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**France and Portugal: comparative
analysis of the rise of the far right and
contextual factors shaping perceptions of
immigration.**

Prof. Maria Rita Testa

Supervisor

Prof. Alfonso Giordano

Co-Supervisor

Antoine Thomas– 648202

Candidate

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Abstract

Through a comparative analysis, this thesis aims to determine the explanatory factors who influenced the perception of immigration and the difference of far-right level between France and Portugal. France, with its long democratic tradition and history of immigration, is highly polarized on the subject and the situation is exacerbated by current political tensions and the growing influence of the far-right party, the Rassemblement National. Portugal, on the other hand, with its recent history of dictatorship and its more recent experience of immigration, has a more positive perception of immigration. Moreover, the needs arising from the major demographic decline in Portugal confirm the need to encourage immigration, whereas in France the demography remain stable, and still one of the best in Europe. Nevertheless, despite these historical and demographic differences, Portugal has recently seen the emergence of the far right, which is unprecedented since its transition to democracy and indicates a potential future influence of far-right party on population and on migratory policies, as is already the case in France.

Introduction

The far right has been on the rise in Europe for several years now, either by winning elections or by bringing its ideas into the political debate, and its influence is growing constantly. What was once a taboo has now become a major figure on the political landscape within European countries, and the number of sympathizers is growing. But is this the case in all European Union countries? In some countries, it has emerged that the level of extreme right-wing is not progressing in the same way in certain southern European countries, notably Portugal. Since the end of the Salazarist dictatorship in 1974, the country has never known the far right, and no representative of this political current has sat in Parliament until 2019. Today, Portugal has 12 seats representing the far-right party

Chega. Although this is a very rapid rise, it is relatively marginal, as the party and its leader André Ventura are far from being in a position to govern. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the factors that explain this lesser presence of the extreme right in Portugal and to compare it with a country where the extreme right has been highly visible for decades, France. The temporality of this thesis will focus mainly on the 1970s to the present day, but will include passages prior to the seventies, notably for the historical factors.

The first chapter focuses on the difference between state-building and democratic transition. France is an old democracy, result of intense struggles between the people and the elites. Despite the Revolution of 1789, democracy and the freedom of the people were not guaranteed, and many changes of regime followed without the people abandoning their aspirations for a democratic regime. Portugal, for its part, is a very young democracy, which came into being with the Carnation Revolution in 1974. Marked by decades of brutal dictatorship, democracy is still a new acquisition, whereas in France democracy and the Republic are pillars of its identity and taken for granted. This chapter will also highlight the link and the evolution of immigration in the two countries. France has been known as a country of immigration since the 19th century and has always been an attractive destination. Portugal, on the other hand, is known as a country of emigration, as its people have repeatedly migrated to other countries, both to escape dictatorship and to obtain better living conditions and economic opportunities. The last sub-section of the first chapter will emphasize the crucial importance of demography for future immigration policies. Portugal's demographic situation is critical, with a population that is already starting to decline, while France's demography is not excellent but remains one of the best in Europe, with a population that is stabilizing.

The second chapter analyses the migration policies implemented by the two countries, with a case study of the migration crisis experienced by the European Union in 2015. France and Portugal were not impacted in the same way by this crisis. France was one of the countries that suffered from a lack of solidarity, particularly on the part of the Visegrád countries, which refused to follow the European Union's quota policy. More of a transit country during this crisis, France also suffered from

a lack of solidarity on the part of the United Kingdom, which benefited from favorable bilateral agreements, leading to a major human, health and safety crisis in the "Calais Jungle". Portugal was not on the migratory routes and was not one of the countries targeted by the migrants, therefore the country was only marginally affected by the crisis. Responding favorably to the quota policy, Portugal even offered to take more than its part, demonstrating its support and engagement towards the European Union.

The third chapter examines the influence of far-right parties in shaping public opinion in France and Portugal. In France, where the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) has managed to occupy a prominent place in the political landscape for over 20 years, we analyze how the party, by exploiting economic, social and identity concerns, has influenced not only voters but also the political agendas of other parties. In contrast, Portugal, which has long resisted the call of the far right, has seen a recent emergence with the Chega party. What is the extent of its influence on public opinion? And how does it compare with the French situation? The remainder of this final chapter will focus on the potential normalization of far-right political parties.

Chapter 1: Historical and Demographic Perspectives

1.1 The political regimes

1.1.1 The construction and the evolution of democracy in France

The aim of this section is not to provide a detailed historical perspective, but rather to give a brief overview of the construction and evolution of democracy in France. The establishment of democracy in France has not been linear. After a long period under monarchical regime, it was during the 18th century, inspired by the “philosophes des Lumières” and combined with increasingly marked social inequalities that the question of a change of regime arose. In 1789, the French Revolution erupted,

overturning the foundations of monarchical power, and the “Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen” proclaimed the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity, giving power to the whole people and laying the foundations of modern democracy, the beginning of the republican regime.

However, the Revolution was not sufficient to establish a stable democratic regime, due to strong political instability and a conflict between several political movements (Vie publique, 2022). Napoléon Bonaparte emerged from this chaos and seized power in a Coup d'état, establishing the First Empire with his crowning in 1804 and became Napoléon I. This new change of regime marked the halt in the desire to empower the people, although the latter was less restricted under the Empire than under the Monarchy, with notably the creation of the Civil Code, as well as high schools and faculties to form an elite that was no longer based on heredity. Thus, Napoléon I retained power, but the rights of the people progressed.

Following the abdication of Napoléon on 6th April 1814, the monarchy was re-established, this period is named “La Restauration”. However, even this time, the newly acquired rights of the people were preserved, despite fears of a return to absolute monarchy (Vie publique, 2022). Indeed, the scale of the changes that had occurred since the Revolution made a reinstatement of absolute monarchy difficult. The new regime was therefore based on a compromise between the gains of the Revolution and the monarchical principle. The Constitutional Charter, conceded, by the King Louis XVIII on June 4, 1814, perpetuates the great principles of liberty and equality contained in the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of August 26, 1789 (equality before the law, before taxation and in access to employment). It confirmed individual freedom, religious and press freedom as well as the independence of the courts (Vie publique, 2022) and proclaimed the inviolability of property, including national assets, political amnesty for acts committed before 1814, and the abolition of conscription. The ultra-royalists, who were in favor of a return to absolute monarchy, did not approved the Constitutional Charter and used their influence to destabilize the regime. After the death of Louis XVIII, the ultra-royalists came to power with the coronation of Charles X, leader of the ultra-royalists, and the freedoms guaranteed by the Charter were threatened. Despite the attempts of

the ultra-royalists to revoke these new rights, the people revolted and once again succeeded in overthrowing the regime.

After the fall of the reign of Charles X, Louis Philippe claimed the throne, marking the start of the July Monarchy. Unlike his predecessors, Louis Philippe was not King of France, but King of the French, and this made a notable difference, since this monarchy was founded on the revised charter of 1814 (Garrigues and Lacombrade, 2019). Executive power still belongs to the king, but legislative power is now shared between two separate chambers. This strengthened and guaranteed the freedom of the people, in particular religious freedom and freedom of the press. However, the promises of this new charter have not been enough to keep the regime going. The country is suffering from hunger and unemployment. Growing discontent and the emergence of conspiracy and corruption led to the deprivation of the freedoms that the Revised Charter of 1814 was supposed to guarantee. The regime faced quadruple opposition: the Legitimists, who wanted to crown a king from the Capetian branch of the Bourbon dynasty; the Bonapartists, who wanted Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of Napoléon I and heir of the imperial house, to take power; the Republicans, composed of part of the bourgeoisie as well as students and laborers; and finally, the Socialists, who observed that the Industrial Revolution only benefited the bourgeoisie (Vie publique, 2022). These events made Louis-Philippe realize that his hold on power was compromised. On 24 February 1848, he abdicated in favor of his grandson but this attempt to transfer power failed to appease the people. The riots continued and became increasingly violent, leading Louis-Philippe and his family to leave France and go into exile in Great Britain. The rioters proclaimed the Second Republic on 24 February 1848, establishing a provisional government dominated by republican and democratic politicians.

The transition to democracy was far from easy and was characterized by gradual evolution rather than sudden change. The French Revolution of 1789 was a pivotal moment in this transition from absolute monarchy to modern democracy. France experienced periods of republic and return to monarchy, as well as a return to empire in 1851 under Napoleon III, just before the establishment of

the Third Republic in 1870, which marked the beginning of democratic stability in France. These regime changes illustrate the opposition that existed in the country and reflect the tension between the popular will and the ruling elites. Despite all the regime changes after the Revolution, the French people fought for their rights throughout a long and difficult period marked by economic crises, epidemic crises and numerous wars.

1.1.2 Long dictatorship and late blooming democracy in Portugal

Portugal's political dynamic has been very different from France. Whereas France has enjoyed a well-established democracy since the advent of the Third Republic in 1870, leaving behind the absolute monarchy and the empire, Portugal suffered a long dictatorship during the 20th century. Yet on October 5, 1910, the First Republic was proclaimed following a popular and military uprising, putting an end to monarchical rule and announcing a perennial transition to democracy. A constitution was approved in 1911, inaugurating a parliamentary system with reduced presidential powers and two houses of parliament (Baiôa, Fernandes and Ribeiro de Mineses, 2003). The establishment of the First Republic was the culmination of a long crisis of the monarchy, which had accumulated difficulties of all kinds over the previous twenty years. The King's subordination to England's ultimatum to withdraw its troops from Mozambique had not been well seen. England wanted to stop the Portuguese project of linking the two colonies of Mozambique and Angola, in order to extend its control in the region and develop the Cairo-Cape Town axis project (Derou, 1987). This event revealed a real admission of weakness on the part of the monarchical regime, and the management of the colonies was costing an enormous amount of money, while poverty was rampant among the population.

However, the Republic caused deep fractures in Portuguese society, particularly in the rural population, which was mainly monarchist, but also within the syndicates and within the Church. Indeed, as José Miguel Sardica (2010) points out, the triumph of October 5, 1910, was not so much

an idea, a new political culture or a unified party project, but rather a military and a political party, the PRP (Portuguese Republican Party) triumph. Building a republic is about much more than ensuring the victory of elected rather than hereditary power. It's also about creating a national community based on equality, reason, patriotism, independence, participation and commitment. The failure of this regime can be explained by the fact that what republicanism represents is much broader than the monopoly of the few men who seized power in October 1910. The Republic is a higher civic stage in terms of citizenship, participation and shared responsibility, but one that can only be achieved through a healthy renewal of habits and mentalities, serving as a guide to social reconstruction. But the idea of the Republic was too different from the reality of the time to endure, leading to a Coup d'état and the beginning of the dictatorship (Baiôa, Fernandes and Ribeiro de Minesses, 2003). In France, the will to establish a republic came from the people, who revolted against the monarchy and overthrew the regime, whereas in Portugal, it was mainly a revolution orchestrated by a political party, the PRP, supported by the military, which can explain the quick fragmentation on all sides once victory was achieved.

The political instability caused by the PRP's fragmentation prevented the governments from resolving the country's economic difficulties, and its participation in the First World War only exacerbated the difficulties. As the situation deteriorated further, some army generals decided to overthrow the regime and put an end to the First Republic. The first Coup d'état took place on May 28, 1926. Although the Coup d'état was initially presented as an action to restore order and stability, it quickly led to the establishment of a military dictatorship. A provisional military government was formed, but it soon showed signs of authoritarianism and repression. The 1926 Coup d'état failed to solve Portugal's structural problems. Instead, it marked the start of a period of political transition, internal divisions and rivalries within the army. This turbulent period eventually led to the rise of António de Oliveira Salazar, an economist and politician, who played a crucial role in transforming the military dictatorship into the New State (Estado Novo). Appointed Minister of Finance on April 18, 1928, thanks to his reputation as a specialist in financial matters, he was able to satisfy the needs

of the country's employers and middle class in his first year, presenting a balanced budget, financial and monetary stabilization, and the promise of economic revival through direct state intervention. Salazar's reputation at the time was excellent, and he went on to impose his vision of the political system. Fernando Rosas (2020) depicts what Salazar saw as the causes of disorder: democracy, liberalism, socialism and, more generally, political parties, which, in his view, undermined national unity. This led to the creation of a single party in 1930, the Union Nationale, to unite all the right-wing parties on a single political platform. He also quickly sought to transform the legislative power into an auxiliary of the government in the shaping of a public opinion in order not to be impeded by any counter-power. In 1932, when Salazar was appointed President of the Council of Ministers (head of government), he applied his philosophy by consolidating more and more power in his hands, de facto transforming the government into an autocratic system. He also introduced constitutional reforms that reinforced his authority and limited democratic participation. By increasing his powers, Salazar was able to change the regime by promulgating a new Constitution in 1933, which established the primacy of the public good over individual interests, extended the powers of the President of the Council of Ministers for himself, banned all political parties other than the Union Nationale and established strict censorship: it was the birth of the Estado Novo and the Salazarist dictatorship.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, Portugal had been grappling with serious problems both inside and outside the country. Internally, the economy was in difficulties, and externally, Portugal was implicated in different wars in its African colonies, putting enormous financial pressure on the country and drawing criticism from the international community. Portugal was also the only country in the world to retain its colonial empire, despite the experiences of its neighbors, the condemnations of the United Nations, and the ever-increasing burden of war, which absorbed almost half the national budget. Faced with growing tensions and almost 50 years of dictatorship, the Carnation Revolution in April 1974 ended the Estado Novo. A Coup d'état perpetrated by a group of young soldiers, but the Carnation Revolution was characterized by its peaceful nature (Araújo, 2020). Supported by the population, who joined the soldiers in the streets to demonstrate their desire to ending the regime. As

a result, Marcello Caetano, Salazar's successor since 1968, resigned rapidly, marking the end of the dictatorship. This revolution paved the way for profound changes in Portugal. Political parties were allowed to operate, civil liberties increased, and the country gradually moved towards democracy, with elections as early as 1975 and integration into the European Economic Community (former European Union) in 1986.

Thus, it is clear that the construction of the two countries and the transition to democracy are very different. The French people fought very early to overthrow the monarchy and did it with violence and at the cost of several uprisings and different regimes. However, since the Revolution of 1789, despite two returns to monarchy and the establishment of the Empire twice, the French people have managed to retain the new rights they had previously won. A return to absolute monarchy was not allowed, and democracy was established after years of struggle. In Portugal, the monarchy was challenged later, not by the people but by a political party backed by the army. Following the failure of the First Republic, it was a military Coup d'état that brought it to an end, laying the foundations for the Estado Novo. The long period of dictatorship under António de Oliveira Salazar left deep scars in the country's collective memory. Completely padlocked and isolated from its European neighbors, the country closed in on itself while other countries were opening to the world and developing democracy. As a result, the youth of Portuguese democracy has had an influence on the level of extreme right thinking in the country. While the country was closed in on itself, France had already a solid democracy for at least one century. As a result, the youth of Portuguese democracy has influenced the level of extreme right-wing in the country, the fear of a return to a dictatorial regime is present in the minds of the Portuguese, and voting for the extreme right could represent a risk. In France, on the other hand, revolutions are far behind, and democracy is now taken for granted. The threat presented by an extreme right-wing party taking power is different from that of the Portuguese.

1.2 Migration of the two countries since 1960

1.2.1 Portuguese large-scale immigration to France and Europe in the 20th century

In the 60s and 70s, Portugal was the scene of one of the largest intra-European migrations of the 20th century. In the space of 12 years, over a million people moved across Europe. One of the main reasons for this massive emigration was Portugal's difficult economic situation at the time. The country was facing serious economic problems, including a declining agricultural economy and high unemployment, leaving the Portuguese people increasingly impoverished. Employment opportunities were limited, and the Portuguese were living in precarious conditions, prompting many Portuguese to research better perspectives elsewhere. In addition, the political situation and weariness with the dictatorial Estado Novo regime prompted the Portuguese to flee this oppression and restrictions on freedom.

France quickly became a preferred destination for Portuguese migrants. The growth of industry and services in the country created a growing demand for labor, paving the way for the migration of Portuguese workers. The number of Portuguese in France rose from 50,000 in 1962 to 750,000 in 1975, making it the largest immigrant group in terms of numbers at this period (Volovitch-Tavares, 2006). This migration was facilitated by bilateral agreements between Portugal and host countries, including France. These agreements facilitated worker mobility and contributed to the integration of migrants into their new societies. From 1964 to 1974, the regularization of Portuguese migrants was almost systematic and largely facilitated by the French authorities.


The transition to democracy initially created a climate of optimism and renewed opportunity in Portugal. Individual freedoms and fundamental rights were restored, encouraging a sense of confidence in the country's future. This helped to reduce the pressures that had previously prompted the Portuguese to emigrate massively. However, economic challenges have not been totally resolved and the transition to democracy was not enough to stop the emigration in the country. Despite

economic reforms, unemployment and inequality persisted, driving some individuals, particularly young people, to seek opportunities abroad. Emigration has become slightly more qualified and targeted, with professionals searching to enhance their skills abroad (Pereira-Ramos, 2004). Transnational ties formed during previous migration years also played a role. Portuguese already established in other countries, maintained connections with their country of origin, facilitating new waves of emigration through social and family connections.

However, over the same period, emigration was now no longer the only option. Portuguese emigrants also hoped that economic and professional prospects in Portugal would improve soon, which convinced some emigrants to consider a return. This return movement contributed to the transmission of experience and skills acquired abroad and thus benefiting to the country's internal development. Portugal has not only become a notorious land of emigration, but it has also started to become a land of immigration. Indeed, the shortage of manpower resulting from the wave of mass emigration in previous years led to an increase in workers' wages, due to the shortage of manpower. Portugal therefore began to compensate for its labor shortage by recruiting workers from its former African colonies, in particular Cape Verde and Angola. Albano Cordeiro (2002) qualifies Portugal as a land of substitute immigration from 1974 to 1990.

Portugal enjoyed a degree of economic and political stability in the 1990s, which led to a reduction in the mass emigration seen in previous decades. However, skilled and temporary emigration persisted, as some individuals sought work opportunities abroad, particularly in other more developed European countries. Portugal's accession to the European Economic Community (Former European Union) in 1986 created new prospects for mobility within the EEC. The free movement of people has made it easier for the Portuguese to travel to other member countries for work and study. In the early 2000s, the country's economy prospered and became very attractive. The country became at this period not just a land of immigration, but a land of opportunity, and immigration has begun to play a more important role, with inflows not only from Portuguese-speaking Africa, but also from Europe and South America.

After promising economic development and the return of many Portuguese to their homeland, and the emergence of a varied immigrant population during the early twenties, the economic crisis of 2008 marked a real setback for Portugal. The deterioration in the country's economic and financial situation has led to a drop in immigration to Portugal, an increase in emigration by Portuguese citizens, and a growing number of foreigners returning to their countries of origin or re-emigrating to other destinations (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014).



Source: Fonseca and McGarrigle. 2014.

The financial crisis has profoundly altered the country, leading to an important economic recession. Employment perspectives have been severely impacted by this crisis and especially for foreigners, as the graph above shows. The unemployment rate rose from 7.6% in 2008 to 9.5% in 2009, 10.8% in 2010, and 12.4% in the third quarter of 2011. The massive job losses during this period impacted the immigrant community more severely than non-immigrant employees, widening the unemployment gap between the two groups. In 2009, the unemployment rate among Portuguese citizens was 9.1 percent, while it was 7.3 points higher for foreigners, reaching 16.4 percent and 17.3 percent for non-EU 27 nations.

The difficulty of finding work thus stopped the development of immigration, but also gave way once again to a wave of emigration. Historically oriented towards countries such as France and Brazil, many Portuguese have redirected their destinations, notably to the United Kingdom and Angola (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014). Unlike previous waves of emigration, this period saw a predominance of highly qualified young professionals leaving the country, a situation often described as a brain dump.

The history and evolution of immigration in Portugal demonstrate that population movements can be characterized as coming and going, depending on the economic situation. Since the establishment of democracy and entry into the European Union, Portugal has been keen to develop immigration, which in the past was not even an issue or a subject of discussion. As a result, Portugal has been able to develop and diversify its immigration beyond the Lusophone community, while also repatriating some of its nationals to the country. However, the crisis of 2008 brought things to a screeching halt, and a new wave of emigration, this time of highly qualified individuals, hit the country. At present, Portugal is focusing its strategy on attracting back its nationals and encouraging foreigners to settle and invest.

1.2.2 France as a land of immigration

One of the great singularities of France compared to other European countries is the precociousness of its immigration. France became a land of immigration in the 19th century, at a time when other European countries were still lands of emigration. This was not an immigration of settlers, as in the United States or Canada: France was the most populous country in Europe at the time of the French Revolution, and the development of its territories had been completed by the end of the Middle Ages (Noirier, 2010). The French model of immigration responds to a capitalist logic, or to put it another way, to the needs of the labor market. In the second half of the 19th century, mass immigration


began to offset labor shortages. Initially border immigrants, principally from Belgium and Germany, it diversified at the end of the 19th century, and even more so after the First World War, to respond to the country's reconstruction needs. Italian and Polish immigrants made significant contributions to the mining, construction and steel industries. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the migratory landscape became even more diversified, with Italian immigration, less significant than expected, being overpassed by Spanish, Portuguese, Yugoslav, Turkish, Tunisian, Moroccan and sub-Saharan immigrants. This new wave of immigration joins the Algerian immigration, already present since the end of the 19th century. At that time, immigration was widely encouraged and facilitated by the establishment of numerous bilateral agreements, as was the case with Portugal and other European and Maghreb countries. These immigrants, initially perceived as visiting workers expected to return to their countries of origin, eventually settled in France and helped shape the country's social and economic development (Hollifield, 1992).

With the oil crisis of 1973, France suffered a severe economic recession, and this was not without consequences for French society. As a result of this crisis, social tensions associated with immigration increased, and racism gained a certain legitimacy, justified by the difficult times. Anti-Arab sentiment, which had been particularly virulent in France since the end of the Algerian war and the conflicts in the Middle East, was now being expressed in a different and renewed way. According to Gastaut (2004), the economic crisis was merely a trigger for discontent that had been buried since the end of the Algerian war.

In response to this economic crisis and growing social tensions in 1974, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his government decided to stop worker immigration by closing the country's borders. This marked the end of labor immigration and gave way in 1976 to the policy of family reunification. The idea was that family reunification would contribute to the social integration of migrant workers already present, on the assumption that a reunited family would be more likely to integrate fully into French society. Thus, 1976 marked a major turning point in the evolution of immigration in France. From a predominantly male labor immigration to a predominantly female

family immigration, new integration challenges emerged, the challenges of education, housing, access to healthcare and social services have become predominant. The introduction of a right to family reunification in France can be explained by a dual phenomenon: on the one hand, a strategy of political openness at national level on the part of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; on the other, the need for the French state to comply with international law. The government therefore opted for a policy of assimilation (Cohen, 2014).

However, the economic crisis appeared to be enduring, and this contributed to a long-lasting debate on national identity and a multicultural society, and the debate became central during the 80's and 90's, becoming the battle horse of the extreme right-wing party, the Front National (now Rassemblement National). The economic crisis has shaped new attitudes towards foreigners, centered around the issue of rejection. Proud of a national identity founded on the ideals of tolerance, French public opinion found itself confronted with the pragmatic management of the migrant populations that economic circles had attracted to France during the Trente Glorieuses period.



(Source: Insee, 2023)

As this table shows, and contrary to what the Front National claimed in the 70s and 80s, the policy of family reunification has not led to a massive increase in immigration to France. In fact, the number of migrants increased over the period 1973-2000, from around 3,900,000 in 1975 to 4,300,000 in 1999. However, if we look at the share of immigrants in the total population, it stagnated or even fell slightly over the same period, from 7.4% of the population to 7.3%. Despite the rise of the extreme right and the importance given to the identity debate, the number of migrants and their proportion of the total population has been growing since the early 2000s reaching over 10% of the French population by 2022. The persistence of huge disparities in living standards between countries, the persistence of armed conflicts and environmental problems are leading to an increase in international migration. In terms of number, France remains a welcoming country although immigration is a polarizing issue.

As a result, France and Portugal have had very different relationships with immigration, and this has shaped the way they perceive it. Immigration to Portugal is still a recent phenomenon, and highly unstable in the face of economic crises. France, on the other hand, is the world's oldest country of immigration in Europe, and has not experienced a massive wave of emigration, unlike the Portuguese, who have emigrated for decades to Europe, Portuguese-speaking Africa and South America. Whatever crises there may be, France remains a destination for immigrants looking for a better life. Although the rise of the extreme right and the reluctance to immigrate marked the end of the 20th century, France has always continued to welcome more migrants every year. However, French society is still fragmented and polarized on this subject, and immigration is held responsible for the country's socio-economic problems. Portugal has not experienced the waves of mass migration that France has, and because of its history of emigration, the Portuguese have a less negative view of immigration.

1.3 Demographic situations as a vector for immigration

Since the beginning of the 1970s, fertility has been falling in Portugal. Still at a level of 3 children per woman in 1970 (Pordata, 2023), the total fertility rate has fallen by one point in just over ten years, and has been divided by more than 2, with a total fertility rate of 1.35 children per woman in 2021, below the European Union average of 1.53 in 2021. This significant reduction in fertility can be attributed to a number of social and political factors. After the Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974, the installation of democracy in Portugal brought with it a modernization of society, amplified by membership of the EEC in 1986. The end of autarky and the liberalization of the country led to a readjustment of social behavior. Other factors stemming from this modernization phase may explain the fall in fertility: the use of contraceptive methods and the spread of information on these methods, amplified by the Church's reduced influence on behavior; the decline in the average age of women at first childbirth, as well as in the average ages at first marriage for men and single women (Fernandes, 2007). Since the early 1960s, the number of annual births has fallen sharply. From around 220,000 births a year, the number has fallen by 2.5 times, reaching 84,426 births in 2020.

The improved standard of living and new career opportunities created by a stimulated economy from the mid-80s onwards sometimes dictate different life choices. Women's average age at first childbirth has risen by more than seven years, from 23.6 in 1981 to 30.9 in 2021 (Pordata, 2023). Furthermore, the average age at first marriage follows the same tendency as the average age at first childbirth. In 2021, women get married for the first time at an average age of 32.9 years, an increase of over 8 years compared to the early 1990s (24.2 years in 1990) and men show a similar increase, from 26.2 years in 1990 to 34.3 years on average in 2021.

All these changes represent an improvement in the standard of living of the Portuguese people and a genuine emancipation from the standards of morality that prevailed during the dictatorship. Life expectancy at birth is another indicator of the improvement in Portuguese living standards. In 1960,

a Portuguese man could expect to live for around 60 years at birth, while a Portuguese woman could expect to live for over 66 years. In 1974, the year of the Carnation Revolution and the transition to democracy, life expectancy at birth was almost 65 for a man and over 71 years for a woman. In 2021, it is 78,5 years for a man and 84,4 for a woman, and this is even more revealing given that these results are above the European Union average, with life expectancies at birth of 77.2 and 82.9 respectively (Insee, 2023).

However, although on paper these results testify to significant progress, a modernization of society and a definite development of healthcare and its access, an underlying problem emerges: the ageing of the population. Age groups are directly affected by this profound change, which is leading to an ageing society, with a reduction in the young population and an increase in the number of older people. The proportion of the population aged 65 or over rose from 8% of the total population in 1960 to 16.2% in 2000 and represents 22.4% of the total population in 2020 (Population Pyramid, 2023). Thus, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over increased by 8.2 points in 40 years, then by 6.2 points in 20 years, which shows how quickly the proportion of the population aged 65 and above is increasing. This ageing trend correlates with the decline in the youngest age group, 0–14-year-olds, from 29.3% of the total population in 1960 to 16.5% in 2000 and 13.5% in 2020. Thus, the age pyramid of the Portuguese population has changed from a pyramid shape in 1960, with a broad base representing a large number of individuals in the younger age categories, which becomes narrower as age increases. In 2020, the age pyramid is more mushroom shaped, with a narrower base and a broader top. This phenomenon is resulting in a significant ageing of the Portuguese population.

The ageing of the population is a particular handicap for Portugal, as the proportion of working people is declining in favor of retirees, who are living longer. Coupled with a relatively low number of children per woman, Portugal needs to adapt in order to re dynamize its economy and demography. Immigration is therefore a fundamental solution for the country. Although increased and encouraged immigration will not solve the country's demographic problems in the long term, it can nevertheless mitigate the phenomenon of an ageing population. The number of young people in work would

increase and the reduction in the ratio of people of working age to older people would be slowed. A study based on the results of the 2001 census by Maria João Valente Rosa and Tiago Santos (2003) showed that 188,000 immigrants a year would have to enter the country until 2021 to prevent the population from ageing. This figure was needed to balance the ratio between the working population (15-64 years old) and the elderly (over 64 years old) and took into account the flow of outgoing immigrants and the mortality and fertility projections for the coming years. These numbers were never attained, as Portugal has never had a positive net migration of more than 43,656 and even experienced negative net migration over the period 2010-2016 (World Bank, 2023), as a result of the impact of the 2008 economic crisis on the country. The Covid 19 crisis in 2020 has also had a negative impact on the country's net migration, which is why the political decisions currently taken will have a major impact on the country's demographic future.

On January 1, 2022, France had a population of 67.8 million. In 1975, 52,600,000 people lived in France (Papon, 2022). The population has therefore increased by over 15 million in forty-seven years. Not escaping the European trend, fertility has gradually declined in France as well. The total fertility index has varied considerably depending on the period. After the baby-boom years, from 1946 to the mid-70s, the total fertility rate exceeded 2.5 children per woman, but fell to 1.93 in 1975 and 1.66 in 1993, its lowest point. Between 2006 and 2014, it gradually increased again to around 2 children per woman, before falling again. In 2018, fertility stood at 1.84 children per woman. Despite the decline, France's fertility rate is above the European average today, and remains close to the generation renewal threshold, which indicates the average number of children per woman required to keep a given population at the same level. Theoretically, it is defined as 2.05 children per woman (Athari and al, 2019). Comparatively, France has a high fertility compared to Portugal, which has a total fertility index of 1.35 children per woman in 2021.

As in Portugal, women are giving birth to their children later and later. In 1975, the average age at childbirth, for all births combined, was 26.7 years in France. Since 1977, it has been steadily falling: it exceeded 28 in 1988, 29 in 1995, 30 in 2010 and reached 30.7 in 2018. The same applies to the age

at first childbirth, which has fallen by 4.5 years over the same period. This is the result of a transformation in society and the increase in the number of women in higher education and employment (Athari and al, 2019).

Life expectancy at birth has tended to increase in France since the mid-1970s, for both women and men, while the mortality rate for each age category has fallen due to medical advances. In 1975, a woman could expect to live 76.9 years under the mortality conditions of the year, and a man 69.0 years. In 2021, life expectancy was 85.2 years for women and 79.2 years for men. In forty-six years, women have thus gained over 8 years of life expectancy and men two years over 10 years, and the gap between women and men has narrowed. This narrowing began in the mid-1990s: while the gap was stable at around 8.2 years between 1977 and 1994, it has been gradually narrowing ever since, reaching 6 years in 2021. As a result of rising life expectancy and the advancing age of the baby-boom generation, the French population is aging, and the age pyramid has changed significantly between 1975 and 2022 (Athari and al, 2019). In 1975, the age pyramid was still strongly marked by birth deficits linked to the human consequences of the two world wars. The generations born between 1940 and 1945, and especially those born between 1915 and 1919, were hollow generations, still young in 1975 and therefore clearly visible on the age pyramid. These historical circumstances are practically erased in the 2022 age pyramid, as these generations have reached an age when mortality is high. In 1975, 13.4% of the population was aged 65 or over. In 1999, this was the case for 15.9% of the population. The ageing process accelerated in the early 2010s, with the first large post-war generations reaching the age of 65. By 2022, 21.3% of the population will be aged 65 or over, more than one person in five.

France is following the European trend, but still to a lesser extent. Its fertility is the best in Europe, life expectancy is above average, and population growth has slowed less than in neighboring countries, unlike Portugal, where the population is already declining. However, France's demography remain unusual in that its population growth is mainly the result of its natural balance. This accounts for three quarters of total growth, while net migration only contributes a quarter. In other words, the

surplus of births over deaths contributes more than the surplus of immigration over emigration, which is absolutely not the case in Portugal. In France, 19% of births are from immigrant women. While immigrant women have a fertility rate of 2.6 children, native-born women have a rate of 1.8 children as of 2017. Even though immigrant women have a higher fertility rate, it only marginally affects the national average, increasing it by 0.1 to 1.9 children per woman in 2017 (Pison and Dauphin, 2020). Therefore, if France is one of the world's leading fertility countries, this is mainly due to its native-born population rather than immigration.

France and Portugal are not in the same demographic situation today. The situation in Portugal is starting to become critical, with an ageing population, one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe and a total population falling every year. Unable to rely on its natural balance, Portugal needs immigration to rejuvenate its population, boost demographic growth and revitalize its economy. The country has already taken this step by adopting new policies to encourage immigration. For its part, although France's population is also ageing, the country is not in a state of emergency, with one of the highest fertility rates in Europe. Furthermore, family policies and family allowances are well established and have been in place for a long time. This stability gives couples the confidence to procreate, as the tools and support are available to them. This difference in situation shows that the demographic situation has an impact on the vision of immigration. Portugal relies on immigration because the country needs it. In France, immigration is not currently a necessity in order to stem population growth. However, France is nonetheless experiencing the effects of an ageing population and a slowdown in fertility, which will probably require it to rethink its demographic policies in relation to immigration.

Chapter 2: The responses to economic, demographic, and social challenges

2.1 Case study: the 2015 migration crisis in European Union and the failure of migration quotas implementation

After looking at historical and demographic factors in France and Portugal, this chapter analyzes recent policies and responses to economic, demographic and social challenges in both countries. To understand and analyze the evolution of the perception of immigration in the two countries, the migratory crisis experienced by Europe in 2015 represents a turning point. Since the creation of the European Union in 1993, this migratory crisis represents one of the greatest challenges it has ever confronted. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), more than one million migrants entered Europe in 2015 without any visas, the largest population movement on the continent since the Second World War (Poddar, 2016). This crisis is the result of numerous wars, a lack of economic opportunities and a major political instability in the countries of the South, particularly in the Middle East but also Maghreb and African horn. People from these regions have flocked to the European Union (EU) to request asylum. Three main routes were used by migrants to reach Europe. The most dangerous, the central Mediterranean route through small, unstable and overloaded boats from Egypt and Libya to Italy and Malta. The second, shorter route from Turkey to the Greek coast. This route was less deadly, although in total, the International Office for Migration (2016) estimated that over 6,000 people died or went missing in the Mediterranean in 2014 and 2015, making it the world's deadliest border. The third route is overland, called the Balkan route, and starts in Turkey to reach the countries of the former Yugoslavia, notably Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia (Krucic, 2020). Therefore, this crisis has put particular pressure on Italy, Greece and the countries of Eastern Europe, as they were

directly exposed to the massive influx of migrants and refugees. These countries were the entry points into the EU and had to manage the flows themselves, as the Dublin agreements of 2003 stipulate that the first EU country of arrival of refugees is responsible for processing the asylum application on its territory (Karolewski and Benedikter, 2018). Then, 2015 marks an unprecedented but unbalanced acceleration in migratory pressure on European countries (Tissier-Raffin, 2015).

Beyond the migratory crisis, the European Union has also experienced a crisis of solidarity. Solidarity is enshrined in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty as a fundamental principle of the European Union, yet it has been lacking on the issue of Europe's external borders and asylum. In autumn 2015, the President of the European Commission at the time, Jean Claude Juncker, proposed sharing 160,000 asylum seekers over two years between the 28 member countries of the EU, based on population and wealth (Withol de Wenden, 2017) but this proposal was rejected by the Visegrád countries namely Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, on the grounds that it would preserve their national homogeneity, and that the European Union's request, presented as obligatory, was not binding on them since it was not a treaty while these countries had benefited from solidarity policies since they joined the EU. The 2015 migration crisis is proving to be completely asymmetrical, as it has not affected all countries in the same manner. Seeing that several countries would not cooperate, others took their share as it became urgent to relieve the countries on the European Union's external borders and particularly in Greece and Italy after the closure of the Balkan route in 2016 (Karolewski and Benedikter, 2018).

2015 was marked by a significant rise in asylum applications in France (+22.1%), mainly in the last quarter, with the total number of applications submitted to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) standing at 79,126. This growth was particularly marked for people fleeing conflict zones in the Middle East (Syria: +84%, Iraq: +248%). The top country of origin for first-time asylum seekers in France in 2015 was Sudan, followed by Syria, Kosovo and Haiti (Sénat, 2016). However, the increase in asylum applications recorded in France last year is still limited compared with the European increase of +123%. This is particularly striking when compared

with trends in some of France's neighbors, where asylum applications literally exploded in 2015: 442,000 applications in Germany (an increase of 155%), 174,000 in Hungary (+323%), 156,000 in Sweden (+108%) and many others. A number of factors may explain this situation. Firstly, the specific nature of France's migration model. Indeed, it is based on the continuous reception of regular migratory flows from its former colonies, with refugees accounting for an average of only 10% of the 200,000 regular migrants registered each year, whereas Germany's migratory profile is strongly impacted by refugee flows, resulting in a greater range of registered arrivals (Sénat, 2016). Additionally, during that period, the economic situation in France, characterized by elevated unemployment and the increase of the terrorism threat, was less attractive. Nations such as Germany, Sweden, and the UK appeared to offer superior prospects, resulting in fewer asylum applications in France.

In this crisis, France has been more concerned with transit flows than installation flows. Considered the crossroads of Europe by its geography, France has seen a significant transit of people during this crisis. Many migrants wanted to reach the United Kingdom through the city of Calais, the closest border between France and the UK. However, the UK's reluctance to play its part in this crisis has created major problems on French territory. The presence of migrants in Calais and the surrounding area is the result both of the UK's non-membership of the Schengen area and of a series of bilateral treaties and administrative arrangements designed to relocate British border controls to French soil. The Sangatte Protocol of 1991 allows border controls to be made for French and British nationals on both sides of the Channel Tunnel, and the Touquet Treaty of 2003 created a legal framework for French and British officials to carry out checks in both countries in wider areas such as the Channel and North Sea ports. The aim was for everyone to apply their own laws in the enclaves thus created, but transits via Great Britain to France are much rarer than the opposite (Le Monde, 2016).

Therefore, in a way, the British border was installed in France to better prevent migrants crossing into the UK, which has been very problematic for France, leading to a major humanitarian,

sanitary and security crisis in the area where migrants are housed, known as the “Calais Jungle”. The National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (2015) severely criticized this series of bilateral agreements. They have led to migrants being detained on French territory in degrading conditions, placed France at a disadvantage given that it had to assume the moral and material cost of a catastrophic situation (even though the UK contributes financially to security measures), and have also impeded asylum requests from being submitted in the UK for both practical and legal reasons. In fact, in 2015 the UK recorded just 32,275 asylum applications, compared to 80,000 a year before the Touquet treaty was ratified in 2003 (Sénat, 2016).

This gave the Front National (FN) the opportunity to capitalize on the situation, denouncing the migratory situation and the need to deport all illegal immigrants. Aided indirectly by the media, which repeatedly showed dramatic images from the Calais jungle, the extreme right-wing party was able to develop a whole range of populist rhetoric. By placing immigration at the heart of the political agenda, the crisis undeniably resonated strongly with the FN's ideology and its strategy, which focuses on cultural issues relating to immigration, identity and Islam, against a backdrop of populist arguments against the "globalist elites" and appeals to the "sovereign people". These discourses worked relatively well, since opinion polls testified the anxiety provoked in France by the migratory situation: 63% of people questioned in France considered that "the country already has a lot of foreigners or people of foreign origin, and welcoming additional immigrants is not possible" (Ivaldi, 2023).

Portugal has not had the same experience of this crisis. In fact, Portugal was not affected by the migration crisis, as it was not on the transit routes and did not receive a large number of asylum applications. However, the number of asylum applications tripled between 2014 and 2017, and the Portuguese authorities have made major efforts to create a new system for relocating and facilitating the integration of asylum seekers (OECD, 2019). When quotas were introduced, Portugal had to accept 2,000 migrants on its soil. Subsequently, the country even undertook to accept over 4,500 migrants, far more than its obligations, and then over 10,000, being ready to relieve Germany, Sweden

and Austria (Costa and Sousa, 2017). However, despite the country's good will and the support of the entire Portuguese political class, the country has had difficulties to reach its quotas. The arrival of migrants was a long time coming. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the slowness of the bureaucracy. Indeed, the administrative process for relocating refugees across the European Union, from countries of first entry such as Greece and Italy, was slow and complex. These countries received so many requests that they were overwhelmed and secondly, Portugal has never been a top destination for migrants, despite the attempt of the country to seem attractive.

In France, the migration crisis has had the effect of fostering extreme right-wing populist rhetoric. Although the country has not been as overwhelmed as other European countries, the situation in Calais has had a high visibility throughout France, and the Front National's strong relaying of it has encouraged reluctance and the development of anti-immigration thought. On the other hand, Portugal tried to do more than its fair share, but didn't really make an impact in this crisis. Despite the goodwill and support of the people and all the country's political parties, the country failed to attract and keep migrants in the country. The migrant and refugee crisis has exacerbated several forms of non-communication. Firstly, between European states and the European Union, linked to the rise of sovereignism and the loss of confidence in the European Union. Communication is lacking between northern and southern European nations regarding the southern countries capacity to manage refugee flows. Additionally, central and eastern European countries are not showing support for western European nations in relocating refugees (Withol de Wenden, 2017). The different understanding of this crisis and the different objectives of the two countries explain why the perception of immigration is more polarized in France than in Portugal.

2.2 Immigration policies of today

After having analyzed the migration crisis, which remains an exceptional event that has profoundly influenced the migration policies implemented since then, it is now interesting to observe what has been done in terms of migration policies over the last 20 years in both countries, and what the future objectives are.

Portugal, like other countries in the European Union, has revised its laws in line with EU conventions and directives. In many cases, however, the country has gone beyond the minimum standards to establish more generous interpretations of the directives, as we saw during the 2015 migration crisis, among others. In 2006, Portugal reformed its nationality law, bringing it into line with the non-discriminatory principles of the European Convention on Nationality. The new law put an end to the positive discrimination against immigrants from the former Portuguese-speaking colonies of Africa and Brazil and extended the right to nationality to a larger number of immigrants and their descendants (Cook, 2018). The conditions for naturalization have also been eased. For example, children born in Portugal to foreign parents can be naturalized even if their parents have no legal status, provided the child completes the first four years of schooling in Portugal. Portugal has one of the highest naturalization rates for non-European citizens, well ahead of France. This nationality law is considered as a model for citizenship reform, stimulating results in terms of naturalization and integration (Cook, 2018).

2007 represents a key date in Portugal's migration policy, with the publication for the first time of a plan for immigration and integration. This three-year document was structured around seven key principles and five axes: legislation, service provision, research, public opinion and community empowerment (European Commission, 2023). Updated in 2010 to continue until 2013, this plan contributes to favorize equality of opportunities for all, the familial reunion, the acceptance of the inter cultures principles or the build of a social consensus (High Commission for Immigration and

Intercultural Dialogue, 2007). In other words, the immigration plan was made to give a positive vision of immigration that recognizes its economic, social and cultural contribution, and is committed to welcoming and fully integrating immigrant communities into Portuguese society. Concerning permanent residency, the 2007 immigration plan considerably improved the procedure for obtaining it, bringing Portugal closer to the European average, where it ranked 8th out of 38 countries. Access to education has been improved but despite the promises of the immigration plan, has failed to improve access to healthcare for migrants, due to resource problems and delays in local implementation (Cook, 2018).

In continuity with previous policies, Portugal has implemented the Strategic Plan for Migration covering the period from 2015 to 2020. This plan is based on 5 priority policy axes. The first axis focuses on the integration of immigrants into Portuguese society. The aim is to strengthen existing integration, efforts to combat discrimination. This involves valorizing the diverse talents and skills of immigrants and ethnic groups, appreciating cultural and religious diversity, reinforcing social mobility and coordinating integration with employment policies for a unified citizenship experience. The second axis focuses on the integration of new nationals, particularly descendants of immigrants and those who have obtained Portuguese nationality. Efforts focus on education, vocational training, facilitating the transition to the labor market, promoting civic and political participation, digital literacy, support for entrepreneurship and essential skills training. The third axis aims to establish Portugal as a preferred international migration destination. This involves actions at national and international level to identify, attract and retain migrants. Objectives include optimizing the management of migratory flows and improving the mobility of skilled people to Portugal. The fourth axis is dedicated to improving the quality and legality of migration services. This involves increasing the effectiveness of interventions in the implementation of migration policies, expanding partnerships with the public and private sectors, supervising potential migrants, adopting electronic tools, simplifying entry procedures and maintaining a high level of quality in the provision of migration services. Lastly, the fifth axis is on the return of Portuguese emigrants. Working alongside the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the goal is to implement programs and initiatives that either facilitate the return of these individuals or reinforce their connection with Portugal. This last axis will be discussed in greater detail in the next sub-chapter.

Beyond the desire to facilitate migration, notably to increase the workforce, Portugal has also been trying to attract foreign investors since 2012 with the introduction of the residence permit for investment activity (Golden Visa). This visa was introduced specifically for non-Europeans wishing to invest. Portugal makes itself attractive by promoting its idyllic environment, its cuisine, its warm climate and its vast coastline (Sumi and Alam, 2023). The applicant must satisfy at least one of the following criteria: a capital transfer of more than 1,500,000 euros, the creation of at least 10 jobs in the country, the purchase of real estate worth more than 500,000 euros, a capital transfer of more than 500,000 euros in scientific research activities involved in the national scientific system, a capital transfer of at least 250,000 euros to support artistic production, the arts, or the renovation of the national heritage, a capital transfer of at least 500,000 euros for the purchase of shares in investment funds or venture capital funds, with 60% of investments made in national commercial enterprises, or a capital transfer of at least 500,000 euros to create a commercial enterprise based in Portugal. The golden visa has been a great success, particularly with the Chinese and Brazilians.

The results of a study showed that between 2012 and 2018, 94.5% of golden visas were issued for investment in real estate, 5.3% for capital transfer and only 0.17% for the creation of 10 jobs (Gaspar and Ampudia de Haro, 2019). While job creation has not increased significantly, the number of visas for family reunification has risen year on year, showing that investors are not only applying for investment purposes, but are also attracted by the quality of life and level of education. The golden visa has improved the country's competitiveness by attracting foreign capital, mainly Chinese and Brazilian, who, attracted by the quality of life, have stayed and brought their families. This type of visa refers then to a business immigration.

On the other hand, France's immigration policy is based on three pillars: ensuring appropriate and balanced management of migratory flows, successfully integrating legal immigrants, and

guaranteeing the right to asylum (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2022). This line of action is the result of the increase in migratory flows in Europe since 2015. To achieve the objectives of these three axes, in 2017 the country implemented an action plan named "Guaranteeing the right to asylum and better controlling migratory flows". Based on the concerted management of flows at European level, the aim is to improve the processing of asylum applications and enshrine a resolute policy to combat irregular immigration. To fulfill this roadmap of migration objectives, a law for controlled immigration, effective asylum rights and successful integration was approved in 2018. Through legislative modifications, this measure allows for a reduction in procedural delays to ensure faster processing of applications, reinforces the fight against illegal immigration by making removal measures against illegal immigrants more effective, and amplifies efforts to improve reception conditions for legal immigrants. In terms of preventing illegal immigration, emphasis has been placed on fighting document fraud through the use of biometrics, fighting the misuse of procedures, reinforcing border controls and revitalizing expulsion policy (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2022).

An "Administrative Detention Center" plan was jointly implemented, creating 379 additional places to hold foreign persons subject to an expulsion order in a closed facility, pending their forced removal. On reading this official document from the French Ministry of the Interior, it appears that France's migration strategy is based primarily on security, rather than economic, social or cultural objectives. Mirna Safi (2014) emphasizes that although France is a long-standing land of immigration, the country is increasingly tightening the conditions under which migrant families are received, notably by extending the length of residence required before naturalization, growing suspicion of binational marriages and tightening controls on naturalization applications, tougher reception conditions for migrants applying for family reunification or, more recently, the right to asylum and intensification of removal procedures for irregular migrants. This primacy of the security aspect can be explained by the fact that immigration today relies particularly on the Ministry of the Interior, whereas traditionally, it was the responsibility of a plurality of ministries such as the Ministry of Urban Affairs, Social Affairs or Employment. It was in 2007 when the country decided to merge

integration and immigration control policies, increasing the scope of the Ministry of the Interior's competencies in terms of migrant integration.

In terms of integration, the policy is based primarily on learning the French language, active participation in society, career guidance and access to employment. Upon arrival in France, the roadmap's integration policy takes the form of the signing of a Republican Integration Contract, the starting point for the personalized Republican integration program. This contract commits foreign nationals to a process that should lead to a sufficient command of the French language and knowledge of and respect for the values of the Republic. Personalized support measures, tailored to the most vulnerable groups such as women, the elderly and refugees, are provided for this purpose. The aim of this integration contract is to obtain French nationality once the conditions are fulfilled. Mastering the language remains the state's priority in the integration process. State-led language programs continue to be an important means of integrating migrants and should be seen as a policy instrument for reinforcing the qualifications of these populations, particularly in terms of employability (Safi, 2014). From this point of view, while language training poses specific technical problems for migrant populations, its political and social usefulness is very important insofar as it contributes to reinforcing their professional qualifications.

Since 2022, Emmanuel Macron and his government have wanted to implement a new immigration law, spearheaded by Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin. This project law has been postponed several times because the government no longer has a majority in the National Assembly, so it is necessary to negotiate with the Republicans, France's traditional right-wing party (Pascual, 2023). This new law aims to facilitate the regularization process for undocumented workers, while broadening the scope for deportation, particularly for foreigners who commit offenses. It will also simplify immigration court procedures and speed up the asylum process. In addition, it provides for the acquisition of a minimum level of French language skills prior to the granting of a multi-annual residence permit, which is not currently the case. The law also makes fingerprinting compulsory, as well as tightening residence requirements for the renewal of long-term residence permits and

prohibiting the administrative detention of minors under the age of 16. The bill addresses the sensitive issue of undocumented workers. Faced with an increase in the number of undocumented workers, the government wants to facilitate the legalization of workers already in the country. At present, to qualify for a residence permit, a professional must prove a minimum of three years' presence in France, at least 24 pay slips and a job offer from his or her employer. The proposed legislation would introduce a new one-year residence permit for jobs in high demand. This permit would be granted to undocumented immigrants working in sectors facing labor shortages, provided they could produce eight salary vouchers and prove that they had been living in France for three years (Pascual, 2023). It is precisely on this point that the government is coming in for criticism from both left and right (Chaulet and Mandonnet, 2023). The creation of a residence permits to regularize illegal immigrants working in professions considered to be in tension, in other words, where there is a shortage of labor, is an incentive for illegal immigration.

On the repressive level, the government plans to eliminate safeguards against mandatory deportation, especially for foreigners who came to France before turning 13, those who have lived in France for over 20 years or more than 10 years, or those who are married to or have children who are French citizens. Currently, individuals can only be expelled if they take part in actions that threaten the fundamental interests of the state, if they are associated with terrorism, or if they advocate discrimination, hatred or violence. The bill extends this possibility to those who represent a significant threat to public order, either because they have been convicted of crimes punishable by a sentence of over 10 years imprisonment, or because they have committed recurrent offences punishable by a 5-year sentence (Pascual, 2023). Furthermore, the bill reintroduces a modified version of a provision of the anti-separatist law, previously invalidated by the Constitutional Council, which allowed the expulsion of individuals who did not adhere to the "principles of the Republic".

Regarding asylum, the bill introduces various measures aimed at shortening the processing duration for applications, projected to surpass 130,000 by 2022. In order to reduce hearing delays, the government intends to deploy agents from the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and

Stateless Persons (OFPRA) to regional administrative centers or prefectures as a trial approach. At present, the judges and staff who deal with these cases are located solely at one site in the suburbs of Paris. A large part of the bill is devoted to rationalizing administrative immigration disputes. This litigation, which generally concerns appeals against refusals of authorization or orders to leave the country, accounts for more than 40% of cases before the administrative courts (Pascual, 2023). The aim of future legislation is to relieve congestion in the courts and accelerate expulsions. To achieve this, the available procedures will be reduced from 12 to 4, each with its own appeal deadlines and verdicts.

Thus, Portugal's approach to immigration and integration has been proactive and global, aligning itself with the EU's main guidelines while often exceeding the minimum standards. With one of the highest naturalization rates in Europe, Portugal has built its strategy on laws and reforms never seen before in the country. The 2007 migration policy marked a significant step forward, establishing a structured roadmap to address the various facets of immigration, from legislation to community empowerment, and emphasizing the positive contributions of immigrants. Subsequently, the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan for Migration strengthened these efforts by targeting five main policy axes, ranging from the integration of immigrants and new nationals to promoting Portugal's image as a desirable migration destination, and dealing with the return of Portuguese emigrants. Complementing these efforts, Portugal has also worked proactively to boost its attractiveness to foreign investors with the "Golden Visa" initiative, launched in 2012. By offering residence permits for substantial investments in various sectors, Portugal has strategically attracted significant foreign capital, particularly from non-European countries such as China and Brazil. While the predominant type of investment has been real estate, the consequent increase in family reunion visas highlights that many investors are attracted not only for business reasons, but also for health reasons. Today's migration policies are a response to the country's demographic crisis and the need to further develop its economy. Migration policies in France are more security-oriented than in Portugal. Torn between humanism and firmness, migration strategy since the 2015 crisis has been between managing

migration flows, integrating legal immigrants and guaranteeing the right to asylum. With each new bill, measures are becoming stricter and stricter on irregular immigration, and there is a real determination to increase the number of expulsions and accelerate the application process. General control is also being stepped up, with the use of biometrics and more stringent conditions. However, although repression is increasing, the emphasis is on the integration of legal migrants. The "contrat d'intégration républicaine" (republican integration contract) is a tool that serves as a guide for new arrivals, enabling them to take part in training courses such as apprenticeships or civic education. France's migration, integration and asylum policy is a delicate balance between its humanitarian and international commitments, its security concerns, its economic needs and its republican values.

2.3 The desire of both countries to attract their nationals to return

France and Portugal share the same desire to attract expatriates to come back and settle in the country. With its large waves of emigration, Portugal has a long-standing desire to make itself attractive. In France, this desire can be felt in Emmanuel Macron's various media appearances since his election in 2017. Macron has always had a certain success with the French abroad, and this is also reflected in his electoral results, he obtained 45.09% of the votes cast abroad in the first round of the 2022 presidential elections (17.24 points higher than his national score), even better than his score in 2017 (Romain and Ferrer, 2022).

For over 20 years, France has been experiencing a major brain drain, particularly to Anglo-Saxon countries. France has fallen behind in the development of new technologies and has paid the price. Today, France wants to compete with a declining Silicon Valley or with technologically dynamic cities such as London and Montreal. The Macron government's attractiveness strategy is reflected in its desire to create a major technology hub by offering a highly favorable tax system. The impatriate fiscal regime provides for various income tax exemptions, under certain conditions, over

a maximum period of 8 years. Added to this is an impatriation bonus, which most often takes the form of additional remuneration linked to the transfer to France (De Montiny, 2021). It may also be granted in the form of a benefit such as the provision of an apartment, the payment of school fees or the payment of an installation bonus. The aim is to attract talented professionals from abroad back to France. This scheme has been steadily improved and made more flexible under Emmanuel Macron's presidency and has aroused increased interest among French people in London since the Brexit. In addition to attracting French nationals back, the aim is also to facilitate the establishment of foreign companies and other investments in France.

This tax advantage for inpatriates is the result of efforts to develop innovation and technology in France. French Tech is the embodiment of French start-ups in France and internationally. Initiated in 2013 by the French government, French Tech has become a recognized label, not only in France but worldwide, representing French innovation and excellence in technology. Its main aim is to unite French start-ups under a common banner, facilitate collaboration and networking, and highlight the dynamism and potential of the French ecosystem. The initiative also aims to encourage entrepreneurship and facilitate access to funding, mentors and resources for French entrepreneurs. The initiative is based on "French Tech Capitals" and "French Tech Communities", which are local ecosystems and networks of French start-ups in France and abroad (French Tech, 2023). One of French Tech's flagship projects is Station F, inaugurated in 2017 in Paris. This gigantic startup campus is billed as the biggest in the world. Spanning 34,000 m², it has been designed as a veritable city within the city. Station F brings together a range of services to make life easier for start-ups: workspaces, meeting rooms, catering facilities, an auditorium and accommodation for entrepreneurs.

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acceleration programs, offered in collaboration with partner companies, academic institutions and other organizations. Giants such as Meta, Microsoft and Ubisoft have established their own incubators on campus, offering specialist support to start-ups in their respective fields. The vision behind Station F and French Tech in general is clear: to transform France into a 'startup nation', capable of competing with major technology ecosystems such as Silicon Valley or the United Kingdom. By combining resources, talent and innovation, French Tech and Station F aim to position France as a leader in global technological innovation. The success of this initiative is reflected in the explosive growth of the French technology sector. Since the creation of French Tech, the amount of investment in French start-ups has increased considerably, with a 16% increase between 2021 and 2022, raising €13.5 billion. This exceptional increase has enabled France to overtake Germany, which has seen a 38% fall over the same period, while Europe as a whole has also seen an 18% fall (Perreau, 2023).

The massive wave of emigration, triggered in large part by the economic crisis of 2008, has left Portugal in a delicate position. Dragging the country into a period of austerity, thousands of young people, as well as skilled professionals, left to seek opportunities elsewhere, leaving a demographic and professional void, particularly in large and medium-sized towns.

As part of the Strategic Plan on Migration 2015-2020, Portugal has precisely emphasized the importance of re-attracting Portuguese nationals from abroad to return. The path followed by Portugal in the area of immigrant integration is accompanied by another path aimed at providing greater support for the reintegration of returning Portuguese emigrants. It has therefore become essential for Portugal to strengthen its knowledge of and links with Portuguese migration, by creating the conditions for a stable relationship based on specific, constant and regularly updated information (Portuguese Government, 2015). Portugal fully encourages and supports the return and integration of Portuguese emigrants who wish to return, as they can bring with them significant added value resulting from their experiences abroad. The Strategic Plan on Migration 2015-2020 brings together 14 measures concerning Portuguese emigrants, the main objectives of which are to rebalance the migratory balance by encouraging the return of those who have left Portugal, to support the

reintegration of emigrants who are socially vulnerable within the national territory, to promote Portuguese professionals and talent living abroad, as well as new citizens of Portuguese origin, and to develop and promote incentives for emigrants to return to Portugal, while adopting a positive perspective on their mobility. Beyond the desire to attract the return of Portuguese emigrants, we can see that Portugal is seeking above all to recreate ties between its diaspora and to encourage their activities abroad, while encouraging those who wish to return to do so.

The Portuguese government has also launched the Programa Regressar in 2019 to fill this labor shortage and re-attract Portuguese expatriates. This program offers a settlement bonus of a maximum of 6,500 euros per family, including costs related to the return, as well as recognition of academic or professional qualifications. Added to this is a 50% tax reduction over a 5-year period (Programa Regressar, 2023). This measure makes it possible to cover significant costs, while facilitating the recognition of qualifications obtained abroad and offering training to help people reintegrate into the Portuguese job market.

The program was originally due to end on December 31, 2020. However, in view of the number of applications still waiting to be processed, the Portuguese government indicated in November 2020 that it would be extended until 2023, and it has now been extended until 2026. The decree-law also fixes the extension of the program's coverage, in particular ensuring that emigrants, their descendants and family members have access to measures to encourage business start-ups, as well as measures to learn or improve the Portuguese language where necessary. This measure goes hand in hand with return assistance, which should be added for applicants who decide to create their own business. The extension of the Programa Regressar shows a certain success and proves that a certain number of Portuguese people are attracted by the idea of settling in Portugal.

Chapter 3: The role and the influence of far-right parties

The aim of this chapter is to observe whether the extreme right is influencing immigration policies and public opinion.

3.1 The influence of the far-right parties on policies and public opinion

3.1.1 The genesis of the Rassemblement National

The far right is gaining ground in Europe. In many European countries, not only are far-right parties achieving high scores, but the electoral system now allows them to form right-wing majorities in government coalitions (Giblin, 2012). In France, the Rassemblement National (RN) is not governing, but it has never been closer. With over 50 years of existence, the party is a historical pillar that has largely influenced the construction of extreme right-wing parties in other European countries. In Portugal, the situation is the exact opposite: there is no historical extreme right-wing party. Since the transition to democracy in 1974, many parties have been created but have never lasted, with insignificant electoral results. It was only in 2019 that, for the first time, an extreme right-wing political party obtained a seat in Parliament with André Ventura, founder of the extreme right-wing Chega party.

Founded in 1972, the Front National (now RN) has its roots in revolutionary nationalism, an ideology promoted by the young neo-fascists of the “Ordre Nouveau” movement (ON). Their program, which was hostile to the "bourgeois order", was based on a number of key ideas inspired by the German conservative revolution of the inter-war period and European fascism: defense of the West, hatred of mixing and otherness, and the search for a third way that would lie between communism and capitalism while refuting both ideologies (Kauffmann, 2016). The ON wanted to bring together the various right-wing movements with the aim of creating a broader, united and politically viable front. Representing a more moderate right wing within this grouping, it was Jean

Marie Le Pen who was chosen by the militants of the Ordre Nouveau to preside the Front National (Kauffmann, 2016). A former member of parliament and sympathizer of the Poujadist movement, Le Pen is a pure product of French Algeria steeped in anticommunism and Anti-Gaullism. An uninhibited right, authoritarian even muscular, but respectful of institutions. In short, it does not have much in common with the activists of the Ordre Nouveau movement, being more moderate and thus having a better ability to rally. Jean Marie Le Pen proposed an anti-elite discourse while defending the interests of small merchants and artisans. The party was created with the aim of putting nationalism at the heart of the electoral game and bringing together the political forces to the right of the “Rassemblement Pour la République”, the party of the traditional right at the time (now known as Les Républicains).

From the 1980s the candidate proposed a neo-liberal, anti-statist economic program and expressed firm opposition to immigration and France's low birth rate. The FN experienced its first major electoral victory in the 1986 legislative elections. Between a campaign promise and an attempt to mitigate his electoral defeat, French President François Mitterrand introduced full proportional representation as a voting system, thereby increasing the number of deputies. This decision will be favorable to the extreme right-wing party, enabling it to enter the National Assembly for the first time with 35 seats (Delafoi and Gaitzsch, 2022). After the return of the two-round electoral system in the following legislative elections, the Front National found itself with only one deputy in the National Assembly (Carvalho, 2013). Jean Marie Le Pen accused Jacques Chirac, in this period of cohabitation with François Mitterrand, of excluding him from the political landscape and strongly questioned the French political party system.

The extreme right-wing party then decided to adapt its ideology by publishing "300 measures for the renaissance of France" before the 1993 legislative elections. The aim was to consolidate its support among working-class voters, particularly disaffected socialists. Contrary to the old neo-liberal approach, this new program balanced nationalist, xenophobic and authoritarian references with measures to combat unemployment, workers' problems, and the crisis of the welfare state (Carvalho, 2013). Presenting itself as the defender of France against international finance, the party proposes the

establishment of a nationalist economy, while continuing to criticize the other political parties, accused of being corrupt and complaisant with international finance at the detriment of the French people. Despite good scores in the first round, the party lost its representation in the Assembly in these legislative elections, disavowed by coalitions in the second round. However, Le Pen made progress in the presidential elections, winning 15% of the vote in the first round, representing more than 4,500,000 voters (Vie publique, 2021).

The 2002 presidential elections were to prove an earthquake for the French political scene. It was an unexpected result in the first round: Jean Marie Le Pen reached the second round with the incumbent President, Jacques Chirac, thus eliminating the left-wing candidate and Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin. This was the first time that a far-right candidate had advanced to the second round of a presidential election, ending the left-right bipartite tradition that has prevailed since the creation of the Fifth Republic. Jacques Chirac ultimately won the second round by a wide margin, but this result reflected the French people's deep dissatisfaction with the traditional political class. While continuing with the themes of security, nationalism and identity, Jean Marie Le Pen made immigration, and the danger it represents for France, the heart of his campaign. Immigration did not feature in Jacques Chirac's program and was mentioned only once in Lionel Jospin's program. The FN candidate distinguished himself from the other candidates by emphasizing a theme that was not addressed by the candidates of the traditional parties. The 2002 presidential election was the moment when the FN really began to have an influence and a voice that counted in the political arena.

3.1.2 Influence of the Front National on migrations policies and public opinion

During the 2002 presidential elections, the FN had a major impact on public opinion. Immigration was one of the top priorities for French voters in the 2002 presidential elections. Carvalho (2013) suggests that the FN had a very significant impact on public attitudes towards immigration in this 2002 election, and that the "lepénisation of minds" was acute in French public

opinion. Immigration was ranked as the fourth priority for the French (6.5% of respondents) in these elections, behind unemployment (33.4%), delinquency (19.6%) and social inequality (14%). Voters most concerned by this issue considered Le Pen to be the best candidate to deal with the immigration issue, garnering more than 40 points more than the second best, Jacques Chirac. These figures show that Jean Marie le Pen and the FN benefited from a major appropriation of the issue of opposition to immigration during the 2002 presidential elections and led the political debate.

Concerning general attitudes towards immigration, almost two-thirds of the electorate agree that there are too many immigrants in France, while 98% of FN voters overwhelmingly share this perception. In addition, more than half of those polled feel that they no longer feel as much at home as they once did. This is more than 85% among Jean Marie Le Pen's electorate (Carvalho, 2013), which is a significant gap. These data show the extent to which the FN has been able to consolidate its electoral support. Moreover, by completely monopolizing the subject of immigration during the election campaign, the FN was able to increase and intensify levels of concern and hostility towards immigration among the national electorate. The key element of the FN's strategy during this campaign is the ability of the party and its voters to spread anti-immigration rhetoric to the rest of the electorate, like a contagion effect.

The FN had no impact on the inter-party competition during the 2002 campaign, because despite the omnipresence of the immigration theme relayed by Le Pen, his party and his voters, no other party wished to respond and take on this subject, and the other candidates remained faithful to their programs. However, during Jacques Chirac's five-year mandate, three laws on immigration were adopted, despite the fact that this subject was not mentioned once in his campaign program. During the 2007 presidential elections, the situation changed, as the importance of the issue of immigration grew and spread across the various political parties. The FN's electoral program for this election covered all types of migratory flows and was presented as an economic burden, whereas references to the threat posed by immigration to the French national identity, which were predominant in the 2002 election campaign, were almost totally absent from Jean Marie Le Pen's rhetoric and program.

The party's strategy presupposes a clear detachment from the predominant cultural xenophobia of the past and a degree of ideological deradicalization. Nevertheless, Le Pen's extremist outbursts have eroded this strategy, as demonstrated by his comments about Sarkozy's religious and immigrant origins which would disqualify him from becoming President of the French Republic (Bôle-Richard, 2007).

Concerning the right-wing candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, immigration was the third most covered subject by the media during his election campaign, after insecurity and social issues. The candidate's election program attached great importance to immigration policy, proposing measures to limit the development of the influx. The strategic aim of this positioning was to attract as many right-wing sympathizers as possible, while the other candidates accused him of aligning himself with the FN's historical discourse (Carvalho, 2013). Centrist candidate François Bayrou proposed delegating the regulation of immigration to the EU and advocated a more liberal approach to flows from the new EU Member States. In line with the integration and reception contract proposed by Sarkozy, this testifies to the hegemony of the integration consensus, which was not even an issue in the 2002 elections. Finally, the Socialist Party experienced internal divisions over immigration policy and a certain realignment towards the right in an internal report in 2005. This document proposed the deployment of a quota system and the repeal of immigrants' automatic right to family reunification, as the FN had proposed in 2002. However, the party's candidate, Ségolène Royal, rejected this report. Refuting Nicolas Sarkozy's association of immigration and national identity inspired by FN ideas, the left-wing candidate focused mainly on illegal immigration (Carvalho, 2013). The campaign program also proposed the introduction of selective regularization processes for irregular immigrants based on integration criteria, confirming the inter-party consensus on integration. Thus, it is quite clear to see that the importance of immigration policy in the 2007 presidential election campaign has increased considerably compared to the 2002 campaign. The issue of illegal immigration was the most discussed and the most dominant in the political debate. While the FN tried to evolve its positioning to appear less extreme despite the excesses of Jean Marie Le Pen, not only Nicolas Sarkozy's right-

wing party but also the other traditional parties shifted to the right. This situation shows that the FN had a very significant impact on competition between the parties on immigration during the 2007 presidential elections, contrary to 2002.

What influence did the FN have on public opinion in 2007? Was it higher or lower than in the 2002 elections? During the 2002 presidential elections, we saw that the FN had a significant impact on public opinion regarding immigration by increasing hostility towards it. To observe this, the same poll, containing the same questions, was conducted for the 2007 elections. Immigration was considered the seventh most important issue by those polled in this presidential election. Despite a slight increase in the proportion of voters most concerned about immigration compared to 2002, rising from 6.5% to 7.1% in 2007, issues such as education, purchasing power, environment and retirement were ranked higher (Carvalho, 2013). Jean Marie Le Pen was again considered as the best candidate able to respond to the concerns of the voters who ranked immigration as their top priority but lost 9 points compared with 2002 (from 50% to 40.9%). Candidate Nicolas Sarkozy received more than a third of the votes polled, whereas Jacques Chirac received only 4% of positive responses in 2002. This narrowing of the gap between the right-wing and extreme right-wing candidates in 2007 reflects the success of Nicolas Sarkozy's strategy of aligning himself with the FN's ideas without making a clear endorsement, with the aim of obtaining a plurality of votes of right-wing sympathizers. However, the FN candidate continues to take ownership of the issue, but at a much lower level than in 2002.

Answering the same question as in 2002 about the number of immigrants in France, around half of those questioned agreed that there were too many immigrants in France, compared with almost two-thirds who shared the same perception in 2002 (Carvalho, 2003). Answering the same question as in 2002 about the number of immigrants in France, around half of those questioned agreed that there were too many immigrants in France, compared with almost two-thirds who shared the same perception in 2002. Among FN voters, some 89% agreed that there were too many immigrants, 9 points less than in 2002. A similar trend occurred when responding to the statement "I don't feel as

much at home as I used to", as this opinion dropped by almost 7 points among all survey respondents and by 11 points among FN voters compared to 2002.

Thus, it would appear that hostility to immigration has declined. However, the FN still had a significant impact on public attitudes towards immigration in the 2007 presidential elections, but its ability to intensify levels of anxiety and hostility among the French electorate was weaker than in 2002. The lower intensity of the FN's impact on public attitudes in 2007 may reflect the intense mobilization against Jean Marie Le Pen's success in 2002, which had succeeded in delegitimizing the FN's xenophobic discourse among the electorate due to the numerous polemics that surrounded him.

3.1.3 The rise of Chega in Portugal

The analysis of the extreme right in Portugal is less obvious, as it has never had any real political weight. Where all other far-right politicians have failed, André Ventura succeeded in winning a seat in Parliament in 2019, representing the party he himself created, Chega. In the 2022 parliamentary elections, his party won 12 seats and demonstrated a rapid expansion (Le Monde, 2022). In this context of the new emergence of the extreme right in Portugal, the legislative elections of 2022 showed the historic victory of the Socialist Party (PS) in obtaining an absolute majority, relying on the support of two radical left-wing parties since 2015 to govern. However, behind the overall image of stability, significant transformations are occurring in the Portuguese party system, particularly on the right. Traditionally occupied exclusively by the center-right Social Democratic Party (PSD), which nevertheless remains the second largest party, and the Christian Democratic Party, the political right has shown signs of fragmentation for the first time with the emergence of the populist radical right Chega.

"Chega", which can be translated as "Enough", emerged when André Ventura left the center-right PSD (Social Democratic Party) in October 2018. In March of the following year, Chega obtained official status as a political party from the Constitutional Court. Born in Lisbon in 1983, Ventura had been associated with the PSD's Social Democratic Youth since the age of 17. He holds a law degree

and a doctorate in criminal law. In the 2017 municipal elections, he led the campaign for a PSD coalition, but faced a backlash and media criticism for making racist statements (Rita dos Santos Gomes, 2022). Building on his dissatisfaction with the PSD, and supported by other party members, André Ventura mobilized enough support to create Chega.

The new competition from this new party contributed to a disastrous result for the Christian Democratic Party, a political party which had been a reliable coalition partner for the PSD, but which found itself without a single seat in parliament in 2022. The PSD was also affected by failing to achieve better results than in 2019 while within the space of 4 years, Chega has become the country's third largest party. Chega's rapid growth should not be seen as the result of contextual circumstances specific to the present moment. Its low score rate in 2019 (1.3%) can be explained by the fact that it was a completely new party at the time. Although it had enjoyed some media visibility before, this was nothing compared to the torrent of media attention that followed its winning of a parliamentary seat on 2019 (Mendes, 2022). Despite this rapid expansion, Chega's voting percentage remains below the average for radical right-wing parties in Western Europe. It appears that, due to its youth, the party may not yet have benefited from notable political opportunities as the FN had, such as the episodes of cohabitation or the migratory crisis of 2015.

Although the leader of the center-right PSD declared during the campaign that his party rejected an alliance with Chega, his assurances often seemed insufficiently clear. This shows that the rise of the radical right in Portugal is going to present a challenge to the traditional right and will give rise to much debate about potential alliances. The debate will probably remain open until the next elections, and much will also depend on the future leadership of the PSD. Bringing moderate parties together is complicated, particularly because Portugal has no tradition of large coalitions in its history but rather center-left minority governments (Mendes, 2022). This convergence of the left means that Chega's future inclusion or exclusion does not depend solely on the mainstream right but could also depend on the willingness of the center-left to facilitate the governability of a right-wing minority government that would exclude the radical right.

Chega's emergence on the Portuguese political scene marks a significant turning point in the country's traditional political landscape. Whereas the far right had never carried any political weight in Portugal's entire democratic history, André Ventura and his party have succeeded in establishing themselves in the national discourse and securing parliamentary representation. Although the party is still young and its influence is currently less than that of other far-right movements in Europe, it is clear that Chega has already redefined political debates and can hold a central place in Portuguese politics for years to come.

3.2 Is Europe's far right on the way to normalization?

Recent elections in Europe have seen a resurgence of support for far-right parties. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni, the candidate of the far-right party Fratelli d'Italia, won the 2022 elections through a large coalition of the rights. The far right is on the rise in Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the UK to mention just a few and even in Portugal, as we have already seen. Beyond the economic, cultural and political factors specific to the current electoral cycle, this new surge by the far right offers a broader perspective on some of the evolutions at work in the extremist phenomenon in Europe. In particular, it illustrates the mainstreaming of the contemporary far right, meaning its establishment at the very heart of Western democracies, in a political space formerly occupied by the traditional parties and from which it remained, more often than not, excluded (Ivaldi, 2023). The current wave of extreme right-wing involves a dual process of normalization of these groups and dissemination of their ideas. It operates on public opinion as well as on the major conservative and liberal parties, to the point where we are witnessing a form of hybridization of the right across Europe (Bherer, 2023).

One of the significant factors is the eroding faith in the political system. The level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in France is not really high, with only 35% of the population believing it's working "very well" or "fairly well". This sentiment comes in a context characterized by deep discontent, particularly in reaction to the pension reform proposed by

Emmanuel Macron and his government. Trust in politicians is also low in France with only 17% of French people think that "politicians care about what people like them think". The majority believe that political elites are out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people (Ivaldi, 2023). Moreover, confidence in the National Assembly has fallen by 10 points, to 28% in 2023 while it was 38% in 2021. Finally, Emmanuel Macron's popularity rating is barely 30% in favor, while almost 70% of those polled have an unfavorable opinion of him.

Indicators from a Cevipof survey (2023) on political confidence also underlined the presence of a relatively solid base of attitudes conducive to voting extreme right in France, based on nativism and authoritarianism. The Rassemblement National (RN) in France is characterized by its exclusive xenophobic nationalism and its politicization of issues relating to immigration and national identity, with an intensification of anti-Islam arguments for decades. The leader of Chega in Portugal is no exception to this rule, but he adapts to his environment. André Ventura's program and discourses are not explicitly anti-immigration, given that 87% of Portuguese people consider their country and their community to be a good place for immigrants according to the Gallup index of acceptance of migrants (European Commission, 2019). Thus, Ventura attacks the Roma in his speeches, a community that is very present in Portugal, in order to establish his primary nativism. Indeed, Ventura and his party portrayed themselves as the saviors of what they called the 'pure people', openly discriminating against the Roma community. On his social networks and those of the party, a lot of effort has been made to illustrate the actors who represent the "saviors of the people". The first portrays André Ventura as a martyr who will save the people, while the second highlights the unstoppable force of change brought by Chega and the Ventura partisans (García Jaramillo, 2021).

Through social media, André Ventura presented himself in different ways. Firstly, as the only opposition leader, as a politician who protests against the status quo and as the only one who genuinely represents a change of system. In addition, Ventura highlighted his anti-system position by asserting that the political system is corrupt, presenting himself as the only politician to be revolted by it. Ventura also presented himself as someone who would never favor any particular social group.

But paradoxically, he proclaimed that he would only represent the "pure Portuguese", meaning the natives and clearly excluding the Roma or the Portuguese from the former African colonies. This apparent contradiction reflects the way in which Ventura's discourse is organized differently, depending on the context, to achieve the same end, namely the exclusion of certain social groups.


Another recurring strategy was to present Ventura as an ordinary person and as an honest, good, responsible, law-abiding, grateful and hard-working politician who always tells the truth and can be trusted. He emphasized his love for the country and his closeness to its citizens. This speech allows Ventura to present himself as a victim who has been constantly attacked, prosecuted, silenced, boycotted and hated by the establishment. Thus, Ventura presents himself in different ways depending on his objectives. He described himself as an honest, polite, patriotic and hard-working man who truly represents the aspirations of the Portuguese people to transform the system. Revealing of a certain cult of personality, of the 253 messages published on Ventura's social media accounts, 90.1% contained at least one reference to himself, Chega or his supporters.

In addition to this base of xenophobic and authoritarian attitudes, another component of the mainstreaming of extreme right-wing parties in Europe is the extensive image work carried out by these movements in an attempt to achieve a strategic balance between anti-establishment radicalism that continues to mobilize people, and the respectability and credibility they need to gain access to power. For a party such as the French RN, which has its historical roots in far-right circles, this distancing from the legacy of extremist ideology is a key factor in their ability to break through the glass ceilings of power (Ivaldi, 2023). This work on the RN's image and reputation takes the form of the now famous "de-demonization" strategy implemented by Marine Le Pen as soon as she became vice-president of the former FN in 2003 and, even more clearly, after her election as leader of the party in 2011. Beyond the essentially superficial changes to the party's image, the de-demonization sought by Marine Le Pen is mainly the result of the persistent tension between the search for credibility and the maintenance of a radical protest positioning.

As for Chega, having no longevity, the party is not seeking to improve its image or to claim that it has moderated in relation to the past. The party's strategy relies mainly on the image and personality of its leader, André Ventura because he is an atypical figure (Mendes, 2022). As a former lawyer and football commentator, Ventura had already a certain public notoriety before he entered in the political world, and this helped him to acquire some public sympathy from the start. Fully aware of the media codes, he quickly became a leading media and political figure by using a populist rhetoric and by using highly the social networks to provoke the reaction of the audience. Because of his youth and his background as a football commentator, Ventura was able to deploy his discourse in a freer and less framed way than any other politician. To support his claim that he is the only one who can break the status quo in Portugal, he has never hesitated to mention on several occasions the support of public figures such as a national actress or a Catholic priest, and even international political leaders such as Marine Le Pen or Matteo Salvini (García Jaramillo, 2021). He knows that presenting political and religious leaders as social authorities alongside him helps to attract the public's attention.

Regarding Marine Le Pen's image, the work of de-demonization has enabled the candidate to emancipate herself from her father, and she is attempting to be more moderate in her approach. The next graph shows the evolution of Marine Le Pen's image between 2017 and 2023.

Marine Le Pen's image between 2017 and 2023




Scale: 0=absolutely not; 10=Absolutely

Source: Cevipof. 2023. « Baromètre de la confiance politique ».

The 2017-2023 comparison confirms that Marine Le Pen's image has improved overall. However, this change in image has occurred at different levels and through different mechanisms. In detail, the change in the dimension relating to Marine Le Pen's extremist profile resulting from the question "does she worry you?", is the weakest, with relatively similar average scores in 2017 and 2023, and it mainly concerns a drop in the most negative judgements: score 10 thus fell from 34% of responses in 2017 to 18% in 2023. On the other hand, the most positive rating (0) fell from 19% to 11% over the same period. These results reflect a fall in the most negative judgements rather than a real increase in judgements. On the dimensions of honesty, empathy, responding to the line "understands the problems of people like you" and political voluntarism "really wants to change things" on the graph, the improvement in Marine Le Pen's image is clearer but is due, once again, mainly due to a drop in the most negative ratings, concentrated on the 0 mark of the rating scale (-21 points for honesty, -18 points for empathy and -13 points on the political voluntarism scale), and much less on the more positive ratings, again reflecting an improvement by default rather than a real enthusiasm for the far-right leader. However, what about the image of her party?

The RN's image once again shows that it is at a crossroads in terms of the efforts at normalization undertaken by Marine Le Pen for over ten years. 51% of respondents consider the RN's economic program to be worrying, and 57% think that the party does not have a large enough and qualified enough team to manage the country. 53% of French citizens perceive the RN mainly as a nationalist and discriminatory political group, and for 51% of them, it represents a real threat to the democratic system. These results show that the work of de-demonization is still far from finished. However, these results confirm the trend observed for Marine Le Pen beforehand, with an improvement on all dimensions compared to 2017.

Comparison of perception of RN between 2017 and 2023



Source: Cevipof. 2023. « Baromètre de la confiance politique ».

There were falls of between 9 and 17 points on all the negative image indicators. The sharpest fall was in the dangerous nature of the party's economic program, with a drop from 68% to 51% on this point, resulting principally of the change of opinion on the question of leaving the Euro Zone (Ivaldi, 2023).

Thus, the RN's strategy of "de-diabatization" in France shows a deliberate desire to distance itself from its extremist roots and position itself as a potential government party. These efforts appear to be having a beneficial impact on public perception, as evidenced by the changing image of Marine Le Pen and her party. However, the effects of this strategy are more likely to result in a less negative image than a positive one. The ascension of Chega in Portugal shows that normalization is not limited to a simple image makeover. Without a strong historical ideological heritage, the party is relying on Ventura's personality and his ability to adapt to national specificities while maintaining a rhetoric that is typical of extreme right-wing populism.

Conclusion

The juxtaposition of France and Portugal in terms of history, demographics and immigration policies highlights complex socio-political realities. France, with its long history of democracy, seems to take democracy for granted, unlike Portugal where the recent memory of a dictatorship makes the political context less polarized than in France. Therefore, with only 50 years of democracy, it is understandable that the population is more fearful of the extreme right, as this could lay the foundations for a return to an authoritarian regime. This historical difference clearly has an impact on each country's attitude towards extreme right-wing movements and the perceptions of democracy.

The migration experience of the two countries shows how a country's personal history of immigration can influence its contemporary view of the issue. Portugal's emigration heritage seems to have humanized its perspective on migrants, and the Portuguese population has one of the most positive views of immigration in Europe. Moreover, Portugal has only really been a country of immigration since the mid-90s, so its history with immigration is relatively short and it is still experiencing waves of emigration, as we saw during the 2008 crisis. France, as Europe's oldest country of immigration, is more divided, reflecting its long history of integration and socio-political

tensions exacerbated by the extreme right since the 1980s. The country has experienced large inflows and has had to adapt its policies, as was the case in the 1970s when it stopped labor immigration in favor of a policy of family reunification.

In more recent events, the 2015 migration crisis highlighted these differences in perceptions of immigration. Portugal showed great solidarity by offering to take more than its fair share. The migration crisis represented an opportunity for the country to make itself appealing and attract migrants to settle long-term. However, bureaucratic delays and lack of communication within the EU have not really enabled the country to attract many migrants. The situation reflects a missed opportunity rather than a real crisis for Portugal.

France, on the other hand, was much more challenged during this crisis. Having to deal with the lack of solidarity on the part of the Visegrád countries, which refused to respect the quotas imposed by the EU, France also had to contend with the reluctance of the United Kingdom. Being primarily a transit country rather than a destination country compared to other European countries, the Sangatte agreements and the Touquet treaty, which allow the French and British authorities to conduct controls in both countries in specific areas, have put particular pressure on the French authorities as the flows are almost exclusively from France towards the United Kingdom. The major influx led to a major humanitarian and security crisis in what was then known as the Calais Jungle. This situation had an impact on the population, and the Rassemblement National (RN) capitalized on it to highlight the dangers of immigration.

The current demographic context is also indicative of the needs of both countries. Portugal has one of the worst demographics in Europe. Its birth rate is very low, its population is already shrinking, and the number of working people is very low compared to the number of pensioners. Portugal therefore sees immigration as an opportunity to counter its demographic and economic decline. France, on the other hand, although facing demographic challenges, benefits from a relatively more stable position. The birth rate is above the European average, and family policies have been in place for a long time, giving people a degree of confidence. Moreover, the natural balance contributes

far more to demographic growth than net migration in France, reflecting the distinct demographic dynamics between the two nations.

In order to meet their respective challenges, the two countries have implemented different policies. Portugal implemented an immigration plan in 2007, the first in its history. Then, Portugal implemented a strategic plan for migration in 2015 covering until 2020 with the aim of improving integration, becoming an international migration destination, improving migration services, facilitate foreign investment and encourage the return of Portuguese emigrants. France's migration policy is based on three pillars: the balanced management of migration flows, the best way to integrate legal migrants and the right to asylum. At the same time, the fight against illegal immigration has become one of France's priorities. For this, stricter measures have been put in place such as administrative detention centers and the acceleration of the application process to accelerate the deportations of illegal migrants. It emerged that France's migration, integration and asylum policy is a delicate balance between its humanitarian and international commitments, its security concerns, its economic needs and its republican values.

However, despite the different characteristics of the two countries, we have seen that even in Portugal is not immune to the emergence of the extreme right. Unlike France, the country does not have a historical extreme right party and has not had to deal with it since its democratic transition in 1974 but has nevertheless experienced a rapid rise of the extreme right party Chega led by André Ventura. Thus, the coming years will be decisive for Portugal because the progression of the extreme right could completely transform the political landscape, accustomed to a certain continuity and weak competition from traditional parties. It also means that political movements are spreading faster than before.

For its part the RN has never been so close to the power and the elections of 2027 will leave room for a new President in any case, since in the state of the Constitution, Emmanuel Macron cannot run again. This election represents the best chance of Marine Le Pen who continues her work of de-

diabatization which we have seen that it generates for the moment especially fewer negative judgments than a genuine outpouring of positive support from French people.

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