

Corso di Laurea in Business Administration

Cattedra International Business

**GREENFIELD FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT:
MOTIVATIONS, TRENDS, AND
STRATEGIC EVOLUTION**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the drivers of greenfield Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), comparing a 2016 dataset (n=280) with a 2023 dataset (n=857). Using a coding methodology based on Dunning's OLI Paradigm, the study classifies firm-level rationale statements into six motivational categories: market-seeking, strategic asset-seeking, efficiency-seeking, resource-seeking, sustainability, and geopolitical factors.

The numbers tell a clear story. Market-seeking was the dominant primary motivation in both years, but its share fell from 61.1% in 2016 to 51.6% in 2023. Strategic asset seeking rose from 24.3% to 28.4%, and efficiency seeking from 12.5% to 17.3%. The most significant shift, though, is at the secondary motivation level: sustainability went from 9.6% to 23.1% of secondary codings, a change of 13.5 percentage points that is the central empirical finding of this thesis.

These results are interpreted through the Extended OLI-S-G Framework, an extension of Dunning's OLI model that incorporates Sustainability (S) and Geopolitics (G) as additional analytical dimensions. The main empirical contribution of this thesis is the coding of the 2016 dataset, the comparison of motivational distributions across the two time periods, and the interpretation of what changed and why.

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Introduction

Every year, thousands of companies announce plans to build something new abroad: a factory, a research center, a regional headquarters, a data facility. These announcements get picked up by databases and trade press, then mostly forgotten. However, if you take the time to read them, they each contain a rationale: a short statement from an executive explaining why this investment, in this country, right now. This thesis is about reading those statements, 280 of them for 2016 and 857 for 2023, and seeing what they reveal about how the logic of greenfield investment has shifted over time.

The aggregate data only takes you so far. Global greenfield FDI reached roughly \$1.38 trillion in announced project value in 2022, up from \$770 billion in 2003. A striking increase, but one that says nothing about why firms invested where they did. The motivational logic behind individual decisions is invisible in the totals. To get at it, you need to look at what companies actually said when they announced their investments, which is exactly what follows.

The two years at the center of the analysis, 2016 and 2023, were chosen based on the available data. It turns out they bracket a period of considerable turbulence: Brexit, the Trump trade shock, COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and the energy transition. Whether that was intentional in the dataset design or not, it makes for a rich comparison. The expectation going in is that a motivational landscape recorded before all of that looks different from one recorded after it. Whether the data actually support that expectation is what the thesis examines.

The analytical framework is the Extended OLI-S-G Framework, which adds Sustainability (S) and Geopolitics (G) to Dunning's original OLI dimensions. It is used throughout to classify and interpret the patterns in both datasets.

Research Objective

The objective is straightforward: code the 2016 dataset for primary and secondary investment motivations, compare the results with the pre-coded 2023 dataset, and draw out what changed between the two periods at the firm level.

Research Questions

Three core research questions guide the analysis:

- RQ1: What is the quantitative distribution of primary and secondary greenfield FDI motivations in 2016, and how does it map onto established theoretical categories?
- RQ2: How has the distribution of greenfield FDI motivations evolved between 2016 and 2023, as measured by percentage-point shifts across motivational categories?
- RQ3: Are the observed distributional shifts sufficiently consistent to support the extension of the OLI Paradigm into a framework that incorporates sustainability and geopolitical drivers as increasingly independent analytical dimensions?

Structure of the Thesis

There are five chapters. Chapter 1 sets the global context for greenfield FDI. Chapter 2 covers the theory. Chapter 3 explains the methodology in full. Chapter 4 presents the empirical findings and compares the two periods. Chapter 5 discusses what the findings mean for theory, for managers, and for policy. The conclusion pulls together the main results, honestly sets out the limitations, and suggests where future research could go.

Chapter 1: Greenfield FDI in the Global Context

1.1 Definition and Types of FDI: Greenfield vs. M&A

Foreign Direct Investment is investment by a firm or individual in another country, typically by establishing operations there or by acquiring a controlling stake in a local company. The standard definition uses a 10 percent equity threshold, as both the IMF and the OECD treat that level as the point at which an investor typically gains some degree of managerial influence over the target.

Within FDI, there are two main ways to enter a foreign market. The first is mergers and acquisitions, buying an existing business. The second is greenfield investment, building something new from the ground up. There is also a middle category, brownfield investment, which involves rehabilitating existing but underused facilities; UNCTAD sometimes classifies this alongside greenfield FDI.

The distinction matters for a few reasons. Greenfield investment tends to create more new productive capacity and employment in the host economy than M&A, which often transfers ownership without adding anything. It also signals something different about the investor's intentions: building from scratch requires more upfront commitment, higher sunk costs, and a longer road to profitability than buying an existing business. For that reason, a greenfield announcement is generally taken as a stronger signal of long-term strategic commitment. The analysis here is confined to announced greenfield FDI projects drawn from the Orbis database.

1.2 Global Trends in FDI

Looking at global FDI flows over the past decade, the pattern is one of growth interrupted by sharp drops. Inflows rose from \$1.57 trillion in 2012 to over \$2 trillion in 2015 and 2016, then fell to \$0.96 trillion in 2020 (the steepest single-year decline on record) as the pandemic hit. The recovery since then has been partial. Inflows reached \$1.5 trillion in 2021 and \$1.36 trillion in 2022, while outflows stabilized around \$1.55 trillion in 2023.




Figure 3: Global FDI Inflows and Outflows, 2012–2023 (Trillion USD). Source: UNCTAD / Statista (2026).

The regional breakdown has also shifted. In 2024, Europe led global FDI outflows at \$487 billion, followed by North America at \$352 billion and East Asia at \$283 billion. The United States continued to hold the largest outward stock, \$9.43 trillion in 2023, ahead of the Netherlands (\$3.39 trillion), China (\$2.94 trillion), and Canada (\$2.75 trillion). The 2024 Kearney FDI Confidence Index ranked the United States, Canada, China (including Hong Kong), the United Kingdom, and Germany at the top, which is broadly consistent with where most large-scale investment has historically been concentrated.

Greenfield FDI followed a broadly similar pattern, though not identically. Announced values peaked above \$1.38 trillion in 2022, then adjusted downward in 2023. Project counts grew from around 9,500 in 2003 to nearly 20,000 in 2015, then declined, partially recovering to about 17,600 by 2022. Part of what is driving these movements is a structural change in the policy environment. UNCTAD data show 183 national investment policy measures in 2022 and 137 in 2023. More telling than the total is the composition: the share of measures classified as 'less favorable' to investment rose from 21 in 2013 to 53 in 2022, indicating a sustained shift toward greater restrictions and screening, particularly in larger economies.




Figure 4: Value of Announced Greenfield FDI Projects Worldwide, 2003–2021 (Billion USD). Source: UNCTAD / Statista (2026).




Figure 5: National Investment Policies by Type, 2013–2023 (Number of measures). Source: UNCTAD / Statista (2026).

1.3 From Pre-Crisis Dynamics (2016) to the Recent Global Context (2023)

The years between 2016 and 2023 were eventful, to put it mildly. This thesis argues that some of the structural shifts that occurred over that period are visible in how firms described their

investment rationales, and the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 tests whether the data support that argument.

In 2016, the backdrop was the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the Brexit vote, and a rising tide of economic nationalism in several major economies. Donald Trump's election in the United States signalled a shift toward trade protectionism that would intensify in the years that followed. Data from the Global Trade Alert, summarised in Figure 8 below, show that between January 2009 and January 2025, the US implemented over 11,000 protectionist trade measures, more than any other country, followed by China (8,143), Brazil (7,681), Germany (3,965), and Canada (3,029). Italy ranked sixth with 2,931. Whatever its causes, this wave of protectionism made supply chain risk a much more explicit consideration in investment location decisions.




Figure 8: Countries with the highest number of protectionist trade measures, January 2009 to January 2025.

The United States leads by a significant margin, followed by China and Brazil. Italy ranks sixth globally.

Source: Global Trade Alert / Statista (2026).

By 2023, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and an intensifying US-China rivalry had further reshaped the landscape. These are the conditions under which the 2023 investment decisions in the dataset were made. They are worth keeping in mind when reading what the data show.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

The theory of why firms invest abroad, and specifically why they choose one mode of entry over another, has been debated in international business scholarship for more than six decades. Two frameworks matter most for what follows: Transaction Cost Economics, which explains the internalization decision, and Dunning's OLI Paradigm, which provides the broader motivational typology on which the classification scheme in Chapter 4 is based. The chapter ends with the OLI-S-G extension, which adds Sustainability and Geopolitics as two additional analytical dimensions to the standard framework.

2.1 Transaction Cost Economics

Transaction Cost Economics starts with a simple question: why do firms sometimes produce goods internally rather than buy them on the market? Ronald Coase (1937) was the first to frame this as a question about costs. Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) developed the answer: market transactions are not free. Finding partners, negotiating contracts, and monitoring compliance all take time and resources. When those costs become high enough, especially when asset specificity or uncertainty is present, it can make more sense to bring the activity in-house.

For international investment, this logic explains why a firm might prefer a wholly owned subsidiary to a licensing arrangement or a joint venture. If the firm's most valuable asset is difficult to price or protect (proprietary technology, say, or a particular way of organizing production), then putting it in a market transaction risks losing control of it. A greenfield facility, wholly owned and purpose-built, is the most controlled option available. There is also a newer argument, less established in the literature, that firms may increasingly prefer greenfield structures, partly because owning the production infrastructure confers a degree of supply chain resilience that outsourced or licensed arrangements cannot match.

TCE has real limits, however. It explains why a firm might internalize a transaction but says relatively little about where to invest, what the firm hopes to achieve by going abroad, or how its competitive position shapes that choice. A firm might internalize production for cost, capability-building, or geopolitical reasons, and TCE treats all of these the same way. That is part of why Dunning's OLI framework became the dominant paradigm: it explicitly adds the location dimension and the firm's competitive position, which TCE does not.

TCE was also developed primarily to explain domestic organizational choices, and its international application introduces complications the original framework was not designed to handle. Across borders, transaction costs are compounded by institutional differences, regulatory uncertainty, and the difficulty of enforcing contracts in foreign legal systems. These factors tend to push firms further toward internalization than a domestic TCE analysis would predict, helping explain why greenfield investment, the most internalized entry mode available, remains common even in sectors where licensing or joint ventures would seem to work.

2.2 Dunning's OLI Paradigm

Dunning's OLI framework was first set out in 1976 and refined over the following four decades (Dunning, 1993, 2000, 2001). The core argument is that FDI occurs only when three conditions are met simultaneously. First, the firm needs Ownership advantages: something firm-specific that gives it an edge over local rivals, whether technology, brand, management capabilities, or something else. Second, there needs to be Location advantages in the host country, things that make investing there more attractive than investing somewhere else, like market size, lower factor costs, or institutional quality. Third, there needs to be a reason to exploit those ownership advantages through direct production rather than licensing them to a local firm — what Dunning called Internalization advantages. Without all three, FDI does not happen, at least not according to the framework.

The OLI framework is still the main reference point in international business for explaining why, where, and how firms invest abroad, and it holds up well. Its limits, though, have become more apparent as the global investment environment has changed. Things like the mainstreaming of ESG and the geopolitical fragmentation of supply chains introduce motivational drivers that do not sit naturally within the O, L, or I categories as originally conceived. Dunning acknowledged this in his later work, calling for the integration of institutional and stakeholder perspectives (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). This thesis takes that observation seriously and tries to test it empirically, as described in section 2.4.

The framework's strength is in how those three conditions interact. A firm with strong ownership advantages but no location advantage in a particular country will not invest there. Equally, a country with strong location advantages cannot attract investment from a firm that lacks the capabilities to exploit them. Moreover, even when both conditions are met, a firm will only choose FDI over licensing if internalizing production is worth the additional cost and

commitment. Single-factor theories of FDI miss this interdependence. OLI captures it, which is the main reason it has remained the standard reference point in the field for nearly fifty years.

Dunning revised the framework considerably in the years after its initial publication. One of the more useful developments was the recognition that different types of FDI correspond to different OLI configurations. Market-seeking investment, for instance, tends to be driven by location advantages in the host country, combined with ownership advantages that enable the firm to compete against local rivals. Efficiency-seeking investment is typically driven more by location advantages related to factor costs, with the firm's production capabilities serving as the ownership advantage that enables exploitation. This typological dimension of OLI is directly relevant to Chapter 4: the six-category classification scheme used in the empirical analysis maps motivations onto different OLI configurations in exactly this way.

A fair criticism of OLI is that it functions more as a checklist than a predictive theory. It tells you what conditions must be present for FDI to occur, but it does not predict when or where investment will happen. Subsequent theoretical work has supplemented the framework rather than replaced it, for exactly this reason. In this thesis, OLI is used as an analytical organizer rather than a predictive model: a way of mapping firm-level rationale statements onto theoretically grounded motivational categories. For that purpose, it works well enough.

2.3 Traditional Motivations for FDI

Dunning's typology distinguishes four main motivations for FDI, each corresponding to a different configuration of OLI advantages. These form the basis of the classification scheme used throughout this thesis.

Market-seeking FDI (Motivation 1) is investment driven by the desire to access or grow a firm's position in a host country or regional market. It is the most common motivation in the literature and spans a wide range of sectors. A firm might choose to produce locally rather than export for a variety of reasons: transport costs, tariffs, the need to adapt products to local conditions, or simply the commercial value of being physically present where your customers are.

Strategic asset-seeking FDI (Motivation 2) is motivated by the desire to acquire capabilities that the firm lacks at home. Unlike other forms of FDI, which exploit advantages the firm already has, strategic asset-seeking investment is about building new ones: accessing technologies, specialist talent, or innovation ecosystems that are not easily replicated

domestically. It has grown in importance as competitive advantage has increasingly shifted toward intangible assets.

Efficiency-seeking FDI (Motivation 3) involves restructuring production to exploit cost differentials or economies of scale across locations. It is most visible in manufacturing, where firms look for lower-cost production sites or try to concentrate particular production stages where they can be done most cost-effectively.

Resource-seeking FDI (Motivation 4) is investment in search of natural resources not available, or not available as efficiently, at home. The category has traditionally been dominated by mining, oil, and gas, but has expanded in recent years to include renewable energy, reflecting the pace of the energy transition.

2.4 Extended Motivations: Sustainability, Geopolitical Factors, and the OLI-S-G Framework

Dunning's four categories cover the traditional logic of FDI well. What they do not cover, at least not adequately, are the sustainability imperatives and geopolitical pressures that have become increasingly visible in investment decisions over the past decade. This section adds those two dimensions to the framework and explains what each contributes analytically.

The OLI framework was designed for a world of relative geopolitical stability, in which environmental considerations were largely treated as externalities in business strategy. A growing number of scholars have questioned whether those assumptions still hold. Rugman and Verbeke (2008) identified limits to OLI in capturing institutional complexity. Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan (2010) argued for incorporating co-evolutionary perspectives. More recently, Gereffi (2020) and Kolk (2016) have argued that supply chain resilience and sustainability commitments do not fit comfortably within the original three-dimensional structure. This thesis seeks to operationalize those theoretical arguments using firm-level rationale data, testing whether sustainability and geopolitical motivations function as increasingly independent analytical dimensions in the greenfield investment context.

Sustainability (S) encompasses environmental, social, and governance commitments and climate-alignment objectives that are shaping investment decisions at an increasing number of firms. In principle, it touches all three OLI dimensions. It may generate new ownership advantages in green technology capabilities and ESG governance. It likely adds new location

criteria (renewable energy infrastructure, regulatory sustainability environments) alongside traditional economic ones. Moreover, it may affect internalization decisions, since full ownership of a greenfield facility is sometimes cited as a way to verify and control sustainability practices more reliably than a partnership arrangement allows. The data in Figure 6 below give some sense of the scale. In developing countries alone, renewable energy attracted \$183 billion in announced greenfield FDI in 2022 and \$176 billion in 2023, more than all other SDG sectors combined.




Figure 6: Greenfield FDI in SDG Sectors in Developing Countries, 2022 vs. 2023 (Billion USD). Source: UNCTAD / Statista (2026).

Geopolitics (G) encompasses supply chain security concerns, regulatory risk, and the strategic positioning pressures that have become increasingly salient in investment decisions. A few concrete examples illustrate the logic. Following the US CHIPS and Science Act in 2022, TSMC, Samsung, and Intel announced large-scale semiconductor greenfield investments in the US. It is impossible to know from the outside exactly how much of that was security-driven versus market-driven, but the policy context makes the geopolitical dimension hard to ignore. Mexico has seen a surge in nearshoring investment as US firms reconfigure their supply chains within the USMCA framework, a phenomenon widely described as 'friend-shoring'. Across electronics, apparel, and automotive, the 'China+1' strategy of diversifying production beyond a single country has been widespread since 2019. In Europe, new EV battery gigafactories in Poland, Hungary, and Germany appear to reflect both geopolitical and sustainability

motivations, though separating the two is not straightforward. The methodological implication of all this is important: firms rarely describe these decisions in explicitly geopolitical terms in their public statements. What you see instead is operational language: supply chain diversification, risk management, resilience. That has direct consequences for how the G dimension is measured in this analysis, as discussed further in section 4.3.

Table 1 below lays out the OLI-S-G Framework, showing how each dimension relates to its predecessor and what it adds analytically.

Dimension	Core Question	Traditional OLI Anchor	Added in OLI-S-G
Ownership (O)	What firm-specific advantages?	Technology, brand, scale	ESG capabilities; geopolitical intelligence
Location (L)	Why this host country?	Market, costs, resources	Sustainability alignment; political stability
Internalization (I)	Why not license/export?	Transaction cost minimization	Resilience: redundancy over pure efficiency
Sustainability (S)	ESG alignment & green mandates	—	Climate commitments; SDG targeting; carbon risk
Geopolitical (G)	Strategic positioning & risk	—	Supply chain security; friend-shoring; sanctions hedging

Table 1: The Extended OLI-S-G Framework: Dimensions and Analytical Content

The OLI-S-G Framework yields three expectations, assessed in Chapter 4. First, the share of investments with a sustainability co-motivation should have grown meaningfully between 2016 and 2023. Second, geopolitical motivations should be more prominent in 2023, even if that is hard to measure directly, given the linguistic displacement described above. Third, pure

market-seeking motivations should have declined as the overall landscape has become more varied. The framework also expects sustainability and geopolitical factors to appear more often as secondary motivations than as primary ones, reflecting their role as background constraints that shape decisions alongside traditional economic drivers rather than replacing them.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Data Sources: 2016 Dataset (Constructed) and 2023 Dataset (Provided)

The empirical analysis draws on two datasets of announced greenfield FDI projects, each containing firm-level information on investment decisions and the rationale statements executives publicly disclosed at the time.

Both datasets were drawn from Orbis, a database compiled by Bureau van Dijk (now part of Moody's Analytics) that aggregates financial, ownership, and operational information on companies worldwide. Orbis tracks announced greenfield FDI projects, drawing on continuous monitoring of news sources, company announcements, and regulatory filings. It is one of the most widely used commercial databases in international business research, valued in particular for the breadth of its firm-level coverage across geographies and sectors. For each greenfield project in the datasets, Orbis records a rationale statement: a verbatim or near-verbatim excerpt from a public statement made by a company representative at the time of the announcement. These statements serve as the raw material for the motivational coding.

The two datasets differ in one important respect. The 2023 dataset was provided pre-coded, with primary and secondary motivational classifications already assigned; it contains 857 primary observations and 856 secondary codings covering investments announced in 2023. The 2016 dataset was provided as raw data, containing the rationale statements but no motivational classifications; the author of this thesis coded all 280 observations using the six-category scheme and codebook described in section 3.4. That coding work is the thesis's principal empirical contribution. The 2023 dataset is considerably larger (3.06 times the size of the 2016 sample), reflecting both growth in global greenfield project activity and broader coverage. All comparative findings are expressed as percentage shares to make the samples directly comparable.

3.2 Data Characteristics and Limitations

Any time you compare two datasets that differ in size, construction, and time period, the obvious question is whether the differences you find reflect genuine change or reflect differences in how the data were collected. This section lays out the case for comparability and is upfront about where that case is weaker.

Table 2 below presents a systematic comparability audit across the key dimensions of dataset structure.

Comparability Criterion	2016 Dataset	2023 Dataset
Source database	Orbis (Bureau van Dijk)	Orbis (Bureau van Dijk)
Total coded observations	280 primary; 270 secondary	857 primary; 856 secondary
Rationale statement format	Verbatim executive quotes	Verbatim executive quotes
Coding categories applied	Motivations 1–6 (same codebook)	Motivations 1–6 (same codebook)
Top primary motivation	Market Seeking (61.1%)	Market Seeking (51.6%)
Construction method	Provided raw; coded by author	Provided pre-coded by the supervisor
Period coverage	Calendar year 2016	Calendar year 2023

Table 2: Systematic Comparability Audit: 2016 vs. 2023 Datasets

Several things support the comparability of the two datasets. Both draw on Orbis and use the same type of raw material, verbatim executive rationale statements. Both were coded using the same six-category scheme. The author coded the 2016 dataset; the thesis supervisor coded the 2023 dataset using the same methodology and categories. That is probably the strongest comparability guarantee available: the coding decisions were made by two people working from the same definitions, not by two independent readers who might have interpreted the categories differently. Moreover, the structural continuity visible in the data is reassuring.

Market-seeking was the dominant primary motivation in both years, 61.1% in 2016 and 51.6% in 2023. If the datasets were fundamentally incompatible in their coding logic, that kind of consistency across years would be a remarkable coincidence.

The difference in sample sizes is handled throughout by using percentage shares rather than counts. The larger 2023 sample should, if anything, produce a more representative picture of greenfield investment motivations, which makes the differences found between the years more credible rather than less.

A related concern is whether pre-coding the 2023 dataset introduced systematic differences in classification. The shared-source database and the standardized format of rationale statements reduce that risk. So does the decision to focus the comparative analysis on ordinal rankings and directional shifts rather than precise point estimates, which are more vulnerable to any residual coding differences between the two coders.

The limitation that cannot be fully resolved is the absence of a formal industry breakdown of both samples. A much higher proportion of energy-sector projects in the 2023 dataset could, in principle, inflate sustainability co-motivation counts. However, the explanation seems insufficient: a +13.5 pp sustainability shift would require an implausibly large sectoral recomposition, and the simultaneous movements in strategic asset-seeking (+10.6 pp) and efficiency-seeking (−23.2 pp) run in opposite directions and span different industries, making a single compositional-bias story hard to sustain. Future research should still formally document the industry composition.

3.3 Qualitative Coding Methodology

The coding methodology is content analysis, a systematic approach to extracting meaning from text. The process works in two steps.

First, each rationale statement is carefully read to identify the expressed investment motivation. The focus is on the specific reasons the firm gives: market access, customer proximity, cost reduction, technology, resources, sustainability, and geopolitical considerations. Anything that looks like promotional framing rather than substantive reasoning is set aside.

Second, the motivation is assigned to one of the six categories. The primary motivation is whichever reason is stated most prominently. If a clearly distinct secondary motivation is also present (either explicitly or through strong implication), it is coded as such.

Borderline cases follow a set of decision rules. When a statement mixes market-seeking and efficiency-seeking language, the primary motivation is the one given more emphasis and specificity. When sustainability appears alongside a more traditional motivation, it is coded as secondary unless it is clearly the main driver. All renewable energy investments are coded with a sustainability co-motivation by default.

The codebook was developed before any coding began, following standard practice in content analysis research. The definitions for each category were drawn directly from the theoretical literature, particularly Dunning's (1993) typological discussion of investment motivations and Williamson's (1985) framework for analyzing internalization decisions. For each category, the codebook includes a brief theoretical definition, a list of keywords and phrases that are positive indicators of that category, and a list of contextual features that would disqualify a statement from being classified under it. For example, a statement referencing 'growing demand in the local market' is a positive indicator for market-seeking. However, if the same statement also emphasizes that the investment would allow the firm to 'serve customers across the region more efficiently,' the efficiency dimension may qualify as a secondary motivation rather than being absorbed into the primary one.

Ambiguous cases were handled consistently through a hierarchy of rules. When a statement expressed both market access and efficiency considerations, the primary motivation was assigned based on which received more specific and emphatic treatment in the text. Vague references to 'strategic fit' or 'long-term growth' were not coded as strategic asset-seeking unless the statement specified which asset or capability was being sought. References to environmental credentials, carbon neutrality, or renewable energy were coded with a sustainability co-motivation regardless of the primary driver, because these represent a genuine additional decision factor rather than just rhetorical framing. Entirely generic statements, for example, 'this investment reflects our confidence in the market,' were assigned a primary motivation based on the investment's sector and destination, where possible, and flagged as low-confidence codings in the working dataset.

The trickiest judgment call that came up repeatedly was distinguishing efficiency-seeking from geopolitical motivation when a firm cited supply chain considerations. 'We are diversifying our manufacturing base to reduce concentration risk' could reflect either a cost-efficiency rationale or a risk-management one driven by geopolitical concerns. The distinction was made based on whether the statement referenced specific cost or logistics advantages, which pointed toward

efficiency, or specific political, regulatory, or sanctions-related risks, which pointed toward geopolitics. When neither was specified, efficiency-seeking was assigned as the default. The conservative choice. This probably means the geopolitical motivation count is somewhat understated, a point picked up again in section 4.3.

Table 5 below gives worked examples of how this coding was applied to representative rationale statements, which should help make the classification criteria transparent.

Representative Rationale Statement (paraphrased)	Primary Motivation	Secondary Motivation
"This investment brings us closer to our customers in the region and allows us to respond faster to local demand."	1. Market Seeking	—
"We are establishing this R&D center to access the deep pool of AI and software engineering talent concentrated in this city."	2. Strategic Asset Seeking	—
"The new facility will allow us to consolidate production and significantly reduce per-unit logistics costs."	3. Efficiency Seeking	1. Market Seeking
"Securing local lithium processing capacity is essential to our long-term battery supply chain strategy."	4. Resource Seeking	5. Sustainability
"This plant is central to our net-zero roadmap and will be powered entirely by renewable energy from day one."	1. Market Seeking	5. Sustainability
"We are diversifying our manufacturing footprint to reduce concentration risk and ensure supply chain continuity."	3. Efficiency Seeking	6. Geopolitical Factors

Table 5: Illustrative Coding Examples, Executive Rationale Statements, and Motivational Classification

3.4 Comparative Framework and Consistency of Classification

The codebook defines each of the six motivational categories in three ways: explicit definitional criteria drawn from the theoretical literature (Dunning, 1993; Williamson, 1985); positive indicators (words and phrases that point toward a given category); and exclusion criteria (contextual features that rule out a statement from a given category). The aim is to anchor coding decisions in predefined theoretical constructs rather than in the coder's judgment in the moment, thereby reducing the scope for inconsistency.

For the primary motivation, the most prominently stated rationale is identified. When multiple rationales appear, the primary rationale receives the most specific and emphatic treatment. A secondary motivation is coded when a clearly distinct second rationale is present. If that condition is not met, the secondary motivation field is left blank rather than assigned a residual category.

The same codebook and decision rules were applied to both the 2016 and 2023 samples. The comparative analysis then operates at two levels: comparing the percentage shares of individual categories across years and examining whether the overall distributions changed in ways anticipated by the OLI-S-G Framework.

The main limitation of a single-coder design is that it precludes formal inter-rater reliability testing, such as calculating Cohen's kappa. This is a recognized limitation of qualitative coding at this level of research, and it does not, in itself, invalidate the findings. Rather, the distributions in Chapter 4 represent one theoretically grounded reading of the statements, applied consistently across both datasets, rather than a reading validated against a second independent coder. Two factors support the robustness of the main findings: the top three motivational categories rank in the same order in both years and at both the primary and secondary levels; and the largest observed shifts are large enough that coding variation alone cannot plausibly explain them.

Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis

4.1 Analysis of Greenfield Investment Motivations in 2016

The 2016 dataset includes 280 coded primary observations and 270 coded secondary motivations. Tables 3 and 4 below present the full distribution for both years. This section focuses on the 2016 figures; the comparative analysis follows in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

Motivation Category	2016 n	2016 %	2023 n	2023 %	Δ pp
1. Market Seeking	171	61.1%	442	51.6%	−9.5
2. Strategic Asset Seeking	68	24.3%	243	28.4%	+4.1
3. Efficiency Seeking	35	12.5%	148	17.3%	+4.8
4. Resource Seeking	6	2.1%	24	2.8%	+0.7
5. Sustainability	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.0
6. Geopolitical Factors	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.0
Total	280	100%	857	100%	—

Table 3: Distribution of Primary Greenfield FDI Motivations, 2016 vs. 2023





Figure 1: Primary Greenfield FDI Motivations by Category, 2016 vs. 2023 (%)

Motivation Category	2016 n	2016 %	2023 n	2023 %	Δ pp
1. Market Seeking	57	21.1%	192	22.4%	+1.3
2. Strategic Asset Seeking	44	16.3%	230	26.9%	+10.6
3. Efficiency Seeking	117	43.3%	172	20.1%	−23.2
4. Resource Seeking	2	0.7%	13	1.5%	+0.8
5. Sustainability	26	9.6%	198	23.1%	+13.5
6. Geopolitical Factors	24	8.9%	51	6.0%	−2.9
Total coded	270	100%	856	100%	—

Table 4: Distribution of Secondary Greenfield FDI Motivations, 2016 vs. 2023*Figure 2: Secondary Greenfield FDI Motivations by Category, 2016 vs. 2023 (%)*

In 2016, market-seeking motivations accounted for 61.1% of primary codings (n=171). Firms in this category cited proximity to customers, access to regional markets, and the commercial value of having a local presence. The sectors most represented are retail and consumer goods,

financial services, hospitality, and logistics, all of which are areas where physical proximity to the customer matters.

Strategic asset-seeking was the second most common primary driver at 24.3% (n=68). These investments mostly involved establishing research centers, technology hubs, or talent acquisition platforms in cities with established concentrations of technical expertise, such as San Francisco, Tel Aviv, Boston, and Singapore. The relatively high share confirms that building knowledge-based capabilities abroad was already a significant driver of greenfield investment in 2016, not just a niche activity.

Efficiency-seeking accounted for 12.5% (n=35) of primary codings. The investments in this category focused on cost reduction, production rationalization, and plugging into international production networks. Rationale statements typically mentioned labor cost advantages, logistics infrastructure, or proximity to input suppliers.

Resource-seeking (Motivation 4) was rare at the primary level, at 2.1% (n=6). No investments in the 2016 sample were coded with sustainability or geopolitical factors as the stated primary motivation, though both appear in the secondary motivation distribution.

The secondary motivation data for 2016 adds an important layer to the picture. Efficiency-seeking dominated secondary codings at 43.3% (n=117), suggesting that market-seeking primary investments frequently cited operational or logistical advantages as an additional rationale. Sustainability was a secondary motivation in 9.6% of cases (n=26), and geopolitical factors in 8.9% (n=24). Both were present in 2016, in other words, but clearly in a subordinate role.

Beyond the aggregate percentages, reading the 2016 rationale statements as a body of text reveals some things the numbers alone do not capture. Market-seeking language tends to be direct and commercial: customer proximity, local demand growth, and the desire to establish a presence in a particular city or region. Much of it comes from consumer-facing firms where the logic of being close to the end customer is intuitive and easy to say in public. Strategic asset-seeking statements are more varied. Some cite 'talent' or 'innovation ecosystems'; others mention partnerships with universities or research institutions; a few are quite specific about the technology they are seeking. The variation within that category makes sense: 'strategic asset-seeking' encompasses a genuinely heterogeneous set of motivations, united by the desire to acquire something the firm does not already have rather than to exploit something it already has.

The efficiency-seeking statements in 2016 are, in retrospect, the most revealing in light of what changes by 2023. In 2016, efficiency rationales are almost exclusively about cost: labor costs, logistics costs, proximity to suppliers, or the opportunity to consolidate production at scale. The word 'resilience' appears only rarely. This matters because, as section 4.2 shows, the efficiency rationales in 2023 look quite different. The contrast between the two periods is not just a shift in which category firms cite most often; it is a shift in the underlying logic of what 'being efficient' means in the context of international production.

Also notable is what is largely absent from the 2016 statements: regulatory and political factors. The 8.9% geopolitical secondary motivation share is real, but these references are mostly about newly opened market access rather than risk management. The 2016 dataset was coded in a world that was still, in many respects, operating under the assumptions of the post-Cold War liberal economic order. Trade was broadly expanding, supply chains were lengthening, and the dominant logic of FDI location was economic optimization. The contrast with 2023 is striking once you notice it.

4.2 Analysis of Greenfield Investment Motivations in 2023

The 2023 dataset contains 857 primary observations and 856 secondary motivation codings. The full distributions are in Tables 3 and 4 above.

Market-seeking remained the most common primary driver in 2023 at 51.6% (n=442). The 9.5 percentage-point decline from 2016 is meaningful and consistent with a more diverse motivational landscape. The content of the rationale statements also seems to have shifted: references to digital markets, e-commerce, and online consumer channels appear more frequently in 2023 than in 2016, alongside a growing emphasis on healthcare market access, though this is an impressionistic observation rather than a separately coded finding.

Strategic asset-seeking grew from 24.3% to 28.4% (+4.1 pp). Reading across the 2023 statements, references to artificial intelligence, machine learning, and advanced data analytics appear more often than in the 2016 sample, suggesting a shift in the kinds of assets firms are going abroad to acquire. Again, this is qualitative rather than separately quantified. The geographic footprint also appears to have diversified, with ecosystems in Southeast Asia, India, and the Gulf states drawing more attention alongside the established hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv.

Efficiency-seeking grew from 12.5% to 17.3% (+4.8 pp), but the character of the efficiency rationales shifted. Rather than the traditional emphasis on lower labor costs, the 2023 statements more often focused on supply chain resilience, nearshoring, and reducing exposure to logistical and geopolitical risks. It is a different kind of efficiency logic, one oriented toward resilience rather than cost minimization, and it sits at the intersection of the efficiency-seeking and geopolitical categories in the OLI-S-G Framework.

Resource-seeking grew modestly, from 2.1% to 2.8% (+0.7 pp), mainly due to investments in critical minerals and renewable energy. Sustainability and geopolitical factors were absent as standalone primary motivations in both datasets, though their profiles as secondary motivations changed substantially, a point returned to in section 4.3.

Reading the 2023 and 2016 statements side by side, the qualitative shift is noticeable even before any coding takes place. The 2023 statements more often include a second layer of explanation that the 2016 statements typically lack. A firm might cite market access as the primary reason for an investment, then add that the facility will run on renewables or that the location reduces dependence on a particular supply chain. That layering within a single statement is part of what drives the growth in secondary motivation codings in 2023. It also reflects something real: firms are presenting their investment decisions differently than they were seven years ago.

The sustainability rationales in 2023 are also more specific than those that appeared occasionally in the 2016 sample. While 2016 sustainability references tended to be general commitments to corporate responsibility, the 2023 statements more often cite specific targets: net-zero commitments, alignment with the Paris Agreement, or the facility's contribution to a particular SDG. This specificity suggests that sustainability is being integrated into investment planning rather than added as an afterthought, which fits the broader shift in corporate ESG governance that has accelerated since 2020.

What did not change is also worth attention. The basic vocabulary of market-seeking investment, references to local customers, regional demand, and commercial presence, is essentially the same in both years. Firms investing for market access in 2023 describe their decisions in terms broadly similar to those used in 2016. That continuity at the primary motivation level is reassuring for the comparability argument: the baseline logic of greenfield investment has not been transformed beyond recognition, which makes the changes at the secondary motivation level more meaningful.

4.3 Comparative Analysis of the Two Periods

Looking at the two distributions together, a few things stand out.

At the primary motivation level, market-seeking fell by 9.5 pp, offset by modest increases in strategic asset-seeking (+4.1 pp) and efficiency-seeking (+4.8 pp). The 2023 distribution is more spread across the top three categories, though market-seeking is still by far the most common.

The changes at the secondary motivation level are more striking. Sustainability rose from 9.6% to 23.1% of secondary codings, 13.5 percentage points, and the largest shift in the entire analysis. By 2023, nearly one in four investments articulated a sustainability co-motivation alongside its primary driver. A chi-square test on the full 6-category secondary motivation distributions (2016: $n=270$; 2023: $n=856$) gives $\chi^2 = 75.17$, $df = 5$, $p < 0.001$, confirming that the two distributions differ well beyond what sampling variation would produce. Figure 7 below maps all the shifts visually, making the overall pattern easier to read at a glance. The test should be read as descriptive support for the pattern of change, not as a causal claim — the cross-sectional design and the differences between the two datasets, discussed in section 3.2, are real constraints on what can be concluded.




Figure 7: Percentage-point shifts in primary and secondary greenfield FDI motivations between 2016 and 2023. The most notable changes are the decline of efficiency-seeking as a secondary motivation (−23.2 pp) and the rise of sustainability (+13.5 pp) and strategic asset-seeking (+10.6 pp) in the same layer. Source: author's calculations based on coded datasets.

Strategic asset-seeking also grew as a secondary motivation, from 16.3% to 26.9% (+10.6 pp), suggesting that even investments driven primarily by market access increasingly involve a secondary dimension of knowledge acquisition. Efficiency-seeking, by contrast, fell sharply as a secondary motivation, from 43.3% to 20.1% (–23.2 pp), the largest negative shift in the analysis. One interpretation is that pure cost-optimization has been partly displaced by the resilience-oriented efficiency rationale documented in section 4.2, though proving that causal link would require more granular data than is available here.

Geopolitical factors declined as an explicitly coded secondary motivation, from 8.9% to 6.0% (–2.9 pp). This is the finding that fits least well with the OLI-S-G Framework's expectations, and it deserves honest treatment. As coded, the data do not confirm that geopolitical motivations grew more prominent between 2016 and 2023.

There is a fairly obvious reason for the undercount. Describing an investment as geopolitically motivated carries reputational and diplomatic costs. Firms do not say, 'We are moving production out of China because of the geopolitical risk.' They say 'we are diversifying our manufacturing base to reduce concentration risk,' which in this study gets coded as efficiency-seeking or market-seeking. If that linguistic displacement is real, the –2.9 pp decline in explicitly coded geopolitical motivations could coexist with a genuine increase in geopolitically driven investment that rational statement coding cannot reach. The G dimension of the OLI-S-G Framework may require different measurement approaches altogether, such as investment location pattern analysis, policy document review, or direct interviews with decision-makers. That is the honest conclusion here.

4.4 Evolution of Strategic Drivers: From Cost-Optimized Efficiency to Resilient Pluralism

The two distributions together point to a directional shift, though with the caveats set out in section 3.2. In 2016, the dominant pattern was a firm entering a new market as its primary driver, with efficiency optimization as the most common secondary consideration. By 2023, sustainability appears to have displaced efficiency as the dominant secondary co-motivation, and the efficiency rationale that does appear has changed in character, from cost reduction to resilience.

This shift can be summarised as a move from 'cost-optimized efficiency' to 'resilient pluralism'. In 2016, greenfield investment tended to follow a fairly simple two-part logic: access a market,

and optimize the costs of doing so. By 2023, the picture is more spread across motivational categories. Sustainability has become the leading secondary consideration, market access is still dominant but less so, and efficiency has been requalified in many cases as a resilience objective. Whether this is a durable structural change or partly a response to the particular disruptions of 2020 to 2023 is something only further research across more years could settle.

This is what the OLI-S-G Framework would expect: as sustainability and geopolitical pressures become more binding for more firms, their influence first shows up in the secondary motivation layer, qualifying and shaping primary economic objectives, before potentially becoming primary drivers in their own right as external pressure intensifies.

Chapter 5: Discussion and Implications

5.1 Theoretical Implications

The OLI framework covers all primary motivation codings in both years, confirming that its core logic still holds. Market-seeking, strategic asset-seeking, and efficiency-seeking together account for everything. What the framework alone cannot account for is the dramatic growth of sustainability as a secondary co-motivation, up 13.5 percentage points, or the qualitative transformation of efficiency-seeking from cost-minimization to resilience logic. Something additional is needed to interpret those changes, and the OLI-S-G extension is one attempt to provide it.

What this thesis actually did, in practical terms, was code 280 investment rationale statements for 2016, compare the result against the pre-coded 2023 dataset, and work out what changed and why. The concept of 'resilient pluralism' as a label for the 2023 motivational landscape emerged from that process, as did the observation that sustainability has displaced efficiency as the dominant secondary driver, while efficiency itself has changed in character. Those are findings that came from the data, not from the framework.

The findings also fit into a broader conversation in the field. Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan (2010), Gereffi (2020), and Kolk (2016) have all argued that the post-2016 environment has produced investment patterns that established theory struggles to explain fully. The OLI-S-G Framework is one response to that challenge. What this thesis adds is empirical grounding: evidence that sustainability and geopolitical motivations can be identified and tracked at the firm level through systematic coding, and that their distributional weight shifted materially over seven years. Whether those shifts are large enough to require a theoretical revision rather than an extension is a question that future research across more time periods and geographies should address.

The most theoretically interesting finding is probably the concept of resilient pluralism. Efficiency-seeking declined as a secondary motivation by 23.2 percentage points. At the same time, sustainability rose by 13.5 points, and strategic asset-seeking rose by 10.6 points. These three shifts move in different directions and involve different industries. A compositional explanation cannot account for all three simultaneously. Taken together, what they suggest is a genuine change in the secondary logic of greenfield investment: away from cost optimization and toward a more complex mix of sustainability commitments, capability building, and

resilience. The embedded geopolitics finding adds another layer. If geopolitical reasoning increasingly appears disguised as operational language, it has methodological implications that extend well beyond this particular thesis.

5.2 Managerial Implications

For managers, the main takeaway is that the framework for evaluating greenfield investment opportunities needs to reflect more considerations than it did ten years ago.

A firm that still evaluates greenfield location decisions purely through the lens of market size and production cost is working with an incomplete picture. The 9.5 pp decline in market-seeking as a primary motivation is one such signal. The rise of sustainability as the dominant secondary co-motivation is another. Investment location decisions now involve trade-offs across sustainability alignment, geopolitical risk exposure, and supply chain resilience alongside the traditional variables, and those trade-offs require input from legal, sustainability, and risk functions, not just finance and strategy.

ESG integration is probably the most immediate practical implication. A greenfield commitment that gets sustainability-framed after the fact, as a communications exercise, is increasingly inadequate. Some host governments have started attaching sustainability conditionalities to investment approvals. Institutional investors and stakeholders are scrutinizing alignment with climate commitments more carefully than they were a decade ago. Building sustainability criteria into the investment appraisal from the start, rather than adding them at the announcement stage, is the more defensible approach.

The shift toward resilience-oriented efficiency also has practical implications for supply chain design. Firms that have optimized their networks purely for cost will need to revisit those configurations in light of the systemic risks exposed by the pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine. Accepting somewhat higher unit production costs in exchange for geographic diversification and reduced concentration risk is increasingly part of the calculation, and investment appraisal frameworks need to accommodate that alongside conventional NPV and payback metrics.

The shift in strategic asset-seeking toward AI and digital capabilities also has implications for talent strategy. In 2016, this type of investment was concentrated in a small number of established hubs. By 2023, the footprint had diversified, with ecosystems in Southeast Asia, India, and the Gulf states attracting attention alongside Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. Firms

benchmarking their R&D location decisions against a playbook from a decade ago may be missing opportunities where talent competition is less intense and government incentives are more readily available.

More broadly, the shift toward resilient pluralism as an organizing logic of greenfield investment has implications for how investment decisions are made within firms. The traditional model, in which a finance team evaluates potential sites based on market size and production costs, is inadequate for a world in which sustainability alignment, geopolitical risk exposure, and supply chain resilience are also significant variables. These dimensions require input from legal, sustainability, and risk management functions alongside the conventional financial analysis. Firms that have not updated their internal investment appraisal frameworks to accommodate these additional variables are likely making location decisions that look optimal by traditional metrics but carry hidden risks that will only become visible under stress.

5.3 Policy Implications

The findings also carry implications for investment promotion authorities and the governments that set the policy environment for FDI.

If sustainability is now a near-universal secondary consideration for greenfield investors, as the data suggest, investment promotion strategies built primarily around tax incentives and subsidies may not be sufficient on their own. Authorities that can credibly demonstrate strong sustainability governance through climate commitments, renewable energy deployment, green finance frameworks, and robust environmental regulation will be better placed to attract the growing segment of sustainability-motivated investors. The UNCTAD data on SDG-sector FDI put some scale on this: developing countries attracted \$183 billion in renewable energy greenfield investment in 2022 alone.

On the geopolitical side, if the reasoning in section 4.3 is correct and geopolitical considerations are increasingly embedded in investment decisions, even when not explicitly stated, then political stability and diplomatic predictability may be more valuable as investment-location attributes than traditional FDI promotion metrics capture. Governments that can credibly signal those qualities may have an advantage that does not show up straightforwardly in the standard incentives-and-infrastructure playbook.

The investment policy data also flags a tension. Most new measures between 2013 and 2023 were pro-investment, but restrictive measures rose sharply, from 21 in 2013 to 53 in 2022.

Investment screening has legitimate national security rationales. However, screening regimes that impose significant compliance costs on genuine greenfield investors create friction that will eventually show up in investment attraction figures. Managing that trade-off actively is worth more attention than it typically receives in policy design.

Developing economies face a particular version of this challenge. Renewable energy attracted \$183 billion in greenfield FDI in developing countries in 2022 alone, but that investment is not distributed evenly. It concentrates in countries with stable regulatory environments, functional grid infrastructure, and clear frameworks for foreign ownership of energy assets. Countries that lack those features risk being left out of the green investment wave, even when they have the renewable resources. Attracting sustainability-motivated FDI requires governance improvements that take time, and the window opened by the energy transition will not stay open indefinitely.

Finally, the data on the evolution of investment motivations imply how bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements are designed. Most existing investment treaties were negotiated in an era when efficiency-seeking and market-seeking were the dominant investment logics, and their provisions reflect those priorities: they focus on market access, non-discrimination, and protection against expropriation. The growing importance of sustainability and geopolitical motivations suggests that future investment frameworks may need to address a broader set of concerns, including provisions for sustainable development, climate commitments, and responsible business conduct, as well as mechanisms for managing the tensions that arise when national security screening and investment liberalization pull in opposite directions.

Conclusion

Summary of Findings

This thesis set out to examine how the motivations for greenfield FDI evolved between 2016 and 2023. It did so by coding 280 investment rationale statements from the 2016 dataset and comparing the resulting motivational distribution with the pre-coded 2023 dataset of 857 observations, using a qualitative coding methodology grounded in Dunning's OLI Paradigm.

The headline numbers are in Tables 3 and 4. At the primary motivation level, market-seeking fell from 61.1% to 51.6% (−9.5 pp), strategic asset-seeking rose from 24.3% to 28.4% (+4.1 pp), and efficiency-seeking rose from 12.5% to 17.3% (+4.8 pp). At the secondary motivation level, the changes were sharper: sustainability rose from 9.6% to 23.1% (+13.5 pp), strategic asset-seeking from 16.3% to 26.9% (+10.6 pp), and efficiency-seeking fell from 43.3% to 20.1% (−23.2 pp). In plain terms, in 2016, the most common secondary motivation was cost optimization. By 2023, it was sustainability. That is the central empirical finding of this thesis, and it is a significant shift over a relatively short period.

The framework used throughout is the Extended OLI-S-G Framework, which adds Sustainability (S) and Geopolitics (G) as analytical dimensions alongside Dunning's original O, L, and I. The empirical contributions are the 2016 coding, the comparative analysis, and the 'resilient pluralism' interpretation of what changed between the two periods.

Limitations

Several limitations apply and should be stated plainly. A cross-sectional comparison of two years supports description, not causal inference. The single-coder design precludes formal inter-rater reliability testing, though the structured codebook and the consistency of ordinal rankings across both datasets provide some reassurance on this front. The absence of a formal industry-level breakdown of both samples means compositional effects cannot be fully ruled out, even if the pattern of shifts across all six categories makes a purely compositional explanation implausible. Moreover, reliance on public executive statements introduces a disclosure bias that is particularly acute for the G dimension: firms do not typically state geopolitical reasoning openly, so the empirical support for the Geopolitics dimension is indirect rather than direct. That is the most significant limitation of the analysis.

Directions for Future Research

Several directions for future research follow from these limitations. Applying the same coding methodology to additional years would allow for more systematic longitudinal testing of the patterns observed here. Survey or interview-based research could access firms' internal decision-making logic directly, which public rationale statements cannot. A formal industry-level breakdown of both datasets would address the main comparability uncertainty. Moreover, operationalizing the S and G dimensions as measurable variables (such as ESG ratings, political risk indices, and supply chain concentration metrics) would enable more rigorous quantitative testing of the OLI-S-G Framework's expectations in future work.

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