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Artificial Intelligence and Representative Democracy: Legal Implications for the Italian Parliament in the EU Context

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Table of Contents

Introduction	4
Chapter 1 – The European Regulatory Framework: The EU AI Act	6
1.1 Origins and objectives of the European AI Regulation	6
1.2 Risk-based classification and obligations for public sector institutions	7
1.3 The Italian Parliament as Both User and Regulator of AI	9
1.4 Parliamentary Debates and Initiatives Related to AI Legislation	10
1.5 Challenges of Aligning National Law with the EU AI Act	11
1.6 Role of Parliamentary Officials and Legal-Administrative Services	12
CHAPTER 2 – AI in Parliamentary Practice: Tools and Case Studies	14
2.1 AI-assisted Drafting of Bills and Filtering of Amendments	14
2.2 The Italian Parliamentary System and the Introduction of AI in Legislative Procedures.....	15
2.3 Case Study: The Italian Senator’s (Lombardo) Speech Written with ChatGPT – Implications for Transparency and Authorship	19
2.4 Case Study: AI and the Filtering of Amendments in the Italian Legislative Process	23
A. Disegno di Legge n. 1146/2024	24
B. Dangers and Protections	26
2.5 Use of AI in Legislative Research and Decision-Support Tools.....	27
2.6 Comparative insights: How other EU parliaments are responding to AI	29
CHAPTER 3 – Risks, Ethics, and Democratic Integrity	32
Chapter 3.1 – Risks to Democratic Integrity: Automation, Opacity, and Accountability.....	32
3.2 – The Role of Digital Constitutionalism in AI Regulation	36
3.3 – Institutional Safeguards and the Need for Digital Literacy in Parliament.....	38
3.4 – Reflections on the Legitimacy and Authenticity of AI-Assisted Political Discourse	41
3.5 – Artificial Intelligence Between Efficiency and Representation: An Epistemic Dilemma	43
CHAPTER 4 – Policy Recommendations and Future Outlook	46
4.1 Guidelines for Responsible AI Use within Parliamentary Functions	46
A. Human-Centered Design and Oversight	46
B. Risk-Based AI Governance Structures.....	48
C. Procedural and Normative Safeguards.....	50
4.2 Recommendations for Transparency and Ethical Oversight	51
4.3 Fostering Institutional Resilience and Digital Literacy in Parliament.....	54
4.4 Italy’s Role in Shaping a Democratic Model for AI Governance in Europe	56

A. Legislative Leadership and Normative Diffusion	56
B. Integrating Constitutionalism into European AI Policy	57
C. Advancing Ethical-AI Research and Legal Thought Leadership.....	57
D. Promoting Participatory AI Governance Across Society	58
4.5 Conclusion.....	60
Bibliography	61

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer a peripheral tool of administrative optimisation in this advanced age of digital acceleration; rather, it has become a major actor in the process of altering public government. This transition is especially noticeable in legislative settings, where the power of artificial intelligence to comprehend language, organise information, and provide assistance in decision-making is interacting with the fundamental ideals of democratic discourse and institutional accountability. The deployment of artificial intelligence within representative institutions creates deep normative, legal, and epistemological concerns, even though AI presents new prospects for procedural efficiency and legislative innovation.

Through the lens of digital constitutionalism and the Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation EU 2024/1689), this thesis investigates the ways in which artificial intelligence (AI) is being incorporated into the legislative operations of the Italian Parliament. Additionally, it investigates the implications of this development regarding the consequences of this development. Given that the Italian Parliament serves both as a user and a regulator of artificial intelligence, it is able to be at the centre of one of the most significant developments in the governance of contemporary constitutional systems. Parliamentary bodies, in contrast to primarily executive agencies or private entities, serve as both symbolic and procedural guardians of democratic principles. They constitute legislation not merely via the use of language and standards, but also through debate, pluralism, and the rituals of institutions. The implementation of artificial intelligence into these functions calls into question long-held beliefs regarding authorship, accountability, and the transparency of the legislative process.

The first chapter provides an overview of the legal environment in Europe, with a particular emphasis on the designation of high-risk systems under the Artificial Intelligence Act and the consequences for applications in the public sector. To comprehend why the employment of artificial intelligence in parliament is not just a problem of internal efficiency but also a constitutional and democratic issue, this lays the groundwork for understanding why it is important. Using both internal advancements and experimental projects, Chapter 2 investigates the way the Italian Parliament has begun to implement artificial intelligence systems. These systems include legislative draughting tools and amendment filtering solutions. A detailed case study of Senator Marco Lombardo's usage of generative artificial intelligence in a public speech is also included in this chapter. The purpose of this study is to emphasise the contradiction that exists between transparency and institutional integrity. Following this, Chapter 3 examines the dangers posed by automation, opacity, and accountability by utilising insights from digital ethics and legal theory. These insights include Floridi's concepts of "infraethics" and "infostructure." Additionally, it investigates the normative framework of digital constitutionalism as a means of protecting democratic plurality from the possibility of having its foundations eroded.

The fourth chapter brings together all these different threads in order to suggest real policy recommendations for how artificial intelligence could be included into legislative functions in a manner that maintains democratic legitimacy. The authors offer a governance method that is layered and is based on human-centered oversight, institutional openness, and ethical supervision. This strategy is in keeping with the ideals that are articulated in the Artificial Intelligence Act as well as in scholarly thought on digital constitutionalism.

The thesis contends, through this study, that artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to assist in modernising parliamentary work; nevertheless, it must do so in accordance with stringent

constitutional criteria. Not by fighting against the progression of technology, but by guiding it with normative clarity and institutional wisdom, the Italian Parliament has a one-of-a-kind opportunity and obligation to define how democracy ought to operate in the digital age.

Chapter 1 – The European Regulatory Framework: The EU AI Act

1.1 Origins and objectives of the European AI Regulation

Over the past decade, artificial intelligence (AI) has progressed from a technical frontier to a transformative force reshaping governmental institutions, economic systems, and civic life. Within this framework, the European Union has established itself as a global leader in normative technology governance, endeavouring to anchor the development of artificial intelligence in the Union's core constitutional values: democracy, human dignity, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights (Di Gregorio, 2022). The Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/...) represents the most comprehensive legislative initiative to date focused only on artificial intelligence. This represents a significant achievement for the digital single market and underscores Europe's aim to create a "third way" distinct from the market-oriented approach of the United States and the surveillance-centric model typically associated with China (Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021).

The AI Act originates from an increasing institutional recognition that the rapid deployment of AI systems—particularly those reliant on autonomous decision-making and opaque machine learning techniques—undermines existing legal safeguards. In response, the European Commission initiated a strategic approach to regulation, commencing with the release of the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence in 2020, which established the groundwork for the legislative proposal anticipated in 2021 (European Commission, 2021). The White Paper stated that artificial intelligence should demonstrate creativity together with "trustworthiness, legality, and ethical behaviour," while shaping the Commission's legislative aims to promote economic competitiveness and earn public trust.

The AI Act classifies AI systems according to four risk categories that match established legal standards: unacceptable risk, high risk, limited risk, and low risk. This approach seeks to ensure proportionality: Artificial Intelligence systems that present significant risks to public safety or basic rights face more rigorous regulatory restrictions. The European Parliament and Council (2024) explicitly prohibit systems deemed to pose unacceptable risks which include social grading by governments and real-time biometric tracking in public areas. Numerous public sector applications in law enforcement and other domains are subject to strict compliance standards which mandate conformity assessments along with risk management protocols and human oversight as well as documentation requirements (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2021).

The most important novelty is the fact that the AI Act positions public sector institutions, including national parliaments, within its regulatory framework. Legislative entities are subject to examination and are implicitly regarded as pivotal participants in the regulation and application of AI. This dual duty carries significant implications: national parliaments must concurrently fulfil the AI Act's stipulations and critically assess how their internal utilization of AI corresponds with democratic principles. The seminal work on algorithmic regulation demonstrates that public bodies employing AI need to maintain transparency and explainability while also allowing contestation of systems affecting individual rights or group decision-making according to Yeung and Lodge (2019).

The AI Act belongs to a wider legal and philosophical trend known as digital constitutionalism which seeks to apply constitutional principles to digital space governance. Di Gregorio (2022) and Pollicino (2021) are among the scholars who emphasize the necessity of adapting traditional legal theories to

address the unique challenges posed by autonomous technologies. This encompasses the enhancement of procedural safeguards, the prevention of algorithmic decision-making from becoming opaque, and the assurance that the deployment of AI does not undermine institutional legitimacy. Consequently, the EU's legal response is not only constitutional but also regulatory in nature, with the objective of ensuring that democratic supervision is prioritized in the context of technology systems.

The objectives of the AI Act are dual. Its primary objective is to create a cohesive internal market for artificial intelligence, ensuring legal clarity and regulatory uniformity across all Union members. Secondly, particularly in sensitive domains such as legislation, public administration, and judicial review where artificial intelligence is employed, it aims to uphold democratic institutions and fundamental rights. AI systems are intertwined with social and political assumptions, making their governance inextricable from matters of power, accountability, and legitimacy, as noted by Crawford (2021)—they are not impartial tools.

The Artificial Intelligence agenda of the European Union seeks to merge technological progress with democratic governance by upholding constitutional values. National parliaments need to manage domestic AI adoption challenges while ensuring they meet European legislative requirements that support this specific goal. The following sections will explore the transformation of these ideas into public authority responsibilities and the difficulties legislative bodies encounter with specific attention to the Italian Parliament.

1.2 Risk-based classification and obligations for public sector institutions

At its core, the EU AI Act is a regulatory risk framework means oriented towards a primordial of Union's ambition to set up regulation on different Ai applications while minimizing innovation from happening. Methodology: it partitions AI systems in four categories i.e. unacceptable, high, limited and low risk — all bearing different types of legal obligations associated. Much of the public conversation has been private sector compliance related, but the impacts for public sector institutions—especially parliaments, ministries and administrations—thanks to the AI act are an equal concern.

According to Section B of Annex III in the AI Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024) that AI systems used in high-risk sectors, such as education, law enforcement and policing, border control and public administrations will be designated as “High-risk”. This group as a natural consequence contains many of the governments tools (governance for forecasting policy analysis systems, drafting legislation and administrative decision-making tools or propagandistic government communication). Importantly, the high-risk classifications comprise executive agencies but also legislative bodies if they apply AI technologies having a direct or indirect effect on individual rights or democratic framework.

These systems should meet strict compliance requirements on the part of the AI Act and include:

- Risk management strategies to foresees, alleviate and supervise the possible damages.
- Set of data governance requirements, to keep compliance to the quality, representativeness and relevance of the training dataset.
- Technical documentation to help traceability and audits.

- Human oversight systems so that AI derived decisions can be challenged or reversed.
- Transparency obligations requiring transparency on the extent to which the use of AI is exploited processes (European Commission, 2021).

The obligations in this regard double bind for national parliaments. Also this dual hat is posing serious institutional and ethical challenge to parliaments on how democratic integrity & transparency can be secured in a digitalised legislative space that do exist nowadays. On the one hand, they are tasked with implementing the AI Act through national legislation and ensuring conformity across sectors. On the other hand, they must critically assess their own internal adoption of AI systems, from algorithmic document review to speech drafting assistance. As noted by the OECD (2022), it is a double bind for national parliaments.

The public deployment of high-risk artificial intelligence systems is further complicated by usually being procured from private vendors, hence creating questions around legal liability and accountability in cases of malfunction or bias. In cases when a parliamentary committee use an artificial intelligence system to categorize public comments on a bill, who holds ultimate accountability for the results: the vendor, the parliamentary IT department, or the presiding committee? The AI Act seeks to clarify this by defining the "deploying user" as a legal entity with compliance obligations (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2021); however, the internal decision-making hierarchies of legislative bodies still present challenges in conforming to these explicit classifications.

This is especially pertinent in the Italian context, where legislative frameworks embody both legal diversity and administrative fragmentation. The legal-administrative offices of the Italian Parliament, although responsible for guaranteeing procedural compliance, may lack the technical proficiency necessary to evaluate or oversee AI systems in real time. The intricacy of AI governance potentially engenders "grey zones" in which accountability is diminished, and transparency is undermined.

Moreover, the high-risk designation entails not only technological requirements but also institutional and cultural transformations. Yeung and Lodge (2019) contend that regulating AI transcends basic compliance; it necessitates a re-evaluation of institutional design, encompassing the processes of decision-making, documentation, and contestation. This prompts an inquiry into the efficacy of human oversight—one of the Act's fundamental protections—when legislative personnel or parliamentarians possess inadequate digital literacy or insufficient comprehension of algorithmic mechanisms.

In this context, digital constitutionalism (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021) provides a crucial analytical framework. Transparency, accountability, and participatory governance are constitutional principles that must be implemented through both legislation and institutional practices that embody democratic oversight of technological systems. The necessity for human oversight must transcend mere procedural formality and serve as a substantive assurance facilitating meaningful involvement in activities backed by artificial intelligence.

The desire for transparency in high-risk systems indicates that parliamentary institutions must establish clear internal protocols for disclosing AI utilization to the public and other governmental branches. Beyond legal responsibilities, this transparency is a democratic need, as legislative bodies derive their legitimacy from public trust and electoral accountability. AI systems possess an inherently political nature, as noted by Crawford (2021); they influence the generation of information, the exercise of power, and the distribution of visibility.

In summary, the AI Act's risk-based approach places a considerable compliance obligation on public sector entities while simultaneously providing a model for ethical and democratic AI governance. For parliaments such as Italy's, it serves as a prompt for institutional reflection: not just on the regulation of AI inside society, but also on the governance of their own utilization of it with integrity and legality. The subsequent section will analyse the interpretation and internalization of these commitments by national legislatures, particularly emphasizing the Italian Parliament.

1.3 The Italian Parliament as Both User and Regulator of AI

The Italian Parliament has a peculiar double identity in the broader governance landscape of artificial intelligence (AI): first, it is norm-setting body at that level; and secondly, it would also be an institutional actor, subject to the regulations it creates.

Parliament is indispensable as lawmaker introducing European regulations, such as the AI Act into national law through transposition. At the same time, it continuously incorporates AI-driven tools into its internal processes - spanning document analysis to legislation drafting assistance- thereby becoming a user of the technologies it aims to govern.

The paradox creates intertwined questions on accountability within an institution, transparency of administration and procedural regularities.

Parliament must ensure that national law respects the normative framework of trustworthiness and centrality on human beings in trustworthy AI within the European Union. However, it must then bear the internal political-institutional ethical and practical challenges of adopting AI in the political-institutional system. Fitzilis (2021) points out that the deployment of AI in legislative contexts should be done with precaution concerning on bias, interpretability and decision-making autonomy - especially when technologies aid deliberative or writing activities.

In Italy, in practice preliminary testing of AI in parliamentary procedures is still experimental. Current applications being considered/pilot using natural language processing systems for text classification and legislative retrieval, algorithms for amendment filtering, sentiment analysis tools measuring public sentiment. These tools have the potential to improve efficiency metrics but at potential cost arising from political and the opacity of results from an automated algorithmics. This is especially important in the case of legislation, where decisions must be unambiguous, debated and appealing to public opinion (OECD, 2022).

Furthermore, the Italian Parliament is constrained by constitutional norms that dictate the exercise of governmental authority. The incorporation of AI technology must adhere to Article 97 of the Italian Constitution, which requires administrative impartiality and efficiency, alongside larger assurances of parliamentary sovereignty and institutional integrity. Researchers like Citino (2020) have underscored that the "augmented parliament" proposed by digital innovation must be anchored by legislative certainty and democratic oversight, steering clear of the use of technology as a replacement for political deliberation.

The Parliament's regulatory function includes evaluating the application of the EU's risk-based approach to its own utilization of AI. The AI Act categorizes tools utilized in public administration, particularly those influencing legal rights or the execution of public authority, as high-risk systems, which must adhere to stringent standards concerning transparency, data integrity, and human oversight (European Commission, 2021; AI Act, 2024). This indicates that the use of AI in

parliamentary contexts, whether it affects legislative results or informs parliamentary discourse, should be evaluated not alone from a technological perspective but also via constitutional and ethical frameworks (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021).

This regulatory self-reflexivity poses the Italian Parliament at a critical juncture. Its judgments will dictate whether AI functions as an instrument for democratic improvement or engenders novel forms of procedural obscurity and power imbalance. The problem lies in preserving the legitimacy and authenticity of political processes while adjusting to the opportunities afforded by digital technologies. Consequently, Parliament must not only adhere to the AI Act but also exemplify responsible and transparent AI utilization, establishing a benchmark for other public institutions.

1.4 Parliamentary Debates and Initiatives Related to AI Legislation

Parliamentary involvement with artificial intelligence in Italy has progressed in tandem with wider European legislative advancements, however it remains comparatively underdeveloped relative to other digital policy areas. The executive and administrative branches have primarily led the implementation of digital strategies, while the Italian Parliament has increasingly assumed a proactive role in formulating AI regulation, demonstrating its legislative function and its duty to oversee the integration of emerging technologies within democratic institutions.

Parliamentary discussions on AI in Italy frequently converge on issues like as privacy, digital rights, algorithmic bias, and technological sovereignty. These talks have intensified in relation to the European Union's AI Act, which has acted as both a benchmark and a stimulus for national contemplation. Members of Parliament have submitted inquiries and proposed motions concerning the ethical application of AI in areas including public administration, education, security, and justice. Some initiatives have aimed to enhance digital literacy and institutional openness, especially concerning the procurement and implementation of algorithmic systems in government bodies (OECD, 2022).

The formation of interparliamentary working groups and digital policy committees has significantly enhanced institutional awareness. These entities often comprise legal experts, technologists, and public officials assigned to assess the benefits and hazards associated with AI in legislative and administrative frameworks. This multistakeholder approach demonstrates the increasing acknowledgment that the regulation of AI necessitates interdisciplinary competence and a discourse among legal standards, technological realities, and democratic principles (Fitzilis, 2021; Di Gregorio, 2022).

In recent years, the Italian Parliament has conducted public hearings and seminars on artificial intelligence, frequently in partnership with academic institutions, think tanks, and civil society organizations. These events have highlighted concerns regarding algorithmic opacity, the possible diminishment of democratic discourse, and the unforeseen ramifications of entrusting public decision-making to automated systems (Pollicino, 2021; Crawford, 2021). These issues express the necessity of preserving institutional supervision and public responsibility, particularly when AI tools are employed in politically sensitive areas such as welfare eligibility, law enforcement, and election communication.

Moreover, discussions in both legislative chambers have recognized the necessity of harmonizing national AI governance with European constitutional principles. Researchers Pollicino and Di Gregorio contend that AI regulation should be guided by digital constitutionalism, ensuring the

protection of fundamental rights—such as freedom of expression, equal treatment, and democratic participation—amidst technological advancements (Pollicino, 2020; Di Gregorio, 2022). These arguments have started to influence parliamentary discussions, resulting in suggestions for national ethical principles, codes of conduct, and transparency registers for AI systems employed by public entities.

Although Italy lacks a comprehensive national AI statute, the parliamentary measures presented indicate an increasing interest in creating a definitive normative framework for the utilization of AI in the public sector. The current discussions in Parliament indicate a dedication to ensuring that the implementation of AI technologies aligns with democratic goals and adheres to constitutional standards.

1.5 Challenges of Aligning National Law with the EU AI Act

The implementation of the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act poses intricate issues for Member States, particularly Italy, as they try to align their national legal frameworks with a new supranational regulatory model. The AI Act establishes a comprehensive legal framework for high-risk AI systems, incorporating transparency requirements and oversight mechanisms that obligate national authorities while allowing for domestic interpretation and execution. This hybrid framework creates legal ambiguities and institutional conflicts, especially in nations such as Italy, where the interaction between national constitutional principles and EU law is already precarious.

A significant difficulty is the incorporation of the AI Act's risk-based methodology into Italy's administrative and regulatory frameworks. Italian public law is historically based on the concepts of legality, proportionality, and procedural fairness. These principles, while generally consistent with the aims of the AI Act, are not always readily compatible with the Act's technology-driven and adaptive rationale. The designation of systems as "high-risk" frequently necessitates technological evaluations and predictive studies that do not conform to the conventional frameworks of Italian administrative law, which is predominantly rule-based and reactive (Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021).

Furthermore, the AI Act establishes horizontal obligations across various industries, many of which coincide with Italy's fundamental protections. Article 97 of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees the impartiality and effectiveness of public administration, must now be construed in accordance with demands for algorithmic openness, auditability, and human oversight. The newly implemented compliance layers prompt inquiries on the reconciliation of EU mandates with current legal protections by national courts and public entities. Researchers Pollicino and Di Gregorio have observed that digital constitutionalism presents a valuable interpretative framework; nonetheless, its implementation necessitates a substantial shift in both administrative culture and legal thinking (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2020).

Institutionally, a further barrier exists in the distribution of responsibilities and coordination among the several national authorities tasked with enforcing the AI Act. The rule anticipates the establishment or nomination of national supervisory authorities empowered to certify, probe, and impose sanctions on the utilization of AI systems. Italy's regulatory framework is already inhabited by numerous separate authorities—such as the Data Protection Authority (Garante), AGCOM (communications), and ANAC (anti-corruption)—each possessing overlapping jurisdiction over

facets of digital governance. The efficient collaboration among these entities is not certain and may lead to fragmentation, regulatory deficiencies, or institutional territorial disputes (OECD, 2022).

A further source of conflict is the possible regulatory burden on public administrations, particularly local or regional entities, which may be deficient in resources or technical knowledge to adhere to the new AI governance mandates. This raises worries over unequal implementation, whether affluent or technologically advanced regions adapt more swiftly, whilst leaving others behind and aggravating territorial inequalities. Fitzilis (2021) cautions that a disjointed implementation of the AI Act at the national level may undermine its credibility and efficacy, especially in politically sensitive domains like as justice, welfare, or education.

Legal scholars have emphasized the dynamic nature of the AI Act, which includes provisions for ongoing amendments through delegated and implementing acts. This ensures regulatory adaptation to technological improvements while also generating uncertainty inside national legal frameworks, where stability and predictability are seen essential for effective government. Italian law must implement mechanisms to monitor and incorporate upcoming EU-level changes, which may need adjustments to existing procedures for the acceptance of secondary legislation.

Ultimately, a cultural and political barrier persists: the integration of AI legislation inside Italy's comprehensive democratic and legal framework. Public trust in institutions and technologies is significantly fragile, especially in contexts marked by low digital literacy or pervasive scepticism towards automated decision-making (Crawford, 2021). Without steps to foster participatory deliberation, precise regulation language, and public education, the implementation of the AI Act may be perceived as technocratic or externally imposed, rather than democratically established.

In conclusion, aligning Italian law with the EU AI Act involves not only transposition but also a comprehensive process of legal harmonization, administrative reform, and constitutional adaptation. It necessitates a meticulous equilibrium: guaranteeing adherence to European responsibilities while maintaining the integrity of Italy's legislative framework and respecting the principles of democratic government, transparency, and fundamental rights.

1.6 Role of Parliamentary Officials and Legal-Administrative Services

In the changing regulatory and technological environment influenced by the European Union's AI Act, parliamentary officials and legal-administrative services play a crucial, albeit frequently overlooked, role. These non-elected entities serve as the institutional foundation of parliamentary functions. They guarantee the continuity, legality, and procedural integrity of legislative processes, and in the realm of AI integration, they are emerging as essential intermediaries between innovation and institutional accountability.

As the Italian Parliament starts using AI tools for legislative drafting, amendment analysis, and internal decision support, the expertise and preparation of its legal and administrative personnel are crucial for addressing the regulatory requirements established by the AI Act. These officials are responsible for interpreting and implementing intricate regulatory requirements, ensuring that any technological integration within parliamentary operations adheres to both EU standards and domestic constitutional principles and procedural traditions (Fitzilis, 2021; OECD, 2022).

Legal-administrative services, especially those inside the legislative offices of the Senate and Chamber, have a longstanding role in delivering non-partisan legal expertise, policy analysis, and

procedural direction. Within the realm of AI, this function encompasses obligations such as evaluating the risk classification of AI systems, scrutinizing procurement contracts for AI-driven technologies, and ensuring the implementation of safeguards such as human oversight and explainability. Their participation is essential in ascertaining if a specific application qualifies as “high-risk” under the AI Act and if it complies with the requirements pertaining to transparency, accuracy, and accountability (European Commission, 2021; AI Act, 2024).

Moreover, these authorities are essential in fostering internal compliance and enhancing capacity development. With the integration of AI tools into parliamentary operations, staff must participate in continuous professional development, acquiring new digital literacy skills and staying informed about technological and regulatory changes. This demand has prompted ideas for official training programs and knowledge-sharing platforms inside legislative administrations. Citino (2020) asserts that the transition to a more digital and “augmented” parliament necessitates a robust administrative infrastructure adept at comprehending and judiciously managing algorithmic systems.

Parliamentary officials, in their consultative capacity, act as middlemen between the political and technical spheres. Elected officials may lack the necessary skills to fully understand the implications of integrating AI tools into legislative processes or regulating emerging technologies. Legal-administrative services enhance comprehension of algorithmic governance by interpreting its terminology in alignment with legal doctrine, constitutional principles, and legislative processes (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021). Their interpretative role is especially important in debates on the boundaries of institutional autonomy, data privacy, and the legitimacy of automated assistance in political discourse or legislative procedures.

Moreover, their impartiality and institutional stability render these authorities as prospective treasurers of ethical and procedural norms in AI implementation. Elected officials may be swayed by political cycles or partisan interests, whereas legislative staff function within a structure of institutional stability and accountability. Consequently, they are positioned to promote transparent procurement procedures, impact evaluations, and internal monitoring systems that conform to European legal norms and national public law principles (Pollicino, 2020; OECD, 2022).

Their involvement in interparliamentary networks and international working groups promotes the sharing of exemplary practices in AI governance. Through collaboration with counterparts in EU parliaments and organizations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and OECD, Italian parliamentary officials can influence the development of a unified perspective on institutional responsibility in the algorithmic era, thereby enhancing the coherence and democratic legitimacy of AI regulation among member states (Fitzilis, 2021; OECD, 2022).

In conclusion, the function of legal-administrative services within the Italian Parliament is becoming increasingly important. These actors are not simply implementers of political will, but co-designers of a regulatory culture capable of integrating technological innovation while upholding democratic principles. Their empowerment and professional growth will be crucial for guaranteeing that the application and regulation of AI in Parliament is constitutionally valid and forward-thinking

CHAPTER 2 – AI in Parliamentary Practice: Tools and Case Studies

2.1 AI-assisted Drafting of Bills and Filtering of Amendments

The application of artificial intelligence in legislative drafting and amendment management indicates a significant epistemic and institutional transformation. What first seems to be a technological advancement—an enhancement in efficiency in legislative operations—rapidly uncovers a shift in legal authorship, the limits of democratic agency, and the fundamental structure of lawmaking itself.

In recent years, national and international institutions have initiated the integration of AI-driven systems to facilitate the drafting of legislation and the administration of modifications. These instruments, driven by natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning, may examine historical law, suggest syntactically and legally coherent provisions, and identify redundancies or inconsistencies in revisions. The Italian Parliament, especially its technical-administrative services, has expressed interest in these innovations to address the heightened legislative workload and the intricacies of harmonizing domestic law with the advancing European regulatory framework, including the AI Act of 2024 (European Parliament and Council, 2024).

These technologies offer enhanced speed, precision, and integration on a practical level. The OECD indicates that AI can assist parliaments in law drafting by "improving consistency, minimizing errors, and proposing better-structured texts" (OECD, 2022). Nonetheless, these practical advantages are inevitably interlinked to the political and normative consequences of assigning aspects of legislative authorship to non-human systems. As Citino (2020) contends that the incorporation of digital technologies into the legislative process creates the danger of the conceptual horizon, deemed as "*Parlamento aumentato*," where computational logic may influence and maybe displace deliberative reasoning.

The issue of authorship not to be undermined: Is a legislative clause produced by an algorithm trained on historical legal texts a mere reiteration of precedent or an original creation? More concerningly, when the origins of such work are unclear, can we truly discuss authorship in the conventional legal context? Yeung and Lodge (2019) assert in their examination of algorithmic regulation that the inherent logic of machine-generated outcomes undermines the accountability frameworks essential to democratic government. The opacity characteristic of most AI models, especially big language models, undermines fundamental legal norms including traceability, transparency, and the potential for reasoned reasoning (Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021).

These concerns become especially pronounced in the context of filtering changes. AI systems are progressively assigned the responsibilities of finding semantically or legally redundant proposals, clustering analogous revisions, or flagging inconsistencies. This seemingly alleviates legislative backlog, although it also establishes a gatekeeping mechanism that may deprioritize or censor specific political expressions. Crawford (2021) asserts in her critique of the political dimensions inherent in AI that the facade of impartiality in algorithmic systems conceals underlying attitudes regarding relevance, coherence, and legitimacy. In legislative contexts, this masking is not only theoretical; it can influence the parliamentary agenda and alter political visibility itself.

Furthermore, the implementation of such systems frequently occurs without a complete understanding of their subsequent impacts. Fitzilis (2021), in an article for the Inter-Parliamentary

Union, cautions that the distinction between suggestion and substitution can quickly become indistinct when AI is employed as a "assistive" tool, especially in institutions facing resource constraints or political pressure to expedite legislation. The authentic concern is that the legitimizing power of parliamentary discourse may be subordinated to the operational efficacy of algorithmic drafting.

Nonetheless, possible advantages must be recognized. In the European multilingual setting, AI has the potential to enhance legal interoperability, identify terminological discrepancies, and synchronize national legislation with supranational standards, such as those outlined in the Artificial Intelligence Act (European Commission, 2021). Di Gregorio (2022) contends that constitutional law must evolve to accommodate the algorithmic landscape, establishing frameworks that acknowledge the democratic potential of digital tools while also addressing their inherent vulnerabilities.

Navigating this terrain necessitates not only regulation but also institutional reflexivity. Pollicino (2021) advocates for a "constitutionalism of artificial intelligence" that establishes ethical constraints on technology integration and fortifies the democratic nature of legislative procedures. The Italian Parliament, uniquely situated as both regulator and consumer of AI, must embrace this dual role. It must set formal requirements for the application of AI in legislative functions, guarantee the interpretability of algorithmic results, and maintain the human element in parliamentary discourse.

The fundamental inquiry is not whether AI can formulate laws or evaluate changes, but whether the resultant legislation retains substantive democratic integrity. Helbing (2021) observes that we stand at a juncture between digital enlightenment and digital control. The drafting process is not simply a logistical phase in governance; it is the point at which political intent, legal structure, and public accountability intersect. For AI to be effective in this domain, it must function not as an inconspicuous entity, but as an instrument integrated into visible, contestable, and human-centric institutions.

2.2 The Italian Parliamentary System and the Introduction of AI in Legislative Procedures

The incorporation of artificial intelligence into the legislative procedures of the Italian Parliament takes place within a constitutional and procedural framework that is one of a kind. This framework is deeply rooted in a normative tradition that places an emphasis on deliberation, accountability, and the representative function of parliamentary institutions. When it comes to understanding the role that artificial intelligence plays in this context, it is not enough to just provide a technical description of its possible uses; rather, it is necessary to conduct a juridical-political investigation into the nature of legislative tasks and the limits of technology mediation in democratic government. It has been asserted by Nicola Lupo and other experts of parliamentary law that the procedural architecture of Parliament is not only instrumental; rather, it is constitutional in nature, and it expresses essential democratic ideals through its shape and operation (Gianniti & Lupo, *Corso di diritto parlamentare* 2023).

The Italian Parliament is distinguished by a bicameral system with complete bicameralism. In this system, the *Camera dei deputati* and the *Senato della Repubblica* carry out functions that are identical to one another in the legislative process. In accordance with Article 71 of the Constitution, legislative initiative is in the possession of a broad variety of entities, including the government, individual parliamentarians, regional councils, and even citizens through popular initiative. A bill goes through

a complicated process from the time it is proposed until it is finally enacted into law. This process includes many readings, interventions from committees, and options for revision. In this context, the implementation of artificial intelligence is not merely a reform that aims to improve efficiency; rather, it has the ability to transform the epistemic and procedural logic that underpins the action of the Parliament.

An administrative-technological enhancement of parliamentary services (for example, AI-based document analysis, legislative drafting tools, and agenda management systems) and assistance in deliberative or expressive functions (for example, AI-supported speechwriting, filtering of amendments, or legal research engines) are the two primary channels through which artificial intelligence finds its way into this institutional space. Despite the fact that these applications could at first appear to be neutral support mechanisms, they carry significant implications for the equilibrium between political discretion and procedural rationalization. This delicate balance is something that the Italian parliamentary tradition has been striving to maintain for a very long time.

Nicola Lupo (2020) emphasizes that every procedural innovation, particularly one that affects legislative drafting or amendment processing, must be evaluated in light of Article 72 of the Constitution, which guarantees the centrality of parliamentary discourse and the committee system. This is especially important in the case of those innovations that influence legislative drafting. Inadvertently diminishing the significance of parliamentary debate as a fundamental moment of democratic will-formation could occur if artificial intelligence systems come to assume gatekeeping roles. These functions include screening amendments, clustering legislative proposals, and prioritizing legislative initiatives. In her perspective on the "*Parlamento aumentato*," Citino (2020) makes the observation that the danger is in a stealthy epistemic shift in which computational logic subtly surpasses political judgment. This is especially true in situations where algorithmic systems appear to be impartial or solely procedural.

It is necessary to have both legal compatibility and political sensitivity to use artificial intelligence inside the Italian system, which is characterized by parliamentary procedure that is profoundly influenced by constitutional guarantees and an ever-evolving corpus of internal laws known as *Regolamenti parlamentari*. The parliamentary offices, in particular the *Servizio Studi* and the *Ufficio Legislativo*, have already begun experimenting with data analysis and automation to enhance the accessibility and coherence of legal texts. Within the broader context of digital modernization, these attempts have been articulated. Digital modernization is a process that is fostered by European institutions and is codified in projects such as the European AI Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024).

Nevertheless, the way in which artificial intelligence is transforming the functions of parliament creates several problems. In the first place, there is the problem of authorship by the institution. The importance of procedures as representations of collective will is emphasized by Lupo, who points out that parliamentary legislation is concerned not only with outcomes but also with procedures. To what extent is it possible to assert that a bill that was developed or extensively crafted with the assistance of artificial intelligence reflects the will of the person who proposed the bill? In addition, when suggestions or revisions are screened through algorithmic evaluations of coherence or duplication, what methods ensure that these decisions are subject to human review and political contestability as well?

Furthermore, if artificial intelligence systems were to modify the parameters under which legislative visibility and priority are given, it would be possible for the procedural legitimacy of parliamentary

discourse to be undercut. For example, if artificial intelligence is used to determine the order in which amendments are discussed or to cluster them thematically, then certain political perspectives, particularly those that are outside the mainstream, could be successfully ignored. Crawford's (2021) statement that algorithmic systems contain political preconceptions in their logic of relevance and coherence, which are frequently masked by the appearance of objectivity, is echoed by this concern.

In addition, artificial intelligence poses a threat to the norms of accountability and transparency, which are fundamental to the tradition of Italian parliamentarians. Numerous artificial intelligence systems function as opaque "black boxes," as Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) have pointed out. This makes it difficult to determine the process by which a particular recommendation or output was generated. When it comes to the legislative realm, this lack of interpretability might hinder the prospect of legal scrutiny and ex-post justification, both of which are vital to preserve the Constitution's demand for a transparent and responsible public administration (Article 97 of the Constitution).

It is necessary, from a theoretical point of view, to revise, or at the very least, to critically update, the concept of parliamentary autonomy (*autonomia parlamentare*) in order to accommodate the use of artificial intelligence in legislative operations. According to the traditional view (see Lupo and Fasone, 2013), this autonomy comprises the authority of each chamber to self-regulate its internal organization and procedures. This empowerment is a component of the autonomy. New actors are brought into this previously closed institutional circle because of the adoption of artificial intelligence tools, which are frequently developed or maintained by external companies and might be either public or private. Because of this externalization, concerns have been raised regarding data governance, confidentiality, and the potential for functional dependence on systems provided by other parties.

Not only does the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the operations of the Italian Parliament represent a technological advancement, but it is a significant constitutional transition that necessitates serious thought on the normative foundations that underlie democratic governance. In the recent volume titled *"Le assemblee rappresentative nell'era dell'intelligenza artificiale: Profili costituzionali"* (De Lungo & Rizzoni, 2025), it is emphasized that the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the work of the parliamentary body needs to be evaluated through the lens of democratic legitimacy, legal accountability, and institutional autonomy. The articles published in this collective book all aim towards a single proposition, and that is that the integration of artificial intelligence within representative assemblies needs to maintain human judgment, institutional reflexivity, and procedural transparency as constitutional requirements.

This problem is particularly pressing within the Italian constitutional system, where parliamentary processes are not administrative processes, but also democratic debating institutions protected by Articles 70–72 of the Constitution. AI-driven tools—regardless of their application in legislative text production, amendment categorization, or speech recognition—must not circumvent or diminish the pluralistic and discursive nature of the lawmaking process. The volume states, “technological innovation, even when framed as a tool of efficiency, poses structural risks to deliberative democracy if not embedded within constitutional and procedural guarantees” (De Lungo & Rizzoni, 2025).

In his paper, *Le prospettive dell'AI generativa nell'esercizio delle funzioni parlamentari* (2024), Davide De Lungo examines the epistemic implications of generative AI in legislative oversight and address functions. He contends that although AI may improve legislators' access to information and their capacity to synthesize intricate data, it also threatens to alter the representative's position from an agent of political will-formation to a manager of algorithmically pre-processed knowledge. He

asserts that “the more generative AI systems intervene in the production of parliamentary knowledge, the more the representational mandate risks becoming diluted”. (De Lungo, 2024).

The present technological era asks for parliamentary institutions to reaffirm their regulatory and symbolic authority. De Lungo and Rizzoni emphasize the necessity for new internal procedural regulations that establish explicit limitations on the application of AI in legislative functions. These should provide obligatory human supervision, ensure transparency about the selection and use of AI technologies, and guarantee the auditability of any automated outputs involved in legislative procedures. The Italian Parliament has a critical decision: it may either passively accept AI systems from external providers, which may lead to dependency and lack of transparency, or it can actively establish constitutional norms for their integration.

In addition, the comparative essays in the De Lungo–Rizzoni collection highlight those other parliamentary democracies, like Germany, France, and Japan, have initiated the development of ethical and institutional frameworks that position AI as a supportive tool rather than a substitute for political discourse. These approaches, despite their technological sophistication, maintain a robust adherence to legal protections and democratic oversight. For Italy, this suggests that using AI without a regulatory framework may engender a technological imbalance that jeopardizes both the internal autonomy of Parliament and public confidence in its choices.

Furthermore, the volume emphasizes the necessity of assessing AI integration via the lens of representational legitimacy. Automated systems, despite being designed neutrally, embed assumptions on relevance, coherence, and priority that may inadvertently marginalize minority viewpoints or skew parliamentary agendas. The authors assert that “algorithmic filters risk functioning as invisible gatekeepers that influence visibility and political significance within parliamentary discussions” (De Lungo & Rizzoni, 2025). Such systems must thus undergo procedural examination and institutional challenge.

De Lungo emphasizes that digital technologies in Parliament should not be viewed merely as tools; instead, they are integral components of the epistemic and communicative processes involved in democratic lawmaking, thus reinforcing the demand for transparency and accountability. Lacking rigid control, AI technologies can cause a "techno-epistemic drift," whereby political conclusions are reached through computer algorithms instead of having their origins in political deliberation.

Finally, the constitutional implications of AI integration into Parliament for Italy need a two-fold strategy: one, instituting strict institutional processes to ensure human control, transparency, and normative explanation; two, reaffirming Parliament's representative role as a deliberative assembly above purely efficiency norms. De Lungo aptly asserts, “Generative AI will only serve democracy if democracy is able of governing it first” (2024).

In addition to the other concerns presented, it is of the utmost importance to include artificial intelligence tools in a manner that is compatible with the constitution, according to the concepts that are drawn from what Di Gregorio (2022) refers to as "digital constitutionalism." Within the context of public institutions, this paradigm states that digital technologies must not only be legal, but they must also be normatively aligned with democratic principles such as contestability, transparency, and participation. To ensure that the principle of human-in-the-loop remains non-negotiable, the Italian Parliament must implement particular internal rules that specify the allowed scope of automation, set procedural protections, and ensure that the adoption of AI technologies is accompanied by the adoption of specific internal regulations.

It is highlighted in the *Corso di diritto parlamentare* (Gianniti & Lupo, 2023) that parliamentary processes are not only formalities; rather, they are democratic infrastructures. As a result, the design and governance of artificial intelligence technologies ought to be inextricably linked to the very nature of procedural law. The fact that this is the case shows that there is a requirement for internal standards or codes of practice within each chamber that specify how and when artificial intelligence can be employed in legislative activity. In particular, when artificial intelligence is involved in crucial roles like agenda-setting or text analysis, these should include criteria for algorithmic openness, human oversight, and procedures for ex-post accountability.

Moreover, this change presents an opportunity for contemplation over the more comprehensive institutional character of Parliament. It has been suggested by Helbing (2021) that we are currently at a crossroads between "digital enlightenment" and "digital control." One of the potential dangers of artificial intelligence is that it could bolster a technical perspective on legislative procedures, giving priority to efficiency and coherence over discourse and pluralism. On the other hand, the possibility lies in the development of a sort of "augmented parliamentarism," in which the thoughtful and dialogical nature of legislative action is supported by artificial intelligence tools rather than fully replaced by them.

Lastly, the implementation of artificial intelligence within the Italian Parliament necessitates a re-evaluation of the connection between innovation and legal tradition. The legal system in Italy is a civil law jurisdiction with a strong textual and interpretative heritage. As a result, the Italian legal system places a high priority on linguistic precision, legal certainty, and the symbolic authority of statutory language. Because of this, the application of artificial intelligence in the process of making or interpreting laws needs to be sensitive to the normative depth of legal texts. This is something that cannot be reduced to pattern recognition or syntactic prediction. According to Floridi (2021), information ethics in the public domain necessitates not only the production of accurate outputs but also the implementation of an informative process that is ethically consistent.

In conclusion, the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the legislative process in Italy is more than just a form of technological advancement; it is a momentous occasion in the country's constitutional history. It is imperative that a concerted effort be made to firmly establish digital innovation within the framework of the democratic and legal principles that define the role of Parliament. Taking into consideration Pollicino's (2021) concept of a "constitutionalism of artificial intelligence," it is imperative that this transition be directed by moral clarity, institutional reflexivity, and an unflinching adherence to the ideals of representative democracy. It is only through this method that Parliament will be able to guarantee that artificial intelligence does not serve as a replacement for discussion but rather as a tool that is transparent and accountable in its service.

2.3 Case Study: The Italian Senator's (Lombardo) Speech Written with ChatGPT – Implications for Transparency and Authorship

In March 2023, Senator Marco Lombardo became the first Italian politician to publicly acknowledge the utilization of ChatGPT, a generative language model, in composing a portion of his Senate address. The senator's act, so small and transparent, reverberated far beyond the confines of the Palazzo Madama. It marked a pivotal moment in the public clash between artificial intelligence and representative democracy, not solely in legislative processes, but at the core of democratic politics: the spoken word, articulated on behalf of the populace by their elected official. This episode serves

as a lens to examine a range of normative, legal, and ethical inquiries that arise when AI participates in the deliberative arena not merely as a passive instrument, but as a co-creator of political discourse.

Parliamentary discourse is not only expressive; it also constitutes political authority. Article 67 of the Italian Constitution grants members of Parliament a representative mandate, liberating them from imperative directives and requiring them to express their own voice and conscience. The application of AI in this context does not directly contravene any legal standards; rather, it raises questions regarding the concepts of authorship and accountability in the algorithmic era. When an elected official employs a language model trained on extensive and untraceable text corpora to produce sentences subsequently articulated in the Chamber, where resides the human agency? Senator Lombardo's disclosure of utilizing ChatGPT may indicate a degree of technological transparency; yet this action also highlights the vulnerability of epistemic faith in political institutions when linguistic output is not only generated by humans.

According to Di Gregorio (2022) in his theory of digital constitutionalism, the normative essence of democratic discourse resides not merely in its content but also in its source, deliberative process, and traceability. A political system that permits, or even normalizes, opaque or automated intrusions in discourse jeopardizes the fundamental principle of representative authenticity. This issue is not based on technological conservatism; instead, it advocates for institutional openness and political accountability. AI systems such as ChatGPT, even when serving just as drafting aids, lack both epistemic accountability and democratic legitimacy. They function based on patterns rather than ideas, on statistical probability rather than normative logic.

Crawford (2021) asserts that generative models are inherently probabilistic systems designed to replicate human language, rather than to comprehend or reason in a constitutional manner. Their output is frequently credible rather than precise, convincing rather than ethical. In the possession of legislators, such instruments can obscure the distinction between authentic debate and mere performance. Senatorial speeches may get progressively refined for rhetorical efficacy, emotional impact, or popular approval; nevertheless, what occurs to the political substance behind the discourse? The concept of parliamentary sincerity—already compromised in media-driven democracies—experiences additional degradation when communication is facilitated by an artificial intelligence trained on an unaccountable body of historical discourse.

This development fundamentally regards authorship, a concept esteemed by both legal and political ethics. Yeung and Lodge (2019) assert that as decisions, or assertions, increasingly derive from machine-generated outputs, it becomes increasingly challenging to attribute blame or discern intent. In legal situations, the origin of legislative texts is essential for statutory interpretation. How can we recover purpose or comprehend legislative history when texts are partially generated from algorithmic sources with opaque training data and internal logic?

This scenario establishes what Pollicino (2021) describes as a necessity for a constitutionalism of algorithms—a novel legal and ethical framework that acknowledges the increasing prevalence of automated technologies in public life and mandates that their application conform to democratic principles. Parliamentary speech may have the need for regulations regarding transparency, processes for human content verification, and potentially the registration of AI contributions in parliamentary records. At now, as noted by the OECD (2022), only a limited number of parliaments have addressed such procedural inquiries in a systematic manner. The Italian Parliament occupies a pioneering position; it must not only govern the societal use of AI but also address its own internal exposure to these technologies.

Fitzilis (2021) highlights this institutional fragility, noting that the implementation of AI tools in parliaments frequently surpasses the establishment of appropriate ethical frameworks. In the absence of internal conversation regarding standards and limitations, even trivial applications of AI—such as drafting assistance—may become habitual, progressively undermining the reflective and rhetorical faculties essential to legislative dialogue. Lombardo’s speech eliciting interest instead of institutional scrutiny is revealing: the normalization of such activities may transpire not via public discourse, but through subtle procedural evolution.

One must also contemplate the symbolic implications of AI-generated or AI-assisted discourse. A parliamentarian’s voice transcends personal expression; it is regarded as an institutional manifestation of political accountability. When that voice intertwines with a generative algorithm, a new form of semantic ambiguity arises. Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) assert in their analysis of the EU AI Act that the primary problem lies not merely in disclosing the use of AI, but in effectively communicating its application, the conditions under which it was employed, and the extent of human control involved. In the absence of such clarifications, the confidence between citizens and their representatives may deteriorate—not due to malevolence, but because of perceptual dissonance: residents become uncertain about whose voice is speaking.

Nonetheless, it would be easiest to regard this episode as entirely dystopian. According to Citino (2020), the concept of the “*Parlamento aumentato*” posits that digital resources, when employed rightfully, can augment the informational, logistical, and communication functions of parliaments while preserving their democratic essence. An augmented parliament does not inherently deem its diminished capacity. The fundamental question is not if AI can aid in speechmaking, but rather if its application is transparent, contestable, and reversible. Institutions must integrate these ideals structurally rather than merely rhetorically.

The gist that we are presented with is the fact that the Lombardo case must be regarded as a generative precedent—a pivotal instance that encapsulates the implications of AI’s involvement in political debate: It calls for prompt institutional reflection and regulatory advancement. The Italian Parliament should capitalize on this chance to establish procedural regulations regarding AI utilization in its operations—not as an issue of censorship, but as a pledge to uphold democratic integrity. Helbing (2021) plainly asserts that the digital revolution offers both ominous and promising trajectories. The future of legislative discourse depends on our capacity to manoeuvre through these matters with ethical clarity, legal accuracy, and political fortitude.

In summary, this prominent case illustrates the issues posed by artificial intelligence in parliamentary settings, in which Senator Lombardo openly admitted to delivering a speech largely composed by ChatGPT, presents itself as an experiment to illustrate the changing function of digital tools in political communication, powered by a wider institutional and media discourse over the validity, authorship, and authenticity of parliamentary interventions. This occurrence precisely aligns with the issues raised by Andrea Cardone in his work *Decisione algoritmica vs decisione politica?*, where he cautions against the gradual replacement of deliberate political agency by opaque algorithmic systems. Cardone’s analysis indicates that assigning communicative or decision-making responsibilities to AI tools, even symbolically, poses the risk of engendering a phenomenon of “technocratic drift,” wherein human accountability is progressively replaced by data-driven automation. The Lombardo case, however singular, demonstrates how algorithmic interventions can modify both the style and the epistemic authority of political discourse. Cardone contends that political decisions, and hence political expressions, obtain their validity from representation, argumentation, and normative reasoning. The incorporation of generative AI in parliamentary

speeches, even for demonstrative aims, undermines these principles by injecting an external, unaccountable entity into the symbolic essence of democratic representation. This episode exemplifies the difficulties Cardone highlights between algorithmic logics and deliberative democracy values, providing a concrete instance of how developing technologies are challenging constitutional and institutional constraints.

In order to further analyse these issues, we must take into consideration Cardone's work. The incorporation of artificial intelligence into legislative bodies has prompted a fundamental transformation in both operational efficiency and the conceptualization of political agency and legitimacy. In his work *Decisione algoritmica vs decisione politica?* (2021), Andrea Cardone presents a persuasive theoretical framework for evaluating this transition. He cautions that algorithmic policymaking may perilously circumvent conventional democratic institutions by entrusting decisions to systems that are obscure and predominantly resistant to public oversight. This issue is especially pertinent within the Italian Parliament, which, as a representative institution, is legally obligated to maintain deliberate, transparent, and accountable legislative procedures.

Cardone characterizes algorithms not solely as technological constructs but as "a set of practices, knowledge, measures, and institutions whose purpose is to manage, govern, control, and steer in the direction of a presumed beneficial outcome" (Cardone, 2021, p. 118). In this context, algorithms function with inherent logics that mirror certain power dynamics. Their increasing utilization in legislative contexts, including amendment filtering, document organization, and speech aid, provides a novel type of epistemic authority that may contest the discursive essence of lawmaking. The designation of a solution as the "best" or "most widely shared," when suggested by AI systems, raises essential political inquiries: best for whom, and which interpretative community endorses it? (Cardone, 2021, p. 118).

The ramifications of these dynamics are especially concerning when seen through the perspective of democratic legitimacy. Cardone delineates a clear separation between political and algorithmic decisions: the former are legitimized through representation, contestability, and public reasoning, whilst the latter frequently depend on opaque models that circumvent normative discourse. He inquires, "Are we witnessing—or will we witness in the future—the advent of a new 'algorithmic democracy'?" (Cardone, 2021, pp. 1–180). This "algorithmic democracy" signifies a transition from the democratic discussion inherent in parliamentary systems to a technocratic paradigm focused on optimization and efficiency.

This move immediately challenges the deliberative foundation of the Italian Parliament. The idea that political authority may be progressively delegated to systems based on statistical inference or machine learning not only threatens to diminish human judgment but also alters the fundamental framework of democratic accountability. Cardone clearly cautions against a "technocratic drift" in public decision-making, because dependence on data-driven technologies undermines the democratic pluralism intended to be safeguarded by parliamentary democracy. In this scenario, the filtration of amendments or the prioritizing of legislative items via AI algorithms could unintentionally suppress minority perspectives or unusual policy approaches—those that require democratic visibility the most.

Cardone contends that algorithmic decision-making must conform to fundamental principles such as equality before the law, legal certainty, and due process, particularly within the EU legal framework, where these principles underpin public administration (Cardone, 2021). This connection is especially vital in legislative contexts, where the procedural formality of debate, contestation, and responsibility

fulfills both functional and symbolic roles. If algorithms progressively dictate the topics that can be addressed, modified, or prioritized in parliament, they undermine the expressive function of legislative institutions.

Ultimately, Cardone's approach emphasizes the necessity of reaffirming the normative independence of parliaments in the era of algorithmic governance. Representative institutions such as the Italian Parliament must not regard AI tools as impartial instruments. They must actively participate in regulatory and institutional design to ensure that algorithmic logic is submissive to democratic principles. This involves transparency, auditability, and human scrutiny, as well as the establishment of internal parliamentary regulations that protect discussion as a constitutional principle.

In conclusion, Cardone's contribution substantiates the central thesis of this work: artificial intelligence can only augment parliamentary function if it is thoroughly embedded within a constitutional framework that upholds political judgment, protects democratic legitimacy, and counters the depoliticizing inclinations of technocratic automation.

2.4 Case Study: AI and the Filtering of Amendments in the Italian Legislative Process

When it comes to the instruments that are accessible to members of the Italian Parliament, the amendment procedure is among the most important ones. Not only does it function as a technical phase in the process of legislative refinement, but it also serves as a key channel through which forces of the majority and opposition can influence, postpone, or redirect legislative texts. It guarantees that the process of lawmaking will continue to be open to contestation and plurality. In light of this, it is profoundly anchored in the constitutional and procedural safeguards that serve as the foundation for Italian representative democracy. Recent advancements, on the other hand, are gradually transforming this process. Artificial intelligence, which was once a peripheral administrative help, is now entering the core of the legislative process, and actual trials in the filtering and clustering of amendments are already underway.

A pilot program for the employment of artificial intelligence-based technologies to manage the high volume of amendments that accompany significant legislative packages was recently implemented by the Italian Senate as a response to the increasing complexity of laws and the congestion that has been occurring in the legislative process. Natural language processing methods are utilized by these tools in order to categorize revisions that are similar to one another and to discover instances of redundancy or inconsistency. These kinds of activities are characterised as a response to workload challenges and an effort to increase parliamentary efficiency, according to public documentation that was given by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Within the technical-administrative services of the Senate, these instruments are currently being put through their paces as part of broader digital modernization initiatives. Nevertheless, although they appear to be neutral, such systems have substantial moral consequences that call for careful investigation.

In the context of the law, any incorporation of artificial intelligence into the legislative process must be structured within the guarantees that are provided in the Constitution of Italy. Article 72 makes it transparent that the important function of parliamentary procedure, which includes the power to submit changes and the discussion of committees, is explicitly affirmed. The rights in question are not merely tangential; rather, they are fundamental components of parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary procedures are constitutional in nature, as Lupo and Gianniti emphasize in their

collaboratory work *Corso di diritto parlamentare* (2023). These procedures are not merely technical regulations that need to be optimized; rather, they are symbols of democratic legitimacy. As a result, the application of artificial intelligence to pre-filter or deprioritize amendments has the potential to have a significant impact on the plurality and visibility of the parliamentary process. This is especially true if such systems are implemented without specific procedural assurances or legal responsibility.

The regulatory framework that is now being developed at the European level is an additional factor that contributes to this concern. "High-risk" artificial intelligence systems are those that are employed in public administration, particularly those that have the potential to have ramifications for rights or legal results. This classification was recently adopted by the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation 2024/1689) and includes systems that have the potential to impact the prioritization of legislative issues or the acceptability of amendments through the parliamentary process. As part of this framework, artificial intelligence systems that pose a high risk are required to adhere to stringent requirements, which include non-discrimination, auditability, transparency, and human oversight capabilities. These concepts are in line with larger currents in digital constitutionalism, which have been created by academics such as Di Gregorio (2022) and Pollicino (2021) to ensure that algorithmic tools used in public institutions operate within a framework that is rights-based and participative.

A. Disegno di Legge n. 1146/2024

In response to these regulatory reforms, the Italian Parliament is gradually becoming more open and adaptable to the forthcoming technological advancements. In March 2025, the Italian Parliament made a notable advancement in establishing a national legal framework for artificial intelligence (AI) by endorsing Disegno di Legge n. 1146/2024, entitled "*Disposizioni e deleghe al Governo in materia di intelligenza artificiale*". The Senate approved the measure on 20 March 2025, signifying Italy's official endeavour to implement and incorporate the EU AI Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1689) into national legislation, while also addressing regulatory and constitutional issues peculiar to Italy. The legislation is founded on the principles of transparency, proportionality, human autonomy, democratic oversight, and data protection, granting the government a 12-month legislative delegation to implement one or more legislative decrees to execute its provisions in both public and private sectors. (Processo Civile Telematico, 2025)

The bill's structure is extensive. It includes six chapters and 28 articles, each addressing a specific theme area. Chapter I establishes fundamental principles, explicitly declaring that the use and advancement of AI in Italy must preserve human dignity, decision-making autonomy, and democratic processes. These principles are in full compliance with the Italian Constitution (Articles 2, 3, 21, and 97) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, thereby situating the law within a multilevel constitutional framework (Processo Civile Telematico, 2025).

The legislation includes distinct protections for high-risk sectors, addressed in separate sections:

- Healthcare: with healthcare, AI can aid with diagnosis and treatment decisions; however, ultimate responsibility must reside with medical personnel. Patients must be apprised about the utilization of AI and its anticipated advantages or hazards.
- Employment: The law requires the establishment of a national Observatory on Artificial Intelligence in Employment under the Ministry of Labour, responsible for overseeing the application of AI in recruitment, training, and assessment procedures. Employers must guarantee that AI systems are non-discriminatory and must notify employees of their utilization.

- **Liberal Professions:** In liberal professions, AI is authorized solely as an auxiliary tool, not as a substitute for human intellectual input. Clients must be notified if artificial intelligence is employed in the provision of services.
- **Public administration:** In the realm of public administration and the judicial sector, AI can enhance efficiency but cannot supplant or automate ultimate decision-making. The legislation stipulates that discretionary actions of public authorities shall be subject to human oversight, notably concerning judicial and legislative bodies.

The bill appoints AgID (*Agenzia per l'Italia Digitale*) and the ACN (*Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale*) as national supervisory bodies that are responsible for overseeing the adoption of artificial intelligence. Despite that, this move has been subject to criticism. It has been argued by a number of legal scholars and data protection professionals that the *Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali* (GPDP) would be a more suitable body given to its autonomy and well-established capabilities in the area of fundamental rights oversight (source: Dentons Italy, 2025).

Importantly, the law establishes new criminal crimes, with a specific emphasis on the malicious application of artificial intelligence. Deepfakes, which are defined as media that has been digitally modified and is aimed to deceive or defame, are included in this category. Deepfakes are particularly effective when they are used to imitate public people or to affect democratic processes. In the legislative decrees that will be used to implement the legislation, the specific criminal classifications will be determined.

Both the general population and the experts have provided contradictory responses. On the one hand, the measure has been hailed as an essential step that must be taken to guarantee that Italy is able to stay up with the technical governance at the EU level. On the other hand, there are those who are concerned about the possibility of regulatory duplication and a lack of coherence with the AI Act. The European Commission released a formal opinion on November 5, 2024, recommending a closer alignment in order to prevent fragmentation and avoid parallel obligations that could limit the consistency of artificial intelligence regulation across Member States. The source for this recommendation is [ProcessoCivileTelematico.it](https://www.processocivile telematico.it), 2025.

Additional criticism has been directed on the national investment policy, which is both ambitious and ambiguous. The Italian government has committed one billion euros to the development and integration of artificial intelligence (AI), but analysts have characterized this amount as insignificant in comparison to the magnitude of the transformation that is predicted, particularly in areas such as education, the digitization of the judicial system, and healthcare. Additionally, critics have encouraged the government to ensure that financing is dispersed in a fair manner, to avoid placing an undue amount of reliance on huge corporate technology actors, and to encourage the development of public infrastructures that are open-source and interoperable (source: Dentons Italy, 2025).

The Disegno di Legge n. 1146/2024 is a significant step forward for Italy. A clear willingness to regulate artificial intelligence in a proactive manner, with a high constitutional awareness and sector-specific specificity, is signalled by this activity. The success of this provision, on the other hand, will be significantly dependent on the manner in which the delegated decrees are drafted, whether or not they strengthen the basic rights protections that are incorporated into the AI Act, and how Italy strikes a balance between national sovereignty and the coherence of EU regulations.

B. Dangers and Protections

Still, there are dangers to be found. The opaque nature of artificial intelligence systems is one of the most pressing challenges. As of right now, most of the tools that are being considered rely on machine learning models that operate like black boxes. This means that their internal logic is frequently difficult to grasp, even for professional engineers. The lack of transparency in this situation becomes extremely problematic in a parliamentary system, because the prioritization or suppression of an amendment might have political repercussions. In the event that an artificial intelligence system congregates a few adjustments and keeps only one of them for further consideration, it is of the utmost importance to comprehend the reasoning behind the selection. Yeung and Lodge (2019) warn that if this does not occur, legislative discretion may be gradually supplanted by algorithmic preferences, and there will be no obvious routes for contestation or accountability.

When one takes into consideration the fact that many artificial intelligence systems are developed in partnership with private actors or third-party suppliers, this issue gets more complicated. In situations like these, even members of the legislative staff might not have complete access to the inner workings of the system or the training data. A democratic deficit is created as a result of this: decisions that have an impact on legislative visibility and political voice may be impacted by mechanisms that are not governed by parliamentary standards. These kinds of situations call for a reaffirmation of institutional reflexivity and human control, as we will go into further detail about in Chapter 3 of this thesis. To ensure that all applications of artificial intelligence are contestable, auditable, and open to public scrutiny, the use of AI in various settings must be followed by the introduction of new kinds of procedural regulation.

The way forward must include the implementation of statutory protections. To begin, the Italian Parliament ought to establish internal protocols that govern the application of artificial intelligence in the management of amendments. This set of guidelines ought to make it clear when artificial intelligence techniques can be utilised, under what legal authority, and in accordance with what standards. In addition to this, they should ensure that human actors, like as members of parliament or qualified administrative personnel, continue to hold the authority to make final decisions. Second, the results that are produced by AI systems need to be understandable. In the event that a system decides to deprioritize an amendment, the explanation for this decision must be made available not just to those who are contained within Parliament but also to the general public. Audit trails, AI interfaces that can be explained, and review rights are all essential components that must be institutionalised as part of any deployment.

Furthermore, there is a need to augment the level of digital literacy within the Parliament. As Fitzilis (2021) points out, artificial intelligence capabilities are frequently introduced before institutions are ready to control them from a cultural or procedural standpoint. It is possible for members of parliament, particularly those who lack technical skills, to become dependent on systems that they are unable to interpret or criticize. Because of this, there is a possibility of passive adoption, which is when technologies are utilized merely since they are accessible, rather than because they are suitable for the normative context. For the implementation of artificial intelligence in the legislative branch, ongoing training, open-source documentation, and staff assistance are all necessary components.

This cautious approach is supported by comparative experience. The use of artificial intelligence tools to help in the drafting of legislation and the tracking of amendments has been implemented in Estonia and Finland. However, openness and reversibility have always been the guiding principles behind these technologies. A cultural commitment to procedural discussion and human scrutiny is

reflected in the restricted usage of artificial intelligence (AI) in parliamentary settings in Germany. It is demonstrated by these models that constitutional principles can coexist with digital innovation; however, this is only the case if the innovation is effectively regulated.

In the context of Italy, the examination of amendments through the lens of artificial intelligence is not merely a question of technology. A constitutional moment has just occurred. The institutional meaning of visibility, participation, and deliberative fairness needs to be rethought in order to accommodate this requirement made by Parliament. Amendment rights cannot be mediated by mechanisms that obscure their rationale or silence their aim if they are to continue to have any significance. In addition to being offered for symbolic or strategic goals, amendments also contribute to the richness of the conversation that takes place in parliament. There is no such thing as a neutral act; rather, it is a redefining of political speech to censor them without following due process.

Lupo and Gianniti (2023) bring to our attention the fact that the legitimacy of legislative procedures is contingent not only on the results of those operations, but also on the methods by which those results are achieved. It is imperative that the implementation of artificial intelligence not be regarded as merely an administrative enhancement. That it be regulated by democratic inclusion principles, human-centered design principles, and constitutional accountability standards is a must. Artificial intelligence has the potential to support legislative work if it is properly regulated. However, if it is allowed to continue unchecked, it runs the risk of undermining the very ideas that it is attempting to strengthen.

2.5 Use of AI in Legislative Research and Decision-Support Tools

Artificial intelligence is progressively transforming the framework of legislative knowledge generation, not just via generative tools employed in drafting but also through decision-support systems aimed at improving research, monitoring, and agenda-setting functions. The incorporation of AI into legislative research signifies a transformation in the establishment of epistemic authority inside representative organizations. The process of selecting, understanding, and acting on information—historically a human domain dependent on expertise, deliberation, and context—is now progressively shared with algorithmic systems that function on speed, scale, and predictive analytics. This growth necessitates a thorough examination of how knowledge is being generated, valued, and maybe restricted in the digital parliament.

AI-driven legislative research tools utilize natural language processing engines to analyse extensive volumes of parliamentary transcripts, comparative legal documents, policy databases, and socio-economic variables instantaneously. These tools enable MPs and their staff to access pertinent data, discern trends, and assess legislation outcomes with unparalleled efficiency. AI systems can be trained to predict the socio-economic consequences of proposed legislation by modelling its effects using historical data. Machine learning classifiers can assist in monitoring policy alignment with European directives, facilitating national compliance and legal coherence (OECD, 2022). The data-driven enhancement of research methodologies has distinct advantages: it diminishes information asymmetries, promotes evidence-based policymaking, and enables strategic foresight.

Yeung and Lodge (2019) state that algorithmic regulation, along with the decision-making tools it requires, is not a neutral improvement but rather a reconfiguration of institutional cognition. Artificial Intelligence does not just process information; it filters it based on pre-defined logics, frequently influenced by obscure factors such as training data, model architecture, and relevance scoring

algorithms. The rare disclosure of these internal standards presents considerable obstacles to the transparency and contestability of legislative research outcomes. When a search query produces filtered results based on probabilistic assessments of significance, legislators may inadvertently encounter a curated (and possibly biased) perspective of reality. Such regimes may favour consensus over dissent, precedence over innovation, or prevailing perspectives over marginalized voices.

This presents what Giovanni Di Gregorio (2022) defines as a “constitutional question of knowledge”: how can democratic institutions guarantee that the cognitive framework of law remains diverse, accountable, and inclusive in an age of automated selection? If legislatures increasingly depend on algorithmic tools to define issues and suggest policy alternatives, there is a risk that machine epistemics—guided by patterns, efficiencies, and correlations—could replace political reasoning grounded in values, debate, and deliberative transparency.

The ethical ramifications are as significant. Fitzilis (2021) cautions that the incorporation of AI in legislative assistance systems may undermine conventional competence and critical analysis. Parliamentary research offices, already burdened by diminishing finances in numerous nations, may experience a decline in expertise if AI tools are employed as replacements rather than enhancements. The transition from human interpretative work to machine-driven analysis may seem efficient; nonetheless, it jeopardizes the analytical depth, contextual comprehension, and political acumen that human researchers provide to the legislative process.

Moreover, AI technologies integrated into decision-support systems frequently utilize predictive analytics to model possible policy outcomes. This may provide significant insights for future planning, but it also shifts parliamentary culture towards anticipatory governance, a legislative approach that prioritizes risk assessment above democratic discourse. According to Helbing (2021), predictive systems often emphasize stability and optimization, which may inhibit political creativity that does not conform to data-driven frameworks. A hidden danger exists that uncertainty—an intrinsic aspect of political agency—may be perceived not as a domain for discourse, but as a factor to be eradicated.

The assurance of harmonization is accompanied by stipulations. AI systems employed in legislative research typically seek to guarantee terminological uniformity and enhance interoperability among national and supranational legal frameworks, especially within the EU setting. Pollicino (2021) and Crawford (2021) contend that AI-driven standardization can result in a homogenizing effect, diminishing linguistic, cultural, and legal diversity to a simplified syntax. Although this may enhance compliance and efficiency, it can undermine the pluralistic fabric of law—particularly in federated or bilingual systems such as Italy’s, where regional nuances and historical particularities are not only rhetorical, but constitutionally vital.

The Italian Parliament is at a pivotal crossroad. On one side, its legal-administrative framework—especially within the *Camera dei Deputati*—has demonstrated a willingness to embrace AI-driven research instruments. In opposition, there exists no unified framework regulating the epistemic implications of these instruments. There is an immediate necessity for institutional norms that delineate the allowable parameters of AI application in legislative research, mandate human monitoring, and guarantee that all outputs are open to political interpretation and examination. Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) contend that the standards pertaining to the EU AI Act should be based on concepts of transparency, auditability, and democratic legitimacy, rather than only on technological criteria.

Without such a framework, the concern is not alone that AI may misinform parliaments, but that it may alter the criteria for what constitutes legitimate or actionable information. Legislative knowledge encompasses not merely facts, but also the framing of issues, underlying attitudes, and the ability to conceptualize future scenarios that data cannot now predict. Despite their analytical capabilities, AI systems lack the normative imagination essential for politics. Their application in legislative research should be perceived not as a substitute for political judgment, but as an instrument whose impact must be evaluated politically.

The path that leads ahead strives for a constitutional awareness of the boundaries of digital enhancement. Utilizing Di Gregorio's (2022) concept of digital constitutionalism and Pollicino's (2020) advocacy for revitalized democratic reflexivity in the midst of a technological advancement, the Italian Parliament ought to adopt a human-centric framework for legislative knowledge—where AI serves a supportive function, and the ultimate decisions, contextualization, and accountability are firmly rooted in elected officials and the public institutions that represent them.

2.6 Comparative insights: How other EU parliaments are responding to AI

The incorporation of artificial intelligence into legislative processes is increasingly becoming a reality, prompting national parliaments within the European Union to adopt varying methods and degrees of readiness. Comparative analysis uncovers a range of adoption frameworks, regulatory cognizance, and ethical considerations. The Italian Parliament has only lately commenced a thorough examination of AI applications, whereas other EU legislative bodies offer valuable insights regarding both opportunities and challenges.

The Finnish Parliament is a prominent example of early institutional experimentation, having initiated a pilot program in partnership with Sitra (the Finnish Innovation Fund) to investigate AI technologies for document summarizing and parliamentary inquiries. This case reveals a realistic strategy for administrative efficiency and a deliberate effort to improve accessibility and public comprehension of legislative papers. Finland's strategy, influenced by a comprehensive dedication to digital democracy, demonstrates an awareness of the civic aspects of AI integration. The Finnish Parliament has developed technologies that enhance internal procedures and external transparency by integrating automation with a user-centred design philosophy.

The Estonian Parliament has utilized the nation's extensive digital infrastructure to experiment with AI for legal writing assistance and intelligent archiving of legislative history. Estonia's standing as one of Europe's most digitally sophisticated governments creates an optimal environment for agile AI experimentation. The Riigikogu has utilized machine learning technologies to arrange legislative texts, identify discrepancies in amendments, and provide searchable archives of parliamentary debates. These applications are constrained in scope yet indicate a long-term approach for developing modular, flexible systems capable of evolving with technology advancements. The focus is on developing AI tools that enhance the capabilities of legal drafters and scholars instead of supplanting them.

The French Parliament has demonstrated cautious behaviour regarding implementation while being highly engaged in discussions regarding the normative implications of AI. The National Assembly formed a specialized research committee on digital sovereignty and artificial intelligence, involving academic experts, industrial stakeholders, and civil society representatives. This discussion highlights the conflict between technology advancement and democratic oversight, especially with

algorithmic accountability and the dangers of opacity in decision-support systems. The parliamentary discourse in France frequently mirrors the overarching French legal heritage, which significantly underscores the state's role in regulating technology for the public good. This reflects the apprehensions articulated by researchers such as Yeung and Lodge (2019), who contend that algorithmic governance should adhere to constitutional requirements, particularly in contexts where democratic debate is jeopardized.

Germany exhibits a compelling hybrid model. The Bundestag has allocated resources for internal capacity-building by utilizing AI for legal research support; nonetheless, its Ethics Council has specifically urged caution in the implementation of AI tools that may affect political discourse or parliamentary discussions. This meticulous balancing act exemplifies the overarching German strategy regarding AI: fostering innovation while adhering to a defined normative and regulatory structure. The internal services of the Bundestag have utilized AI to manage legislative archives, improve search capabilities in parliamentary databases, and assist in comparative legal analysis. Parliamentary leaders have intentionally opted against utilizing generative AI for speechwriting or public-facing materials. This limitation signifies a profound institutional apprehension regarding the preservation of the authenticity of legislative discourse, a sentiment also articulated in Di Gregorio's (2022) examination of the constitutional limitations imposed by digital revolution in public institutions.

The European Parliament, at the supranational level, has served as a legislative entity in formulating the AI Act and has implemented internal initiatives to investigate the possibilities of AI in translation services, policy briefings, and administrative processes. These applications are typically confined to low-risk areas as delineated by the AI Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024), although they demonstrate a proactive approach in integrating AI for legislative support functions. The Parliament's Directorate-General for Translation has utilized neural machine translation systems to improve productivity in multilingual publications, while AI-assisted summaries have been tested to assist MEPs in managing intricate dossiers. While these applications are not central to legislative decision-making, they demonstrate a consistent institutional learning trajectory and a readiness to utilize the technologies in a regulated and transparent fashion.

An examination of the various EU parliaments reveals the absence of a uniform framework for the integration of AI into legislative processes. Nevertheless, certain common patterns are clear. Firstly, digital maturity is of great importance: countries such as Estonia and Finland, possessing robust digital infrastructures, are inherently better positioned to experiment with AI in their legislative bodies. Secondly, most lawmakers are appropriately prioritizing legal and ethical protections. There is an increasing acknowledgment that employing AI in this context transcends mere efficiency; it also prompts significant inquiries on representation, transparency, and democratic accountability. Thirdly, parliaments that exhibit transparency in their operations—engaging citizens, soliciting public input, and experimenting with open-source tools—tend to garner greater public trust.

These comparisons provide valuable guidance for Italy. A dual strategy is required: firstly, enhancing technological and administrative capabilities for the adoption of AI technologies; secondly, establishing a robust ethical and constitutional framework to govern their application. There's much to learn from elsewhere: Estonia's smart use of AI for legal back-end work, Finland's focus on accessibility and public understanding, and Germany's cautious approach to preserving the integrity of political speech. If Italy can leverage these diverse models—while tailoring them to align with its legal culture and parliamentary tradition—it has a genuine opportunity for responsible innovation. Pollicino (2020) rightly asserts that digital transformation in public organizations transcends mere

technology adoption. It is a political and legal procedure that must uphold democratic values rather than undermine them.

The way EU parliaments elect to implement and govern AI will influence both their internal operations and the general public's view of democratic flexibility in the digital era. As parliaments transition from isolated trials to more integrated use of AI, their current decisions will establish significant precedents for transparency, inclusivity, and institutional confidence. Italy, akin to its European peers, is at a pivotal crossroads: the prospect of spearheading responsible parliamentary innovation is tangible; however, it necessitates dedication, collaboration, and a clear objective. By examining the varied approaches across Europe, the Italian Parliament has the opportunity not only to advance but also to shape the future of a digitally empowered and ethically principled legislative body.

CHAPTER 3 – Risks, Ethics, and Democratic Integrity

Chapter 3.1 – Risks to Democratic Integrity: Automation, Opacity, and Accountability

The introduction of artificial intelligence into legislative proceedings presents a significant opportunity, despite the fact that it concurrently raises complex challenges that have a direct impact on the democratic independence of representative institutions. Automation, opacity, and accountability are the three interrelated ideas that underlay these concerns. These are not merely technical concerns; rather, they raise fundamental questions concerning the authority, legitimacy, and the role that public institutions play in this age of algorithmic systems.

Automation, which is usually sought after for the sake of improved efficiency, has the potential to transfer decision-making authority from elected officials to systems that may be difficult to comprehend or that are not well regulated. The utilization of artificial intelligence for the purpose of filtering amendments, prioritizing legislative agendas, or recommending voting positions has the potential to improve efficiency; yet, it also offers the risk of overlooking crucial instances of political conversation. Rather of reducing parliamentary activities to a merely technocratic role, Fitzilis (2021) warns that the use of artificial intelligence into legislative processes must preserve the political core of parliamentary functions. When the major explanation is efficiency, there is a risk of depoliticizing the institutions that uphold democratic pluralism. This risk emerges because efficiency is the fundamental justification. The conversation that takes place in parliament is inherently drawn out and frequently contentious because it incorporates competing interests and points of view, which are characteristics that no machine can replicate or resolve.

The European Union's strategy for regulating artificial intelligence should be viewed not merely as legal harmonization, but as an integral aspect of a wider moral transition towards what researchers refer to as digital constitutionalism. This notion, articulated by Edoardo Celeste in his pivotal work *Digital Constitutionalism: The Role of Internet Bills of Rights* (2022), encapsulates the nascent framework of normative instruments—frequently informal or non-binding—that aim to preserve constitutional norms within the digital realm. Celeste contends that digital constitutionalism is not only a symbolic reaction to technological disruption, but rather a systematic and pluralistic evolution that signifies the reallocation of norm-making authority among official institutions, corporate entities, and civil society.

The Internet Bills of Rights, exemplified by the Italian Declaration of Internet Rights (2015), are fundamental to this framework. Despite the absence of formal legal enforcement, these texts function as "catalysts of digital constitutionalism, articulating values like accountability, transparency, and due process that are vital to representative democracy but frequently lacking in AI systems" (Celeste, 2022). These charters significantly influence the establishment of legal norms and the formulation of institutional conduct, particularly within supranational entities like the European Union. Celeste asserts that these activities are not ancillary but essential for comprehending the normative framework governing AI.

Celeste's thoughts are particularly pertinent in the context of the Italian Parliament. He observes that "the Italian Parliament must navigate a normative framework where supranational digital rights frameworks increasingly prefigure national legislative priorities, creating a tension between democratic accountability and regulatory efficiency" (Celeste, 2022). This illustrates a wider trend

wherein EU-level measures, particularly the proposed AI Act, influence domestic policy agendas significantly. This can improve regulatory coherence but also presents issues with national sovereignty, institutional legitimacy, and procedural adaptability.

This hypothesis substantiates the principal assertion of this thesis: that AI governance, particularly inside representative institutions, is inextricably linked to constitutional frameworks and principles. He posits that the emergence of digital constitutionalism challenges the historical monopoly of parliaments in lawmaking. “By distributing the creation of norms among platforms, institutions, and civil society, digital constitutionalism challenges the historical monopoly of parliaments over lawmaking. Representative democracies must adapt to incorporate AI into laws that are co-produced by courts, EU agencies, and private stakeholders” (Celeste, 2022). This concept is fundamental to understanding the EU's model of regulation as administrative but as part of a constitutional restructuring that remakes power and legitimacy in the government of digital spaces.

This pluralist diffusion of normativity, which was observed by Celeste, necessitates creating new frameworks of democratic legitimacy and procedural safeguards, particularly in the governance of AI. Parliament must procedurally and legally innovate to remain relevant and authoritative. Failure to do so risks further empowering non-democratic actors—private platforms, transnational bureaucracies, or AI systems themselves—to shape public life with little or no democratic accountability.

Celeste also stresses that “it is impossible to comprehend the regulatory ramifications of artificial intelligence for the Italian Parliament without considering the developing context of digital constitutionalism” (2022). Even where Internet Bills of Rights are not legally binding, they “influence expectations surrounding digital governance” and demand institutional responses. Parliaments also need to lead by principles of fairness, openness, and democratic accountability not just in their AI laws but also in applying AI within their own internal affairs. As regulators and takers, legislatures are at the crossroads of normative experimentation and institutional risk.

The author identifies one of the essential tensions in the architecture: the increasing burden of EU-level regulation, particularly the AI Act, could “inject a degree of sophistication that could undermine national legislative control,” unless counteracted by deliberate institutional ingenuity. National parliaments, including that of Italy, are therefore urged to exercise their autonomy through legislation modification, procedural innovation, and normative guidance. The alternative—a passive alignment with international initiatives—poses a risk to their democratic function in the long term.

In conclusion, Celeste’s study provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for comprehending the transnational dynamics of AI legislation and their ramifications for national parliaments. His research endorses the perspective that a sustainable and legitimate AI governance framework should be founded on digital constitutionalism, and that representative institutions must redefine their function within a legal context increasingly influenced by distributed normativity, supranational governance, and technological mediation.

Moreover, the incorporation of AI inside the legal framework might subtly modify the power dynamics between political entities and technocratic institutions in manners that are not always readily apparent or easily disputable. Legislative processes are fundamentally based on the concept that political discourse, rather than technical efficiency, should dictate the formulation of laws and regulations. Nonetheless, when AI systems—especially those created or employed by legislative secretariats, private contractors, or third-party consultants—significantly influence the drafting, amending, or evaluation of legislation, a nuanced yet substantial redistribution of institutional power

may ensue. These actors, frequently functioning beyond the formal political domain and devoid of direct electoral responsibility, may start to wield excessive influence over procedural and substantive results, not via direct intervention but through the design and adjustment of algorithmic instruments that pre-filter, rank, or organize information flows.

If legislative secretariats or external consultants develop proprietary tools for evaluating the admissibility of amendments, predicting policy outcomes, or benchmarking the coherence of legislative proposals, their function may evolve from technical support to de facto gatekeeping. This transition presents significant challenges regarding transparency and democratic legitimacy, since these instruments may incorporate ideological, institutional, or methodological presuppositions that remain untested due to their claimed neutrality or technicality. Elected officials, tasked with democratic decision-making, may become increasingly dependent on instruments that they cannot scrutinize or alter—tools whose underlying logic embodies the priorities or constraints of their developers rather than the wider political mandate.

A growing reliance on automated systems, especially those formed through unclear public-private partnerships, jeopardizes the integrity of representative democracy by creating a "democratic deficit." In contrast to public officials or parliamentary advisors, who are embedded inside institutional hierarchies and adhere to established norms of parliamentary procedure, private AI system developers may lack motivation to conform to deliberative and constitutional principles. Their proficiency is in optimization, efficiency, and pattern identification, rather than in maintaining political pluralism or normative equilibrium. Consequently, technical determinations about the classification of amendments, the weighting of policy factors, or the ranking of competing legislation may be influenced by commercial rationales or data-driven heuristics that are incongruent with the principles of democratic governance. In severe instances, the legislative process may become reliant on a technical framework that perpetuates its own biases and favours specific institutional actors over others.

This dynamic is further intensified by the informational asymmetry between AI tool developers and users. If legislators are unable to comprehensively comprehend, contest, or amend the outputs generated by algorithmic systems, their authority becomes procedural rather than substantive—they may accept judgments without the capacity to thoroughly evaluate the foundations upon which those decisions rest. This epistemic disparity compromises the principle of democratic discussion and evokes the threat of technological domination, wherein decision-making is influenced more by the internal mechanisms of intricate systems created by unaccountable specialists than by discourse and accountability.

The constitutional ramifications of this development are significant. Representative democracy depends not alone on electoral legitimacy but also on the ongoing capacity of elected institutions to have substantial influence over legislative outcomes. If AI systems are permitted to supplant human judgment or obscure crucial judgments with algorithmic complexity, parliaments may become technically sovereign yet substantively subordinate resulting in a hollowing out of democratic agency under the pretence of modernization. Preventing this consequence necessitates both technical safeguards and a definitive commitment to institutional reflexivity, public transparency, and a reaffirmation of the political essence of lawmaking in the era of AI.

The issue of opacity, which is also known as the "black box" problem, is often considered to be the most persistent obstacle in the field of artificial intelligence in the public sector. It may be difficult for developers to comprehend the results that algorithms that have been trained on big datasets

produce, and it may even be even more difficult for legislators or the public to understand. Both public trust and the constitutionally mandated accountability are put in jeopardy because of this widespread lack of transparency. The authors Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) argue that the presence of opacity in artificial intelligence systems undermines the ability of both the public and institutional actors to comprehend decision-making processes, which in turn makes it easier for arbitrary or biased outcomes to occur. In situations when artificial intelligence approaches are used to develop legal language or identify trends in legislative data, the risks associated with decision-making that is not transparent become increasingly apparent. If these systems are unable to communicate their rationale in a manner that is both clear and legally justifiable, then they are incompatible with the fundamental principles of constitutional governance.

In legislatures, opacity also intersects with procedural issues. Numerous legislative choices are already the outcome of intricate negotiations, modifications, and institutional procedures. Integrating opaque AI techniques into this context may further diminish the already restricted transparency that citizens possess regarding legislative procedures. This would intensify current democratic deficiencies and reinforce popular perceptions of unaccountable rule. In a politically charged environment characterized by distrust and division, ensuring openness in legislative AI systems is imperative.

This is directly related to the third issue: accountability. In conventional parliamentary proceedings, accountability can be distinctly attributed to elected representatives, legal counsel, or committees. However, when AI tools facilitate or partially automate these procedures, the boundaries of accountability become indistinct. Who bears responsibility if an AI tool proposes a legislative action that subsequently proves to be detrimental or illegal? Who conducts the audit of the training data and decision-making processes? According to Di Gregorio (2022), these inquiries must be resolved prior to the recognition of AI as legitimate in parliamentary contexts. In the absence of explicit accountability measures, democratic institutions may transfer authority to systems functioning beyond the normative parameters of constitutional law.

The reliance on artificial intelligence may also impair the institutional memory and human discernment that are necessary for the preservation of legislative traditions. The practice of delegating routine tasks that require a high level of cognitive effort to machines has the potential to result in a gradual decline in the professional capacities of parliamentary staff, so promoting a cycle of dependence on automated technologies. Consequently, this institutional deskilling reduces the effectiveness of internal control and makes it more difficult to identify and challenge errors, omissions, or biases in the outputs of artificial intelligence. If there are no robust accountability procedures in place, it is possible that errors that are produced by artificial intelligence would go ignored. This is especially true if these systems are seen as being impartial or superior to human judgment.

The investigation that Luciano Floridi conducted on the ethics of information offers a significant perspective that can be utilized in the evaluation of these challenges. The concept of "infraethics," which refers to the moral framework that is required for ethical decision-making in digital situations, is emphasized by Floridi (2021). The use of artificial intelligence in the setting of parliaments requires a basic adherence to transparency, explainability, and institutional reflexivity. Inquiries should be made by parliaments not only concerning the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI), but also about the functions that are appropriate for it and the ethical parameters that govern its use. Floridi adds that ethics is not merely a concern; rather, it is a factor that must be present in order for digital government to be considered legitimate.

Floridi's term of "infostructure" further emphasizes the idea that information systems alter the settings in which decisions are made. In a parliamentary context, this indicates that AI technologies are not impartial instruments but components of a larger framework of political influence. AI influences legislative drafting, research, and voting recommendations, shaping the cognitive and institutional environment in which lawmakers operate. This underscores the necessity of integrating principles like as equity, inclusion, and deliberative transparency into the design and implementation of AI systems. Helbing (2021) and Pollicino (2021) both underscore that misalignment of technical systems with democratic principles might result in systemic distortions in the exercise and comprehension of power.

The risks associated with AI in parliamentary contexts are not hypothetical or distant. Institutions are commencing to emerge as they pilot and implement these techniques. If neglected, these concerns might undermine the fundamental principles of democratic governance: open discourse, electoral accountability, and the rule of law. Crawford (2021) emphatically asserts that AI lacks neutrality. It mirrors and exacerbates prevailing social and political frameworks, frequently solidifying disparities under the pretence of innovation. The issue for parliaments is not merely to control AI externally, but to oversee its internal utilization in a manner that is inherently democratic, transparent, and responsible.

Furthermore, the legitimacy of parliamentary decisions relies not solely on their consequences but also on the methods by which they are formulated. The integration of AI into legislative contexts must be meticulously regulated to maintain the symbolic and procedural aspects of parliamentary democracy. Public hearings, open-source software, audit trails, and inclusive governance mechanisms are essential instruments for guaranteeing that AI upholds democracy rather than subverting it. These methods must be institutionalized rather than improvised for parliaments to maintain their legitimacy in the digital era.

In conclusion, the incorporation of AI into parliamentary procedures must be informed by a lucid comprehension of its capacity to both augment and undermine democratic processes. Addressing automation, transparency, and accountability transcends technical regulation; it necessitates institutional self-awareness. To maintain their credibility as guardians of democracy in the digital era, parliaments must guarantee that the technologies they utilize embody, rather than misrepresent, the values they are intended to uphold.

3.2 – The Role of Digital Constitutionalism in AI Regulation

The unprecedented incorporation of artificial intelligence into public governance challenges conventional constitutional frameworks and necessitates that democratic institutions re-visit their fundamental commitments to transparency, accountability, and human rights. Digital constitutionalism, a normative initiative designed to integrate constitutional ideas into the digital domain, has arisen as a conceptual and legal solution to these issues. In the realm of AI legislation, particularly with its parliamentary application, digital constitutionalism delineates a framework for limiting technical authority through democratic norms and rights-based protections (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021).

By suggesting that rights, discussion, and procedural equity should drive the design and execution of algorithmic systems, digital constitutionalism fundamentally offers an alternative to the technocratic logic that is now prevalent in the discourse around artificial intelligence (AI). According to Di

Gregorio (2022), the proliferation of artificial intelligence in public institutions poses a constitutional conundrum: how to incorporate emerging technology without jeopardizing the institutional balances and civic safeguards that are characteristic of liberal democracies. Digital constitutionalism, as he sees it, is a vital progression of constitutional law. It is a form of constitutional law that confronts power not just as it moves through institutions, but also as it becomes ingrained in data infrastructures, algorithmic frameworks, and digital architectures.

When it comes to analysing artificial intelligence in legislative situations, this approach is particularly consistent. Parliaments are not only places for administrative purposes; they also function as forums for demonstrating democratic legitimacy in both a symbolic and procedural manner. When applied in this context, artificial intelligence systems cannot be evaluated only based on their efficiency or technical correctness. This is true whether the systems are being used for amendment screening, legal advice, or policy result prediction. Additionally, they need to be reviewed to determine whether they are in accordance with constitutional ideals, such as equality before the law, access to political participation, and pluralism in deliberative processes. In the field of current Italian legal studies, Bollettino and others have brought attention to the fact that this compatibility is not an inherent quality but rather one that must be cultivated by institutions and evaluated on a continuous basis.

The regulatory path of the European Union, especially via the Artificial Intelligence Act (European Commission, 2021; European Parliament and Council, 2024), demonstrates a regional initiative to integrate constitutional principles into AI regulation. The AI Act, while frequently presented as a market regulation, explicitly incorporates normative commitments to fundamental rights, particularly via its risk-based structure that imposes more scrutiny on public sector AI. This methodology aligns with the principles of digital constitutionalism: the state's application of AI, particularly in legislative bodies, must adhere to elevated legitimacy standards as it directly impacts individuals' legal and political rights (Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021).

Translating these abstract commitments into practical limits presents a significant issue. Pollicino (2020) asserts that the pure presence of rights in digital charters or legal preambles does not ensure their enforcement within technical systems. This is especially relevant in parliamentary settings, where AI tools may be implemented gradually, lacking sufficient debate, documentation, or oversight measures. In these situations, the institutional inertia around technological adoption might overshadow democratic oversight. Digital constitutionalism necessitates not only legislative concepts but also institutional reforms, including obligatory impact studies, parliamentary committees on digital governance, and requirements for algorithmic openness.

It is recommended that "constitutional-by-design" concepts be used for artificial intelligence systems that are used in the public sector. This is a specific recommendation that comes from this body of material. It is imperative that such instruments be designed from the very beginning with the intention of upholding the norms of proportionality, accessibility, contestability, and non-discrimination. This methodology, which was influenced by privacy-by-design frameworks that were established in EU data protection legislation, stipulates that legislative artificial intelligence systems have inherent auditability, complete recording of training data, and substantial human supervision. These are not only technical improvements; rather, they are constitutional requirements that must be considered. According to Helbing (2021), the legitimacy of digital decision-making systems is dependent not only on the outputs of those systems, but also on the procedural frameworks that govern how those systems operate.

When it comes to the legal framework, the Italian legal system exemplifies both the potential advantages and the challenges that are associated with the implementation of digital constitutionalism. Over the course of its history, Italy has upheld a robust tradition of constitutional scrutiny of executive activity. Furthermore, the country's legislative system exhibits a dedication to the principle of deliberative plurality. However, as Citino (2020) points out, the growing automation of legislative procedures has not been regularly matched by a commensurate concentration on normative protections. This is something that has been seen. This presents a challenge. There is a chance that the implementation of digital platforms for legislative drafting or parliamentary inquiry could inadvertently consolidate authority inside technocratic structures. This is a possibility. The occurrence of this could take place in the absence of the implementation of democratic safeguards and transparency norms.

Furthermore, the potential for artificial intelligence to enhance opaque power structures is not merely a theoretical possibility in an environment such as Italy, which is characterized by coalition governments, changing legislative majorities, and repeated institutional realignments. Within this perspective, digital constitutionalism ought to be seen as a framework for institutional resilience. This framework would enable parliaments to incorporate technological innovation while still maintaining their democratic nature. It states that artificial intelligence is not impartial and that its application in political institutions ought to be treated as a subject of constitutional interpretation rather than merely a question of administrative efficiency. However, it is important to note that this is not the case.

Moreover, Floridi's (2021) notion of "legitimate data governance" is fundamental to the concept of digital constitutionalism. He asserts that democratic institutions must incorporate concepts of explainability, accountability, and inclusion into their information processes, especially when automated technology facilitates public discourse or affects legislative results. This aligns closely with the requirements of parliamentary AI supervision, where legitimacy relies not only on procedural transparency but also on epistemic inclusivity: ensuring that AI tools enhance, rather than undermine, democratic pluralism.

In summary, digital constitutionalism provides a principled and realistic framework for the incorporation of AI into parliamentary operations. It does not reject innovation but insists that it be constrained by the ideals that uphold democratic existence. This framework offers Italy and other EU member states a means to balance the demands of digital modernization with the requirements of constitutional democracy. The future of AI in legislative contexts will be influenced not just by technical feasibility or regulatory requirements but also by our constitutional creativity.

3.3 – Institutional Safeguards and the Need for Digital Literacy in Parliament

As artificial intelligence technologies become more integrated into parliamentary processes—ranging from legislative drafting and amendment screening to research support and speech generation—issues regarding institutional safeguards and human digital proficiency become critically significant. Although legal frameworks like the EU AI Act put forth basic risk-based criteria, they do not replace the internal institutional structures necessary for the responsible, transparent, and constitutional implementation of AI in parliaments. A digital constitutionalism perspective (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021; Floridi, 2021) posits that these mechanisms should function not only at the level of formal legality but also in the quotidian activities of legislative institutions. This requires two

concurrent mandates: strong institutional protections and the development of digital literacy among legislative personnel and elected officials.

At the institutional level, safeguards alienate the protocols, frameworks, and standards that regulate the implementation, oversight, and assessment of AI systems. This includes transparency mandates, algorithmic auditing protocols, impact evaluations, and oversight entities particularly designed to scrutinize technology systems from a legal-democratic perspective. As per the OECD (2022), only a limited number of parliaments have institutionalized such safeguards. AI systems are frequently implemented on a trial basis or via outsourced public-private partnerships, lacking adequate parliamentary discussion or internal oversight. This improvised method heightens the risk of institutional drift, as technology advancement surpasses normative regulation, thereby undermining parliamentary sovereignty and deliberate integrity.

In legislative contexts, the implementation of AI tools necessitates pre-emptive review processes similar to those employed for significant regulatory measures. Fitzilis (2021) asserts that ethical and legal evaluations should precede the implementation of AI-driven legislative technology, particularly when these systems affect agenda-setting, amendment eligibility, or research results. These evaluations must be performed by politically neutral, interdisciplinary entities that integrate technical proficiency with legal and constitutional authority. In the absence of such protections, algorithmic systems pose a significant risk of undermining the procedural balance of parliamentary democracy by prioritizing efficiency and uniformity over diversity and debate.

Moreover, institutional safeguards must tackle the concerns related to procurement and third-party participation. Numerous parliamentary AI technologies, including amendment filtering algorithms and natural language processing engines, are developed and sustained by private companies. This invites ambiguity and possible conflicts of interest into the legislative process. Crawford (2021) and Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) contend that proprietary models, especially those created outside the public sector, frequently lack transparency and are difficult to audit. In parliamentary contexts, this poses significant challenges, as it may lead to legislative outcomes being swayed by instruments whose rationale and parameters are obscure even to their users. Consequently, institutions ought to mandate open-source code, comprehensive documentation of training data, and contractual assurances for public monitoring in all technological acquisitions.

Without a matching investment in digital literacy, however, even the most extensive institutional structures are not sufficient to meet the needs of the organization. For legislators and legislative staff to be able to properly oversee artificial intelligence systems, it is necessary for them to have the ability to comprehend how these systems operate, what they are intended to accomplish, and what their limitations are. In this context, digital literacy is not limited to fundamental technical know-how; rather, it incorporates an awareness of the political, ethical, and legal components of algorithmic governance that is interdisciplinary in nature (Helbing, 2021; Floridi, 2021).

Digital literacy has been recognized as a core component of institutional resilience in the face of artificial intelligence by the European Parliamentary Research Service (2021). The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) highlights the importance of continual professional development programs to adapt to the various duties and responsibilities of parliamentary actors in its examination of the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). Not only does this comprise training for legal drafters, clerks, and technical workers, but it also includes seminars and briefings for members of parliament and committee employees. A comprehensive program for fostering such literacy across the legislative body is still lacking in the Italian Parliament, even though there has been an increase

in the use of digital tools (Citino, 2020). Because of this, separate offices are forced to rely on outside consultants or ad hoc knowledge, which weakens both uniformity and responsibility throughout the organization.

Furthermore, the low level of digital literacy that exists within political institutions has the potential to worsen the existing knowledge gap that exists between public officials and commercial technology contractors. Floridi (2021) sees that when institutional actors do not have the conceptual tools necessary to challenge the outputs of algorithms, they run the risk of perceiving artificial intelligence systems as neutral arbitrators rather than structures that are contested. What Luciano Floridi calls "unjustified epistemological deference" is a condition in which technical systems are viewed as fundamentally objective, which ultimately leads to the abdication of human judgment. This epistemic dependency can result in this sort of situation. This kind of deference is incompatible with the democratic requirement that laws and policies must be open to debate, criticism, and revision within the context of a parliamentary setting.

Additionally, the ethical implications of digital literacy are particularly acute in parliamentary environments, as parliaments are not merely responsible for the processing of information; they also establish legal significance. AI systems employed in the legislative process do not function in isolation; they collaborate to establish normative categories, prioritize framings of social issues, and organize political discourse. To this end, digital literacy must be founded on what Floridi (2021) refers to as "epistemic justice," which involves enabling users of digital systems to critically engage with the sources, methods, and implications of algorithmic reasoning. This necessitates a novel professional development model that incorporates technical comprehension, ethical scrutiny, and legal interpretation into the education of parliamentary actors.

The intersection of institutional safeguards and digital literacy is crucial when assessing the evaluation and auditability of AI systems. Helbing (2021) and Pollicino (2021) assert that parliaments must guarantee that every algorithmic tool employed in a deliberative framework is amenable to ex post review, encompassing not just accuracy and efficiency but also adherence to constitutional ideals. This necessitates not only technological criteria but also legally established principles of transparency, proportionality, and non-discrimination. Parliamentary audit mechanisms must possess both technical expertise and normative power, potentially via a specialized AI oversight committee or an inter-branch council with representatives from many parties.

The concept of "designing for human oversight" proposed by Floridi (2021) provides a useful viewpoint for the implementation of such endeavours. He proposes that artificial intelligence systems ought to be designed to make human intervention easier, rather than merely to make it possible. In parliaments, this might be translated into interfaces that emphasize sections that are disputed, provide explanations that are easily available for decision-making patterns, and allow for active deliberation and override by human actors. If artificial intelligence systems are deployed without such affordances, there is a possibility that they will replace democratic judgment rather than assisting it.

Finally, increasing the level of digital literacy within the parliamentary body has the additional advantage of boosting public trust. There is a reasonable expectation among citizens that their representatives will understand the technologies that influence law and government. They are a sign of institutional maturity and transparency when members of parliament and staff are able to demonstrate their competence in subjects pertaining to artificial intelligence (AI), when they can explain, question, and amend the usage of algorithmic tools. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Fitzilis, 2021), trust in democratic institutions is dependent not just on the outcomes of

elections, but also on the perception that these institutions are able to adjust to new circumstances without compromising their fundamental principles by doing so.

In conclusion, institutional safeguards and digital literacy are not ancillary issues in the governance of AI in parliament; they are essential. In the absence of strong supervision systems and knowledgeable human participants, AI tools may transform into obscure instruments of technocratic dominance instead of facilitating democratic discourse. The validity of AI in legislative settings depends on its conformity to constitutional standards, its subjugation to democratic scrutiny, and its comprehensibility to its users. Parliaments can only guarantee that AI enhances, rather than undermines, their function as custodians of democratic lawmaking in the digital era through the simultaneous growth of institutional infrastructure and human competence.

3.4 – Reflections on the Legitimacy and Authenticity of AI-Assisted Political Discourse

The incorporation of artificial intelligence into legislative processes prompts not just functional and ethical inquiries but also profound symbolic considerations. Among them, the most delicate issue may be the impact of AI on the legitimacy and authenticity of political discourse within representative institutions. This chapter explores a basic issue: can AI-generated or AI-assisted political communication maintain the essential characteristics of democratic expression, following previous discussions on transparency, accountability, and institutional safeguards? The concern extends beyond the legality or efficacy of such tools; it questions whether they diminish the symbolic authority of parliamentary discourse and its function in articulating public sovereignty.

AI-generated discourse creates a new kind of mediated political agency, wherein the speaker's original meaning may be partially altered or recontextualized by automated systems trained on historical data and linguistic patterns. According to Fitzilis (2021), the application of AI techniques for the generation or enhancement of political discourse has transcended mere theoretical conjecture. Instances like Senator Lombardo's address in the Italian Senate—partially composed by ChatGPT—represent a pivotal moment in the shifting demarcation between human representation and algorithmic authoring. Despite the senator's declaration of AI utilization and adherence to legislative regulations, the incident prompted extensive public and institutional contemplation. This contradiction between formality and perception, technical legality and symbolic authenticity, must now be analysed and managed.

Political legitimacy in representative democracies fundamentally relies on the premise that elected representatives are the independent architects of their political actions. These actions encompass votes, proposals, amendments, and, most significantly, speech. Parliamentary speech is not a private discourse; it constitutes a public act, and its democratic legitimacy stems from the idea that the speaker articulates the desires of their constituents, mediated by their own discernment. If this judgment is substituted or even subtly influenced by an opaque generative model, the discourse can risk becoming inauthentic. Floridi (2021) emphasizes that agency in digital contexts should be perceived not just as the ability to act but also as the ability to be held accountable for one's actions. Artificial intelligence, in its present form, is incapable of assuming responsibility. It lacks intentionality, recollection, and accountability. Consequently, when technology influences political discourse, it creates a responsibility void—an ethical and legal deficiency that current legislative traditions are inadequately prepared to address.

Furthermore, authenticity in political discourse possesses symbolic and emotional facets that defy mechanization. Political communication is influenced by fervour, improvisation, rhetorical immediacy, and context-dependent signals. Algorithms, including sophisticated massive language models, may replicate rhetorical patterns but lack the experiential knowledge and ethical reasoning that underpin political stances. Pollicino (2021) and Di Gregorio (2022) assert that in constitutional democracies, political discourse is not merely a right; it is a rite of democratic sovereignty. By articulating positions in their own terms, legislators participate in the reaffirmation of constitutional principles and the collective deliberation process. If AI-generated speech supplants this function with optimal linguistic outputs derived from historical data, parliamentary discourse may become derivative, generic, and politically stagnant.

This matter is not solely symbolic; it carries institutional ramifications. Crawford (2021) contends that AI systems are not impartial instruments but manifestations of institutional authority, influenced by prevailing disparities and ingrained value systems. An AI-generated political statement based on majoritarian data may inadvertently perpetuate ideological or cultural prejudices, therefore constricting the discursive space available for minority speakers and opposing perspectives. This poses a structural challenge to pluralism in parliaments, since it may favour dominant norms and marginalize dissenting or unusual political discourse.

The public's view of AI-assisted political discourse significantly influences trust in representative institutions. The OECD (2022) indicates that citizens typically endorse the application of AI in administrative and technical roles, although harbor reservations regarding its involvement in decision-making and symbolic political activities. If constituents see that their politicians are no longer the genuine originators of their statements or positions, political participation may diminish. This erosion of trust cannot be remedied by technical precision or adherence to procedures. According to Fitzilis (2021), the legitimacy of democratic institutions relies on transparency, discussion, and perceived authenticity, rather than solely on formal accuracy.

Floridi's (2021) notion of infostructures enhances this critique by emphasizing how digital systems influence not only the content of communication but also the parameters of what may be communicated. Language models do not merely produce text; they impose epistemic limitations by prioritizing statistically likely expressions, prevailing ideologies, and refined syntaxes. This may limit the spectrum of permissible rhetorical techniques in parliamentary debate, dissuading impassioned, poetic, or combative expressions. Ultimately, this may result in the uniformity of political discourse, wherein contrarian or minority viewpoints are algorithmically mitigated or overlooked.

The incorporation of AI into political debate prompts inquiries regarding parliamentary privilege and culpability from a legal perspective. Di Gregorio (2022) and Helbing (2021) assert that the law assumes parliamentary acts are human actions. If a derogatory statement is made in the chamber, the speaker bears accountability. Should the Member of Parliament still be held accountable if the comment was generated by an AI system? Is the AI accountable, or does the duty lie with the programmers and data providers? The existing legal doctrine lacks definitive answers, and this uncertainty constitutes a perilous normative void in democratic administration.

Moreover, employing AI to produce political discourse may promote a novel type of political automation, wherein time-constrained legislators increasingly assign their communication responsibilities to machines. What starts as convenience may develop into dependency, resulting in a decline in political expression and a steady deterioration of rhetorical proficiency. As indicated in

Chapter 3.1, this phenomenon mirrors the hazards of automation in legal and procedural spheres, where human competence is eclipsed by algorithmic results. In verbal communication, the ramifications are even more profound as they impact not only government but also representation itself.

To alleviate these dangers, legislature must establish and implement legislative frameworks and practical standards for the application of AI in political communication. These must include the following:

- Explicit disclosures anytime artificial intelligence has assisted in the composition of speeches or comments.
- Internal ethical assessment processes for AI-generated parliamentary documents.
- Human-in-the-loop provisions guarantee that ultimate accountability and authorship reside with the elected authority.
- Prohibitions on the utilization of AI-generated language in official votes, statements, or inter-institutional agreements.

Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) contend that such controls are crucial to avert function creep, as systems originally designed for administrative purposes progressively encroach over normative domains without adequate oversight.

Certain nations have commenced dialogues in this regard. The European Parliamentary Research Service (2021) has suggested a non-binding code of conduct for the application of AI in parliamentary contexts. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (Fitzilis, 2021) has advocated for peer-learning and knowledge exchange across legislators to guarantee the dissemination of best practices. These are promising indicators; nonetheless, considerable effort is still required. The Italian Parliament could assume a leadership role by launching a public discourse on the symbolic and ethical aspects of AI-assisted communication, with contributions from constitutional experts, technologists, members of parliament, and civic organizations.

In conclusion, the legitimacy and authenticity of legislative discourse are fundamental; they constitute the bedrock of democratic representation. AI may assist legislators, but it cannot supplant the performative, ethical, and symbolic roles of political discourse. The language used in parliament serves not merely as a medium but as a manifestation of democratic authority. Delegating authority to mechanisms devoid of judgment, context, or accountability jeopardizes the foundational principles of representative democracy. During digital transformation within public institutions, it is essential to recognize that authenticity is not merely a technical attribute; it is a fundamental constitutional requirement.

3.5 – Artificial Intelligence Between Efficiency and Representation: An Epistemic Dilemma

As previously addressed in Chapters 3.1 and 3.4, the incorporation of artificial intelligence into parliamentary procedures presents regulatory and ethical challenges, while also prompting profound inquiries regarding democratic legitimacy, human authorship, and institutional authenticity. This article elaborates on such views by analysing the epistemic consequences of AI integration in

representative institutions, namely the transition it may incite from deliberation to automation, and from human thinking to data-driven logic.

Although AI is frequently presented in parliaments as a tool for improving efficiency—such as in the filtration of amendments, assistance in legislative drafting, or automation of internal processes—this technological enhancement may compromise epistemic and political profundity. The danger is in democratic representation being increasingly influenced by systems that emphasize coherence, speed, and replicability over debate, pluralism, and unpredictability. As emphasized in Chapter 2.4, the implementation of AI in the filtration of amendments establishes a sort of covert gatekeeping that may marginalize minority or unconventional viewpoints under the pretence of procedural logic.

Luciano Floridi's notion of infraethics provides a theoretical framework for understanding this shift. Floridi (2014) posits that the digital environment, or "infosphere," functions not alone as a medium but as a normative space that influences the generation, structuring, and legitimization of information. When applied to parliamentary AI tools, this indicates that algorithmic systems not only facilitate legislative procedures but also shape the epistemic conditions that give rise to political knowledge and authorship. This issue is especially pertinent in the Italian context, since, as indicated in Chapter 2.2, parliamentary procedures are intimately linked to constitutional principles such as transparency, deliberation, and formal legal authorship.

Shoshana Zuboff (2019) cautions that algorithmic systems frequently operate inside frameworks of behavioural prediction and manipulation. Her notion of surveillance capitalism, while centred on the private sector, is pertinent to public institutions that utilize AI tools created by external entities. Chapter 3.3 addresses the Parliament's dual function as both regulator and user, highlighting concerns regarding democratic autonomy: how can a representative institution preserve sovereignty over its processes when the informational infrastructure that informs them is outsourced or lacks accountability?

Evgeny Morozov (2013) introduces the concept of technical solutionism, which refers to the inclination to redefine intricate political and institutional challenges as issues that can be addressed through automation. This critique aligns with the situations examined in Chapters 2.1 and 2.3, when AI is employed for drafting and speechwriting tasks. Although the efficiency improvements are apparent, the symbolic and epistemic power of political language—anchored in human judgment and rhetorical discourse—faces the danger of being diminished. Morozov emphasizes that politically significant matters cannot always be simplified to what is computationally manageable.

Mireille Hildebrandt (2015) presents the concept of code-driven normativity, contending that algorithmic systems are not solely descriptive but also actively normative from a legal-theoretical standpoint. They influence the legal and institutional options accessible to decision-makers by incorporating implicit criteria for selection, prioritization, and exclusion. In legislative bodies, this implies that AI not only aids human decision-making but also partially delineates the parameters of what can be determined, frequently in an imperceptible manner. Chapter 2.6 illustrates that the integration of AI across EU parliaments differs considerably based on the normative frameworks regulating its implementation.

Julie E. Cohen (2017) underscores this study by highlighting the intrinsically political nature of digital architectures. Her research on the platform economy posits that information systems encode and perpetuate certain power dynamics. In the legislative context, this implies that implementing AI technologies without a rigorous examination of their design and institutional impacts may unintentionally reinforce existing hierarchies or conceal exclusionary mechanisms. Cohen's

observations correspond with the considerations in Chapter 3.2 regarding digital constitutionalism, emphasizing that the principle of contestability should encompass both legal standards and technological systems.

Recent research by Matthew Wihbey (2024) intensifies the urgency of these epistemological issues. In his paper *AI and Epistemic Risk for Democracy: A Coming Crisis of Public Knowledge?* Wihbey contends that artificial intelligence engenders a systemic vulnerability in democratic countries by transforming the processes of public knowledge production, verification, and dissemination. In institutional environments such as parliaments, where judgments rely on the legitimacy of common facts and transparent deliberation, the incorporation of AI poses a threat to the informational underpinnings of trust. This aligns with earlier arguments in Chapters 1.1 and 3.1 regarding the issues of opacity and explainability, indicating that in the absence of strong institutional safeguards, AI may create epistemic distortions that compromise democratic accountability internally.

Collectively, these viewpoints indicate that AI should not be seen only as a neutral tool for procedural enhancement. Rather, it should be seen as a co-author of institutional epistemology, possessing the ability to shape perceptions, discourse, and decisions within representative situations. Consequently, democratic institutions like the Italian Parliament must transcend mere adherence to the AI Act and actively establish constitutional oversight over the epistemic contexts in which they function. Only through such reflexivity can parliaments guarantee that AI facilitates democratic discussion rather than covertly altering it.

This epistemic vigilance encompasses not only technological knowledge and ethical oversight but also the preservation of conditions that ensure representation remains human, contestable, and politically significant in the digital era.

CHAPTER 4 – Policy Recommendations and Future Outlook

This concluding chapter synthesizes the findings from preceding chapters and formulates detailed policy recommendations for the responsible integration of artificial intelligence (AI) inside the legislative operations of the Italian Parliament. It functions as both a framework for institutional reform and a normative guide consistent with the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024) and the developing paradigm of digital constitutionalism (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021; Floridi, 2021).

In the previous chapters, we encountered the role of the AI Act in designating parliaments as both regulators and users of AI technologies (Chapter 1), the current piloting or deployment of these technologies within the Italian legislative framework (Chapter 2), and the ethical and democratic risks associated with these implementations (Chapter 3). This chapter aims to address those findings by highlighting operational tactics and institutional procedures that can guarantee AI integration boosts, rather than undermines, democratic integrity and institutional legitimacy.

We initiate by outlining criteria for the correct utilization of AI in parliamentary contexts, then addressing more specific proposals regarding transparency, ethical supervision, digital education, and institutional transformation.

4.1 Guidelines for Responsible AI Use within Parliamentary Functions

When it comes to legislative functions, the responsible application of artificial intelligence is not merely a matter of technical efficiency; rather, it is a democratic need. According to Yeung and Lodge (2019), every institutional deployment of algorithmic tools must be guided by the concepts of explainability, contestability, and accountability. This is a requirement that must be met. In the setting of parliamentary proceedings, where decisions can have far-reaching legal and symbolic repercussions, the significance of these principles is amplified.

A. Human-Centered Design and Oversight

The first guideline emphasizes that the role of elected officials and parliamentary staff cannot be replaced by algorithmic systems and stresses explicitly on the centrality of human judgment in all legislative processes that are aided by artificial intelligence. In the course of his investigation into the ethics of information, Luciano Floridi (2021) proposes the fundamental idea of "designing for human oversight." This concept entails that the digital tools that are utilized in public institutions should be structured in such a way that they strengthen, rather than diminish, the capacity for human intervention, responsibility, and moral reasoning. According to Floridi, this design principle is not just an issue of usability; rather, it is a matter of legitimacy: systems must be intelligible, auditable, and epistemically transparent in both their structured outputs and their outputs themselves.

The application of this principle in the Italian Parliament implies, from a practical standpoint, that artificial intelligence systems—whether they are used for drafting legislation, filtering amendments, supporting research, or even assisting in speech composition—must include features that are

interactive and legally accountable. The real-time tracing modules, user-facing audit trails, and visual dashboards that clarify not only what the system suggests but also how, on what basis, and according to whose interpretative logic are included in this category. The employment of artificial intelligence in institutions must always preserve traceability and allow for contestation, as Di Gregorio (2022) has emphasized. This is especially important in legislative settings, where constitutional principles are performed, interpreted, and debated during everyday procedural choices.

When looking at real-world applications, such as the case of Senator Marco Lombardo (Chapter 2.2), who openly admitted that he had utilized ChatGPT in the process of preparing a portion of his address in the Senate, the significance of this principle becomes abundantly evident. Even though his openness was admirable and sparked a significant public discussion, the episode also brought up significant normative and legal problems concerning authorship, institutional sincerity, and representational authenticity. In accordance with the approach that was presented by Fitzilis (2021), generative artificial intelligence systems have the potential to distort the distinction between rhetorical performance and political aim, so substituting computational coherence for deliberate nuance. Crawford (2021) cautions that not only are these systems educated to mimic, but they are also trained to reason. They do not adhere to democratic norms or constitutional ethics when they develop language; rather, they do it for probabilities.

Pollicino (2021) provides further support for this criticism by bringing to our attention the fact that legislative discourse is not only a language output but rather a performative act of sovereignty. The speech of a legislator is an expression of their discretionary judgment, which is founded on the legitimacy of the electoral process and is accountable to the public. When such discourse is generated or substantially impacted by opaque algorithmic systems, we run the risk of eroding the foundation of representative democracy, which is both symbolic and legal in nature. According to Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021), even the appearance of automation in political communication has the potential to erode public trust and deepen the democratic deficit that has already been identified in situations of technocratic drift.

As a result, human oversight in legislative contexts backed by artificial intelligence needs to be elevated from a procedural formality to a fundamental institutional imperative. It is necessary for artificial intelligence technologies to be developed to notify users whenever their outputs overlap with sensitive legal categories, controversial policy domains, or potential rights implications. In addition to providing alternate framings or contextual clarifications, these warnings ought to come with built-in explanatory paths. Furthermore, all outputs must continue to be subject to human editing, inspection, and, eventually, approval through the process. To ensure that the chain of responsibility is strengthened, it is imperative that the name and function of the human actor accountable for the incident be documented in official records.

Individual users should not be the only ones subject to this supervision need. Through the use of internal protocols, training programs, and oversight committees, institutional frameworks are required to promote and enforce these values, as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2022) has argued. As was covered in Chapter 1.6, legal-administrative services need to be given the authority to interfere in situations where artificial intelligence systems operate outside of the parameters that have been specified or when they constitute a threat to the integrity of parliamentary work. Human oversight must serve as a protection of democratic pluralism, ensuring that algorithmic efficiency does not come at the expense of political diversity or procedural justice. This is in accordance with Bollettino's (2023) emphasis on the constitutional implications of artificial intelligence systems.

In conclusion, the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the realm of legislation must be founded on a solid framework of governance that is oriented on the human being. In addition to technological adaptations, this necessitates the establishment of institutional commitments, the knowledge of constitutional principles, and the ongoing examination of essential aspects. The Italian Parliament, which is both a user of artificial intelligence and a regulator of it, has a responsibility to set an example by demonstrating how human judgment continues to be the foundation of democratic lawmaking, even in this day and age of digital technology.

B. Risk-Based AI Governance Structures

The second guideline is based on the core principles that are outlined in the Artificial Intelligence Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024). This act classifies certain applications of AI as "high-risk," notably those that have relevance to the public sector and have the potential to harm fundamental rights. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of having a strong and anticipatory governance framework in parliamentary settings, because decisions made in these settings have repercussions throughout the entire legal system and democratic institutions. Within the context of this situation, risk governance needs to be all-encompassing, cross-disciplinary, and ingrained within the operational framework of Parliament itself.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in legislative operations involves both technical and constitutional concerns. These concerns range from the clustering of amendments and the creation of agendas to legal research and the automation of procedural processes. As Di Gregorio (2022) points out, the use of digital technologies within representative organizations must not only correspond to legal norms, but it must also actively reinforce the objective of the institution, which is to exercise democratic supervision. As a result, it is necessary to have a governance system that goes beyond compliance and incorporates substantive constitutional scrutiny, ethical evaluation, and rights-based oversight.

In order to accomplish this goal, the Italian Parliament ought to form an autonomous Artificial Intelligence Supervisory Committee featuring a diverse and well-balanced membership. Constitutional academics, digital ethicists, legal-administrative authorities, information technology engineers, data protection professionals, and members from civil society should all be included in this organization. Not only is algorithmic risk an issue of technical reliability, but it is also a matter of legal liability, institutional coherence, and public accountability (Pollicino, 2021; Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021). The fact that this committee is comprised of members from a variety of disciplines is extremely important.

The following are some of the tasks that should be assigned to the committee: conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; issuing AI Impact Reports; reviewing third-party contracts and public-private procurement frameworks; establishing metrics for algorithmic fairness, explainability, and proportionality; and auditing system performance on an ongoing basis. These are just some of the tasks that should be included. It is recommended that these functions be formalized in parliamentary regulations and incorporated into the oversight procedures that are already in place. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2022) has underlined that internal review procedures and auditing protocols should be institutionalized rather than improvised. In the absence of this formal anchoring, artificial intelligence systems may potentially function in procedural grey zones, so evading the same checks and balances that are necessary for democratic legitimacy.

Moreover, all applications of artificial intelligence that pose a significant risk must be exposed to periodic external audits that are carried out by independent evaluators. Not only should these audits examine the performance of the system from a technical standpoint, but they should also consider the broader institutional impacts, such as the transparency of the deliberative processes, equal access to decision-making pathways, and consistency with the constitutional mandates outlined in Article 97 of the Italian Constitution. The auditability of automated systems is a crucial requirement for the democratic acceptability of those systems, as Fitzilis (2021) points out. This is especially true in situations where the automated systems influence the decision-making process of parliament either directly or indirectly.

Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that risk governance continue to be dynamic and adaptable. Because artificial intelligence systems are always evolving because of machine learning and recursive data training, the dangers that they provide are not static. An examination of conformance that is only performed once is insufficient in such a context. Rather than that, it is necessary to put in place real-time monitoring systems to identify any irregularities, discriminatory outputs, or changes in the behaviour of the system. When constitutional norms are no longer maintained, these systems should be equipped with automatic notifications that are sent to human operators, and they should automatically necessitate retraining or deactivation of the system.

In this case what the Parliament should do is instate a "red flag" policy. This protocol would require the suspension of AI-supported processes in situations where there is a suspicion of prejudice, procedural irregularity, or rights abuses. These kinds of systems would not only guarantee legal conformity, but they would also guarantee institutional reflexivity, which would enable the Parliament to self-correct in a digital ecosystem that is always growing.

Additionally, in accordance with Floridi's (2021) idea of "infraethics" and Bollettino's (2023) call for the constitutional structuring of algorithmic infrastructures, the regulation of artificial intelligence in Parliament needs to be founded in an ethical architecture that comes before the deployment of technical solutions. Within this context, governance is not merely administrative; rather, it is moral and constitutional in nature. Asserting that technology instruments should be adapted to serve public purposes rather than the other way around is a fundamental principle.

Through the implementation of this risk-based governance strategy with several layers, the Italian Parliament has the potential to not only establish itself as an institution that complies with the Artificial Intelligence Act, but also as a proactive model of democratic and ethical innovation. Additionally, the classification, evaluation, and ongoing monitoring of artificial intelligence systems that are utilized within Parliament is the subject of the second guideline. In accordance with the Artificial Intelligence Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024), apps that are used in the process of decision-making in the public sector, legal interpretation, or communications that have the potential to affect fundamental rights should be regarded as "high-risk." As a result, the deployment of these systems must be preceded by risk evaluations, impact analysis, and conformity checks.

In the context of Italy, this entails the establishment of a specialized internal organization that is tasked with the control of artificial intelligence. Membership of this council should include constitutional scholars, IT specialists, legal experts, and members from civil society. The issuance of AI Impact Reports, the auditing of system behaviour, and the assessment of procurement procedures utilizing AI tools would fall under the purview of this committee. Not only should these inspections determine whether the technology performs appropriately, but they should also determine whether it complies

with the principles of legality, impartiality, proportionality, and accessibility that are stated in Article 97 of the Italian Constitution.

Moreover, all high-risk artificial intelligence systems are required to be subjected to external audits at regular intervals. These should evaluate the democratic impact, the integrity of the data, the explainability of the system, and the fairness of the algorithm. Auditability is not a technical luxury but rather a democratic requirement, as highlighted by Fitzilis (2021) and the OECD (2022). This is especially true in situations when artificial intelligence tools interfere in processes such as amendment triage, agenda prioritizing, or legislation drafting.

An essential requirement is that these governance tools should be proactive rather than reactive. Artificial intelligence systems are always evolving because of machine learning and data retraining; hence, their behaviour may alter over time in ways that were not intended. The certification of compliance with static standards is insufficient. It is imperative that the design of the system has capabilities for continuous monitoring and real-time detection of anomalies or discriminatory actions.

C. Procedural and Normative Safeguards

The establishment of procedural and normative safeguards is the third pillar of responsible AI integration into parliamentary functions. These safeguards consist of concrete institutional instruments and regulatory protocols that guarantee transparency, accountability, and democratic oversight throughout the entirety of the lifecycle of AI systems. It is possible that even the most well-intentioned deployments could become opaque, unchallengeable, and structurally misaligned with constitutional principles if certain safeguards are not in place.

The first and most important step is for the Italian Parliament to create a centralized artificial intelligence registry. There should be a database that is open to the public that contains a listing of all artificial intelligence systems that are currently being utilized by parliamentary departments. This database should include information on the developers of these systems, their intended function, contractual conditions, risk classification, conformity assessments, data governance processes, and records of previous audits. In addition to functioning as an essential instrument for public scrutiny and accountability across institutions, such a register would also operationalize the principle of transparency, which is outlined in the Artificial Intelligence Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024) and reaffirmed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2022).

Secondly, a uniform set of procedural regulations must be established to delineate the parameters of AI-assisted decision-making inside legislative functions. These regulations should delineate, for example, the circumstances and methodologies for utilizing AI tools in the formulation of amendments, the evaluation of legislative proposals, the execution of policy study, or the facilitation of speechwriting. Primarily, they must ascertain whether decisions or outputs necessitate human scrutiny, validation, and formal approval. According to Floridi (2021), the ethical integrity of AI systems relies not only on their design but also on the institutional contexts in which they operate. Artificial intelligence should never serve as the ultimate arbiter in matters of political judgment or constitutional interpretation. All AI-assisted products must be finally sanctioned, modified, or denied by a designated human authority, with their name, title, and justification meticulously documented.

Third, tools for democratic contestability must be incorporated into parliamentary procedures. Drawing from the principles of digital constitutionalism (Di Gregorio, 2022; Pollicino, 2021; Bollettino, 2023), these systems would enable Members of Parliament, staff, journalists, academics,

and civil society organizations to formally submit inquiries or objections regarding AI-generated choices or outputs. A parliamentary redress mechanism may be instituted, comprising impartial expert teams that evaluate disputed AI outcomes and provide binding or advising opinions. These methods embody the principle—supported by Yeung and Lodge (2019)—that algorithmic authority should consistently be subordinate to deliberate and contestable procedures of democratic governance.

Moreover, institutional safeguards should encompass obligatory pre-deployment Fundamental Rights Impact Assessments (FRIA). Helbing (2021) and Crawford (2021) demonstrate that AI systems might mistakenly generate outputs that promote bias, compromise legal neutrality, or marginalize dissenting viewpoints. A thorough FRIA must foresee such repercussions by analysing the ethical, legal, and social ramifications of any AI system before its implementation. This evaluation must include stakeholder engagement, legal examination, algorithmic bias assessment, and a comprehensive outline of proposed oversight protocols. Additionally, periodic post-deployment evaluations should be undertaken to assess if the system remains effective in fulfilling its original purpose and to identify any emerging rights-based issues.

In addition to these legal procedures, a comprehensive cultural dedication to procedural equity and democratic transparency should direct the institutional conduct of Parliament. Pollicino (2020) and Citino (2020) emphasize that legal formality alone is inadequate; safeguards must be ingrained in the institutional culture via constant application, training, and political leadership. Public officials and staff must not only adhere to procedural standards but also comprehend their constitutional importance and ethical justification.

Ultimately, these measures must be harmonized with the changing European regulatory framework. Italy's parliamentary procedures should exemplify adherence and innovation within the larger EU context. Through the development and codification of procedural and normative safeguards in a proactive and inclusive manner, the Italian Parliament may maintain its constitutional legitimacy while significantly influencing AI governance within the European Union.

In summary, procedural and normative safeguards convert abstract concepts into institutional realities. They guarantee that the use of AI technology inside democratic frameworks adheres to legal boundaries, maintains the validity of political discourse and decision-making, and facilitates participatory oversight and accountability. From this perspective, technology does not endanger democracy; rather, it serves as one of its instruments, when appropriately regulated and transparently administered.

In the subsequent sections, we present additional recommendations for implementing transparency, instituting ethical oversight bodies, strengthening democratic resilience via education, and defining Italy's role in the European governance of AI.

4.2 Recommendations for Transparency and Ethical Oversight

For using artificial intelligence in a responsible manner within the corridors of legislative authority, transparency and ethical supervision must not be considered as incidental considerations. Instead, they ought to be included into the basic logic of the deployment and administration of artificial intelligence systems. In the context of this discussion, the term "transparency" refers not only to the

visibility of algorithmic outputs but also to the comprehensibility of their reasoning, the traceability of their data sources, and the accountability of their institutional use. Ethical oversight, on the other hand, refers to the construction of standards, procedures, and institutional structures that guarantee that artificial intelligence systems are in accordance with fundamental rights, democratic ideals, and constitutional values.

There is a strong emphasis placed on transparency as a legal necessity for high-risk systems under the Artificial Intelligence Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024), particularly when it is implemented by public entities. However, as Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021) point out, the mere supply of information does not constitute transparency unless such information is comprehensible and actionable by individuals who are not specialists in the field. Consequently, transparency needs to be contextual and interactive, making it possible for parliamentary players as well as the public to question and challenge the design, implementation, and effects of artificial intelligence systems.

The formal institutionalization of a legislative AI Transparency Protocol is the first recommendation that should be made in the context of the Italian legislative system. As a result, any artificial intelligence tool that is adopted or tested inside the operations of the parliamentary body would be required to go through a comprehensive transparency disclosure procedure. This would include the release of the system's purpose, data sources, developers, planned use cases, restrictions, and known hazards. Parliamentarians, legal-administrative services, journalists, researchers, and citizens should all have access to this material, which should be stored in a repository that is open to the public.

As stated in *Corso di diritto parlamentare* (Gianniti & Lupo, 2023), which emphasizes the significance of parliamentary autonomy and procedural regulation in the process of safeguarding the integrity of the legislative function, transparency is key to operating and integrating the set protocol. Transparency in artificial intelligence would shift from being an administrative best practice to a constitutional obligation if it were incorporated into the rules of process. The concept of transparency is transformed into a tool of parliamentary sovereignty and legislative legitimacy when viewed in this context.

In the second place, there should be a Parliamentary Ethics Committee on Digital Innovation that is explicitly entrusted with monitoring advancements that are associated with artificial intelligence. The purpose of this body would be to act as an ethical checkpoint during the entire lifecycle of artificial intelligence. It would be constituted of constitutional lawyers, ethicists, computer scientists, and public representatives. As part of its responsibilities, it would be responsible for receiving complaints or notifications involving potential misconduct or misuse of artificial intelligence in legislative processes, screening contracts for the procurement of artificial intelligence, reviewing declarations of transparency, advising on the legal and ethical consequences of AI deployments, and checking for transparency.

It is recommended that this committee be modelled after a permanent oversight body that possesses the procedural capacity to halt or seek modifications to artificial intelligence systems that are regarded to be problematic from an ethical or constitutional standpoint. By doing so, Parliament would be able to put Bollettino's (2023) argument into practice, which states that the oversight of artificial intelligence should be physically incorporated within the constitutional architecture of public institutions.

Taking into consideration Floridi's (2021) ideas regarding "infostructures" and "infraethics," it is recommended that transparency mechanisms be extended to the design level of artificial intelligence

systems. This entails giving priority to artificial intelligence models that have a design that incorporates explainability by default. This involves the provision of explicit rationale logs, natural language justifications, and visualization tools that assist users in tracing the thinking behind algorithmic outputs. Particularly important in situations where artificial intelligence is involved in tasks such as the analysis of legal texts, the filtering of amendments, or the prediction of voting patterns.

Additionally, the registration and communication of any third-party engagement in the development of artificial intelligence should be included in the definition of transparency. Crawford (2021) gives a warning that artificial intelligence systems frequently incorporate implicit value judgments and institutional biases. If private contractors or external developers are involved in the process of shaping artificial intelligence tools for the parliamentary body, it is imperative that they disclose their techniques, training data, and commercial interests in their entirety. This is consistent with the digital constitutionalism model that Di Gregorio (2022) and Pollicino (2021) advocate for. This model views algorithmic systems not as neutral infrastructures but rather as normative actors that are susceptible to rights-based scrutiny.

Participation from the public is yet another essential component of openness. The implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) within parliaments should incorporate deliberative procedures, as suggested by Fitzilis (2021). These mechanisms should allow civil society, academic institutions, and the media to evaluate, discuss, and exert influence on the scope and character of AI use. Large-scale deployments of artificial intelligence ought to be accompanied by public hearings, white papers, and participatory consultations. In addition to serving as legitimizing processes, these participatory moments also serve as communal ethical audits that are reflective of broader social ideals.

Continuous training for parliamentary staff and members of parliament is an indispensable requirement in order to ensure sustained ethical supervision. As was discussed in Chapter 3.3, digital literacy is not just a technical talent but also a competency that is universally accepted. Legal and administrative services need to be educated so that they can comprehend algorithmic operations, evaluate ethical conundrums, and suggest regulatory actions. A digitally competent Parliament is one that is able to both govern the use of artificial intelligence and be ruled by its own laws in a way that is reflective and legally coherent. This is in line with Citino (2020).

Lastly, explicit legislative mechanisms must be institutionalized in order to ensure that ethical monitoring and transparency are maintained. If a legislative code of behaviour for artificial intelligence were to be adopted, it would serve as a document that is both declaratory and binding. The purpose of such a code would be to articulate fundamental principles, such as legality, impartiality, traceability, and contestability; to define practices that are prohibited, such as fully automated legislative outputs and undeclared use of artificial intelligence in public communication; and to establish procedural requirements for the approval, modification, and deactivation of intelligence.

In conclusion, transparency and ethical supervision are not seen to be supplementary aspects of artificial intelligence governance in Parliament; rather, they are fundamental principles. They promote democratic accountability, prevent misuse, and build trust in the legislative process when they are constructed appropriately and anchored in the institutions. Additionally, they make certain that the Italian Parliament continues to uphold its constitutional responsibility, which is not limited to only regulating the use of technology in society but also to serve as an example for the ethical application of technology within the framework of democratic governance.

4.3 Fostering Institutional Resilience and Digital Literacy in Parliament

The sustainability of democratic institutions will depend not only on legal frameworks and oversight bodies, but also, because artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly integrated into the core functions of parliaments, such as legislative drafting and amendment triage, research assistance, and procedural planning, the sustainability of democratic institutions will be dependent on the cultivation of internal human capacity. Digital literacy and institutional resilience are not only additional issues; rather, they are necessary criteria that must be met in order to guarantee that artificial intelligence serves the public good rather than undermining the authority or legitimacy of parliament.

It is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of digital literacy in this environment. It is not enough to simply have a technical fluency in software or system interfaces; rather, it is necessary to build normative, legal, and ethical competences that enable legislative actors to engage with algorithmic systems in a critical manner. Floridi (2021) emphasizes that the digital age imposes not only new tools but also new ways of thinking on people. Elective representatives run the risk of abandoning their deliberative and interpretative functions to opaque technology if they do not have access to conceptual tools that can investigate the outputs and governance structures of artificial intelligence.

The establishment of a permanent artificial intelligence training and capacity-building program within the Italian Parliament is consequently a recommendation that should serve as a foundational component. This program ought to be multidisciplinary, obligatory, and structured across several layers of the parliamentary ecosystem, ranging from legal drafters and committee staff to members of parliament and technical people. Not only should its curriculum address the technical architecture of artificial intelligence systems, but it should also cover fundamental ideas in data ethics, algorithmic bias, procedural rights, and regulatory frameworks such as the AI Act and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This training should also include simulations and scenario-based exercises that educate actors to face real-world ethical challenges. For example, the use of generative artificial intelligence in speechwriting (as shown in the Lombardo case, Chapter 2.2) or the automated screening of politically problematic amendments are examples of situations that these exercises should equip actors to address.

In addition, digital literacy should be regarded as a continuously developing skill rather than a prerequisite that must be met once and for all. Considering the quick pace at which technological advancements are occurring, the training curriculum ought to be amended on a regular basis and included into the system of continuing professional development administered by the Parliament. This program should also be open to partnerships with universities, civil society organizations, and research institutions. This would create a networked learning environment that would enable Parliament to continue to be at the forefront of artificial intelligence ethics and governance. The program would draw on recommendations from the OECD (2022) and Fitzilis (2021).

In addition to individual proficiency, institutional resilience includes organizational capability and structural adaptability. Parliament must evaluate and enhance its internal infrastructure to guarantee that AI technologies are both technically compatible and procedurally aligned with established legislative procedures and traditions. Gianniti & Lupo (2023) emphasize in the *Corso di diritto parlamentare* the normative vitality of parliamentary law relies on its ability to adapt to innovation while maintaining its foundational principles, including the sovereignty of deliberation, the centrality of accountability, and the inviolability of legislative independence.

To achieve this goal, parliamentary offices—comprising the Legislative Research Department, Committee Secretariats, and the Legal Affairs Office—ought to be staffed with specialized AI liaison officers or digital innovation teams. These jobs would operate as intermediaries between technical implementation and legal-political assessment, facilitating the translation of AI tool implications into practical procedural decisions. This advice aligns with Di Gregorio's (2022) assertion regarding the necessity of integrating algorithmic literacy into the fundamental operations of representative institutions, thus empowering them to counteract the tendency towards technocratic reliance.

The second aspect of institutional resilience refers to the enhancement of collective deliberative capacity. AI systems typically operate by modelling and forecasting based on past examples and patterns. This may enhance consistency and efficiency, but it could also reinforce existing institutional biases or backhand innovation. Pollicino (2021) cautions that unfettered systemic conservatism may insidiously suppress dissent, constrain rhetorical innovation, and diminish the quality of political debate. Consequently, Parliament ought to establish frequent cross-party conferences to evaluate the impact of AI on legislative culture, communication methods, and policy objectives.

These forums must adhere to principles of openness and pluralism, guaranteeing involvement from smaller parties, minority representatives, and unconventional actors. An external advisory group composed of members from academic and civic communities could potentially provide support. These approaches would not only improve oversight but also provoke essential discourse regarding the cultural implications of automation on parliamentary identity and legitimacy. According to Helbing (2021), AI governance must encompass not only technological systems but also the social and epistemological frameworks they alter.

In addition, the existence of an existing and robust system of feedback and adaptive learning is necessary for the resilience of an institution. An evaluation process that is structured ought to be carried out after each and every deployment of an artificial intelligence system within Parliament, whether it be for the purpose of internal knowledge management, document classification, or voice support. The collection of input from users, data on the performance of the system, and evaluations of disruptions to ethical or procedural standards should all be included in this. In accordance with Veale and Zuiderveen Borgesius (2021), it is recommended that feedback methods of this kind be documented and publicized on a regular basis in order to maintain public trust and institutional transparency.

"Anticipatory regulation" is a term that is highlighted by Crawford (2021) and echoed by Floridi (2021). Finally, the Parliament needs to assume a constitutional posture of "anticipatory regulation." As opposed to waiting for issues that are associated with artificial intelligence to surface, the Parliament ought to take the initiative to predict future technological situations and develop regulations that are flexible, founded on principles, and capable of responding to emerging obstacles. As part of this, red lines will be established for the utilization of completely autonomous decision-making tools, ethical limits will be established for the application of predictive analytics in political strategy, and response mechanisms will be developed if artificial intelligence is misused or the system fails.

In conclusion, in this day and age of legislative artificial intelligence, it is both a precondition and an ongoing obligation to emphasize the importance of digital literacy and institutional resilience. As a result, it guarantees that elected officials will continue to exercise substantial control over the legislative process, that legal and administrative services will continue to operate with informed

independence, and that the Parliament will continue to be a site of deliberative legitimacy in a political system that is fast becoming more digital. It is possible for the Italian Parliament to fulfill its constitutional duty while also managing the major changes that are brought about by artificial intelligence if it makes investments in human capability and reactive institutional architecture.

In the following and final portion of this chapter, we will begin to discuss broader thoughts and strategic paths for Italy's contribution to discussions on artificial intelligence governance in democratic institutions that are taking place in Europe and internationally.

4.4 Italy's Role in Shaping a Democratic Model for AI Governance in Europe

Italy is in a position unlike any other to not only implement these principles but also to shape them through constitutional innovation and institutional example. This is because the European Union is leading the world movement in regulating artificial intelligence, and Italy is in perfect position to do so. A landmark point in the regulation of artificial intelligence has occurred with the approval of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (European Parliament and Council, 2024). This act establishes a standardized legislative framework for evaluating, monitoring, and limiting algorithmic systems in accordance with a risk-based paradigm. However, as Di Gregorio (2022) and Pollicino (2021) have argued, the effectiveness of this regulatory framework will depend less on formal compliance and more on how member states incorporate its ideas into their democratic and constitutional systems. This is because formal compliance is less important than institutional compliance. With its rich parliamentary heritage, legal pluralism, and prominence in the creation of EU law, Italy has the potential to play a crucial role in the advancement of a model of artificial intelligence governance that is both operationally effective and normatively exemplary from a governance perspective.

This section presents a strategic vision for how Italy may position itself at the forefront of European efforts to regulate artificial intelligence in a manner that is consistent with fundamental rights, constitutional pluralism, and democratic legitimacy. This vision is proposed through Italy's Parliament, legal culture, and academic community.

A. Legislative Leadership and Normative Diffusion

It is imperative that Italy make a commitment to changing its parliamentary processes into a place that serves as a demonstration for the dissemination of norms. Not only does algorithmic regulation move through legislative instruments, but it also travels through institutional models, professional networks, and discursive frameworks, as Yeung and Lodge (2019) have demonstrated. By putting in place sophisticated internal regulations on artificial intelligence transparency, ethical supervision, procedural safeguards, and algorithmic literacy (as described in sections 4.1–4.3), the Italian Parliament has the potential to serve as a reference point for other legislatures that are attempting to deal with transformations that are comparable to those that it is currently experiencing.

This particular style of leadership has its origins firmly planted in the legal tradition of Italy. Based on what Gianniti & Lupo (2023) assert in the *Corso di diritto parlamentare*, parliamentary autonomy, procedural transparency, and symbolic representation are not only operational rules; rather, they are fundamental components of constitutional democracy. By enacting a legally enforceable internal code of conduct on the deployment of artificial intelligence, institutionalizing ethics committees, and

creating a transparent AI registry, the Italian Parliament will not only be in compliance with EU legislation, but it will also be able to build models of best practices that are reproducible. According to Fitzilis (2021), these developments have the potential to provide information to inter-parliamentary networks such as the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union respectively.

A body of this relevance and importance would be responsible for monitoring the incorporation of artificial intelligence into parliamentary institutions across Europe, promoting interoperability between national oversight systems, and sharing methodological principles. Floridi (2021) and Helbing (2021) suggest that digital coordination should not be done in response to crises, but rather something that is proactive in protecting the democratic order.

B. Integrating Constitutionalism into European AI Policy

The incorporation of constitutional principles into the fundamental framework of European artificial intelligence regulation is another issue that Italy must advocate for. There is a lack of appropriate foundation in the ideals of democratic participation and institutional autonomy, as Di Gregorio (2022) points out, even though the AI Act serves as a vital regulatory backbone. It is possible for Italy to provide a solution to this problem by introducing its jurisprudential traditions and legal plurality into the discourse at the EU level.

To achieve this on the domestic front, it is necessary to conduct stringent monitoring of the ways in which AI tools interact with important constitutional requirements. It is necessary to examine artificial intelligence systems considering the robust framework that is provided by Article 1 (people sovereignty), Article 3 (equality), Article 21 (freedom of expression), Article 54 (parliamentary accountability), and Article 97 (public administration efficiency and impartiality...). These extensive evaluations should determine whether and how algorithmic interventions correspond to these rules (Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021). The legal services and technical offices of the Parliament should be charged with the responsibility of preparing periodic "constitutional stress tests" of AI deployments.

The concepts of digital constitutionalism ought to be institutionalized into pan-European regulatory frameworks, and Italian members to the European AI Board and the Fundamental Rights Agency ought to strive toward this end globally. Across the European Union, they might fight for certifications that adhere to ethical-by-design principles, rights impact evaluations, and a standardized framework for parliamentary information technology literacy. By making these efforts, not only would the execution be harmonized, but the normative coherence of the AI Act itself would also be strengthened.

C. Advancing Ethical-AI Research and Legal Thought Leadership

The intellectual infrastructure of Italy provides an additional avenue for democratic leadership. With faculties of law, ethics, political science, and information technology that are recognized all over the world, Italian universities have the potential to play a pivotal role in the establishment of normative frameworks for the regulation of artificial intelligence. It is possible that a permanent "AI and Democracy Observatory" may be established by national and regional universities, in conjunction with the Research Service of the Parliament and the *Istituto di Studi Giuridici Avanzati*. This

multidisciplinary group would be responsible for monitoring developments on a national and European level, conducting empirical research, and issuing annual reports on the influence that artificial intelligence has on the democratic process and the power of institutions.

Investments from the public sector ought to be substantial in conjunction with such initiatives. As Crawford (2021) points out, artificial intelligence systems are not neutral instruments; rather, they are social power structures that they embody and replicate. Therefore, funding from the academic community ought to be channelled toward research that challenges the authority of algorithms, criticizes the drift of institutions, and improves ethical design standards. These results ought to be directly incorporated into legislative briefings, policy white papers, and regulatory review procedures.

This knowledge exchange should be formalized by the establishment of a Joint Committee on Artificial Intelligence and Democratic Institutions by the Parliament. This committee should consist of politicians, public personnel, and academics. This organization has the potential to act as a consultation mechanism during the process of developing new legislation, purchasing artificial intelligence technologies, or evaluating the ethics of algorithmic systems. According to Di Gregorio (2022), it would be an embodiment of the interdisciplinary governance model that he envisioned. In this model, law, ethics, and computer science would come together in a democratic calibration process that would be deliberated about.

D. Promoting Participatory AI Governance Across Society

When it comes to the formation of a democratic paradigm for the governance of artificial intelligence, Italy's participation must be inclusive and participatory. In accordance with the arguments presented by Pollicino (2021) and Citino (2020), the symbolic power of legislative institutions is contingent upon their capacity to speak both for and to society as a community. It is not possible to presume that AI efforts are legitimate in the eyes of the public; rather, their legitimacy must be continuously refreshed through consultation, education, and participation.

The Italian Parliament ought to initiate a series of public discussions on the applicability of artificial intelligence in legislative contexts, making use of both online platforms and in-person forums in all the Italian regions. During these consultations, fundamental questions such as "Should artificial intelligence be used in speechwriting?" should be asked of the public. To what extent should algorithmic tools be allowed to exercise their own discretion? To what extent are the requirements of transparency acceptable? The governance of artificial intelligence would be rooted in democratic principles that are lived, rather than in the legal abstractions of elites, if these participatory techniques were implemented.

Concurrently, it is recommended that a nationwide civic education program be launched in order to raise public understanding regarding the advantages, disadvantages, and fundamentals of artificial intelligence in government. This campaign might be developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, the RAI, and coalitions of civil society organizations. Creating a digitally literate electorate that is capable of critically engaging with developing technologies and their institutional applications would be the goal of this initiative, which would target both young people and senior citizens as learners.

Establishing a permanent "Public AI Forum" that is open to all stakeholders, including media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), technologists, regional leaders, and ordinary individuals, should also be a priority for the Parliament. During this forum, ongoing applications of artificial intelligence

in government would be reviewed, complaints or praise would be voiced, and amendments would be suggested. These initiatives, which are reminiscent of the OECD (2022) and Fitzilis (2021), would guarantee that artificial intelligence systems continue to be attentive to the social realities that they want to organize.

With its long-standing dedication to democratic innovation, constitutional pluralism, and legislative discourse, Italy is in a position unlike any other to design a model of artificial intelligence governance that is uniquely European. This model should not only be legally sound, but it should also have political significance. It is possible for Italy to take the lead in ensuring that artificial intelligence strengthens democratic institutions rather than supplants them. This may be accomplished by incorporating constitutional ideals into technological regulation, bolstering institutional reflexivity, and encouraging public participation.

The Italian Parliament has the chance to steer the trajectory of the revolution brought about by artificial intelligence, rather than just responding to it. A clear vision, the ability to coordinate, and most importantly, a deep belief in the ideas that characterize constitutional democracy in the age of algorithmic systems are all necessary for this. If Italy takes this step, it will be able to provide Europe and even the entire world with a legislative model in which innovation supports democracy rather than the other way around.

4.5 Conclusion

A dilemma that was founded in the junction of technology and democracy served as the starting point for this thesis. The question was: how can artificial intelligence be integrated into the legislative activities of the Italian Parliament without compromising the constitutional norms that give these functions their legitimacy? As we have progressed through the chapters, we have seen that the solution is not to oppose digital innovation; rather, it is to guide it through a constitutional and institutional framework that can safeguard the symbolic, procedural, and deliberative heart of parliamentary democracy.

Not only has the Artificial Intelligence Act of the European Union characterised artificial intelligence as a technology that needs to be managed, but it has also positioned it as a governance problem in and of itself. This presents a challenge to democratic supervision, institutional responsibility, and the preservation of fundamental rights. In this context, the parliamentary system of Italy, which is characterised by its extensive normative tradition and complete bicameralism, presents both potential and risks. Even though technological solutions like amendment filtering, generative text tools, and legislative analytics have the potential to improve procedural efficiency, there is a risk that they may undermine the visibility, authorship, and plurality that are essential to democratic lawmaking.

As is mentioned throughout the chapters, the distinction between aid and substitution is becoming increasingly hazy. This is especially evident via the case study of Senator Lombardo's speech that was assisted by artificial intelligence and the pilot projects that the Senate is conducting in amendment triage. There is a genuine and urgent danger posed by the use of automation, opacity, and delegating that is not responsible. On the other hand, the tools for institutional resilience are also important. The Italian Parliament has the ability to establish a model of artificial intelligence governance that is legally rigorous, ethically grounded, and procedurally transparent if it adopts the paradigm of digital constitutionalism, which has been articulated by researchers such as Di Gregorio, Floridi, and Pollicino.

The recommendations that are presented in Chapter 4 are not intended to be merely policy options; rather, they are intended to be constitutional imperatives. These proposals include requirements for mandated supervision structures, algorithmic registers, impact assessments, and unambiguous procedural protections. In order for the Parliament to fulfil its dual role as a regulator and an example of responsible use of artificial intelligence, it is imperative that it institutionalises the fundamental principles that define its democratic legitimacy. These principles include contestability, transparency, and human oversight.

It is important to note that the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the Italian legislative system should not be considered a merely administrative modernisation. A change of constitutional significance has occurred as a result of this. It is dependent on the rules, ethics, and institutional architecture that accompany this shift as to whether it will affirm or corrode the basis of representative democracy. As has been stated in this thesis, it is not sufficient for Parliament to employ artificial intelligence; it must also govern it, understand it, and most importantly, continue to be its master. At that point, it will be possible to guarantee that the digital future of democracy will continue to be democratic at its core.

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