topic it is first and foremost essential to outline working definitions of concepts which constitute the theoretical foundation of the research area under analysis. The security doctrine that was created with the precise scope of focusing on the human aspect of security, and therefore the civil society, was human security. Accordingly, this first and second chapters will be dedicated to the examination of what do we mean by “human security” and the evolution of the concept in the international debate and what constitutes civil society, analysing the concepts in the framework of the new security environment and the emergence of new forms of “conflicts”.

### **1.1. Human Security and its difference with concepts of “State Security”, “Human Development” and “Human Rights”**

Since its first official appearance in a document in 1994<sup>18</sup>, the term human security has become the object of numerous analyses aimed at defining its meaning. The importance of this approach to international relations and security management has become increasingly relevant provided the changing security environment in the international arena. It is now no further possible to employ a traditional approach based on conventional state-centred threats and military response and deterrence, but it is rather essential to move the attention on a people-centred approach that takes into consideration new emerging threats which target first and foremost single individuals who therefore must be placed at the centre of new security remedies aimed at solving crisis and providing stabilization and possibly resolution.

The concept of human security presents both common areas of interests and differences with already existing definitions of state security, human development, and human rights. An analysis of communalities and distinctions clarifies the necessity for a security framework based on human security and presents a ground for the following investigations on the definition itself.

Differences with traditional security, based of the Westphalian understanding of international relations, are the most manifested. While the sphere of action of traditional security is the state within its borders and territory and therefore the responsibility is to provide security to the state’s population

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<sup>18</sup> UN Development Programme (1994). Human Development Report, New Dimensions of Human Security

alone, human security is a wider concept that knows no border and is directed to the whole global community, founded on the moral responsibility to provide security to every individual based on the sole fact that he/she belongs to the human specie. Traditional state security is conventionally associated to the realist school of thought whose followers often criticize human security as aimed at the establishment of an unrealistic new international order based on collaboration at the global community level. They often associate human security to the liberal current and to an understanding of human nature as essentially good and altruistic therefore considering human security as a concept itself somehow naïve. State security, in the conventional meaning attributed by the realist school, basically implies the maximization of State power and the protection of territorial integrity as the main goal, something that is absolutely not shared by human security. An extremist example of the incompatibility of these two security interpretations is the current of realism presented by John Mearsheimer in his famous book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* which is “offensive realism”. According to the scholar, the supreme goal of a state in order to ensure its security is the increase of national power whose achievement justifies actions against principles of human security in a Machiavellian perspective of international relations that justifies every mean in order to obtain the final end.<sup>19</sup> Such view is and must be completely rejected in terms of human security.

For what concerns the comparison between Human Security and Human Development and Human Security and Human Rights they might result trickier and less radical. A sharable analysis is the one provided by Sabina Alkire in her working paper for the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity of the University of Oxford.<sup>20</sup> Comparing Human Development to Human Security it is possible to notice that the first approach is based on a broader methodology whose goal is to expand people’s choices and opportunities by creating favourable conditions for expanded capabilities. Development means growth not only in the traditional meaning of economic and income power but rather in a whole set of areas which are shared by the framework of Human Security as well. Human Security and Human Development do share the basic traits of their approach meaning a people-centred focus, the multidimensionality of approaches and threats taken into consideration, and the understanding of human fulfilment as a long-term necessity, hence the confusion and often interpretation of the two approaches as practically the same. However, three main differences can be detected. Firstly, the scope of Human Security is limited compared to the one of Human Development.

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<sup>19</sup> Mearsheimer J., (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York, W.W. Norton & Company.

<sup>20</sup> Alkire S., (2003). *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; CRISE Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.



Human Development virtually applies to every single country, territory and community, regardless their current level of growth and concerning every aspect that constitute an element for choice and opportunity expansion – as exemplified by its main tool being the Human Development Index. Human Security’s security agenda on the other hand, is more concerned with ensuring provision of basic needs and capabilities so as to enhance a basic security to every individual equally. The second, and potentially most significant dissimilarity, is the consideration in the Human Security approach of insecurities in the broader sense, including insecurity deriving from violence, and the fact that the scope of Human Security comprehend the direct confrontation of conflict and economy-originated downturns in a direct and immediate way adopting a preventive approach to address threats. Such preventive attitude is not considered in the Human Development methodology. In the words of Amartya Sen while Human Development is about growth with equity, Human Security is about downturns with security.<sup>21</sup> Human Security’s action is expanded compared to Human Development since it foresees threats and cope with their prevention, mitigation and consequences. Finally, a divergent element between Human Security and Human Development is the length of their actions’ time horizon. While Human Development is essentially based on a long-term approach sustained by institution-building and capacity-building projects over time, Human Security’s goal is to provide response to people’s insecurities in a timely manner which also, and especially, include emergency interventions such as relief actions and notably peacekeeping operations.

A sharable summary of distinctions between Human Security and Human Development was also provided by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (fig 1), an Iranian-American researcher whose contribution in the field of Human Security has been of great relevance for the international debate on the topic and particularly thanks to her consulting action to the United Nations:<sup>22</sup>

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Human Development</b>	<b>Human Security</b>
<i>Values</i>	Well-being.	Security, stability, sustainability of development gains

<sup>21</sup> Sen K. A., (July 28, 2000). *Why Human Security?* Text of presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security in Tokyo, Japan.

<sup>22</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2008). Human Security, Human Development Insights Issue 17, UNDP HDR Networks. New York.

<i>Orientation</i>	Moves forward, is progressive and aggregate: “Together we rise”	Looks at who was left behind at the individual level: “Divided we fall”
<i>Time Frame</i>	Long term	Combines short-term measures to deal with risks with long term prevention efforts.
<i>General objectives</i>	Growth with equity. Expanding the choices and opportunities of people to lead lives they value.	“Insuring” downturns with security. Identification of risks, prevention to avoid them through dealing with root causes, preparation to mitigate them, and cushioning when disaster strikes.
<i>Policy goals</i>	<a href="#">Empowerment</a> , <a href="#">sustainability</a> , equity and productivity.	Protection and promotion of human survival (freedom from fear), daily life (freedom from want), and the avoidance of indignities (life of <a href="#">dignity</a> ).

*Fig 1*

The distinction between Human Security and Human Rights must be investigated in terms of approach and concrete action. Indeed, the two concepts are deeply interconnected provided that they share motivation and field of action. In an overall analysis of what constitute Human Rights and what is the difference with Human Security’s content, it can be stated that Human Rights are those fundamental principles at the basis of human dignity and life whose list has been provided by multiple documentations, the most significant of which is the UN Declaration of Human Rights which highlights their universality. The nature of these rights renders them in force and to be respected everywhere and at all times regardless of the concrete actions of authorities and possible in-practice violations which do not influence their existence. World governments are morally bound to them, always, everywhere and at all times. Human Security on the other hand include the most basic and universal human rights whose respect is unacceptable to ignore in practice and for whose violations an intervention to restore them is necessary. Both approaches address rights derived from freedom of want and freedom from fear however, while the language of human rights derive from the ideological legacy

of the Cold War period, and therefore is socially and politically contested in some regions, Human Security's approach is more appealing as it takes in consideration a concrete mechanism of intervention based on prioritization. Indeed, despite human rights being a moral obligation and duty for world governments their application is limited due to the lack of an institutional authority whose task is to enforce them (e.g. the controversial recognition of the International Criminal Court). Human Security instead, although it can somehow be interpreted by states as an extension of national security, and therefore does not constitute an obligation to enforce it but rather a choice in the hand of governments, is still designed to supply a stage of shared debate at every level: national, international and local with the scope of enhancing coordinated action where necessary. It goes without saying that the consequence of this is that, in order to ensure the international obligation/responsibility to protect civilians is respected, when the local or national level is dysfunctional the "burden" shall pass to the international community, as the highest scope is to enhance human security. In concrete term, while Human Security fellows act according to a prioritization of human rights and related human security elements in accordance with the local necessities, Human Rights activist held that rights are indivisible and that no one has the authority to set a priority list. The concepts therefore differ in their approaches while holding the same interests and principles, for this reason they should act as to be complementary in the international debate: while the human rights methodology defends their universal and highest nature, human security provides a concrete security approach to address threats and human rights violations individually, materializing the sometimes vague and abstract language of human rights in concrete situations. Finally, the main essential difference is in the tools and institutions involved within the two approaches: while human rights activist have traditionally been fighting employing legal instruments, Human Security acts through a combination of economic, political and military interventions consistently with its nature as a security theory.<sup>23</sup>

From this first analysis, it is possible to conclude that human security is a security science by its own whose elements and methodologies present similarities and differences with other pre-existing approaches. Despite the distinctions and still predominance in the security debate of conventional Westphalian state-centred approach, human security as proven itself a significant concept influencing the international arena. An expansion of national security towards its direction is already ongoing as highlighted by the appearance in public documents and speeches of terms such as "collective security" and "global governance", the recognition of new relevant non-state actors and the consideration of a

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<sup>23</sup> Alkire S., (2003). *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; CRISE Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

broader agenda with the inclusion of the civil society as both a mean and goal to ensure security. On the other hand, elements of state security can positively shape the human security approach by providing a response mechanism based on funding, research, consensus, efficacy and in depth-analysis of situations which is to be emulated to provide a consistent security framework to new threats.

## 1.2. Why Human Security

As highlighted by Sabina Alkire in her working paper *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*<sup>24</sup> alterations in the security environment can be described through three descriptions focusing on empirical changes, analytical advances - meaning the interdependence between different forms of security threats - and institutional transformations at national and international levels. For what concerns empirical proofs of changes in the security environment summarizing the evidences it appears that the number conflicts intended in the traditional meaning of the concept – inter-state wars – have dropped, however new forms of conflict and alteration to the stability of a country have emerged first and foremost civil wars and more in general intra-state fights.<sup>25 26</sup> Such new forms of warfare which are not regarded as wars in the traditional sense of the term, involve the emergence of new actors, mainly non-state ones, which are consequently difficult to be held accountable for breaches in international law especially for what concerns the targeting of civilians. Indeed, a second empirical evidence underlining the changing security environment, and the particular need of a new approach based on human security, is the considerable increase in the number of civilian casualties which, as reported by Ambassador Pasquale Ferrara in his book *Cercando un paese innocente: la pace possibile in un mondo in frantumi*, if throughout pre Cold War and Cold War wars the ratio between civilian casualties and military ones was 1 to 8, in the post Cold War scenario such numbers appear to be inverted with 8 civilians to 1 military target being the object of an attack.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, evidences related to increase in the environmental insecurity, pressures deriving from an exponential growth in [illegal] migration and energy and resource security, as well as, concerns deriving from economic crises, health issues such as HIV/AIDS and pandemics, increase in global inequality and new threats connected to the development of new technologies and related cybersecurity, manifestly present a new security environment that cannot be dealt with employing tools and methods of previous eras' approaches. Finally, the emergence of new non-state actors is drastically shaping current international relations and security environment.

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<sup>24</sup> Alkire S., (2003). *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; CRISE Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

<sup>25</sup> Geneva Academy database 2023. Available at <https://geneva-academy.ch/galleries/today-s-armed-conflicts>

<sup>26</sup> Escola de Cultura de Pau (2022). *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona, Spain.

<sup>27</sup> Ferrara P., (2023). *Cercando un paese innocente: la pace possibile in un mondo in frantumi*. Roma, Città nuova editrice.

The interconnectedness of today's world as a result of the globalization phenomenon in every and each area of human lives, results not only in an increase a faster rate of spread of these new threats but also in a more evident interdependence between such threats. This is what constitute analytical advances. Discovering and analysing these interconnections is the key to provide new operational responses to emerging crises. In doing so it is yet again fundamental to maintain the centre o the attention of human security as the final goal. An example of analytical advance of useful knowledge in theorizing security approaches is the fact that there has never been a famine in a country with a strong freedom of press<sup>28</sup> or more evident connections between poverty and conflict or between the environment, health and food security with the productivity and economy of a country.

Finally, the security environment has been altered, in this case allegedly towards a positive trend, through institutional changes both at national and international levels. A clear example of this is the establishment of common goals through international and multilateral agreements such as, for instance, the AGENDA 2030 whose Sustainable Development Goals were set as objectives for whole the UN Member States.<sup>29</sup> Forms of institutional cooperations also take the form of financial cooperation and support through organs such as the World Bank or the New Development Bank and humanitarian missions aimed at the stabilization of a country under conflict - this point will be specifically analyzed in investigating the importance of focusing on human security and involving the civil society in conflict resolution and peace building and overall building institutions whose work and main goals are based on a human security approach.

As highlighted by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Human Security allows the expansion of the international debate in policy intervention analysis by reconsidering concepts who were radicalized in security discussions and international relations.<sup>30</sup> Human Security changes the point of view by re-examining the meaning of sovereignty, collective security, power politics and global governance and understanding that human lives shall be the ultimate goal of any policy making. Tadjbakhsh declares that "states themselves are becoming perpetrators of insecurities" due to wrong domestic policy making but also unsuccessful operations abroad moved by personal interests, whose consequences and downturn are on the local population. For this reason, the very question of who should be the provider of security arise and to which the answer can only be provided by acknowledging the need of ensuring

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<sup>28</sup> Sen K. A., (1981). *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

<sup>29</sup> UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). 17 Sustainable goals of the Agenda 2030. Available at <https://sdgs.un.org/goals>

<sup>30</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2005). *Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan*; Les Etudes du CERI N 117-118 - septembre 2005; Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, Paris.


human security as ultimate goal.<sup>31</sup>

### 1.2.1. The internationalization of conflicts

As anticipated in the introduction to this work a fundamental element of the post Cold War world and international relations the number of what can officially be regarded as “wars” in the traditional meaning attributed to the term, that is to say inter-states conflicts, has decreases, however the number of overall conflicts, with a particular emphasis on intra-states ones has exponentially increased and attracted the attention of the international community becoming the new context for great powers competition. Factions involved in intra-state conflicts, or civil wars, has increasingly needed and looked to the outside to support their causes and overcome stalemates, making the countries and contexts in which these fights occur, the new battle ground for international state powers competition and the fulfillment of their agenda.

To this regard, a relevant source of datasets is provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), one of the leading providers of data on conflicts and violence, as well as the oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war. According to the data collected, as manifested in the following graph, the number of state-based conflicts by region has exponentially increased in all regions in the period between 1946 and 2022.

State-based conflicts by region (1946-2022)




Based on UCDP 23.1 data 32

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

The vast majority of such conflicts has furthermore been intrastate in its nature, as earlier stated, with internationalized intrastate conflicts becoming increasingly relevant in number per year:

State-based conflicts by type of conflict (1946-2022)




Based on UCDP 23.1 data 33

The immediate result of the internationalization of conflicts has been the increase in the number of actors involved per region, which, as provided by the UCPD has occurred in all regions including, in the last year, Europe:

<sup>32</sup> Shawn D., Pettersson T., Öberg M., (2023). Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states?. *Journal of Peace Research* 60(4). Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Available at <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.


One-sided actors by region (1989-2022)



Based on UCDP 23.1 data 34

Moreover, as underlined in the following fourth graph, the number of fatalities has consequently consistently increased, with a peak reached in the year 2022 itself:

Fatalities in state-based conflicts by region (1989-2022)



Based on UCDP 23.1 data 35

Finally, also the number of non-state conflicts have increased, with a new acceleration in the


<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.




number of non-state actors being involved, despite the fact that state-actors are still detaining the primary positions:

Non-state conflicts by region (1989-2022)



Based on UCDP 23.1 data <sup>36</sup>

One-sided actors by type of actor (1989-2022)



Based on UCDP 23.1 data <sup>37</sup>

These trends highlight the internationalization of conflicts with a particular focus on domestic ones, which appear to be the most frequent ones. The UCDP provides its sharable definition of internationalized conflicts as follows: “An armed conflict between a government and a non-government

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict.”<sup>38</sup> Such internationalization is double edged: from one hand it can help unknown conflict areas become at the centre of the attention of the international community and as such receive the necessary humanitarian support and sustainment for resolution, from the other however, the external actors, especially states, becoming involved do not result in an acceleration of negotiation and peacebuilding operations but rather further exacerbate the situation due to an escalation in violence, complication of the context, and pursue of their own interests and agenda. As such the internationalization of conflicts requires an approach based on human security rather than a territorial one. Once again, human security appears to be the key to conflict-management and peacebuilding as the only approach that prioritizes the wellbeing of those who are primary damaged and the object of violence: the local population, as also highlighted in the increase in the number of fatalities in the fourth graph.

### 1.3. Historical evolution of the concept of Human Security

Human security is and must be considered as a separate category of security studies. Provided the evolution in the international area previously described it is no further possible to consider human security as a single component of a broader security approach but, as declared in Roland Paris’ studies, it must be considered as its own broad category of research comprising investigation on military and non-military threats to societal groups and individuals. An excellent basis for comprehending the meaning of human security is therefore represented by Paris’ two by two matrix (fig 2) providing a visual identification of the content of each research field, again identifying human security as a separate field of investigation.<sup>39</sup>

Security for Whom?	What is the Source of the Security Threat?	
	Military	Military, Non-military, or Both
States	National security (conventional realist	Redefined security (e.g., environmental and economic [cooperative or comprehensive] security)

<sup>38</sup> UCDP Definitions. Available at [https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump\\_4595192254101894\\_12](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump_4595192254101894_12)

<sup>39</sup> Paris R., (2001). Human Security - Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? In *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2. 87-102.

	approach to security studies)	
Societies, Groups, and Individuals	Intrastate security (e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)	Human security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)

Fig 2

This table represents a visual starting point in the scope of this work, for the following historical pathway of the evolution of the concept of human security.

### 1.3.1. The UNDP 1994 Report and further UN doctrine

The first appearance of the term “Human Security” can be detected in the 1992 Agenda for Peace. The agenda was drafted by the at the time UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali with the intent of proposing a new and more efficient method of peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict management. Such methodology was based on a “integrated approach to human security”.<sup>40</sup>

Although, as anticipated the term was first coined in 1992, a more comprehensive and explicative presentation of the concept was published two years later in 1994 and is nowadays considered by scholars as the real birth of the human security approach. Such first official document was the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report which was specifically dedicated to the new dimensions of human security. The approach proposed in the Report was the product of the theories developed by former Pakistani Minister of Finance and international development theorist Mahbub ul Haq. The 1994 Human Development Report presented Human Security as an approach whose goal was the protection and safeguard of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” among the world population. An explanation of what constitutes freedom from fear can refer to the traditional meaning of security as freedom from violence and conflict. On the other hand, freedom from want also includes the economic and social aspects of an individual’s life, first and foremost freedom from poverty.

“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related

<sup>40</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2005). *Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan*; Les Etudes du CERI N 117-118 - septembre 2005; Centre d’études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, Paris.

more to nation-states than to people.”<sup>41</sup>

The Report therefore defined a new identification of what constitutes security and what on the other hand was to be considered insecurity. According to the UNDP security can be defined as safety from chronic threats and protection from “sudden and hurtful disruption” in the everyday life of an individual. By contrast, insecurity is perceived when there are gross violations of human rights, armed conflicts and natural disasters considering a more traditional approach to security studies. Insecurity must however also include aspects of underdevelopment such as chronic poverty, poor public health and food security, addressing international organized crime and the raise of inequality rate together with population growth and environmental degradation. By simply analysing these definitions of security and insecurity it appears evident that a new approach to the altered security environment, as previously described, must be multidimensional and simultaneously face new and different forms of threats which have as common denominator, a disruptive influence on human lives. The Report therefore underlines how the concept of security must change in two directions: from a state/territory-based perspective to people’s security and from security through weapons and armament to sustainable human development.

The report describes human security as a comprehensive tool including new objectives of security and as a precondition to human development necessary for achieving sustainability in the long-term. Provided this definition, the question might naturally arise on what the difference between human development and human security is. Provided that this question is a the basis of a great majority of critiques to the concept, as will later be described, in the 1994 Report, the UNDP underlines how human development consists in the freedom for individuals to live a life according to their choices, while on the other hand human security focuses on the downside risks, being, whether people are able to conduct their lives in a safe and free environment being confident about their opportunities and not scared about potentially being deprived of their possibilities in the future, therefore going beyond the potentially superficial goal of simply improving the conditions of life of the overall State. Supporting this argument many scholars, among which Tadjbakhsh, have presented the example of the economic expansion of Asian countries during the 1990s which was definitely consistent with traditional theories of human development but unstable and limited from a human security standpoint, as proven by the devastating effects of the 1997-1998 economic crisis on the local population.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> UN Development Programme (1994). Human Development Report, New Dimensions of Human Security

<sup>42</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2005). *Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan*; Les Etudes du CERI N 117-118 - septembre 2005; Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, Paris.

Consistently with the definition of security provided, the Report highlights seven areas of human security each of which is analysed in a specific section of the document: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political security. Economic security entails providing individuals with a guaranteed income, typically through productive and well-paying employment or, as a last resort, through publicly funded safety nets. Economic insecurities significantly contribute to political tensions and ethnic conflicts. Food security ensures that all individuals have continuous access to basic food both physically and economically. According to the United Nations, the problem lies not in overall food availability but rather in the inadequate distribution of food and insufficient purchasing power. Health security aims to provide a minimum level of protection against diseases and unhealthy lifestyles including due to malnutrition and limited access to healthcare, clean water, and other basic necessities. Environmental security seeks to safeguard individuals from the immediate and long-term impacts of natural disasters, human-made threats to the environment, environmental degradation and the global warming, which stems from the emission of greenhouse gases. Personal security aims to protect individuals from physical violence, whether perpetrated by the state, external entities, violent individuals, domestic abuse, or predatory adults. Community security aims to shield people from the erosion of traditional relationships and values, as well as sectarian and ethnic violence. Political security concerns whether individuals live in a society that upholds their fundamental human rights. Amnesty International's survey revealed that political repression, systematic torture, ill-treatment, or enforced disappearances persisted in 110 countries.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, Human security focuses on four essential dimensions: it is a “universal concern” as several threats are common to all the people simply for the fact of being “human”; the interdependence of human security’s components; it is “easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention” and probably most importantly it is people centred.

“Human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons-it is a concern with human life and dignity.”<sup>44</sup>

A further step in the history of the human security concept was represented by the adoption of this very approach to the security agenda of the UN under Secretary General Kofi Annan. In particular,

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<sup>43</sup> Amnesty International Report 2022/2023 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/>

<sup>44</sup> UN Development Programme (1994). Human Development Report, New Dimensions of Human Security

in his Millennium Declaration “We the People” the now former Secretary General highlighted how the meaning of peace could not merely be interpreted as the simple absence of war. Absence of war is to be considered a precondition to peace which however presents a numerous number of expressions and necessity consistent with the everyday life of human beings.<sup>45</sup> Kofi Annan notably mentioned the need for development, social and environmental security, justice, democratization, disarmament, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law. Moreover, and of particular interest in the scope of the present work, the Secretary General underlined the failure of previous peacekeeping operations and called of a new approach based on a global forum where NGOs and civil society groups could come into dialogue with governments.

Towards the same directions the 2003 UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the 2004 Summit “A more secure world: our shared Responsibility” were held. Focusing on the second, it is of particular relevance as it was organized around six clusters: economic and social; inter-state conflict and rivalry; internal violence taking into consideration civil wars, state collapses and genocides; nuclear chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. Finally, once again in support of the thesis presented in this dissertation, the Summit was organized with the goal of creating a long-term partnership between national, regional and civil society delegations, recognizing the importance of a multidimensional approach involving every and all components of the international arena.

In September 2012 a new step towards the integration of the human security approach in the international debate was made through resolution 66/290 of the General Assembly (UNGA). In the text of the concerned resolution human security was defined as “an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people...” which calls for “... people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people.”<sup>46</sup> Accordingly, the UNGA have redefined Accordingly, the UNGA have agreed on a common understanding of the approach based on six points: 1) human security does not only include freedom from fear and freedom from want but also freedom to live in dignity and freedom from despair; 2) human security is “people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented” with the goal of empowering local communities worldwide; 3) human security is based on the interconnected between peace, development and human rights; 4) human security does not equal responsibility to

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<sup>45</sup> Kofi A., (September 8, 2000). United Nations Millennium Declaration. New York.

<sup>46</sup> UN General Assembly (2013) Resolution 66/290 par 3.

protect and its implementation; 5) human security is not in substitution of state security but its extension and complementation and as a different approach it does not consider force among its remedies and tools of intervention; 6) human security is based on “national ownership”, that is to say, that it is aimed at finding solutions compatible with the local reality and that support national plans. Consequently, the main actor who is responsible for providing security is still the State, who is to be supported by the international community and by channeling a dialogue between Governments, international organizations, regional organizations and civil society movements.<sup>47</sup>

Finally, the United Nations carries out its Human Security missions around the world through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), established in 1999. The objectives of the UNTFHS and related investments are connected to the major goals established by the UN General Assembly such as, first and foremost, the already mentioned Agenda 2030. “To realize the full potential of the human security approach, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) finances activities carried out by UN organizations to demonstrate the added value of the human security approach and extend its usage and awareness both within and outside of the United Nations system.”<sup>48</sup> Currently there are human security country-specific programs of the UNTFHS in 38 African countries, 26 in Asia and Pacific region, 8 in Europe, 11 in Latin America and 2 in the Middle East. Moreover, there are 22 regional programs<sup>49</sup> and 14 Global programs<sup>50</sup>. In 2016, the UNTFHS has moreover contributed to the mission through its *Human Security Handbook*, aimed at providing an integrated approach for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals envisaged by the Agenda 2030. The document is drafted as a guidebook for policymakers with the scope of including the human security approach in their political strategy.<sup>51</sup>

### **1.3.2. Regional Approaches: the EU; ASEAN; AU; and OAS**

After analysing two diametrically national approaches to human security, it is of relevant interest to investigate the concept for a regional perspective. In this section the two main regional organizations will be considered with the goal of providing a framework for of how the different world’s “poles” intend human security. The investigation will therefore take in consideration the European sphere through the Security Strategy of the European Union (EU) and the Asian approach through the

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<sup>47</sup> UN Trust Fund for Human Security, (2016). *Human Security Handbook*, New York. Available at <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/trustfund/>

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> UN Trust Fund for Human Security database of regional programmes available at <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/global-and-regional-programme/regional-programmes/>

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> UN Trust Fund for Human Security, (2016). *Human Security Handbook*, New York. Available at <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/trustfund/>

interpretation provided by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, a brief introduction to the African understanding of human security provided by the African Union (AU) through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the American, embedded by the Organization of the American States (OAS), will be presented.

The selection of organization has been conducted considering the influence of the proposed approach on the regional and international agenda for human security. Unfortunately, the African continent is still considered a recipient and object of human security, therefore its understanding on the matter is often discredited and undermined and the promises made by the African Union rarely find a concretization due to the outbreak of new crises. For what concerns the OAS and in particular the United States, it is a well established critique that, despite being allegedly the most influential great power in the security realm, the United States still lack a comprehensive framework on human security, therefore, the work carried out at the regional level by the American organizations meet at a natural obstacle to any efficient implementation.<sup>52</sup>

The EU's approach to human security was incorporated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. After presenting the ESS to the European Council, the at the time High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and simultaneously Secretary General of the Council of the European Union Javier Solana presented the Human Security Doctrine of Europe at the 2004 Barcelona Forum. The work was the result of a group of European experts, led by Professor Mary Kaldor from the London School of Economics, whose goal was to provide a doctrine to make the EU the main security provider and rule of law setter in the unstable neighbourhood.

The idea behind the Human Security Doctrine was to reinforce the image of the Union abroad as a positive example of cooperation, and peaceful development towards the respect for human rights, democracy, participation, rule of law and diversity. At the same time the approach was intended address the raise of terrorism, criminal groups and violations of human rights whose direct consequence was a threat to European security and stabilization.<sup>53</sup> The document defined human security as the freedom from harm caused by the infringement of human rights and was based on seven main guidelines: legitimate political authority; the primacy human rights; multilateralism; a bottom-up approach from the population to institutions; regional understanding of security; clear and transparent direction through dialogue and legal instruments; and appropriate and legitimate use of force. In

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<sup>52</sup> Bishai L., Cleary L. R., (February 9, 2023). *The US Needs a Strategy for (Human) Security Cooperation*. Just Security. Available at <https://www.justsecurity.org/85034/the-us-needs-a-strategy-for-human-security-cooperation/>

<sup>53</sup> Kaldor M., (2004). A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Paper presented at the Universal Forum of Cultures, Barcelona, Spain.



addition to this, the document advanced the proposal of a “Human Security Response Force”. Such force was to be composed by 15,000 units, one third of which would be civilians. Part of the troops and civilian organizations were to be made available by the Member States, while a smaller part would have been named the “Human Security Volunteer Service”, therefore, as the name suggests, based on the voluntary enrollment of individual citizens. Finally, the doctrine proposed a framework for conducting operations based on the laws of the intervening states and international criminal and human rights law.<sup>54</sup> The approach was consistent with the EES as it was based on preventive intervention and multilateralism. Overall, the framework presented in the Human Security Doctrine of Europe, which after almost 20 years is still the theoretical basis of the EU’s definition of human security, affirmed a close link between conflict, poverty and insecurity and was still established on the traditional principle of the superiority of military intervention over civilian campaigns. Despite the bottom-up approach envisaged in its principles, the document’s recommendations on how to address human security was founded on the fear of immigration and terrorism and less concentrated on the underlying causes of instability in the neighbouring countries.

A human-security approach more oriented towards the meaning attributed by the UNDP and agreed on in this dissertation was presented in the 2004 DOCHAS (Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations) framework in the contest of the European Council Presidency of Ireland. The concept was defined as connected to multilateral issues such as trade, health concerns (HIV) and developmental projects in a more comprehensive definition of human security.

In 2007 the same study group for security that I had given their contribution to the Barcelona doctrine, published the Madrid report which further investigated the background and scope of human security in the EU framework. The Madrid report took in consideration the evolution of the European missions in crisis zones and its action in the framework of the “War on Terror” conducted in the aftermath of the 9/11. According to the report:

“human security is about the basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. It is about feeling safe on the street as well as about material survival and the exercise of free will. It recognises that ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ are both essential to people’s sense of wellbeing and their willingness to live in peace.”<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Albrecht U., Chinkin C., Dervis K., Dwan R., Giddens A., Gnesotto N., Kaldor M., Licht S., Pronk J., Reinhardt K., Schmeder G., Seifter P., Serra N., (2004). *A human security doctrine for Europe: the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities*. Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, Barcelona, Spain.

<sup>55</sup> Albrecht U., Chinkin C., Collantes Celador G., Flechtner S., Glasius M., Kaldor M., Kiljunen K., Klabbers J., Kuper J., Licht S., Lotti F., Reinhardt K., Schmeder G., Seifter P., Serra N., Weisskirchen G., (2007). *A European way of security: the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group*. Human Security Study Group, Madrid, Spain.

This definition acknowledges an expansion of the understanding of human security in Europe who should constitute the basis for the security strategy of the European Union in the years to come. In particular, the document advances three proposals: 1) Member States should agree on a public declaration of their commitment to human security as core value behind the EU's external action and provide clear guidance; 2) Establish a system of political process as the ultimate and lasting solution to crises, according to which every [military] mission should be placed under a "comprehensive planning process under civilian leadership" for a sustainable and durable resolution; 3) Commitment to the operationalization of human security from theoretical principles to concrete actions through human security mandates for external actions, trainings and evaluation systems based on the principles already mentioned.

The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis showed the world and the Asian region how strong the interconnectedness between countries was. In the aftermath of the crisis the debate sparked on the necessity for a common framework of management for those crises who were caused by non traditional/military threats such as economic and financial ones, environmental and health-related ones and whose impacts was on people wellbeing and their human rights. The initial discussion on the concept of human security saw the UNDP definition as a critique to the Asian security approach handled by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and based on mutual trust among the members in military terms and cooperation towards economic and political stability with the imperative respect of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. As anticipated, the necessity for a common human security approach was envisaged in the aftermath of the financial crisis and particularly pushed forward by Thailand's Minister of Foreign Affairs Surin Pitsuwan. According to the new approach proposed a flexible intervention policy was considered according to which member states were allowed to discuss sensitive social, economic and political matters of one another while respecting each other's sovereignty. Such approach was however rejected by some States including Myanmar.<sup>56</sup>

A step forward was made by the advancement of the ASEAN Vision 2020 whose objective was the achievement of freedom from want and freedom for fear in direct connection with the UNDP definition of human security. Despite the economic development of the region, concerns to human security are still a priority for ASEAN as well as the difficulties in finding a regional approach to the crises.<sup>57</sup> The

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<sup>56</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2005). *Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan*; Les Etudes du CERIN 117-118 - septembre 2005; Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, Paris.

<sup>57</sup> Yeti Puspita N. (2019). Asean Mechanism for Human Security Problems in Southeast Asia: What's Wrong?, in *Journal Dinamika Hukum* Vol. 19 Issue 2.

ASEAN recognizes that, despite the fact that the sources of most forms of insecurities lie at the community and individual level, the global approach is still linked to the traditional military understanding of security and tend to underestimate the promotion of human wellbeing and security. In order to promote human security, it is therefore necessary to build regional security and a shared an understanding of issues and their solution. Moreover, the Association highlights the necessity to stop the adoption of double standards in conducting humanitarian interventions as these means have become a tool for major power to advance their political and strategic agenda at the expenses of the population in crisis zones. In addition to this, the ASEAN approach to human security calls for dialogue between political forces and in particular between countries considered “democratic” and those who fall under the category of “authoritarian” to discuss about differences - for instance in geographical, social, political, and economic terms – and carrying out priorities to enhance an international agenda of human security.<sup>58</sup>

Such agenda cannot be carried out if practices in favor of the defense of national frontiers and military security are the primary objectives of regional and global powers and when “concerns and priorities of regional civil society are not shared by the political and bureaucratic elites. They are incompatible when regional alliance building of the civil society is threatening the narrow and self-serving interpretation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.”<sup>59</sup> A multilateral approach is therefore demanded through responsive and attentive global and regional institutions whose primary goal is the protection of individuals and where rules concerning humanitarian intervention and other related practices are clearly established including a well-defined ration between military and social spendings.

The human security agenda of the African region is mainly organized by the African Union. However, security and development concerns in the region has always of been of primary focus and therefore it is possible to trace attempts to address what would later be considered “human security” before its establishment in 2002. In particular, in 1990 the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development was signed by the Heads of Continental Africa States, and shortly after the Kampala Forum, better known as the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation

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<sup>58</sup> Abad Jr. M.C. (August 30, 2000). *The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security*. Statement to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Available at <https://asean.org/the-challenge-of-balancing-state-security-with-human-security-by-m-c-abad-jr/>

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

(CSSDCA) was launched.<sup>60</sup>

As anticipated, in 2002 the African Union was founded. The centrality of human security as primary concern for the new-born organization can already be detected in its founding document (October 2001) where it is stated that its central goal is the establishment of “Long-term conditions for ensuring peace and security in Africa”.<sup>61</sup> Consistently to the same regional goals, in 2001 the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was adopted by the Union and during the 2002 meeting of the AU and NEPAD civil society sessions on human security were included.<sup>62</sup>

A very relevant step in the framework of a security and human security agenda for Africa, was the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by members of the African Union. This mechanism together with the 2004 Protocol Relation to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union are still today the two most efficient tools in the hands of the Union to carry on its security and development agenda which encompasses the concept of human security. In particular, the APSA is the major mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. A further positive element in the fight towards human security was recently demonstrated by the African Center for Disease Control and Prevention, who took the lead in the management of health issues in the region and in particular of COVID-19 pandemics.<sup>63</sup>

However, overall, despite the promises advanced by the African Union as of “Silencing the Guns by 2020”<sup>64</sup> and the commitment in collaboration with the UN for the creation of a African Human Security Index<sup>65</sup>, the concrete reality in the region is far from promising, with the Union demonstrating proving itself helpless in the management of crises outbreaks such as the recent Ethiopian on in the Tigray Region, and systemic limits exemplified by the corruption level in African countries and misguided policies by local governments, together with overall traditional state-centric approach to security in Africa, which makes the development and operationalization of human security a very challenging goal.

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<sup>60</sup> Makinda S. M., Wafula F. O., (2021). *The African Union as a human security arrangement*, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

<sup>61</sup> Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 2000 (entry into force May 2001).

<sup>62</sup> Alkire S., (2003). *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; CRISE Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

<sup>63</sup> Makinda S. M., Wafula F. O., (2021). *The African Union as a human security arrangement*, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

<sup>64</sup> Wafula O, Atta-Asamoah A., Sharamo R. D., (2020). Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020: Achievements, Opportunities and Challenges, *Institute for Security Studies*.

<sup>65</sup> African Union Press Release (March 5, 2020). *AU and UN Join Efforts towards Developing an African Human Security Index*. Available at <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200305/au-and-un-join-efforts-towards-developing-african-human-security-index>

Finally, the Organization of American States describes its approach to security as still based on traditional military terms although taking in consideration the increasing multidimensionality of the threats to the countries and their population.<sup>66</sup> Consistently with the main security concerns of the region the focus of the OAS is mainly on the development of international organized crime, drug and arm trafficking, money laundering, terrorism and corruption, however the list is in expansion and recent meetings of the Organization have demonstrated a rising interest towards environment-related and biodiversity concerns together with social problematics related to the growth of inequality, poverty and access to health. As anticipated in the first paragraph of this section, the American region and its main power, the United States, are still behind in the development of a comprehensive human security approach to security. This is manifested by official documents and declarations of related countries which take in considerations concepts of human rights, human development and civil society but not under the comprehensive concept of human security, rather still in traditional security terms.<sup>67</sup>

### **1.3.3. Different national interpretations: Canada and Japan**

The definition of the concept of human security has also been the focus of attention from some national governments and included in their doctrines of foreign policy as a distinctive part of their security framework. The two examples here proposed are the most relevant ones in terms of influence and as proof of different interpretations that can be attributed to the approach which are in their turn a problematic element in the application of the doctrine in concrete terms. The content of this section will therefore be dedicated to the analysis of the rationale developed by Canada and Japan in the application of human security.

For what concerns Canada, the main concept behind the definition of Human Security is the focus on the “freedom from fear” rationale. Such element is detectable not only in the national discourse on the topic but also in the approach adopted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty born under the authority of the Canadian Government. The Commission was created in 2001 in the wake of the Kosovo War under the impulse of Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy and the Government of Jean Chrétien. The Commission was thus co-chaired by Australian politician Gareth Evans and Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, under the authority of the Canadian Government and financial support of Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The goal of the

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<sup>66</sup> Alkire S., (2003). *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; CRISE Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

<sup>67</sup> Organization of the American States (OAS) Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM) (2011). *A Rights-Based And Gender Equality Approach To Citizen Security In The Americas*; Briefing Note. Available at [https://www.oas.org/en/cim/docs/TechnicalNote-CitizenSecurity-EN\[Jun2011\].doc](https://www.oas.org/en/cim/docs/TechnicalNote-CitizenSecurity-EN[Jun2011].doc)

Commission was to provide an answer to the question raised the already cited UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in relations to the well noted dilemma of humanitarian intervention vis-à-vis state sovereignty and principle of non-interference. In particular, the debate was related to the recent gross violations of human rights perpetuated in Rwanda and in Srebrenica and the problematic international response. The Commission drafted a report whose result was the adoption of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine. According to this doctrine it is not only an option but a duty to intervene in those area where gross violations of human rights are occurring adopting an approach that not only implies military intervention but the stabilization of internal social security of a country.<sup>68</sup> Despite the clear intent of the Commission was to provide answers to the ongoing debate on humanitarian intervention and avoid the continuation of genocides and other forms of massacres, the R2P approach has soon manifested its shortcomings starting from the apparent arbitrariness in its adoption in some cases (Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia) but not in others (Rwanda) and double-standard applied to its interpretation. Furthermore, the R2P doctrine called for a “pre-emptive defense” approach that if from a national standpoint intervention could be justified provided the supremacy of human rights over principles of sovereignty and interference – still debatable – on the other hand the concept finds absolutely no application under principles of humanitarian international law and the UN Charter, therefore creating even more confusion if considering the environment previously described that should find its core strength in a system of multilateral institutions under the authority of international law and the UN Chartered themselves.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, as underlined by a Catherine Renshaw in an article or the Lowry Institute, the doctrine has increasingly become an “empty mantra” rather that a concrete system of intervention.<sup>70</sup> Finally, the report produced by the Commission and subsequent approach failed to recognise that at the origin of the pathway leading to the reported violations of human rights was a weak government and disrupted civil society. Therefore, in line with the argument presented by this work, the security issue was not realistically addressed as the doctrine failed to consider the relevant actors to be supported.

The established of the ICIS is considered as one of the successes of the Canadian approach to human security and foreign policy of Lloyd Axworthy. The overall interpretation of the concept, as anticipated, was based on the idea of “freedom from fear” – or for better says “freedom for pervasive

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<sup>68</sup> ICISS Report (2001). International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Archived from the original on July 31, 2007. Retrieved February 29, 2008.

<sup>69</sup> Macrae, J., Harmer, A., (2003), *Humanitarian Action and the 'Global War on Terror': A Review of Trends and Issues*, HPG Report 14.

<sup>70</sup> Renshaw C., (2021). *R2P: An idea whose time never comes*. Lowry Institute

threats to people's rights, safety or lives" - and criticized the UNDP 1994 definition as considered too broad. As exemplified by the report produced by the ICIS, the Canadian doctrine identified human security as immediately connected to humanitarian intervention, whose responsibility was to be shared at the global level. In particular, the rationale was based on 5 elements: public safety; protection of civilians; conflict prevention strengthening local capabilities; governance and accountability, whose result was the determinant contribution to the establishment of the International Criminal Courts; and peace support operations. Although, as underlined by Tadjbakhsh, the inclusion of human security in the Canadian agenda was presumably aimed at ensuring a relevant role for Canada in the international arena<sup>71</sup>, the country has "Canada has taken human security as the paradigm for its foreign policy and has taken a leadership role in operationalizing it"<sup>72</sup> as proven by the fact that by 2000, human security appeared as a separate voice in the government's budget. Successful application of the Canadian interpretation and active role played where demonstrated by non only the creation and influence exercised by the ICIS but also by the 1997 Ottawa "Convention on the Prohibition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and Their Destruction" signed by 122 countries, the already mentioned creation of International Criminal Court through the 1998 Rome Statute, and the Kimberley Process on conflicts in the diamond trade.

The Japanese agenda on human security was actively developed in the aftermath of the 1997/1998 Asian crisis and, in strong opposition to the Canadian one, it presents the other side of the concept highlighted by the UNDP: "freedom from want". The definition attributed to human security by Japanese official documents is the broadest one, as it recognises human security as a field covering all threats to human survival, life and dignity and ensuring the carrying out of projects to face such threats. Such definitions was provided by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in the context of the 1998 "Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow," during which the Japanese Human Security programme was launched. In concrete terms, the Japanese efforts towards human security were manifested through the diplomatic "Bluebook", the establishment of a Commission on Human Security and the set up the largest Trust Fund in the United Nations. The first document, in accordance with the definition provided by Prime Minister Obuchi, underlined the concept of human security as a process of addressing new multidimensional threats such as poverty, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, international organized crime, health concerns, mass migration and anti-personnel landmines,

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<sup>71</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2005). *Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan*; Les Etudes du CERI N 117-118 - septembre 2005; Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, Paris.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

underlying Japan's active role in the field and particularly stressing the importance of international cooperation not only among state-actors but also involving international organizations and community, and the local civil society.<sup>73</sup> An analysis of Japan's approach to human security through more realist eyes highlights the benefits of the doctrine for a country whose Constitution itself prohibits the use of force to solve disputes.<sup>74</sup> Development and human security related projects in the area not only allow Japan to play a security role in the region but also to economically influence the area, balancing the Chinese superpower and the Korean nuclear pressure. Moreover, Japan has historically aspired to a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and these kinds of actions definitely play in favor of this direction also considering the country's position in the ongoing debate on the reform of the UNSC. However, as once again highlighted by Tadjbakhsh Japanese approach must not be confused as a replacement of traditional security with human security but rather as a complementary action which has played a great contribution to the development of related projects and debate sustaining the concept.<sup>75</sup>

#### **1.3.4. The expansion of security: Emma Rotschild**

A further description of what can be referred as human security was provided by political scientist Emma Rotschild. In her work "What is security" although not specifically dedicated to the concept of human security, Rotschild analyses the directions of the new approaches to security which she labels as "extended".<sup>76</sup> According to her findings security is expanding downwards, upwards, horizontally and in all directions.

The first direction, downwards, refers to the shift of the focus point from national government to the population. As previously analysed, among the empirical evidence underling the changing in the contemporary security environment, is the emergence and increasing importance of the role played by non-state actors. Accordingly, the entire security paradigm, must shift its attention from a territorial and state perspective to a more localised one where the centre appears to be groups and individuals.

The second direction is upwards, which indicates a shift from the traditional meaning attributed to security, the security of the territory under the control of a single nation, to security of the international sphere. Such shift is proven by the increasing role played by multilateral institutions in addressing new challenges faced at the global level. Such new forms of threat can be identified in those already mentioned whose main characteristic is the fact that they ignore territorial boundaries and

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<sup>73</sup> State of Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook (2000). Overview of Human Security.

<sup>74</sup> Constitution of the State of Japan Art. 9

<sup>75</sup> Tadjbakhsh S., (2005). *Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan*; Les Etudes du CERIN 117-118 - septembre 2005; Centre d'études et de recherches internationales Sciences Po, Paris.

<sup>76</sup> Rothschild, E., (1995). *What is Security?*, Daedalus. 124:3. 53-98.



influence the world population regardless of national traditional security tools. The recent experience with the global pandemics of COVID-19 is a great example of these forms of threats and so are environmental insecurities or those caused by the advancement in the world of technology and cyber space. Common challenges, although the magnitude of the effects varies according to the economic, social and geopolitical situation of each nation, require common solutions and these can only be achieved through the shift of security approaches upwards as declared by Emma Rothschild.

Thirdly, and strongly connected to the upward shift, is the one occurring horizontally which refers to the kinds of security which are to be considered. If accepting the human security paradigm, the answer to this question is already provided by the 1994 UNDP Report presented in the previous section, which is to stay, the multiple dimensions of security to be considered to enhance security to each and every human on the globe. The change highlighted by Rothschild is therefore from the traditional military approach to security to a more comprehensive one involving the political, economic, social and environmental spheres: human security.

Finally, the fourth movement occurs in all directions, which signifies, that the political responsibility associated to the duty of ensuring security is extended from national governments to not only international institutions (upwards shifts) but also regional and local governments (downward shifts) and non-governmental organizations, public opinion and the press (sideway shift) together with the more abstract market regulatory forces, in a sort of subsidiarity model of security provision.<sup>77</sup>

### **1.3.5. Lack of Generalized poverty as precondition for Human Security: King and Murray**

The concept of human security was subsequently evolved by Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray in their essay *Rethinking Human Security*. The two scholars agree on the changing nature of the security environment and the necessity for a different people-centred approach. In doing so, they refer to off-the-record interviews the conducted to politicians responsible for foreign policy, stating that all the authorities of several countries had describe their policies as de facto In accordance with human security. The problem highlighted by King and Murray, is the descriptive conceptualization proposed in the UNDP Report. According to them, the seven dimensions previously described imply several overlaps and interrelations centered on the idea of human dignity as cardinal goal with the documents lacking a “coherent framework for integrating them into a single concept.”

In their analysis, the scholars therefore go one step forward starting from the analysis of the

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<sup>77</sup> Rothschild, E., (1995). *What is Security?*, Daedalus. 124:3. 53-98.

meaning associated to the term security in the public in the common usage. Their conclusion is that security as a concept is the product of two elements: “an orientation to future risks and a focus on risks of falling below some critical threshold of deprivation.” Any possible working definition of human security must therefore include these two characteristics in its formulation. For this reason, King and Murray propose a measurable rationale based on the numbers of years spent under the condition of “generalized poverty”. The term “generalized poverty” refers to the idea of poverty as a condition broader than the one in economic terms but rather the deprivation of any basic capabilities which renders an individual’s life “impoverished” in some ways from its well-being,<sup>78</sup>

Consistently with their working definition of human security as life outside of the state of generalized poverty, King and Murray built a human security index based on thresholds for those domains of well-being that put the life or property of an individual at risk. Such domains are income, health, education, political freedom and democracy and for each of them measurement of human security is conducted according to a practical indicator and threshold. The choice of such dimensions is justified by the fact that the allegedly relevant ones that results as left out are indirectly caused by the ones taken into consideration, while every factor directly influencing the life-expectancy of an individual (e.g. the environment) is automatically included as a factor of measurement of human security without the necessity for a separate indicator nor threshold. In their essay the scholars call for a general and not context- or region-specific index based on the assumption that human security is a global issue and challenge and therefore require thresholds in absolute terms. The goal, as explicitly stated, is to treat every individual according to the same standards as part of one global community.

Practically analysing King and Murray’s measurement methodology the scholars adopt two standard approaches for well-being investigation: money-metric utility and human development index. The indicators considered are GNP per capita for the dimension of income; survival as the product of mortality rate and health status during life for the dimension of health; the right of an individual to vote in a free and fair election and the amount of adults actively participating to such elections for the dimension of democracy (moving the attention to an evaluation of the citizen rather than the government in contraposition to for instance indicators considered by the Freedom House); and years of schooling – and when data area available literacy rate – for the dimension of education.<sup>79</sup>

King and Murray’s working and definition and subsequent creation of a more concrete index

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<sup>78</sup> Anand S., Sen K. A., (1997). Concepts of Human Development and Poverty: A Multidimensional Perspective, UNDP Human Development Papers, New York.

<sup>79</sup> King G., Murray C. J. L., (2002). Rethinking Human Security; *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 4, pp. 585-610.

that can easily be compared to those produced by the UN such as the Human Development Index or Non-Profit Organizations such as Freedom House, are of relevance in the evaluation of the human security concept as they propose it in more proscriptive and measurable terms. However, a sharable common critique to the system is the fact that the two scholars do not take into consideration the sphere of “freedom from fear” as for instance indicators for violence or conflict in the evaluation of an individual or collective human security, but only those elements that can be considered as part of the concept of “freedom from want”. Nevertheless, their work represents a step forwards in the concretization of this new security approach and for this reason it is of relevant interest of the purpose of this work.

### **1.3.6. Sabina Alkire: vital core doctrine**

In her work “A conceptual framework for Human Security” Professor Sabina Alkire, current director of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) proposed a definition of human rights based on the idea of “safeguarding” the “vital core of all human lives” from “critical and pervasive threats” with the goal of enhancing long-term wellbeing and fulfillment. Her paper is dedicated to the explanation of what is meant by “safeguarding”, what is the “vital core of human lives” and what can be considered a “critical and pervasive” threat.

Safeguarding human lives is a two-faced concept: on one hand it means the responsibility for institutions at every level (global, regional and national) to protect the population and every aspect of its wellbeing. Such protective action, in order to be effective and respond to any form of crisis – sudden or extended through time – require an institutionalized organization based on knowledge on those possible threats and a responsive and preventative understanding of intervention so that “people will face inevitable downturns with security.”<sup>80</sup> On the other hand the safeguarding of human security requires respect, meaning the commitment at any level to refrain from actions that may directly or indirectly negatively impact human security. Safeguarding human security is thus the result of a comprehensive proactive attitude to human lives whose goal is protecting and respecting its “vital core” (later defined) through actions on the “political, economic, social, cultural and natural environment.”<sup>81</sup>

The object of these actions is the vital core of human lives. In Alkire’s words such core “does not cover all necessary, important, and profound aspects of human living. Rather, it identifies and protects

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<sup>80</sup> Sen K. A., (July 28, 2000). Why Human Security? Text of presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security in Tokyo, Japan.

<sup>81</sup> Alkire S., (2003). *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*; CRISE Working Paper 2, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

a limited vital core of human activities and abilities.”<sup>82</sup> Such as fundamental human rights, basic needs and capabilities. The term used by Sabina Alkire is not technical but rather identifies a field of action pertaining to the survival, livelihood and dignity of people, reassembling the basic definition provided by the UNDP. The task of setting a priority agenda in the safeguarding of such vital core should be in the hands of appropriate institutions, whose goal is the determination of a realistic and effective plan of action. Alkire thus highlights a tension between “(i) the need for participatory engagement and scrutiny of this “core” by many, especially by those whose security is endangered, and (ii) the need for international agencies, NGOs, and public institutions, among others, clearly to define a “vital core” and to create procedures and institutions that prepare to protect it effectively.”<sup>83</sup> The operational response is therefore to be based on a vague and wide working definition allowing an adaptation of interventions to the concrete situations faced by the population according to the judgment provided by appropriate institutions and based on pre-existing threat analysis and knowledge.

Other than the already determined people-centred approach of human security, Professor Alkire underlines the transfer of the point of view from a perception of human beings as a mean to economic growth and productivity to an end of development through institutionalized action and from instrumental goal to human development and rights. Furthermore, an innovative point advanced by Sabina Alkire is the fact that human security is not the result of a “humanitarian or altruistic motivation” but rather, somehow demonstrating the possible compatibility with a realistic view of security, the product of a community’s or nation’s interest in preserving the lives of its population recognizing their fundamental role to preserve the nation or community itself.

What this vital core of human lives is to be safeguarded from is “critical and pervasive” threats. Here again Professor Alkire narrows the scope of action of human security to a specific category of threat. Such redefinition is not concerned with direct or indirect origin of the term but rather the depth and expansion of their impact. The term critical refers to the fact that such threats have a depth and tragic impact on human lives, regardless of their being unpredictable and sudden or rather the product of a long-term path of insecurity. The pervasive nature of such threats is determined by its large scale (whose definition depends on the subjectivity of local or international institutions) and its continuation overtime which makes it possible to have a pre-existing understanding the preparation to address them. Finally, the idea behind human wellbeing and fulfillment refers to the necessity to have a long-term process of safeguard which enhance the development and flourishing of human opportunities and

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

capabilities and does not limit itself in scope to the context of a specific crisis or moment in time. It therefore highlights the importance of the process through which the safeguarding takes place which must be in accordance with principles of good governance, democratic participation, transparency and capacity and institution-building, so as to enhance the long-term advancement of the community/nation. This also implies the necessity to have a multilateral understanding of threats and engage in programs which take in consideration all sides of security simultaneously: a balance between protection and development. “Rudimentary poverty programs may attend to wider goals simply by encouraging deep participation; refugee camps may teach transferable vocational the rhythm of grief may be such that longer term considerations should be set aside for awhile.”<sup>84</sup>

#### **1.4. Conclusions and evaluation**

The increasing relevance of the human security approach is undeniable. Not surprisingly the importance of the concept has emerged from the United Nations’ understanding of it as a tool of multilateralism and protection of individuals rights, freedoms and dignity. The growing significance of human security is exemplified by its evolution through time and space. Starting from the 1990s in the context of the UNDP, the approach has evolved and been investigated by numerous scholars and researchers from all over the world and, despite its apparent contraposition to the traditional model of state security, it has increasingly been introduced in the national discussions and security framework as proven by the cases of Canada and Japan previously analysed. The phenomenon of globalization and increasing interconnectedness between countries have manifested its consequences also in the emergence of international threats which do not regard national borders and as such requires actions with equally disregard the territorial component of security. Human Security was born as a people-centred approach and for this reason provide the necessary mentality and tool to address such threats focusing on the real object of insecurity being single individuals. It is therefore of no surprise that this security approach is increasingly becoming discussed at the regional level.

The people-centred focus is the fundamental component at the basis of the human security approach. As previously analysed differences pertain among working definitions and applications of human security among scholars, nations and regional organizations, however, the one element that is never under discussion is who should be at the centre of policymaking according to this model. The chapter was built with the intention of providing an understanding of human security through the evolution of its working definitions and by underlining differences and similarities with currently

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

existing model. The scope was to define as a methodological basis for the resolution and stabilization of conflicts, and in particular internationalized conflicts, by focusing on the involvement of the civil society in the process. As specified in the first section of the chapter, contemporary conflicts are increasingly becoming inter-state rather than intra-state. However, conflict areas are becoming the field of action for international actors to carry out their national agenda and competition with other great powers in the region. Contrarily, human security advances a model of intervention whose primary goal is the well-being of local population. It is therefore necessary to keep engaging in such security strategies whose goal is the protection of individuals, through context-specific actions, as envisaged by the General Assembly resolution of 2012, and by empowering local communities worldwide.

Many of the scholars analysed in the present chapter has raised questions related to whose responsibility it is to provide security and how. While in the common understanding humanitarian interventions, including military ones, are part of the framework for collective security and human security as well, an understanding of the theoretical basis behind this approach provides the tools to understand that this is not the case. The General Assembly itself stated, in the already mentioned resolution, that human security does not imply the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine advanced by the ICIS, but it’s rather an approach to ensure civil societies are not disregarded and the world community realizes the responsibility towards them when in the context of crises, as those civil societies are part of the global community itself. The main problem in the contemporary international system remains in the setting up of institutions with the authority to set guidelines and prioritize goals for human security in the basis of a subsidiarity approach that takes in consideration the local level first, the national level on second place, then the regional one and finally the international and great powers as security providers. Being civil societies the basis for government legitimization and state functioning it is essential to establish a security international approach who acknowledges them as the first mean for stabilization and resolution and secondary, when local realities and the state are manifestly dysfunctional, those whom efforts should focus on regionally and globally in order to attempt a re-establishment of security. In order to do so, it is necessary to change the security mentality moving from taking the “state” as unit of measurement to the single human being, and therefore from the international order based on borders and territories, to the global community of people. In order to complete the theoretical framework at the basis of this understanding of peace and security building, the second chapter will be dedicated to the concept of civil society and what and who constitute civil society organizations worldwide.

## CHAPTER 2: EVOLUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY'S COMPOSITION AND ROLE

The definition of Statehood in international law is based on the 1933 Montevideo Convention: The American Convention on Statehood. Article 1 of the latter established that a State has to respect four requirements: have a population, a territory, a government, and the capacity to enter in relations with other States.<sup>85</sup> Despite the list provided by the Montevideo Convention is clearly outdated, these four requirements have remained the well-established foundation for the consideration of States. The population of a State is therefore an essential element for the very existence of the State itself and as such it is fundamental to dedicate attention and focus on the later as a key actor within the nation. The State's life is indeed determined and influenced by its civil society whose role and composition has been evolving through time and according to the geopolitical context. The present chapter is therefore dedicated to an investigation on what constitutes the civil society, how has the concept evolved particularly in regard to the advent of globalization, and finally what role can the civil society (national and global) play in conflict zones. The purpose of this chapter is to complete the theoretical and methodological foundation initiated by the previous one on the concept of Human Security, in order to provide an established base of reasoning for the case studies that will later be analysed in the following chapters.

### 2.1. The birth of the concept and its modern evolution

The idea of a civil society with an active role in the political life of the State has its roots in the Classical Age. Indeed, despite obvious evolutions of the concept throughout history, the acknowledgement of the civil society's influence on the State's life can be traced back to Aristotle. Aristotle conceptualized the polis as a *koinonia politike*<sup>86</sup>, that is to say, as a political community made up of civil associations. The concept was later re-adapted to the roman scenario by Latin author Cicero who translated the term into *societas civilis*<sup>87</sup>, which became the basis for later developments of the term.

The emergence of the concept according to its modern connotation was born in Western Europe. In particular, a first interpretation of civil society was developed around its connection to the very State foundation. Philosophers such as John Locke (1631-1704), Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) and Adam Ferguson (1723 – 1816) connected the birth and role of civil society to the very existence of the State and its birth according to the social contract theory that embeds the Enlightenment spirit the three

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<sup>85</sup> American Convention on Statehood, Montevideo, 1933 (entry into force 1934), Article 1.

<sup>86</sup> Aristotle (4th century B.C.). *The Politics* 1252a, 1-7.

<sup>87</sup> Cicero (54-51 B.C.). *De Re Publica* I.49.

philosophers adhered to.

Locke and Hobbes started from the same premise of social contract although considering the human nature in opposing terms. While on one hand according to Thomas Hobbes the State was a necessity to maintain control in social natural State of *homo homini lupus*, where humans are by nature enemies to one another and therefore the State and the social contract were a necessity to create order and stability<sup>88</sup>, on the other hand Locke envisaged the human nature as naturally altruistic and human beings as benevolent towards one another. The social contract was therefore the established of an organized reality where the State was limited in its powers and its scope was the respect of basic rights: property, life and liberty.<sup>89</sup> Although the two philosophers are considered the founding fathers of the two opposing theories of international relations – Hobbes realism and Locke liberalism – they both shared the view of a system where the existence of a civil society and a contract between the latter and the central authority, was the only way to allow a peaceful and civil coexistence in a ordered reality. The two philosophers did not separate the notion of civil society from that of the State as the two concepts were intrinsically connected to one another, however established a basic understanding of the influence of the population on the very functioning and life of the State. Adam Ferguson’s work on the topic was particularly influential in Russia as his masterpiece *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* was lectured at the University of Moscow for decades. According to the same enlightened principles of the previous two philosophers, Ferguson still linked the concept of civil society to that of the State underlining in his essay that every step-in history the political developments were the product of human societies as based on their values and actions.<sup>90</sup>

A second step in the evolution of the concept of civil society was provided for in the works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and Karl Marx, whose definition of civil society was mostly connected to their critics towards capitalism and the emergence of subsequent class struggle whose major protagonist was clearly the civil society itself (1818 – 1883). In his masterpiece *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* Hegel identifies the civil society as a separate part of polity, a stage in between the family and the State. It is an association of self-sufficient individuals “occasioned by their needs” and an external order that consists in the rudimental elements of a State: the court system, law enforcement, public education, public works, etc.<sup>91</sup>; therefore the formation of a State is secondary to that of a civil society which constitutes the middle stage between the individual citizen with its self-

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<sup>88</sup> Hobbes (1651). *The Leviathan*.

<sup>89</sup> Locke (1690). *Of Political or Civil Society*.

<sup>90</sup> Ferguson (1767). *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*.

<sup>91</sup> Hegel (1820). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.



interests and needs and the universal system in a process of interdependence with the other individuals. Krishan Kumar in his article *Global Civil Society* highlights that Hegel's understanding of civil society was based on market forces and economic factors as driven elements of the civil society together with other non-economic institutions such as religious and civic associations, welfare institutions and educational bodies.<sup>92</sup> A further investigation on Hegel's definition of civil society is proposed by Shlomo Avineri in his book *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* where he underlines the way on one hand Hegel considers civil society the major achievement of the modern world, but on the other criticizes the way civil society is uncontrolled as part of his overall critics to the emergence of capitalism.<sup>93</sup> This is testified by the philosopher's highlights on the system of inequalities and conflicts that is at the basis of the capitalist model and which influences the ability to define the work choices of State's "members" or rather individuals that constitute the civil society. In this regard, Hegel identifies three States: the substantial one related to the agricultural world (a sort of first sector of production in the current system), the formal one related to trade and industry (second sector) and finally a universal State being the civil society. Accordingly, men's choice to belong to one of these States is limited by natural inequalities inherited in the capitalist system. At the same time, such inequalities are the driven factors that allow every State to be filled, enhancing the productivity and full efficiency of the State itself, which therefore is based on such inequalities.

Hegel's dialectics around the concept of civil society became the basis for further developments advanced by Karl Marx. While basing its definition on the same economic factors as Hegel, Marx criticized Hegel's relations between the State and the civil society in his book *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State*.<sup>94</sup> An account on Marx's critique to Hegel has been developed by Aliosha Pittaka Bielenberg in his article *The Relationship Between Civil Society and the State Between Hegel and Marx*.<sup>95</sup> In particular, he refers to the misinterpretation of Hegel's thoughts as too logical in its interpretation of politics, conservative in regards to the Prussian regime and essentially finally anti-democratic. Without the necessity to investigate in too depth the differences between Hegel and Marx, it can be Stated that Marx's conception of the State is based on the idea that the latter is made by men intended as real human beings in their own real existence as their own creation and not a form of "subjectivized State" as he interprets Hegel's definition of civil society. Nevertheless, Marx's

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<sup>92</sup> Kumar K., (2007). *Global Civil Society*; in *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 413-434; Cambridge University Press.

<sup>93</sup> Avineri S. (2012). *Hegel's theory of the modern State*; Cambridge University Press.

<sup>94</sup> Marx K., (1844). *Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State*.

<sup>95</sup> Bielenberg A. P., (2022). *The Relationship Between Civil Society and the State Between Hegel and Marx*. Available at <https://alioshabielenberg.com/the-relationship-between-civil-society-and-the-state-between-hegel-and-marx/>

understanding of civil society is undoubtedly shaped by Hegel's works as he shares the view of the modern State as based on a system of inequalities that allows the private interests of a little portion of the population: the bourgeoisie. The State was therefore seen as a guardian of the bourgeoisie's interests and the only way to enhance a reunification between the private and public sphere, between the State and the civil society, was through the mobilization of the society itself, namely through class struggle. As declared by Krishan Kumar Marx goes even one step further, anticipating what in the next paragraph will be better analysed as the concept of a global civil society. Indeed, according to Karl Marx, capitalism was always global in its tendency and therefore civil society was consequently global itself. However, according to the philosopher, the working class needed to first resolve the class struggle within each and every nation before becoming aware of its global nature, which would have been proper of a later stage.<sup>96</sup>

Another anticipator of this "global nature" of civil society, or rather its aspiration to be as such, was Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804). Kant belongs to a different category of civil society theorists that can be regarded as cosmopolitan or international. In his renowned work *For Perpetual Peace* he envisaged a world based on a universal State with a global legal order, global public sphere and consequently global citizenry under a single supranational authority.<sup>97</sup> According to the philosopher real freedom and peace could only be granted through the passage from a national law-governed civil society to a "federation of peoples" whose original social contract with their own national State would be repeated at higher level in order to substitute the Westphalian system of States with a universal State and therefore international law regulating the international relations between such nation with a "cosmopolitan law". Despite the goal foreseen by Immanuel Kant is far from being achieved, it is interesting to highlight links with this idea of "universal citizenry" with the major objective of human security as previously investigated, namely the focus on individuals as part of one whole single international human community.

The problematic of this "universal project" proposed by Kant, were more recently underlined by Jurgen Habermas (1929 – present) by focusing on the manifest difficulties met in the concretization of a central supranational authority. Habermas however, provided a great contribution to the understanding of civil society starting from the idea that civil society implies associations ranging from religious ones, to cultural, educational, sport clubs, academia, media, political groups or more specific

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<sup>96</sup> Kumar K., (2007). Global Civil Society; in *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 413-434; Cambridge University Press.

<sup>97</sup>Immanuel Kant; *For Perpetual Peace*.

issue-related groups focusing for instance on gender equality, environmental security and so on, but having as common denominator active and involved citizens.<sup>98</sup> In this sense Habermas is very close to the definition of civil society that had previously been proposed by Antonio Gramsci as something that contributes, or rather plays a crucial role, in the democratization process of a State and is not part of its coercive apparatus nor necessarily related to its economic institutions as envisaged by Karl Marx and those who linked civil society's nature to capitalism. Despite recognising the limits and failure in the institutionalization of the supranational authority that constituted the key element of Kant's universal project, Habermas agreed with the philosopher's basic point, that is to say, the civil society as driven for the development of democracy and institutions through what it refers to as "communicative rationality" which is an inherited and therefore universal element of human social life and as such established processes of reciprocal understanding.<sup>99</sup> The consequence is that the human being is by nature an *homo democraticus* that is to say a democratic being whose empirical expression is, according to Habermas, the emergence of social movements as "agents of communicative rationality and of change in the public sphere".<sup>100</sup> At the basis of this democratization process through discourse and social consensus building is nevertheless a normative institutionalization, that is to say, a judicial basis that allows this political involvement of citizens to take place and in this regards he still envisages a top-down institutionalization of civil society's action based on the power of the law and sovereignty. In this sense, as highlighted by Bent Flyvbjerg, Habermas is rather optimistic about modernity in the fact that he sees the State and his action through law-making and institutionalization, as tools to strengthen the civil society.<sup>101</sup> In conclusion, it is possible to identify three main political-philosophical conceptualizations of civil society: civil society as intrinsically connected to State formation; civil society as expression of capitalism and class struggle; and finally civil society as engine for democratization process and institution-building.

## **2.2.Substance of civil society**

Currently substantial definitions of civil society have been provided by major organizations and institutions among which the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union and the Asian Development Bank. The United Nations Development Program in particular presented in 2009 the following definition: "Civil society is an arena of voluntary collective actions around shared interests,

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<sup>98</sup> Habermas J. (1992). Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in C. Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press.

<sup>99</sup> Flyvbjerg B. (1998). Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?; The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 210-233.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

purposes and values distinct from families, State and profit seeking institutions. The term civil society includes the full range of formal and informal organizations that are outside the State and the market – including social movements, volunteer involving organizations, mass-based membership organizations, faith-based groups, NGOs, and community-based organizations, as well as communities and citizens acting individually and collectively.”<sup>102</sup> Therefore, in the context of the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) do not include profit-making and business associations. Accordingly, in 2010, the UNDP proposed five “dimensions” of civil society. The first dimension is the impact of civil society, that is to say, whether CSOs are an effective tool for change. The second dimension is linked to capacity building in order to understand and support CSOs with the necessary knowledge and resources. The third dimension is connected to the level of engagement with CSOs’ beneficiaries and stakeholders. The fourth dimension highlights governance’s role in enhancing CSOs’ accountability and consistency. Finally, the fifth dimension is related to the environment where CSOs operate as an influential factor in providing information on their account as well as determining their action.<sup>103</sup> Moreover, in 2005, the European Council’s Horizontal Drugs Group, added a sharable element in the definition of civil society as a space between the State and the market based on individual, voluntary and non-governmental participation.<sup>104</sup> Civil society is also sometimes referred to as “third sector” to distinguish it from the public sector (the first one) and the private sector (the second one) but still acknowledging its influential role in shaping State functioning.

This more concrete understanding of civil society can be further expanded by taking in consideration Timothy J. Peterson and Jon Van Til’s article *The Pacific, and Challenges Facing American Nonprofits: Defining Characteristics of Civil Society*. In their article Peterson and Van Til indeed provide an understanding of civil society based on its founding principles and characteristics. According to them, civil society as a concept is based on three essential elements: participatory engagement, constitutional authority, and moral responsibility. Participatory engagement implies the possibility for single individuals to have access to resources, be involved in civil action, and be free to participate to the community life. Constitutional authority means an institutionalised system of protection for the rights and freedoms of individuals that involves an accountability mechanism for authorities breaching such rights and freedoms on the basis of the respect of the rule of law. Finally, the

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<sup>102</sup> UN Development Programme (2009). *Voice and Accountability for Human Development: A UNDP Global Strategy to Strengthen Civil Society and Civic Engagement*, New York.

<sup>103</sup> UN Development Programme (2005). *A Users’ Guide for Civil Society Assessments*, New York.

<sup>104</sup> European Council (2005). *Green Paper on the role of Civil Society in Drugs Policy in the European Union*, Council’s Horizontal Drugs Group, Brussels.

moral responsibility to operate in a way that does not violate the human rights of other individuals in a “community spirit” based on equity, justice and reciprocity, an element that can again be linked to the previously analyzed concept of human security. In Peterson and Van Til’s words, these three basic principles can be combined so as to articulate nine measurable characteristics defined as follows: “the commons”, “office”, associations, trusteeship, sovereignty, accountability, equity, justice, and reciprocity where by “commons” the authors refer to the ability and possibility for every citizen in a society to access and “govern” common resources and the term “office” is linked to the exercise of civil duty or a form of self-governance through participatory actions of the civil society.<sup>105</sup>

The central importance of civil society in the international discourse is testified by the guide published by United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) *Civil Society Space and The United Nations Human Rights System: A Practical Guide for Civil Society*, which deserves a special attention. The guide is organized around a first part defining a working definition and action space, a second part highlighting the necessary conditions for the flourishing of an active civil society, a third part on the challenges currently faced by civil society organization, and finally a fourth part on the role of the UN in sponsoring and supporting civil society actors and collaboration with governments. According to the OHCHR, civil society actors (CSAs) can be defined as “individuals and groups who voluntarily engage in forms of public participation and action around shared interests, purposes or values that are compatible with the goals of the UN: the maintenance of peace and security, the realization of development, and the promotion and respect of human rights.”<sup>106</sup> Examples of civil society therefore include human rights activists and organizations; coalitions and networks for social causes and rights; persons and organizations defending the rights of those with disabilities; community-based groups; religious groups; unions and associations; social movements; professionals contributing to the respect of human rights; associations and families of human rights’ breaches victims; and public institutions contributing to the UN mission of human rights defence and respect. The Guide proceeds defining the main functions of such CSAs at the local, national, regional and international level, including: “combatting poverty, corruption and economic inequality; responding to humanitarian crises, including armed conflict; promoting the rule of law and accountability; promoting public freedoms; advocating for transparency of government budgets;

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<sup>105</sup> Peterson T. J., Van Til J. (2004). *The Pacific, and Challenges Facing American Nonprofits: Defining Characteristics of Civil Society*; Volume 6, Issue 2, International Center for non-profit law. Available at <https://www.icnl.org/resources/research/ijnl/defining-characteristics-of-civil-society#:~:text=The%20literature%20suggests%20that%20the,societies%20regardless%20of%20cultural%20context>.

<sup>106</sup> UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) (2014). *A practical guide for civil society: civil society space and the United Nations human rights system*, New York.

protecting the environment; realizing the right to development; empowering persons belonging to minorities and other groups at risk; combating any form of discrimination; supporting crime prevention; promoting corporate social responsibility and accountability; combating human trafficking; empowering women; combating hate speech; empowering youth; advancing social justice and consumer protection; and provision of social services”.<sup>107</sup> An immediate comment to what just cited is that civil society actors are entrusted with functions and goals that perfectly fit within the definition of human security as provided in chapter one. Considering this, objectives should be shared between the United Nations and CSAs; accordingly, the OHCHR have published a handbook for civil society specifically dedicated to the organization and management of work between the UN and CSAs.<sup>108</sup>

The second section of the OHCHR guide is as anticipated dedicated to the identification of what is necessary for the building of a free and independent civil society and can consequently influence State-functioning. In this regard, the Office of the High Commissioner identifies four essential characteristics for CSAs: participation, non-discrimination, dignity, and transparency and accountability. In social contexts where these conditions are respected civil society are able to flourish and consequently be impactful in advancing their goals. Moreover, specific conditions in accordance with these four basic principles are provided for together with case studies used as examples. Good practice from public institutions and State actors is for instance visible when there is a “conducive political and public environment” which encourages civic involvement; the case presented is that of Tunisia. The second condition to be respected is a supportive regulatory framework as in Slovenia, Lebanon and Morocco. The OHCHR documents proceeds with the concept of free flow of information and long-term support and resources for CSAs as in the case of Croatia. Finally, the flourishing of civil society is made possible by shared spaces for dialogue and cooperation in which CSAs are involved in the decision-making process; this is for instance exemplified by the Maldives, Nepal, Mexico, New Zealand, and Vanuatu. Clearly, as also Stated in the guide itself, preconditions that make CSAs’ action possible and effective are international standards and agreements aimed at protecting basic individual and group freedoms and rights, among which, the essential freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, right to participate in public affairs, and the principle of non-discrimination. As previously Stated, the guide proceeds with a third part dedicated to the challenges faced by CSAs which are mainly State-originated and include: law or rule-based measures to limit civil

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) (2008). Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme: a handbook for civil society. New York.

society action; arbitrary measures (for instance arbitrary scrutiny or ban); and State-authorized forms of intimidations, harassment, and reprisals. The OHCHR guide provides an effective tool to acknowledge the importance of civil society actors in today's international arena and State affairs and is therefore to be used as basis of understanding for civil society works and future support to these actors.

The influence and interaction of national civil society with States have furthermore been the object of an increasing number of recent studies. Such interaction is bidirectional in the sense that is not only CSAs that influence their own State but also the State itself that influences that structure and functioning of its civil society as underlined by Naomi Chazan in her article *Africa's Democratic Challenge*.<sup>109</sup> The boundaries between the State and the civil society are therefore becoming blurred especially in regards to the action carried out by NGOs on national ground and to the fact that when States become weak and go towards failure, the space that would regularly be occupied by the State become occupied by civil society organizations which become an alternative system of self-help and informal governance or, as declared by Transparency International in their 2005 annual report "shadow State".<sup>110</sup> At the same time as provided by Roberto Belloni in *Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina* when a State is internationally recognized and officially existing but practically lacks sovereignty and independence civil society actors are themselves weakened as a result of the interaction between the two "sectors".<sup>111</sup> Not surprisingly, considering the previous definition of civil society that were analysed, in the article *Conflict Society: Understanding the role of civil society in conflict*, Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci link the form of civil society in relations to the State they belong to, to the degree of democratization and rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in the country. Accordingly, the authors identify three forms of national civil societies that depend on the kind of State they belong to. In nationalistic yet democratic States, civil society is likely to include a form of "uncivil" society, that is not say, a section of xenophobic and racist groups; in democracies where a strong military presence is detectable, civil society actors are traditionally responsible for pushes towards democratization and civilization of politics; finally in democracies with a strong ideological component, CSAs can become involved in the "surveillance" action aimed at protecting the ideological boundaries the State is based on with the scope of countering threats – being them real of

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<sup>109</sup> Chazan N., (1992). Africa's Democratic Challenge, *World Policy Journal* 9, no. 2.

<sup>110</sup> Transparency International (2005). *Transparency International's Annual Report 2005*. Available at <https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/transparency-international-annual-report-2005>

<sup>111</sup> Belloni R., (2001). Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 2.

perceived – to the ideological order of the State.<sup>112</sup>

A further element to be consider when analysing national civil society reality is the socio-economic condition of a country. Ernest Gellner identifies a fundamental component that distinguishes civil societies from traditional societies, that is to say, the concept of “modularity”. According to the scholar indeed, while traditional societies are characterized by “segmentalism”, as in the case of developing countries without voluntary associations, civil societies follow the modularity model that is detectable in the “developed world” and characterized by an active participation of citizens.<sup>113</sup> Groups in developing countries present stronger bonds and consequently a occupy a stronger position that allows them to carry out State-like modern functions. Consequently, as highlighted by Ashutosh Varshney, not including CSAs in analyses on developing countries and their society determines a huge lack of information that prevent from having a full picture of developing countries’ societies.<sup>114</sup> These further analyses on national civil society are relevant as they provide a more concrete and possibly realistic understanding of what civil society actors are, who compose them, and what is their relationship with the State they belong to.

### **2.3.From national to global civil society**

In the framework of investigating the concept of civil society it is essential to consider the influence exercised by the phenomenon of globalization. As previously cited, Karl Marx had already anticipated the understanding of civil society as a reality that was destined to have global characteristics, however, according to the philosopher, times were not mature enough to allow civil society to acknowledge such global personality but rather it was necessary to focus on the national level. Nowadays, the increase in magnitude and fast spread of globalization has consequently made it possible to talk about a global civil society influencing the international arena. In an article by Raffaele Marchetti and Mario Pianta *The Global Justice Movements: The Transnational Dimension*, the authors highlight exactly this international character of the civil society and in particular how the international community is increasingly shaping civil societies in their national and international forms while the control exercised by States is decreasing and world politics is going through a “privatization” process.<sup>115</sup> In this context, many of the functions that were traditionally allocated in the hands of States are now exercised by civil

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<sup>112</sup> Marchetti R., Tocci N., (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.

<sup>113</sup> Gellner E., (1995), *The Importance of Being Modular, in Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparison*, ed. John Hall, Cambridge: Blackwell.

<sup>114</sup> Varshney A., (2001). Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond, *World Politics* 53, no. 3.

<sup>115</sup> Pianta M., Marchetti R., (2007). *The Global Justice Movements: The Transnational Dimension, in The Global Justice Movement: A Cross-National and Transnational Perspective*, ed. Donatella della Porta, Boulder,CO: Paradigm; Anheier H., Glasius M., Kaldor M., (2001). *Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.



society actors first and foremost for what concerns security policies and peace-building. Clear examples of this attitude are aid programmes promoted by NGOs, both international and local ones, and humanitarian interventions.<sup>116</sup> Such new approach has been defined by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci as a neo-liberal counter-hegemonic paradigm whose scope of action, in order to be effective, should necessarily be aimed at supporting the local community.<sup>117</sup>

A clear distinction between old “world civil society” and new “global civil society” was proposed by John Keane. According to the philosopher the major distinction between these new concepts is the focus point under consideration. Indeed, while “world civil society” or “international society” is a term still connected to a traditional State-centric approach and governmentality, the globalization process and advent of a “global civil society” are related to a non-governmental social sphere.<sup>118</sup> According to Victor Perez Diaz, John Keane belongs to the category of generalists, that is to say theorists of civil society that take into consideration a full range of economic, political and social institutions, as opposed to the “minimalists” such as Helmut Anheier and Mary Kaldor, whose perspective will later be investigated.<sup>119</sup> Keane is a “restricted generalist” as he believes that without the market there cannot be a civil society but at the same time, as previously Stated, he connects the concept of civil society to that of “non-governmentality”, therefore excluding the State from its definition.<sup>120</sup> In highlighting the essential role played by markets, Keane talks about “turbo-capitalism” as a global, dynamic, multinational component for the development of civil society and social relations. In this sense markets themselves have a “civilising effect”.<sup>121</sup> At the same time civil society also depends on other institutions such as religious associations, households, and communities. The result is an ideal type of civil society that according to Keane is a “dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions” while global civil society is “an unfinished project that consists of sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who organize themselves across borders, with the deliberate aim of drawing the whole world together”.<sup>122</sup> Actors involved in this global civil society project “problematize violence” and are therefore aimed at influencing in a civil way the international arena passing from the local

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<sup>116</sup> Marchetti R., Tocci N., (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Keane J., (2003). *Global Civil Society?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>119</sup> Perez-Diaz V., (1998). The Public Sphere and a European Civil Society, in J. C. Alexander, ed., *Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization*, London and Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Keane J., (2005). Eleven Theses on Markets and Civil Society, *Journal of Civil Society*, 1 (1), PP- 25-34.

<sup>122</sup> Keane J., (2003). *Global Civil Society?*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

reality, to the regional one and arriving to the international level. At the same time, global civil society also have the power to mitigate destructive and divisive effects of global capitalism through the mediation of NGOs, INGOs and social movements, including anti-globalization ones, and the promotion of human rights and transnational citizenship as essential principles in the international arena. As said, global civil society is always a separated concept from the State and as such is never incorporated into State institutions but rather consist in a “parallel society” whose goal is “civic repair”. Accordingly, Keane talks about a “mélange cosmocracy” that is to say a partnership between these different sectors rather than a parallel construction which imply no aversion of global civil society towards the public sphere.<sup>123</sup>

On the other hand, political sociologists defined as “minimalists” by Perez-Diaz, have provided a different understanding to the emergence of a global civil society which exclude the market from its definition and re-elaborate Habermas’ thought as a counter Hegelian-Marxist view of the concept. For the purpose of this work the two minimalists that are relevant are Helmut Anheier and Mary Kaldor. In 2000, Anheier defined civil society as “the set of institutions, organizations, and behaviors situated between the State, the business world, and the family”<sup>124</sup> including non-profit organizations of every kind, institutions, and movements that allow for a social participation to the public sphere. In 2003, the concept expanded to the birth of a global civil society defined as “people, organizations, and the values and ideas they represent, but with the major difference that these are, at least in part, located in some transnational arena and not bound or limited by nation-States or local societies”.<sup>125</sup> Mary Kaldor identified five versions of the concept global civil society: the older “*societas civilis*”; the “bourgeois society”; the activist version; the neo-liberal version; and the postmodern version.<sup>126</sup> The first version of global civil society is based on the cosmopolitan world order envisaged by Kant which according to Kaldor found a form of concretization in the institutionalization of the international criminal court and peacekeeping operations, however, as previously already underlined by Habermas, the absence of a “world State” is perceived as a failure in the completion of this version of global civil society. The bourgeois society refers to the commercial/economic view of global civil society proposed by theorists such as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment tradition, and contemporary ones such as John Keane as analyzed and Ernest Gellner, previously cited in the

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Anheier H., (2000). Culture, market and state relate?, LSE Magazine, pp. 16-18.

<sup>125</sup> Kaldor M., Anheier H. Glasius M., (2003). Global civil society in an age of regressive globalization: the state of global civil society in 2003. In: Kaldor, Mary, Anheier, Helmut K. and Glasius, Marlies, (eds.) Global Civil Society 2003. OUP, Oxford, UK, pp. 3-33.

<sup>126</sup> Kaldor M., (2003). Global Civil Society: An Answer to War; Cambridge, Polity Press.

understanding of civil society as connected to the socioeconomic conditions of a country. The last three versions find on the other hand their origin in the revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s. The activist version is based on groups of transnational advocacy networks such as Amnesty International or Green Peace, who fight for the respect of human rights and specific global issues. This version thus includes social movements of protest and sensibilization campaigns originating in the civil stratus of society. The fourth version of global civil society, the neo-liberal one, is according to Mary Kaldor the heir of the bourgeois society in the fact that it focuses on the liberalization of the trade market and other economic as a way to enhance the global civil society's development. This vision, as highlighted by Kumar, is associated to the theory of the "end of history" proposed by Francis Fukuyama who sees in the emergence of a global civil society the full manifestation of liberal capitalism. Finally, the fifth version is that of postmodern global civil society based on the concept of plurality and the idea that globalization has accelerated all postmodern tendencies such as mass migration, cultures' destabilization, redirection of the focus point from the nation-State, and the creation of a system of common understanding of the global reality as based on differences. In the words of Mary Kaldor: "a plurality of global civil societies through different globally organized networks", such as global Islam, nationalist Diasporic networks, and human rights networks. Each has its own characteristic emphasis, and conflict and contestation are almost necessarily built into the model, but they are all visions of globality and global civil society.<sup>127</sup> According to Kaldor, the current predominant global civil society is the neo-liberal version as exemplified by the process of deregulation and privation in world politics and the advent of multinational corporations and institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization together with think tanks, advocacy groups and economic summits (e.g. Davos), which not necessarily benefit the public good and citizens but contrarily sometimes persecute their own agenda in a new logic of self-help. Therefore, civil society organizations are not always "civic" in the traditional meaning of the term but can be distinguished among positive ones based on the active participation and promotion of human rights, and negative ones whose goals depart from such understanding.

A particular case observed by Helmut Anheier and Mary Kaldor is the phenomenon of global civil society in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq and in particular in the spread of anti-war movements which influenced the international political understanding of the conflict. In their article, written with Marlies Glasius, *Global Civil Society in an Era of Regressive Globalization*, the authors cite the definition of global civil society provided by the New York Times in the context of the Iraq

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

war, that is to say, as a “second superpower” influencing the conflict. Starting from this definition they identified a process of globalization from below whose main actor was indeed the global civil society aimed at challenging methodological nationalism, overcoming disciplinary fragmentation, and building bridges between research, policy, and practice.<sup>128</sup> They then proceeded proposing different categories of manifestations of such global civil society specifically advancing for kinds: new public management, corporatization, social capital/self-organization, and activism. New Public Management main actors are NGOs and devolved governments. The main goal is the modernization of the welfare State in developing countries through public-private partnerships, competitive bidding, and contracting following a privatization process according to a logic of “less government = less bureaucracy = more flexibility = greater efficiency”.<sup>129</sup> Manifestations of this form of global civil society are institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. Corporatization refers to CSOs partnering with companies. Main actors of this global civil society expression are “professionalized” NGOs and transnational corporations (TNCs) and INGOs which represent a growing point of contact between global businesses, global civil society and society organizations in addressing global issues. Social capital or self-organizations refer to transnational communities that cross borders and are characterized by a social infrastructure based on face-to-face interactions and networking and disregard social differences and cleavages. The goal and result of this third manifestation is social capital which develops the society as well as the economy thanks to the action of NGOs and other global actors in facilitating the sense of trust and social inclusion which is essential for the State functioning at the national level as well as at the transnational one. Finally, activism presents as main actors’ social movements, civic networks, and social forums whose goal is to act as “watchdogs” of the economic, social and political actions of State and markets. Accordingly, they represent a form of feedback that reflects the plurality, diversity and dynamism of today’s world by providing a source of manifestation of dissent and innovative ideas. It goes without saying that while the first two approaches still present a top-down approach to the international management and social organization, the second two approaches provide an original bottom-up view of globalization and global civil society which allows for new forms of mobilization and innovation benefitting the entire international arena. Finally, Anheier and Kaldor highlight how the advent of this global civil society

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<sup>128</sup> Kaldor M., Anheier H. Glasius M., (2003). Global civil society in an age of regressive globalization: the state of global civil society in 2003. In: Kaldor, Mary, Anheier, Helmut K. and Glasius, Marlies, (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2003*. OUP, Oxford, UK, pp. 3-33.

<sup>129</sup> Kettle D. (2000). *The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance*. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press.

has allowed a value shifting beyond the traditional logic of left and right views by providing for the growth in an increasing number of issues and cleavages shaping the international debate from multiple perspectives thanks to an increase in the overall global participation. In conclusion, the authors provide a framework on the evolution civil society growth as provided in the following table:

**Table 1.5: Changing contours of global civil society**

Decade	Infrastructure growth	Composition/ fields	Form innovation	Value changes	Participation
1970s	Medium growth	Economic, research & science	Humanitarian membership-based INGOs	Rise of post-materialism	Slow increase
1980s	Acceleration of growth	Value-based	INGOs linked to international social movements	Cosmopolitan values	Mobilisation
1990s	Medium growth	Value-based; service-provision	Corporate and public management INGOs	Consolidation	Slow increase
2000s	Acceleration of growth	Social justice and opposition to war	Social forums, dot.causes	Resilience	Renewed mobilisation

And consequent possible future scenarios based on the evolution of attitude towards globalization:

**Table 1.6: Possible future scenarios**

	1990s	Scenarios for the 2000s			
		Unilateralist	Bargain	Division	Utopian
<i>Governments</i>	Coalition of Supporters and Reformers	Predominantly Regressive	Alliance of Regressives and Reformers	Division between Regressives, Reformers and Rejectionists	Dominance of Reformers
<i>Global Civil Society</i>	Reformers and Rejectionists	Predominantly Rejectionist	Dominance of Reformers	Contest between Rejectionist and Reformers	Dominance of Reformers

The success of the actions carried out these global civil society actors is determined other than, as declared by John Keane, market influences, by State actors and their attitude towards these organizations and movements. For instance, in his article *Global Civil Society* Krishan Kumar proposed the examples of Central and Eastern Europe changes in the 1970s and 1980s which originated from the action of NGOs and social movements but whose success was determined by the support, sometimes

explicit, of leaders of the then Soviet Union.<sup>130</sup> States' attitude is therefore, still today, a major determinant in the influence exercised by global civil society. This point was further investigated by Bruce Mazlish who particularly analysed the United States' approach to civil society comparing the concept of "Global America" to that of "Global Islam".<sup>131</sup> Accordingly, Mazlish identifies an historical indifferent stance of US governments towards civil society institutions, national and global, which consequently makes America one of the greatest obstacles to their development. On the other hand, according to him, Global Islam represents a smaller threat to the development of CSOs clearly depending on how far this movement will proceed in the incorporation of civil society's culture. Regardless the controversies and ambiguities surrounding the topic of "Islamization" of world politics, critics towards the US can be shared as also testified by the country's – missing – attitude towards human security and as highlighted by Krishan Kumar in his already cited article. Kumar indeed mentions some practical obstacles to development of global civil society movements and international changes that can also be connected to the non-prioritization of the topic from the American perspective.<sup>132</sup> Such examples include: the refusal to recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court in international legal matters and even more importantly the already cited military operations conducted on humanitarian grounds and their dramatic failures as in the cases of Srebrenica, Rwanda and Somalia.<sup>133</sup> Kumar finally determines that the unilateral thinking and acting of the US is indeed a major enemy of global civil society together with the already mentioned in the previous chapter "language of human rights" which create misunderstanding and conceptual conflicts between the "Western" world and the non-Western one as it is perceived as a form of Western imposition and neo-imperialism in the conducting of international relations. Nevertheless, the political scientist also highlights how since the 1990s the role played by NGOs and INGOs have become increasingly influential and consequently so have the overall impact of global civil society institutions. Examples in this regard are those already considered in the previous chapter which include the growing importance attributed to discourses on humanitarianism and human rights as in the case of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the concrete actions consequently undertaken as the institutionalization of the ICC. Kumar also mentions the global protests following the 2003 Iraq invasion and other major international events which have triggered global forums of debate and the birth of new social movements. Such social

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<sup>130</sup> Kumar K., (2007). *Global Civil Society*; in *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 413-434; Cambridge University Press.

<sup>131</sup> Mazlish B., (2005). *The Hi-jacking of Global Society? An Essay*, *Journal of Civil Society*, 1 (1), PP- 5-17.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> Kaldor M., (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*; Cambridge, Polity Press.

movements are in their turn supported by international NGOs, INGOs and the international community creating an exponential networking of global civil society. In this regard, it is to be cited the contribution provided by the birth of the internet and particularly social media which enhance a truly global resonance of every and each cause advanced by national and international forms of civil society. Citing another fundamental political scientist, Iris Marion Young: “The worldwide coordination of these demonstrations may thus signal the emergence of a global public sphere, of which European publics are wings, but whose heart may lie in the Southern Hemisphere”.<sup>134</sup>

The natural conclusion to this reasoning about the evolution from a national conception of civil society to a global one is again provided by Krishan Kumar. The scholar indeed states that while conceptually global civil society depends on national civil society, the first one is actually better defined in the contemporary international scenario. It has indeed a “much more self-conscious construction”.<sup>135</sup> It is true that global civil society runs the risk of becoming an empty slogan rather than a concrete reality, however, it has demonstrated its real force on the global arena that goes beyond mere rhetoric and is increasingly expanding to include in its understanding the Global South. Consistently with what has already been presented in the previous chapter, it must be stated that the full realization of global civil society’s empowerment can only be made possible by the suppression of purely national interests and a shift to supranational goals of human rights’ defence, justice, civility and cooperation, that can once again be summarized in the idea of human security. An example provided by Krishan Kumar is that of the European migration crisis that necessitate of the empowerment of transnational organizations and the supranational EU institutions to properly be addressed, while it is impossible to be dealt with following national interests of each single EU Member State.<sup>136</sup>

#### **2.4. The role of civil society in conflict zones**

The role played by civil society actors in peaceful and democratic contexts have been widely investigated by the previous sections. However, the purpose of this work is to provide an analysis on the role of the civil society in the stabilization and resolution of conflicts which consequently implies an impactful action by CSAs in conflict zones. In their article *Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict*, Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci support the same thesis provided for in this work, that is to say, that civil society does indeed play a very relevant work on conflicts which

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<sup>134</sup> Young M., (2005). De-centering the Project of Global Democracy", in D. Levy, M. Pensky, and J. Torpey, eds, *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*; London and New York, Verso.

<sup>135</sup> Kumar K., (2007). Global Civil Society; in *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 413-434; Cambridge University Press.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

can be of three kinds: “fuel the conflict, sustain the status quo, or build peace”.<sup>137</sup> There is a widespread erroneous understanding that when States fail and/or conflicts outbreak the civil society disappear accordingly, however, this is not true as civil society still holds political significance during conflicts which can even lead to a higher degree of mobilization provided the lack of a well-structured institutional setting and normally higher politicization of the society. The result is therefore, contrarily to what is thought, an increase in the number of both global and national CSAs.

One very interesting and sharable point advanced by Marchetti and Tocci in their article, is that civil society actors are not necessarily “civil” in the traditional meaning of the term but can also be “uncivil” in their scope and action. In particular, the two authors identify four main categories of Conflict Society Organizations (COSOs) that are both local and of international nature and depend on the degree of social inclusiveness and egalitarianism.<sup>138</sup> “Conflict society comprises all local civic organizations within conflict contexts as well as those third country, international and transnational civic organizations involved in the conflict in question”.<sup>139</sup> The first kind of COSO is the post national civic identity which is the result of an inclusive and egalitarian society and whose emphasis is on the individual through the promotion of a liberal civic identity freely chosen by the single individual as also explained by Amartya Sen and Jurgen Habermas, both already cited in the previous chapter and paragraphs.<sup>140</sup> Examples of this first form of COSO are mostly INGOs whose action focus on the sensibilization towards liberal freedoms. On the international front the most famous can allegedly be identified in Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières while at the local level Marchetti and Tocci present the examples of Women in Black in Israel-Palestine and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).<sup>141</sup> The second form of COSO is the multi-culturalist which results from an exclusive and egalitarian society. The focus of these civil society organizations is on the respect of cultural differences and consequent equality, and they thus include inter-cultural movements and inter-religious ones. The third kind of COSO is the assimilationist one. These third organizations flourish in the context of an inclusive and non-egalitarian society which determine their goal of creating a homogenous social reality as in the case proposed by Marchetti and Tocci of the Grey Wolves in Türkiye promoting pan-Turkishness in the region. These groups can also be examples of

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<sup>137</sup> Marchetti R., Tocci N., (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

<sup>140</sup> Sen K. A., (2006). *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny*; New York: W.W. Norton and Co.; Habermas J., (1998). *The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays*; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

<sup>141</sup> Marchetti R., Tocci N., (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.



uncivil behaviors as testified by the practice of ethnic rape for the preservation of social homogeneity and destruction of other ethnicities. Finally, the fourth form of COSO is the ethnic/racist one which is of exclusive and non-egalitarian nature. These groups firmly support the idea of a superior race which not assimilable by external individuals. The result is therefore form of ethnic cleansings, genocides, and apartheid-like forms of regimes which can definitely be categorized as uncivil. Historical and clear examples of this last form of COSO are Nazis and Fascists in Europe, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the USA and far right Israeli movements in the Middle East. It appears therefore evident that it is necessary to focus and understand not only global civil society actors but also the local reality as they both combined are the key to conflict stabilization. A traditional critique that can indeed be shared is the fact that the Western view on peace-building and conflict resolution tend to overlook the local reality and focus on only Western-financed institutions, movements and organizations, while, as seen, local COSO can also play a crucial role in conflict management, both towards its resolution, as in the case of “civil” organizations, or towards an even deeper form of conflict provoked by “uncivil” groups.

As anticipated civil society plays an influential role in conflicts which can result in a further escalation of the latter, management and maintenance of the status quo, or as it is largely hoped, resolution and peacebuilding. In his article *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Donald L. Horowitz identifies as key element in divided and conflictual societies the ethnical component.<sup>142</sup> According to him indeed, in this context the social class and the ethnical origin overlap and therefore the overall country-system is based on an either hierarchical or un-hierarchical ethnical systems. In the first case, conflict arises from the cleavages between the ethnical group in power and discriminated groups which mobilize against the first one through internal violent or non-violent operations. In this case conflict escalation is provoked by civil society groups who by mobilizing unfreeze the hidden social conflict that was already inherited in the country. As earlier analyzed, international and external action in this context play an essential role in the support of these movements and organizations as input providers which influence the balance between ethnical groups through the provision of resources and tools. Civil society groups indeed appeal to the international community to support their cause and by doing this they often coordinated with the global civil society represented by transnational movements, NGOs, INGOs and so forth and consequently “internationalizing” the conflict. Following this conflict escalation, CSAs keep carrying out their role in fueling and maintaining the conflict alive through mass demonstrations, protests, or even more violent actions, and by keep trying to maintain the spotlight of the international community on their cause also through the use of (social) media.

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<sup>142</sup> Horowitz D. L., (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Status quo management allows a sort of peaceful coexistence in non-resolved conflict zones. The importance and influence exercised by CSAs in this context is evident. Actors on the ground can indeed be involved in bargaining and negotiation between the parties involved in the conflict. This can again be the result of national CSOs or international ones by exercising external pressure. Citing Marchetti and Tocci it is undeniable that in this context State actors still play a major role while COSOs play a marginal if not non-existent role. This is so because the pressure to be exercised on the conflictual parties is clearly more easily achievable by international State powers rather than independent and often resources-lacking CSAs. The commitment of the international community and State players must therefore focus on the support of a more active involvement of civil society actors and particularly those locally based. A relevant exception to this secondary role of COSOs which is highlighted by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci is that of the Sant'Egidio community in Mozambique between 1990 and 1992. COSOs nevertheless are already active in pursuing track-two diplomacy operations by supporting in secondary ways official diplomacy actions. This also involves academia and research as well as lobbying and business operations and public opinion influence through media and activism.<sup>143</sup>

Finally, conflict resolution, consistently with the thesis already advanced and analyzed in the first chapter, must coincide with human security, that is to say in short, the respect of individual humans and their consequent human rights, freedoms and opportunities. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to focus on a conflict-resolution approach based on dialogue and inclusion rather than coercive means as in other schools of thought. In this case the focus shall be shifted from official diplomacy to the civil society as real and only actor legitimizing any possible long-term resolutions in concrete terms. As highlighted in the already cited article *Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict*, real conflict resolution necessitates of a bottom-up social reconciliation and pacification, rather than a top-down approach to conflict management by elite groups. This implies the involvement and engagement of a wider part of civil society which is the real heart of a country. COSOs are in this regard an essential tool for conflict resolution as they are the first actors to engage in (informal) people-to-people talks and dialogues which, if properly supported, can lead to local ceasefires and peace agreements. This implies that private citizens are themselves the key to peacebuilding and conflict-resolution and can result in more effective results than official talks or international interference in the country's affairs which often result in an imposition from abroad and above of a peace accord. Civil

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<sup>143</sup> For further examples see Marchetti R., Tocci N., (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.


society, as previously described, include all the associations that form a country which means all the educational, religious, political institutions and journalism and social movements. Practically speaking, this is translated in an essential role played by civil society not only in conflict resolution itself but also in a mentality-building aimed at building a functional and inclusive society, long-term reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction: R&D. This kind of action cannot be imposed from external entities who are not aware of the local reality and therefore are perceived as imposing their own view and resolution approach, which implies an obstacle to the long-term management of such solutions.<sup>144</sup> This approach can be connected to what Oliver Richmond calls “third generation peace-building approaches” which implies conflict resolution not only in military/territorial traditional terms but also including new conflict issues: economic, political, and social ones also in the post-conflict context. Other forms of COSOs’ involvement in conflict resolutions proposed by Marchetti and Tocci include norm-framing and norm-changing for instance through lawyer associations, grass-root activism to raise international awareness about the local situation and put pressure on governments, and provision of humanitarian aid during active violent events.

Finally, the overall level of impact is determined by multiple factors. First of all, the political, social and economic context in which the conflict society is present. This includes the existence and nature of a proper institutional system, a constitutional and legal setting, the existence of public functioning working institutions and their attitude towards CSAs, the overall level of domestic development (economic, political, social, cultural etc.), the interest and influence of the public opinion and the role of the international system. In particular, concerning the latter as provided for in Keashley and Fisher’s contingency model for third party intervention, its impact and consequences, are largely determined by the time variant. Indeed, the result and perception of international intervention strongly depends on the moment in which action takes place.<sup>145</sup> As earlier analysis COSOs scope and field of action largely depends on its identity according to the four categories identified by Marchetti and Tocci, therefore COSOs’ identity and action work are additional factors determining their impact. Finally, the political opportunity structure (POS) is also a strong determinant of the concrete impact that COSOs can have. This model is summarized in the following scheme:

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<sup>144</sup> Marchetti R., Tocci N., (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict, in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 21:2, 201-217.

<sup>145</sup> Keashley L., Ronald Fisher R., (1996). A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: Theoretical and Practical Considerations’, in *Resolving International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner.



## 2.5. Conclusions

The scope of this chapter was to present an analysis on the evolution of the concept of civil society and its influential impact in their country and particularly during conflicts. Accordingly, an analysis of its traditional meaning as provided for by major philosophers including Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, Marx, Kant, Gramsci and Habermas was firstly presented. The goal was to highlight the way the concept has evolved through time from its original meaning as intrinsically connected to the State civil society belonged to, through a natural link to development of the capitalist model and subsequent class struggle, and finally as a tool for States' democratization. In all these cases, civil society was still regarded as "national" and as such presented a substance and characteristics directly connected to the State, they were part of as well as national objectives and action methodologies as stated in the second paragraph.

The third chapter presented a more recent step in the evolution of civil society actors that is immediately connected to the emergence of globalization as a major phenomenon influencing international relations. In this regard, great analyses on the changes occurred from the concept of national civil society to that of global civil society and its expressions were advanced by scholars including John Keane, Helmut Anheier, Mary Kaldor and Krishan Kumar among others. The emergence of a global civil society has resulted in the birth of new organizations, movements and actors having a transnational character and evolving thanks to new technologies and innovations. Consequently, it is possible to talk about different forms of CSAs, that is to say, national civil society actors and global civil society actors which in their turn further divided between those that are locally based and those that have an international nature or are simply based abroad, as in the case of diaspora movements representing the interest of a specific nationality and/or country (this example will

particularly be investigated in the case of the Syrian diaspora in the last chapter).

Finally, the fourth paragraph, based on the article by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci entitled *Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict* presented the specific case of civil society actors in the context of conflict zones. In this regard the authors have underlined four different kinds of conflict society organizations (COSOs) which include both national and global forms of civil society. The thesis supported by this article, that is to say, that civil society plays a crucial role during conflicts, represent a theoretical standpoint of this work, together with what was presented in the earlier chapter about the concept of human security. COSOs do indeed have an impactful nature in shaping conflicts' future by either escalating/initiating them, managing them by maintaining a status quo, or actively being involved in conflict resolution and post-conflict R&D. Provided that interconnected of the contemporary international arena, it is necessary to consider in this regard the importance of international intervention and the support it should provide to civil society organizations in order to enhance the third possible track: resolution.

The theoretical basis of this chapter is directly connected to the previous one. As highlighted throughout the paragraphs, the scope and goal of most civil society actors coincide with that has earlier been defined as Human Security and more generally a broader concept of security itself. Indeed, by focusing on civil society – being it in its national or global expressions – the focus is shifted from a traditional State/territory conception of the international relations and security to a more human dimension of the latter which recognize individuals and citizens not only as the object of operations but also as means, tools and protagonists of today's international relations. The two chapter together therefore create a unique theoretical and methodological basis for the present work which will now present, in the following chapters more concrete case-study examples. In particular, the next chapter will proceed with a presentation of current security cultures, in accordance with the research carried out by already cited Professor Mary Kaldor, and their practical outcomes in conflict management with the investigations of three case studies which represent cases of bad management. Finally, the work will conclude with a final chapter dedicated to an analysis of a specific ongoing internationalized conflict, the Syrian “civil” war, and recommendations for a future stabilization/resolution of the conflict according to the theoretical basis included in these first two chapters.

## **CHAPTER 3: SECURITY CULTURES AND NEGATIVE CONFLICT- MANAGEMENT EXAMPLES**

This third chapter is aimed at investigating the different security cultures that shape the security strategies of states and non-state actors, particularly in conflict zones. Accordingly, it will be divided into two sections. The first section is based on Professor Mary Kaldor's book *Global Security Cultures*, as anticipated in the introduction to this work and the previous chapters. Kaldor proposes an understanding of four security cultures currently shaping worldwide security strategies: geo-politics, liberal peace, new wars, and war on terror, which will be the object of investigation of the first part. The second section, will then provide examples of negative conflict-management which testify the application of the previously described security cultures and the disregard of the human security approach and focus on civil society, as envisaged by this work. The scope of the chapter is to prove that currently existing security cultures and their application, do not take in consideration the human and civil society components and are therefore destined to fail in long-term as testified by the examples provided. Such examples will be represented by a Middle East past conflict, namely the Iraq war of 2003-2011; a past European one whose consequences are still concrete nowadays and new tensions constantly arise, namely the Kosovo war of 1998 and 1999 and its subsequent events; and finally, an ongoing conflict occurring in Africa, and specifically in the Sahel region, namely Mali.

### **3.1. Security Cultures**

According to Mary Kaldor a security culture “comprises different interconnected combinations of ideas, rules, people, tools, tactics and infrastructure, linked to different types of political authority”.<sup>146</sup> The term culture refers to the unification of practices and mentality in the way of doing security which is a dynamic concept influenced by the global changes and balances of power. The globalization phenomenon and consequent interconnectedness has therefore deeply influenced the post Cold War global security cultures. In the words of Kaldor: “there's no such thing as non-intervention in an era of interconnectedness”, that is to say, that all global security cultures that can now be observed imply intervention in multiple areas outside of traditional idea of sovereignty in the name of security. This is at the same time consequence and cause of the internationalization of world politics, conflicts, and their management. In analysing the four main security cultures that she detects, Kaldor underlines the fact that security is increasingly become more “bio-political” rather than “geo-political” in the sense that power is now obtained and expressed through the control over the population rather than directly

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<sup>146</sup> Kaldor M., (2018). *Global Security Cultures*; Cambridge, Polity Press. p2

territory.

The term security culture was proposed by Cristopher Daase in 2012 using the German word “Sicherheitskultur” which applies a study of security based on what he and his colleagues, Rauer and Junk, call the kulturwissenschaftlicher approach.<sup>147</sup> This approach includes the strategies and practices adopted by elite groups in their security management and the perception and fears of the population therefore including in the conception of security the social component and not presenting security as an exclusive matter of nation-states and territory. According to Daase, there are four dimensions to be considered when analysing the evolution of security: whose security is under consideration; the kind of security considered (beyond the military/territorial one); the geographic dimension not only confined to the nation-state, but to the region, the international arena and aspects of global concerns; and finally the severity of threats analysing the vulnerability of different actors to the different forms of security.<sup>148</sup>

Security cultures describe security in an innovative way in the sense that they break with the territorial and communitarian idea of security and rather describe an approach to security that is independent from the national strategy *per se*. The most manifest example of this is the United States and Russia’s approach to security. Despite their differences in international views and opposing sides in the majority of conflicts and topics, the US and Russia share an understanding and consequent practices and objectives that insert both countries in the realm of the first security culture: Geo-Politics. Security cultures are therefore different from security communities and states’ conception but rather describe an approach. As it will later be investigated more security cultures can coexist in the strategy applied to conflict and threat-management, therefore the security culture attributable to a state can change according to the context, however, the principle is that political and geographical disagreements do not matter in the manifestation of security cultures, but rather sometimes are a stronger presumption for the development of a common understanding of security as in the case of the US and Russia which developed their Geo-political approach during the Cold War, when it was the only global security culture.

As previously anticipated, an important element shaping the security culture is the power equilibrium. Power relations can be described through what Michael Foucault named a “dispositif”.<sup>149</sup> Power relations are indeed exercised through multiple tools including institutions, infrastructure, discourses, ideologies, decisions, laws, measures, scientific statements, and propositions, not

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<sup>147</sup> Daase C. (2012). Sicherheitskultur: Soziale und politische Praktiken der Gefahrenabwehr; Campus, pp. 23-44.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Foucault M., (1984). *Confession of the Flesh: the History of Sexuality Volume 4*; ed. Pantheon.

necessarily in an explicit way but thought the employment of diversified instruments that operate in all social spheres. The influence on social sphere is indeed what determines the institutionalization and radicalization of a security culture. The consequence of the de-territorialization of the security understanding is also a change in the conception of security providers. Security providers are indeed not only to be intended as nation-states and state-actors in general but also international institutions and local and/or hybrid political authorities, including civil society influential groups and leaders.

Security cultures are therefore to be identified according to their objectives and practices which in turn shape their components. The objectives are the norms and ideas constituting the basis of a culture, while practices are to be intended as the tools, tactics, technology and infrastructure employed to obtain the goals. Security cultures are thus the results of narratives, indicators, rules, tools, tactics, finance, infrastructure, technologies, political and power authorities. They are not static but rather dynamic and as such necessitate of what Edward Lock has identified as a “reproduction mechanism” which enhances the security culture to always re-invest itself throughout historical changes of any kind: social, political, economic, technological etc. Security practices, moreover, “in and of themselves create insecurity”, meaning that in the attempt to create security they re-invigorate and escalate causes of insecurity.<sup>150</sup> A clear example of this is that War on Terror launched by the United States, whose consequence has been the expansion and increase of terrorist extremist groups worldwide. As anticipated, according to the elements provided, Mary Kaldor identifies four global security cultures: Geo-politics, liberal peace, new wars, and war on terror, which will now be analysed. The following sections are therefore based on the characteristics described by Professor Kaldor in her book *Global Security Cultures*.

### **3.1.1. Geo-Politics**

The first security culture proposed by Mary Kaldor is Geo-Politics. Geo-Politics is a legacy of the Cold War era during which it was the only one global security culture as based on military forces, territoriality and deterrence. Nowadays Geo-Politics is still the dominant security culture as it is in practice the most applied to conflict-management. Nevertheless, Mary Kaldor describes how its characteristics have evolved in the post Cold War international scenario and new power balance consistently with the dynamic nature of security cultures in general.

The culture of Geo-Politics is based on great power contestation, as such the protagonists and real actors on the international arena are states, with their individual interests and territoriality.

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<sup>150</sup> Kaldor M., (2018). *Global Security Cultures*; Cambridge, Polity Press.



Territoriality is a key element as it is not only the major goal of the geo-political culture but also the starting element in determining power. The term “Geo-Politics” indeed refer to geographical determinism in the history of states where geography is a key element in the determination of their power: “geography is destiny”. As said, it is a military-based culture whose goals are achieved through traditional tools such as regular troops, intelligence operations, diplomacy, bureaucracy, military industries, and technological advancement through scientific and engineering discoveries applied to the military context. The tools obtained are those sophisticated weapons which are mainly used, following the logic of the Cold-War, for deterrence, in particular, of “peer competitors” such as China, or “rogue states” such as Iran or North Korea. The objective of their action is linked to national security intended as preservation of the national territory and the state’s sphere of influence together with access to the “global commons” such as the ones provided as examples by Kaldor: The Arctics and energy routes. This culture is powered by public financing and infrastructure of military industry and bases worldwide. As a legacy of the Cold-War, Geo-Politics finds its foundation on the control over the state, however, as previously anticipated, Mary Kaldor highlights an evolution in security cultures from a geopolitical understanding to a bio-political meaning of security that can also be detected in the culture of Geo-Politics. This implies that, Geo-Politics is increasingly less focused on securing borders and acquiring new territories and more about the control over the population through communication and political tools that constitute the “soft power” of a State. Control over the territory is therefore obtained through the control of the social element, the population.<sup>151</sup> It goes without saying, that it is possible to detect strong bonds between the culture of Geo-Politics and the realist current of thought and indeed great exponents throughout history of this culture were Otto von Bismarck, whose approach “realpolitik” constitute the origin of realism, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

In her book Professor Kaldor identifies six historical phases of Geo-Politics mostly associated to scientific revolutions that shaped military practices. The first phase is associated to gunpowder as scientific innovation and permanent official troops as military creation. Armaments production and industries were moved under the direct supervision of the state, personified in the monarch (*l’etat c’est moi*), therefore establishing a legitimate military apparatus that constitute the basis for all following phases. In this context, great personalities of the culture of Geo-Politics can be exemplified in the figures of Oliver Cromwell, William D’Orange and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.

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<sup>151</sup> Adler E., Barnett M., (1998). Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective; in *Security Communities*; Cambridge University Press.

The second phase coincides with the aftermath of the peace of Westphalia (1648) including the colonization period and Napoleonic Wars up until 1815. The elements introduced by these two war scenarios were the use of military tools against the population, in the case of colonial experiences, and the increase in scale and speed in warfare under Napoleon. Following the French Revolution, political and administrative measures were applied to most European countries including the freeing of serfs, the emancipation of Jews, the liberalization of trade, an overall reorganization, the growth in state arsenals, the establishment of a textile factory system and the standardization of uniforms in state's armies.

The third phase took place during the nineteenth century and mainly involved innovation in the communication and transportation sectors, including thermodynamics. These discoveries were applied to the military field by facilitating troops' movements and logistics. Historically, this period includes great events such as the American Civil War, the Crimean War, and unification and liberalization of Italy and Germany together with what has been called the "scramble for Africa".

The fourth phase coincides with the end of the nineteenth century, the birth of incorporate private industry and great arms companies. Another characterizing aspect was moreover the increase in market pressure and the importance on technical change and developments which led to a period of competitive militarization and the emergence of a global market for arms.

The fifth phase included the period of the two world wars and the Cold War which determined the peak of the culture of Geo-Politics. This phase included the development of cybernetic as technological innovation and an increase in the emphasis on command and control through technologies including, first and foremost, oil-intensive platforms (tanks, aeroplanes, submarines and missiles) which enabled offensive attacks. In the communication sphere great inventions are testified by the birth and military usage of radios, radar and the telephone together with the internet. All these technological advances applied to the military sphere and included in a global attitude based on Geo-Politics, determined an increase in the scale of killings facilitated by these tools themselves. The most renewed example of this is the employment of the atomic energy in the construction of the nuclear bomb and its launch on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This period was the peak of Geo-Politics as wars were "total wars" influencing every aspect of human life and mobilizing the whole population which therefore embraced the culture itself. The Cold War established meaning and practices to security that are still nowadays embedded in the global understanding: this includes military exercises, propaganda and soft power tools, competitive arms race and technological research in the field, and centralized control, together with a top importance attributed to military spending in the national budget.

Finally, the sixth phase, coincides with the last years of Cold War and is allegedly still going

on. This phase was characterized by the institutionalization of arms control through treaties in particular the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements between the US and the Soviet Union, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Conventions on the ban of Biological and Chemical weapons together with the on Intermediate-range nuclear forces and conventional forces.

One element can be particularly highlighted throughout these phases, that is to say, that the security culture of Geo-Politics has been able to survive to historical changes thanks to its innovative character based on technological changes. The reproduction mechanism envisaged by Lock is thus based on economic, political and military elements that reinforce the culture in its goals, strength and justification. A specific in-depth analysis of technological changes and evolution is provided by Mary Kaldor in her chapter dedicated to Geo-Politics of the book *Global Security Culture*. In the chapter the scholar analyses how developments and innovations have impacted on the way of doing security and conducting war and determined the re-invention of Geo-Politics throughout time and space arriving to the new advent of cybersecurity and consequent adaption to this new threat/opportunity.<sup>152</sup> The same concept applies to the tactics in war. Kaldor different forms of attacks and responses: the first one are conventional military attacks whose goal is the paralysis of the enemy; the second response is the population-centric COIN (Counterinsurgency, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) operations as applied in Afghanistan and Iraq whose goal is the protection of the population although destined to fail due to its military character and consideration of the population security as a mean rather than an end; a third response is what in Russia is called “non-linear war” or “hybrid war” through manipulation and ceasefires hiding geo-political selfish purposes and agenda also through the employment of special forces and internal opposition to exacerbate the internal division of a state. Once again, what is the manifest in these three approaches is the shift from a territorial based strategy to an understanding of security as based on population control.

### **3.1.2. Liberal Peace**

If Geo-Politics is easily attributable to a realist conception of international relations, liberal peace a security culture model is linked to the liberalist school of thought. Liberal peace culture is associated with multilateral institutions and interventions based on international cooperations for humanitarian purposes. The difference with Geo-Politics, and as will later be analysed with the other two cultures, is the shift in the meaning attributed to security: from defeat of the enemy to stabilization, intended as a collective form of stability rather than individual. The major component of liberal peace

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<sup>152</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press; p 56 -64.

is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine used to justify humanitarian interventions as in the case of Kosovo, Libya, Iraq, Somalia and Mali. Provided the centralization of multilateral organizations as major actors of the culture, such humanitarian interventions fall under the umbrella of UN peacekeeping operations whose goal is the establishment and preservation of human rights against abuses. Peacekeeping operations should also be aimed at the preservation of human security consistently with their UN mandate, although unfortunately, as will later be investigated in the analysis of case studies, they often fail in focusing on this approach. Liberal peace is often associated to the concept of “global governance” which implies a wide range of actors being involved in conducting security operations. Indeed, not only military personnel is involved but also civil organizations such as NGOs and international agencies, and not only states detain the control of tools and infrastructure but contrarily mainly regional and international organizations such as the European Union, whose humanitarian projects are present in wide geographical areas, the Africa Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) in coordination with also private institutions. In the words of Mary Kaldor, Liberal Peace can be described as the security culture of the inside going outside, highlighting the goal of an expanded security and stability worldwide.<sup>153</sup>

The term “liberal peace” was coined by Michael Doyle in 1983 and later adopted by the already mentioned UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In Doyle’s understanding, liberal peace was to be based on three pillars: democracy, liberal international principles, and commerce/free trade.<sup>154</sup> Today’s security model of liberal peace is based on four components: humanitarian efforts; international peacemaking; peacekeeping operations; and peacebuilding. Humanitarian efforts are based on humanitarian law principles of impartiality, neutrality and consent which are at the basis of the mandate of organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs such as Save the Children, MSF, and CARE with the support and coordination of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and action of the UNHCR. Peacemaking is aimed at the signing of internationally mediated peace agreements for whom the capacity to implement is assumed and which are a mix of international law and domestic public law. This second component also involves a Track 2 diplomacy through the mediation of NGOs and civil groups (e.g., Sant’Egidio) in the stipulation of the agreement. Peacekeeping operations are widely known and are probably the most controversial component of this culture. Such operations consist in interventions of troops under UN mandate aimed at intervening against human rights abuses and those who undermine the security of a country. The

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Doyle M., (2005). Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace; *American Political Science Review*; 99(3); pp-463-6.

three principles at the basis of peacekeeping operations are consent (of the state where troops are sent), impartiality, and non-use of force, although as it will be analysed in the second section of this chapter controversial situations are frequently created caused by the infringement of these principles. Finally, peacebuilding is a multidimensional component of liberal peace whose goal is to operate on several sectors in order to enhance peace and security. Thus, operations in the name of this component include: legal and administrative reforms, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration in society, elections, constitutions drafting, establishment of justice mechanisms, economic measures, and development projects.

Although on paper the culture of Liberal Peace seems perfectly in line with what was described in the previous two chapters and thus the goal of establishing a secure, just, and stable world, this approach has in practice presented many flaws. The major weakness, as underlined by professor Kaldor, is the fact that Liberal Peace as a culture is still deeply related to a conception of security linked to the understanding of old wars which was born during Cold War and therefore to the territorial and geopolitical components of security. Moreover, there are three major critiques to be highlighted. Firstly, according to Roland Pairs liberal peace as a concept has been implemented in a wrong way by enhancing the advancement of great powers' agenda while justifying them as humanitarian interventions.<sup>155</sup> Secondly, liberal peace has become a form of neo-imperialism as the result of interventions has been the imposition of western models without the respect of local values. Finally, and mostly importantly for the purpose of this work, liberal peace can still be described as a top-down approach which does not take into consideration local actors and their influential role in mediation and stabilization, or even possibly resolution as described in the previous chapter, therefore it fails in providing long-term conflict resolutions.

### **3.1.3. New Wars**

The security culture of new wars emerged from Cold War's civil wars characterized by ideological polarizations of the conflicting sides and international influence according to the two blocs. The result in today's culture is the disappearance of the distinction between the "inside and the outside" as well as the public and the private.<sup>156</sup> This imply the context of fragmented and decentralized political authorities, often in failed or quasi-failed states which are not able to provide for their citizens. The authority is therefore substituted by informal or hybrid entities such as, the most famous example, the

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<sup>155</sup> Paris R., (2009). Does Liberal Peacebuilding Have a Future; in Newman et al.; *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*; pp. 97-111. UNU/Brookings.

<sup>156</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press; P 29.

Islamic State (IS) or internationally recognized ones such as the Entities in Bosnia. The goal of new wars actors, which are composed by networks of both global and local state and non-state entities, is not a territorial conquest but rather the allocation and control over power and resources. This is obtained through the employment of low-tech armaments and small weapons aimed at obtaining political control over the population through violence directly against civilians. War tactics are not conventional because the goal is to obtain power through fear and fear is provoked by the frightening of the unarmed civilian population in any form of irregular warfare: sexual assaults, destruction of cultural sites, human trafficking, forced displacements etc. Provided so finance is not only the mean through which these activities occur, but also the final objective creating a reproduction mechanism based on eternal disorder that is by its nature destined to reproduce itself.

As reported by Mary Kaldor in the chapter dedicated to New Wars, after World War II wars that took place in China, Indo-China, Africa and Latin America, under the personalities of Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and Vo Nguyen Giap were characterized by this bio-politics component of warfare based on the control over the population rather than territory and the overthrow of previous systems.<sup>157</sup> What was critical in these contexts was external support from neighboring countries both in providing arms, bases, training, like particularly the country of the Eastern bloc (Russia, China and Cuba) or on the other hand by applying a counter-insurgency strategy (COIN) as most countries of the Western world. In this second case, tactics included the killing or arrest of insurgents by coercive means and intelligence operations. While in the context of the Cold War it was possible to make a distinction between guerrillas wars and terrorists, the New Wars of the twenty-first century are more stringently closer to the second group. New Wars' main actors are warlord rebels rather than those who demand reforms and anti-colonialization like in the past, and as such, their ultimate goal is to obtain power and resources through violence itself not necessarily against a regime.

Differences highlighted between the Cold War guerrillas and today's New Wars include the actors, the goals, the narrative, the tactics, communication technologies (ICTs), and the sources of income. For what concerns the actors, while during the twentieth century arms groups were composed of educated left-wing people moved by idealistic principles and organized, new warlords on the other hand command and control network of state and non-state groups which are remnant of previously organized one and do not belong a clear structure nor ideology or high goal. As already stated, the goal itself has changed from the willingness to overthrow the regime and thus lead to a structural change in the country, to a more general desire for power and resources through violence. In order to obtain so

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<sup>157</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press; P 78.

the narrative has lost its ideological component, usually socialist, and have become strictly populist and based on fear and a distinction between an “us” and “other” normally based on ethnic and religious identities. The result is a widely polarized society based on hate between different social groups fighting against one another for control over population, resources and therefore power. Provided the change in goal and narrative, the immediate consequence is a modification in the tactics. As already described, during the twentieth’s guerrillas the goal was a regime change and therefore the tactics consisted in liberating areas, nowadays, considered the goal of obtaining power and resources the tactics consist in pure violence against civilians, going against every established principle of international humanitarian law and warfare. Through violence, chaos is generated and through chaos warlords are able to maintain their control. A fifth element to be considered is the evolution of technology in shaping communication and warfare, and in particular of Information and Communications technologies (ICTs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Indeed, warlords’ power is linked to the magnitude of networks under their control and therefore mobilization is a fundamental component of New Wars. Such mobilization is facilitated by new communication devices and particularly the employment of social media. On the warfare side IEDs represent the concretization of anarchy in conducting attacks against the population. Finally, as already declared guerillas’ forces were supported by the Cold War’s blocs and in particular the Eastern one, while today finances have become increasingly private and as said goals and finance are intrinsically connected and reproduce the mechanism of the culture since access to state power is required in order to acquire resources, and on the other hand violence is needed to access the state power. All of this is further exacerbated by globalization which have facilitated the spread of these extremist and terrorist groups worldwide increasing their strength, capacity, and resources.

#### **3.1.4. War on Terror**

War on Terror is a security culture which is connected to the United States and the idea of American exceptionalism launched by President Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. The goal of the War on Terror is in its name itself that is to say the defeat of terrorism in the name of global security. The War on Terror can be considered as an evolution of the culture of Geo-Politics, with the main difference being that the enemies identified as to be defeated are non-state actors. Therefore, war tactics have evolved with the rise of a new model of attack based on targeted killing and torture through intelligence operations and drone campaigns shifting from a traditional military understanding of attacks to a hybrid one involving not only the military apparatus but also special forces, intelligence cells and private contractors and the employment of technologies such as mass surveillance, cyber warfare and robotics.

Although the term “War on Terror” was theoretically abolished in the National Security Strategy of President Barak Obama, in practice it has survived as a culture and rhetoric in the way the United States manage understands and manages global security. Paradoxically, these counter-terrorism measures have allegedly had the opposite impact, that is to say, the dramatic spread of extremist and terrorist groups, creating a self-reinvigorating reproduction mechanism based on an aggressive escalation.

The War on Terror was born as a geo-political response to 9/11 with US attack on Afghanistan and Iraq respectively in October 2002 and March 1993. Both attacks were justified as against the terrorist group Al Qaeda considered responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>. Such attacks were a model template for the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that implied the insertion in the US tactics of special forces and targeting killings and use of information technology to diminish the rate of casualties. In practice, the US approach proved to reserve little or no regard for the civilian population and casualties as well as human rights of those young men imprisoned and tortured on the ground of possible connections with Al Qaeda whose dignity was completely undermined (a clear example of these are the Guantanamo Bay cases). As previously anticipated, this resulted in an exponential increase in the recruiting of civilians in these extremist groups. As Kaldor states in her book “if before the invasion, Al Qaeda had barely existed ... now Al Qaeda in the Levant as it called itself expanded dramatically and adopted an exclusivist anti-Shi’a ideology”.<sup>158</sup>

Domestically, in the USA, President Bush institutionalized the War on Terror through the 2001 Patriot Act and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) together with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, new intelligence agencies and special forces. Great powers were moreover provided to the CIA which became directly involved in abroad military operations and directed the use of drones and other technologies for capturing and killing of the targets. Practices of illegal detention and torture of “foreign combatants” by special corps and under ambiguous conditions, such as the cases of the Guantanamo Bay area, raised concerns and aversion towards these practices by most countries, including US allies in Europe. Consequently, during his presidency, Barak Obama promised to close the Guantanamo detention center and end such practices, while abroad change the “war” doctrine with an anti-terrorism approach involving an increase in the employment of drones, surveillance, and raids together with the promise of withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, which was only temporary. With the growth of ISIS and its sub-groups (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) and increase in terrorist attacks worldwide (e.g., France in 2015) European countries have become increasingly

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<sup>158</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press p 127.



involved in the war on terror embracing the same security culture advanced by the US (e.g., Operation Barkhane in Mali). The main element of this culture is the conceptualization of anti-terrorism as a actual war against a – not always well defined – enemy through the militarization and securitization of abroad interventions on the ground of the global fight against terrorist which have become the worldwide legal justification for these attacks. Practically speaking, the main difference between the War on Terror and Geo-Politics and New Wars, is that the “enemy”, or rather the target, is an individual not a state or a group. Accordingly, the War on Terror has been described by many as an international manhunt <sup>159</sup> which creates a condition of a permanent state of war and exception. Critiques to these culture as many and well known, starting from the disregard for human dignity and fundamental rights such as the right to due process (Guantanamo cases) to the flaws in the legal ground behind the ideas of a pre-emptive self-defence justifying US invasions abroad.

**Table 2.1** Components of security cultures

Security culture	Narratives	Indicators	Rules	Tools	Tactics	Finance	Infrastructure
Geo-politics	Deter major war	Levels of armament and defence spending	Self-defence and international humanitarian law	Regular military forces, advanced weapons systems	Deterrence	Taxation	Arms industry, military bases, Ministries of Defence
New wars	Establish identity-based political authority	Discrimination against particular identity-based groups	None, occasionally warped version of Shari'ia	Networks of state and non-state actors, IEDs, suicide bombers, small arms	Violence against civilians	Outside sponsors or war-related and/or criminal activities	Globally networked havens
Liberal peace	Global stability	Numbers of conflicts	Emergence of post-bellum law, peace agreements	International agencies, peace-keeping forces, NGOs, private security contractors	Peace-making, peace-keeping, state-building	International public funding plus voluntary contributions	Global communication links, transportation, etc.
War on terror	Defeat terrorists militarily	Terrorist incidents	Stretching of international humanitarian law and notion of self-defence	Intelligence agencies, private security contractors, drones	Extensive surveillance and targeted killing	US government, public borrowing	Satellites, defence industry, communication networks

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<sup>159</sup> Chamayou G. (2011). The Manhunt Doctrine; *Radical Philosophy*; 168.

<sup>160</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press, p 26.

**Table 2.2** The dimensions of security cultures

Security culture	Political authority	Inside/Outside	Public/Private
Geo-politics	Nation-state	Clear distinction between inside and outside	Security under public control
New wars	Fragmented and decentralized	Merging of outside with inside, war and violence moving inside	Merging of public and private
Liberal peace	Global governance	Spread of inside to outside, more police-type use of military	Use of private subcontracting
War on terror	US hegemony	Spread of outside to inside, more militarized policing	Merging of public and private

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The described security cultures represent ideal models of current global approaches to security that have been and are applied to conflict-management to justify foreign interventions in conflict zones. However, given the complexity of today’s conflicts and global dynamics, it is quite impossible to detect a single culture in a specific context, but rather situations are to be explained as a union of more security cultures together. In particular, Mary Kaldor underlines how the unification of the culture of New Wars with the Liberal Peace approach create conditions for an “Hybrid Peace”; New Wars summed to Geo-Politics generate an “Hybrid War”, while New Wars associated with War on Terror lead to raise of Jihadism.<sup>162</sup> The next section will therefore be dedicated to the presentation of three case studies and an investigation on the approach applied to their resolution and reasons for their failure, to be found in the application of these security cultures which, as anticipated in the premises to this chapter, do not regard the concept of human security and the importance of civil society in conflict-resolution.

<sup>161</sup> Kaldor M.; (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. Polity Press p. 27.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

### **3.2. Case-studies of negative conflict-management**


The following three case-studies are aimed at providing examples of how these four security cultures, when applied, fail in finding concrete and long-term solutions for conflict-management. The reason behind this is the disregard for the local population and therefore lack of communication with those who are supposed to be the recipients of security. Most interventions have been or are justified as “humanitarian”, however, the humanitarian focus is often practically put in a second-place position, as the “human” component itself is not at the centre of considerations when defining and applying a strategy. The following three case-studies have been selected according to a geographical and temporal logic and application of a security culture, although, as previously highlighted, security cultures tend to mix in the context of a single reality. The first one, Iraq, belongs to the Middle East region and is a concluded conflict that represents the perfect example of application of the War on Terror security culture. The second one, Kosovo, serves as European example of a conflict that, despite being officially concluded, still presents negative consequences in the reality of the country and the everyday life of its citizens being a greatly unstable country from a political and social perspective and which represents the, failing, application of the Liberal Peace security culture. Finally, the third case-study is Mali, an African country whose violent conflict is still on-going, and which represents the application of New Wars security culture and foreign response according to a initially Liberal Peace approach that is transforming in a, mostly European, War on Terror.

#### **3.2.1. Iraq War 2003-2011**

On March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003, the US and its allied forces launched a mass-scale attack on Iraq initiating the Iraq war/invasion or Second Gulf War through an airstrike on Iraqi Presidential Palace. The attack was launched following an escalation in tensions that have continued in the aftermath of the first Gulf War (1990-91) and particularly the rise to power of Saddam Hussein. A “no-fly” zone to Iraqi aircrafts was indeed established in the northern and the southern part of the country and the UN imposed sanctions aimed at preventing further development in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (WMD) which were part of Iraqi arms programme. Despite this, weapons keep being uncovered by UN inspectors throughout the 1990s and, following President Bill Clinton’s authorization to Operation Desert Fox (bombing of Iraqi military sites), the country refused to allow further UN inspectors on the territory and started its decline due to the economic sanctions and isolation. Following the 9/11 attack, the US accused Iraq of still detaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and supporting terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda (the perpetrator of 9/11) therefore the Bush Administration set the disarmament of Iraq as its priority. Despite in November 2002, UNSC Resolution 1441 was passed

demanding Iraq to readmit UN inspectors, and Iraq seemed to comply with this and previous resolutions, President Bush (together with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair) keep declaring that Iraq was hiding its WMD arsenal from UN inspectors and on March 17<sup>th</sup> declared the end of all diplomatic ties with Iraq without involving the UNSC in a possible further resolution and issuing an ultimatum according to which Saddam Hussein was demanded to leave the country within 2 days. The United States' action was firmly objected by major powers such as Russia, France and Germany as a considered an action aimed at setting the ground for a war, which indeed started, as anticipated, on March 20<sup>th</sup>, following Saddam Hussein's refusal to leave Iraq, and lasted until 2011 when President Obama withdrew US troops from the country.

For the purpose of this work there is no need to go into details on the dynamics of the attack, it is sufficient to say that US forces invaded Iraq and conquered its capital Baghdad in April 2003 and on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2003 with his "Mission Accomplished Speech" President Bush declared the end of the first phase of combat, only a few weeks after launching the attack and concluding the first stage of the conflict very rapidly considering that, as previously stated, US troops remained in Iraq until 2011. The following December 13<sup>th</sup> Saddam Hussein was captured, convicted for crimes against humanity and executed on December 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006. The second phase of the war was characterized by insurgencies in all major Iraqi cities that transformed the war in a full-scale guerrilla warfare that was increasingly presented to the international community as a civil war, with the number civil casualties, that had initially been contained in the first part of the conflict, skyrocketing. Statistics and number of casualties are clearly at the centre of dispute and there has been no official agreement on a final number. However, in June 2023 the research study Statistica have published the statistics from 2003 to 2023 according to the data collected by the independent British-American group the Iraq Body Count Project (IBC Project), that figure as follows:



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Moreover, according to a report of the same Organization, between March 2003 and March 2005 24,865 civilian deaths were recorded, 37% of which is attributable to US and allied forces' responsibility (9,270 deaths).<sup>164</sup>

The three major justifications to the war provided for by the Bush Administration were the following: the defeat of terrorism in the country; the necessity to destroy Iraq's WMD arsenal; and the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime and establish a democratic government based on the western model. Soon after the conclusion of the first stage of the war all three justifications vacillated. Indeed, in July 2004, a U.S. bipartisan Commission empowered of investigating on the 9/11 attacks found that there was no "collaborative operational relationship" between the Iraqi Ba'ath Government and Al Qaeda.<sup>165</sup> Soon after the International Iraq Survey Group (ISG) published the Duelfer Report according to which Iraq did not have any viable WMD programme at the time of the US invasion in

<sup>163</sup> Statistica (2023); Number of documented civilian deaths in the Iraq war from 2003 to May 2023; source iraqbodycount.org.

<sup>164</sup> Iraq Body Count Project (2005). A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003–2005. Archived from the original on November 24, 2006. Retrieved November 24, 2006.

<sup>165</sup> United States' Congress 9/11 Commission Report p 9.

2003 and afterwards, proving that the US intelligence services have provided erroneous forecasts and advices to the Bush Administration thus exacerbating the political domestic debate within the United States at the eve of the 2004 presidential elections and drastically diminishing domestic support for the invasion.<sup>166</sup> These reports made the first two justifications advanced by the Bush Administration void therefore deteriorating the US position globally. To this, in late 2006, was added a new report from the ISG according to which the internal situation in Iraq was “grave and deteriorating” and therefore called for a regionwide diplomatic effort and a reduction for US military role as it stated that the latter was providing diminishing support to Iraq and increasing responsibility for the drop in the country’s security.<sup>167</sup> This last report basically proved to the US and the world that the “democratization” process that was supposed to occur with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, has failed to take care, and that the US presence on the country has contrarily exacerbated internal hostilities and chaos as proved by the insurgencies and guerrilla-like warfare that has begun on Iraqi territory, thus contradicting with the third justification provided for by Bush.

Consequently, the last justification promotable to the international arena, was the one based on humanitarian grounds. Regarding this, in January 2004, Human Rights Watch published an article named *War in Iraq: not a humanitarian intervention*, which is summarized in the following paragraph. The article is of particular relevance because, although it was published relatively soon compared to what would have been the continuation of the conflict for the following 7 years, exposed the point of view of an influential NGO which, as stated in the article itself, tend to not provide comments on conflicts and maintain its neutrality. The reason for this is explained in the article: “at a time of renewed interest in humanitarian intervention, the Iraq war and the effort to justify it even in part in humanitarian terms risk giving humanitarian intervention a bad name. If that breeds cynicism about the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, it could be devastating for people in need of future rescue.”<sup>168</sup> Human Rights Watch’s conclusion on the war in Iraq is that it cannot be considered a humanitarian intervention, and thus be justified in these terms, starting from the fact that humanitarian military interventions as provided for by the UNSC and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (mentioned in chapter 1) can only be justified when there is an imminent danger

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<sup>166</sup> United States’ Central Intelligence Agency. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD – Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on 2 October 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2016.

<sup>167</sup> Iraq Study Group Report (2006). <https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/12/iraq-study-group-report>

<sup>168</sup> Roth K., (2004). *War in Iraq: not a humanitarian intervention*. Human Rights Watch. Available at [https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/3.htm#\\_Toc58744952](https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/3.htm#_Toc58744952)

for the country's population of "genocide, mass slaughter or loss of life"<sup>169</sup>, therefore a large-scale danger that can be considered proportionate to the further danger and destruction that a war implies, and in this case there was not. Moreover, there was no approval by the UN Security Council, which clearly run the risk of becoming a precedent in the legitimation of military interventions damaging the entire international legal system. Humanitarian interventions are to be deemed exceptional measures. Provided this, HRW underlined five factors characterizing humanitarian interventions: reasonable and proportionate military action; an action primarily guided by humanitarian grounds; respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; respect the principle that it should in principle do more good than harm; and respect the authority of the UNSC (with exception in the case of emergencies). In applying these criteria to the Iraqi case, HRW took in consideration the "level of killing" in Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein, to determine whether the high threshold set to justify humanitarian interventions was met. Despite recognising the brutality of Hussein's dictatorship, the NGO found that no large-scale or exceptional magnitude of killings was occurring to justify a military humanitarian intervention and that moreover no other remedy to overthrow and held Hussein accountable for his crimes has consistently been looked for therefore also the "last reasonable option" criteria was missing to justify the intervention. Moreover, the humanitarian ground for justifying the war was explicitly second-placed as Bush himself provided as official reason the need to destroy alleged WDMs and terrorist groups and restore a democracy. For what concerns compliance with human rights and IHL, HRW declared as follows "Coalition forces took extraordinary care to avoid harming civilians when attacking fixed, pre-selected targets. But their record in attacking mobile targets of opportunity was mixed. As Human Rights Watch reported in detail in its December 2003 report on the war, U.S. efforts to bomb leadership targets were an abysmal failure. The 0-for-50 record reflected a targeting method that bordered on indiscriminate, allowing bombs to be dropped on the basis of evidence suggesting little more than that the leader was somewhere in a community. Substantial civilian casualties were the predictable result ... Such disregard for civilian life is incompatible with a genuinely humanitarian intervention."<sup>170</sup> Although this assessment by HRW was made in January 2004, the organization correctly predicted that the rise of insurgent groups and civil war would have made Iraq an even deadlier reality than it was under Hussein, therefore also the "make more good than harm" criterion was not met in considering this a humanitarian intervention. Finally, as fundamental legal ground for the future of the international arena and norms of international law, the intervention could not be

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

considered legitimate without the approval of the UNSC which clearly lacked.

In conclusion to this paragraph on the Iraqi conflict, it is possible to detect the application of the security culture of the War on Terror, sometimes disguised as “Liberal Peace” although clearly lacking any criteria to justify it as an intervention on humanitarian grounds. The application of the culture showed in the case of Iraq the dangers from a political, civilian and legal perspective in conducting military operations based almost exclusively on intelligence findings and preconceptions, in the case of the US due to its vulnerabilities in the aftermath of 9/11. The application of the War on Terror security culture led to a debatable success in the first phase of the conflict which however transformed the country on which the conflict was taking place, in power-kef, where a full-scale war without clearly defined borders and laws was occurring at the expenses of civilian lives and the local population, which was never involved in the decision-making process on Iraq’s future. The US invasion of Iraq was preceded and followed by my firm criticism. The main grounds for criticism are to be found in the legality of the intervention itself; the number of human casualties; the disregard for human rights and dignity as in the number of scandals US troops were involved in (e.g. Iraq prisons abuses); the insufficient post-invasion plans for R&D; the financial costs; the damages to the US reputation globally; the endangerment and ethnic cleansing of religious and ethnic minorities by insurgents; and the disruption of Iraqi oil production and related energy security concerns. Moreover, paradoxically, the US invasion of Iraq was perceived as anti-Muslim/ anti-Islamic world operation, becoming the reason and justification for jihadist groups to raise and advancing their own cause. As in the case of Afghanistan, terrorist groups were not defeated but rather transformed and reinvented themselves becoming even more influential non-state actors in the international arena, as the ISIS attacks in Europe prove. A slightly positive side that was instigated by the US invasion of Iraq was the raise of global awareness on sensible issues and the willingness of the global civil society to have a voice in the matter. Indeed, a month before the starting of the war, on February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2003, the EU countries organized protests in the major European cities (in the end together with cities in North America and elsewhere) which were joined by more than 100 million people globally, with the one in Rome reaching the peak of 3 million people and breaking the Guinness World Record as the largest anti-war rally in history.

### **3.2.2. Kosovo 1998-present**

The Kosovo war was a conflict fought between the ethnic Albanians of the rebel group of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the ethnic Serbs and forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) under whose control was the autonomous region of Kosovo. The conflict was characterized by brutalities and atrocities against the civilian population from all sides: the Yugoslavian



forces pursued a strategy of ethnic cleansing against KLA opponents and sympathizers and when attempts to reach a peace agreement failed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's forces intervened with airstrikes on the region causing numerous civilian deaths under the justification of a "humanitarian war". The war was followed by a peace accord between NATO and Yugoslavia and the deployment through UNSC Resolution 1244 of the UN Peacekeeping Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission which are still in place and have proceeded in their operations with multiple controversies since 1999. This conflict presumably remains the most important example of controversies around the Liberal Peace security culture and its application, together with its failure to consistently focus on the civilian population and make their security a priority, as the tensions in the now disputed Republic of Kosovo, as unilaterally declared independent in 2008 but not yet recognised as such by all states (including Serbia), are still continuing nowadays.

The prelude to the conflict can be traced back to the decision by the at the time President of the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, to abrogate the constitutional autonomy of the Kosovo region which was (and is) inhabited by a majority of Muslim Albanians, but still represented a sacred land for the Orthodox Serbs. The decision triggered an increase in tensions between the two ethnic groups which led to growth in support for the more extremist side of the ethnic Albanians, and in 1995 the KLA started its first attacks against the Serbs, including police stations and law enforcement authorities in the region. The Kosovo war initiated in 1998, when KLA's attacks transformed in a real insurgency and armed uprising expanding against Yugoslav authorities which intervened in the region. The increase in presence of Serb and Yugoslav forces led to atrocities against the ethnic Albanian population causing a mass-outflow of refugees leaving the region. By March 1999 370.000 Kosovars were officially considered displaced.<sup>171</sup> Despite the increase in attention by international media and authorities, with the creation of the Contact Group formed by Germany, France, Italy and Russia, and consequent attempts to reach a cease-fire, return of refugees and access to international inspectors, fights in Kosovo did not stop but rather increase in their magnitude, with Milošević becoming President of Yugoslavia and engaging in a programme of ethnic cleansing. The international response was the imposition of an arms embargo by the UNSC and attempts to reach an agreement in Rambouillet, which however, failed. On March 20<sup>th</sup>, 1999, a new campaign of repression and expulsion of Kosovars from the region was initiated by the Yugoslav forces in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. These last attacks led to the decision of NATO military forces to military

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<sup>171</sup> Abrahams F., et al. (2001). *Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (March–June 1999)*. Retrieved 25 February 2013. Human Rights Watch. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/kosovo/>

intervene initiating a campaign of airstrikes and aerial bombing under the name of “humanitarian intervention”, without however never obtaining the UNSC authorization. The bombing lasted 11 weeks expanding to the whole Serbian Republic and reaching Belgrade and significant Serbian infrastructure targets, as well as causing the death of around 500 Yugoslav civilians and wounding approximately 6000.<sup>172</sup> In response, the Yugoslav forces caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in what are now Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro. A peace accord was finally reached in June when Yugoslav and Serb forces agreed to withdraw the region and allowed the return of nearly 1 million ethnic Albanians, together with the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, which became a region under UN administration, and the NATO’s KFOR. Such missions are in still in place nowadays but have however proceeded, as in the majority of UN monitored missions, be at the centre of debate and controversies due to their legitimacy and actions carried out by peacekeepers and force units as in the case of sexual abuses scandals and forced prostitution cases denounced by Amnesty International in 2004 and various journalist reports.<sup>173 174</sup>

As anticipated, the failure in NATO “humanitarian intervention” and Liberal Peace security culture is manifest in the fact that, not only civilian lives were disregarded throughout the war, but the conflict within the region never practically stopped. Indeed, in 2004 insurgencies started again leading to the 2008 self-declaration of independence and creation of the autonomous Kosovo Republic, which is a the centre of international dispute as it has been recognised by 99 out 193 UN states, including the United States and major European countries, but never by influential ones such as Russia and China (together with Spain, Greece, Cipro, Slovakia and Romania) and most importantly Serbia, causing a permanent state of tension in the region. Most recently a new crisis has erupted starting from November 2022 when Kosovo demanded Serb residents to renounce to their licence plates issued in Serbia and swap them with Kosovo-issued ones raising new tensions with Serbia which, in line with its non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, does not deemed the licences’ swap necessary and therefore accept Kosovar police’s reprimands and fines. Kosovo’s actions have raised disappointments and concerns also from its EU partners and the United States. Tensions have since then escalated, particularly in the northern region of Kosovo inhabited by a majority of Serb residents, where, in April 2023, four ethnic Albanian mayors have been elected with a 3.47% turnout following an election

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<sup>172</sup> Arkin W. M., (2000). The Civilian Deaths. Civilian deaths in the NATO air campaign. Retrieved 3 May 2015. Human Rights Watch. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/natbm002.pdf>

<sup>173</sup> Amnesty International Report 2004. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/poi10/0004/2004/en/>

<sup>174</sup> Traynor I., (May 7 2004). *Nato force feeds Kosovo sex trade*. The Guardian. Retrieved 1 September 2012. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/07/balkans>

boycott by the Serbs and provoking new demonstrations and violent clashes in the region between local police, protestors and NATO KFOR troops. Of the latter, around 30 peacekeepers have been injured, the majority of which Italians and Hungarians, drawing the international community's attention with NATO declaring the attack "totally unacceptable" and calling for dialogue. On the other hand, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, has put the Serbian forces on alert and moved them closer to the border with Kosovo. Finally, in June 2023, Pristina has accused Belgrade of having illegally arrested and detained three Kosovar police agents on the border between the two countries. Serbia in response holds that the agents had illegally trespassed the border line, which is however not officially defined yet as, since Serbia does not recognise Kosovo's independence, is considered by the latter an international border while by the former a simple administrative line between two regions. The current situation highlights the flaws of the international community's strategy and its past failures in providing a long-term stable resolution to the Kosovo War. Indeed, the controversies around civilian casualties and arbitrariness in the conducting of military interventions and operations within the region, have disregarded the importance of focusing on local civil society and lacked a consistent communication with those directly involved in tensions and who represent the only real legitimate source of a stable and long-term resolution. Liberal Peace security culture has in Kosovo demonstrated its weaknesses as it missed in priority: the protection of civilians and stable resolution of civilian tensions. <sup>175 176 177 178</sup>

### **3.2.3. Mali 2012 - ongoing**

On January 16<sup>th</sup> 2012 the still on going war in Mali outbreak. The war started in the form of insurgencies by the National Movement for the Liberalization of Azawad (MNLA), a secessionist group was the independence of the northern region of Mali which they call indeed Azawad. The insurgencies transformed, on March 22<sup>nd</sup> of the same year, in a coup d'état against the official government and Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré, resulting in the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State gaining power and taking control over Mali. Immediately after, the National Committee suspended the Malian Constitution. By April 2012, the MNLA had in the meantime gained control over the Northern region of Mali and declared the independence of the Tuareg

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<sup>175</sup> Kovacevic T., (May 31, 2023). *Kosovo: Why is violence flaring up again?*. BBC. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/62382069>

<sup>176</sup> Delauney G., (November 1, 2022). *Number-plate crackdown raises tensions in Kosovo*. BBC. Available at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63471041>

<sup>177</sup> Delauney G., Armstrong K., (May 30, 2023). *Kosovo: Fresh clashes as Nato troops called in to northern towns*. BBC. Available at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65748024>

<sup>178</sup> Pizzolo P., (July 15, 2023). *Le nuove tensioni tra Serbia e Kosovo dopo l'arresto degli agenti di polizia kosovari*. Osservatorio sul Mediterraneo (OSMED). Available at <https://www.osmed.it/2023/07/05/le-nuove-tensioni-tra-serbia-e-kosovo-dopo-larresto-degli-agenti-di-polizia-kosovari/>

people on April 5<sup>th</sup> by officially renaming the region Azawad. The MNLA was initially backed by Islamist groups in the region, which however, once the control was obtained over northern Mali started imposing their own ideology in the form of application of the Sharia Law. This led to manifest divergences with the MNLA and consequently new fights between the MNLA and the mentioned Islamic groups including the Al-Qaeda Malian cell Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin . By July 17<sup>th</sup> 2012, the MNLA lost control over Azawad to these Islamic groups which therefore remained in complete control of Northern Mali and its population.

The overall climate of chaos led the Government of Bamako to officially request military support from abroad obtaining it from its culturally and historically closer foreign power: France, that intervened through Operation Serval. The French intervention, together with the contribution of an international coalition, was successful in regaining power over the Northern territories under Islamic control by February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2013. Soon later, on April 25<sup>th</sup> the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, better known by its French acronym MINUSMA, was established through UNSC Resolution number 2100 and by June 18<sup>th</sup> a first peace agreement was reached between the official Government and the Tuareg, which seemed to stabilize the situation. However, on September 26<sup>th</sup>, the rebels pulled out of the agreement by claiming that the Government had not respected it. In the meantime, the international intervention in the country, starting from the French one, developed its goal in a broader counterterrorism mission by transforming the previously declared Operation Serval, which was solely aimed at answering to the Malian Government's request to re-obtain power in the northern territories, in Operation Barkhane, a declared counterterrorism operation in Mali. The same logic was followed by the UN peacekeeping mission which expanded its scope to security matters on June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2014, through UNSC Resolution 2164. On the fighting side, a new ceasefire was reached on February 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015, together with new peace accords being signed in Bamako in April of the same year. Despite this, violence and fighting in the country did not stop but rather increased especially from 2018 and two more coup d'états occurred in 2020 (August 18<sup>th</sup>) and 2021 (May 24<sup>th</sup>). In particular, during the most recent one the newly elected President Bah Ndaw and the Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were arrested and only released following their resignations with the Vice-President Assimi Goita proclaimed new President and Choguel Kokalla Maiga Prime Minister. Following this coup d'état, the Government of Bamako and French forces manifested divergences on the security strategy to stabilize Mali which escalated until in February 2022, President Emmanuel Macron officially declared the end of Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of French troops from Mali, alongside other EU countries and Canada. The withdrawal of troops concluded in August, while

the termination of all operations linked to Operation Barkhane occurred on November 9<sup>th</sup> 2022. Soon later, on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, Germany followed-up announcing the withdrawal of its troops while more recently, in conjunction with the expiration date of UN mandate in Mali on June 30<sup>th</sup> 2023 and call for extension by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and as peak of growing tension between local authorities and peacekeepers that has continued throughout years, Mali's Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, rejected Guterres's proposal, by declaring that UN forces have failed to respond effectively to Mali's security challenges. In response, UN commanders have claimed that local Malian government authorities have often interfered with peacekeeping operations causing its diminished effectiveness to which Foreign Minister Diop has replied by saying that these allegations are "detrimental to peace, reconciliation and natural cohesion in Mali". The most recent news at the time of writing (July 2023) is that the UN Security Council has hold a session dedicated to Mali during which the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces for the next 6 months has been voted.<sup>179</sup>

One of the main aspects making the situation in Mali complex is the different actors involved in the conflict. The original factions opposing one another were the Government of Mali, with its military apparatus, and National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which initiated the conflict insurging against the central government to have the northern Mali regions, renamed Azawad, declared independent and a homeland for the Tuareg people, a local autonomous population. Originally, the MNLA was supported by Islamist groups but given their differences on the future of the new proclaimed independent state, a conflict arose between these two factions as well. In particular, actors to be mentioned are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, with other jihadist foreign entities supporting them. In addition to this, foreign involvement in the conflict is of the utmost importance. At Bamako's request to obtain military support to regain control over the northern region, in 2013 former colonizer, France, initiated a military operation in Mali against the Islamists, who had by the time obtained control of the area. The initial operation, Operation Serval, was replaced in mid-2014, by a broader counterterrorist action: Operation Barkhane, which was declared terminated at the beginning of 2022 with the consequent withdrawal of French troop by August 2022. In collaboration and support to French operation in the area, although with an officially different mandate being peacekeeping or for better saying in this context, peacebuilding, is the UN mission MINUSMA. The original mandate established by the UNSC in April 2013 was to support the political process of the country. With a new Resolution (2164) of June 2014 the duties were expanded to ensuring security, stability, protection of

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<sup>179</sup> BBC (July 30, 2023). Mali and the UN: Why peacekeepers are being told to leave. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60419799>

civilians, reconciliation between the parties involved, the reestablishment of State authority, the promotion and protection of human rights and the rebuilding of the security section. Moreover, the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS) is strongly engaged in the area: its leaders are among the main contributors to MINUSMA and the Organization has been acting as mediator in order to lead to a political process and new fair elections. With the failure to comply to the agreement on new elections between Mali and ECOWAS, the latter has imposed rigid economic sanctions on the country and, following the extraordinary Summit on January 9, 2022, taken strong actions aimed at the reestablishment of democracy and stability. An additional support is provided by the European Union through EUCAP Sahel Mali: a civilian crisis management Mission launched in January 2015 following an official invitation by the Malian government. This implies the involvement of the EU Member States and troops of some of them, as for instance, Germany. Finally, a very controversial matter is related to the presence of the Wagner group: a Russian paramilitary organization and private military company who is officially acting autonomously through mercenaries, but allegedly financed by the Russian government. The incursion of Russia in Malian affairs is a concern for all the other actors previously mentioned and actions perpetrated by the Wagner group are a source of anxiety for future stabilization of the country given that it acts “beyond the law” (even the Russian one that prohibits private military organizations) and fail to respect international law committing war crimes and breaches of human rights.<sup>180</sup>

A particularly relevant element in evaluating the conflict-management strategy of international powers and organizations in Mali is the evolution of their goal. Both the French approach and UN one has developed from a logic of military stabilization (Operation Serval) and peacebuilding (UNSC Resolution 2100) to one of counterterrorism operation and securitization mission with Operation Barkhane and the enlargement of UN scope through Resolution 2164 which have not always met the approval of the local government.<sup>181</sup> The UN mission deserves in this regard a particular attention. With a troop ceiling of about 12.600 units MINUSMA is the third largest UN force and with around 300 peacekeepers’ fatalities it is the deadliest. As anticipated, an analysis of UN approach in Mali is essential because it is one of the major causes for failure in the country. UN peacekeeping missions operate under basic principles of consent of the parties (currently lacking from the Malian Government side); impartiality, which is going to be the main element under investigation in this paragraph; and non-use of force except in cases of self-defence, again here under debate. By applying in this new

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<sup>180</sup> Congressional Research Service (May 23, 2022). *In Focus: Crisis in Mali*.

<sup>181</sup> Karlsrud J.; (2017). Towards UN counter-terrorism operations?, *Third World Quarterly*.

securitization and counterterrorism approach UN forces have however become an active part of the conflict by engaging in collaboration missions with other international powers, first and foremost France, against insurgents and Islamic groups considered terrorists, despite the fact that there has not been an agreement on an officially internationally recognised definition of terrorism and those who are to be considered terrorists, thus the identification of who is a terrorist and who is not is strongly politically motivated, and again against the principle of neutrality and impartiality of the UN. This stance as active actor in the conflict is undermining the neutrality of the UN peacekeepers consequently also bringing up a legal issue, that is to say, that as active part to the conflict, peacekeepers should not be protected by their special status anymore but be considered prosecutable under humanitarian international law. Moreover, MINUSMA's strategy and this active role runs the risk of undermining not only the legitimacy of the Mali mission but of the whole system of UN operations globally.<sup>182</sup> More practically speaking furthermore, instead of providing protection to civilians and stabilization and stability to the country the UN approach results in creating a more hostile and diffident environment towards the operation and peacekeepers and pushing local entities, both authorities, civil society organizations, and individual civilians farther from the original goal and looking for protection from those entities which the UN operations is aimed at dissolving. Finally, the current failure of MINUSMA can also be identified in the act that to conduct counterterrorist missions it has been collaborating with the other international entities in the country, however with the withdrawal of the French troops and the other countries' alongside, the UN operation lack resources and capabilities to continue its actions efficiently. Three major examples of this lack of neutrality, active part in the conflict, and lack of resources independently from the French and international forces are: the 2015 plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism announced by former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, which extended the UN missions' mandate in areas threatened by terrorist groups; the creation of All Sources Information Fusion Mission (ASIFU), the first explicit intelligence cell in a UN peacekeeping mission working in open collaboration with France through information-sharing; and the establishment of a Transnational and Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Unit within MINUSMA.


The Mali conflict represents an example of the application of a New Wars security culture to which the international response has been a failing mix between Liberal Peace and a European form of War on Terror, with the latter taking the lead. Indeed, not only the international presence has increasingly been rejected by Malian authority, but also the population is growingly losing faith in the UN due to its securitization approach which has lost focus on the protection of civilians and their well-

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<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

being as priority, as looking for protection from those groups who were to be dissolved, as local news and stories tell. Regarding civilian casualties the UN has released a report in May alleging that during an anti-jihadist operation in central Mali in March 2022, Malian army troops and foreign mercenaries killed 500 civilians.

## Fatalities in Mali violence



Source: ACLED Info

**BBC** 183

Finally, even the goal of eradicating terrorism is failing, which is not surprised if considered the previous analysis on the application of the War on Terror culture to Iraq. In article by the BBC dated June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2023, it was reported that “Despite the presence of UN peacekeepers and French troops, who led counter-terror operations, the number of terror attacks in Mali steadily increased, as did the number of Malians joining insurgent groups.”<sup>184</sup>

### 3.3. Conclusions

In this third chapter the security cultures at the basis of strategy approaches in international conflict managements have been investigated. Such global security cultures are the object of Professor

<sup>183</sup> BBC (July 30, 2023). *Mali and the UN: Why peacekeepers are being told to leave*. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60419799>

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.



Mary Kaldor's analysis presented in her homonymous book *Global Security Cultures*. According to her four security cultures can be detected: Geopolitics, Liberal Peace, New Wars, and War on Terror. An investigation on these four approaches have been provided in the first section of this chapter highlighting the flaws deriving from the application of all four cultures to past and current global conflicts through international interventions that have disregarded the social and civil component of the conflict zones.

The second section has consequently been dedicated to an analysis of three conflicts which represents examples of these approaches' application. The first example has been the Iraq war between 2003 and 2011 which represents the application of the US War on Terror sometimes disguised as Liberal Peace, and consequent eruption in the second phase of the conflict of a sort of New Wars culture which has led, as envisaged by Mary Kaldor as the unification of New Wars and War on Terror, to the emergence of jihadist groups. The second example is the Kosovo war, which has officially taken place between 1998 and 1999 but whose consequences and tensions have continued steadily until 2008 with the self-proclamation of independence of the Kosovo Republic, and again escalating now with new tensions at the border. This second conflict represents the failure in the applications of the Liberal Peace security culture as response to a domestic conflict. Again, as theorized by Kaldor, the result has been a very flexible and unstable hybrid peace which result in constant tensions and new escalations. Finally, the last example is an ongoing conflict in the Sahel region, namely Mali, which has been the unification of a New Wars security culture followed by an initially Liberal Peace approach that has transformed into a European War on Terror. All of these examples represent failures by the international community in providing consistent support to the resolution of conflicts as their flaws and weakness, mainly caused by the disregard of the civil society as fundamental component in peacebuilding, have had as consequences a great number of casualties and unstable short-term resolutions whose consequences are evident.

This chapter was aimed at providing negative examples of conflict management due to the non-compliance with the approach proposed in chapter 1 and 2 through the prioritization of human security and the involvement of the civil society. The next fourth and final chapter will be entirely dedicated to the Syrian conflict and proposals and recommendation for the above-mentioned strategy in order to envisage a stable and long-term stabilization of the country.

## CHAPTER 4: CASE-STUDY ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION: THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

This last chapter is written with the intention of applying the methodology presented in chapters 1 and 2 to a case-study. The example selected is the Syrian conflict which represents the perfect case of a civil war that has become an internationalized conflict and ground for great powers' competition, as well as, proliferation of non-state actors involved. This chapter will therefore provide insights on the on-going war, the socio-economic situation of the country and the work carried out by civil society organizations towards peacebuilding and stabilization. It will finally conclude with a short analysis of two other case studies in which civil society organizations has been/are influential in the context of resolution and stabilization in order to prove how the methodology presented is applicable to different contexts and situations. The chapter will be followed by practical policy recommendations that can be applied not only to the specific case of Syria but also to all conflict zones, starting from the concept of human security and support to civil society that has theorized in the first chapters and is the supported thesis of this work.

### 4.1. The Syrian War

What started as pro-democratic peaceful revolution known as the “Revolution for Dignity” in the context of the major Arab spring protests in the region, transformed in a now 12 years long war which has been regarded as the second deadliest conflict of the 21<sup>st</sup> century with an estimate of 470,000–610,000 deaths and about 11 millions displaced people.<sup>185</sup> The revolution started in the southern city of Daraa on March 15<sup>th</sup> 2011, after the arrest and incarceration on March 6<sup>th</sup> of 15 students who had written anti-Assad and anti-government graffiti. The protests soon expanded to other provinces in the country and immediately met the repressive response of the Syrian Arab Forces which were deployed with the intent of shooting at the participants, starting from Daraa itself where about 6000 soldiers were deployed and hundreds of people killed.<sup>186</sup> On March 18<sup>th</sup> the “Friday for Dignity” occurred with large-scale protests being organized major cities of the country including its capital Damascus, to which the police responded by opening fire against the protestors. As reported by the BBC, by June 2011 hundreds of thousands of people had joined the protests and tens of thousands of

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<sup>185</sup> Ray M., (2020). *Deadliest Wars of the 21st Century*. Britannica. Archived from the original on 2 April 2020. Available at <https://www.britannica.com/list/8-deadliest-wars-of-the-21st-century>

<sup>186</sup> Shadid A., (25 April 2011). *Syria Escalates Crackdown as Tanks Go to Restive City*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html>

people had been arrested.<sup>187</sup> Following the military response of the government the uprising was increasingly joined by an armed faction of the opposition front with the first armed insurrection being reported on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011, in the Idlib province. On June 30<sup>th</sup> the protests reached Aleppo, Syria's largest city.

From July 2011 to April 2012 the early insurgency phase took place marked by the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on July 29<sup>th</sup> and the Syrian National Council on August 23<sup>rd</sup> with the aim of ending Assad's regime in the country and coordinating opposition forces. The FSA engaged in an active insurgent campaign throughout Syrian cities and receiving Turkish support from October. This first initial phase was followed by the escalation of fights between government forces and FSA from November, arriving in Damascus, and April 2012, when the estimated deaths reached 10.000. During this phase the Arab League tried to intervene by establishing in December 2011 a monitoring mission, which however failed at the end of January 2012 as the active armed conflicts threatened the observers' mission and action on the battlefield. Accordingly, in the same month, Kofi Annan was appointed as joint UN-Arab League Special Representative for Syria and advanced negotiations for a peace plan and a ceasefire which however failed to conclude fighting between the two factions. In June 2012 Kofi Annan initiated the first Geneva Conference bringing together representative of the "action group" for Syria including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, and delegations from Great Britain and China together with representatives from the Syrian government and the opposition forces. The result of these talks was the first Geneva Communiqué in which it was declared the need for a transitional government of Syria, although the faith of President Assad was left unclear due to the different positions demonstrated by the five permanent members of the UNSC. Meanwhile, earlier in November the Syrian opposition had reorganized forming a new coalition named the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces which receive international recognition as the legitimate representative of Syria but several nation-states.

The failure of Kofi Annan's mediated ceasefire (UNSC Resolution 2042), collapsed in the aftermath of the Houla massacre, led to the third phase of the conflict which consisted in an escalation between 2012 and 2013. The UN recognised the uprising as a proper civil war on June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2012 and so did the International Committee of the Red Cross in mid-July, followed by the withdrawal of the UN mission in Syria in August. During the first months of third phase fights spread all over the country increasing in their scale and violence magnitude. In particular, fights reached the entire western part of

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<sup>187</sup> Rodgers L., Gritten D., Offer J., Asare P., (March 11, 2016). *Syria: The story of the conflict*. BBC. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>

the country from the northern border with Türkiye in the Idlib region and thus Aleppo and the coastal Latakia Governorate to the southern region around Damascus, along the border with Lebanon and south close to Israel and Jordan. By the end of July, the “Battle for Aleppo” started where civilians were attacked also in “neutral” districts including the Kurdish one of Sheikh Maqsd and consequently caused the Kurdish forces to vow to retaliate and started being involved in the fights. A new ceasefire was signed at the end of October, but is soon collapses and second part of fights begun with the rebels engaging in an offensive campaign which resulted in rebel forces obtaining control over most of northern Syria and important bases in the Aleppo governorate. The following months up to December 2013 were characterized by an alternation between rebels’ and government’s offensive in most western and northern Syria with a consequent alternation in territory controlled and increased violence against civilians particularly around the cities of Aleppo, Raqqa and Damascus. As no faction seem to prevaricate over the other and a stalemate was deemed probable, international powers started being more involved. On the rebels side Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided forces with arms and by the end of 2012 the United States also initiated its program of support. On the other hand, the Syrian government received support by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, with the latter starting to send its own fighters into Syria. International attention was particularly reached when on August 21<sup>st</sup>, 2013, hundreds of civilians were killed in Damascus due to the employment of chemical weapons. Factions accused each other of being the perpetrator of such attack and international great powers sided with the two sides but it was understood that a peace agreement was fundamental. A first diplomatic effort in this direction was exemplified by the agreement signed between Russia, Syria and the United States on September 14<sup>th</sup> which was aimed at putting all Syrian chemical arsenal under international control.

In the meantime, as fights between rebels and government continued and the international community was turning its attention to the country, Islamic extremist factions started getting increasingly involved in the country. In particular, in 2013, the Syrian Al-Qaeda faction named Nusra Front joined the fights initially siding with some opposition groups but also clashing on multiple occasions with the FSA. In April of the same year the Iraqi Al-Qaeda faction also crossed the border with Syria led by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who claimed to unify the forces under his control in the two countries under the organization of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). His intention was to also merge the Nusra Front which however refused and thus inter-Islamic fights started occurring alongside the inter-rebel ones and the major conflict between opposition forces and the official government. ISIL’s forces were concentrated around the city of Raqqa in eastern Syria from where its expanded towards the Iraqi border and fueling

international concerns and particular those of the United States and some Arab States which intervened by launching an airstrike campaign aimed at preventing ISIL's forces to reach the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq. The ISIL started later to lose ground due to its simultaneous confrontations against the Kurdish forces backed by the United States, the Assad troops supported by Russia and Iran, and the rebel faction sustained by Türkiye. In particular the latter, managed to regain the territory along the border with Türkiye while in June 2017 Kurdish and American troops launched an attack on Raqqa, declaring ISIL forces defeated in the region. The Nusra Front had in the meantime merged with other Islamic factions opposed to the ISIL creating the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and took control over the Idlib governorate.

After a formal request for support by Assad, on September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2015, the Russian Federation officially joined the conflict by deploying its troops in the Latakia Governorate and launching its first airstrike against rebel troops. Following this, in 2016, a partial ceasefire was signed between the Syrian government and Russia and opposition forces which however collapsed soon. The attention again turned towards Aleppo which had in the meantime become the rebels' main outpost and was the object of disastrous fights and civilian massacres until the rebels' defeat in December 2016 and a new ceasefire being signed in 2017 through the Astana Talks organized by Russia, Türkiye and Iran which resulted in the establishment of four de-escalation zones. In 2017 new chemical attacks triggered an increase in western intervention in Syria, particularly following the attack on the city of Douma.

During the year 2018 Israel actively joined the fighting by launching the heaviest barrage in Syria since the beginning of the war after Iran had shelled the Golan Heights and claiming to have defeated nearly all the Iranian arsenal in the country. During the same year, the government forces launched a new counter-offensive to regain the territories under opposition control and particularly succeeding in southern Syria and the region of Daraa where the rebellion had started, while the rebels were all sent in Idlib region. Consequently, Türkiye and Syria started deploying troops on the border and in order to de-escalate the situation an agreement was signed by Russia and Türkiye to establish a buffer zone. Such buffer zone was recognised by Assad's troops and the FSA, however it was unclear whether it was to be also respected by the other participant groups as it was a top-down agreement that did not involve all the actors involved. The creating the HTS for instance never officially recognised the agreement but practically and implicitly seemed to comply to it. Part of the agreement was also the responsibility in the hands of Türkiye of managing the HTS and under Islamic extremist groups which were by the time confined in the region along the border. The situation in the Idlib region consisted therefore in the confinement of both the HTS and rebel groups which resulted in an attack by the HTS

in January 2019 against the rebel forces and its achievement of control over the region until government troops violated the buffer zones and regained the territory in June 2019. This led to a somewhat direct confrontation with Türkiye for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, until a general ceasefire was signed by Russia and Türkiye in 2020. Meanwhile in December 2018, the US President Donald J. Trump announced the withdrawal of US troops from Syria which was completed throughout 2019.

A further front was opened in October 2019 when the war expanded to the Syrian Kurdish autonomous region in the north-east part of the country. Indeed, following the US withdrawal as American troops as previously analysed were the ones backing Kurdish forces, Türkiye deployed its troops in the region with the intent of the defeating Kurdish separatists' groups in Syria connected to the Turkish Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK), declared and considered a terrorist organization by Turkish President Erdogan and his allies. The official aim of the operation was to provide a "safe zone" for Syrian refugees in order to enhance the return of those that had flown the country and gone into Türkiye. The Kurdish forces replied by signing an agreement with Assad which allowed government troops to come back in the Kurdish region for the first time since its liberation in 2012.

To further complicate a manifestly complex situation which has briefly been presented in the previous paragraphs, has been the disastrous earthquake of a 7.8 magnitude on the Turkish-Syrian border which has occurred on February 6<sup>th</sup>, 2023. This occurrence stands out as one of the most severe natural disasters of the current century. The impact has been devastating, leading to substantial loss of life, with the death toll estimated at nearly 60,000 as of May 2023. Among these casualties, approximately 50,700 were reported in Türkiye, while Syria bore a loss of 8,400 lives. The earthquake's ramifications have been exacerbated by Syria's twelve-year-long conflict, impeding relief endeavors. The head of the World Food Programme characterized the situation as a compounding "catastrophe on top of catastrophe." The financial toll in Syria alone is assessed to be \$5.1 billion in damages.

Efforts to address the aftermath of the earthquake are complex, given the territorial divisions rooted in Syria's civil war. The most affected area in the northwest of Syria is under rebel and Islamic forces control, with the Syrian government having imposed restrictions on access to this region. Consequently, international aid necessitates approval from the Turkish government to pass through the single humanitarian corridor, the Bab al-Hawa crossing, connecting Syria and Türkiye. However, the earthquake caused severe damage to the connecting roads between the two countries. Moreover, the Turkish government's attention has been focused on its own relief initiatives. The initial United Nations

aid convoy reached Bab al-Hawa on Thursday, February 9<sup>th</sup>. On Friday, February 10<sup>th</sup>, the Syrian government declared its willingness to permit international aid organizations to access rebel-controlled parts of Syria but refrained from specifying a timeline for this action.

On the other hand, recent relevant evolution has occurred which demonstrate new openings towards the Assad regime, despite the firmly declared US attitude of no-normalization with Assad. In May 2023, when the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi conducted a meeting with President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. The aim was to reinforce economic collaboration, marking the first instance of an Iranian president's visit to Syria since the commencement of the war. Later in the same month, the Arab League made the decision to readmit Syria, following a twelve-year suspension. This move occurred despite ongoing Western sanctions against President Assad's administration (for instance US Congress CAESAR Act), which could potentially dissuade oil-rich Arab nations from investing in Syria. In July 2023, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudan engaged in discussions with President Assad in Damascus. The topics covered included drug trafficking, the repatriation of Syrian refugees, and the elimination of Western sanctions.

#### **4.1.1. International initiatives for peace-resolution**

The two main channels for peace-resolution are exemplified by the Geneva Conferences and the Astana Talks. What is evident in both these arenas is the top-down approach that has resulted in short-term solutions and constantly failing ceasefires due to the failure in involving all the parties involved and particularly the civil society. Moreover, as evident, the peace talks have been led by great powers involved in the area who have all manifested their own interests and national agenda in their management of the conflict consistently with the security cultures proposed by Mary Kaldor and analyzed in the previous chapter. It is nevertheless important to acknowledge the international initiatives carried out until now with, as anticipated, a particular focus on the UN led Geneva Conference and the Astana Talks under the auspices of the Russian Federation with Türkiye and Iran.

Given the different sides taken by the five Permanent Members in the UNSC and the failure of the mission initiated by the most directly involved organization, the Arab League, in February 2012 the first Special Envoy was appointed: Kofi Annan.<sup>188</sup> Annan's strategy was first based on a six-point plan in collaboration with the Arab League.<sup>189</sup> The six points Syrian authorities were requested to comply with were: to work with the Special Envoy to enhance a political Syrian-led process in compliance with

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<sup>188</sup> Lundgren M., (2016). Mediation in Syria: Initiatives, strategies, and obstacles, 2011-2016; *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37:2, 273-288; 2016

<sup>189</sup> UN News (July 21, 2012). Security Council calls for implementation of six-point plan to end crisis in Syria. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/03/406912-security-council-calls-implementation-six-point-plan-end-crisis-syria>

the wishes and desires of the Syrian people; to stop the fighting and enhance a UN sponsored and supervised ceasefire (also applied to the opposition); to ensure humanitarian assistance and implement a daily two hours of stop in the fighting to enhance such humanitarian assistance in all areas coordinating with local authorities; to release arbitrarily detained prisoners with a particular regard to those arrested for political reasons and provide an updated list of prisoners; to ensure freedom of movement for journalists; and to respect the right to association and peaceful demonstration according to the UN Charter.<sup>190</sup> This was the first demonstration of a UN unified approach, which led to a first ceasefire in 2012<sup>191</sup> and to the creation of a contact group at the first Geneva meeting, as previously described, which enacted the Geneva Communiqué. This document describes the goals for all subsequent proposals in the resolution of the conflict. The Communiqué's content provided for a Syrian led political process of transition to which all Syria would agree on establishing clear steps towards this direction starting from the institution of a general ceasefire in the country under UN supervision and the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers to include both members of the official government and opposition forces to enhance a legitimate political resolution. Moreover, the communiqué called for the involvement of all ethnic groups constituting the Syrian society and for the ratification of a new Constitution and legal order. Finally, free and fair elections were to be held for all new bodies established by the transitional governing body and legal system's reform by also ensuring full representation of women in all the aspects of such transition. As part of Annan's approach was the establishment on April 21<sup>st</sup> 2012, of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) through a Resolution of the UNSC. The mission was carried out in steps under the leadership of Major General Robert Mood and by the end of June consisted of 277 unarmed military observers, 81 international civilian staff and 30 local civilian staff units with the goal of monitoring the cessation of hostilities and supporting the implementation of Annan's six-point plan. As reported by Turkmani et al. "the mission focused on major population centres and areas of acute tension" but met multiple difficulties and obstacles due to security issues directly and indirectly constituting risks for the observers – as testified by the death fatality of one of the local civilian staff members – and delays in reporting.<sup>192</sup> Part of UNSMIS's work was to engage with local communities and build networks thanks to the civil society's representatives within the UNSMIS which, again citing

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<sup>190</sup> Annan K. (2012). *Six-point plan for Syria*. Text Archived 2015-09-24 at the Wayback Machine, Reuters, 4 April 2012. Retrieved 26 October 2013.

<sup>191</sup> UN Security Council Resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012)

<sup>192</sup> Turkmani R., Kaldor M., Elhamwi W., Ayo J., Hariri N., (2014). *Hungry for Peace: positives and pitfalls of local truces and ceasefires in Syria*; London School of Economics, London, UK.



Turkmani et al. “provide their civilian staff with access to the ‘second line’ in the uprising, who were typically educated and organized and able to influence the rebel fighters”.<sup>193</sup> Indeed, the mission’s report itself highlighted the crucial impact that this networking knowledge-building with local communities has had on the operations’ success which allowed a decrease in violence, local stabilization, and more precise information-sharing with high-level international decision makers. The lack of progress in the establishment of a ceasefire combined with the increasing risks faced by the mission’s members led to the suspension of UNSMIS on June 15<sup>th</sup> 2012 and, despite the UNSC promises to deploy more units and provide more resources to the mission in the case of a decrease in the level of violence and use of heavy weapons, it was finally ended on August 20<sup>th</sup> 2012 due to the failure in meeting these two conditions. Despite its short life, which was a consequence of the ceasefire’s failure and its analysed weaknesses, UNSMIS provides a great example of how collaboration with local civil society can have a great beneficial impact on conflict de-escalation and prepare the ground for resolution.

Although it is true that the first Envoy demonstrated a great commitment, several problematics must be highlighted. First of all, his approach was explicitly oriented towards the Arab League’s direction, being, Assad’s regime fall in line with Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s interests, which created mistrust towards Annan. Moreover, the first contact group did not involve several parties participating in the conflict, first and foremost, Iran. Third, the text of the Geneva Communiqué, although being of undeniable importance was open to interpretation in regard to the future of in-power regime, and therefore, did not solve the dispute between the US and Russia on the future of President Assad, preventing the UNSC from finding a common unified approach. Finally, the effects of the 2012 ceasefire only lasted for few weeks, and the opposition soon revoked its commitment to it re-starting the military actions in the area.<sup>194</sup>

Passing directly to July 2014 and the third Special Envoy Staffan De Mistura, his original strategy of creating “freeze-zones” across the country soon failed and therefore he engaged in a new international approach, by convoking new talks in Geneva in 2015 finally involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in the peace-negotiations. Moreover, during the 2015 Vienna Meeting, the International

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’s Report (2014); Calculations of fatalities statistics based on Megan Price, Anita Gohdes, and Patrick Ball, ‘Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic’; Human Rights Data Analysis Group, 2014.

Syrian Support Group (ISSG) was instituted<sup>195</sup> and on the 18th of December 2015, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2254 calling for a ceasefire and political settlement in Syria, which is the current legal basis in peace-talks.<sup>196</sup> However, talks were soon suspended again. After the 2016 Munich meeting and a new Resolution a ceasefire was finally announced.<sup>197</sup> Nevertheless, even in this case, someone was left behind, namely the Jihadist forces and opposition groups operating around Aleppo, which therefore did not recognize the ceasefire and did not stop the fights and violence perpetrated in the country. Further attempts to agree on a ceasefire or demilitarization zones have failed, as proven by the most recent 2020 ceasefire in Northwest Syria between Russia and Türkiye, which did not prevent an escalation in hostilities, since January 2021, in Idlib governorate, and by the October 2021 failure in Geneva for the ratification of the new Syrian Constitution.

To be positively evaluated are, nevertheless, the projects launched by De Mistura, the UNHCR, and the OHCHR, to concentrate on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis and the civil society. De Mistura has indeed started promoting the involvement of the civil society in the resolution of the conflict through meetings with local movements and NGOs, an initiative that is now followed by his successor Geir O. Pedersen who has been appointed Special Envoy in January 2019. This had led to the creation of the Civil Society Support Room (CCSR and the Women Advisory Body which has given a voice to the civil society for the first time from the beginning of the conflict.<sup>198</sup> Moreover, at the very start of the crisis, the OHCHR established the “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic” to monitor human rights’ violations and identify those responsible.<sup>199</sup> In 2016 the UN General Assembly founded an “International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the management of the Syrian crisis.”<sup>200</sup> Recently in July 2021, Resolution 2285 established US-Russian channels to provide humanitarian support and aid in Syria.<sup>201</sup> Finally, the UNHCR is greatly involved in the management of the refugees’ flow, by supporting host countries, refugees, and people willing to go back to Syria. The major action plan is the 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan),

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<sup>195</sup> UN Secretary General (May 17, 2016). Note to Correspondents: Statement of the International Syria Support Group. Available at <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2016-05-17/note-correspondents-statement-international-syria-support>

<sup>196</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015)

<sup>197</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 2268 (2016)

<sup>198</sup> Zahar M-J.; Hellmuller S., (2019). UN-led mediation in Syria and civil society; *Conciliation resources, Accord issue 28 inclusion in peace processes*. Available at <https://www.c-r.org/accord/inclusion-peace-processes/un-led-mediation-syria-and-civil-society>

<sup>199</sup> See UN Human Rights Council’s website. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/pages/independentinternationalcommission.aspx>

<sup>200</sup> European Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP and European Council Regulation No 442/2011.

<sup>201</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 2585 (2021).

supporting Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq in hosting refugees. Its main goals are protecting people, supporting durable solutions, contributing to dignified lives, and enhancing local and national capacities, by cooperating with other smaller institutions and NGOs, providing both humanitarian aid and development opportunities simultaneously.<sup>202</sup>

Another parallel initiative to that led by UN Special Envoys, are the Astana Talks held in Kazakhstan's capital under the guide of Russia, Türkiye and Iran. The Astana Process, officially named "International Meeting on Syrian Settlement", was launched by the three countries between December 2016 and January 2017, with the aim of establishing a ceasefire and creating de-escalating zones monitored by Russia, Türkiye and Iran. In particular, de-escalation areas covered four zones: the Idlib province, together with the northeast part of the Latakia governorate, western area of Aleppo and northern of Hama were the HTS was the main actor; the northern part of the Damascus region; the northern Homs province; and the area along the border with Jordan controlled by rebel factions. Participation to the talk was limited to "moderate opposition forces" thus excluding the Islamic extremist groups of the HTS and ISIS while being open to some important rebel groups whose voice were also mediated by the fundamental presence of Türkiye. UN and US delegates also assisted the talks while the Gulf Countries were missing.<sup>203</sup> The initiative were veery positively welcomed by at the time UN Envoy Stefan De Mistura who acclaimed it as an efficient tool to end armed conflict in Syria and "jumpstart the convening of formal political negotiation process". Throughout the overall past nineteen meetings held in Astana, with additional ones held in Sochi, Ryad, Ankara and Teheran, various topics have been object of discussion among which the request from the Syrian government's side to withdraw international intervention in the country, the question of the return of Syrian refugees, the release of detainees, and the drafting of the new Constitution. In 2019, due to the escalation in the migration crisis towards neighboring countries, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were finally involved in the talks. In June 2023 the twentieth and last round of talks has been held in Astana. The meeting focused on the rebuild of ties between Türkiye and Syria as well as the Israeli involvement in the conflict and the re-admission of Syria in the Arab League, and has concluded with the Kazakhstan's representative declared that the country is not willing to host the peace talks any longer to which Russia, Türkiye and

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<sup>202</sup> UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Regional Strategic Overview 2021-2022 Regional Refugees and Resilience Plan, December 2020.

<sup>203</sup> Al Jazeera (October 30, 2017). *Syrian war: All you need to know about the Astana talks*. Available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/30/syrian-war-all-you-need-to-know-about-the-astana-talks>

Israel responded declaring that the process will simply be moved to another location.<sup>204</sup> Overall, although recognizing the efforts at the basis of the Astana talks, the system of de-escalation zones and local ceasefires has once again proved to be a failure due to constant infringements of the agreements and the left out of important actors from the meetings. The monitoring system on which the Astana process is based on has not prevented the escalation in violence against civilians and the increase in displaced people who are mainly now confined to the Idlib governorate at the border with Türkiye or being refugees in neighboring countries and Europe, but has *de facto* only justified foreign troops' presence on the ground against the wishes of the Syrian population, who does not have a saying in this context.<sup>205</sup>

#### **4.2.Syria's socio-economic conditions**

The Syrian Arab Republic is classified by the World Bank as a low-income country.<sup>206</sup> When analysing the economy of the state, it is important to highlight the difficulty in finding recent data, as with the outbreak of the conflict, it has become increasingly hard to collect reliable updated statistical information on the socio-economic evolution within the region. Indeed, according to the World Bank, the “Statistical Capacity Store” - the capacity of a country’s statistical system to provide reliable data on a scale from 0 to 100 – has dropped from a score of 60 in 2011 to 26,667 in 2019. According to the last report issued by the World Bank, by 2019 the economic activity in Syria has shrunk by more than 50% compared to data available from 2010. The social and economic impact of the conflict is large and growing: the major impact is on human capital with lack of sustained access to health care, education, housing and food, and an increase in unemployment and poverty through out the population. The World Bank’s “Toll of War” report analyses the economic and social impact of the conflict in Syria, highlighting how, between 2011 and 2016, the losses in GDP reached 226 billion US\$, an amount equal to four times the Syrian GDP in 2010.<sup>207</sup>

A further report, “The Fallout of War”, published in June 2020, analyses the economic and social impact on the Mashreq region: in Syria the conflict has broken down bilateral and transit trade routes, has destabilized the region, and has caused the largest displacement crisis since WW2; in Syrian neighbors there has been a decrease in economic activity, a deterioration of the labor market, and an

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<sup>204</sup> Auyezov O., (June 21, 2023). *Kazakhstan unexpectedly proposes ending Syria talks in Astana*. Reuters. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/kazakhstan-unexpectedly-proposes-ending-syria-talks-astana-2023-06-21/>

<sup>205</sup> Mohamad F. A., (August 1, 2023). *The Astana Process Six Years On: Peace or Deadlock in Syria?*. Carnegie Endowment. Available at <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90298>

<sup>206</sup> World Bank’s official website – Syrian Arab Republic Overview. Available at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview#1>

<sup>207</sup> World Bank’s official website – Syrian Arab Republic Data. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/country/syrian-arab-republic>

increase in poverty; moreover the structural weaknesses of the region (i.e. institutional resilience and migration policies) have worsened under the burden of the conflict's consequences; the short-term solutions proposed by the various governments to face the shock, has resulted in costly and ineffective services, lost economic opportunities, and under funded programs; for this reason the World Bank highlights the necessity for a shift from short-term migration policies to a medium-term regional strategy.<sup>208</sup> The longer the conflict lasts, the more difficult will recovery be, and losses will become persistent over time.

Data provided by the last World Bank's last report (2019), show that the Gross Domestic Product of the Syrian Republic has gone from a pick of 252.518 billion US\$ in 2010 to 22.778 billion US\$ in 2019, with a drastic decrease provoked by the outbreak of the conflict, as also testified by the Gross National Income (from 10,900 billion US\$ in 2010 to 1,170US\$ in 2019), and by the GDP per capita. For this last indicator it is important to stress the fact that, while on the global level there has been an overall increase, Syria is facing a decrease: from 11,820.608 US\$ in 2010 to 1,334.371 US\$.<sup>209</sup> This drastic decline in GNI and the increase in poverty – later mentioned - has made Syria eligible for funds from the International Development Assistance. According to the “Ease of Doing Business” index, provided again by the World Bank, Syria classified 176 out of 190 in 2020. Data show a difference in the average scores of West Asia compared to Syria (range 0-100): for what concerns starting a business Syria's score is 80.1, while West Asia's is 84.9; enforcing contracts in Syria has a score of 42.6, while the West Asia's average score is 57.3; finally the most influential value determining the difficulties in doing business in Syria is the indicator “getting credit”, for which Syria has a score of 15.0 while West Asia's average is 44.6.<sup>210</sup> The fact that this last indicator is the one determining the overall law score on the index, highlights the impact of the conflict on the economics sphere, as the overall unstable situation in the country has influenced the possibility of, precisely, obtaining credit.

Positive data on the economic and financial sphere are the following: it takes 15.5 days to start a business in Syria compared to the regional average of 19.1 days; household consumption expenditure in Syria was lower than regional average; Syria registered a higher export trade flow than the regional average in 2020; in 2019, total merchandise imports amounted to US\$5.5 billion. Moreover, in 2020,

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<sup>208</sup> World Bank's official website – Projects' map Syria. Available at <https://maps.worldbank.org/projects/wb/country/SY/Syrian%20Arab%20Republic?active=1>

<sup>209</sup> World Bank's official website – Syrian Arab Republic Data. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/country/syrian-arab-republic>

<sup>210</sup> Trading economics – Ease of doing business index. Available at <https://tradingeconomics.com/countrylist/ease-of-doing-business>

Syria has registered a higher export trade flow than the regional average. According to the World Trade Organization's data, taking as reference point the year 2014 (representing the 100% for exports and imports), the average exports for West Asia has been below the reference point (at about 85%) while Syria has registered values above the reference point (at about 110%); for what concerns average imports instead, both the regional average and Syrian data appear to be below the 2014 reference point, however, while West Asia's data appear to be at about 75%, Syrian data are at about 85%. The same positive comparison can be made for what concerns the 2019 share of manufacturers in merchandise imports: 51.9% for Syria against 61.4% for West Asia in manufactures; 3.9% for Syria against 11.4% for West Asia in fuel and mining; 29.2% for Syria against 17.3% for West Asia in agricultural products (for manufacturers in merchandise exports data for Syria are not available).<sup>211</sup>

For what concerns the Syrian business structure, prior to 2011, 80% of Syrian economy was dependent on small to medium-sized businesses. Currently most of Syria's wealth is controlled by business networks linked to a few figures constituting the business elite such as Rami Makhlouf and Samer al-Foz, which are the major players in the economy in virtually all kind of industries. Such country's business elite is growing and, according to estimations, they control over 75% of economy, a value which is increasing as they benefitted from the outbreak of the war, since the latter has drastically decrease competition and has made the creation of monopolies and, thus, concentration of wealth progressively easy. This new elite tries not only to protect their gains but also to build public support by hiring people as a demonstration of "business as usual" in the country.<sup>212</sup>

The economy is essentially state-run, although the private sector is developing, especially in the sector of retail trade business. Moreover, when elected President al-Assad started a process of privatization through reforms which brought the country to the opening of private banks in the early 2000s: in 2004 the first private bank opened, in 2005 6 private banks were operating, and by 2010 they were 14; before that Syria had its central bank and 6 state-owned banks. The same applies to insurance companies which were again state-owned until the first private one opened in September 2009. In the same year, 2009, a series of reforms opened the financial sector to foreign capital, increasing the flow of investment in the country: before that, according to Syrian law, 51% of business' capital had to be Syrian, making the Syrian market unattractive for foreign investors. Although, as previously stated, the economy is essentially state-run (despite the mentioned reforms), it must be highlighted the fact that the

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<sup>211</sup> Statista - Statista Country Report: Syria 2021. Pdf Available at <https://www.statista.com/study/48488/syria/>

<sup>212</sup> BTI Transformation Index – Syria Country Report 2022. Available at <https://btiproject.org/en/reports/country-report/SYR#pos0>

private sector's productivity accounts for about 2/3 of Syrian GDP, and the productivity of the public sector is decreasing.<sup>213</sup>

For what concerns the share of GDP, the third sector – services – accounts for 46.5% of GDP; the second sector – industries – for the 30,6%; and the first sector – agriculture – for 22.9%. The export trade is constituted by mainly agricultural and natural products and resources: 48% vegetable products, 15% textiles, 9,4% animal and vegetable bi-products, 5,9% metals, 5,1% food stuffs, 4,3% chemical products, 2,4% animal products, and 9,9% other. It is evident that Syria is highly dependant on its natural resources and its first sector, contrarily to what happens in the most advanced economies. Moreover, with the outbreak of the conflict and its worsening, trade exports data have become increasingly hard to obtain, but generally exports have decreased, as proven by the fact that the main export partner before 2011 was the EU, which has adopted an embargo on various products including crude oil and petroleum products, therefore resulting in a drastic drop in the export rate of Syria and a consequent deterioration in its trade balance. A further sector that has been strongly adversely affected by the conflict is tourism: by 2010 tourism accounted for the 10% of GDP with 8.5 million visitors and a 40.3% increase compared to 2009, by 2011 the number of visitors dropped to 5 million, and by 2012 the number was 2.9 million, after this is no data is available, but it is evident that the steady growth of the sector until 2010 has encountered a strong obstacle following the beginning of the conflict, and this has also had repercussions on unemployment as by 2010 tourism constituted the 8% of total employment and by 2012 this number has already decreased to 4%. Finally, it is important to underline the importance of informal economy in the country as it is omnipresent. Its significance is testified by the September 2008 launch of the National Programme of Informal Sector with the contribution of Nobel prize winner for Economics Professor Hernando de Soto who estimated the informal sector of Syria to account for about 40% of the economy. Finally, the conflict has had a great negative impact on Syrian currency – the Syrian pound – which has depreciated by over 90% to about 512 to the dollar by November 2019, against its lowest record in 2010 which was 44 Syrian pound to one dollar. While the currency depreciates, prices and overall cost of life increase, with inflation that has grown by 25% in 2016, but salaries remain unchanged provoking an overall increase in the number of people living in poverty.<sup>214</sup>

The current Syrian population is estimated to be 2.4 million and it is projected to reach 25.5

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<sup>213</sup> BTI Transformation Index – Syria Country Report 2022. Available at <https://btiproject.org/en/reports/country-report/SYR#pos0>

<sup>214</sup> Statista - Statista Country Report: Syria 2021. Pdf Available at <https://www.statista.com/study/48488/syria/>

million by 2028. Damascus is the largest and most populated city (2,392,000 people) followed by Aleppo (1,917,000 people), Hims (1,336,000 people), and Hamah (922,000 people). 92.8% of the population is Muslim, 5.2% is Christian, while the remaining 2% is unaffiliated; ethnically the 90.3% of the population is Arab while the remaining 9.7% is Kurdish, Armenian and from other minorities. The total labor force is estimated by the International Labour Organization, to have declined to 5.17 million in 2020, with 83.3% constituted by male individuals while only the 16.7% are women. Given the growth in population and the increasing difficulties in finding a stable and safe job in the area, Syria is facing high unemployment rate (10.257% of labor force in 2020), with values especially high when looking at youth unemployment (25.24% in 2020) and steadily increasing (22.33% in 2019; 22.12% in 2018; 21.93% in 2017; 21.68% in 2016; 21.44% in 2015; 21.21% in 2014; 21.16% in 2013; 20.90% in 2012; 20.47% in 2011; 20.09% in 2010). Such increase in youth unemployment rate is a clear consequence of the effects of the conflict on the society, as confirmed by the unemployment rate before the beginning of the first disorders which led to the civil war and presented a drastic drop in 2009: 16.16% (against 21.82% in 2008). The young population, considering people aged 15 to 24, represents the 22.2% of the overall population. The most disadvantaged category is constituted by young females whose unemployment is twice the size of the male counterpart and 50% of young women (aged 15 to 29) are neither part of the labor force (employed or unemployed but actively looking for a job) nor enrolled to school.<sup>215</sup>

The population's size's pick was in 2010 with 21.362.541 people and in 2019 it was 17.010.132 individuals, with an annual growth rate in 2021 of 3.2%. School enrollment has presented a drastic fall in 2012 going from 128.46 gross enrolment ratio to 81.664 in less than a year, and, regarding this point, it is important to underline how for children leaving school, human capital accumulation stops when they do so, resulting in a persistent effect on their lifetime well-being and therefore on the destiny and prospects of the whole future generation. Furthermore, the percentage of people living below poverty line appeared to be 82.4% of the population in 2014, with a particularly dramatic situation in north-eastern regions of the country. For what concerns working hours lost during the 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemics, according to an estimation made through data of the World Bank, the IMF and the ILO, Syria appears to have been less affected than the rest of the region: the estimation for Asia is 8.4% of hours lost, while for Syria the percentage is 7.8.<sup>216</sup> Regarding the sector of employment of the active

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<sup>215</sup> International Labour Organization's official website – Syrian Arab Republic. Available at [https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/syria/WCMS\\_546481/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/syria/WCMS_546481/lang--en/index.htm)

<sup>216</sup> Statista - Statista Country Report: Syria 2021. Pdf Available at <https://www.statista.com/study/48488/syria/>



labor force, in 2019 66.7% was employed in the services' sector, 23.2% in industry, and 10.1% in agriculture; in 2017 it was 66.4% for services, 22.4% for industry, and 11.2% in agriculture; in 2015 it was 65.0% for services; 22.8% in industry, and 12.3% in agriculture; and finally in 2013 it was 61,8% for services, 25% for industry and 13.2% in agriculture. Overall, a shift in the labor force towards the third sector from both the first and the second ones is evident.<sup>217</sup>

Coming back to the topic of education, analysing the level of education attained in 2020 by people aged 15 and above (considered potential labor force) it results that: 12.1% of this section of the population has no education, 23.4% has an incomplete primary education, 15.8% has obtained a primary education, 20.5% lower secondary education, 15.5% upper secondary education, and finally 12.7% post secondary education. From this data we can draw the conclusion that there is a very high level of lack of education or low education and a wide inequality in the population for what concerns the level reached. Related to this it can be added that inequality in Syria is difficult to evaluate due to a lack of data, and the UNDP does not currently calculate the country's Gini index or inequality adjusted HDI. But the gap between a small class of war profiteers and wealthy, regime-connected businessmen, on the one hand, and the increasingly impoverished majority, on the other, has likely widened.<sup>218</sup>

Overall Syria presents low levels of human development with a score of 0.567 in 2019 ranking 151 out of 189 countries. This is consistent with the country's scores in recent years, which were 0.556 in 2014, 0.528 in 2016 and 0.563 in 2018. It should be noted that Syria had previously shown steady improvement from an HDI of 0.550 in 1990 to 0.672 in 2010, indicating that the first few years of the conflict wiped out two decades of human development. It is likely that the situation has deteriorated further as a result of the 2020 financial crisis following Syrian assets in Lebanese banks being blocked and the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Scores registered are: health measured by life expectancy 72.2; education evaluated through expected years of schooling 8.9; income/composition resources, namely, GNI per capita at constant 2017 PPP\$ 3,61; no data available for inequality; gender measured with the Gender Development Index 0.829 and Gender inequality index of 0.482 (122 out of 162 countries, underlining a great gender based discrimination in the country); poverty, i.e., population in multidimensional poverty, headcount (%) 7.4, work, employment and vulnerability through the employment to population ratio (% ages 15 and older) 40.4; human security, measured with homicide rate (per 100,000 people) 0.9; no data available for trade and financial flow; mobility and

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<sup>217</sup> International Labour Organization's official website – Syrian Arab Republic. Available at [https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/syria/WCMS\\_546481/lang--en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/beirut/countries/syria/WCMS_546481/lang--en/index.htm)

<sup>218</sup> Statista - Statista Country Report: Syria 2021. Pdf Available at <https://www.statista.com/study/48488/syria/>

communication calculated using internet users, total (% of population) 34.3; environmental sustainability, that is, carbon dioxide emissions, production emissions per capita (tonnes) 1.7; demography using total population (millions) (Data referring to 2030) 26.7; finally socioeconomic sustainability for which data are not available. Moreover, the country has a low rule of law; a strong risk for violence and terrorism; a clearly unstable political situation; and a weak control of corruption being, according to the World Bank, the fourth most corrupted country in the world.<sup>219</sup>

The outbreak of the conflict in Syria has had a great negative impact on the socio-economic situation of the country. Prior to 2011, the Republic showed encouraging data in most of the sectors and indicators considered by the major institutions and organizations, however, the civil war has brought to a deterioration of the economic and financial situation of the country and particularly on its human capital, as showed by the Human Development Index. Given the natural resources of the country, its process of privatization and opening to foreign investments initiated before the beginning of the civil war – although now again there is an increasingly bigger control of the state on the economy and influence on the private sector – and the expansion of relatively developed system of infrastructure in the years of economic growth, there is potential for assistance and development programmes in the country. These plans, which were indeed been initiated by institutions such as the World Bank, has stopped due to the conflict, but. The Syrian Republic has a lot of potential which could be realized through investment. Given the negative impact of the conflict on such investments it can easily be drawn the conclusion that the priority is the realization of a strategic regional action plan to settle the consequences of the crisis, as declared by the World Bank, it is necessary to find a common regional strategy to face the increasingly difficulties met by countries due to the crisis in order to prevent persistent damages to the economies of the states.<sup>220</sup> The natural and spontaneous result would also be more safety perceived by foreign investors and therefore a boost in the development of the country. However, it must be highlighted in conclusion, that such development would anyway happen in an unequal way given the wide differences among the different Syrian regions, which the current conflict has further exacerbated.

#### **4.3.Civil Society Actors involved in humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding and resolution**

The dramatic situation in Syria has been, as analysed, faced by imposing top-down agreements which have found weak or no practical application in the country at the expenses of the economy and

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<sup>219</sup> Statista - Statista Country Report: Syria 2021. Pdf Available at <https://www.statista.com/study/48488/syria/>

<sup>220</sup> World Bank's official website – Projects' map Syria. Available at <https://maps.worldbank.org/projects/wb/country/SY/Syrian%20Arab%20Republic?active=1>

the local population. In order to apply the methodology proposed in chapters 1 and 2 of the present work it is thus fundamental to focus on the hidden but real actors of this conflict: the civil society. While indeed peace talks have been conducted by bringing at the negotiation tables government, rebel forces, and foreign state-actors involved, as seen always missing someone out, the civil society has rather been disregarded in practical term. The previously mentioned Civil Society Support Group, initiated by Special Envoy Stefan De Mistura and attempts to involve some civil society groups in peace talks have been a remarkable starting point which needs to be fueled in the future by expanding concrete support to other Civil Society Actors involved. This section is therefore aimed at presenting relevant CSA that shall be involved in peacebuilding attempts as they are the real and only source of legitimacy for the political future of Syria and have direct ties with the concrete life in the country. The first subparagraph will present relevant Syrian diaspora organizations spread worldwide due to the dramatic migration crisis caused by the conflict, which are active from abroad in providing humanitarian assistance, providing legal and economic support, fight for human rights, and provide the basis for post-conflict reconstruction, among many others actions. The second paragraph will then describe communities Syria-based which constitute examples of what Mary Kaldor in her book calls “Islands of Civility”, which act from the inside in the attempt to provide a normal life to local communities and enhance dialogue between the different factions. In particular, to this regard, a special attention is dedicated to the Deir Mar Musa community which represents a fundamental intercultural and inter-religious space surviving the conflict and being a “safe heaven” for the local population. Finally, an attention will be deserved to international NGOs, INGOs, academia institution and research studies who have been concentrating their efforts in supporting the Syrian cause by giving in a global voice through civilian action.

#### **4.3.1. Syrian Diaspora Organizations**

One of the most dramatic consequences of the Syrian conflict has been the mass displacement of Syrians which in March 2023 has been estimated by the UNHCR of about 13.5 million people since 2011, 6.8 million of which hosted in 131 countries, representing the world’s largest refugee crisis with 1 out of 5 refugees in the world coming from Syria (25%). The majority (approximately 5.5 million or 77% of refugees) has requested asylum in neighbouring countries causing great social crises in the welcoming societies with a particular case being represented by Türkiye which has welcomed 3.6 million refugees, followed by Lebanon (about 800 thousand), Jordan (661 thousands), Iraq, Egypt and other

countries in North Africa.<sup>221 222</sup> A report drafted by UNHCHR Cyprus in March 2021, estimated over 1 million Syrian refugees in Europe with the vast majority hosted by Germany (about 850 thousands, 59%) followed by Sweden (11%). Germany is therefore the largest non-neighbouring country hosting country. A smaller percentage has also reached North America with an estimated total of 18 thousand Syrian refugees living in the United States. A relevant group of refugees fleeing particularly to Europe and North America constituted the educated middle-class society of Syria and has started providing support to its country from abroad creating associations and organizations aimed at fastening the peace process and in the meantime provide the necessary humanitarian, economic, social and legal tool to alleviate the local population.

A first group of Syrian diaspora groups is based in the United States and some of them as been recognised as non-profit organizations due to their particularly active engagement in regard to humanitarian assistance and advocacy action. To this group belongs for instance the Syrian Expatriates Organization (SEO), a non-profit educational organization, registered in the US and composed by Syrian expatriates animated by their demands for freedom, democracy and reforms in their home-country. Throughout the first months of the revolution in 2011, the SEO became the tool for Syrians living abroad to provide their support to the cause through peaceful means. As the conflict erupted the aim and action of the organization changed accordingly, becoming a way to denounce what was occurring within the country and bring it at the attention of the international community while supporting activists operating in Syria. Practically speaking, the SEO today supports the local population by providing medical assistance and telecommunications tools and raising awareness on human rights violations and other atrocities occurring at the expenses of civilians. In their host countries, SEO members engage with international organizations, NGOs and governments advocating for the Syrian cause and manifesting against the brutalities taking place in Syria against the Syrian people. The SEO is also committed to a long-term project of post-conflict reconstruction by looking for support abroad and particularly focusing on re-establishing the meaning of “Syrian” as a unique citizenship, against the ethnic fragmentation of the society. Another initiative is the one advanced by the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), funded back in 1988 and transformed, in 2007, in a Foundation whose aim is to provide medical tools and reliefs to Syrians working front line on the

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<sup>221</sup> UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Operational Data Portal: Syria Regional Refugee Response. Available at <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>

<sup>222</sup> UN High Commissioner for Refugees (March 14, 2023). Syria Refugee Crisis Explained. Available at <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/#:~:text=Approximately%205.5%20million%20Syrian%20refugees,more%20than%20850%2C000%20Syrian%20refugees.>

ground both in Syria and neighbouring countries. Other than providing medical assistance through medical equipes, medicines and further healthcare tools, SAMS has been active in fostering medical education and training on the ground, as well as financial support directly destined to healthcare structures in Syria and neighbouring countries. Projects carried out by SAMS have permitted the building of hospitals, intensive care and primary care units, birth and newborn facilities and mobile medical units, as well as the formation of on-the-ground personnel, mental health and psychosocial support and specialized missions in the area.

With the same goals as the SAMS is the Syrian Medical Association for Syrian Expatriates. SEMA International operates as umbrella organization uniting national SEMA organizations based in France, Türkiye, and the United States along with two offices in Qatar and Kuwait. SEMA International was launched in 2011 as a federation whose aim is to obtain international recognition and support in order to advance their goals in providing national Syrian medical associations with high-level expertise and creating a networking of Syrian professionalized communities abroad fighting for Syrian people relief. The three major pathways advanced by SEMA are relief actions, development projects, and recovery projects towards which the work is organized as based on SEMA's strategic goals. Such objectives are the following: to have SEMA acting as legal, administrative and advisory reference body supporting all affiliated national organizations; to coordinate efforts with other organizations to implement project works on the ground and have access to the necessary resources; to follow-up and advice the affiliated organizations and their work; to develop resources; to foster investment projects supporting the Federation; to obtain recognition from international organizations and bodies; to institute a central database to assess all needs in areas covered by affiliated organizations; to analyse, process and export data in order to provide information to the affiliated organizations and beyond.

A further relevant expression of Syrian diaspora-led civil society engagement is represented by the Karam Foundation and project. The scope of the latter is to provide young generations Syrian refugees in Türkiye and Jordan with the tools to empower themselves and shape their future. The first Karam house was opened on the border between Türkiye and Syria in the city of Reyhanli, while the second one is located in Istanbul, and they also held online workshop to connect with a broader community of Syrian youth. Moreover, the Karam Foundation supports scholars attending the university in Amman. The project is community-led and aimed at turning traditional humanitarian assistance in a long-term support towards “sustainable transformative impact” by forming Syrian youth refugees who will be future global leaders and possibly able to shape Syria's future.

Another professional field where Syrian diaspora organizations have been particularly active is the legal one. An example is provided by the Syrian Centre for Legal Studies and Research based in Germany whose aim is to provide legal support for the fostering of the new Constitution project and the respect of the rule of law in Syria. Their action is carrying out through the publication of legal articles and research studies aimed at providing basic tools for building the new legal system of Syria. The centre also supports arbitrarily detained prisoners by providing them with legal assistance from abroad and in particular sustaining those imprisoned due to their political opinion. To those the centre seeks for recognition and support from international bodies and governments and bases its action on principles of impartiality, neutrality, objectivity, and credibility and on the UN Charter and International Law. The aim is to obtain accountability for human rights' breaches and justice for Syrian victims worldwide.

Further mentionable movements are the “Syrian Women’s Political Movement” and Syrian Diaspora groups within hosting countries particularly in Europe and specifically in the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Switzerland, and Germany. To this regard, sharable research was conducted by Nora Jasmin Ragab and Amer Katbeh for the Arab Reform Initiative and commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council’s Civil Society Engagement Unit as part of the Diaspora Programme of the institute and the durable solutions platform joint initiative between the Danish Refugee Council, the International Rescue Committee and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The research analysed civic engagement of Syrian diaspora groups in Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Findings of the conducted analysis show that mobilization efforts of such diaspora organizations to alleviate the Syrian people within the country have increased through time despite the heterogeneity of such groups which reflects the one characterizing the motherland’s society. Despite differences among Syrian ethnic groups, host countries have proved to be safe and mostly neutral environment to foster dialogue and encourage diaspora organizations’ action as “agents of change and peace”.<sup>223</sup> The findings have indeed show that commitment to contribute to Syria’s peacebuilding and reconstruction have grown together with the desire to be able to return home. Diaspora organizations in Europe also manifested differences that prove how the environment provided by the welcoming societies shape their goals and possibilities. Ragab and Katbeh indeed describe how in the United Kingdom professionalization of groups originally created around “kitchen tables” have been more easily possible

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<sup>223</sup> Ragab N. J., Katbeh A., (December 5, 2018). Syrian Diaspora Groups in Europe: Mapping their Engagement in Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Arab Reform Initiative. Available at <https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/syrian-diaspora-groups-in-europe-mapping-their-engagement-in-denmark-france-germany-sweden-switzerland-and-the-united-kingdom/>

compared to France and Germany where this occurred to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, organizations have now obtained leading roles in providing humanitarian support in Syria also increasingly organizing under bigger umbrella organizations that enhance cooperation and coordination across borders. To this regard networks have particularly been created around professions or fields of action – as proven by the earlier example of SEMA – both within hosting countries and transnationally. Moreover, findings show that while Swedish and Danish groups have been more focused on local integration in the hosting societies, Swiss ones have been the most engaged ones towards the Syrian context, while those based in the UK, Germany and France have showed an attention towards both pathway and a particular focus on humanitarian assistance and development initiatives. Nora Jasmin Ragab and Amer Katbeh highlight how Syrian diaspora organizations are becoming “growing networks of institutions and individuals who work in (post-) conflict environments”<sup>224</sup>; this is further made possible by the accurate and in-depth knowledge of Syria and its complexities together with network connections to local social groups and higher risk thresholds that allow them to work in areas and more profoundly compared to the international community alone. Finally, the research proved that the main obstacle to Syrian diaspora groups’ action are financial capacities and resources which they are not able to access nor manage and an increasing loss in human capital due to growing feelings of hopelessness and despair in regard to the Syrian situation which they feel out of control and not in the hands of the Syrian people. To further exacerbate this feeling are international political discourses around Syria which are currently almost exclusively based on matters of securitization and counterterrorism leaving out the focus on the civilian population and its needs. Provided all this it is fundamental that host countries in the first place, international organizations, NGOs and the international community in general, provide support to these groups who are the heart of Syrian society and have more space of manoeuvre than their compatriots on the ground.<sup>225</sup>

#### **4.3.2. “Islands of Civility”: Deir Mar Musa and locally negotiated ceasefires**

In her book *Global Security Cultures*, whose content has already been provided for in the previous chapter, Professor Mary Kaldor describes what she calls “Islands of Civility”, that is to say local realities in war zones that keep living a “regular” life despite the mutated and harsh conditions civilians are forced to experience and that provide examples of local peacekeeping and peacebuilding to be supported in order to expand their influence and magnitude. Syria represents a great example for the existence of such “Islands” that can take the form of religious communities, local societies, or

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

associations mediating local ceasefires between actors involved in the conflict. This paragraph is thus dedicated to the analysis of these realities within Syria. As reported by Rim Turkmani, Mary Kaldor, Wisam Elhamwi, Joan Ayo and Dr Nael Hariri in *Hungry for Peace: positives and pitfalls of local truces and ceasefires in Syria*, the term Syrian civil society not only include NGOs and civil associations but also all those organizations, groups, projects, and initiatives that were born in the aftermath of the conflict's outbreak. Indeed, as reported in the mentioned paper, before the war started civil society in Syria was a rather weak concept that instead emerged and expanded in the crisis' context.<sup>226</sup> It is hard to define what constitute the Syrian civil society simply because they lack any legal framework and, considering the overall repressing character of the Syrian social conditions, mostly operate in officially non-legitimate ways. However, the analysis provided in chapter 2 can help understand what can be regarded as civil society also in the Syrian context and why these organizations are so relevant. Syrian civil society represents a great example for the purpose of this work as it proliferated and demonstrated its efficiency during the conflict directing its activities to maintaining social cohesion and supporting civilian's everyday lives. Civil society actors thus include traditional leaderships figures who has become crucial in the work towards Syria's future and reconstruction, as well as, networks, coalitions and unions which have become increasingly influential in providing humanitarian support and playing a role in local negotiations via UN mediation. In particular, to be highlighted are community groups and traditional leaders together with Syrian technocrats who work to support communities and against the political polarization with the goal of alleviating the civil society rather than obtaining a military victory; Local Administrative Councils (LAC) which have emerged in the gaps left by institutions who have collapses in the aftermath of the conflict's outbreak and coordinate service provisions as well as mediation among armed groups, the local community and mediators to stipulate ceasefires; and businessmen and traders – although on a lower level – who engage in local deals mostly in order to rebuild their business but overall obtaining favourable economic conditions for the whole local community they operate in.<sup>227</sup>

The impact of interreligious dialogue in a country strongly influenced by the presence of Islamist armed groups and ethnical religious differences is of the utmost relevance. In a very recent article by Dogukan Cansin Karakus published in July 2023 and named *Resolution of Local Conflicts involving Armed Islamists: the Syrian Civil War, 2011-2021* the author analyzed the role played by

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<sup>226</sup> Turkmani R., Kaldor M., Elhamwi W., Ayo J., Hariri N., (2014). *Hungry for Peace: positives and pitfalls of local truces and ceasefires in Syria*; London School of Economics, London, UK

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.



interreligious dialogue and mediator in shaping the community life of a country at war and peacebuilding initiatives. In particular, according to data collected and findings provided by Karakus “141 verbal/informal and written/formal ceasefire arrangements between the Syrian government and non-state actors and between/among non-state actors distributed over 191 Syrian locations [were stipulated] from March 2011 to October 2021. 90 out of the total of 191 ceasefire agreements (47.37 percent) include at least one Islamist/jihadist armed faction.”<sup>228</sup> The fundamental role of religion in such context is especially highlighted in the dedicated work of Jonathan Fox *The religious wave: religion and domestic conflict from 1960 to 2009* where the scholar highlights the “double-edged nature” of religion in conflict zones as it can either “be exploited to instigate a conflict and achieve political power” or “it can be helpful to facilitate conflict resolution” and as such should deserve a special and investigated attention by peace and development studies.<sup>229</sup> In an article by Chadwick Alger, *Religion as a Peace Tool*, the author identifies religious entities as those filling out the gaps left by state-actors particularly in during war times and in areas under the control of rebels’ forces, therefore, such religious actors can play a determinant role in setting out the basis for “field democracy” by acting on the ground and having access to contact with all parties involved, while also being the ones enhancing humanitarian support and services when fighting forces do not prioritize civilians.<sup>230</sup> In the specific context of the Syrian civil war under analysis, as provided for by Karakus and Svensson “The use of third-party mediation as a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of armed conflicts has been shown to be very beneficial “<sup>231</sup> putting into practice what had previously been theorized by Alger by observing the humanitarian assistance enhanced by local religious entities as well as their role as mediators in peacebuilding mechanisms and negotiation talks, locally. In particular, according to their research, three findings can be highlighted, namely that Islamist fighting groups are more willing to accept a ceasefire and set an agreement when 1) humanitarian concerns are prioritized over strategic ones; 2) the implementation of such ceasefire/agreement is obtained gradually and with a “step-by-step” approach that enhances confidence-building among the contracting parties (although as underlined by the author agreements of this kind are more informal and in a non-written form); 3) third parties involvement does not have any significant impact on the establishment of these ceasefires/agreements. The result is thus, as also stated by Axeirod and Hamilton in *The evolution of*

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<sup>228</sup> Karakus D. C., (2023). Resolution of Local Conflicts involving Armed Islamists: the Syrian Civil War, 2011-2021. *Pathways to Peace and Security* 64 (1), pp 58-75.

<sup>229</sup> Fox J., (2012). The Religious Wave: Religion and Domestic Conflict from 1960 to 2009, *Civil Wars*, 14:2, 141-158.

<sup>230</sup> Alger C. F. (2002). Religion as a peace tool, *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1:4, 94-109

<sup>231</sup> Karakus D. C., Svensson I., (2020). Between the Bombs: Exploring Partial Ceasefires in the Syrian Civil War, 2011–2017. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32 (4), 681-700.

*cooperation*, that while no peace deal has been instituted and have effect on the national level, agreements at the local ones have been increasingly relevant in providing ease to the civilian population and establishing locally administered realities living outside of warfare dynamics.<sup>232</sup>

A practical example that is worth mentioning for the purpose of this work is the monastic community al-Khalil (the close friend – the Coran name for Abraham) of Deir Mar Musa al-Habashi (Saint Moses the Abyssinian) near the city of Nebek, the capital of Qalamoun located in the middle between Damascus and Homs. The community was founded in 1991 by the Italian Jesuit Father Paolo Dall'Oglio after his discovery of the abandoned monastery in 1982 and has survived through the war, ISIS and the first expulsion in 2012 and then the kidnapping and disappear in 2013 of its founder, representing the perfect example of the “Islands” Mary Kaldor talks about and civil society’s mediators in humanitarian assistance and negotiations from the inside. The community has since its foundation also expanded in Maryam al-Adhra in the Kurdistan Iraqi city of Sulaymanyah and San Salvatore in Cori, Italy. Since the beginning the monastery and community has acted as reference point from the interreligious dialogue between Christians and Muslims transforming throughout the war in a center to enhance the continuation of everyday life to the local population from the smaller provision of essential goods and services to the mediation with extremist factions for hostages and detainees’ release and ceasefires negotiations with fighting actors. Father Dall'Oglio himself was kidnapped in the city of Raqqa while he was engaged in negotiations for the liberation of hostages detained by ISIS’ forces in the region. In her book *Paolo Dall'Oglio e la Comunità di Deir Mar Musa: Un deserto, una storia*, Francesca Peliti traces the birth and evolution of the community through the words of people belonging to the community or who’s had contacts with him, and letters written by Dall'Oglio to his family between 1985 and 1995.<sup>233</sup> Since that day, as stated by Peliti, lots of people’s existence has changed thanks to the actions of those who dedicated their life to the community despite the dangers of the area. A particular testimony is the one of Jaques Mourad, the first monk to found the community together with Dall'Oglio arriving at the monastery in 1989 and who also experienced a kidnapping. In his words the strong power and influence that religion can play in difficult areas becomes clear and so does the fundamental important of coexistence and dialogue between different religions, whose results is peace and collaboration benefitting religious faith and civilians. Since May 2021 the community is led by Father Jihad Youssef, who has since June 2022 re-open the monastery to visits from outside after the disappear of ISIS, and thus a fundamental improvement in safety conditions in the area where for years

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<sup>232</sup> Axelrod R., Hamilton W. D., (1981). The evolution of cooperation. *Science*, Vol 211, Issue 4489 pp. 1390-1396

<sup>233</sup> Peliti F., (2022). *Paolo Dall'Oglio e la Comunità di Deir Mar Musa: Un deserto, una storia*; Effatà editrice; Torino.

kidnapping where a primary concern, and the COVID pandemics. The community has nevertheless continued its action according to its four principles: faith, work, hospitality, and dialogue throughout all this time. They support the local community by enhancing the provision of education, the institutionalization of schools, providing services and assistance to refugees, mediating with factions in the area – especially Islamic one due to their funding principle of interreligious dialogue - and working for the protection of environmental preservation and the protection of the area’s biodiversity.

In a text written in June 2013, Professor Mary Kaldor described the organization of Syrian Civil Society and particularly focused on a meeting in a hotel north of Beirut which reunited Syrian civil society actors not only from all over Syria (Damascus, Aleppo, Raqqa, Kurdish area, and the Turkish Border) but also from Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and the United Kingdom, including two pro-regime supporters. Despite the variety of different opinions, the overall climate was of collaboration and a shared willingness to have Syrian people’s voice being heard in peace negotiations and a vision of the future of multicultural cosmopolitan Syria. As Kaldor reports, throughout the meeting the Centre for Policy Research in Damascus presented its report on the economic crisis and education and health deterioration in the country, together with low women’s participation and problems for younger generations. A shared understanding was moreover the desire for a peace process based on internal negotiations despite the acknowledgment that the most probable scenario was to have negotiations “driven by the interests of external players or a combination of internal and external factors” and thus the necessity to make sure that the needs and wishes of the Syrian people were taken into consideration. Despite the manifested diversities in the composition of Syrian CSAs and their perspectives “Syrians were committed to a shared vision of Syria. In contrast to the fractious and fragmented nature, of the formal political opposition, the overwhelming sentiment of this group of Syrians was mutual solidarity”, thus working for the concretization of the future of Syria and establishment of projects for the support of the Syrian population.<sup>234</sup> In the same text Professor Kaldor indeed describes the way several peaceful protesters from 2011, who did not join those that become the fighting rebel groups remaining skeptical about the employment of violence to obtain their goals, re-organized to try to stop violence and help war-victims from both sides. The examples she advances are those engaged in humanitarian relief projects, organization of workshops bringing together people from all sides, help provided to widows and families of those killed at the front (again from both sides), women’s groups against sexual violence, provision of services such as healthcare and education, and active cessation of hostilities. The latter is exemplified by a group of peace-activists who mediated between a brigade of

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<sup>234</sup> Kaldor M. (2013). Civil Society in Syria. Text written for the London School of Economics, August 28th, 2013.

the FSA and a Kurdish brigade in the city of Ras al-ayn (Kurdish region) and negotiated the withdrawal of both. Another example is that of a young woman who was photographed standing in the middle of Damascus with a “Stop the Killing” sign, becoming the symbol of a tired and anti-war Syrian population and civil society. In a later interview from 2017, Kaldor reinforced the necessity to support such CSA by stating that “civil society is the key to establishing legitimate political authority and that this is essential to end new wars. You can’t end them through violence, or through talks among illegitimate participants” adding that “unfortunately at the moment [...] both the UN and the EU have been very much sidelined and the key actors, like Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia are still thinking in very old war terms”, thus failing in concentrating on the involvement these civil society groups in peace negotiations and supporting their actions locally.<sup>235</sup> Practical examples of these civil society local actors who enhance and support life in Syria are several. A database of active CSAs and projects divided by their field of action and geographic areas is available on the Civil Society Gateway portal. The platform is aimed at providing updated news about local initiatives and strengthening the role of CSAs by informing the outside world about their existence and also enhancing networking and information-exchange among both locally based organizations and foreign and global actors. The Syrian civil society gateway is run by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM) which is an independent non-governmental non-profit organization, which beyond provide information on these associations also drafts reports, studies and share news by Syrian organizations and international organizations, including UN agencies. According to SCM’s database the field of action in which Syrian civil society organizations are active are: democracy (12); livelihood and food security (121); advocacy (18); governance (4); health (17); education (37); media (16); women issues (35); protection (15); human rights (25); training and capacity building (26); sustainable development (38); environmental issues (1); psychological health (3); child issues (31); culture and arts (2); youth issues (9); research and studies (5); and other (7).<sup>236</sup> A few examples worth mentioning are the group “People of Aleppo”, which is a group of engineers who worked to ensure the regular functioning of the city’s infrastructure (power lines, water pipes, and gas glows) by negotiating with those groups who were controlling the goods (ISIS was controlling oil supplies, the government the electricity grid, and the rebel group Jabhat Fateh al-Sham the water installations); the “Syrian Salvation Government” again in the region of Aleppo which carries out its work by organizing administrative matters and providing services to local citizens as for instance issuing identity cards,

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<sup>235</sup> E-International Relations (2017). Interview to Mary Kaldor July 21, 2017.

<sup>236</sup> Civil Society Gateway portal. Available at <https://csgateway.ngo/en/>

rented electricity, organization of civil records and courts; “The Day After Project” who works to enhance the best possible conditions to ensure a future to Syria and research on possible scenarios for post-conflict reconstruction; and the “Syrian Woman Council” aimed at raising awareness on gender issues and empowering women to participate in public life and debate in Syria.

Finally, special attention is to be dedicated to locally negotiated ceasefires which involve locally active fighting parties mediated through civil society respected figures for the benefit and relief of the civilian population. A general research on local agreements was conducted by the Conflict Research Programme (CRP) of the London School of Economics and particularly by Mary Kaldor, Marika Theros and Rim Turkmani and published in November 2021 under the name *War Versus Peace Logics at Local Levels: Findings from the Conflict Research Programme on Local Agreements and Community Level Mediation*. According to the research international peace efforts have traditionally focused on national level deals resulting in very fragile and short-term agreements, while disregarding the local reality and negotiations occurring at the lower level in more limited areas. Findings of this article however, demonstrate that the international community and foreign actors involved in conflicts should contrarily mainly focus on local agreements and ceasefire as they constitute the basis for long-term stabilization and possibly, if backed, peacebuilding. The scholars identify five main findings: 1) local agreements are not necessarily peace agreements, some of them keep following a war logic, although those that focus on peace, humanitarian intervention, service provision and so on are the ones on which it is necessary to focus on and support as the researchers highlight that community-level mediation is mostly prompted towards a peace-logic approach; 2) local agreements are about concrete situations and needs on the ground; 3) local agreements influence the overall region and war balance as areas influence one another and an agreement in a geographical place can greatly shape what happens in neighboring regions, accordingly what happens at one level, say the local one, influences what happens at the regional one or even the national. It is for this reason that is fundamental to include concrete local issues in high-level negotiation through the involvement of civilians, civic and communities figures together with multilateral actors such as UN agencies; 4) local agreements are not simply about signing the agreement itself but also about the process since data have proved that also throughout the negotiation phases lower levels of violence are detected and that the fundamental element is long-term confidence building for a long-term reconciliation process; 5) local agreements are based on a detailed knowledge of concrete local needs and wishes, as such it is fundamental to have a fusion of bottom-up and top-down approaches to enhance the most concrete possible application of agreements in accordance with what’s needed. According to Local PA-X, a database recording local

agreements between 1990 and mid-2020, out of 286 local agreements in this time frame 27% of these were stipulated in Syria between 2012 and 2019.<sup>237</sup> A first more in-depth research on the Syrian context specifically was conducted by Karakus and Svensson and published in the article *Between the Bombs: Exploring Partial Ceasefires in the Syrian Civil War, 2011–2017* which was later expanded by Karakus, Svensson and Lundgren in the article from December 2022 *Local Ceasefires and De-Escalation: Evidence from the Syrian Civil War*. The first article analyzes 106 local-level ceasefires/agreements during the indicated time frame, providing that 72% of them were respected. According to the scholars' findings a relevant role was played by "internal mediators", that is to say local actors such as "Kurdish and Arab tribal leaders and elders, and prominent figures such as the preacher Abdullah al-Muhaysin" as "internal mediators are systematically associated with respected ceasefire arrangements".<sup>238</sup> By contrast when external actors are involved in negotiations data show a decreasing chance for a ceasefire/agreement to be respected. Moreover, Karakus and Svensson highlight that the same fundamental role is played by confidence-building measures throughout ceasefires/agreements negotiations. According to this it appears clear that local civil society figures play an important role in peacebuilding and that local pressures have increased overtime the likelihood of external mediation "indicating that civilians can have some influence over the decisions of external mediators to intervene and negotiate ceasefires".<sup>239</sup> Finally, using the scholars' words "local ceasefires may cumulatively contribute to larger areas without armed hostilities, and in the longer run, provide a bottom-up approach to peace".<sup>240</sup> The second research added to the first one a few more detailed findings on the 145 agreements stipulated in Syria between 2011 and 2019 that is to say, that despite more uncertain results in the short-term, locally negotiated ceasefire show an overall de-escalation in areas involved in the long-term, particularly when signatories have an history of interactions and confidence-building was deserved some time and attention and ceasefires were adopted following a step-by-step approach and finally that such agreements have evidence of "spatial diffusion", that is to say, that agreements in one area influence the reduction in violence and conflict intensity in neighboring ones.<sup>241</sup> The three cited articles were supported by case-study examples and data

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<sup>237</sup> Kaldor M., Theros M., Turkmani R., (2021). *War Versus Peace Logics at Local Levels: Findings from the Conflict Research Programme on Local Agreements and Community Level Mediation*. Findings from the Conflict Research Programme on Local Agreements and Community Level Mediation, The London School of Economics, London, UK.

<sup>238</sup> Karakus D. C., Svensson I., (2020). *Between the Bombs: Exploring Partial Ceasefires in the Syrian Civil War, 2011–2017*. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32 (4), 681-700.

<sup>239</sup> See note 238. p 15

<sup>240</sup> See note 238. p 17

<sup>241</sup> Karakus D.C., Svensson I., Lundgren M., (2023). *Local Ceasefires and De-Escalation: Evidence from the Syrian Civil War*; *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

constituting evidence on the Syrian case such as the 2014 agreement between the opposition and the government in Deraa and the ones between ISIS and HTS that focused on the exchange of services and good and were mediated by local actors or those stipulated under civilian pressure in the Eastern Ghouta and Homs.

Regarding this last example a sharable analysis was provided by Rim Turkmani in the article *Local agreements as a process: the example of local talks in Homs in Syria*. Turkmani's analysis focus on the six years long local negotiation process in Homs finding that 1) even in cases where agreements were not reached even just the talk process had provided a relief for the local population by creating condition of decreased violence and civilian fatalities as well as improved living standards; 2) local agreements are not simply relevant because they constitute the basis for higher top-level peace talks, but because they reach fields of action that cannot be achieved in other ways due to the involvement of local actors and in-depth knowledge of local needs and wishes as well as overall on-ground context; 3) local agreements are not simply about the signing of the agreement but about the process and the interlinks with other levels and locations.<sup>242</sup> Homs was among the first cities to join the 2011 uprising, initiating local talks and agreements over a span of six years from spring 2011 to spring 2017. As the Syrian conflict escalated militarily in late 2011, opposition armed groups emerged, primarily made up of defected soldiers and civilian volunteers, with Homs serving as a significant base for several of these groups situated in various parts of the city. Initial talks involving key security and government figures from Damascus began in February 2012 in Homs, but these discussions were hindered by the Syrian army's military campaign to regain control of the Baba Amr neighborhood, held by the opposition until March 2012. The failure of this initial track, combined with other conflict dynamics, led to a decline in security. The armed opposition received increased support and funding from foreign sources, particularly private and state Gulf donors, enabling them to expand their security control. Concurrently, loyalist militias formed to counter the armed opposition and suppress public protests. In Homs, loyalist militias fell into two major categories: the National Defence Forces and similar groups, and militias recruited from Shia villages, primarily the al-Rida brigade, both receiving training and financing from Iran and Hezbollah. By the latter half of 2013, the opposition held control over areas such as al-Waer, the old city of Homs, and the northern countryside, resulting in sieges and constant attacks from both the government and loyalist militias. Several negotiation attempts took place in 2013, driven by the stalemate in both the military and top-level political tracks, as well as the dire situation for civilians. One notable attempt was led by a civic committee of doctors and lawyers from Homs, aiming for a

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<sup>242</sup> Turkmani (2022): *Local agreements as a process: the example of local talks in Homs in Syria, Peacebuilding*.

comprehensive solution that included a ceasefire, lifting the siege, and addressing local needs. In February 2014, a local deal was reached, resulting in the evacuation of 1,348 civilians under the supervision of UNHCR and the Syrian Red Crescent. However, not all civilians left, and the humanitarian situation remained dire in the besieged areas. Subsequent efforts by the civic committee to reach a city-wide solution were interrupted by a separate deal for the old city sponsored by regional supporters of the opposition and government. This May 2014 agreement focused on the armed opposition, allowing them to move to other opposition-controlled parts of the northern countryside, contrasting with the civic committee's proposal for disarmament and reintegration within the city. Al-Waer, home to armed groups and civilians, was left isolated after these developments. A new phase of al-Waer-only talks commenced, led by a committee of civic and armed actors, resulting in a ceasefire agreement by the end of August 2014. This agreement encompassed various humanitarian aspects, the release of political detainees, and the establishment of a local neighborhood committee, incorporating both military and civilian personnel. The period between August 2015 and September 2016 was daily covered by the CCPE Syrian events databased. During the timeframe there were three periods during which local talks were not taking place and three when they were occurring alternating moments of violence and moments of peace. An analysis of the year provides further evidence in support of the thesis that local talks are a fundamental and successful element of peacebuilding. Indeed, according to the data collected by Turkmani during peace periods when local talks were ongoing “People were 26 times more likely not to be killed and 31 times more likely not to be injured as a result of violence. Service restoration and aid delivery were 16 times more likely to take place”.<sup>243</sup> Moreover, data also showed that civilians were 93% more likely to be killed and 98% more likely to be injured than armed men. Local agreements were based on a logic of peace which in the words of the scholar “was mainly promoted by civic actors and some leaders of armed actors who believed that a military solution would be costly and/or not viable”<sup>244</sup> thus providing the active and fundamental role played by civilians in conflict-resolution. The Homs’ example proves how local mediation is an essential tool to achieve long-term, durable and stable peace as they focus on local grievances and disarmament rather than dislocation which fuel violence by moving it in other areas. At the same time there is still a wide area for effective improvement in local talks as the absence of a UN mandate to play a role in such talks prevent them from acting as a neutral external actor thus not allowing it to intervene for humanitarian purposes and the protection of civilians themselves, while allowing access to these talks to the UN

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<sup>243</sup> See note 242. P 13

<sup>244</sup> See note 242. P 14-15



would greatly benefit the overall effective result focusing on human security and civilians. As concluded by Turkmani “A greater multilateral presence could have strengthened the role of civil society, protected civilians, and kept the locally initiated civic-led process alive”.<sup>245</sup> Further examples that contribute to this understanding are the ones of Ras al-Ain and Aleppo described by Rim Turkmani et al in *Hungry for Peace: positives and pitfalls of local truces and ceasefires in Syria* which again prove the crucial role played by civil society local actors in local peace talks which have had a generalized positive influence on the whole civil society.<sup>246</sup>

#### **4.4.Parallel positive examples of civil society contributions to peacebuilding**

##### **4.4.1. Mozambique and the Community of Sant’Egidio: how religious associations can mediate for peacebuilding**

Towards the end of the 1980s, the global community faced a sense of helplessness as conflict raged in Mozambique. The roots of the conflict ran deep, information was scarce, interests were entrenched, and the intricate dynamics between The Mozambique Liberation Front, the Frentede Libertagaode Mogambique (FRELIMO), mostly composed by those who has led the resistance movement and supported by the Soviet Union and China; a Mozambican insurgency group aimed at eliminating the communist ideology from the country, The Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) and a government with limited ability to handle them added complexity. It was a situation characterized by both excessive and insufficient conditions for intervention. The Mozambique conflict stood as the final Cold War conflict, featuring two ideologically opposing factions. Concurrently, it marked the dawn of a non-traditional "post-1989" conflict, characterized by ambiguities, nuances, and uncertainties. In this context a prominent role was played by the Community of Sant’Egidio: a religious association founded in Rome in 1968 and now present in 70 countries between Europe, Latin and Central America, Asia, and Africa recognized as “International associations of believers” who provide services to people in discomfort situations and particularly those living in poverty. For the Community of Sant’Egidio, mediating for peace demanded a shift from mere solidarity and developmental work to entering the challenging realm of politics and war. This was a formidable task that civil society, along with its organized expressions, had to embrace: taking on the responsibility of navigating this conflict-ridden terrain to lay the groundwork for peace. Following a successful liberation struggle spanning decades, the FRELIMO regime adopted the socio-economic model of socialist nations, leading to

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<sup>245</sup> See note 242. P 16

<sup>246</sup> Turkmani R., Kaldor M., Elhamwi W., Ayo J., Hariri N., (2014). *Hungry for Peace: positives and pitfalls of local truces and ceasefires in Syria*; London School of Economics, London, UK.

extensive restructuring and limitations on freedoms. In opposition, the guerrilla movement known as RENAMO emerged around 1975. Lacking a strong political platform and external relations, RENAMO was often perceived as an instrument of South African apartheid. South Africa, indeed, held the key to the situation, and prevailing Western beliefs indicated that substantial change in South Africa was essential before any progress could be made. International political factors heavily influenced assessments of the Mozambique conflict. However, these assessments didn't consider crucial factors, such as the absence of direct US involvement in the crisis. The concept of a "war by proxy" was no longer applicable in Mozambique. Additionally, South Africa had gradually disengaged after signing the Nkomati agreements in March 1984. This resulted in a degree of autonomy and limited military and political self-sufficiency for RENAMO, making it neither strong enough to win nor weak enough to be defeated. A detailed analysis of conflict mechanisms reveals that RENAMO managed to position itself as the voice of opposition against social change, anti-religious mobilization, youth unemployment, as well as discontent between the north and south regions and traditional ethnic authorities. RENAMO's strength derived from within the country and was linked to the conflicting policies pursued by FRELIMO. The Community of Sant'Egidio believed that the war could persist without either side achieving a decisive victory. Consequently, it was crucial to dispel the notion that a peace process could only occur within a broader international context and solely depended on external factors. Sant'Egidio perceived that the process wasn't exclusively reliant on neighboring countries or major powers; rather, there were internal factors that needed understanding to develop a unique Mozambique-specific solution. The initial step taken by Sant'Egidio was to establish contact with RENAMO, the enigmatic guerrilla group. For years, efforts were directed at uncovering the true nature of RENAMO, going beyond the stereotypes (sometimes referred to as "khmers noires") and the characterizations presented in the propaganda of the Maputo government, which typically labeled them as "bandidos armados" (armed bandits). Sant'Egidio facilitated a visit by a Mozambican bishop to the RENAMO base in Gorongosa, and subsequently, RENAMO's leader, Alphonso Marceta Dhlakama, was invited to Rome. When RENAMO opted to play its political card in 1989-90, the consequences remained uncertain even to them. However, Frelimo had come to the realization that a military victory was unattainable. The challenge was how to bring the two parties together. The FRELIMO government had no intention of granting any form of status to RENAMO, except as a dissident armed group. However, RENAMO considered itself a government in exile and controlled vast portions of the national territory. The core issue was political recognition. Political recognition was sometimes seen as legitimizing subversive violence, a potentially risky or even detrimental choice. Can a state or official diplomacy

afford to grant such legitimacy? Nevertheless, during peace negotiations, the customary confidentiality of contacts must transition to some degree of visibility to commit the parties to dialogue. In the case of Mozambique, the shift from armed conflict to a political paradigm took two years and three months. This transition signified a shift in mindset—from guerrillas to politicians. It necessitated acknowledgment in some form, and that acknowledgment could only be political. Essentially, the primary challenge was to establish a shared framework that could pave the way for peace negotiations, with unwavering commitment from both parties. In Mozambique's case, the initial meetings between RENAMO and FRELIMO held in Rome in June-July 1990 were particularly significant, laying the foundation for this shared vision. It was vital for them to recognize each other as integral components of the same nation, "children of the same land," with common interests, to ensure genuine negotiation rather than transforming the encounter into a courtroom to accuse each other. This task presented considerable difficulty with FRELIMO, entrenched in its single-party system logic, and with RENAMO, devoid of political and national categorizations due to prolonged isolation. The first document signed in June 1990 acknowledged that they were part of the same Mozambique family, marking a step in the right direction. This preamble marked the culmination of the slow and challenging yet crucial process of recognition. RENAMO agreed to recognize Frelimo as the governing party of the country (no longer a party in power), and in turn, Frelimo recognized RENAMO as an opposition party. The government, which had sought to preempt some of RENAMO's demands by implementing reforms that might nullify the negotiations, pledged not to undertake further unilateral actions of that nature. Consequently, the negotiating table at St. Egidio became an urgent national necessity for achieving peace. The guerrillas, on their part, adopted a new logic: a government existed in Maputo, and Mozambique possessed a legal and political system that could be modified, yet already existed. The common Mozambique family had a state. The objective of the negotiations in Mozambique was to marginalize the military option and exclude it as a comprehensive solution to the crisis. While avoiding intricate details, it's worth noting that the 27-month process (continuing beyond the reciprocal recognition of the parties) was a slow, gradual, and challenging endeavor. Talks occurred in Rome while fighting still raged in Mozambique. FRELIMO sought an immediate ceasefire, but arms were RENAMO's primary form of leverage, making it reluctant to relinquish them. FRELIMO's democratic transformation manifested in its acceptance of democratic pluralism. This proved more challenging for RENAMO due to the limited education of its members. Moreover, the worldview of a guerrilla fighter, whose sustenance relies solely on military activity, is distinct, affecting their sense of proportion and interpretation of political events. Hence, the task was to shift the mindset of an armed

group from a military logic to a political and international one.<sup>247</sup> The goal was achieved as on October 4<sup>th</sup> 1992 Joaquim Chissano, the Mozambique President and secretary of the FRELIMO, and Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the RENAMO signed a comprehensive peace agreement mediated by two members of the Community of Sant'Egidio, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi, Bishop Jaime Gonçalves and Italian government representative Mario Raffaelli. The agreement ended the 16-year civil war that had caused one million lives and four million of displaced people. After their successful mediation in peace talks and the signing of the Rome agreements, the Community of Sant'Egidio as proceeded its work in Mozambique by instituting the "Schools of Peace" and the BRAVO (Birth Registration against Oblivion) Program, though which it registers thousands of children that had no legal identity, in order to protect their civil rights.<sup>248</sup> The action carried out by Sant'Egidio in Mozambique provide a great example of how global civil society can play a crucial role as mediator in fragmented societies by focusing on a human security approach and proposing themselves as neutral and impartial actors.

#### **4.4.2. Somalia and the Galkaio local agreement: the importance of community-led diplomacy supported by multilateral external actors**

Between approximately 1987 and 1992, Somalia faced a significant collapse and civil war. During the 1990s, a series of peace and reconciliation conferences occurred in the northern regions of the country, leading to the establishment of Somaliland in 1991 and Puntland in 1998. These entities, operating with a notable degree of autonomy, displayed a level of continuity and coherence not observed in other parts of Somalia. However, the situation differed in central and southern Somalia, where a more entrenched conflict environment and war economy persisted. In central and southern Somalia, there were periods of relative peace mixed with varying degrees of violence and conflict since the early 1990s. Starting from the mid-2000s, the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab emerged as a major player in the country's dynamics. Following internationally supported peace conferences, a federal government recognized on the international stage was nominally established in 2012. Amidst this backdrop, competition for control over the state and its institutions emerged as a crucial catalyst for conflict and political rivalry. The state offered access to external resources through relationships of "extraversion." Additionally, clan-based or identity-centered politics contributed to conflict, particularly when underlying grievances were manipulated by political entrepreneurs. Further

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<sup>247</sup> Giro M., (1998). The Community of Sant'Egidio and its Peace-Making Activities; *The International Spectator*, Volume XXXIII No. 3.

<sup>248</sup> Sant'Egidio dossier on Mozambique. Available at <https://www.santegidio.org/downloads/Mozambique-Sant-Egidio-EN-2019.pdf>

complexity arose from commercial competition among business groups, ideological differences, and competition for resources, each contributing additional layers to the underlying conflict environment. An influential role in peacebuilding and research contribution to the Somali conflict is provided by the International Organization Interpeace. In its comprehensive study on internationally mediated peace processes, written by Mark Bradbury, the organizations highlighted how in the country Somalis led peace through about 90 local peace processes where a prominent role was particularly played by clan elders thus constituting community-led examples of agreements. The Somali peace process is based on inclusivity of civil society by focusing on social reconciliation and representation. Therefore, decision-making was based on consensus among parties including youth, women, businessmen, religious actors, diaspora communities and media together with respected personalities, such as the clans' elders, who represented a form of authority in the community. The report produced by Bradbury thus underlines the successes detectable when peace processes are community-led and involve civil society at every level following a logic of collective responsibility but also rights. In their article *Galkaio, Somalia: bridging the border*, Marika Theros & Nisar Majid go beyond this analysis by providing a case-study example of how locally initiated peace processes, in this case in particular by a single civil society actor namely Ms. Gasser, can provide even more successful outcomes thanks to the neutral mediation of external third-party actors such as the UN or international organizations as Interpeace itself and local ones like the Peace and Development Research Centre (PDRC).<sup>249</sup> Galkaio town stands as a significant border on multiple levels, notably between two of the prominent Somali clan families: the Darod and the Hawiye. In the early 1990s, during the Siad Barre regime's downfall, two primary insurgent groups, the USC (United Somali Congress) and SSDF (Somali Salvation and Democratic Front), initially opposing Siad Barre and then each other, reached a cessation of hostilities, known as the 1993 Mudug (Peace) Accord. This accord effectively created a division, separating northern Somalia from the central and southern regions, paving the way for the subsequent reconciliation process that culminated in the establishment of Puntland in 1998. The 1993 Mudug Accord, while preventing large-scale conflict for more than two decades, should be characterized as a truce or ceasefire, as it lacked deeper reconciliation mechanisms. The border, involving guarded checkpoints, carries not only a physical barrier but also social and psychological dimensions, reflecting the complex history of the region and its unresolved nature, a theme frequently evident in public discourse and social media. Although trade continued across the border, other forms of social interaction, such as intermarriage and everyday social exchanges, had been notably absent. A significant underlying tension within Galkaio town

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<sup>249</sup> Theros M. Majid N., (2022). *Galkaio, Somalia: bridging the border*, *Peacebuilding*.

revolved around the uneven pace of development on either side of the border. In the northern sector (Puntland), substantial diaspora involvement and business investments took place, while the more volatile southern portion saw minimal investment, with its population choosing to invest in Mogadishu instead. This disparity was amplified by the unequal distribution of aid resources, favoring north Galkaio due to its superior security and infrastructure. This imbalance acted as a catalyst for two major outbreaks of violence during the relevant period and reflects the intricate connection of aid within Somalia's political economy. The more immediate context of conflict and agreement-making unfolded from 2014 to 2017, coinciding with the establishment of the Federal system in Somalia, which necessitated the formation of new Federal Member States. Galmudug emerged as a combination of Galgadud and southern Mudug regions, while Puntland fully integrated into the new Federal system. The decision to establish and recognize Galmudug immediately stirred Puntland's leadership, leading them to withdraw their MPs from the Parliament in Mogadishu as a response. A key underlying reason for this reaction was the concern within Puntland's incumbent leadership that the close ties between Somalia's national President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, and the inaugural Galmudug President, Abdikarim Guled, could influence the upcoming Federal election scheduled for early 2017. The impending Puntland elections in 2018 added further complexity, with some viewing the incumbent President, Abdiwali, as a weak diaspora leader unable to defend the territory. On the Galmudug side, tensions were partly driven by Galmudug politicians attempting to assert their new political identity and statehood. More precisely, the path towards the December 2017 Galkaio agreement was preceded by three phases. The first one started with the election, in July 2015, of President Guled in Galmudug which met the opposing reaction of Puntland and consequently violent actions in November 2015 which caused 20 deaths and about 90.000 displaced people.<sup>250</sup> The second phase involved two ceasefires mediated by national and international actors which imply a truce but no effort towards reconciliation. Throughout this period Galkaio remained a major arms trade center and politically divided reality hiding deep tensions. Moreover, a drought occurred, and insecurity levels remained high, as such, a consistent portion of the population was displaced. After another violent event which occurred in October 2015, the third phase begun which was characterized by the involvement of UN agencies, Interpeace and the PDRC. The mediation process and agreements signed in December 2017 represent a relevant example of the importance of inclusivity and people-oriented mediation by

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<sup>250</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG) (November 17, 2016). The Islamic State Threat in Somalia's Puntland State, Commentary. Available at <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-threat-somalias-puntland-state>; Hiiraan Online (November 25, 2015), Despite Ceasefire Deal, fears of fighting persists Galkaio town. Available at [https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2015/Nov/102738/despite\\_ceasefire\\_deal\\_fears\\_of\\_fighting\\_persists\\_galkayo\\_town.aspx](https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2015/Nov/102738/despite_ceasefire_deal_fears_of_fighting_persists_galkayo_town.aspx)

multilateral actors. Indeed, the agreement was signed by a range of political, military, customary and civil society figures, including prominent women in Galkaio as well as the highest customary authority and was “far-reaching than previous agreements and includes provisions on the norms and rules for resolving further disputes and demonstrated the value of provisions such as banning media hate speech”. The mediation approach focused on long-term concrete and underlying issues causing the more general tensions, namely, not simply ending violence but social and economic relations by involving in particular a young Somali woman belonging to the Somali diaspora in the UK, Ms. Ilham Gasser, who played a crucial role in the peace process. Despite her gender, age, the fact that she came from one of the clans on the Galmudug side of Galkaio and the overall tense situation between local and diaspora Somali population, she carried out an outstanding job by proposing herself as an effective mediator through peace resolution proposals and participating to elders’ meetings who started taking her seriously despite all the cultural and social obstacles. Ms. Gasser conducted informal investigations on the ground to assert what were the concrete issues to be brought at the negotiation table, coordinating efforts with UN agencies and the two peace organizations earlier mentioned. The overall result was a wide comprehensive agreement whose main points were: stopping violence and rebuilding social relations and trust among local actors; opening up the town and calming down the overall tensions, in this context it was fundamental to bring people together and rebuild social ties and as such a prominent role was played by local youth and women associations as for instance the celebration of International Women’s Day on March 8<sup>th</sup> 2017 involving women from both side and the organization of a football match which brought together young men again from both sides; finally, the creation of joint security forces which not only provided a common framework for security but also destroyed the identity barrier that was created by having distinct police forces acting in the interest of only one side. The Galkaio Somali example represent therefore a perfect example of how civil society actors supported by multilateral external and local ones and multidimensional and multi-level diplomacy can be drivers for peacebuilding and even in particularly complex and deeply rooted conflictual situations.

#### **4.5.Conclusions**

An overall detectable conclusion, that will be followed-up by consistent policy recommendations in the next section of this work, is that civil society actors can play a crucial role in conflict areas by enhancing new peacebuilding tracks and focus on civilian lives and their needs and wishes. As such it is fundamental to focus on conflict-resolution approaches that are based on the involvement of these civil society actors both locally based and abroad. Organizations of nationals from the country at war, as in the case of associations and projects within Syria and foreign countries,

represent the real focus on which security approaches shall be based, namely the people and thus, once again, human security. As such, not only state-actors but, as demonstrated, more importantly, multilateral actors and other non-state ones (such as NGOs, INGOs, and Academia) must focus their peace initiatives on supporting these associations and voicing their wishes and needs as when their efforts combine, for instance in the case of local ceasefires and agreements, concrete issues at stake are discussed, civilians improve their living conditions, fatalities and violence rates decrease, and long-term escalation and confidence-building is instituted.



## **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The investigation carried out throughout these chapters makes it possible to provide a few policy recommendations not only applicable to the mentioned case study of the Syrian conflict but to all on-going armed conflicts which present manifest sharable characteristics as for instance a great fragmentation of local actors involved; external influence; religious actors and particularly the emergence of extremist groups; and the evolution of the conflict from a civil society and regionally limited one to an internationalized one, among those more evident. This section will therefore propose a series of policy recommendations to provide a practical conclusion to the reasoning proposed in this work. Such policy recommendations are based on what have emerged throughout the previous chapters and analyses proposed and directed towards a greater support and involvement of civil society and local actors in conflict resolution.

1. The international community, comprehensive of governments, organizations, and institutions must turn their mind to a people-centric approach to International Relations and conflict management and resolution. As analysed in the first and the third chapters the dominant security culture is still strongly linked to the heritage of the Cold War and a state-centric approach which prioritize the territorial aspect of warfare and control over the population rather than the wellbeing of the local civil society. As such it is important to reiterate the necessity to focus on a human security approach which prioritize human rights, development and civil society's needs and desires and recognize the relevance of non-state actors in international relations.
2. International Relations studies must be expanded in their scope to civil society studies. Such focus has met a strong increase in development and economic studies in the last years, however, the political debate and security-related fields of study are still failing in providing a comprehensive understanding and relevance to civil society as fundamental component for international relations, war and peace studies, and security management.
3. When it comes to conflict-management a combination of bottom-up approach and top-down one must be employed. Indeed, none of the two approaches is effective enough to provide a stable and finalized solution, but when the two are combined agreements are more easily reached and have long-term application.

4. External actors involved in conflicts should engage themselves in finding an external agreement among them and be committed to avoid re-armament as to create a positive environment for local talks to expand their talks and not meet external obstacles in look for resolution.
5. Support for local agreements shall be included in UN mandates in conflict-areas. As such UN agencies can be great contributors to logistics and security provision, mediation and protection of local mediators; inclusion of civilians in local talks (especially women, youth and civil activists); and monitor the situation both on the ground and through remote technology. The UN can also increase its cooperation with local mediators – who have been proved to be efficient in negotiations and confidence building – as they are the ones possessing greater capability, expertise, reputation and impartial organization in the country.
6. External actors must refrain from politically and arbitrarily designate local groups as terrorist entities and simultaneously the UN Security Council shall give local mediator full authorization to negotiations in order to provide the most effective conditions and environment possible.
7. Completed and advanced databases of local processes must be developed. As previously analysed a few databases on local agreements exist but are mostly incomplete as they only comprehend signed agreements without considering non-written accords – which appear to be the majority at the local level – and the process through which the agreement have been reached. As such it is fundamental to develop databased collecting both peaceful events and negotiation sessions and violent events in order to understand the impact that local agreements have on the evolution of the conflict and particularly violence against the local population. Moreover, databases must expand their sources from media reporting to local knowledge and contacts with the local reality always taking into account biases.
8. According to the findings proposed in the previous chapter it is necessary to increase the multilateral actors' presence in conflict areas. Indeed, it has been provided that when multilateral neutral actors take part to local negotiations agreements are more often reached and respected and civilians are more included in talks. International multilateral mediators can greatly support civil society actors in providing advices, support, and facilitation for reached deals.
9. An overall support to locally negotiated agreements is fundamental since, as demonstrated, local events are interconnected, and an agreement reached in one particular area does have a great impact on neighbouring zones as well as on higher levels. It is thus necessary to focus and support the snowball effect of these agreements and not treat them as isolated cases but rather

increase the research on ground concrete situations and how to support single realities to expand the magnitude and scope of local accords. Accordingly, local agreements and ceasefires must be included in overall peace plans negotiated at all levels.

10. Once local agreements have been reached international support should be proposed in order to maintain the terms of the agreement in accordance with the local population and the factions involved in the process.
11. Interreligious dialogue and religious groups operating in this field must be sustained in their action as mediators and providers of services and relief actions for the civil society. Religion is indeed a fundamental component in conflicts such as the Syrian one and the other examples provided and as such must deserve its own research field. Interreligious dialogue can play a crucial role in conflict stabilization and long-term resolution also providing the reputational status of local religious leaders, as provided for in the previous chapter's analysis.
12. Support to local civil society can also take the form of economic contributions however, donors must refrain from imposing their own view on the actions that have to be carried out by the organizations and groups they support but rather sustain their local knowledge and activities locally initiated which result to be more effective in the long-term.
13. For what concerns diaspora organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and governments must ensure efforts in the long-term rather than ad hoc and support the development of trustful relationships among civil society actors within the country at war and outside. As such their actions must be directed towards the promotion of networks both within the country's different areas and at the transnational level; include diaspora groups in decision-making by involving them in the foreign policy strategy of the country they belong to, as well as, peace talks; diaspora organizations must have dedicated access to financial resources to support their activities which, as states, cover a wide range of needs for the population within the conflict country; they must support CSA' capacity to develop projects, fundraise and collaboration with each other also through the organization of workshops and peer-to-peer learning opportunities; support the advocacy efforts by enhancing contacts with the global civil society and creating networks among the international community as well as promoting research activities and recommendations advanced by diaspora groups; and focus on a positive and constructive discourse on integration of diaspora population.
14. The UNHCR and the OHCHR and the supervision of the OCHA shall create direct agreements with local NGOS, and CSOs to provide humanitarian support and booster development. The

agencies shall provide for financing these organizations' programs according to the UNHCR Supplementary Programme and the Guidance for Partnering with UNHCR. Given that the OHCHR's budget mostly relies on voluntary contributions, campaigns should be carried on in order to sustain local projects, by raising awareness of the importance of civil society's organisations' work in rebuilding conflict countries. It is important to rely on them as they have the true experience and capability of working in the field and because most of these movements have no funds due to their fear of getting too politicized and be associated with one of the sides in the conflict.

15. Finally, a specific recommendation for the support of Syrian civil society but can easily be expanded to other cases is the call for agencies to collaborate in implementing the 2015 Humanitarian Forum Initiative on livelihood and education in Syria, by financing local organization and implementing the findings of the SWOT analysis presented by the research. In particular, recommendations include: adopt policies that support transparency; raise awareness of the issues of concern to the Syrian CSOs; involve civil society in all stages of programs; work on developing relationships and gaining the support of the national private sector; work with experts; create a database of experts inside and outside of Syria and divide them according to expertise in areas; involve the host community in programs that target and affect Syrian refugees; ensure that programs targeting Syrian refugees are sensitive to their host states' communities and acknowledge the difficulties that host communities are facing; improve education by supporting entities providing it and ethnical integration within Syria; create partnership agreements with charities having experience in the area in providing educational and other forms of humanitarian services; support better communications between families and institutions providing education; encourage programs improving teachers' skills in various fields (including technological and psycho-social) and training programs; and implement programs that focus on rehabilitation of damaged school buildings in safe zones and making them available for education provision. By enhancing the education of the younger generations, and development projects, the result would be long-term benefit and evolvement of the country so as to also encourage refugees to go back to Syria or at least, in the shorter term, diminish fluxes towards neighboring countries.

## FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this work was to support the necessity to further involve and sustain the civil society in the resolution of conflicts in order to promote long-term legitimate and sustainable solutions. The findings underlined in each of the four chapters through which this work was developed, confirm the increasing importance and necessity to focus on the human component of security and the crucial role played by both local and global civil society actors in conflict-management. In order to further reiterate this thesis, case studies have been provided showing both the negative side of current security cultures' application by state actors and the positive influence demonstrated by civil society actors in mediation and peacebuilding as well as providing food for future thoughts and further development in the field through the analysis of the Syrian conflict and the provision of policy recommendations.

The first chapter has been entirely dedicated to an investigation on the concept of Human Security. This approach moves the traditional state-centric approach to international relations to a people-centric one making the human being the real unit of analysis and focus. As such the differences and commonalities between the concept of Human Security and those of State Security, Human Development and Human Rights have been provided in order to define Human Security as its own independent field of research and approach to security management. The definition of the concept was traced back to the UNDP 1994 report which defined it as a combination of “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”. Throughout the chapter further definition have been proposed which cover the regional level (in particular the EU, the ASEAN, the AU, and the OAS) and the state level, with the most prominent understandings being the ones of Canada and Japan. The academic research on the concept has also proved to be expanding with the work of Emma Rotschild, King and Murray and Sabina Alkire being the ones particularly investigated for the purpose of this work. The importance of Human Security and the necessity to shift from a traditional territorial and state-centric approach to security to a people-centric one has been justified also considering the expansion in the magnitude and nature of threats to non-traditional ones, together with the influential role played by the phenomenon of globalization and the consequent necessity to adopt a methodology whose primary scope is the wellbeing of the population.

This reasoning has consistently proceeded in the second chapter dedicated to the concept of civil society and its role in today's world with a particular focus on conflict areas. Accordingly, the investigation was dedicated to the evolution of the concept of civil society between the modern age and the contemporaneous world with a particular attention on the advent of a global civil society and its manifestations. The concept of civil society was traced back to Aristotle's *koinonia politike* as

described in *The Nichomachean Ethics* and *The Politics* and later adapted to the Roman world by Cicero. The modern connotation was proposed in different terms by a first group of philosophers who connected the existence of a civil society to the one of the State itself. Such political scientists, as analysed, were Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Ferguson. A second group of modern interpretation linked civil society's actions to the critics towards capitalism and the emergence of subsequent class struggle whose major protagonist was the civil society itself. To this understanding belong, although with great differences, philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. Finally, a third group, led by the prominent figure of Immanuel Kant, focused on the cosmopolitan and international nature of civil society whose actions were to be the tools for the establishment of a global world order with global citizenry and a federation of peoples ruled by the international law and supranational institutions. Practically speaking nowadays various organizations and academia have tried to define what can be regarded as civil society actors. A section of the chapter was indeed dedicated to such definitions as provided by the United Nations and other prominent multilateral institutions, as well as scholars dedicated to the field and the substance of the work carried out by CSOs in today's world and the way they are regarded and sustained by international organizations. As anticipated, the third section was then dedicated to the advent of a global civil society whose birth was linked by major scholars Helmut Anheier and Mary Kaldor to the 2003 Iraqi War which have met the strong opposition of the global civil society. In this contest the works by Raffaele Marchetti and Mario Pianta, John Keane, Helmut Anheier and Mary Kaldor, and Krishan Kumar among others have been analysed in order to propose an understanding on global civil society and its impact in today's world. Finally, a specific section was dedicated to the role played by CSAs in conflict zones by re-evaluating and sharing the investigation conducted by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci on the different forms of contribution civil society actors can provide in war contexts: escalation, status-quo, peacebuilding.

The first two chapters constituted the theoretical and methodological basis to be applied for the case study in the fourth chapter and subsequent policy recommendations. To provide complete research and understanding on the reason why it is fundamental to shift to a human security approach and civil society involvement in conflict resolution, the third chapter was drafted with the intention of analysing current security cultures and their unsuccessful application which have resulted in poorly managed conflicts and peacebuilding operations. This chapter was based on the work carried out by Professor Mary Kaldor and her book *Global Security Cultures* in which she describes today's understanding of security as based on four major approaches: Geo-Politics; Liberal Peace; New Wars; and War on

Terror. One overall element that the scholar underlines is the shift from a geopolitical understanding of security to a bio-political one, where power takes the form of population control. Geo-Politics' culture is a heritage of the Cold War period and as such is based on is based on great power contestation in the form of territory control and military operations connected to technology evolution in the field and the realist school of thought. Liberal Peace on the other hand, as provided for in its name, can be linked to the liberal school of thought and is rather based on multilateral institutions and cooperations and the practice of humanitarian interventions. New Wars emerged as the evolution of Cold War's civil wars and the social political polarization within countries that consequently resulted. The goal of new wars actors, which are composed by networks of both global and local state and non-state entities, is not a territorial conquest but rather the allocation and control over power and resources through the employment of non-conventional war tactics at the expenses of the civilian population Finally, the War on Terror was a security culture established by the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 terroristic attacks with the scope of defeating terrorism itself. As such it can be considered an evolution of Geo-Politics with a transformation in the identified enemies as non-state actors rather than other great powers and new tools employed during operations: targeted killings, drones technology, torture, intelligence operations, mass surveillance, cyber warfare and so on, therefore being characterized by hybrid war tactics rather than traditional military ones. The negative effects produced by the application of these four security cultures have been investigated by providing three case-studies in which the approaches are detectable. The first case is the 2003 - 2011 war in Iraq which is the major example of the War on Terror security culture. The second one is Kosovo which represents the application of Liberal Peace in the management of the 1998-1999 crisis and the failures testified by the current unstable situation in the now declared independent country. Finally, the last case-study is Mali whose ongoing conflict can be regarded as the combination of New Wars, a Liberal Peace response and its transformation into a European War on Terror which, considering the recent evolutions in the country, have all showed their weaknesses.

The fourth and final chapter has been entirely dedicated to the case study of Syria. In particular the investigation was based on an historical reconstruction of the ongoing crisis and most important peacebuilding initiatives carried out throughout these 12 years. In this regard, to be mentioned are the actions carried out by UN Special Envoys Kofi Annan and Staffan De Mistura as connected to the Geneva Conferences. A parallel channel of negotiation is moreover represented by the Astana Talks led by Russia, Turkey and Iran. These initiatives have resulted in temporary ceasefires and agreements and the establishment of talks and negotiation bodies which have however show weaknesses and

malfunctions as they lack the involvement of all relevant parties and do not focus on the real needs of the Syrian population due to the too pressing external involvement and influence in the conflict. The second section has been dedicated to an analysis of the current socio-economic conditions of Syria in order to provide a complete picture of the context in which the conflict is taking place and what was provoked by the war itself as well as describing in terms of numbers the conditions in which the local population lives, and civil society actors operate. Finally, the chapter focus on such civil society actors. A first paragraph is dedicated to diaspora organizations in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Turkey particularly. Relevant examples as presented as the Syrian Expatriates Organization, the Syrian American Medical Society, the Syrian Medical Association for Syrian Expatriates, the Karam Foundation, the Syrian Centre for Legal Studies and Research, and the Syrian Women's Political Movement. The work carried out by these organizations is a major source of humanitarian services and relief projects to the local population in Syria as well as basis for research development towards a post-conflict Syrian future. The possibilities and actions of such diaspora groups strongly depend on the attitude of the welcoming countries, the resources and finances that they are able to allocate as well as the level of integration within the welcoming societies, for this reason it is particularly important for countries hosting Syrian refugees to provide a favorable environment for the continuation of these projects which greatly contribute to the human security of Syrians. A second group of civil society actors are those operating from within Syria. These can be regarded in Mary Kaldor's words as "Islands of Civility" as they represent a standpoint for regular civilian life inside the conflict. A particular focus has been dedicated to the importance of the religious component in Syria - which have been the object of multiple research articles cited - and consequent interreligious dialogue. To this regard, an investigation was proposed on the Deir Mar Musa community and its mediation and humanitarian operations in the region of Qalamoun. Moreover, multiple laic civil society groups have been operating in various Syrian regions with the goal of providing a dignified life to civilians and work towards negotiation and peacebuilding locally. To this group belongs organizations such as People of Aleppo, the Day After Project, the Syrian Woman Council, and the Syrian Salvation Government. A database of active CSAs and projects divided by their field of action and geographic areas is available on the Civil Society Gateway portal. Finally, a specific analysis is dedicated to the phenomenon of locally negotiated agreements and ceasefire which appear to be particularly significant and efficient in the Syrian context and involve the mediation of civil society actors and other local entities. As provided for in the chapters these local initiatives shall be more investigated and supported particularly at the multilateral level as they have proved to be crucial for the de-escalation of violence



and re-establishment of decent lives for civilians as well as overall confidence-building among the local factions involved in the conflict. The fourth chapter concludes with two examples of crucial involvement of civil society in the resolution of conflicts as to provide cases to be taken as models which present commonalities with the Syrian one and a majority of ongoing conflicts. In particular, these two cases are Mozambique, with the mediation of the community of Sant'Egidio for the stipulation of the peace agreement, and Somalia, with the locally signed and community led Galkaio agreement.

The research conducted and findings provided has made it possible to present a list of policy recommendations to be directed to the international community comprehensive of international institutions, Governments, academia, research studies, NGOs, and INGOs together with some specific UN agencies and bodies. It is fundamental to support civil society's involvement in conflict resolution from all perspectives: providing economic support but without imposing external views on the actions to be carried out; increasing the research on their action and expanding databases on local processes and ceasefires; directing international relations' studies towards civil society studies which are nowadays mostly covered by development studies; supporting integration of diaspora community abroad; combining a top-down approach with a bottom-up one including civil society actors at all levels of negotiation; avoiding arbitrary designation of local groups as terrorist and the UNSC by authorizing full powers in local negotiations; increasing the multilateral presence and monitor local dynamics and agreements putting them under UN missions' mandate; increasing the attention on and sustaining interreligious dialogues and organizations dedicated to the latter; and stipulating direct agreements between local NGOs and CSOs with UN agencies such as the UNHCR, the OHCHR and the OCHA.

In the introduction to the present work a list of research questions was presented as follows:

- To give an overview of conceptual and practical approaches (doctrines) of human security, to understand where this concept can be applied,
- To give a definition of civil society from different theoretical perspectives and analyze the phenomenon of global civil society within the concept of human security,
- To figure out the patterns of functioning of the global civil society as one of the actors of world politics,
- To present the concept of security cultures in order to better understand the role of civil society in conflict resolution,

- To study cases of successful or failing projects in the resolution of conflicts, including the case of Syria,
- To figure out the patterns and results of the involvement of civil society in the resolution of the internationalized conflicts,
- To formulate policy implications on the basis of several case studies

The research was developed as to provide answers to all the questions advanced and as such support the thesis according to which civil society actors, both locally and internationally, play a crucial role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and therefore should deserve a major attention by the international community, multilateral organizations, and state governments in applying security approaches based on civil society's wellbeing (human security) and the involvement of civil society actors.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The dissertation has been developed as to expand the research on the role of civil society in conflict-resolution and peacebuilding and supporting the thesis according to which it is necessary to involve civil society actors in order to enhance long-term, stable and legitimate solutions to conflicts. In order to reach the goal of this dissertation, the work has been developed through four chapters. The first two chapters and the first section of the third constitute the theoretical and methodological basis for the case-studies analyses later taken into considerations. Accordingly, the first chapter was dedicated to the concept of human security and its relevance in the context of a new security environment and the internationalization of conflicts. The second chapter investigated the evolution of civil society between modernity and contemporaneity with a particular focus on the transformations occurred due to the globalization phenomenon and the role played in conflict zones. The second chapter has consequently analysed the current security models and approaches as described by Professor Mary Kaldor in her book *Global Security Cultures*, which are Geo-Politics, Liberal Peace, War on Terror and New Wars; the chapter then investigates three case studies (Iraq, Kosovo, and Mali) to underline the weaknesses and failures attributable to the application of these four models. The fourth chapter was aimed at analysing a specific case study for the application of the thesis advanced, namely the Syrian conflict. The chapter then concludes with two examples of successful negotiations and conflict resolution thanks to the involvement of civil society organizations: Mozambique and Somalia. Finally, the thesis concludes with a list of policy recommendations drawn from the analysis conducted and general conclusions on the findings collected.

The first chapter, as anticipated, was dedicated to the human security's approach. First of all, differences and similarities with the more affirmed concepts of state security, human development, and human rights were analyzed. In particular, while the strong contraposition between human security and state security in their goal and methodology is already evident in their names, as one mainly focuses on territoriality and nationality while the other is a people-centred approach, it is important to also focus on the differences between this new approach and human development and human rights in order to underline its innovative character and relevance in international relations. Therefore, it was stated how human security and human development differ in particular in the expansion of their scope, while human security and human rights share the same goals but apply a different approach to concrete actions carried out in their name. The second paragraph was then dedicated to the reasons why it is nowadays fundamental to focus on human security, Accordingly, valid motivations have been investigated to include the advent of new non-traditional threats to human and national security, the

change in nature of conflicts and actors involved, the increase in global interconnectedness which implies a faster rate of expansion of the mentioned threats, and the growing number in fatalities among civilians. A specific section has then dedicated to the internationalizations of conflicts and an inquiry on the transformation of the latter from mainly inter-state in their nature to intra-state, with a consequent modification of the actors and war tactics involved as well as, as already mentioned, increase in civilian fatalities. These trends have been supported with the findings of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and their visual graphs. The chapter proceeds by providing an historical evolution of the understanding of the human security concept. The approach finds its birth in the 1994 UNDP report, in which human security is defined as the combination of freedom from fear and freedom from want for all individuals. The definition was then expanded to include freedom to live in dignity and human security started receiving more ground in UN doctrine, documents, and bodies as exemplified by Resolution 66/290 of the UN General Assembly, the at the time Secretary General Kofi Annan's "Millenium Declaration", and the institutionalization of a UN Trust Fund for Human Security, among others. Human security's understanding varies also among different regional approaches. The dissertation has in particular taken into account the European Union, the African Union, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, and the Organization of the American States. The different regions, through their documents, programmes, and declarations, manifest different levels of attention towards human security with the EU and the AU being the more active ones, the ASEAN expanding their understanding and working towards a multilateral approach based on human security and the OAS being the farthest from the focus the concept should deserve. Human Security has increasingly become the focus of national interpretations as well. For the purpose of this work, two in particular were presented: the Canadian one and the Japanese one. For what concerns Canada, the understanding is essentially based on the "freedom from fear" component of the UNDP report. The practical implication was advanced in the famous International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, sponsored indeed by the Canadian Prime Minister in the first place, in which the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine was established, which is still a controversial point of practical application of human security. On the other hand, Japan's view focuses on the "freedom from fear" element, making the 2000 Diplomatic Bluebook a standpoint for the Japanese conception as it was entitled "Overview on Human Security". Finally, scholars analysed by Emma Rotschild, Kind and Murray, and Sabina Alkire were provided to complete the framework presented on human security. In particular, Rotschild's analysis focuses on the way security has expanded in multiple directions: there has been a shift from the state to the population, from the national realm to the international, a transformation in the kinds of

security and threats involved, and finally an expansion of actors involved and therefore who it is possible to hold accountable for political responsibility. King and Murray's work is on the other hand more numerical and aimed at determining the threshold beyond which it is possible to talk about human security. Such threshold is the result of a series of factors taken into account which allows for the lack of "generalized poverty" in an individual's life. Finally, Sabina Alkire's definition of human security is based on the vital core doctrine, that is to say, that human security is aimed at safeguarding the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive threats as to enhance the long-term wellbeing and fulfillment. The chapter was aimed at providing a theoretical and methodological framework on the concept of human security which is at the conceptual basis of the thesis advanced in this dissertation. The chapter's investigation analysed today's focus on the topic and drew the conclusion that it is nowadays a collective responsibility for governments, international organizations, and the international community in general to work in order to practically implement an approach to international relations based on human security, which is the only possible one to face the mutated panorama.

The second chapter focuses on the concept of civil society and the role played by civil society actors in today's international arena. As one of the constitutive elements of a State, according to the Montevideo Convention, the population, thus the civil society, is an essential component to be considered. The birth of the idea comes from the term *koinonia politike* in Aristotle's understanding of active citizenry which was later translated by Cicero in *societas civilis*. Throughout the modern age the concept evolved among three lines of thought: those who connected civil society's existence to the State itself through a social contract (Locke, Hobbes, and Ferguson); those who saw civil society as the protagonist of class struggle thus linking the concept to the critics against capitalism (Hegel and Marx); and those who saw in civil society the element for the democratization of the State through a range of associations, not only economic, of active and involved citizens (Gramsci and Habermas). A particular case was then represented by Immanuel Kant who believed in a cosmopolitan or international civil society and in the birth of a "federation of peoples" ruled under a global authority and a cosmopolitan law as the only way to enhance long-term peace and stability. Civil society's importance at the local level progressed in the contemporary world as testified by its appearance in important international, regional, and national documents. In particular, the chapter took into account the 2009 UNDP definition of civil society which states as follows: "Civil society is an arena of voluntary collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values distinct from families, State and profit seeking institutions. The term civil society includes the full range of formal and informal organizations that are outside the State and the market – including social movements, volunteer involving organizations,



mass-based membership organizations, faith-based groups, NGOs, and community-based organizations, as well as communities and citizens acting individually and collectively.” UN bodies have increasingly focused on the relevance of civil society actors and how to support them and a major example of this, as reported in the chapter, is the UNOHCHR’s *Civil Society Space and The United Nations Human Rights System: A Practical Guide for Civil Society*. The guide is organized around a first part defining a working definition and action space, a second part highlighting the necessary conditions for the flourishing of an active civil society, a third part on the challenges currently faced by civil society organization, and finally a fourth part on the role of the UN in sponsoring and supporting civil society actors and collaboration with governments. According to the OHCHR, civil society actors (CSAs) can be defined as “individuals and groups who voluntarily engage in forms of public participation and action around shared interests, purposes or values that are compatible with the goals of the UN: the maintenance of peace and security, the realization of development, and the promotion and respect of human rights”. More aspects to be underlined about civil society is that according to Timothy Peterson and Jon Van Til civil society actors are characterized by three components: participatory engagement, constitutional authority, and moral responsibility. Finally, it is important to note as done by Marchetti and Tocci, that civil society actors can also be “uncivic” in their nature and that their action is strongly influenced by the socio-economic conditions they operate under, as presented in the work of Ernest Gellner. The third section of the chapter proceeds then in analysing the transformation of civil society from a national and local reality to a global one, particularly influenced by the phenomenon of globalization and by major events such as the 2003 Iraq war. In this regard, authors under investigation have been John Kean, Victor Perez-Diaz, Helmut Anheier and Mary Kaldor. While the first scholar belongs to the category of “generalists” who consider global civil society actors as belonging to a full range of institutions including economic ones, Anheier and Kaldor are minimalists who do not take into account market forces and institutions. To summarize the content of this section it is necessary to state that Professor Mary Kaldor detects five versions of global civil society’s concepts: the first version is that of *societas civilis* coming from the cosmopolitan meaning attributed to the term by Kant; the second version is the bourgeois society focusing on commercial and economic factors and heritage of the current of Ferguson; the third version is the activist one whose manifestation are transnational advocacy groups; the fourth version is the neo-liberal one focusing on the liberalization of the market and politics; and finally the fifth version is the postmodern one based on pluralism and focusing on globalization and the creation of a global reality. According to Kaldor, in today’s world the predominant version is the neo-liberal one. Finally the section concludes with an

analysis of possible future scenarios by Anheier and Kaldor, Kumar, Mazlish and Young. What emerges in particular is the fact that isolationist, nationalist and self-centred/individualist behaviors constitute the main obstacle to the flourishing of a global civil society and its action and that nowadays it is becoming increasingly more possible to better define the global component of civil society rather than the national one. The final paragraph of the second chapter is dedicated to the role played by civil society actors in conflict zones. This paragraph was particularly inspired by the work carried out by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci in defining the role of Conflict Society Organizations (COSOs) in the article entitled *Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict*. Summarizing the content of their research and the chapter's paragraph, COSOs can be of four kinds depending on the degree of social inclusiveness and egalitarianism: the first kind is post-national civic COSO which results from inclusiveness and egalitarianism and is exemplified by INGOs; the second one is the multi-culturalist COSO which is born from an exclusive and egalitarian society and creates inter-cultural and inter-religious institutions; the third one is the assimilationist COSO from an inclusive and non-egalitarian society and whose groups are aimed at creating homogeneous societies also through uncivic actions; finally the fourth kind is the ethnic/racist COSO in exclusive and non-egalitarian societies whose major representations are the Nazis and the KKK. COSOs play a crucial role in conflict zones as their action can determine an escalation in the level of violence; a maintenance of the status quo; or actions towards resolution particularly through (informal) people-to-people talks. The goal of this second chapter was to prove the key importance of the concept of civil society in today's world and to investigate its evolution and component, as well as, the support provided by major institutions and the impact of its actions in defining world politics' dynamics.

The third chapter's investigation was divided into two sections: a more theoretical framework on the security cultures and models detectable in today's international contest, and a practical application of these approaches to three case-studies. The first section's content was based on the book *Global Security Cultures* published in 2018 by Professor Mary Kaldor. In her book Kaldor states that a security culture "comprises different interconnected combinations of ideas, rules, people, tools, tactics and infrastructure, linked to different types of political authority". The terms come from Christopher Daase's 2012 research on *Sicherheitskultur* and the consequent *kulturwissenschaftlicher* approach as described in the chapter. Given the interconnectedness of today's world Kaldor underlines how all security models imply a form of intervention in foreign affairs which becomes therefore both cause and consequence of the already mentioned internationalization of conflicts. Moreover, the scholar underlines how in general security is experiencing a shift from a geo-political understanding to a bio-

political which implies that security is obtained not through territory control but rather population control. A security culture is formed by objectives and practices. By objectives Kaldor means norms and ideas while practices are a collection of tools, tactics, technologies, and infrastructures employed to reach goals. Security cultures' components also include their narratives, indicators, rules of behaviour, financial sources, and authority entities. Finally, as highlighted by Edward Lock, each security culture reproduces itself through a reproduction mechanism which consists of the union of all its objectives and practices and in particular its narrative which allows it to transform and adapt to the events and therefore never extinguish. In her book Mary Kaldor detects four security cultures: Geo-Politics; Liberal Peace; New Wars; and War on Terror. Geo-Politics is the culture legacy of the Cold War and the dominant one in today's international arena. It is based on great powers competition and as such the main actors are State ones. The culture is based on the primacy of territoriality and nationality with the traditional assumption that "geography is destiny". The tools employed are traditional ones, thus troops, intelligence bodies, diplomacy, bureaucracy, military industries and technological advancement (scientific and engineering discoveries for instance) applied to the military sphere, which are in turn used as deterrence tools. Security is intended as national security and national security in its turn means the security of the national territory. According to Mary Kaldor Geo-Politics' culture has evolved throughout six phases which can be connected to the scientific revolutions which shaped military practices. The first phase is connected to the advent of gunpowder and the creation of regular permanent troops. The second phase occurred in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia until 1815 and was particularly linked to the innovations of the Napoleonic era such as the re-organization, institutionalization, and standardization of the military apparatus. Moreover, during this phase military tools started to be used against civilian population, colonization took place, as well as, the French revolution, and the scale and speed of warfare increased drastically. The third phase can be detected during the nineteenth century with innovations in communication and transformation and particularly the discovery of thermodynamics. The fourth phase saw the advent of incorporate private industries and great arms companies becoming the era of competitive militarization. The fifth phase comprises the two world wars and the cold war. During this phase scientific innovations applied to the military field include communication technologies such as radio, radar, the telephone, and the internet and the nuclear bomb together with the employment of oil-intensive platforms and advent of cybernetic. Finally, the sixth phase is one currently taking phase since the end of the Cold War and which the institutionalization of arms has taken place, with a particular reference to nuclear weapons, and biological and chemical arsenal. The second security culture, Liberal Peace, is aimed at collective

security. The main actors involved are multilateral organizations together with MGOs, international agencies, international organizations, and institutions such as the EU and the OSCE. The main tactics employed are humanitarian interventions according to the major goal of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) under the umbrella of UN Peacekeeping missions. As such Liberal Peace's main components are humanitarian efforts (under humanitarian law), international peacekeeping, peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding. The main weaknesses are linked to the fact that Liberal Peace regardless of its final goal is still connected to an idea of old war which results in the operation employed often being regarded as a form of neo-imperialism. The third security culture, New Wars, was born from the Cold War's civil wars which went through a process of ideological polarization and international influence. The result is fragmented and decentralized authorities and the involvement of informal hybrid entities including warlord rebels and a network of state and non-state actors. The goal is the allocation and control over power and resources through the use of low-tech armaments, ICTs, IEDs, and the use of violence against civilian. War tactics are thus not conventional and actually include irregular warfare actions (such as rape and genocides) with the goal of instill fear in the population. Finally, the fourth security culture, War on Terror, was initiated by US President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the terroristic attacks of the 9/11 in the United States with the goal of defeating terrorism in the name of global security. The enemy becomes therefore a non-state actors and the tactics evolves to include targeted killing, torture, intelligence operations and the employment of drones as well as the involvement of special forces, and private contractors and tools of mass surveillance, cyberwarfare and robotics to reach the goal. Major critics to this culture include the fact that it caused a dramatic increase in the number of civilian casualties and that legally it implies a pre-emptive self defence that is not allowed by international law, as well as the fact that under the justification of the War on Terror horrible human rights breaches have taken place (e.g., the cases of the Guantanamo Bay). Despite the fact that President Barak Obama declared the War on Terror over, the mentality of this culture has persisted expanding, as proved the later case study of Mali, to some European countries as well. The second section of this third chapter is dedicated to the analysis of three case study to investigate the application of the mentioned security cultures. The three case-studies are aimed at providing examples of how these four security cultures, when applied, fail in finding concrete and long-term solutions for conflict-management. The reason behind this is the disregard for the local population and therefore lack of communication with those who are supposed to be the recipients of security. Most interventions have been or are justified as "humanitarian", however, the humanitarian focus is often practically put in a second-place position, as the "human" component itself is not at the centre of considerations when

defining and applying a strategy. The three case-studies have been selected according to a geographical and temporal logic and application of a security culture, although, as previously highlighted, security cultures tend to mix in the context of a single reality. The first one, Iraq, belongs to the Middle East region and is a concluded conflict that represents the perfect example of application of the War on Terror security culture. The second one, Kosovo, serves as European example of a conflict that, despite being officially concluded, still presents negative consequences in the reality of the country and the everyday life of its citizens being a greatly unstable country from a political and social perspective and which represents the, failing, application of the Liberal Peace security culture. Finally, the third case-study is Mali, an African country whose violent conflict is still on-going, and which represents the application of New Wars security culture and foreign response according to an initially Liberal Peace approach that is transforming in a, mostly European, War on Terror. All of the case-studies have been presented from an historical perspective describing the background of the conflict and analysing then the security strategy applied for their conflict-management. This chapter was aimed at providing an understanding of today's security approaches and their unsuccessful application due to the disregard of civil society and the concept of human security.

The fourth and final chapter has been entirely dedicated to the case study of Syria. In particular the investigation was based on an historical reconstruction of the ongoing crisis and most important peacebuilding initiatives carried out throughout these 12 years. In this regard, to be mentioned are the actions carried out by UN Special Envoys Kofi Annan and Staffan De Mistura as connected to the Geneva Conferences. A parallel channel of negotiation is moreover represented by the Astana Talks led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran. These initiatives have resulted in temporary ceasefires and agreements and the establishment of talks and negotiation bodies which have however show weaknesses and malfunctions as they lack the involvement of all relevant parties and do not focus on the real needs of the Syrian population due to the too pressing external involvement and influence in the conflict. The second section has been dedicated to an analysis of the current socio-economic conditions of Syria in order to provide a complete picture of the context in which the conflict is taking place and what was provoked by the war itself as well as describing in terms of numbers the conditions in which the local population lives, and civil society actors operate. Finally, the chapter focus on such civil society actors. A first paragraph is dedicated to diaspora organizations in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Turkey particularly. Relevant examples as presented as the Syrian Expatriates Organization, the Syrian American Medical Society, the Syrian Medical Association for Syrian Expatriates, the Karam Foundation, the Syrian Centre for Legal Studies and Research, and the Syrian

Women's Political Movement. The work carried out by these organizations is a major source of humanitarian services and relief projects to the local population in Syria as well as basis for research development towards a post-conflict Syrian future. The possibilities and actions of such diaspora groups strongly depend on the attitude of the welcoming countries, the resources and finances that they are able to allocate as well as the level of integration within the welcoming societies, for this reason it is particularly important for countries hosting Syrian refugees to provide a favorable environment for the continuation of these projects which greatly contribute to the human security of Syrians. A second group of civil society actors are those operating from within Syria. These can be regarded in Mary Kaldor's words as "Islands of Civility" as they represent a standpoint for regular civilian life inside the conflict. A particular focus has been dedicated to the importance of the religious component in Syria - which have been the object of multiple research articles cited - and consequent interreligious dialogue. To this regard, an investigation was proposed on the Deir Mar Musa community and its mediation and humanitarian operations in the region of Qalamoun. Moreover, multiple laic civil society groups have been operating in various Syrian regions with the goal of providing a dignified life to civilians and work towards negotiation and peacebuilding locally. To this group belongs organizations such as People of Aleppo, the Day After Project, the Syrian Woman Council, and the Syrian Salvation Government. A database of active CSAs and projects divided by their field of action and geographic areas is available on the Civil Society Gateway portal. Finally, a specific analysis is dedicated to the phenomenon of locally negotiated agreements and ceasefire which appear to be particularly significant and efficient in the Syrian context and involve the mediation of civil society actors and other local entities. As provided for in the chapters these local initiatives shall be more investigated and supported particularly at the multilateral level as they have proved to be crucial for the de-escalation of violence and re-establishment of decent lives for civilians as well as overall confidence-building among the local factions involved in the conflict. The fourth chapter concludes with two examples of crucial involvement of civil society in the resolution of conflicts as to provide cases to be taken as models which present commonalities with the Syrian one and a majority of ongoing conflicts. These two cases are Mozambique, with the mediation of the community of Sant'Egidio for the stipulation of the peace agreement, and Somalia, with the locally signed and community led Galkaio agreement.

Finally, the research conducted, and findings provided has made it possible to present a list of policy recommendations to be directed to the international community comprehensive of international institutions, Governments, academia, research studies, NGOs, and INGOs together with some specific UN agencies and bodies. It is fundamental to support civil society's involvement in conflict resolution

from all perspectives: providing economic support but without imposing external views on the actions to be carried out; increasing the research on their action and expanding databases on local processes and ceasefires; directing international relations' studies towards civil society studies which are nowadays mostly covered by development studies; supporting integration of diaspora community abroad; combining a top-down approach with a bottom-up one including civil society actors at all levels of negotiation; avoiding arbitrary designation of local groups as terrorist and the UNSC by authorizing full powers in local negotiations; increasing the multilateral presence and monitor local dynamics and agreements putting them under UN missions' mandate; increasing the attention on and sustaining interreligious dialogues and organizations dedicated to the latter; and stipulating direct agreements between local NGOs and CSOs with UN agencies such as the UNHCR, the OHCHR and the OCHA. These policy recommendations reflect the objectives of the thesis and as such the investigation in support of the involvement of the civil society in the resolution of conflicts can be deemed concluded and successful.