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The relationship between public opinion and immigration policies.
The case of Denmark and Finland.

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Abstract.

This Thesis explores the relationship between public opinion and policies, investigating the extent to which public beliefs influence immigration policymaking, with a particular focus on immigration policies. Immigration, being a salient issue, lends itself to this study, as the salience of the issue plays a fundamental role in the relationship between public opinion and policy. The literature widely asserts that policies are a function of public opinion, which thus plays a significant role in policymaking. This study combines qualitative analysis, based on a review of the literature, with quantitative analysis, based on the observation of responses to *the WVS Wave 7 (2017-2022),* a questionnaire measuring people's beliefs and values over time. The Public Opinion Index created from this survey is then compared with the MIPEX, an index of the effectiveness of immigration policies. Finally, the Thesis discusses the case of Denmark and Finland, which have similar public opinions on immigration but different immigration policies. The method selected for the analysis of the case study is *J.S. Mill's Method of Differences*, which involves the comparison of two cases that are equal in all dimensions except two: *the Dependent Variable* (DV), namely the *Outcome* to be explained (in this case, the diversity of policies in the two countries), and an *Independent Variable* (IV), which is the cause of the outcome. If the two cases, here Denmark and Finland, are equal in all other dimensions, the only dimension in which they differ (in addition to the Outcome) will be the IV, namely the only possible explanation for the outcome.

Introduction.

What influence does public opinion have on shaping immigration policies? Is immigration policymaking correlated with public values and preferences? The synthesis of extant literature and empirical data posits the hypothesis that within democratic governance structures, a discernible correlation exists between these two variables, albeit manifesting varying degrees of strength contingent upon contextual conditions. This work elucidates this relationship primarily through a meticulous scrutiny of pertinent literature, and secondarily through a quantitative analysis employing comparative indices. This examination also endeavors to discern the multifaceted variables influencing this intricate relationship. It becomes evident that public opinion, while a significant factor, is not the exclusive determinant in the formulation of immigration policies. This assertion finds validation in the cases of Finland and Denmark, both characterized by favorable public opinion towards immigration, yet displaying stark policy disparities. Utilizing the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX), which evaluates countries based on parameters encompassing *basic rights*, *equal opportunities*, and a *secure future*, Finland emerges as among the top-performing nations across all three dimensions. In contrast, Denmark exhibits a response to immigration deemed "*slightly*

unfavorable," marked by a partial guarantee of basic rights and equal opportunities, while lacking assurance of a secure future for immigrants (MIPEX, 2020) The ensuing case study probes the underlying factors elucidating why two nations with akin public attitudes towards immigration enact divergent policies. This inquiry adopts the methodological approach of *Mill's Method of Difference*, wherein the investigation seeks two countries analogous in all pertinent dimensions, except for the Dependent Variable (in this instance, the openness of national immigration policies) and the Independent Variable (i.e., the determinant of policy divergence). By identifying the dissimilar factor between Denmark and Finland, this research endeavors to unravel the intricacies contributing to the observed policy disparities, examining dimensions such as economic and demographic factors, electoral and political systems, and the structure of the economy and welfare systems.

Background.

The theme of the relationship between public opinion and policies has been extensively discussed in academic literature. Various models, including those proposed by Dahl (1971), Weale (1999), Pitkin (1967), and Wlezien and Soroka (2009), attest to the correlation between these two variables. The measurement of this correlation is facilitated by the utilization of diverse indices and questionnaires that assess public opinion or the impact of policies, considering a multitude of criteria. In the realm of immigration policies, this correlation gains even greater significance due to the heightened *salience* of the subject (Hatton, 2017). However, it is imperative to underscore that this correlation is influenced by sociopolitical variables, such as the governing party, economic variables like the welfare model, well-being, and demographic situations, as well as institutional variables such as the political and electoral system. A nuanced understanding of these dynamics is crucial for accurately analyzing the intricate interplay between public opinion and immigration policies.

Methods and Sources.

The analysis has been conducted leveraging the extant literature on the subject, with a particular focus on the *World Value Survey Wave 7* (2017-2022) and the *MIPEX* (2019-20). The former is a questionnaire that surveys citizens worldwide regarding their values and beliefs, examining how these evolve over time (WVS, 2022). The latter is an index measuring the effectiveness of immigration policies across 56 countries along various dimensions, notably *basic rights*, *equal opportunities*, and a *secure future* (MIPEX, N.D.). The Case Study analysis outlined in the third chapter, on the other hand, will adhere to the methodology of J.S. Mill's *Method of Differences* (Hancké, 2009).

Relevance.

This thesis holds significance within the realm of political science and international relations, as it delves into a common aspect across all political systems: the relationship between public opinion and policies. Particularly, within a global context characterized by escalating political and economic challenges, an in-depth study of how public opinion influences immigration policies assumes a pivotal position in the development of political theories and the analysis of power dynamics. Understanding how the preferences and perceptions of the population impact the decisions of political leaders provides an essential framework for comprehending the internal policies of states. This work contributes to academic research on the subject by synthesizing key developments in the literature to date, while also presenting original content. Indeed, the quantitative analysis is conducted based on a questionnaire, specifically that of the WVS, which has been subsequently indexed for measurability and comparability. The third chapter, focusing on the case study of Denmark and Finland, constitutes original content within the literature. Additionally, the findings of the case study introduce issues that could serve as points of reflection for further research on these same countries, but within a more recent temporal framework.

Expected Results.

This thesis primarily aims to examine the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Firstly, it seeks to explore the variables that play a role in this relationship and how they may influence it by reviewing existing literature. Secondly, it involves constructing a quantitative analysis through the development of public opinion indices based on the *World Values Survey* questionnaire, followed by a comparison with key findings on immigration policies derived from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (*MIPEX*). This analysis aims to address the question: *What is the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies?* Furthermore, in the pursuit of discussing this relationship, the thesis sets the goal of examining a specific case that emerged from the observation of collected and compared data: the case of Denmark and Finland. These two countries exhibit a similar Public Opinion Index on immigration but divergent indices on policies (restrictive policies for Denmark, tolerant policies for Finland). The thesis aims to investigate the cause of this phenomenon, thereby illustrating an example of dynamics that can impact the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. Regarding the anticipated outcomes of the case study analyzed with Mill's Method of Differences, it is not predetermined, before the Method's application, that there is only one dimension in which Denmark and Finland differ. Therefore, the expected objective is to arrive at an answer within the limits permitted by the Method, shedding light on the dynamics influencing the public opinion-immigration policies relationship.

Thesis Structure.

The Thesis will be organized into three distinct Chapters:

1. The *first Chapter* introduces the Thesis, providing an overview of the existing literature on the correlation between public opinion and policies, firstly in a general context and subsequently with a specific focus on immigration. The Chapter also delineates the variables that can impact this relationship, contributing to the theoretical foundation of the study.

2. The *second Chapter* encompasses a quantitative analysis of the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. This involves the creation of a Public Opinion Index derived from the *World Values Survey* dataset (*Wave 7, Version 4.0.0*) and its comparison with the Migrant Integration Policy Index (*MIPEX*). The correlation between these two indices is described through scatter plots. Also, tests are conducted to assess the impact of potential third variables on this relationship. Additionally, the Chapter includes an analysis of the determinants of the Public Opinion Index using supplementary data from *Version 5.0.0* of *WVS Wave 7* for a selected group of countries. The chapter sets the stage for the Denmark and Finland case study based on the initial data analysis.

3. The *third Chapter* is devoted to the explanation of Mill's Method of Difference and its application to the specific cases of Denmark and Finland. The chapter addresses the question: *"Why do Denmark and Finland have the same public opinion on immigration but different policies?"* through the execution of the Method of Difference. It firstly provides a theoretical overview of the method and justifies the selection of the cases. Subsequently, the method is applied to answer the research question. The determinants of integration policies identified in the first chapter will be considered in the analysis of factors influencing the divergent policies observed in Denmark and Finland.

CHAPTER 1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY.

The initial chapter of the Thesis scrutinizes the correlation between public opinion and immigration policies. It delves into the subject matter at a theoretical level, establishing the parameters of the research and outlining the significant contributions made by scholars in this field. This groundwork enables the subsequent chapters to apply and discuss the concepts and relationships described here through empirical analyses. The initial section (§1.1) will present the theme of the thesis by elucidating the variables and processes that govern the correlation between public opinion and policies. Initially, this text will elucidate the factors that influence policies, including an examination of the specific function that public opinion plays within these determinants. The variables that impact policy decisions can include socio-political, economic, cultural, or institutional elements. These aspects are typically connected to public opinion through numerous processes, which will be explained in detail in this chapter. The subsequent section (§1.2) will delve into the essence of the Thesis by examining the correlation between public opinion and policies in the context of immigration. The selection of immigration as a research domain is warranted due to its significant level of salience. Section §1.2.1 provides an overview of researchers' perspectives on the importance of salience in this field. Furthermore, it explores the matter of various categories of immigrants (their distinct motivations for leaving their home countries and the varying entitlements they possess), as well as the influence of anti-immigrant political parties on the interplay between popular sentiment and governmental measures. Section §1.2.2 provides a detailed explanation of the elements that impact the government's behavior in immigration policy. It covers the same content as the previous section but delves deeper into the immigration topic. The concluding paragraph (§1.2.3) summarizes the primary findings of the literature on analyzing the correlation between public opinion and immigration policies.

1.1 The relationship between public opinion and policy.

The topic of the interaction between politics and public opinion has been extensively studied in the literature. The occurrence of a correlation between the two variables is a widely acknowledged hypothesis. The causal relationship between the two variables, meanwhile, is a subject of dispute. Are policy choices determined by public opinion? Does political choice influence public opinion? This section elucidates the primary contributions of the existing literature on the subject in order to examine the connection between the two variables.

1.1.1 Key drivers of policy.

The formulation of policy is influenced by various factors. Prior to examining the connection with public opinion, it is essential to evaluate the additional dynamics that influence the government's adoption of a certain policy. First and foremost, political factors influence the selection of policies to be implemented. The composition and ideology of the parties forming the government are of utmost importance. Ntini (2014) asserts that political parties possess a robust correlation with the composition of the government, hence exerting influence over government policy. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the ideological stance and makeup of opposition parties, which can have varying degrees of influence in Parliament based on the institutional framework and the efficacy of "countervailing power" mechanisms inside that framework. Furthermore, the party opposition plays a crucial role by developing an alternative political agenda to that of the ruling majority, with the aim of gaining power in future election cycles (Modafferi, 2009). Therefore, the ruling parties may be motivated to predict the opposition's policies in order to avoid losing voters. Also, it is crucial to establish whether there are minority groups that hold greater influence in the decision-making process. Shri Bhartendra Singh Baswan, the former secretary of the Department of Secondary and Higher Education in the Ministry of Human Resource Development within the Government of India, who currently serves as the President of *IMPRI*'s Center for *Human Dignity and Development, Impact and Policy Research Institute*, identified three political factors, namely *ideology*, *corruption*, and *populism*, as the key drivers of public policy. He referred to party ideology as the initial foundation and guiding principle for a party's policies, perhaps prioritizing it over critical thought. Corruption, secondly, pertains to the act of offering favors in return for votes in upcoming elections. Populism, conversely, arises directly from corruption and the subsequent anticipations in voters (IMPRI, 2022). Political variables are intricately interconnected with other elements. The formulation of policies is contingent upon the actions of politicians, who, in turn, make judgments based on their economic motivations. Economic interests, such as the desire to stay in power, might motivate politicians in a democratic system to cater to public sentiment in exchange for votes.

Furthermore, economic issues exert a significant influence on political decisions. The adoption of policies is particularly influenced by the economic interests of the most prominent economic groups. Indeed, special interest groups, including major corporations, labor unions, municipalities, and civil rights organizations, employ lobbyists to exert influence on the government in order to advocate for policies that align with their own interests. Lobbyists can exert influence on policy in a convenient manner, frequently by making substantial financial contributions to election campaigns. Subsequent sections will demonstrate the significant influence of clients' economic interests on the correlation

between public opinion and policies, particularly in the domain of immigration policy (Böhmelt, 2021; Cornelius, Rosenblum, 2005). Simultaneously, a country's policies are influenced by economic factors such as GDP, growth, debt, employment, inflation, and other related indicators. Two centuries ago, there was little disparity in the economic progress of nations. As statistician Hans Rosling observed, *"all countries were sick and poor".* However, in the present day, although GDP per capita has increased for all countries, the distribution of growth has been highly uneven. This has resulted in significant disparities in living standards, health, and wealth among nations (OECD, 2011). Simultaneously, the implementation of productivity and employment policies leads to increased economic growth. Hence, there exists a correlation between the two variables, however the causal connection between economic growth and policies is often ambiguous. Factors such as the quantity of natural resources, a nation's industrial and agricultural capabilities and its population size can also play a crucial role (Marume, 2016).

Policies are also influenced by sociocultural variables. In her 2014 publication, Katherine Daniell conducted a comprehensive analysis of the influence of national culture on the process of public policy formulation. The study examined how countries with distinct cultural backgrounds use diverse approaches in the development of policies. A nation can exhibit varying degrees of individualism or collectivism, hold values of egalitarianism (in social, familial, or occupational contexts), and may perceive situations of inequality as more acceptable or commonplace. Additionally, a country can display varying levels of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion when it comes to resolving conflicts. Consequently, the approach to policy will vary based on the beliefs and culture of a society, perhaps leaning towards greater or lesser egalitarianism, risk-taking, individualism, collectivism, and other factors. Both Coyle and Ellis (1994) assert that there is a reciprocal causal relationship between culture and policy, meaning that culture influences policy and policy, in turn, influences culture.

When formulating public policy, the government takes into account national security concerns, particularly in connection to foreign policy. However, in the realm of international relations, diplomatic factors such as safeguarding national reputation and managing relationships with other nations are equally significant (Marume, 2016).

Another important aspect to consider is the institutional framework, which refers to the organization of power at different levels and the distribution of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. This framework has a direct impact on the efficiency of decision-making processes and the consistency of policies. As the System of Checks and Balances becomes more advanced, obtaining approval from both the Legislative and Executive Systems for a certain policy requires an increasing number of processes. In a system with a higher separation of powers, the decision-making process may be prolonged, resulting in less effective policies. Simultaneously, this approach guarantees an elevated

degree of democracy (Persson et al., 1997). Furthermore, foreign and particularly supranational institutions exert influence in shaping national policies. In the context of the European Union, the allocation of competence varies depending on the specific area. In some cases, competence is exclusive to the EU, meaning that only the EU has the authority to pass laws and member states are obligated to implement them. This applies to areas such as custom unions, competition rules for the market, trade under certain circumstances, and monetary policy for eurozone countries. In other cases, competence is shared between national governments and the EU, allowing both entities to legislate. This applies to areas such as market regulations, agriculture, environment, transport system, immigration, research, and space. Lastly, there are areas where competence is exclusively held by the EU, such as public health, industry, tourism, and education.

Lastly, Public opinion is a crucial determinant of policies. Policymakers must diligently monitor shifts in public opinion as consensus regarding a policy is subject to alter over time, and such changes can be significant. An illustration can be seen in the U.S. military conflict in Iraq. In 2003, a majority of 72 percent of Americans expressed support for the utilization of military force in Iraq. However, over a span of three years, this figure significantly declined to 43 percent. The lack of agreement among individuals had significant repercussions on the November 2006 midterm elections, resulting in the Republicans losing their hold on Congress (Pew Research Center, 2018). Public opinion is intricately connected to voters' socio-political beliefs and economic interests, therefore establishing a clear correlation with policies.

1.1.2 Does public opinion influence policy?

A general model that encapsulates several theories is the one that views policy as a function of opinion.

P = f {O}.

In this model, (see e.g. Dahl 1971; Weale 1999; Pitkin 1967) policy is considered a dependent variable, and opinion the independent variable. The stronger this relationship is, the greater the level of representativeness present in a democracy. Wlezien and Soroka (2009) trace the extensions and various empirical tests of this theoretical model, and thus different interpretations of how people's preferences and opinions translate into policy. Within the classification, the two authors distinguish Dyadic Representation and Collective Representation (Weissberg, 1978) The first model looks at the relationship between individual opinions and the political positioning of individual representatives; in particular, it describes that the opinions of constituencies are directly reflected in the representatives they elect. Miller and Stokes (1963) demonstrated empirically, with an analysis confined to the U.S. (where roll-call votes are readily available), that members of Congress behave, with respect to social

and economic issues, on the basis of constituency preferences. The second model, Collective Representation, by contrast, examines the relationship between public opinion and policies more broadly, and considers the effects of aggregate preferences on policies at the national level (Hurley, 1982). To analyze "*collective representation*," Weissberg distinguishes several approaches: *policy consistency, policy covariation,* and *policy congruence*, based on *dynamic representation*. The "*policy consistency*" approach measures the correspondence between public opinion and policy by testing the consistency between people's desire for change and the change implemented by policymakers (Monroe, 1979; 1998). This approach, on the one hand, is easy to adopt because it does not require large amounts of data: all that is needed is a survey that measures people's opinions and verification of policy change. On the other hand, it is approximate because it does not consider the change in preferences over time, and thus does not accurately measure whether people's preferences actually anticipate change in policy. *Policy covariation* tries to solve this problem by measuring people's preferences over time, which is why it requires more data. For now, this type of approach has been taken mainly in the U.S. (Page and Shapiro, 1983), where subnational level data are readily available. *Policy congruence*, meanwhile, analyzes the relationship between public opinion and policies through the study of dynamic data and time series. The results of this study (Stimson et al., 1995) proved that public opinion has two effects on policy: a direct effect, on changes in politicians' actions as a result of shifts in opinion, and an indirect effect, on election outcomes and the composition of legislative bodies. Again, the model is little used because of the limited availability of data. The main countries suitable for this approach are the US, Canada and the UK.

A variation of the model described earlier considers the politics function of public opinion not only directly, but also indirectly through the change in party composition following elections.

P = g {O, I}

with:

P = policy.
O = opinion.
I = partisan control of government (I stands for Indirect Linkage).

In turn, I, that is, partisan control of government, depends on public opinion.

I = h {O}.

The relationship between public opinion and policy also depends on the institutional context. For instance, in a parliamentary system, the government can adopt the policies it wants rather freely, barring the real risk of a no-confidence motion from Parliament. The enhanced fusion of powers allows the electorate to have more control over government policies. In contrast, in a presidential system, the balance of power is characterized by a stricter separation of powers. For this reason, the government cannot act without the agreement of the legislative body, within which it must often reach the agreement of a majority. Soroka and Wlezien's (2009) research notes that different countries adopt different models by which they turn opinions into policy, which would suggest that institutional differences play a role in the issue. Another relevant factor that shapes how public opinion influences politics is the electoral system: first, whether a country has a majoritarian or proportional system has consequences for political representativeness and thus the extent to which public opinion is followed in politics. Lijphart (1984) is the first to address this issue, distinguishing between countries with proportional systems, referred to as *"consensual democracies"* and countries with majority systems. According to his view, the first group of countries manage to achieve a higher level of representativeness and political congruence. This idea is taken up and supported by Powell (2000). The author states that countries with proportional systems achieve a higher level of *indirect representation*, that is, they have a greater correspondence between the ideological position of the government and that of the electorate. At the same time, however, Powell states that *direct representation* (i.e., actual policy change, as a result of changes in opinion) is higher in countries with majoritarian systems. First, this would happen because in countries with majoritarian systems, government systems are more streamlined, do not have to deal with the problem of coordinating multi-party coalitions, and are able to respond more quickly to change. Second, in these systems, Parties, according to Powell, would have a greater incentive to track changes in public opinion, because a change in voter sentiment has greater consequences on election day. However, the level of party competition in the country is also relevant: the greater the number of parties, the higher the incentive of the individual party to follow public opinion, in order to secure as many seats as possible.

1.1.2.1 The role of democracy in the public opinion-policy relationship.

As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a stronger link between P and O leads to a greater level of representativeness in a democracy. In his work "*On Democracy*," Robert Dahl examines the origins and attributes of the democratic system, notably the criteria for making decisions, the fundamental institutions, and the purposes. Additionally, Dahl explores the distinctions across different democracies. Democracy, as an exemplary paradigm, entails the active involvement of the populace in governmental decision-making, guided by the principle of equality. He elucidates that democracy can be conceptualized in two ways: the "ideal" conception and the "actual" conception, which pertains

to the tangible system and frequently diverges from the ideal. The author outlines five essential elements for an ideal democratic process. 1) *Effective participation*: Every individual who is considered a "member" should be provided with an equitable opportunity to engage in the process of formulating policies. 2) *Universal suffrage*: Every member must have an equitable chance to vote and each vote must carry equal significance. 3) *Enlightened understanding*: It is important that all members are given an equal chance to comprehend and assess the offered alternative policies. 4) *Agenda control*: Members should possess authority over the agenda. 5) *Incorporation of adults*: It is necessary for all adult individuals who are permanent residents to possess the rights that are suggested in the first four requirements (Dahl, 1998, p. 37).

The objective, therefore, is for every member of an association to possess "*equal political status*." In an "ideal" democracy, the concept of "client's interests" would be irrelevant as all individuals' interests hold equal weight in the decision-making process, and there is no select group that controls the agenda and influences decisions. Dahl himself acknowledges that these standards are not easily implementable in the context of state administration, but they serve as a valuable conceptual framework and benchmark towards which democracy should strive. According to Dahl, democracy is the sole governmental system that enables citizens to safeguard their own interests. He argues that public engagement in the government's activities is the only effective means for individuals to protect themselves and prevent government abuses. According to John Stuart Mill's statement in 1861, it is eventually desirable to allow everyone to have a role in the sovereign power of the state. Regarding genuine democracies, Dahl asserts that a democratic government ought to strive to fulfill the requirements of an exemplary democracy. The essential prerequisites for a democracy on a large scale include: 1) the presence of elected officials who act as representatives of the citizens and wield authority over government decisions; 2) the existence of elections that are conducted in a manner that is both free and fair, and occur regularly; 3) the guarantee of freedom of expression; 4) the availability of diverse sources of information; 5) the ability for individuals and groups to associate freely and independently; and 6) the inclusion of all individuals as citizens, without discrimination. Based on these characteristics, in democratic regimes, public opinion plays a significant role in shaping policy, particularly at the theoretical level. Nevertheless, the actuality is markedly dissimilar. Dahl cites India as an illustrative case, where the Constitution recognizes fifteen distinct languages, the caste system marginalizes individuals known as "outcastes" or "untouchables," tensions arise between the Hindu faith and other minority groups, and disparities exist. The inherent constraints of a system that seeks to embody the interests and viewpoints of all individuals within a deeply polarized nation are readily apparent.

1.2 The relationship between public opinion and immigration policies.

The second paragraph provides a more detailed examination of the relationship between public opinion and policies, focusing specifically on immigration policy. It explains the rationale behind choosing immigration as the topic of investigation, discusses the saliency issue, and highlights the significance of this topic in the relationship being studied. Furthermore, the underlying factors that significantly influence immigration policy are delineated, expanding upon the overall factors discussed in the preceding paragraph and tailoring them to the specific context of immigration. Lastly, the section delves into the existing literature on the correlation between public opinion and immigration, elucidating the influence of public opinion in shaping policies based on the current research findings. It explores various theories regarding this correlation and identifies the factors that either restrict or bolster this relationship.

1.2.1 Immigration as a salient topic.

This section examines the prominence of immigration as a subject. The objective of this explanation is to highlight the importance of selecting a topic with high salience when examining the connection between public opinion and policy. Specifically, it will address the function of salience in this relationship. Furthermore, it delineates the various categories of migrants, as their motivations for movement and legal statuses differ. This analysis reveals the specific types of migrants that have experienced growth over time and those that have contributed to the emergence of the widely discussed "refugee crisis." Furthermore, this analysis delves into the underlying reasons for the prominence of immigration, with a specific focus on the interplay between cultural factors, security concerns, and economic instability. This introduces the function of anti-immigration parties, which capitalize on the fears and insecurity of citizens through the deliberate amplification of immigration-related discourse. Based on these factors, an evaluation is conducted on the selection of immigration as a prominent subject for studying the relationship between public opinion and policy.

1.2.1.1 The role of saliency in the public opinion-policy relationship.

Within the context of analyzing the relationship between public opinion and policies, the saliency of the topic in issue is crucial. A prominent subject garners more public attention, therefore increasing the likelihood of interest groups aligning themselves and exerting influence on government policies. An example of this dynamic may be seen in the work by Bromley-Trujillo and Poe (2018)[1], which examines the role of salience in the relationship between public opinion and government policies on

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[1] The importance of salience: public opinion and state policy action on climate change. Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo and John Poe. 2018. Journal of Public Policy 2020.

the issue of climate change. The authors provide two reasons for their argument: firstly, the prominent topic assumes the "problem status" and secondly, it gains greater attention from the public, who will advocate more for policies that align with their interests compared to a less prominent issue.

Therefore, it is not paradoxical to comprehend why the prominence of the immigration matter is a crucial factor in the examination of this study. While the majority of polls primarily examine individuals' public sentiment towards immigration, whether it is good or negative, there also exists research that analyze the importance or prominence of this matter. Givens and Luedtke (Givens et al., 2005) examine the significance of the issue and propose a hypothesis that suggests immigration policies align with the preferences of stakeholders. Initially, policies tend to be more inclusive and permissive, but as the issue gains prominence, policies become more stringent. In addition, they delineate the precise extent of policies that serve as the basis for the division of political parties. They contend that both left-wing and right-wing parties advocate for an equivalent level of stringency in terms of immigration control policies. However, right-wing parties exhibit greater stringency when it comes to policies aimed at integrating immigrants who are already living in society. Hence, while examining empirical data and indices pertaining to public receptiveness towards immigration and immigration policy, it is crucial to delve into the particular criteria used to develop them and identify any instances of restrictiveness. In a discourse paper examining the significance of preferences and saliency in relation to public opinion on immigration, Hatton (2017) demonstrates that saliency frequently holds greater importance than preferences. He contends that the government would not modify policies, even if they differed from the typical citizen's preferences, unless those desires became politically relevant due to their significant importance. Furthermore, within the same research, he demonstrated that the degrees of preferences and saliency frequently do not align among European countries. He identifies the stock of immigrants and social benefits as the primary factors correlated with preferences. Conversely, increased unemployment or short-term shocks, such as migration flows, decrease saliency. It is important to note that the variable of the stock of immigrants is a long-term factor. Paul and Fitzgerald also highlight the significance of the saliency of the issue in the correlation between immigration policies and public opinion. Furthermore, their study demonstrates that frequently, immigrants and natives within a country share a consensus on the most significant issues. For instance, in Germany, both groups exhibit a same level of apprehension regarding crime. Regarding terrorism, immigrants exhibit greater concern than natives. It is important to acknowledge that this discovery may be attributed to a potential apprehension among immigrants of being held responsible in the event of terrorist attacks. Additionally, it highlights that Germany does not have a strong history of embracing multiculturalism. Nevertheless, it also demonstrates that

diverse groups of individuals, likely with varying interests and viewpoints, can concur on the significance of a particular matter (Paul et al., 2021).

The saliency of an issue is relative and inversely proportional to the saliency of other topics. During the global financial crisis, the prominence of immigration diminished in order to prioritize economic concerns (Hatton, 2016)[2]. One further factor that contributes to the relative nature of saliency, rather than its absoluteness, is the constrained rationality of individuals, as demonstrated by Simon's (1985) research. Furthermore, the significance that individuals attribute to a specific matter is also contingent upon the extent of knowledge they acquire regarding the matter, specifically through media coverage (Hatton, 2017, p.4).

1.2.1.2 Different types of migrants and their role in the public debate.

In recent decades, migration has become a salient issue. The number of "international migrants" (people who reside in a country other than the one in which they were born are defined as such) doubled from 2000 to 2015 to about 244 million (United Nations, 2015). By 2020, the estimate is up to 281 million. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis from 2020 changed the balance with restrictions on freedom of movement, yet people continued to need to flee their home countries due to war, persecution or natural disasters (IOM, 2021). Today there are still challenges related to migration, economic imbalances between countries, the location of migrants, and the protection of their rights (World Bank, 2023). Within migrants, various categories must be distinguished, depending on the migrants' reasons for displacement, legal status or duration of displacement. In particular, six categories of migrants can be distinguished (Council of Europe, N.D.)[3] : 1) *Temporary labor migrants*, who move for work for a limited period of time; 2*) Highly Skilled and Business Migrants*, professionals who work in transnational corporations or international organizations; 3) *Irregular migrants:* those who enter a new state without the necessary permits; 4*) Forced migrants*: migrants forced to leave their country of origin for reasons of persecution or life-threatening reasons related to wars or environmental disasters. Within this category are subcategories that have more specific characteristics such as Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons. Refugees are people forced to leave their country either because of persecution due to race, religion, membership in a particular social group, nationality, or political opinion or because of war, violence, or serious public disorder, often they have suffered human rights violations. The definition of refugee was defined by the 1951 UN Convention related to the status of refugees, which came into force in 1954,

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[2] Hatton, T. J. (2016a), "Immigration, Public Opinion and the Recession in Europe," Economic Policy, 86, pp. 205-246.
[3] Council of Europe. https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/migration

which also defines the main rights of refugees. First, according to the Convention, refugees have the right not to be prosecuted for their illegal entry into countries, so they have the right to apply for asylum illegally and despite that maintain the right related to the "*principle of non-refoulement*": refugees cannot be sent back to the country from which they fled, where they would encounter limitations to their freedom or dangers to their lives, against their will (UNCHR, 2010). At present there are 35.3 million refugees worldwide, 41 percent of whom are children (UNCHR). Asylum Seekers are people who flee their country of origin for the same reasons as refugees; thus, to seek protection from persecution or severe human rights violations, but who have not yet received legal recognition of "refugee" status. Entering a country to seek asylum is considered a human right of all immigrants (Amnesty International, N.D.). Internally Displaced Persons are "*persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border*"(United Nations, 2004). So, IDPs are a type of refugees who do not fall into the category of international migrants because they change region or location but remain within the borders of the national territory. 5) *Family members*: who migrate to join part of the family that has already migrated; 6) *Return migrants*: migrants who return to their nation of origin after a period spent in another nation. The distinction between these categories of migrants is necessary because depending on their category, these people have different rights, and because in opinion polls it is necessary to distinguish which types of migrants create divisions in public opinion, and where the opposition comes from. Throughout the Thesis this distinction will be considered to clarify what kind of immigrants we are talking about.

The graph below shows how since the 2000s the number of refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers and other types of migrants has grown exponentially, decreasing the rate of growth only recently, in the last two to three years.

Figure 1.1 Annual number of refugees under United Nations mandates, internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum seekers, and other persons in need of assistance from 1951 until 2023

The issue of immigration gained significant importance following the 2015 refugee crisis (Dennison et al., 2019; Torres, 2019). After the crisis, the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean reduced significantly, dropping from 390,000 in 2016 to 141,462 in 2018, the year when the European Commission officially announced the end of the crisis. However, based on Eurobarometer statistics, immigration remained a significant and noticeable subject, and support for anti-immigrant political parties continued to rise, even in countries with minimal immigration rates, such as Hungary (Torres, 2019). This provides evidence of a weak connection between the influx of immigrants, the refugee crisis, and the importance of immigration, indicating that the topic is significant for other factors.

1.2.1.3 Public opposition and the role of anti-immigration parties: security, cultural identity and economic insecurity issues.

Immigration is inherently prone to salience due to its ability to evoke a multitude of issues. Initially, the migration matter has prompted concerns over security, particularly following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Following the assaults in the United States, approximately one thousand Muslim immigrants were apprehended due to concerns over their nationality (originating from Arab nations or Southeast Asia) rather to individual suspicions (MPI, 2021). Since then, both in the United States and Europe,

immigration has been consistently linked to concerns about security and a perceived rise in crime. This association is often rooted in the belief that crime rates are increasing. For instance, in Italy, there has been an increase in public expenditure to enhance law enforcement, despite the absence of an actual increase in crime rates (Elia et al., 2019). Furthermore, the migration issue is seen as a potential danger to both national and cultural identity, as explained by Money (2010) and Tajfel and Turner's (1979) *Social Identity Theory*, which states that individuals identify with the social group they are a part of. Additionally, the issue affects economic well-being, as highlighted by Sniderman et al (2004), due to conflicting interests, such as job availability and social benefits, as discussed by Hardin (1995).

These are the specific tactics employed by far-right populist parties, who exploit the migrant issue by amplifying residents' anxieties, even if they are baseless, instilling panic, insecurity, and fostering a demand for law and order, which the parties themselves claim to offer (Torres, 2019). The data from Dennison and Geddes (2019) reveals a clear upward trend in votes for anti-immigrant Parties across 15 European nations from 2005 to 2018. The majority of nations, with the exception of Belgium and Norway, have shown a consistent growth in this trend, particularly after 2015. However, it is worth noting that UKIP, a political party in the UK, suffered a fall after the Brexit referendum in 2016. The surge in popularity of anti-immigration parties during the refugee crisis in 2015 experienced a partial fall in several countries, with the exception of Italy, Germany, and Sweden, where it has subsequently recovered.

Dennison and Geddes (2019) argue that the increase in votes for anti-immigration parties is not due to a growth in anti-immigration sentiment, and thus a hostile public opinion, but rather to an increase in the saliency of the issue and negative media coverage following the 2015 crisis. The issue, therefore, would not be xenophobia and racism (which, although existent, are often present in less quantities than expected), but rather the emphasis that the media, government, and political parties place on this issue. In this sense, what increases anti-immigration sentiments and leads citizens towards anti-immigrant parties are not xenophobic and racist feelings, but rather the fear related to the chaotic management of the migration issue, often fueled by the media and the parties themselves, who have used the topic as a lever to gain trust and votes (Dennison et al., 2019). By sampling eleven countries in Western Europe[4], the authors have demonstrated the correlation between voting for right-wing populist parties and the saliency of immigration in each country. The two factors are positively

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[4] The choice of sample was first and foremost due to data availability: the countries all had to belong to the EU out of necessity to use the Eurobarometer as a measure of salience (hence the exclusion of Norway and Switzerland). In addition, the authors excluded countries without strong anti-immigrant parties (such as Spain, Ireland or Greece); finally, parties considered too diverse in party systems and other factors were excluded.

correlated in all countries except Finland, and in seven out of eleven countries, the level of significance is at 95%.

Figure 1.2. Polling for anti-immigration parties in fifteen western European countries, January 2005 to June 2018.

Source: Dennison et al.; 2019.

Figure 1.3: Correlations between percentage listing immigration as one of the two most important issue affecting one's country and percentage voting for anti-immigration parties; 2005-2018.

Source: Dennison et al.; 2019.

The authors also anticipated in 2018 that as the salience of immigration in Spain grew, support for Spain's anti-immigration party Vox would also increase.

1.2.1.4 Why the choice of the immigration topic to analyze the public opinion-policies relationship.

At this point, it is uncomplicated to rationalize the selection of immigration as the issue for investigating the relationship between public opinion and policy. The topic of immigration is contentious due to its association with economic and socio-cultural concerns, as well as its ability to evoke emotional responses, particularly related to security apprehensions, cultural assimilation, and economic instability. Regardless of whether the data indicates that immigration does not negatively impact the security, economy, or cultural stability of citizens, what is important for analysis is the significance of the issue. This significance is determined by political discourse and emotional

influences rather than rational factors and, consequently, data. Consequently, political parties, particularly those on the extreme right, incorporate stringent migration policies into their platform. Their objective is to present themselves as protectors of peace and stability, alleviating citizens' concerns regarding turmoil, unemployment, rising crime rates, and the financial burden of supporting non-working individuals who enter the country. The argument is intense and therefore involves emotional elements, which increases the likelihood of it remaining a significant issue, particularly due to the complexity of the migration issue and the absence of a consensus in international accords to resolve the situation. Public opinion's salience makes it very relevant, thus justifying its suitability for this research.

1.2.2 Key drivers of immigration policies.

The previous section has illustrated that the determinants of policies are varied in nature. In this section, the determinants of immigration policies will be analyzed in more detail. The paragraph, therefore, answers the question: *what are the factors that influence and help determine immigration policies?*

Firstly, as previously stated, policies are influenced by economic forces. The labor market position holds major importance in the context of immigration policies. Immigrants frequently fulfill labor demands by willingly taking on professions that are typically deemed unappealing or offer limited prospects for career advancement. Therefore, a state may implement a strategy to allure immigrants if it requires inexpensive workforce. Nevertheless, immigration can serve as a valuable means of addressing generational turnover in nations with insufficient working-age populations, particularly when immigrants possess better levels of education and greater practical skills compared to elderly native residents. Immigration significantly affects public finances. A study conducted by the OECD (OECD, 2014) reveals that immigrants make a greater fiscal contribution than the individual benefits they obtain. Immigrants, particularly those with high qualifications, have the potential to enhance a country's creativity and progress through their skills and competencies (Peri, 2020). The demographic issue is closely connected to the economic issue. As previously predicted, a nation with a high median age, decreasing population, and low birth rates may require an increase in inflows to raise the proportion of the population that falls into the working age range. The average fertility rate in the Global North has fallen below replacement level since 1980, reaching 1.7 in 2020. The issue of decreasing birth rates is directly linked to the alteration and ongoing transformation of the population pyramid. The number of births is declining, leading to a decrease in the working-age population. Consider Europe as an illustrative case. The following images depict the progression of population pyramids from 1960 to the present, along with projections extending to 2070. The population

pyramids in Europe have shown a consistent decrease in births over time, resulting in a narrowing base. In 1960, the base of the pyramid was wider than the top. However, projections for 2070 indicate that there will be more people between the ages of 50 and 80 than in the 0-14 age range. Additionally, there will be more people between the ages of 55 and 75 than in their 20s and 40s. This demographic shift poses a financial burden on the younger generation, who will be responsible for funding the pensions of the older generation. Therefore, the inclusion of young and working-age immigrants in the immigration process could potentially alter the structure of these pyramids.

Figure 1.4 Population pyramids of Europe (1960-2070).

Source: PopulationPyramids.

International factors, such as the degree of economic integration, also play a role in shaping immigration policies. Economic integration facilitates migration by lowering costs, such as transportation expenses, through the global interconnections established between host and sending countries. Globalization and the liberalization of the global labor market generally promote the influx of low-cost migrants, while simultaneously disadvantaging traditional families who rely on rural labor (Hatton & Williamson 1997). Consequently, a nation's immigration policies are influenced by its degree of economic integration with other nations, which is determined by its amount of globalization or liberalization. Some countries have become reliant on immigration and immigrant labor in specific industries (Cornelius, 1998). The European Union has a significant influence, particularly in Europe, where member countries strive to align their policies on refugees and asylum seekers. Their objective is to promote liberalization and integration of immigrants into their democratic system (Cornelius et

al., 2005). In 1990, the EU signed the Schengen Convention, which aimed to remove internal border controls and establish the free movement of all EU citizens. This decision was documented in the Official Journal of the European Communities in 2000. The Schengen Area currently comprises 26 members, consisting of 22 European Union countries and four non-EU countries: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein (Marzocchi, 2023)[5]. Furthermore, the European Union has a joint authority in relation to migration policy and takes action based on the application of the concept of subsidiarity (TFEU, Art. 79). Hence, it is crucial to take into account a country's international connections and agreements while evaluating the factors that influence immigration laws. Far Right Parties play a significant role in shaping integration policies. Due to their ideological stance, they typically express opposition or criticism against immigration. Hence, an increased prevalence of far-right parties in positions of authority correlates with a higher probability of implementing stringent immigration laws. Nevertheless, the correlation between political parties and public opinion is intricate. It is important to take into account that public opinion carries significance in the development of party programming. Political parties may be seen as catering to and taking advantage of the alleged "perceived threat" posed by immigration, which, nevertheless, has its own underlying factors that warrant more examination. As per Hopkin's (2020) findings, the primary factors contributing to anti-immigrant views are economic uncertainty and the financial crisis. The author effectively illustrates and substantiates the notion that while the refugee crisis of the mid-1990s and the terrorist attacks in France, Germany, and Belgium were contributing factors, the migrant flows had preexisted for a considerable duration and were not the primary catalyst for this animosity. The key factor that determines anti-immigrant sentiment is not the factual threat, as measured by objective facts like the presence of migration flows, but rather the perceived threat. This perception of threat is a significant driving force behind far-right groups. (Blalock, 1967, as cited in Meuleman, 2011). Dixon (2006) and Schneider (2008) provide support for Hopkin and Blalock's thesis by using Contact Theory to demonstrate that interacting with immigrants really reduces prejudice and perceived threat. Institutional factors, such as the significance of labor unions and social alliances, must also be taken into account when determining policies. In a highly corporatist nation, businesses may want to attract additional immigrants in order to address their labor needs. Industrial interest groups frequently engaged in lobbying efforts to oppose restrictive legislation, as they perceived immigration as advantageous for its ability to provide inexpensive labor to the nation (Givens and Luedtke 2005). Conversely, labor unions object to the presence of immigrants due to their potential to decrease wages and create heightened competition within the job market. The research authored by Simoni and Baccaro in 2004 elucidates the significance of social partnerships in shaping the wage formation

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[5] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/147/free-movement-of-persons

process in Ireland (Simoni et al., 2004). Hence, the significance of corporate and employer interest organizations in comparison to labor unions cannot be overlooked. The press plays a vital role in shaping public opinion and influencing policies regarding immigration. It has the power to sway people's overall sentiments on the matter, as demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, particularly in terms of fear. This fear is a significant factor that political parties exploit to garner support. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the level of pluralism in the media system, the quality of information, and the diversity of sources to determine if democratic principles are upheld and to assess the decision-making process regarding immigration policies. Meyers (2004) acknowledges the significance of diplomatic connections in shaping immigration policies. A nation is more likely to welcome immigrants from a country with whom it shares a greater interest in fostering commercial, investment, or security links. Hence, migration policy can serve as a means to achieve foreign policy objectives (Cornelius et al., 2005). Simultaneously, empirical statistics about the movement of immigrants has clear significance. Nevertheless, a nation that experiences a higher number of inflows does not necessarily adopt more stringent laws; in fact, just the opposite is often true. Therefore, the Thesis focuses specifically on examining the significance of these factors in shaping immigration policies, particularly in light of the influence of public opinion. Migration policies are ultimately shaped by public opinion, however a detailed analysis of this will be provided in the following section.

1.2.3 Does public opinion on immigration influence policy?

This section will describe the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies, in accordance with the existing literature, to comprehend and demonstrate the extent to which public opinion can influence immigration policies.

Once the significance of the issue has been examined, the factors that influence immigration policies have been delineated, and the rationale for selecting the scope of analysis regarding immigration has been established, we can now delve into the central subject matter: the influence of public opinion on immigration policies, with a historical examination of the literature's progression. While numerous studies have explored popular attitudes towards immigration and the variables that contribute to anti-immigrant sentiments, such as economic or cultural issues, there has been relatively little focus on the direct correlation between public opinion and immigration laws. Pioneering methodologies frequently emerge in research examining the elements that influence immigration policies, evaluating the significance of public opinion in comparison to other factors, and seeking to elucidate the discrepancy between public opinion and policy orientation. An instance of such research is a study conducted by Gallya Lahav (Lahav, 2004) on EU nations. The study seeks to elucidate the disparity between the rise of anti-immigration sentiments, as evidenced by the increasing support for far-right parties, and the EU's progressively liberal policies. It does so by scrutinizing and examining the

hypothesis that the selection of policies does not take into account "negative" public opinion. The author aims to evaluate the significance of public opinion in policy making, challenging the conventional view that it is inconsequential. Specifically, the author seeks to determine if public opinion, particularly when it is well-informed and based on immigration data, has an impact on policy determination. The author demonstrates, through a longitudinal analysis, that policy changes are not contingent upon changes in immigrant flows. Consequently, the author puts out a hypothesis regarding the potential influence of elite and mass reactions. The interests of the majority are only considered to the extent that the elites represent them. Nevertheless, the significance of the people should not be ignored as they exert influence over the language in which the elites establish the "rules of the game." Furthermore, the author elucidates the increasing importance of public opinion among EU scholars, which coincided with the rise of the "democratic deficit" issue and the division between citizens and elites. The author also highlights the growing significance of the European Parliament and the escalating utilization of popular referendums (Lahav, 2004). Nevertheless, the main objective of this analysis was not to examine the dynamics that impact the relationship between public opinion and immigration policy, but rather to assign a negligible significance to public opinion.

An alternative first method for investigating this correlation is the work of Cornelius and Rosenblum in 2005, conducted as part of a study on "Immigration and Politics" with the objective of illustrating the reasons behind the discrepancy between policy outcomes and professed policies. In this paper, the two authors examine the function of domestic interest groups and their interaction with domestic institutions in the process of policy formulation. The topic of immigration gives rise to the establishment of interest groups (both economic and non-economic) with conflicting interests, which can have influence on policy decisions. The primary economic interest groups consist of landowners and businesses who support immigration due to the resulting increase in inexpensive labor and subsequent reduction in wages. Conversely, labor organizations frequently oppose immigration due to concerns about reduced pay. Immigration generates a division at the sociocultural level, opposing the viewpoints of civil libertarians and cultural conservatives. Simultaneously, Cornelius and Rosenblum recognize the intermediary function of political institutions, diminishing the true significance of the conflict between diverse interest groups. Indeed, the authors contend that public perception of these interest groups and the conflict between them primarily influences gateway communities at the regional level. However, the actual political negotiations occur only at the national level. In order to directly impact the interplay between political coalitions and legislative institutions, the Interest Group must possess substantial influence at the national level, hence influencing policy. The potential for Interest Group intervention in the debate is contingent upon the distribution of

powers within institutions. For instance, Fitzgerald (1996) cited the allocation of visas to permanent residents, which falls under the jurisdiction of Congress, and the management of refugee flows, which falls under the jurisdiction of the President, as examples. The authors contend that policy making is influenced by either client politics or broader interest group demands. However, policy changes are more likely to occur when immigrant neighborhoods become swing districts at the national level, prompting national parties to actively seek support from pro- or anti-immigration voters. In certain instances, institutions have the ability to impede certain decisions, as seen in the example of the Constitutional Courts and the ECtHR. These institutions can impose restrictions on the enactment of immigration laws that fail to uphold human rights (Hollifield, 1992). This pertains to the legal dispute between the US Supreme Court and the case of Proposition 187 v. California Immigrants. Another determinant that might impact immigration policies, serving as a constraint on the impact of public opinion, is the influence of "international factors." An instance can be observed in the alterations associated with globalization, which have led to the implementation of more permissive policies. The authors also highlight international conflicts and the utilization of migration policies as a means of foreign policy, which influences the selection of countries from which to accept migrants. These countries are chosen based on the potential benefits in terms of trade, economic investment, or willingness to establish security agreements (Meyers 2004). Additionally, there exists a corpus of research that presents an opposing viewpoint to the concept that international considerations restrict the formulation of migration policy. This literature argues that international migration regimes are inherently feeble (Teitelbaum, 1984).

Extensive research indicates that in liberal democracies, the government often disregards the majority view of citizens, leading to policies that diverge from popular sentiment. In 2007, Schuck examines the "political disconnect" that exists between the general public's opinion and that of political interest groups and immigration law scholars. He demonstrates that policies often disregard the unorganized public opinion that supports strict immigration policies, instead prioritizing the interests of political groups advocating for more lenient policies. Specifically, the author demonstrates that the adoption of inclusive and permissive immigration policies (policy defined as the government's practical actions, rather than its public declarations) arises from the concerns of political economy. According to Schuck's polls, the American public has consistently shown hostility towards immigration. The percentage of individuals supporting stricter immigration restrictions has increased from 1965 to 2007, initially rising steadily and then seeing significant surges from 1997, reaching above a million in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the author enumerates certain sectors in the United States that rely on immigration, including but not limited to agriculture, which holds paramount importance in

America, as well as the software and technology industry, healthcare (comprising doctors, nurses, and student researchers), and the restaurant industry. The agricultural sector's interest was so significant that the farmers' association frequently advocated for broad measures, such as the legalization of undocumented immigrants (Immigration Reform and Control Act, 1986). Additional interest groups encompass human rights advocates, who engage in lobbying efforts to enhance the standards pertaining to asylum seekers, ethnic communities (such as the Irish community's involvement in the American context), and religious organizations. Environmentalists, despite their concerns about the environmental impact of immigration, often hold liberal ideals that prioritize inclusiveness. Hence, it is evident that the preferences of the most politically powerful factions tend to align with the most progressive and inclusive measures intended to promote immigration (which may encompass unauthorized immigration as well). Organized labor is the sole significant group that has advocated against immigration due to concerns about competition in the job market and the potential decrease in wages. Recently, this group has shown support for inclusive policies regarding admissions based on familial ties. Academics, as noted by Schuck (2007), have a similar liberal perspective.

Levy, Wright, and Citrin (2015) examine the issue of the disparity between public opinion and immigration policies. They argue that the "disconnect" theory oversimplifies public opinion, creating the illusion of a significant gap between public opinion and policies, when in fact policies are more widely accepted than they appear. While public opinion often expresses opposition to immigration in a theoretical sense, in practice, most people are not supportive of a drastic alteration to the existing state of affairs. In fact, a significant portion of the population would prefer to preserve or even expand the current situation. The authors argue that public opinion appears less favorable than it actually is due to the use of too abstract questions concerning opinions on immigration policies. There is a lack of explanation on humanitarian issues in this manner. Specifically, the authors use the United States as a case study to illustrate that American citizens' perspectives on family reunification or skill-based visa allocation are not characterized by tight limitations, unlike their stance on refugee rights. While the primary objective of the article is not to exactly evaluate the magnitude and fluctuations of public opinion's influence on policy formation, the two authors do acknowledge that public opinion plays a part in this process. Furthermore, this article presents statistics indicating that migration policies do not consider the interests of elites and "clients". For instance, the data about the quantity of visas granted to skilled and agricultural workers does not meet the expectations of the high-tech and agricultural industry interest groups. As a result, the function of clients is being questioned, and the authors advocate for a more thorough examination of the role of mass public opinion. The source cited is Levy et al. (2015). Referring to Lahav's (2004) previous analysis, the elites serve as

representatives for the people's interests and possess the actual ability to shape policy. However, it is the masses who ultimately determine the framework within which the elites operate as spokespersons. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the dynamics around the collective public opinion.

In 2021, Paul and Fitzgerald engaged in a discussion over the significance of issue salience in shaping the relationship between public opinion and policies. Given the premise that the government operates under a democratic system, as we have previously deliberated, it can be inferred that the greater the prominence of an issue, the higher the probability that public opinion will impact policy decisions. This study demonstrates that the general public tends to gravitate towards selecting concerns that are prominent and noticeable. However, acknowledging that an issue is significant does not imply aligning with the same perspective. Conversely, the issue of salience is also connected to the issue of polarization. When an issue is very salient, it tends to generate more extreme perspectives, leading to more division and polarization of opinions. Paul and Fizgerald argue that the alignment of views on important issues does not indicate division within society, but rather indicates a coming together of different groups (Paul et al., 2021). In the upcoming chapters, we shall observe that polarization significantly influences the examination of the correlation between public opinion and immigration policies.

Prior to co-authoring the article on the correlation between public opinion and policy in 2009, Wlezien had previously written an article in 1995 that outlined the thermostatic model. This model suggests that the public acts as a thermostat, whereby if policies deviate from public preferences, the public will send signals to prompt the government to make adjustments (Wlezien, 1995). In 2009, Jennings utilizes the thermostatic model to analyze immigration in the UK. The research findings highlight a correlation between public opinion and the handling of asylum petitions, while recognizing the constraints imposed by supranational issues such as the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and the ECHR (1950). Nevertheless, this research is limited to the context of the UK system, which is distinguished by a robust integration of powers. Indeed, the United Kingdom is a unique scenario where the executive branch holds significant authority over the legislative branch. As a result, public opinion has less influence due to the diminished role of elected parliamentarians. However, this setup allows the government to be more efficient and capable of promptly addressing public demands, resulting in a higher level of responsiveness. In 2023, Hauwaert use the similar technique to examine the level of public opinion and policy responsiveness in European countries about immigration from the 1980s onwards. The initial observation indicates that the range of public opinion regarding immigration is wider and more diverse compared to that of policy. An additional point is that while the thermostat affects both sides, with public opinion responding to policies and policies responding to public opinion, this relationship is asymmetrical. Public policies exhibit a more

immediate and evident response to public opinion compared to the response of public opinion to policies. This highlights the significant influence of public opinion on policy decisions, as well as the limited effectiveness of measures in addressing issues after they have already occurred. Consequently, in reality, this implies that the general sentiment of the population shifts in opposition to altering policies. Hauweart acknowledges the significance of salience in enhancing the receptiveness of public opinion towards the matter of immigration. Hence, the model forecasts that policies will align with public sentiment, and encompasses three equations.

(1) $R_{kt} = P^* - P_{kt}$

Where:

R_{kt} = Rational Public Opinion
P^* = Ideal Politics
P_{kt} = Actual Politics
k = Country
t = Timing

Equation (1) demonstrates that public opinion is determined by the disparity between ideal policy and actual policy. Consequently, public opinion will be more stringent when actual policies are less restrictive than ideal policies ($P^* > Pkt$), and less stringent when actual policies are more restrictive than ideal policies ($P^* < Pkt$). Put simply, policy change and public opinion tend to move in opposite directions. Due to the difficulty in measuring P^*, equation (2) is incorporated into the model to account for this.

(2) $R_{kt} = \beta_{0k} + \beta_{1k}U_{kt} - \beta_{2k}P_{kt} + e_{kt}$

Where: $\beta 0k$ is the intercept, ekt the error term, Ukt = set of exogenous predictors of P^*, and $\beta 1$ and $\beta 2k$ of the political coefficients applying the thermostatic model and the weight of political alternation.

The last formula (3) captures the responsiveness of politicians to public opinion: the direct one (policy adjustments to public opinion) and the indirect one, (policy adjustments through the mediation of politicians acting as representatives).

(3) $\Delta P_{kt} = \gamma_{k0} + \gamma_{1k}R_{kt-1} + \gamma_{2k}G_{kt-1} + e_{kt}$

Where:

γ_{k0} = intercept

γ_{1k} = direct reactivity

γ_{2k} = indirect reactivity

e_{kt} = error term

This model demonstrates that the asymmetry of this model is characterized by reactivity on both sides. Specifically, public opinion in year t-1 influences policies in year t, which then affects public opinion in the opposite manner. Nevertheless, this model is contingent upon the specific location and timeframe. It will yield varying outcomes in different nations and at different points in time. Additionally, factors such as the prominence of immigration in a particular country and the structure of policy incentives also influence the results.

CHAPTER 2. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES.

The second chapter describes the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies through a quantitative analysis using indexed and compared measurements of public opinion and immigration policies in a sample of countries. First (Section §2.1), the Public Opinion Index used, constructed from the *World Values Survey* database, is described and critiqued. Second, the MIPEX (section §2.2), a measure of the level of openness or restrictiveness of a country's immigration policies, is described. Finally, the third section (§2.3) illustrates the correlation between these two indices, while also showing the effect of third-party variables, selected from the determinants of policies outlined in the first chapter, on this relationship. The fourth section (§2.4) elaborated further analysis on the Public Opinion Index and its determinants. In light of these calculations, the last paragraph (§2.5) shows and justifies the choice of the case study that is the subject of the third chapter of the Thesis: that of Denmark and Finland, which from the data appear to have the same level of public opinion, but a very different level of policy restrictiveness (Finland appears to have liberal policies, while Denmark more restrictive).

2.1 Public Opinion Index.

As analyzed by Callens (2015), "*Public Opinion on Immigrants*" is an umbrella term that can mean several different things. Depending on the context, it can refer to general attitudes toward immigration (Ceobanu & Escandell 2010; Fetzer 2000), but it can also directly encompass prejudices or negative feelings toward immigrants (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman 1999). Assessing the phenomenon of immigration or making judgments about immigrants are two different things, and thus already this first aspect can be confusing, with respect to what is meant in the literature by *"public opinion regarding immigration*". In this thesis, an index measuring public opinion on immigrants was constructed, based on two responses to a questionnaire, which have a precise definition. Specifically, the questions ask respondents to give an opinion on the extent to which job employers should favor nation people over immigrants, and the impact immigrants have had on the country's development.

Therefore, the first step in this Thesis was to calculate an index of public opinion, measuring what the approach to immigration is in different countries: whether it is an open or closed approach. The following section describes the various steps in creating the index, from the choice of questionnaire, time frame, sample, to the calculations performed.

2.1.1 World Values Survey Dataset.

The research for this thesis first involved a consideration of public opinion with respect to the topic of interest, immigration. The first question that had to be answered was: what do citizens think about immigration in the different various countries? Are they for or against it? A reliable source to analyze to compare public opinion in different countries around the world are the surveys of the World Value Survey Association, an institute of social researchers that study changes in citizens' values and beliefs with respect to social, cultural, economic and political issues through periodic surveys. Since 1981, the WVS has been conducting surveys of a sample of 90 countries, repeating them periodically, in the so-called "*Waves*." From the association's inception to the present, 7 Waves have been analyzed (*Wave 1 from 1981 to 1984; Wave 2 from 1990 to 1994; Wave 3 from 1995 to to 1998; Wave 4 from 1999 to 2004; Wave 5 from 2005 to 2009; Wave 6 from 2010 to 2014; and Wave 7 from 2017 to 2022).* In particular, Wave 7, which collected data from 2017 to 2022, was considered for our analysis. The questionnaire used is called "*Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 - Version 4.0.0. - Data weighted by 'gwght*." The survey brings together data from the European Value Study and the World Values Survey. There are two questions of interest with respect to the immigration issue contained in the WVS questionnaire. From these questions, indices were constructed to measure perceptions of immigration in different countries. A description of the two questions and the reasoning behind the construction of the index of public openness toward immigration will follow.

2.1.2 Index construction.

The first question is, "Job's scarce: employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants." The answers could be <<*strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, strongly disagree, don't know, no answer>>*. Since the responses were recorded, in the questionnaire, as percentages of total respondents, a score was assigned to each response to construct the index.

strongly agree: -2

agree: -1

neither agree nor disagree: 0

strongly disagree: 2

The percentages were recalculated by considering only the total number of respondents, and then excluding those who fell into the "don't know" or "no answer" categories.

The formula that came out is as follows:

INDEX 1 OF COUNTRY OPENNESS TO IMMIGRATION = [(% of respondents who answered "Strongly Agree" *-2) + (% of respondents who answered "Agree "*- 1) + (% of respondents who answered "Neither Agree nor Disagree" * 0) + (% of respondents who answered "Disagree" * 1) + (% of respondents who answered "Strongly Disagree *2).

This result produced an initial index of the country's openness to immigration, which will be as high as the country's openness to immigration. In fact, the people who do NOT agree with the statement "employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants" are those who were assigned the highest coefficient (2 and 1), as they are the ones most likely to distribute jobs to immigrants, while those who agree with the statement are those who were assigned a negative coefficient.

Another interesting question related to immigration emerged from the questionnaire, which was also used to calculate an index of openness to immigration.
The question is:

"Evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of your country." Answers to this question could be "very bad, quite bad, neither good nor bad, quite good, very good, don't know, no answer."

Again, scores were assigned to the various responses, which were:
- Very bad: -2
- Quite bad: -1
- Neither good nor bad: 0
- Quite good: 1
- Very good: 2

Again, the percentages were recalculated on the total number of respondents, thus excluding "don't know" and "no answer."

INDEX 2 OF COUNTRY'S OPENNESS TO IMMIGRATION = [(% of respondents who answered "Very bad" *-2) + (% of respondents who answered "Quite bad "*-1) + (% of respondents who answered "Neither good nor bad" * 0) + (% of respondents who answered "Quite good" * 1) + (% of respondents who answered "Very good*2).

The following table illustrates the list of non-standardized indices resulting from these formulas, for Question 1 and Question 2, for all nations considered by the World Value Survey.

Table 2.1. List of non-standardized Public Opinion Indices for 86 countries (Question "a" and "b").

COUNTRY	Public Opinion INDEX Qa	Public Opinion INDEX Qb	COUNTRY	Public Opinion INDEX Qa	Public Opinion INDEX Qb
ALBANIA	-100,80	78,49	LEBANON	-152,70	-68,38
ANDORRA	42,35	101,91	LIBYA	-158,43	-8,92
ARMENIA	-94,76	38,93	LITHUANIA	-135,58	19,38
AUSTRALIA	-27,25	-15,27	MACAU SAR	-78,98	-47,55
AUSTRIA	-30,72	13,18	MALAYSIA	-141,16	-37,91
AZERBAIJAN	-146,17	15,82	MALDIVES	-148,15	-0,10
BANGLADESH	-133,16	3,91	MEXICO	-37,44	-30,76
BELARUS	-126,17	1,96	MONGOLIA	-87,40	15,98
BOLIVIA	-103,65	-64,71	MONTENEGRO	-117,58	-13,60
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	-147,83	-38,56	MOROCCO	-96,70	-55,90
BULGARIA	-138,41	65,40	MYANMAR	-157,29	-16,12
CANADA	-2,80	-17,16	NETHERLANDS	5,96	73,09
CHILE	-54,53	53,14	NEW ZEALAND	-19,58	-36,50
CHINA	-77,51	-55,70	NICARAGUA	-58,80	83,42
COLOMBIA	-56,20	-25,08	NORTH MACEDONIA	-125,31	-12,51
CROATIA	-83,84	-24,13	NORTHERN IRELAND	8,44	48,08
CYPRUS	-105,77	-34,92	NORWAY	46,93	45,51
CZECHIA	-111,02	-6,69	PAKISTAN	-149,70	-24,77
DENMARK	6,94	-22,87	PERU	-93,54	29,55
ECUADOR	-104,51	-60,52	PHILIPPINES	-96,30	56,56
EGYPT	-174,97	-13,42	POLAND	-92,37	-4,09
ESTONIA	-86,85	-12,91	PORTUGAL	-56,78	37,69
ETHIOPIA	-91,17	14,93	PUERTO RICO	18,28	41,39
FINLAND	-30,78	-1,53	ROMANIA	-106,36	-8,30
FRANCE	-0,20	4,11	RUSSIA	-106,59	-19,58
GEORGIA	-134,74	-6,29	SERBIA	-111,00	-24,41
GERMANY	31,49	56,12	SINGAPORE	-107,82	32,70
GREAT BRITAIN	19,56	-47,27	SLOVAKIA	-136,99	-38,97
GREECE	-90,65	-40,00	SLOVENIA	-81,15	8,70
GUATEMALA	-72,10	-23,31	SOUTH KOREA	-104,60	4,80
HONG KONG SAR	-114,53	-69,56	SPAIN	-8,77	39,67
HUNGARY	-136,29	75,23	SWEDEN	93,87	9,30
ICELAND	17,93	13,80	SWITZERLAND	-54,69	31,79
INDONESIA	-110,02	-19,53	TAIWAN ROC	-111,32	16,82
IRAN	-146,00	-95,95	TAJIKISTAN	-133,20	17,78
IRAQ	-160,16	-16,34	THAILAND	-92,76	-47,43
ITALY	-81,96	-0,55	TUNISIA	-157,66	-39,59
JAPAN	-66,22	-103,68	TURKEY	-75,97	-81,60
JORDAN	-165,47	10,41	UKRAINE	-96,46	8,39
KAZAKHSTAN	-82,28	-65,20	URUGUAY	-34,59	31,62
KENYA	-88,24	-3,48	VENEZUELA	-62,80	12,71
KYRGYZSTAN	-126,63	-30,19	VIETNAM	-99,90	37,04
LATVIA	-108,56	-99,90	ZIMBABWE	-108,12	-33,47

At this point, the two resulting indices were normalized to a scale ranging from -2 to 2, in order to facilitate comparability of the two.

The formula used for standardization is as follows.

Consider, for each of the two indices:

X max = the maximum value of the index before normalization

X min = the minimum value of the index before normalization

MAX = the maximum value of the range within which the index is to be normalized

MIN = the minimum value of the range within which the index is to be normalized

The formula for X scaled is:

X scaled = [(X – X min) / (X max – X min)] * (MAX – MIN) + MIN

In the figure below, we illustrate the two normalized indices in a range from -2 to 2.

Table 2.2 List of Normalized Public Opinion Index for 86 countries in [-2; 2] scale (question "a" and "b").

COUNTRY	Public Opinion INDEX Qa	Public Opinion INDEX Qb	COUNTRY	Public Opinion INDEX Qa	Public Opinion INDEX Qb
ALBANIA	-0,90	1,54	LEBANON	-1,67	-1,31
ANDORRA	1,23	2,00	LIBYA	-1,75	-0,16
ARMENIA	-0,81	0,77	LITHUANIA	-1,41	0,39
AUSTRALIA	0,20	-0,28	MACAU SAR	-0,57	-0,91
AUSTRIA	0,15	0,27	MALAYSIA	-1,50	-0,72
AZERBAIJAN	-1,57	0,32	MALDIVES	-1,60	0,02
BANGLADESH	-1,38	0,09	MEXICO	0,05	-0,58
BELARUS	-1,27	0,06	MONGOLIA	-0,70	0,33
BOLIVIA	-0,94	-1,24	MONTENEGRO	-1,15	-0,25
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	-1,60	-0,73	MOROCCO	-0,84	-1,07
BULGARIA	-1,46	1,29	MYANMAR	-1,74	-0,30
CANADA	0,56	-0,32	NETHERLANDS	0,69	1,44
CHILE	-0,21	1,05	NEW ZEALAND	0,31	-0,69
CHINA	-0,55	-1,07	NICARAGUA	-0,27	1,64
COLOMBIA	-0,23	-0,47	NORTH MACEDONIA	-1,26	-0,23
CROATIA	-0,64	-0,45	NORTHERN IRELAND	0,73	0,95
CYPRUS	-0,97	-0,66	NORWAY	1,30	0,90
CZECHIA	-1,05	-0,11	PAKISTAN	-1,62	-0,46
DENMARK	0,71	-0,43	PERU	-0,79	0,59
ECUADOR	-0,95	-1,16	PHILIPPINES	-0,83	1,12
EGYPT	-2,00	-0,24	POLAND	-0,77	-0,06
ESTONIA	-0,69	-0,23	PORTUGAL	-0,24	0,75
ETHIOPIA	-0,75	0,31	PUERTO RICO	0,88	0,82
FINLAND	0,15	-0,01	ROMANIA	-0,98	-0,14
FRANCE	0,60	0,10	RUSSIA	-0,98	-0,36
GEORGIA	-1,40	-0,11	SERBIA	-1,05	-0,46
GERMANY	1,07	1,11	SINGAPORE	-1,00	0,65
GREAT BRITAIN	0,89	-0,90	SLOVAKIA	-1,43	-0,74
GREECE	-0,75	-0,76	SLOVENIA	-0,60	0,19
GUATEMALA	-0,47	-0,44	SOUTH KOREA	-0,95	0,11
HONG KONG SAR	-1,10	-1,34	SPAIN	0,47	0,79
HUNGARY	-1,42	1,48	SWEDEN	2,00	0,20
ICELAND	0,87	0,29	SWITZERLAND	-0,21	0,64
INDONESIA	-1,03	-0,36	TAIWAN ROC	-1,05	0,34
IRAN	-1,57	-1,85	TAJIKISTAN	-1,38	0,36
IRAQ	-1,78	-0,30	THAILAND	-0,78	-0,91
ITALY	-0,62	0,01	TUNISIA	-1,74	-0,75
JAPAN	-0,38	-2,00	TURKEY	-0,53	-1,57
JORDAN	-1,86	0,22	UKRAINE	-0,83	0,18
KAZAKHSTAN	-0,62	-1,25	URUGUAY	0,09	0,63
KENYA	-0,71	-0,05	VENEZUELA	-0,33	0,26
KYRGYZSTAN	-1,28	-0,57	VIETNAM	-0,88	0,74
LATVIA	-1,01	-1,93	ZIMBABWE	-1,01	-0,63

In order to ascertain whether the two indices are two manifestations of the same phenomenon, or if they assess two distinct dimensions, the correlation between them was then computed, yielding a value of 0.3. The two indices, therefore, are correlated, so the calculation of their average will produce an even stronger index, which considers both aspects of openness to immigration: 1) how the population is inclined to favor the nation people over immigrants in providing a job; 2) what is the perception of the impact of immigrants on the development of the nation.

Therefore, the overall index of openness to immigration was calculated as an average of the two, and a ranking arose with the 86 countries considered by the WVS/EVS survey.[6]

Table 2.3. Public Opinion Index Countries' Classification (86 countries from WVS).

position	country	public opinion index	position	country	public opinion index
1	ANDORRA	1,62	44	ESTONIA	-0,46
2	NORWAY	1,10	45	TAJIKISTAN	-0,51
3	SWEDEN	1,10	46	LITHUANIA	-0,51
4	GERMANY	1,09	47	CROATIA	-0,55
5	NETHERLANDS	1,07	48	ROMANIA	-0,56
6	PUERTO RICO	0,85	49	CZECHIA	-0,58
7	NORTHERN IRELAND	0,84	50	BELARUS	-0,61
8	NICARAGUA	0,68	51	AZERBAIJAN	-0,62
9	SPAIN	0,63	52	BANGLADESH	-0,64
10	ICELAND	0,58	53	RUSSIA	-0,67
11	CHILE	0,42	54	MONTENEGRO	-0,70
12	URUGUAY	0,36	55	INDONESIA	-0,70
13	FRANCE	0,35	56	MACAU SAR	-0,74
14	ALBANIA	0,32	57	NORTH MACEDONIA	-0,74
15	PORTUGAL	0,25	58	SERBIA	-0,75
16	SWITZERLAND	0,21	59	GREECE	-0,75
17	AUSTRIA	0,21	60	GEORGIA	-0,75
18	PHILIPPINES	0,14	61	MALDIVES	-0,79
19	DENMARK	0,14	62	CHINA	-0,81
20	CANADA	0,12	63	CYPRUS	-0,82
21	FINLAND	0,07	64	JORDAN	-0,82
22	HUNGARY	0,03	65	ZIMBABWE	-0,82
23	GREAT BRITAIN	0,00	66	THAILAND	-0,84
24	ARMENIA	-0,02	67	KYRGYZSTAN	-0,93
25	VENEZUELA	-0,03	68	KAZAKHSTAN	-0,94
26	AUSTRALIA	-0,04	69	MOROCCO	-0,95
27	VIETNAM	-0,07	70	LIBYA	-0,96
28	BULGARIA	-0,08	71	MYANMAR	-1,02
29	PERU	-0,10	72	IRAQ	-1,04
30	SINGAPORE	-0,17	73	PAKISTAN	-1,04
31	MONGOLIA	-0,18	74	TURKEY	-1,05
32	NEW ZEALAND	-0,19	75	ECUADOR	-1,06
33	SLOVENIA	-0,21	76	SLOVAKIA	-1,09
34	ETHIOPIA	-0,22	77	BOLIVIA	-1,09
35	MEXICO	-0,27	78	MALAYSIA	-1,11
36	ITALY	-0,30	79	EGYPT	-1,12
37	UKRAINE	-0,33	80	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	-1,16
38	COLOMBIA	-0,35	81	JAPAN	-1,19
39	TAIWAN ROC	-0,35	82	HONG KONG SAR	-1,22
40	KENYA	-0,38	83	TUNISIA	-1,25
41	POLAND	-0,42	84	LATVIA	-1,47
42	SOUTH KOREA	-0,42	85	LEBANON	-1,49
43	GUATEMALA	-0,45	86	IRAN	-1,71

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[6] Because for some countries the data had been recorded twice (once taken from the EVS and once from the WVS) as a first step the weighted average of the countries repeated twice has been calculated, so that each country was in one row, and considered only once.

2.1.3 Reflection on *saliency* of immigration and public opinion *polarization*.

As anticipated in the previous paragraphs, immigration is a highlighting topic, which for this reason tends to be useful for analyzing the relationship between public opinion and politics. Consequently, it is advantageous to check whether this aspect is confirmed by the data used in this empirical analysis. Hence, the saliency of the subject, defined as the proportion of the survey participants that didn't avoid the immigration questions, was computed. In particular, the saliency index was calculated excluding from the total respondents the percentages of the ones who answered: "don't know" and the ones who did not answer. The result derived from this calculation is that saliency is very high in all countries, reaching a level above 90 percent.

Table 2.4 Saliency of the Immigration Topic.

COUNTRY	SALIENCY	COUNTRY	SALIENCY
ALBANIA	0,997	LIBYA	0,995004995
ANDORRA	0,994	LITHUANIA	0,991008991
ARMENIA EVS	0,994	MACAU SAR	1
ARMENIA WVS	0,985	MALAYSIA	1
AUSTRALIA	0,991	MALDIVES	1
AUSTRIA	0,983	MEXICO	0,991
AZERBAIJAN	0,966966967	MONGOLIA	1
BANGLADESH	0,988011988	MONTENEGRO	0,985971944
BELARUS	0,985014985	MOROCCO	1
BOLIVIA	0,987987988	MYANMAR	1
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	0,993	NETHERLANDS EVS	0,975975976
BULGARIA	0,983016983	NETHERLANDS WVS	0,945054945
CANADA	1	NEW ZEALAND	0,949050949
CHILE	0,994994995	NICARAGUA	1
CHINA	0,996	NORTH MACEDONIA	0,980980981
COLOMBIA	1	NORTHERN IRELAND	0,995995996
CROATIA	0,984	NORWAY	0,994005994
CYPRUS	0,988	PAKISTAN	0,997002997
CZECHIA EVS	0,988	PERU	0,989010989
CZECHIA WVS	0,998	PHILIPPINES	1
DENMARK	0,994	POLAND	0,983983984
ECUADOR	0,997	PORTUGAL	0,988988989
EGYPT	0,987	PUERTO RICO	0,999001996
ESTONIA	0,981981982	ROMANIA EVS	0,97997998
ETHIOPIA	0,997	ROMANIA WVS	0,991026919
FINLAND	0,981	RUSSIA EVS	0,968
FRANCE	0,989	RUSSIA WVS	0,992
GEORGIA	0,993993994	SERBIA EVS	0,98
GERMANY EVS	0,984984985	SERBIA WVS	0,978
GERMANY WVS	0,987	SINGAPORE	0,998998999
GREAT BRITAIN EVS	0,994994995	SLOVAKIA EVS	0,997
GREAT BRITAIN WVS	0,99	SLOVAKIA WVS	0,997
GREECE	0,995	SLOVENIA	0,992
GUATEMALA	1	SOUTH KOREA	1
HONG KONG SAR	0,998	SPAIN	0,992992993
HUNGARY	0,981981982	SWEDEN	0,978021978
ICELAND	0,988977956	SWITZERLAND	0,991
INDONESIA	0,998998999	TAIWAN ROC	0,998998999
IRAN	1	TAJIKISTAN	1
IRAQ	0,994994995	THAILAND	0,967
ITALY	0,981981982	TUNISIA	0,998001998
JAPAN	0,964035964	TURKEY	0,978978979
JORDAN	0,999	UKRAINE EVS	0,946
KAZAKHSTAN	0,992007992	UKRAINE WVS	0,95
KENYA	0,995	URUGUAY	0,98
KYRGYZSTAN	0,995995996	VENEZUELA	1
LATVIA	0,981	VIETNAM	1
LEBANON	1	ZIMBABWE	0,997002997

Secondly, it would also be useful to consider what is the distribution and *polarization* of opinions in the country, and thus how many people are taking the extreme sides and are not "neutral." Therefore, for each of the two questions used to develop the index of openness of public opinion, a different polarization index was calculated. As for the first question, "*Job's scarce: employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants*.", the polarization index was calculated by summing the percentages of extreme answers. Out of a possibility of answers: *strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, strongly disagree, don't know, no answer*; the polarization index was calculated by summing the "strongly agree" + the "strongly disagree." For the second question, "*Evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of your country, whose answers could be "very bad, quite bad, neither good nor bad, quite good, very good, don't know, no answer*.", the polarization index was calculated by summing the percentages of "very bad" and "very good". Finally, the average between the two indexes was calculated. The table below shows the heatmap of the countries, with the polarization index for both questions and the average. Hungary and Latvia are the countries with the highest level of polarization, Portugal and Slovenia the countries with the lowest polarization (Table 2.5).

A scatterplot was then constructed (*Figure 2.1*) to graphically show the location and polarization of countries through a color scale, ranging from red (high polarization) to green (low polarization). The graph shows that Eastern European countries tend to be more polarized. Otherwise, we do not find a great relationship, the colors are distributed quite randomly. However, the graph was then replicated by considering the polarization index related exclusively to the question about the impact of immigration on the development of the country (Figure 2.2), and the results were slightly more significant. It can be observed that in the right part of the graph, where the public opinion index is higher, the red dots (high polarization) tend to be in the lower part of the graph (where the policy index is lower), and the green dots (low polarization) are present in greater amounts in the upper part of the graph (higher policy index). Thus, where immigration policies are most effective, there is less polarization. One should, however, consider what immigration flows in or out of countries, for example, Poland, is a country that has had a large number of emigrants.

Table 2.5 Polarization Index.

Country	Ctry	Polarization Index Qa	Polarization Index Qb	Average Polarization
HUNGARY	HU	64,83	23,26	44,04
LATVIA	LV	46,79	37,79	42,29
SLOVAKIA	SK	58,54	16,92	37,73
ALBANIA	AL	43,83	29,89	36,86
SERBIA	RS	51,40	17,59	34,49
TURKEY	TR	40,29	28,37	34,33
NORTH MACEDONIA	NM	53,78	13,83	33,80
ESTONIA	EE	41,39	25,51	33,45
GREECE	GR	44,82	20,10	32,46
NORWAY	NO	52,56	10,39	31,48
ROMANIA	RO	49,10	13,75	31,43
FRANCE	FR	45,10	17,37	31,23
DENMARK	DK	31,99	29,95	30,97
JAPAN	JP	14,92	43,35	29,14
CZECHIA	CZ	46,01	11,25	28,63
LITHUANIA	LT	53,33	3,71	28,52
SWEDEN	SE	38,51	15,95	27,23
POLAND	PL	39,17	12,16	25,66
NETHERLANDS	NL	27,68	23,51	25,59
NEW ZEALAND	NZ	26,95	23,51	25,23
ITALY	IT	40,67	9,12	24,90
GERMANY	DE	28,91	19,93	24,42
AUSTRIA	AT	33,67	14,62	24,15
SPAIN	ES	35,58	9,77	22,68
GREAT BRITAIN	UK	24,87	20,04	22,46
FINLAND	FI	29,56	14,83	22,19
CHILE	CL	29,98	11,05	20,52
ICELAND	IS	23,00	17,59	20,29
SWITZERLAND	CH	28,56	11,60	20,08
CANADA	CA	27,60	8,84	18,22
MEXICO	MX	27,04	8,92	17,98
PORTUGAL	PT	25,30	6,39	15,84

Figure 2.1 Relation between Public Opinion and Immigration Policies: level of polarization of opinions on jobs and impact on the development of the country.


Figure 2.2. Relation between Public Opinion and Immigration Policies: polarization in opinions on employers' need to prioritize nation people over immigrants.

Figure 2.3 Relation between Public Opinion and Immigration Policies: polarization in opinions of impact on development of the country.

Heat map: polarization of opinions of citizens about the impact of immigration on the development of their country

2.2   Migration Policy Index: the MIPEX.

Once the public opinion index was calculated, the second step was to find an index that measured how effectively governments are promoting useful immigration policies. A good index of this parameter exists and it is the MIPEX, an index that measures the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies in 56 different countries, including all EU members (essential for our future analysis). This index is multidimensional and assigns scores based on different parameters. It is considered one of the most widely used indexes by researchers; in fact, the *Joint Research Center* of the European Commission stated that: "*no other index currently offers the same coverage. In addition, the presence of a discrete number of updates (and the expectations of further ones) makes the index one of the few 'alive' sources of information for migration policies, and moreover allow comparison between countries and within countries (over time)*" (Solano et Huddleston, 2020).

Specifically, MIPEX scores each country on the basis of three aspects of integration: *basic rights*, *equal opportunities* and *secure future of immigrants*.

Of the 59 countries considered by MIPEX, those not in common with the WVS dataset were excluded, and that left 39 countries. *Figure 1.6* show the MIPEX scores of the above countries, in order from best to worst.

Table 2.6. MIPEX scores.

Position	Country	MIPEX	Position	Country	MIPEX
1	Sweden	86	21	Denmark	49
2	Finland	85	22	Ukraine	48
3	Portugal	81	23	Japan	47
4	Canada	80	24	Greece	46
5	New Zealand	77	25	Austria	46
6	Norway	69	26	Turkey	43
7	Spain	60	27	Albania	43
8	Italy	58	28	Hungary	43
9	Germany	58	29	North Macedonia	42
10	Netherlands	57	30	Cyprus	41
11	UK	56	31	Poland	40
12	France	56	32	Bulgaria	40
13	Iceland	56	33	Slovakia	39
14	Chile	53	34	Lithuania	37
15	Mexico	51	35	Latvia	37
16	Switzerland	50	36	China	32
17	Serbia	50	37	Russia	31
18	Estonia	50	38	Indonesia	26
19	Czechia	50	39	Jordan	21
20	Romania	49			

2.2.1 MIPEX's components.

This section will look in detail at what the components of MIPEX are. This aspect will also have relevance in explaining the difference between the policies in the countries chosen for the case study: Finland and Denmark.

The dimensions of integration policies exhibit considerable variability, reflecting diverse approaches adopted by countries toward immigration. A nation may maintain a highly favorable reception policy for those seeking employment within its borders yet fail to regard immigrants on par with citizens concerning human rights and social benefits. Additionally, such a country may implement less favorable policies, particularly concerning family reunification. Alternatively, a nation might ostensibly ensure equal rights and opportunities for both citizens and immigrants on paper, while in practice, discrimination persists. Consequently, the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2020) delineates three distinct aspects of immigration policies: 1) *basic rights*; 2) *equal opportunities*; 3) *secure future*.

The dimension of *basic rights* evaluates the level of equality in safeguarding rights between citizens and immigrants. It scrutinizes whether the state legally affords citizens greater rights than immigrants or if rights such as the right to work, health, education, and non-discrimination are equally guaranteed. The dimension of *equal opportunities* measures the actual support measures a country implements to ensure immigrants have the same level of opportunities as citizens in areas such as employment, health, education, and political participation. Lastly, the *secure future* dimension gauges immigrants' actual possibilities to stabilize in a country, encompassing elements such as family reunification rights, permanent residence, and rules for obtaining citizenship.

Based on these three determinants, four potential approaches to immigration are identified by countries: a) *Comprehensive Integration*; b) *Equality on Paper*; c) *Temporary Integration*; d) *Immigration without Integration (Integration Denied)*. Countries adopting the *Comprehensive Integration* approach exhibit a high level across all three parameters: *basic rights, equal opportunities,* and *secure future*. This implies that immigrants are legally protected, actively supported by state initiatives, and accepted as permanent citizens of the country. Countries falling into the *Equality on Paper* category guarantee rights to immigrants and do not hinder their stabilization with regulations, such as those limiting family reunification or permanent residence. However, these countries do not actively commit to providing equal opportunities for immigrants. The *Temporary Integration* category includes countries that grant equal rights and opportunities to immigrants, but only on a short-term basis, discouraging and hindering their long-term stabilization. Finally, some countries adopt the approach of *Immigration without Integration (Integration Denied)*, allowing long-term stabilization of immigrants while denying them equal rights and opportunities (MIPEX, 2020).

The accompanying map illustrates the global allocation of these categories. Among countries with higher scores in the *Comprehensive Integration* category are Sweden and Finland, along with Portugal, Canada, New Zealand, the USA, and Norway. Countries falling into the *Temporary Integration* category include Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and Denmark. Nations such as Argentina, Romania, Mexico, Chile, and Poland fall into the Equality on Paper category. Lastly, some countries classified in the *Integration Denied* category include India, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China (MIPEX, 2020).

Figure 2.4. MIPEX: World Countries.

1. Comprehensive Integration - Top 10
2. Comprehensive Integration (slightly favourable)
3. Temporary Integration (slightly favourable)
4. Comprehensive integration (halfway favourable)
5. Equality on paper (halfway favourable)
6. Temporary integration (halfway unfavourable)
7. Immigration without integration (Halfway unfavourable)
8. Equality on paper (Halfway unfavourable)
9. Equality on paper(slightly unfavourable)
10. Immigration without integration (most unfavourable)

Source: MIPEX, 2020.

2.3   The correlation between PO Index and MP Index.

Considering the 39 remaining countries, through Excel's heat map function, an initial comparison between the index measuring migrant integration policies, and the one measuring public opinion has been made. From the color difference (the closer the color is to green the more the parameter indicates that the value is favorable to immigration, the closer it is to red the more it is negative), it is already possible to detect contradictions between public opinion and MPI for some countries. Some have more favorable public opinion than actual migrant integration policies, such as Denmark (yellow

MPI, green public opinion), while, conversely, others have more favorable policies than public opinion, such as Italy (green MPI, yellow public opinion).

Table 2.7. Correlation between Migration Public Opinion and MIPEX - heatmap.

Country	CTRY	Public Opinion Index	MIPEX
Norway	NO	1,102	69
Germany	DE	1,091	58
Sweden	SE	1,099	86
Netherlands	NL	1,066	57
Spain	ES	0,631	60
Iceland	IS	0,578	56
Chile	CL	0,422	53
France	FR	0,349	56
Albania	AL	0,324	43
Portugal	PT	0,255	81
Switzerland	CH	0,213	50
Austria	AT	0,210	46
Denmark	DK	0,139	49
Canada	CA	0,123	80
Finland	FI	0,066	85
Hungary	HU	0,028	43
UK	UK	-0,004	56
New Zealand	NZ	-0,190	77
Mexico	MX	-0,267	51
Italy	IT	-0,305	58
Poland	PL	-0,417	40
Estonia	EE	-0,461	50
Lithuania	LT	-0,510	37
Romania	RO	-0,562	49
Czechia	CZ	-0,581	50
North Macedon	NM	-0,744	42
Serbia	RS	-0,753	50
Greece	GR	-0,753	46
Turkey	TR	-1,049	43
Slovakia	SK	-1,088	39
Japan	JP	-1,191	47
Latvia	LV	-1,469	37

At this point, a scatter plot was constructed (Figure 2.5)

Figure 2.5 Scatterplot – Public Opinion on Immigration VS Immigration Policies

Public Opinion on Immigration VS Immigration Policies

First, the graph shows that there is a good statistical relationship between public opinion and integration policies, confirmed by the R2 value of 0.37. Second, it is interesting for our analysis to consider two countries that have the same position on the horizontal line (measuring public opinion), but different position on the vertical line (measuring Migration Policy Index). This would mean that the two countries have the same public opinion regarding immigration, but different policies, and thus in this case public opinion is not the determinant of immigration policies. For example, a pair of countries with similar public opinion but different policies are Denmark (49; 0.21) and Finland (85; 0.20). These two countries have similar openness index to immigration (0.592 and 0.514), but very different MPIs (49 and 85). In support of this theory, the MPI website divides countries into various groups according to their approach to immigrant integration. Finland is in the top 5 best performing countries, within the "Top Ten countries" group, which provides the highest level of basic rights, equal opportunities and secure future in the country. Denmark, on the other hand, is in the sixth group, called "Temporary integration- halfway unfavorable." This group of countries, in fact, does not treat immigrants as equals, but still as foreigners, and is in fact "halfway" in guaranteeing basic rights and equal opportunities, and does not guarantee immigrants a secure future in the country.

2.3.1 The sample of countries.

The analysis sample has been progressively reduced: of the initial 86 countries, 39 are now left, those in common with the MIPEX dataset.

To make the sample more homogeneous, we remove the non-OECD countries-Jordan, Indonesia, China, Russia, Ukraine, Cyprus, Bulgaria. That leaves 32 countries: Norway, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Iceland, Chile, France, Albania, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Hungary, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Mexico, Italy, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Czech Republic, North Macedonia, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, Slovakia, Japan, Latvia.

It is interesting to make an observation about the distribution of European countries. The Eastern European countries are disposed in the same area of the graph, but more importantly, despite the very different levels of opinion (they range from Latvia, which stands at less than 20 as a value of the public opinion index, to Albania, which has more than 70), they all maintain more or less the same level of the policy index, staying between about 40 and 50. This figure might prompt a reflection on whether these countries have more or less uniform policies due to minimum standards imposed by the European Union (*Figure 2.6*).

Figure 2.6. Correlation between Public Opinion and Immigration Policies in Europe.

2.3.2 Possible variables influencing the correlation.

At this point, a correlation between public opinion and immigration policies has been identified. It makes sense, however, to ask: what other variables determine immigration policies besides public opinion, and whether these variables influence the newly calculated relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. In the following sections, candidate variables that might influence the relationship will be analyzed.

- *GDP per capita*

The relationship between GDP per capita, using 2020 data, and policy and public opinion indices was first analyzed. As visible from the heatmap and scatter plot below, there is a correlation between public opinion, immigration policies and GDP per capita. However, the arrangement of countries is peculiar. For example, looking at the Scandinavian countries, from the scatter plot, it can be seen that they all have the same income bracket (they are green dots, all between about US$50 and US$70), but very different MIPEX-public opinion combinations. Finland and Sweden are two outliers, far above the straight line: Sweden has very high MIPEX and public opinion index values, while Finland same MIPEX value but less favorable public opinion. Norway, on the other hand, is on the straight line, with MIPEX and public opinion index values almost matching the prediction. Denmark, on the other hand, has the same level of public opinion as Finland, but much lower MIPEX, thus much less favorable policies (the case study of the next chapters will be taken from here). Thus, it is observed that, in general, higher income corresponds to a combination of public opinion and policies that are more favorable to immigration. However, this does not explain the causal relationship between these variables. Does a country have more favorable public opinion and immigration policies because it has higher per capita income, or does it have higher per capita income because it is more open to immigration? It is difficult to assess, because GDP per capita is a variable that is correlated with so many others, as is the level of democracy (see figure 2.7).

Table 2.8. Public Opinion - MIPEX - GDP per capita: heatmap.

Country	CTRY	Public Opinion	MIPEX	GDP per capita (2020) USD '000
Switzerland	CH	0,32	43	85,7
Norway	NO	1,10	69	67,3
Denmark	DK	0,21	50	60,9
Iceland	IS	0,58	56	59,2
Sweden	SE	1,10	86	52,8
Netherlands	NL	1,07	57	52,2
Finland	FI	0,21	46	49,2
Austria	AT	0,25	81	48,8
Germany	DE	1,09	58	46,8
Canada	CA	-1,19	47	43,3
New Zealand	NZ	-0,75	46	41,6
UK	UK	0,14	49	40,3
Japan	JP	-1,05	43	39,9
France	FR	0,42	53	39,1
Italy	IT	0,12	80	31,9
Spain	ES	0,63	60	27
Estonia	EE	-0,19	77	23,6
Czechia	CZ	-0,42	40	23
Portugal	PT	0,35	56	22,2
Lithuania	LT	-0,27	51	20,3
Slovakia	SK	-0,74	42	19,5
Latvia	LV	-0,75	50	18,2
Greece	GR	-0,56	49	17,7
Hungary	HU	0,03	43	16,1
Poland	PL	0,00	56	15,8
Chile	CL	-1,09	39	13,1
Romania	RO	-0,30	58	13
Mexico	MX	-1,47	37	8,7
Turkey	TR	-0,58	50	8,6
Serbia	RS	-0,51	37	7,7
North Macedonia	NM	-0,46	50	6
Albania	AL	0,07	85	5,3

Figure 2.7. Public Opinion - MIPEX - GDP per capita: scatterplot.

- *Age*

Secondly, the variable of age was considered. The question makes sense to ask whether the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies present in a given country has a correlation with the average age of the same country. Specifically, the measure of "age elders," i.e., the percentage of people over the age of 65 in the total number of people living in a country, was chosen to measure age. So, the figure will measure how old the population is. We observe from the heatmap below that this figure does not give great information, as the proportion of elderly people in the countries considered is about the same for most countries, but the corresponding indices of public opinion or immigration policies are highly variable, with colors ranging from red, yellow and green. For example, Sweden has the green Public Opinion Index (93), a green MIPEX (86), and the yellow age elders index (20 percent). Taking another country with the same percentage of age elders, such as Hungary (20.1 percent), we observe that the age elders index is still yellow, but the Public Opinion Index is yellow (62.75 percent), so no longer green like Sweden, and the MIPEX is even orange (43 percent). Another country with the same percentage of age elders is Lithuania (20.4%), which has still different values in the other two indices, with an orange Public Opinion index (46.05%), and an

even lower MIPEX, red (37). Therefore, this variable does not affect the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies.

Table 2.9. Public Opinion – MIPEX – Age elders: heatmap.

Country	CTRY	Public Opinion Index	MIPEX	Age elders (65 and above) % of total population (2020)
Japan	JP	-1,19	47	29,6%
Italy	IT	-0,30	58	23,4%
Finland	FI	0,07	85	22,5%
Portugal	PT	0,25	81	22,3%
Greece	GR	-0,75	46	22,2%
Germany	DE	1,09	58	22,0%
Latvia	LV	-1,47	37	21,4%
France	FR	0,35	56	21,0%
Serbia	RS	-0,75	50	20,7%
Lithuania	LT	-0,51	37	20,4%
Estonia	EE	-0,46	50	20,2%
Czechia	CZ	-0,58	50	20,2%
Hungary	HU	0,03	43	20,1%
Sweden	SE	1,10	86	20,0%
Denmark	DK	0,14	49	20,0%
Spain	ES	0,63	60	19,7%
Netherlands	NL	1,07	57	19,6%
Austria	AT	0,21	46	19,1%
Switzerland	CH	0,21	50	18,7%
UK	UK	0,00	56	18,7%
Romania	RO	-0,56	49	18,7%
Poland	PL	-0,42	40	18,4%
Canada	CA	0,12	80	18,0%
Norway	NO	1,10	69	17,7%
Slovakia	SK	-1,09	39	16,8%
Albania	AL	0,32	43	15,8%
New Zealand	NZ	-0,19	77	15,6%
Iceland	IS	0,58	56	14,6%
North Macedonia	NM	-0,74	42	14,6%
Chile	CL	0,42	53	12,4%
Turkey	TR	-1,05	43	8,2%
Mexico	MX	-0,27	51	8,0%

As a matter of fact, the following scatter plot (*Figure 2.8*) shows that there is no relationship between the share of elders and the MI Public Opinion Index.

Figure 2.8 Public Opinion – Share elders: scatterplot.


- ***Income Inequality***

The third variable considered is income inequality. Specifically, the measure adopted to compare different countries is the GINI Index. It makes sense to ask whether, in a country with more inequality, the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies is different. Again, the heatmap immediately shows how there is no correlation between the variables. We can consider for instance three countries with almost the same GINI Index value: Norway, Denmark and Czechoslovakia (27.7; 27.5; 26.2). Norway has a dark green MI Public Opinion 93.8 and a light green MIPEX (69), thus very immigrant-friendly policies and public opinion. Denmark has a light green MI Public Opinion (64.8) and a yellow MIPEX (49), thus rather favorable public opinion, and policies that are not terrible, but not very effective either. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, has a yellow MIPEX (50), and an orange public opinion index (43.65), thus not very good policies, and even worse, rather unfavorable public opinion. This means that the income inequality variable has no weight on the public opinion-immigration policies relationship.

Table 2.10. Public Opinion – MIPEX – GINI Index: heatmap.

Country	CTRY	MIPEX	Public Opinion Index	Gini Index 2020 (0-100)
Slovakia	SK	39	-1,088	23,2
Netherlands	NL	57	1,066	26
Iceland	IS	56	0,578	26,1
Czechia	CZ	50	-0,581	26,2
Finland	FI	85	0,066	27,1
Denmark	DK	49	0,139	27,5
Norway	NO	69	1,102	27,7
Poland	PL	40	-0,417	28,8
Sweden	SE	86	1,099	28,9
Albania	AL	43	0,324	29,4
Hungary	HU	43	0,028	29,7
Austria	AT	46	0,210	29,8
France	FR	56	0,349	30,7
Estonia	EE	50	-0,461	30,7
Germany	DE	58	1,091	31,7
Canada	CA	80	0,123	32,5
UK	UK	56	-0,004	32,6
Japan	JP	47	-1,191	32,9
Switzerland	CH	50	0,213	33,1
North Macedonia	NM	42	-0,744	33,5
Greece	GR	46	-0,753	33,6
Romania	RO	49	-0,562	34,6
Portugal	PT	81	0,255	34,7
Spain	ES	60	0,631	34,9
Serbia	RS	50	-0,753	35
Italy	IT	58	-0,305	35,2
Latvia	LV	37	-1,469	35,7
Lithuania	LT	37	-0,510	36
Turkey	TR	43	-1,049	41,9
Chile	CL	53	0,422	44,9
Mexico	MX	51	-0,267	45,4
New Zealand	NZ	77	-0,190	NA

In support of this thesis, a graph is illustrated showing that there is no relationship between opinions and inequalities (Figure 2.9).

Figure 2.9. Income Inequality – Public Opinion Index Relation

No relations between public opinin and income inequality

$y = -1,5665x + 31,12$
$R^2 = 0,0202$

(y-axis: GINI Index; x-axis: Public Opinion)

- ***Quality of Democracy: Access to Information***

The same reasoning was developed with a variable measuring the quality of democracy. Specifically, this figure measures the aspect of "access to information," and thus considers aspects such as transparency and freedom of the press in general as indicators of democracy itself. With respect to this figure, the relationship is quite weak, as it can already be noticed from the heatmap. There are countries like Finland that have *Public Opinion Index* yellow (medium), *MIPEX* green (good) and *Quality of Democracy Index* green (very good); others like Estonia that have Public Opinion Index orange (bad), MIPEX yellow (medium) and Quality of Democracy Index green (very good). At the same time we see countries such as Latvia that have a red (very low) Public Opinion Index, red (very low) MIPEX and light green (good) Quality of Democracy Index. In contrast, in France, the Public Opinion Index is light green (good), MIPEX is light green (good), and Quality of Democracy is orange (medium-low). This might prompt a reflection on the validity of the index measuring the Quality of Democracy: access to information, which in fact has values that are repeated for many countries and only has a score ranging from 3 to 10. At the same time, however, looking at both the heatmap and the scatterplot, one can observe that, for countries that have a low index score of "Quality of Democracy: access to information," the indicator works quite well, maintaining color consistency. For example, we observe Turkey: Public Opinion red (low), MIPEX orange (medium-low), Quality of democracy: access to information red (low). Similarly for Greece, Slovakia, Poland, Japan, Mexico, and Hungary, the values of all three indicators remain at medium-low levels, representing indices of public opinion and policies that are rather against immigration, and consistently, index of

"quality of democracy: access to information" measuring poor quality of democracy with access to information often hindered. However, overall, this indicator is incapable of influencing or having a bearing on the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies, and thus, of little use to our analysis.

Table 2.11. Public Opinion - MIPEX - Quality of Democracy: Access to Information; heatmap.

Country	CTRY	Public opinion	MIPEX	Quality of democracy: access to information
Romania	RO	-0,304734042	58	NA
Serbia	RS	-0,509825316	37	NA
North Macedonia	NM	-0,461346395	50	NA
Albania	AL	0,066371495	85	NA
Finland	FI	0,209959906	46	10
Estonia	EE	-0,190425738	77	10
Switzerland	CH	0,323990223	43	9
Norway	NO	1,102192891	69	9
Denmark	DK	0,212663793	50	9
Sweden	SE	1,099153649	86	9
Germany	DE	1,090534025	58	8
UK	UK	0,139445061	49	8
Lithuania	LT	-0,267449559	51	8
Latvia	LV	-0,752881376	50	8
Netherlands	NL	1,06568323	57	7
Austria	AT	0,254587259	81	7
Canada	CA	-1,190934088	47	7
New Zealand	NZ	-0,753210991	46	7
Italy	IT	0,122507548	80	7
Spain	ES	0,631027719	60	7
Czechia	CZ	-0,416623684	40	7
Portugal	PT	0,348740045	56	7
Chile	CL	-1,087854975	39	7
Iceland	IS	0,578001341	56	6
France	FR	0,42166728	53	6
Slovakia	SK	-0,743607105	42	6
Greece	GR	-0,561658742	49	6
Japan	JP	-1,048716807	43	5
Poland	PL	-0,004020365	56	5
Mexico	MX	-1,469152566	37	5
Hungary	HU	0,028254376	43	3
Turkey	TR	-0,58064604	50	2

Figure 2.10. Public Opinion VS Access to Information: scatterplot with colors.

public opinion on immigration VS immigration policies
heatmap by access to information

- **Employment in industry**

Another variable chosen for analysis is a measure of the employment in industry present in each country, measured as a percentage of total employment. The heatmap showing the correlation between public opinion index, immigration policy index and employment in industry itself was measured for this variable as well. Here, a relationship can be seen. In countries where there is little industrialization, attitudes toward immigration are more positive, while in countries where there is a lot of industrialization, opinions and policies toward immigrants tend to be more unfavorable. Looking at the scatterplot, we notice that countries with a low level of employment in industry are on the upper right, and thus have a favorable MIPEX and Public Opinion. For instance, we note that Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Germany, which, with different combinations of the two indices, all maintain an overall favorable opinion and policy framework for immigration. On the other hand, countries that have a high level of employment in industry are placed on the lower left, where the levels of public opinion index and MIPEX are lower. For example, we observe Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, and Lithuania, all with Employment in industry green (high level), but with unfavorable

MIPEX and public opinion toward immigration. One possible explanation for this phenomenon that could be hypothesized is that workers perceive immigrants as someone who will steal their jobs.

*Table 2.12. Public Opinion - MIPEX - Employment in industry: heatmap.*

Country	CTRY	Public opinion	MIPEX	Employment in industry (% of total employment)
Czechia	CZ	-0,416623684	40	37,25%
Slovakia	SK	-0,743607105	42	36,55%
Hungary	HU	0,028254376	43	31,90%
Poland	PL	-0,004020365	56	31,68%
orth Macedor	NM	-0,461346395	50	31,02%
Romania	RO	-0,304734042	58	29,73%
Estonia	EE	-0,190425738	77	29,14%
Serbia	RS	-0,509825316	37	27,95%
Germany	DE	1,090534025	58	27,45%
Italy	IT	0,122507548	80	26,37%
Turkey	TR	-0,58064604	50	26,24%
Lithuania	LT	-0,267449559	51	25,36%
Mexico	MX	-1,469152566	37	25,36%
Austria	AT	0,254587259	81	25,05%
Portugal	PT	0,348740045	56	24,77%
Japan	JP	-1,048716807	43	23,97%
Latvia	LV	-0,752881376	50	23,64%
Finland	FI	0,209959906	46	21,95%
Chile	CL	-1,087854975	39	21,87%
Albania	AL	0,066371495	85	20,78%
Spain	ES	0,631027719	60	20,53%
New Zealand	NZ	-0,753210991	46	20,39%
Switzerland	CH	0,323990223	43	20,28%
France	FR	0,42166728	53	19,96%
Norway	NO	1,102192891	69	19,46%
Canada	CA	-1,190934088	47	19,26%
Denmark	DK	0,212663793	50	18,89%
Sweden	SE	1,099153649	86	18,31%
UK	UK	0,139445061	49	18,15%
Iceland	IS	0,578001341	56	17,95%
Netherlands	NL	1,06568323	57	15,96%
Greece	GR	-0,561658742	49	15,00%

Figure 2.11. Public Opinion - MIPEX - Employment in industry: scatterplot.

Another observation that should be made is that the level of employment in industry does not have a large variability (in the range of 15% to 30%) and is similar for many countries (most around 20%-25%). We observe this in the graph below (*Figure 2.12)*, which shows the relationship between employment in industry and public opinion index. The level of Employment in industry is always quite similar, and there is not a very significant relationship between the two variables.

Figure 2.12. Employment in industry - Public Opinion

- ***Electoral System Family***

Finally, a variable measuring the type of electoral system in the country was chosen to see if this had any influence in the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. However, this parameter did not lead to any relevant consideration. Most countries belong to the same electoral system family (type 1, green), and have very different public opinion or policy indexes (*Table 2.13*). Norway, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia belong to the same electoral system family, but have contrasting public opinions: in order they are green (good), yellow (average), orange (somewhat unfavorable), and red (very unfavorable). This lack of relationship is also visible from the scatter plot measuring the relationship between public opinion and Electoral System Family (*Figure 2.13*).

Table 2.13. Public Opinion - MIPEX - Electoral System Family: heatmap. Figure 1.23 Electoral System Family - Public Opinion relation.

Country	CTRY	Public Opinion	Electoral System Family
Switzerland	CH	0,323990223	1
Norway	NO	1,102192891	1
Denmark	DK	0,212663793	1
Iceland	IS	0,578001341	1
Sweden	SE	1,099153649	1
Netherlands	NL	1,06568323	1
Finland	FI	0,209959906	1
Austria	AT	0,254587259	1
Spain	ES	0,631027719	1
Estonia	EE	-0,190425738	1
Czechia	CZ	-0,416623684	1
Portugal	PT	0,348740045	1
Slovakia	SK	-0,743607105	1
Latvia	LV	-0,752881376	1
Greece	GR	-0,561658742	1
Poland	PL	-0,004020365	1
Chile	CL	-1,087854975	1
Turkey	TR	-0,58064604	1
Serbia	RS	-0,509825316	1
Canada	CA	-1,190934088	2
UK	UK	0,139445061	2
France	FR	0,42166728	2
Germany	DE	1,090534025	4
New Zealand	NZ	-0,753210991	4
Japan	JP	-1,048716807	4
Italy	IT	0,122507548	4
Lithuania	LT	-0,267449559	4
Hungary	HU	0,028254376	4
Mexico	MX	-1,469152566	4
Romania	RO	-0,304734042	NA
North Macedonia	NM	-0,461346395	NA
Albania	AL	0,066371495	NA

Figure 2.13. Electoral System Family – Public Opinion: scatterplot.

2.4   Further analysis on Public Opinion Index

The calculation of the indices utilized in section 2.1 was derived from Wave 7 version 4.0.0 of the World Values Survey. To provide a comprehensive overview, it is important to point out that there is also a version 5.0.0, which includes further questions but is limited to a restricted selection of nations. More precisely, particular aspects of public opinion regarding immigration are explored in the form of secondary questions, which supplement the two inquiries that were initially included in version 4.0.0. For convenience, we rewrite the two questions from which the indexes were constructed in Section 2.1. and name them "a" and "b." Question "*a*" asked "*Job's scarce: employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants.*" Question "*b*" asked "*Evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of your country*". (§ 2.1). Specifically, with respect to question b, Survey version 5.0.0 has sub-questions for some countries regarding qualitative descriptions of this impact. Specifically, there are eight questions which will be named b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7 and b8 to emphasize the subordination relationship to the more generic question b. In particular, Question b asks respondents to assess the impact of immigrants on the development of their country, and the sub-questions propose various options that qualify this impact: *b1) fill useful jobs; b2) strengthen cultural diversity; b3) increases crime rate; b4) gives asylum to political refugees; b5) increases the risk of terrorism; b6) helps poor people establish new lives; b7) increases unemployment; b8) leads to social conflict.* For each of these options respondents had to indicate, as for question b, the degree to which they agree with the statement by choosing from "disagree," "hard to say," and "agree."

These data are helpful for assessing the correlation between public opinion and immigration laws. They provide insights into the factors that drive good or negative public sentiment towards immigration, as well as the strategies employed by politicians to secure votes. Nevertheless, the analysis in this area is constrained by the scarcity of accessible data. Version 5.0.0 of the software considers a smaller number of nations compared to version 4.0.0. Specifically, it only includes 63 countries, out of which only 13 are declared usable. Indeed, since at this stage of the analysis the sampling has already been done, the countries being analyzed are 32,[7], among which the Survey version 5.0.0 only includes 13, namely: Canada, Chile, Czechia, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Slovakia e Turkey. This list of countries does not contain the two Case Study countries that will be elaborated in Chapter 3 (Denmark and Finland). However, the analysis of these specific questions, although partial, may provide insights for consideration in the case study and conclusions.

Therefore, an index was calculated for each of these sub-questions[8], showing the degree to which respondents agree with the statement. In other words, indices b1, b2 etc. answer the question, *"How much do you agree that immigrants produce this consequence?"* each for one of eight different consequences. Next, the correlation between index b^9 and the indices resulting from the sub-questions (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7 and b8) was calculated to determine the extent to which the answer to question b is explained by the sub-questions. In other words, indices b1, b2 etc. are considered the determinants of index b, and then the correlation is measured to determine which are the main determinants of opinion regarding the impact of immigrants on the country's development. These results are now illustrated graphically and quantitatively and commented on.

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[7] Norway, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Iceland, Chile, France, Albania, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Hungary, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Mexico, Italy, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Czech Republic, North Macedonia, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, Slovakia, Japan, Latvia.

[8] The index was calculated using the same logic as the indices in section 2.1, multiplying by -1 the percentages of "disagree" responses, by 0 the percentages of "hard to say" neutral responses, and by 1 the percentages of "agree" responses. The resultant is an index that measures the degree to which respondents agree with the statement. The higher the index, the greater the degree of agreement.

[9] The one that measures the response to the statement "Evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of your country": the higher the index, the more positive the respondent thinks the impact is.

Figure 2.14. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b)– Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the filling of useful jobs (Index b1).


Figure 2.14 shows the scatter plot of the relationship between the *b*-index, which measures the opinion about the impact of immigrants on the country's development, and the opinion about the contribution of immigrants in *filling useful jobs in the workforce*. The correlation between the two indexes is 0.8, so it is very high: this means that people's opinion about the impact of immigrants on the country's development is closely related to the opinion about the role of immigrants in filling useful jobs in the labor market. The correlation is positive, so high values of index *b* correspond to high values of index *b1*: this means that if people think that immigrants have a strong impact in filling useful jobs, they also think that the impact of immigrants on the country's development is positive.

Figure 2.15 shows a perfect positive correlation of 1 between public opinion about the impact of immigrants on the nation's development, and public opinion about the role of immigrants in *enhancing cultural diversity*. This means that the more people think the impact of immigrants on the country is positive, the more they also think they contribute to cultural diversity of the country. This is because the higher the b-index, the more it measures positive public opinion about the impact of immigrants on the country's development, while the b2-index, the higher it is, the more people agree with the statement that immigrants have an impact in strengthening the country's cultural diversity.

Figure 2.15. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the strengthening of cultural diversity (Index b2).


Figure 2.16. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the increase of crime rate (Index b3)..

Figure 2.16 shows the relationship between the opinion on the impact of immigrants on the country's development and the opinion on the impact of immigrants in *increasing the crime rate*. In this case, the correlation index between the two indices is -0.8, thus a very strong relationship in which as one variable increases, the other decreases. In this case, it can be seen from the graph that the more people have a positive opinion about the impact of immigrants on the development of the country (higher index), the less they agree with the fact that the presence of immigrants increases the crime rate. On the contrary, people who have a more negative opinion of the impact of immigrants on the country's development are very much in agreement with the statement that immigrants contribute to the increase of the crime rate.

Figure 2.17. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the asylum policies for political refugees (Index b4).

The figure above describes the relationship between public opinion on the impact of immigrants on the country's development and public opinion on how the presence of immigrants impacts *political refugee asylum policies*. In other words, it describes whether people who are most satisfied with the impact of immigrants on the country think it is correlated with asylum policy, or vice versa. In this case correlation is weak, with an index of 0.17. As a result, thinking about the impact of the presence of immigrants on asylum policy to political refugees is weakly correlated with thinking about the impact of immigrants in general. So, this means that whether the public opinion on the impact of

immigrants is positive or negative is not more strongly determined by the opinion on the asylum granted to political refugees. There are other variables with a much stronger correlation, which are probably the major determinants of the b-index on opinion about the impact of immigrants on the development of the country.

Figure 2.18. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the increase of risk of terrorism (Index b5).

The relationship between public thinking on the impact of immigrants on the country's development and the opinion on the impact of immigrants on the level of *terrorism risk* is represented in the *Figure 2.18*. The relationship here is also strong, and negative at -0.75. This means that the more respondents have a positive opinion about immigrants, the less they think their presence increases the risk of terrorism. In contrast, people who have a negative opinion about the role of immigrants in the country's development at the same time think that the impact of immigrants produces an increased risk of terrorism.

The *b6 index* (*Figures 2.19*). measures the degree to which people agree that the presence of immigrants impacts the development of the country in terms of *helping poor people more in creating new lives for themselves*. Correlation with index b measures whether the perception about the impact of immigrants (positive or negative) is correlated with the belief that more immigration affects the helping of poor people in creating new lives. In this case, the correlation index is 0.54, so there is a

moderate correlation between the two variables. As can be seen from the graph, the trend is not uniform, and in some countries people with negative public opinion think that the presence of immigrants has an impact on helping poor people, while in other countries they think the opposite.

Figure 2.19. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the establishment of new lives for poor people (Index b6).


Figure 2.20. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the increase of unemployment (Index b7).

The *b7 index* provides the extent to which people in these 13 countries believe that immigrants have an impact in the *increase of unemployment*. In this case, the correlation is high and negative at -0.78. This means that the more positive public opinion about immigration is, the more people in that country disagree with the statement that immigration causes an increase in unemployment; conversely, the more people think that immigrants have had a less positive impact on the country, the more they are inclined to think that immigrants produce an increase in unemployment.

Figure 2.21. Scatterplot: Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the development of the country (Index b) – Opinions on the impact of immigrants in the increase of social conflict (Index b8).

Finally, the last index b8 measures people's opinion of the impact of immigrants in creating *social conflict*. Here the correlation with the b-index is medium-high and negative at -0.63. So, people who think the impact of immigrants on the country is positive tend to think their presence does not increase social conflict, while those who think immigrants have a negative impact tend to consider social conflict a determinant of this measure. The value is significant, but social conflict does not appear to be the primary determinant of the public opinion index on the impact of immigrants on the country's development.

As a result of this analysis, some conclusions can be drawn. All people who think that immigrants have a positive impact on their nation also think that immigrants help to strengthen cultural diversity in the country, while those who have a negative opinion do not consider strengthening cultural

diversity as one of the determinants of the impact of immigrants on the state (correlation coefficient between the two variables equal to 1, thus a perfect linear correlation). This is consistent with the fact that the cultural dimension is a cleavage: anti-immigrant parties, as we saw in the previous Chapter, use precisely the issue of the nation's cultural identity as leverage, exploiting the fears of citizens who feel their national identity is undermined. As a result, cultural diversity is not perceived as an added value for citizens who see the impact of immigrants on the state as negative. In contrast, those who have a positive view of the impact of immigrants see cultural diversity as an added value and a major determinant of this impact. Second, correlations with other variables resulted that were not perfect but still very high.

The correlation with the *Fill useful jobs in the workforce* variable was 0.8, indicating that those who think the impact of immigrants is positive also think this impact results in the *Fillment of useful jobs in the workplace*, while those who think it is negative believe that immigrants do not occupy useful positions in the labor market. Also, on the topic of employment, there was a very high correlation with the variable *Increase of unemployment*, although it was negative (-0.78). This means that those who think that the impact of immigrants is negative also think that they contribute to increasing unemployment, while those who think it is positive believe the opposite. Thus, labor is another key issue that explains the feelings of hostility toward immigrants: those who think they have a negative impact also have the belief that they do not fill useful jobs, and that also contribute to increasing unemployment as well. Third, an important determinant was found to be the variable *Increase of crime rate* (*correlation index* of -0.8). Thus, those who are hostile to immigration think that it implies an increase in crime. At the same time, by the same criterion, there is a strong correlation with the variable *Increase of risk of terrorism* (-0.75). Not surprisingly, security management is another of the levers that anti-immigrant parties use, thus appealing to people who have this sentiment and belief. Less strong, but still fairly consistent, is the correlation with the *Social conflict* variable (-0.63). People who have a negative opinion of immigration tend to think that it produces an increase in social conflict, and, conversely, people who have a positive opinion do not believe that the impact of immigrants is related to social conflict. So social conflict is a dimension that matters, but less than employment, cultural identity and security. The variable *Helping poor people establishing new lives* was even less decisive (0.54), and there is a slight correlation with the *variable asylum granted to political refugees* (0.17).

2.5   The case study of Denmark and Finland.

To center the research question of the case study, we need to go back to the section on the correlation between public opinion and immigration policies (Figure 2.5). It can be seen from the scatterplot, reproduced below, that Denmark and Finland have almost the same level of the public opinion index (0.21; 0.20), but a different level of the policy index (49, 85).

Figure 2.5. Scatterplot – Public Opinion on Immigration VS Immigration Policies

Public Opinion on Immigration VS Immigration Policies

Indeed, it can also be seen from the heatmap *(Table 2.7)*, which shows the countries sorted from the one with the most unfavorable immigration policies, to the one with the most favorable policies, that Denmark is in the middle of the list, with MIPEX in yellow color (49), while Finland is the second best scoring country, preceded by Sweden, with green color (85).

Table 2.7. The correlation between public opinion and immigration policies: heatmap.

Country	CTRY	Public Opinion Index	MIPEX
Norway	NO	1,102	69
Germany	DE	1,091	58
Sweden	SE	1,099	86
Netherlands	NL	1,066	57
Spain	ES	0,631	60
Iceland	IS	0,578	56
Chile	CL	0,422	53
France	FR	0,349	56
Albania	AL	0,324	43
Portugal	PT	0,255	81
Switzerland	CH	0,213	50
Austria	AT	0,210	46
Denmark	DK	0,139	49
Canada	CA	0,123	80
Finland	FI	0,066	85
Hungary	HU	0,028	43
UK	UK	-0,004	56
New Zealand	NZ	-0,190	77
Mexico	MX	-0,267	51
Italy	IT	-0,305	58
Poland	PL	-0,417	40
Estonia	EE	-0,461	50
Lithuania	LT	-0,510	37
Romania	RO	-0,562	49
Czechia	CZ	-0,581	50
North Macedonia	NM	-0,744	42
Serbia	RS	-0,753	50
Greece	GR	-0,753	46
Turkey	TR	-1,049	43
Slovakia	SK	-1,088	39
Japan	JP	-1,191	47
Latvia	LV	-1,469	37

The research question might be, then: why do Denmark and Finland have similar public opinion related to immigration, but very different policies? The Denmark-Finland country pair was not chosen at random (there are also other countries with the same public opinion index value, and MIPEX very different), but the case becomes more interesting when one considers that the two countries are both Scandinavian countries. In fact, this would facilitate the use of the reasarch method chosen: namely, the Mill Difference Method. The application of this method consists in finding two cases, in our case two countries, that are completely similar along all relevant dimensions with respect to the phenomenon we want to analyze, minus two: the dependent variable, which we want to explain-in

our case the effectiveness of national immigration policies-and the independent variable-that is, the cause of the difference between the two countries. If they are similar in every relevant respect, the only factor they do not have in common will, therefore, be the one that explains the different approach to policies. The analysis of data on public opinion was useful because it is a starting point: according to this method, public opinion is definitely not the factor that will explain the difference between immigration policies in Denmark and Finland being in common. Through the application of the method this Thesis aims to analyze a number of potentially relevant aspects in the determination of immigration policies, which might be in common between the two countries: for example, geographical aspect, demographic aspect, electoral and party system, economic system and welfare model. There will remain dimensions along which the countries are different that may explain the different policies. We can't be sure a priori whether there is only one dimension-which would lead to an "ideal" application of the method-or more than one, and we will only find out with further research.

CHAPTER 3. THE APPLICATION OF MILL'S METHOD OF DIFFERENCE TO THE CASES OF DENMARK AND FINLAND

In this chapter Mill's method of Difference will be described and applied, to analyze the cases of Denmark and Finland and answer the research question: *why do Denmark and Finland have the same public opinion on immigration, but different policies?*

3.1 Explanation of Mill's method of Difference.

The Method of Differences by J.S. Mill is a widely employed approach in international relations studies, particularly within the realm of comparative research. This method involves selecting two cases that share similarities in all aspects except two: the first being the outcome to be explained (the "dependent variable"), and the second being the variable presumed to explain this outcome (the "independent variable"). According to this logic, if all potentially relevant variables explaining the outcome are equal in both cases, the one that differs will be the sole factor capable of elucidating the outcome (Hancké, 2009, p.73).

The method follows the pattern outlined in the following table:

Table 3.1. Mill's Method of Difference: example.

	Case A	Case B
Explanation 1	Present	Present
Explanation 2	High	High
Explanation 3	Present	Present
Explanation 4	Low	Low
Explanation 5	Absent	Absent
Explanation N ("IV")	Absent (low)	Present (high)
Outcome ("DV")	Absent	Present

Source: Hancké, 2009.

Therefore, consider two cases: Case A and Case B. They will be identical in all dimensions, referred to as "*Explanations*" (which may be present in both cases, absent in both cases, slightly present, or strongly present). However, they differ in the Outcome, which is also the DV, and in only one of the Explanations, which will be the IV. The variables chosen as Explanations must be plausible candidates

for explaining the *Outcome* and must be independent of each other. Among the variables selected as potential explanations for the phenomenon, the one that differs between the two countries will serve as the IV and, consequently, explain the DV.

One of the advantages of this method is its potential to facilitate causal inference. The method is based on three assumptions: determinism, inclusion of all causally relevant causes, and independence of cases. Among its limitations is the need to consider only variables that are independent of each other and have individual, non-joint effects as possible explanations. A potential limitation of this thesis is that additional factors may emerge as possible determinants of the Outcome. In such a case, the analysis of the issue is deferred to the use of another methodology, such as QCA (Hancké, 2009). Secondly, a limitation of the Methods of Difference is the inability to handle equifinality, the narrow focus on individual causes, and the presumed incompatibility with observed research (Ghalehdar, 2022).

3.2 The Danish and Finnish cases.

The paragraph will first outline the key events related to immigration policies and measures in the two countries. Finally, it will substantiate the reasons for selecting the two cases, a choice initiated through the observation and analysis of the scatter chart depicting the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies.

3.2.1 Brief description of the main immigration policies and measures in the two countries.

The index of immigration policies demonstrates a different approach in the policies of Denmark and Finland in the time frame between 2017 and 2022. In this section, we briefly describe the main immigration measures and laws of the two countries that were also adopted earlier, so as to then explain in the following paragraphs the different approaches of the Parties in the relevant years. In Denmark, center-right and center-left governments have alternated from the 1970s to now. In the 1970s the Danish Social Democratic Party ordered a stop to labor immigration to improve the country's unemployment level (Matthiessen, 2009). In 1977, a cross-party committee was established in Denmark to meet to form the country's overall view on immigration. Based on the recommendations of this committee, in January 1983 the center-right government, through Minister of Justice Erik Ninn-Hansen (Conservative People's Party) prepared a draft of the measure later called the Aliens Act, which was limited to minor adjustments of policies on residence permits, deportations, and refugee rights. However, this draft was opposed by Parties that were not in government: the Venstre Social-Liberal Party, the Socialist People's Party, and the Left-Wing Socialists, also involving

Social Democrats. This group of parties supported the minority ideas of the 1977 Commission and pushed for more liberal policies. Since this group although not in government held a majority on the issue (alternative majority), the proposal was sent back to committee, which made changes in a more liberal direction. On June 3, 1983, the Aliens Act was passed, which was considered the most liberal immigration law in Europe at that time, being very tolerant of asylum. In fact, asylum seekers increased very quickly after this measure, and their applications were for the most part accepted by Denmark. The Conservative People's Party, through Erik Ninn-Hansen bitterly criticized these changes, alarming the public that family reunification policies would erode the cessation of labor immigration policies present in Denmark, contributing to unemployment, stressing that more social service and welfare benefits would attract more and more immigrants to the country. Ninn-Hansen also gave an interview arguing that overly liberal policies would lead to the risk of undermining the "nation-state" identity, and the possibility of racial tensions. The interview received much media attention, at a time when immigration was not yet such a salient issue (Nordics Info, N.D.). In fact, when the number of asylum seekers increased in the 1980s, he blamed too liberal reforms. From that point on, public opinion about immigration policies became increasingly polarized, and so did that of politicians, dividing between people who wanted to help people in need and people who vandalized immigrants.

Beginning in 1985, the Social Democrats, who had been dragged by the other parties to support liberal policies, changed their orientation, moving toward more center-right positions because of concerns over the increasing number of refugees and the difficulty of immigrants to integrate, especially in the more rural areas around Copenhagen. As the Social Democratic Party's position shifted, therefore, the alternative majority lost control of the issue, and in 1985 restrictions were adopted on the approvals of asylum applications, particularly of de facto refugees. In this context, the Progress Party taking advantage of the growing polarization of public opinion began a very intense election campaign, in which it often involved the public by calling referendums for the people to express their opinion on whether or not to accept immigrants. Another major event involved Palestinian immigrants from Lebanon whose asylum applications were rejected, only to be accepted by two Copenhagen Churches (Enghave and Blagards) in the form of "church asylum." The internally divided Social Democratic Party in this case supported Socio-Liberal MP Arnold in her bill that would have given permanent residency to these immigrants (Palestinians Law , 1992).

In 2002, the Aliens Act was overhauled, making family reunification permits less easy to obtain, from a standpoint of the family's economic possibilities and the criteria for falling into the category entitled to this measure, e.g., the years of permanent residence required increased from three to seven (Bauer, Larsen and Matthiessen, 2004).

Following the refugee crisis of 2014-2015, asylum application rules were tightened in Denmark, and various initiatives were promoted to improve the integration of refugees and conform them as much as possible to Danish culture. The Social Democrats in 2014 made a proposal, accepted by the Parliament in 2015, that would introduce a temporary residence permit for asylum seekers (section 7(3) of the Aliens Act), starting at one year with the possibility of being extended. This measure does not provide for family reunification for the first three years in Denmark (European Parliament, 2019). In summer 2015, a center-right coalition returned to government, which applied the "sudden brake" to immigration. Since then, rules for residence and family reunification have been tightened and limits placed on welfare. The public allowance for residents of Denmark who have been in the country for less than 7 years (introduction allowance) has been lowered, both for Danes and foreigners, with the aim of discouraging asylum claims and making it clear that to be in the Danish state one must contribute to welfare. The center-right government also placed ads in Lebanese newspapers informing those who wanted to seek asylum in Denmark that it had become less affordable, that benefits had been reduced, again aiming to discourage entry into the country. The country then put a stop to the quota of 500 refugees resettled in Denmark UN agreement. In 2016, the *Jewelery Law* was passed allowing police confiscation of cash and items worth more than 10,000 kroner from migrants and asylum seekers to support their livelihoods, and has since been used seventeen times (The Local Denmark, 2022). In 2018 a law was passed banning the veil in public places, calling it disrespectful and incompatible with Danish values (Margolis, 2018). In 2019, the *Act on the Integration of Foreigners* in Denmark was enacted, aimed at making them Danish citizens in accordance with the values and norms of Danish society, their residential placement, the organization of an integration program including their education related to Danish culture and history, and the integration contract, work requirements and welfare restrictions; in 2019, permits became always temporary.

According to MIPEX (2020), Denmark in 2019 worsened its integration policies, dropping its score by 4 points (while the average of the countries considered by MIPEX went up by 2 points). The category of countries in which Denmark was placed is that of "*temporary integration,"* which includes countries that provide basic rights to immigrants and related equal opportunity support, but do not accept the integration of immigrants on a permanent basis, never considering them citizens on a par with natives. In particular, the insecurity dimension is one of the lowest in all of Europe, reaching a score of only 17 points out of 100. The areas in which Denmark has adopted the most restrictive policies are labor market participation, family reunification, education, permanent residence, health, and citizenship. For example, the right to Danish citizenship by declaration for those who are young people born and raised in Denmark has been abolished, economic requirements for permanent residence permits have been increased and the period of residence required has been increased,

language level requirement for family reunification has been required, and social assistance measures have been reduced (MIPEX, 2020a). More favorable are measures in the area of political participation, slightly less anti-discrimination policies and access to citizenship (there is the law providing for dual citizenship, but present restrictions discourage applying for it).

*Figure 3.1 Denmark MIPEX score in 2019.*

Source: MIPEX, 2020a.

As for Finland, its immigration history is not known to be very long, the country being more characterized by emigration than immigration (OECD, 2017). However, Finland began even before its independence to have immigrant flows, when the country offered asylum to Russians, Estonians, and Jews (Leitzinger 2008), then continued with the Russian Revolution, during which the country took in Russians fleeing the war, and with World War II, always maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union. The most noticeable waves of immigration began in the 1970s (Chileans) and 1980s (Vietnam). The first Aliens Act was passed in 1984 and the first *Asylum Act* in 1991, regulating the right to asylum in Finland and refugee status, later replaced by the *Act on the Integration of*

Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers of 1999 (European Commission, N.D.c), which aimed to take measures to encourage the integration of immigrants into Finnish society. The latter was later replaced by the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration of 2010. There have been several citizenship laws in Finland, dating back to 1920, 1941, 1968, and 2003, which have made it easier to acquire Finnish citizenship. Finland also has an anti-discrimination law (Finnish Non-Discrimination Act, 2014), including ethnicity. As in Denmark, those responsible for implementing integration policies are the Municipalities, here in cooperation with the Employment and Economic Development Offices (European Commission, N.D.c). The migration crisis came to Finland at the end of 2015, when the country, grappling with an unprecedented influx of immigrants, had to change immigration policies, limiting residence permits or increasing criteria and requirements for protection. Since 1999, immigration support has been provided through customized plans that assess the level of speed of integration based on each immigrant's skills and circumstances, such as on the Finnish language. These policies are aimed at increasing the chances that immigrants can integrate into the labor market and find a permanent contract. The Finnish state provides programs aimed at immigrants to help them find temporary work while the integration process is completed (OECD, 2017). Finland, compared to Denmark and also to other OECD countries, stands out by not having high-stakes tests: the first assessment by the state is the baccalaureate exam. According to MIPEX (2020-b), Finland ranks in the top 10 countries with best integration policy approach, in the group of Comprehensive Integration, i.e., integration that effectively encompasses the criteria of basic rights, equal opportunities and secure futures, considering immigrants as equals and as (potential) Danish citizens (see Section §2.2.1). In addition, in 2019 (the year included in the case study, which considers the time frame from 2017 to 2022) Finland's policies are found to have improved by 3 points on the 100-point MIPEX scale. The score for the year 2019 is 85 points out of 100 (the average for countries considered by MIPEX is 49/100). The dimensions in which Finland is found to have improved are support for equal opportunities in employment, immigrants' human rights to nondiscrimination, and family life, with also enforcement of anti-discrimination mechanisms. Finland among the Nordic countries is best in the area of political participation and permanent residence, while Sweden is most advanced in the area of health and obtaining citizenship. Family reunification laws are a weakness of Finnish immigration policy, although needs consdierate the personal circumstances of each family, as well as health: immigrants do not have the same service as citizens, due to procedural and bureaucratic limitations.

Figure 3.2. Finland MIPEX score in 2019.

Source: MIPEX, 2020b.

3.2.2 Explanation of the choice of the cases.

The choice of Denmark and Finland starts from the observation of the scatter plot created in Chapter 2 that intersects public opinion with immigration policies, already mentioned in Figure 1.8. Mill's method considers the choice of cases as fundamental to the success of the study, which must come from observing something that is counterintuitive, or paradoxical (Hancké, 2009, p.72). In this case, it was observed that Denmark and Finland, two countries with several characteristics in common (Scandinavian countries, similar welfare tradition, similar characteristics of the economy and demographics, a similar values approach, similarities in the political and electoral system) have, in the period 2017-2022 a similar public opinion on immigration, but opposite policies, as can be shown by their position in the graph.

Figure 2.5. The correlation between public opinion and immigration policies.

Public Opinion on Immigration VS Immigration Policies

Therefore, the choice of these two countries lends itself to a search carried out through the Difference Mill Method.

3.3 Application of Mill's Method of Difference.

In this section, the previously presented theory will be applied through the description and analysis of candidate factors that could potentially explain the phenomenon.

In this case, following the logic of Mill's *Method of Difference*, the two cases under consideration are Denmark and Finland, with the differing outcome to be explained being immigration policy (Dependent Variable or DV). Specifically, Finland's policy is characterized as tolerant and liberal, while Denmark's policy is restrictive. The uniqueness of this case lies in the fact that both countries share the same public opinion. The purpose of this case study is to understand how the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies may be influenced, elucidating why public opinion in Denmark and Finland did not translate into similar government policies. The subsequent paragraph will discuss the variables that could potentially explain the policy differences and, consequently, what has impacted the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies.

To apply Mill's method, two cases (referred to as Case A and Case B) must be selected, identical in every relevant dimension except for two: the Outcome to be explained, also known as the Dependent Variable (DV), and the variable presumed to explain the Outcome—the Independent Variable (IV). Keeping everything else constant, only a variation in the independent variable can account for the variation in the Outcome (Hancké, 2009, p.73). Based on the observation of the dataset outlined in paragraph §3.2.2 and the fact that Denmark and Finland share the same Pro-immigrant Public Opinion, the construction of the Mill's method is envisioned with Denmark as Case A, Finland as Case B, Immigration Policies as the DV or Outcome, and Public Opinion as one of the potential explanations, which, in this case, we already know to be equal in both countries.

Table 3.2. Mill's Method of Difference: case A, case B, explanation 1 and outcome.

Case	Denmark (Case A)	Finland (Case B)
Public Opinion (Explanation 1)	Pro-immigrant	Pro-immigrant
Immigration Policies (DV or *Outcome*)	Anti-immigrant	Pro-immigrant

The Table will be supplemented with other potential explanations for the Outcome, namely immigration policies. The following paragraph will delineate the variables that serve as potential candidates, and subsequently, these variables will be analyzed for both Denmark and Finland, assuming that many of them will be similar due to the shared characteristics between the two countries. Indeed, the selection of this method is predicated on the fact that both Denmark and Finland are Scandinavian nations with similar socio-economic models.

3.3.1   List of candidate variables that might explain the difference of policies between the two countries.

This paragraph describes the list of variables suitable for explaining the difference in policies between the two countries and, consequently, what has influenced the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. In the second chapter, which analyzed the quantitative relationship between public opinion and immigration policies, tests were conducted on a sample of countries to assess the impact of third variables on this relationship (Paragraph §2.3.2). The only variables that showed a correlation with the public opinion-policies relationship were the GDP level and employment in the industry. The GDP per capita was found to have a positive correlation with the Public Opinion Index-MIPEX relationship; however, establishing a causal relationship is challenging: does higher GDP

correspond to a combination of public opinion and more favorable immigration policies, or do public opinion and more favorable policies contribute to economic growth and, therefore, higher GDP? Regarding the variable "employment in industry," the analysis shows that where there is less industrialization, attitudes towards immigration are more positive, while in areas with more industrialization, attitudes are less positive (§2.3.2; Table 2.12). One possible explanation for this phenomenon that could be hypothesized is that workers perceive immigrants as individuals who will take away job opportunities. In coherence with this analysis, these two variables will be included in the application of the method as potential candidates explaining the difference in policies between Denmark and Finland.

Regarding the selection of other variables, in the first chapter, in paragraph 1.2.2, the "key drivers of immigration policies" have been identified. These determinants are all possible candidates for explaining the difference between Finland and Denmark in immigration policies: if the level of these variables is the same in both countries, they will not be the cause of the difference. According to Mill's Method of Difference, the factor (or factors) that will not be common to the two countries will constitute the only possible cause. However, for the proper application of the method, it is important to select only factors that are independent of each other (Hancké, 2009, p.72). It is also crucial to choose only factors that can genuinely play a role in determining this difference; therefore, it is advisable not to confuse correlation with a causal relationship.[10].

Variables considered possible candidates to explain the difference between the immigration policies of Denmark and Finland are:

- *Negative public opinion toward immigration.* It is already known that public opinion towards immigration is the same and favorable in both countries, as the choice of the case stems precisely from observing this unique aspect. Indeed, considering that this thesis has demonstrated the significant influence of public opinion in shaping policies, the peculiarity lies in analyzing, in this case, the dynamics that came into play and impacted the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies in Denmark and Finland. This analysis aims to understand what factors influenced the connection, leading to restrictive policies in Denmark and tolerant and liberal policies in Finland, despite both countries having favorable public opinions towards immigration.

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[10] During the research, these assessments may undergo changes based on new information collected.

- *Economy, welfare model, social stability and demography.* The economic and demographic situation can influence immigration policies based on the demand for workers and the percentage of people in the working age group. If the percentage of people in the working age group is declining or is unsatisfactory, immigration may be considered as a solution to fill this gap. It is also relevant to measure the level of social capital and the welfare system. Due to the requirement in Mill's method that the examined variables must be independent of each other, these aspects will be considered together as they are closely correlated. For instance, social capital is understood as the level of social cohesion, measuring the social stability of the population, and depends on factors such as income, wealth equality, demographic structure, and the absence of conflicts (Solability, N.D.). These variables, in turn, are inevitably influenced by the welfare system, which is generous and redistributive in Denmark.

- *Electoral, institutional and political system.* It is essential to consider the institutional framework of the countries to assess the level of democratization, which clearly influences policy determination, especially in the dynamics of public opinion-policy relationship, as well as the balance of powers. Similarly, the electoral system could explain why the equal preferences of the two countries have resulted in different policies, also measuring the level of democratization of the election system and policy coherence. In general, it is worthwhile to observe if there are differences in the political system (e.g., whether it is bipolar or multipolar), and consequently, what the distribution of parties in government is. Particularly, attention will be given to the presence of extreme right-wing parties in government or opposition, which, in their propaganda and electoral programs, extensively employ anti-immigration rhetoric (Hopkin, 2020). Within an evaluation of the political system, the level of political participation can also be considered. These variables are grouped together due to their close correlation.

- *Role of the Social Democratic Party.* Since the 2019 elections resulted in the victory of the social democrats in both countries, and the MIPEX index of that period, as seen earlier, shows a significant difference, it is interesting to analyze how this aligns with the approach of the two parties, which should share the same political orientation.

- *Polarization & Saliency.* In order to understand a potential factor explaining the difference in policies between the two nations, it is essential to consider the influence of opinion polarization. Schneider-Strawczynski and Valette (2022), in their study on the impact of the media on attitudes towards immigration, note that as an issue becomes more prominent, public opinion tends to

polarize rather than simply becoming more negative. Consequently, moderate attitudes shift towards the extremes of the public opinion distribution. Analyzing the case of France, it is observed that with the increasing significance of the immigration issue, support for moderate, center-right, and center-left political parties declined, while backing for extremist far-right and far-left groups rose. Consequently, there was an increase in support for far-right groups advocating anti-immigration policies. The discussion will commence with polarization since it can be directly computed with the data used in Chapter 2. However, the role of issue saliency in the two countries, which is closely linked to polarization, will also be examined.

- *Level of employment in industry.* In the second chapter, a relationship was identified between the level of employment in the industry and public opinion and immigration policies. Specifically, a higher level of employment in the industry corresponded to a lower level of the Public Opinion Index and MIPEX, and vice versa. The investigation aims to determine whether this factor differs between Denmark and Finland.

3.3.2 Analysis of the chosen variables.

The research carried out so far seems to confirm the basic assumption that Denmark and Finland have many of the factors described above in common. In particular, the two countries appear to have the same economic and demographic situation, belong to the same geographical region of Scandinavia (although in two different positions and with different immigration flows), with similar culture, tradition and language and an equivalent public opinion (despite Denmark, although having the same public opinion index, present a greater history of hostility to immigration, a factor that could be linked to greater polarization). Accurate data and comparisons will be provided. Public Opinion and Employment in industry are two of the common factors between the two countries.

- ***Public Opinion towards Immigration.***

The existence of a relationship between public opinion and immigration policies is the essence of this thesis. Consequently, we cannot omit public opinion from the list of variables that could explain the difference between Danish and Finnish immigration policies. However, the research question of this thesis arises from the observation of this counterintuitive aspect: as extensively described in the quantitative analysis of the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies conducted in Chapter 2 and subsequently reported in paragraph §3.2, Denmark and Finland have the same Public Opinion Index. Both countries have a favorable public opinion on immigration. Figure 2.5 is provided, showing the correlation between public opinion and immigration policies, highlighting that

Denmark and Finland have very similar public opinion values, 0.21 for Denmark and 0.20 for Finland, within a range of values from -2 to +2, indicating positive public opinion.

Figure 2.5. Scatterplot – Public Opinion on Immigration VS Immigration Policies

The same result is made explicit in the table below.

Table 3,3. Public Opinion Index in Denmark and Finland.

Country	Denmark	Finland
Public Opinion Index	0,21	0,20

This outcome was already calculated, however for logical consistency it should be included in the Mill method test. It is clear that if public opinion is the same in the two countries, that cannot be the factor that explains the outcome, i.e., the difference in policies in Denmark and Finland.

- *Economy, welfare model, social stability and demography*

Denmark and Finland have a similar economic and demographic situation. Regarding the economic situation, consider the IDI (Inclusive Development Index), an index introduced by the World Economic Forum, which, in addition to using GDP to measure a country's economic growth and development also considers aspects such as intergenerational equity, sustainability, inclusion, growth

and development, thus including parameters such as the GINI Index, public debt, dependency ratio, employment level, life expectancy, labor productivity, poverty rate etc. (World Economic Forum, 2018). According to this parameter, Denmark and Finland in 2018 had a score of 5.81 and 5.33 respectively, ranking fifth and 11th in the ranking. Second, we measure the level of well-being through an index that measures quality of life. Kälin and Kochenov's Quality of Nationality Index (QNI) measures the all-around quality of life in a given country by considering parameters such as economic strength, human development, stability, employment, and freedom to travel and settle. In 2018, Denmark scored 81.7 percent and Finland 81.2 percent, showing that the two countries are always close in the rankings as they have a similar standard of living (QNI, 2018).

Table 3.4 IDI and QNI in Denmark and Finland.

| Country	Denmark	Finland
IDI	5,81	5,33
QNI	81,7%	81,2%

Source: World Economic Forum, 2018; QNI, 2018.

The demographic status of a country plays a significant role in shaping immigration laws as well. This is because immigration can be advantageous in augmenting a country's workforce and possibly lowering expenses (Peri, 2020). The demographic status of the two countries bears striking similarities, as evidenced by the analysis of the 2020 population pyramids. Denmark and Finland have comparable populations, with Denmark having approximately 5.8 million inhabitants and Finland having around 5.5 million. The population pyramid exhibits a similar structure in both cases, converging towards a rectangular shape, with nearly all age groups having values around 3 percent (refer to Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.3 *Population Pyramids Denmark and Finland 2020.*

Another factor to take into account while analyzing demographic patterns is the fertility rate, which is the average number of children per woman. Presently, this element is posing difficulties due to its decline. In 2021, the global fertility rate stood at 2.3 children per woman, which is half of the rate observed in 1970, which was 4.8. Currently, the fertility rate is somewhat higher than the replacement rate of 2.1, which is the minimum rate required for a generation to maintain its population size (Nordic Statistic database, 2023). The issue of a decreasing birth rate is interconnected with the problem of a population that is both aging and declining (Desire, 2020). This, in turn, is associated with the challenge of maintaining a productive labor force while supporting a population that is economically dependent (European Commission, N.D.). Although the Nordic countries are renowned for their strong welfare systems, the Fertility Rate in these nations has been steadily decreasing for several decades due to a decrease in the number of children being born, either as a result of personal choice or necessity. Figure 3.2 illustrates that Denmark and Finland have followed a similar path, with both nations witnessing a significant fall in their Fertility Rates over the last decade. Specifically, Denmark's Fertility Rate has declined by 7 percent, while Finland's has witnessed a more substantial decrease of 25 percent. The fertility rate in Finland in 2022 was 1.3 children, whereas in Denmark it was 1.55 children, according to the Nordic Statistic database in 2023.

Figure 3.4 *Fertility rate by country (Nordic countries), 1990-2022*

Source: Nordic Statistic Database, CHIL02; Fertility rates by age, time and reporting country

Figure 3.5 *Fertility rates by country (Nordic Countries), 2020-2022.*

Source: Nordic Statistic Database, CHIL02; Fertility rates by age, time and reporting country

As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Social Capital is also an aspect to be included in the economic-demographic analysis, as it is closely correlated with them by definition. In 2020, the top positions in the Social Capital Index, calculated as a sub-index of the Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index (GSCI), were occupied by Scandinavian nations. In 2020, Finland ranked as the fourth nation in the world with the highest level of Social Capital Index, while Denmark ranked fourteenth globally. Overall, the Scandinavian peninsula boasts the highest levels of SCI worldwide.

Figure 3.6 The Social Capital Index World Map.

Source: Social Capital Index 2020. *Solability, 2020.*

Hence, due to the same population patterns of Finland and Denmark, the socio-economic concerns associated with them are inherently similar. Therefore, the disparity in policies between the two nations cannot be attributed to the economic or demographic aspect.

Regarding the analysis of the welfare system, Nordic models (especially Scandinavian countries) are characterized by high taxation and income redistribution. Citizens are willing to pay higher taxes in exchange for more social benefits, and this is common in both Denmark and Finland. Therefore, both countries are designed to protect citizens from events such as job loss, ensuring provisions related to education, pensions, healthcare, and providing unemployment benefits, childcare assistance, and longer parental leave than the average of other countries. Andersen et al. (2007) define this as "The Nordic Model," a universal welfare model that offers services without payments and aims at equalizing the living standards of all citizens, ensuring equal opportunities regardless of the ability to pay. Thus, the tradition of the welfare model is the same in both countries: a model based on high taxation, reallocated and redistributed to support the living standards of as many citizens as possible,

with the goal and need to maintain a high level of employment (Andersen et al., 2007, p.67). However, this model relies on citizens' willingness to pay taxes for services in return, and when the country becomes populated by non-working individuals, in this case, immigrants, this inclination may change (Goodman, 2019). Nevertheless, for the purposes of the Mill's method, this aspect is not relevant because there is certainly no different welfare tradition in the two countries. What can change is the response to immigration – in other words, the level of solidarity. However, as we have seen and will see in the following points, this follows other dynamics.

- *Employment in industry.*

In the first Chapter, variables that could influence the correlation between public opinion on immigration and immigration policies were analysed. The analysis of the data led to the conclusion that, indeed, employment in industry is a factor correlated with public opinion and immigration policies. In particular, it turns out that in countries with a low level of employment in industry, public opinion and immigration policies tend to be more favourable, whereas in those with a high level of employing in industry public opinion is less favoured and immigrant policies are less effective. One possible explanation is that in countries where the industrial sector is predominant, people more often perceive immigrants as their possible substitutes, and thus a threat to their workplace. If this hypothesis were true, there could also be a causal relationship between the variable "employment in industry" and "immigration policies": a higher level of employment in industry could be the cause of more restrictive policies. However, this variable is not useful in explaining the difference in policies between Denmark and Finland. In fact, as shown in Figure 1.19, Denmark and Finland have two similar levels of employment in industry, both very close to 20% of the total employment (Denmark 18.9%; Finland 21.9%). Therefore, employment in industry can be considered a common factor in Denmark and Finland and cannot be the cause of the policy differences between the two countries.[11]

Table 3.5. Employmnet in Industry in 2020 (% of total employment) in Finland and Denmark.

Country	Employment in industry in 2020 (% of total employment)
Finland	21,9%
Denmark	18,9%

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[11] However, there are some criticisms about this factor, as increased employment in industry results not only in a level of more restrictive policies, but also in a more restricted public opinion. This could not be reconciled with the case of Denmark and Finland, which have the same public opinion.

Figure 2.12 - Public Opinion - MIPEX - Employment in industry: heatmap.

| CTRY (WB)	Mi Public Opinion	MIPEX	Employment in industry (% of total employment)
GRC	38,225	46	15,0%
NLD	92,5	57	16,0%
ISL	77,925	56	17,9%
GBR	60,25	56	18,2%
SWE	93	86	18,3%
DNK	64,8	49	18,9%
CAN	64,325	80	19,3%
NOR	93,8	69	19,5%
FRA	71,1	56	20,0%
CHE	67,45	50	20,3%
NZL	54,9	77	20,4%
ESP	79,75	60	20,5%
ALB	70,525	43	20,8%
CHL	73,7	53	21,9%
FIN	62,85	85	21,9%
LVA	16,875	37	23,6%
JPN	25,45	47	24,0%
PRT	68,55	81	24,8%
AUT	66,875	46	25,1%
MEX	52,575	51	25,4%
LTU	46,05	37	25,4%
TUR	29,75	43	26,2%
ITA	52,05	58	26,4%
DEU	93,5	58	27,5%
SRB	39,1	50	27,9%
EST	47,35	50	29,1%
ROU	44,5	49	29,7%
MKD	39,425	42	31,0%
POL	48,75	40	31,7%
HUN	62,75	43	31,9%
SVK	28,325	39	36,5%
CZE	43,65	50	37,2%

- *Electoral, institutional and political system*

In this paragraph, the institutional, electoral, and political systems will be described together, as they are interconnected.

Firstly, an element that could explain the difference between the policies of the two countries is the *institutional context* (the power distribution among different organs, the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, etc.). Both Denmark and Finland are parliamentary democracies: Finland is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral parliamentary system, Eduskunta, a president as the Head of State, and a government led by the Prime Minister, who is the leader of the party with the majority in Parliament. Denmark, on the other hand, is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliament, the Folketing, whose acts must be signed by the monarch and co-signed by a Cabinet Minister. The government is also led by the leader of the party with the most seats in the Folketing, even though the monarch is formally the Head of Government (Kongehuset, N.D.). Despite one country being a republic and the other a monarchy, in a constitutional monarchy, there is still a separation of powers, and the monarch often plays a ceremonial and representational role. Both are forms of parliamentary government, expressions of the popular will, so the difference in the Head of State does not matter in the analysis of this case. Secondly, the *electoral system* could explain the

differences in policies between the two countries, especially in elucidating why similar public opinions translated into different policies. Electoral mechanisms could lead to different representativeness of public opinions. However, both the Danish and Finnish electoral systems are proportional representation systems; therefore, according to Mill's Method, if the factor is the same in both countries, it cannot explain the difference. This is evident from the fact that both Denmark and Finland have coalition governments. It is worth noting that this does not mean the electoral system does not influence this dynamic; it just influences it in the same way for both countries and thus does not explain the outcome this case study seeks to elucidate. In proportional systems, even a slight shift in voting preferences can result in very different government majorities and potentially opposing policies. If public opinion is highly polarized, and opposing-oriented parties compete in elections, a small change can lead to a switch from left-wing to right-wing governments. Indeed, observing the *political system* reveals its multipolar nature in both countries. Below are figures depicting the outcomes of the elections in both countries in the years 2011, 2015, and 2019. In both countries, center-left and center-right governments have alternated. The center-left parties (Social Democrats in both countries) and center-right parties (Venstre for Denmark, NCP for Finland) consistently garner a significant share of votes. Additionally, there is at least a third pole with a substantial share of votes in both countries, which is the far-right party: the DPP for Denmark and the Finns Party for Finland. Therefore, the distribution of votes among various parties aligns with the outcome of a proportional representation system.

*Figure 3.7. Denmark 2011 general elections – share of votes.*

Source: IDB, 2021.

Figure 3.8. Denmark 2015 general elections – share of votes.

Denmark 2015 general elections - share of votes

3,40%
4,20%
4,60%
4,80%
7,50%
7,80%
19,50%
21,10%
26,35%

- Social Democratic Party (SD)
- DPP (DF)
- Venstre (Liberal Party)
- Unity-Red / Green Aliance (E)
- Liberal Alliance (LA)
- Alternative (A)
- Social Liberal Party (RV)
- People's Socialist Party (SF)
- People's Conservative Party (KF)

Source: IDB, 2021.

Figure 3.9. Denmark 2019 general elections – share of votes.

Denmark 2019 general elections - share of votes

2,95%
2,36%
2,33%
6,62%
6,94%
7,71%
8,63%
8,74%
23,40%
25,90%

- Social Democratic Party (SD)
- Venstre (Liberal Party)
- DPP (DF)
- Social Liberal Party (RV)
- People's Socialist Party (SF)
- Unity-Red / Green Aliance (E)
- People's Conservative Party (KF)
- Alternative (A)
- New Right
- Liberal Alliance

Source: IDB, 2021.

Figure 3.10. Finland 2011 Parliamentary elections results – share of votes.

Finland 2011 Parliamentary elections results - share of votes

- National Coalition Party
- Social Democratic Party of Finland
- True Finns
- Centre Party
- Left Alliance
- Green League
- Swedish People's Party
- Christian Democrats

Source: IDB, 2021.

Figure 3.11. Finland 2015 Parliamentary elections results – share of votes.

Finland 2015 Parliamentary elections results - share of votes

- Centre Party
- Finns Party
- National Coalition Party
- Social Democratic Party
- Green League
- Left Alliance
- Swedish People's Party
- Christian Democrats

Source: IDB, 2021.

Figure 3.12. Finland 2019 Parliamentary elections results – share of votes.

Source: IDB, 2021.

Furthermore, as an additional indicator of the equality of the political systems in the two countries, it is noteworthy that in 2022, the Policy Participation Index is exactly the same for both Denmark and Finland, standing at 8.33. This demonstrates that there is an identical level of political participation in the two countries.

Table 3.6. Policy Participation Index in Denmark and Finland, 2022.

	Denmark	Finland
PPI (2022)	8,33	8,33

- **Role of the Social Democratic Party.**

An aspect that needs discussion is the role of the Social Democratic Party. Since the Social Democrats won the elections in both countries in 2019 *(Figure 3.13)*, it is worth exploring the role they played in Denmark and Finland, considering they should share the same ideals. The data presented in this thesis demonstrates that they had opposing approaches to immigration policy.

Indeed, in Finland in 2021, the government considered immigration, which was steadily increasing, as a permanent and fundamental part of the country's development. The Finnish Minister of the Interior planned a comprehensive migration policy aiming to enhance Finland's attractiveness for employment, studying, and remigration (Lampi et al., 2022, p.12). In contrast, in Denmark, the Social Democrats adopted anti-immigration policies aligned with measures taken by the previous right-wing government, aiming to discourage and limit immigration (Poulsen, 2021).

Figure 3.13. 2019 Elections results in Denmark and Finland.

Denmark 2019 general elections - share of votes

2,95% 2,36% 2,33%
6,62%
6,94% 25,90%
7,71%
8,63%
8,74% 23,40%

- Social Democratic Party (SD)
- Venstre (Liberal Party)
- DPP (DF)
- Social Liberal Party (RV)
- People's Socialist Party (SF)
- Unity-Red / Green Aliance (E)
- People's Conservative Party (KF)
- Alternative (A)
- New Right
- Liberal Alliance

Finland 2019 Parliamentary elections results - share of votes

3,90% 2,25%
4,53% 17,73%
8,17%
11,49%
17,48%
13,76%
17%

- Social Democratic Party
- Finns Party
- National Coalition Party
- Centre Party
- Green League
- Left Alliance
- Swedish People's Party
- Christian Democrats
- Movement Now

Source: IDB, 2021.

Firstly, the government in Denmark sent Syrian refugees back. From 2019 to 2021, at least 254 people lost their asylum status or were under appeal proceedings because the Danish state asked them to leave Denmark. The newspaper Politiken estimated that around 500 Syrians were asked to return to Syria. The Social Democratic government relied on a 2015 law distinguishing between political refugees and refugees who obtained status due to the state of war in their country of origin, and they sent back Syrian refugees arguing that Syria was sufficiently safe. Following this measure, there were protests in front of the Danish Parliament (Poulsen, 2021; Rauhala, E. 2023).

Furthermore, at the beginning of 2021, the Social Democratic government, in agreement with right-wing parties, implemented a measure that made it impossible for foreigners with a suspended sentence to obtain Danish citizenship and declared its intention to create immigration centers outside Europe to detain asylum seekers pending the examination of their applications. In Denmark, immigration was considered a challenge and often a threat. For instance, extremist Muslim immigrants were treated as a threat to Danish values and culture, even by the Social Democrats who justified their anti-immigration policies with the argument that they were security policies (Poulsen, 2021).

In contrast, Finland regarded labor migration as a beneficial means to address workforce shortages in specific sectors, notably nursing, and to concurrently support the pension system. In the year 2021, a total of 12,992 extended permits for work-related purposes were issued, marking an increase from 10,461 permits issued in the preceding year. Additionally, the Finnish government, in 2021, unveiled a comprehensive long-term plan aimed at achieving objectives related to immigration and enhancing Finland's appeal as a destination for work or study: the "*Roadmap for education-based and work-*

based immigration 2035" (Lampi et al., 2022, p.28). Further initiatives, such as a project initiated by the Finnish Immigration Service to streamline the issuance of work permits, were implemented. The number of first residence permits for family reunification also exhibited an upswing in 2021 compared to the pandemic-affected year of 2020 and showed a slight increase from the figures recorded in 2017 (Lampi et al., 2022, p.35). Notably, the *Finnish Immigration Service* demonstrated increased flexibility in handling reunion applications from Afghan citizens, partially attributed to the precarious security situation in Afghanistan (Lampi et al., 2022, p.38).

The reasons for the discrepancy in the immigration policies of the Social Democrats stem from a dual nature: a distinct history of anti-immigration propaganda by right-wing parties and a different interpretation of values promoted by the Social Democratic Party.

1) Different impact of right-wing anti-immigration Parties
First and foremost, Denmark's politics and public opinion have been significantly shaped by the activities of the leading Danish far-right party, the Danish People's Party (DPP), which emerged as a breakaway faction from the Danish Progress Party (Rydgren, 2010, p.3). Since the 1990s, the DPP, known as Dansk Folkeparti in Danish, has influenced public opinion by promoting the idea that the strength of the Danish welfare state lies in its homogeneity (Rauhala, 2023) and positioning itself against Radical Islam, considering it a security threat (Poulsen, 2021). In the early 2000s, the DPP began gaining votes from the working class, eroding the electoral base of the Social Democratic Party. By 2001, the DPP had 56% of workers' votes, while the Social Democrats had 43%. Over the years, the DPP has been adept at balancing its populist propaganda with a serious and credible image, always attentive to shifts in public opinion to garner trust from various social groups in the electorate. Notably, the party achieved extensive media coverage, particularly through the figure of Pia Kjxrsgaard. In response, the Danish Social Democratic Party, during the ten years of center-right government led by the Liberal Party Venstre, began advocating for a more restrictive immigration policy even in opposition. The aim was to regain the votes lost to the DPP. In 2019, the Social Democratic Party succeeded in winning back a portion of the electorate because, although both parties had clear positions on immigration policies, the DPP lost control over other issues such as climate, childcare, and pensions during the election campaign. Additionally, the DPP's position as the sole far-right party was challenged by the formation of the New Right Party, which gained four seats in Parliament with 2.36% of the vote in 2019 (Bosch et al., 2019).

Finland also has a history of anti-immigration right-wing parties, but their impact on the political system has been less influential in the history of Finnish politics. Firstly, while Denmark had made

immigration a prominent issue since the 1990s through the rhetoric of the *Danish Progress Party*, anti-immigration rhetoric was less forcefully articulated by the *Finnish Rural Party*, which experienced a moment of success in the 1970s-80s but faced internal issues and declared bankruptcy in 1995, the same year the Finns Party was founded. Consequently, the *Danish People's Party (DPP)* emerged on more fertile ground compared to the Finns Party. However, even the *Finns Party*, formerly known as *True Finns*, became the third-largest party in the country in 2011 after initially having little public appeal. The party achieved a substantial share and maintained it steadily over the years (see Figures), even entering the center-right government following the 2015 elections. Although the *Finns Party* shared xenophobic and racist values with the DPP, its influence was not such as to *"change the flavor of almost the entire Parliament,"* as former social democrat Allarp stated. This is evident from the policies implemented by the social democratic government, which maintained a liberal and multiculturalist approach (Poulsen, 2021). Consequently, we can assert that while in Denmark, the social democratic left adopted the strategy of anticipating and aligning with right-wing immigration policies, in Finland, the Social Democratic Party did not find it necessary.

This outcome is also reflected in the analysis of the election results in 2011, 2015, and 2019 in both countries. In Denmark, the DPP grew from 12.32% in 2011 to 21.10% in 2015. Consequently, the Social Democratic Party adopted the strategy of aligning with the policies proposed by the DPP. The strategy proved successful, as in 2019, the Social Democratic Party won the elections with 25.90%, and the DPP reduced to 8.74%, explained also by the aforementioned management of other party issues. The results of 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections have already been presented in *Figures from 3.7 to 3.9.* In Finland, on the other hand, the share of the *Finns Party* (formerly *True Finns*) has remained about the same, in fact slightly decreased from 19.10% (2011), to 17.65% (2015) to 17.48% (2019). As a result, there was no increase in the Finns Party electorate that challenged the *Social Democrats'* electorate as well as in Denmark. The results of the elections from 2011, 2015 and 2019 are shown in *Figures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12.*

2) Different interpretation of the values promoted by the Social Democratic Party.
Secondly, the two parties interpreted social democratic ideals differently. The values of social democracy include equality, solidarity, freedom, and, in general, the foundational values of human rights. At the core of social democratic ideals is the right to work: every citizen has the right to earn a living through a job they choose or freely accept, and the state must actively work to safeguard this right. However, there are various interpretations of these values, and a party's political agenda is based on these interpretations (Kastning, 2013. If the Finnish Social Democratic Party promoted the ideals

of multiculturalism, defending and supporting immigration, the *Danish Social Democratic Party* returned to a more classic conception of social democratic values, focusing on the protection of Danish workers while facing various internal divisions on the issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Initially, when the *Progress Party* conducted its very aggressive election campaign, the *Social Democratic Party* was torn between aligning with right-wing orientations or keeping the Social-Liberal Party on its side (Nordics Info, N.D.). Strategically, the party then moved towards a more indifferent stance on the issue (initially, its position was confused) and later increasingly hostile (Rydgren, 2010). This shift in the social democratic party's stance can also be interpreted as a "return to social democratic values," as analyzed by Paul Collier (2021).

According to Collier, in a context where social democracy in Europe is focusing on individual rights, facing an undeniable crisis of the electorate (Bandau, 2022), Meyye Frederiksen[12] advocates for a renewal of European social democracy. This renewal should begin with a rebuilding of shared identity, common purposes, and mutual obligations (Collier, 2021). In other words, from this perspective, the Danish *Social Democratic Party* seems to be returning to considering and prioritizing the interests of Danish workers. On the contrary, the Finnish *Social Democratic Party*, in line with other European social democratic parties, has shown support and tolerance towards immigration, promoting multicultural ideals. According to the Multiculturalism Policy Index developed by *Queen's University* in Canada, Finland is considered one of the most multiculturalist countries in Europe (Saukkonen, 2018; Coburn, 2011; Duvieusart-Déry, 2011; Tolley, 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that the Finnish *Social Democratic Party*, in the context of a strategic reorientation that occurred after the 1980s by all European social democratic parties, also described as "*the most dramatic programmatic reworking*" in the history of left-wing parties (Rapone, 2007; Sassoon 1996), has favored individual rights and multiculturalism. In contrast, the Danish *Social Democratic Party* has preferred the founding values of the social democratic ideal, emphasizing an interventionist state rather than a purely regulatory one, as advocated by neoliberals. It prioritizes collective interests over individualistic demands (Rapone, 2007). This trade-off between social solidarity and multiculturalism is described in Goodhart's work (2017), explaining that for citizens to feel social solidarity, it is essential to have a solidarity more easily achievable in homogeneous societies (Freeland, 2017).

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[12] Leader of the Social Democrats since 2015, since 2019 minister of state of Denmark.

- **Polarization of opinions & saliency of the issue.**

In the previous paragraphs (§1.2.3, §2.1.3, §3.3.1), we discussed the role of opinion polarization in the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. Immigration, being a prominent issue, is often highly polarized. Schneider-Strawczynski and Valette (2022) explain that a more salient issue doesn't necessarily lead to an increase in negative opinions but results in a shift in attitudes toward immigration from more moderate to more extreme, indicating higher polarization. Consequently, the difference between Denmark and Finland's policies might be explained by the fact that the public opinion index (capturing the country's average orientation toward immigration) might not be indicative as it doesn't account for the polarization of opinions. Indeed, data resulting from the analysis conducted in Chapter 2 confirms a difference in opinion polarization between the two countries: high polarization in Denmark and low polarization in Finland. In Table 3.2, derived from the calculations in §2.1.3, it is observed that within the sample of 32 countries considered in this thesis, Denmark has one of the highest levels of polarization regarding opinions on immigrants (highlighted in orange, score of 31), while Finland is among the countries with the least polarized opinions.

Table 3.7. PO Polarization: Denmark and Finland scores and positions in the general ranking.

Position	Country	Polarization of opinions
1	HUNGARY	44
2	LATVIA	42
3	SLOVAKIA	38
4	ALBANIA	37
5	SERBIA	34
6	TURKEY	34
7	NORTH MACEDONIA	34
8	ESTONIA	33
9	GREECE	32
10	NORWAY	31
11	ROMANIA	31
12	FRANCE	31
13	DENMARK	31
14	JAPAN	29
15	CZECHIA	29
16	LITHUANIA	29
17	SWEDEN	27
18	POLAND	26
19	NETHERLANDS	26
20	NEW ZEALAND	25
21	ITALY	25
22	GERMANY	24
23	AUSTRIA	24
24	SPAIN	23
25	GREAT BRITAIN	22
26	FINLAND	22
27	CHILE	21
28	ICELAND	20
29	SWITZERLAND	20
30	CANADA	18
31	MEXICO	18
32	PORTUGAL	16

Table 3.8. Opinion Polarization Index in Denmark and Finland (2017-2022).

Country	Polarization Index (opinions)
Denmark	30, 97
Finland	22,19

The result on polarization is also consistent with the analysis of political dynamics, and the propaganda role of far-right parties in the two countries. Denmark's strong polarization is certainly related to the strong anti-immigration election campaign that involved citizens' opinion as early as the late 1980s, with the *Progress Party* calling for local referendums to get all municipalities to vote, and then with the DPP. At the same time, however, as reported earlier the Danish people were protesting in 2021 in front of the Danish parliament over the decision to send Syrian refugees back to Syria (Poulsen, 2021). It is also visible in the volatility of the Danish people, which has allowed new parties to escape electoral marginalization (Rydgren, 2010). Consequently, the facts are consistent with a high polarization of opinions.

As expressed above the more salient an issue the more polarized it is (Schneider-Strawczynski et al., 2022) and this is again confirmed by the data. Eurobarometer surveys show that the salience of the immigration issue from 2011 to 2017 rose much more in Denmark than in Finland. Specifically, according to the 2010/11 Eurobarometer, the salience of immigration in Denmark was 13.1 while in 2016/2017 it rose to 39.4; in contrast, in Finland in 2010/11 it was 11.3 and in 2016/7 it only rose to 17.5 (Hatton, 2021; EU, 2011; EU, 2017).

Table 3.9. Saliency of Immigration Issue in Finland and Denmark in 2010/11 and 2016/17.

Country	Saliency of Immigration in 2010/11	Saliency of Immigration in 2016/17
Finland	11,3	17,5
Denmark	13,1	39,4

Source: Eurobarometer 2010/11; Eurobarometer 2016/17.

Another aspect to be considered is the influence of the EU in the two countries in immigration policies, which, however, is logically included in the variable polarization of opinions and saliency, because it is dependent on it, as will be explained in a moment. First, it should be noted that although both countries belong to the EU and have signed the Dublin Regulation with a view to the realization of common asylum system, the influence of the EU on immigration policies is definitely greater in Finland, as Denmark in its history of relations with the EU has always tried to maintain a higher level

of national autonomy and sovereignty. It has exercised its right to opt out of the *Common Security and Defense Policy* (CSDP), which was later repealed in a referendum (Liboreiro, 2022) and certain aspects of *Justice and Home Affairs* (JHA), including EU policies on political asylum and immigration (Petersen, 2012). This aspect is very much related to the polarization and salience of the issue, as the political system at one point had questioned the usefulness of the opt-out, in the context of commitment to the EU, but the main obstacle to its repeal was precisely convincing the public that opt-outs were more of an obstacle than a privilege. It is also clearly related to the values of salience and polarization in Denmark, where the issue of immigration was highly felt, and the people did not want to lose national sovereignty on the issue. Eventually, the opt-out from security and immigration policies was turned into an opt-in: Denmark can take part in decisions that are in its interest (Petersen, 2012). Consequently, Finland, which has not made any kind of opt-out, has a greater commitment to harmonizing its laws with the principles, but this reasoning is in line with what has been said about polarization and saliency.

3.4 Answer to the research question.

The analysis just conducted was aimed at analyzing several variables in Denmark and Finland over the period 2017-2022 that could explain the difference in immigration policies in the two countries. First, the difference between Danish and Finnish immigration policies cannot be explained by the variable of public opinion. This was already clear, and the Thesis arises precisely from observing this counterintuitive aspect: there is a relationship between public opinion and immigration policies, but in Denmark the same public opinion leads to two very different types of policies. What, then, is the factor that explains this phenomenon? The answer to different policies cannot lie in the economy, welfare model, social stability, and demographics either. In fact, the indicators of these aspects confirm that both countries offer a very good level of social and economic welfare, while encountering the same problems at the demographic level related to declining fertility rate, declining birth rates and aging and related problems for the pension sector. Third, the employment in industry variable, which in Chapter 2 was found to have a negative correlation with public opinion and immigration policies, was also tested: the higher the level of employment in industry as a percentage of total employment, the less tolerant public opinion and policies were toward immigration, and vice versa. However, the level of employment in industry was found to be very similar in Denmark and Finland (21.9 percent and 18.9 percent). Consequently, even this variable cannot explain the different policy approach. Fourth, all aspects of institutional, electoral, and political system were analyzed, and it was found that both countries have parliamentary systems, with proportional electoral systems leading to multipolar political systems, where the Parties with a substantial share of the electorate are

more than two: the center-left party, the center-right party and the far-right party. In addition, the two countries also have the same level of political participation. So, even this variable does not explain the outcome of the case. Finally, the role of Social Democratic Parties in the two countries and the level of opinion polarization & salience of the issue were described. The role of the Social Democratic Party, which has controlled the government since 2019 in both countries, was found to be very different for two reasons. First, in Denmark, the Social Democratic government shifted toward anti-immigration policies to win back the votes that the far-right Party (*DPP*) was gaining among the working class, the Party's historical electoral base. The history of anti-immigration parties was found to be very significant and had a strong impact in changing Danish policies. In contrast, the Finnish Social Democratic government did not adopt this strategy, presumably first because the party did not need it (its share remained virtually unchanged from 2011 to 2019 and not challenged by the Finns Party). Second, the different approach of the two Social Democratic Parties can also be ascribed to a different interpretative choice of social democratic values: while Finland promoted the ideals of multiculturalism, Denmark focused on social solidarity of workers. Goodhart (2017) explains that these two aspects are in conflict. Collier (2021) explains that following globalization, the Social Democratic Parties have become more and more protectors and promoters of multiculturalism, while the Danish Social Democratic Party has distinguished itself from the trend of the Social Democratic Parties at this time in history. So, Denmark and Finland differed on the size of the Social Democratic Party's role: in Denmark it adopted a political strategy to recover votes and win elections, and at the same time departed from an established social democratic tradition in Europe by now, returning to a more original conception of the Party; in Finland, on the other hand, it continued along the lines of multiculturalism and the encouragement of immigration. Finally, the polarization of opinions & saliency variable was analyzed. Both variables were high in Denmark and low in Finland. This finding shows that although average public opinion is the same in Denmark and Finland, it is not indicative: what matters is polarization, that is, the distribution of opinions. It is also closely related to the saliency of the issue, which, not surprisingly, is most strongly felt in Denmark in the period 2017-2022. So, the variables left out to explain the outcome are:

1) *Role of the Social Democratic Party*; 2) *Polarization of Opinions & Saliency of the Issue.*

We summarize the results in the Table below (*Table 3.10)*, which is based on the table shown in Section §3.1.

Table 3.10. Application of Mill's Method of Difference to the case of Denmark and Finland.

	Denmark	Finland
Public Opinion towards Immigration.	Pro-immigrants.	Pro-immigrants.
Economy, welfare model, social stability and demography.	High level of social and economic well-being; same demographic issues related to declining fertility rates, aging, and corresponding problems for the retirement sector.	High level of social and economic well-being; same demographic issues related to declining fertility rates, aging, and corresponding problems for the retirement sector.
Employment in Industry.	Around 20% of total employment.	Around 20% of total employment.
Institutional, electoral and political system.	Parliamentary system, with proportional electoral system leading to multipolar political systems, where the Parties that have a substantial share of the electorate are more than two: the center-left party, the center-right party and the far-right party. *Policy Participation Index* = 8,33.	Parliamentary system, with proportional electoral system leading to multipolar political systems, where the Parties that have a substantial share of the electorate are more than two: the center-left party, the center-right party and the far-right party. *Policy Participation Index* = 8,33.
***Role of the Social Democratic Party* (IV).**	Adopted a political strategy to recover working class votes and win elections; departed from multicultural values, reverting to a more original conception of the Party, focused on workers protection.	Continued along the lines of multiculturalism and the encouragement of immigration.
***Polarization of opinions & Saliency* (IV).**	High.	Low.
***Outcome* (DV).**	Anti-immigrant policies.	Pro-immigrant policies.

Criticism: Are they really two variables or is it the same?

Following the conduct of this case study and the results obtained, a question arises: are *the role of the Social Democratic Party* and *Polarization & Saliency* really two separate and independent variables, or do they converge into one answer? The fact that the Social Democratic Party adopted that political strategy is closely related to the advancement of the Far-Right Party (*DPP*). The fact that the far-right Party had a greater influence on the political system in Denmark than in Finland is related to the greater salience of the issue in Denmark, where people felt the issue was more important, and consequently to the polarization of opinions. Recall that in Denmark, when the government took measures against Syrian refugees, part of the population protested in front of the Danish Parliament (Poulsen, 2021; Rauhala, E. 2023), but that was the same people against whom the government was afraid to take sides by repealing the opt-out from EU migration management. Consequently, it could be argued that the Social Democratic Party's approach and the polarization & salience of the issue are two aspects of the same response. So, a unique variable could be defined as: *Saliency of the issue, Polarization of Opinions and Political effects.*

Conclusions

The Thesis aimed to describe the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies, and it can be concluded that the two variables are definitely related, and that the people have an important impact in the policies of democratic governments. Politicians respond to changes in people's needs, primarily with the goal of winning elections or otherwise not losing voters. Usually, the public opinion that matters is not that of all the people, but that of the most politically and economically influential interest groups, such as major corporations, labor unions, municipalities, and civil rights organizations, employ lobbyists that exert influence on the government in order to advocate for policies that align with their own interests (Böhmelt, 2021; Cornelius, Rosenblum, 2005). However, it has been shown that the more salient the issue, the more impact people's public opinion has. The Thesis made a contribution in analyzing the ways in which issue salience affects the relationship between public opinion and immigration policies. In fact, it was found through the Case Study of Denmark and Finland that the average public opinion is not a relevant parameter in the determination, but rather we need to look at its distribution, that is, the *Polarization of opinions*. In fact, in Denmark and Finland the difference in policy approach cannot be ascribed to the Public Opinion Index (which measures the average orientation of people in the two countries toward immigration), but corresponds to a different level of Opinion Polarization, which is high in Denmark and low in Finland. This aspect, in the two countries is also related to the *approach of the governing Parties*, which adjust to public opinion: the Danish Social Democratic Party, for example, reacted has a shift of the working class to the far-right DPP Party. Through a study of people's preferences, the SD Party chose to adopt a deterrence strategy, through which it anticipated the DPP's immigration policies and won back the part of the electorate that was moving to the right, through careful management of issues of public interest. Policies, therefore, cannot disregard public opinion, and this dynamic is all the stronger the more salient the issue: for example, it was seen that Denmark had difficulty repealing the right to opt out of JHA because of the very divided and attentive public opinion on the issue.

The Thesis empirically demonstrated the results of the different *polarization* in the two countries from an original analysis of the WVS dataset (Chapter 2). Regarding the calculation of *saliency*, however, the dataset did not prove effective due to lack of data. An attempt was made to calculate the saliency of the topic as the percentage of people who expressed themselves (thus measuring the total number of survey participants by eliminating those who did not respond or answered "*don't know*"). However, it was higher than 90 percent in all countries, and therefore not very indicative. For this reason, a pre-existing data disconnected from the WVS, the Eurobarometer, was used to measure the saliency of the topic in the two countries, but it was consistent with the rest of the analysis.

Regarding the answer to the question "*why do Denmark and Finland have the same public opinion on immigration, but different policies?",* Mill's Method highlighted the role of *polarization & saliency*, as well as the different *approach of the Social Democratic Party* in the two countries. However, following the application of the Method the independence of the two variables was questioned, for while on the surface they appeared to be two separate variables, they actually have many connections. First, the SD Party's political strategy in Denmark is closely related to the advancement of the far-right Party (DPP) and its influence on the political system in Denmark, due in turn to the increased salience of the issue in Denmark and the polarization of opinion. Denmark's atypical approach is consistent with a history of public hostility toward multiculturalism, but at the same time support for immigrants as in the case of the Syrian refugee crisis. Consequently, the method is successful if these two variables can be grouped into a single variable that could be defined as: "*saliency of the issue, polarization of opinions and political effects."* Alternatively, if these two variables were independent, this result would be consistent with the Expected Results at the beginning of the writing of the Thesis. It could not be known *a priori* how many different determinants there would be of the phenomenon considered as Outcome, namely immigration policies. Consequently, in that case one would ascribe the partial conclusion to a limitation of the Method and defer to the research further analysis of these two determinants to discriminate which one really explains the phenomenon, through the use of a different methodology, such as QCA.

Finally, as the analysis in this thesis closes in 2022, it is worth mentioning that the situation in Finland has radically changed, as in Finland as of 2023 the center-right party (*National Coalition Party*) took over the leadership of the Finnish government, which has allied itself with the far-right nationalists (*Finns Party*) and two smaller center-right parties (*Swedish People's Party of Finland* and *Christian Democrats*). Again, like Denmark, the government is formally moderate in orientation, but in policies it is taking an increasingly nationalist and anti-immigration stance, as evident from the policy of closing the border with Russia in November in 2023 to counter illegal immigration (Baccini, 2023; Szumski, C.), or to measures on austerity and tightening of citizenship regulations (Henley, 2023). We refer further research to see whether the conditions presented in the case study have changed in Finland, i.e., whether polarization and saliency have increased in the meantime, or whether the more centrist Parties were losing electoral base and thus anticipated the policies of the more extremist parties, as this would confirm the hypothesis presented in this Thesis. This hypothesis would be reconcilable with the growth of the young and working-age electorate that was occurring for the *Finns Party* as early as 2020: it is possible that the process was the same as Denmark, but slower over time since the populist party took longer to become a threat to the centrist parties.

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