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SUPERVISOR: Prof. Maria Beatrice Deli
CANDIDATE: Valentina Loisi 620012

ASSISTANT SUPERVISOR: Prof. Paolo De Caterini

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ABSTRACT

“The EU’s enlargement policy makes Europe a safer and a more stable place; it allows us to grow stronger and to promote our values, and enables us to assume our roles as a global player on the world stage” stated the European Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle. However, the enlargement of the European Union is no easy task, especially for countries like the Republic of Macedonia, that suffer socioeconomic disparities with European member states, have unsettled hostilities with neighbouring countries and bear limitations in the public administration’s capacity. Indeed, the path towards the European Union will need the country not only to programme and adopt laws compatible to the EU standards, but also to practically implement them.

How close is the Republic of Macedonia to becoming a European member state? The scope of this thesis is to analyse the role of regional and international organizations present in the Republic of Macedonia in helping the country achieve its biggest aim: become a member state of the European Union. In particular, more space is dedicated to the analysis of the role of the European Union, which is the main external aid supply for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Republic of Macedonia, through a detailed study of the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) funds, a programme which assists candidate and potential candidate countries “in their progressive alignment with the standards and policies of the European Union, including where appropriate the acquis communautaire, with a view to membership” (European Council, 2006).

The first two chapters deal with the EU and the IPA assistance, which is
very complex: it was created in order to produce internal changes to these countries, with the purpose of bringing “political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required to bring the countries closer to Union values and to progressively align to Union rules, standards, policies and practices with a view to Union membership” (European Commission, 2014). How has IPA affected the Macedonian accession process? What are the main characteristics, and which of them turn into weaknesses? Did the European Union learn from its past mistakes during previous aid programmes? How will the scenario change with the new financial programme, IPA II? Will IPA II overcome the problems linked to IPA I or will the story repeat itself? These are the main questions to which I try to find an answer. I also analyse the reasons why the Macedonian accession process towards the European Union is currently at an halt, being the Greek veto an additional reason and not the only one.

In the first chapter, I examine in detail the European Union’s relation to the Republic of Macedonia. Initially, I briefly retrace the country’s history from its independence in 1991, examining its complicated relations with Greece over the name, the Constitution and the flag (issues which are fundamental to understand the relations nowadays especially with the EU, NATO and UN), and the momentary “ceasefire” given by the Interim Accord of 1995.

In the second paragraph I discuss the EU’s interest in the country, analysing at first its role in security and defence, its initial involvement with the European Community Monitor Mission, how its tasks and responsibilities changed through two operations in the Republic of Macedonian, namely “EUFOR Concordia” and “EUFOR Proxima”, in the background of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which put an end to the hostilities between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians.
In the third paragraph, I retrace the main steps the Republic of Macedonia has taken in order to move closer to the accession in the European Union: the success of the Stabilization and Association Process, the recognition as candidate country in 2005, the first recommendation of the European Commission to open accession negotiations in 2009, the High Level Accession Dialogue which began in 2012. However, the five continuous recommendations of the European Commission have remained unanswered by the European Council.

In the fourth paragraph, I introduce the topic of European Aid Programmes, analysing at first the terminological difference between “project” and “programme”, in order to clarify the area of discussion, then I explore the main former aid programmes that have been implemented in the Western Balkans and specifically in the Republic of Macedonia, divided into three big phases: PHARE and OBNOVA programmes, CARDS and, last but not least, IPA, the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the real focus of this thesis. I discuss them first in general terms, through their attempt to “Europeanize” the region, then in their specific application to the country, including the role of the European Agency for Reconstruction and the influence of the Kosovo crisis.

In the last paragraph of the first chapter, I begin to examine the third and current phase of European aid programmes, the Instrument for Pre-Accession, specific for countries who wish to join the EU. In this chapter I only discuss it in general terms, looking at what it is, the five components, the beneficiaries and the general framework for management and implementation, with an overview of the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire, leaving the detailed discussions for the following chapter.

The second chapter is completely devoted to the Instrument for Pre
Accession in the Republic of Macedonia and is the core of my analysis. It is a study of what is currently occurring in the country under IPA I (the first seven years of implementation from 2007 to 2013), in comparison to the future IPA II (2014-2020), with a focus on the major weaknesses of IPA in the Republic of Macedonia, which have emerged from interviews and from official documents, like the Interim evaluation of the Commission and Progress Reports, the Sigma Assessment, Analitytica’s Analysis and various publications from the European Policy Institute in Skopje.

So the first paragraph is about studying how IPA (2007-2013) is currently functioning, how it has been managed, how the shift from centralized management to Decentralized Implementation System (DIS) is going, what is the role of the EU bodies (at first the EAR and then the EU delegation) and national authorities, how they interact without overlapping and at what level of compliance to the acquis is the Republic of Macedonia (with an insight to the accession process).

In the second paragraph, I divide the analysis of IPA I under three aspects: the programming of funds, the implementation of projects and the evaluation, after a project has been concluded. I underline the main difficulties IPA has encountered under each aspect. In the third paragraph, using the same division, I discuss how those issues could be tackled under IPA II and try to answer the question if IPA II, as currently envisaged, could be a solution.

In the last paragraph, I tackle three main problems of a more general nature that may be an obstacle to the Macedonian accession in the EU. What if the beneficiary country becomes compliant to IPA II only on paper? What about the name issue? And most importantly, is the European enlargement still desired
by both Macedonians and Europeans? So in the end, is the Republic of Macedonia in the EU just a dream or a real possibility?

In the third and last chapter, I examine the other main international and regional organizations that are engaged in the Republic of Macedonia: what is their role in helping the country with the accession process? Indeed, although the European Union is the main donor and the most involved, “the support of the international community and neighbouring countries is essential to facilitate the democratisation process of Macedonia and pave the way for its integration in the European Union and NATO, to which it aspires” (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2013, pag. 36). In fact, most of the international organizations present in the country are actively involved, in different ways, in helping the country achieve its goal of becoming an European Union member state. The international and regional organizations which I examine are the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

I start with a detailed analysis of the UN’s relations to the Republic of Macedonia: first I retrace the most important peacekeeping forces the UN established in the region that touched the Republic of Macedonia’s territory, namely UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP; I examine the Resolution of the Security Council which permitted the country’s entrance into the UN club, namely Resolution 817 (1993), the one that introduced for the first time the denomination “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, looking at its peculiarities, the difficulties and doubts it arose; finally, I briefly describe the UN’s involvement in
the country today, the assistance towards the European Union, its successes and failures, through an analysis of the Interim Accord between Skopje and Athens and the still unresolved name issue.

The second paragraph deals with the relations between NATO and Skopje. First, I examine the three NATO operations in the Macedonian territory: “Operation Essential Harvest”, “Operation Amber Fox”, “Operation Allied Harmony” and “NATO Liaison Office Skopje”. Then, I continue with Skopje’s road to accession, through the participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, differently from the UN, the Republic of Macedonia is still not a NATO member state: in the last paragraph, I analyse Greece’s veto to Skopje’s accession to NATO, in light of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment of 2011, which recognized it as a violation of the 1995 Interim Accord.

I conclude the third chapter with the analysis of five other international actors involved in the Macedonian borders. The first one is OSCE, with its long-lasting Spillover Monitoring Mission in Skopje, then the Council of Europe, the WTO and the Free Trade Agreement partners with the Macedonians, the World Bank and its management of funds (also IPA funds from component V) and the IMF with its Article IV and third Post–Program Monitoring mission, Skopje. After all the difficulties highlighted with the ongoing IPA I and the possible way out through the future IPA II, after all the help from regional and international organizations, is the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union just a dream or a real possibility?

It is essential to underline that this thesis does not claim to express opinions
on the Macedonian question, on the existence of a Macedonian identity, or on the cohabitation of different nationalities, neither does it demand to enable closure on the controversial topic of the name issue. Any reference to these matters is purely academic, used as a tool to understand the current situation, especially regarding the use of IPA funds, and the relations between the country in question and the international organizations, and is not in any way intended to be a political judgement. As this is an extensive and consuming topic, I leave this debate to others or to another time. Nevertheless, for practical reasons I refer to the country as “Republic of Macedonia” rather than “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” or FYROM, since many countries, in their bilateral relations with the country in question, have recognized it under this denomination, although I acknowledge that the official term used by international organizations is the latter.

In conclusion, this thesis wants to demonstrate that although the country has received support by the EU and the other regional and international organizations in helping the country reach the European dream, “IPA assistance has been positive but not as effective as planned” (Ecorys, 2013, pag. 18), and the country is still far away from becoming a European member state. In particular, I analyse IPA’s main weaknesses, which have emerged from interviews and from official documents, such as the Interim evaluation of the Commission, the Sigma Assessment, Analitytica’s Analysis and various publications from the European Policy Institute in Skopje, and I divide them in three different phases: the programming phase, the implementation and the evaluation stage.

I come across four main weaknesses in the programming phase. First of all, Macedonians tend to “do” rather than “plan to do”: they lack strategic planning, being unable to understand what is truly important, just guided by the act of tick-
boxing the tasks they were supposed to do because someone from above told them to, and in this way they give rise to other problems like delays in the programming of funds and a low quality of documents. Second, Civil Society Organizations are insufficiently involved in the consultation process, which is a “top down process” (Ecorys, 2013), increasing the gap between European Union and national citizens. Moreover, the projects are too many, they are fragmented and are too short-term, resulting in less effectiveness and more difficulties in their management. Also, the absorption of funds is indivisible from their programming: the latter should be made on the basis of the former. However, this is not Skopje’s case, as there is inadequate information on the ability of the state to absorb funds, and from the few studies that have been concluded on this subject, the result is that the Macedonian absorption capacity is very low (Kacarska, S. and Ristevska Jordanova, M., 2013).

In the implementation process, I mainly examine the different realities of the Decentralized Implementation System (DIS) and centralization. Before, with the centralized system, the process was smoother, however, it lacked ownership. On the other hand, the road towards the DIS brings to an increase of ownership, but also to more difficulties: different procedures for the different components, few people for so many projects, delays for correct documentation, lower effectiveness of projects, slow tendering and contracting rates, no flexibility. In the end, it usually takes around two and a half years to move from the programming to the implementation of a project: definitely a too long time span since “in a transition environment projects are likely to be out of date by the time they are implemented” (Ecorys, 2013, pag. 6).

What happens to a project once it is concluded? Evaluations may be internal
to a project, or outsourced by the European bodies. In the first case, evaluations are provided only for big projects, which can finance them internally; the second type is outsourced by the Secretariat of European Affairs and it is only randomly executed. In the end, there is no systematic control once a project has been concluded and the existing evaluations are done with different methodologies. From my point of view, it is a contradiction that the EU is so strict through its controls during the implementation of a project, and then does not care of what happens after a project has been concluded. In fact, it is not automatic that if a project is well implemented, then it also obtains results: it could be badly executed but could have a positive impact, or vice versa. The effectiveness depends in large amount on the political willingness of the beneficiary. On paper the priorities of the Macedonian government are still EU and NATO membership, nothing has changed; but the practice seems to suggest something else. So far, it seems like the Republic of Macedonia and the EU did not learn from its past mistakes encountered with previous aid programmes like PHARE and CARDS.

Considering the new seven-year framework known as IPA II, which formally started at the beginning of 2014, adopting the same division in three (programming, implementation and evaluation phase), I try to envisage a new and more effective scenario, on the basis of the novelties declared so far from the European institutions. While IPA I focuses mainly on programming and implementing, IPA II will focus more on sustainability. As it is designed, it will be more aimed at achieving practical results with the intention of making progress in the route towards accession, in order to deliver durable benefits to the beneficiary. Both beneficiaries and the EU will concentrate on one milestone of the accession process, once it will be ticked off, the country may move to the
following one.

For what regards the programming of funds, I examine how the shift from the components to the sector approach will bring to “a more coherent longer-term planning process” (European Commission, 2011b), with simplified procedures and more internal coordination required. With IPA II there will be more involvement of all actors in the consultation process, which will not be just partners, they will be leaders of the discussions. Projects shall be reduced in number but increased in terms of budget and delayed in time, lasting for four-five years: bigger projects have greater impact. The newly drafted Country and Multi-Country Strategy Papers, together with the first Programmes, will help both the Commission and the beneficiary define the real absorption capacity of the country and the priorities that must be tackled first, in terms of the chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. Aid will be tailored to tackle needs.

On the implementation side, one of the main aims is to increase ownership of the beneficiary, done mainly in two ways: through co-financing and through a greater involvement of the beneficiaries, regional partners, CSOs and other stakeholders in the discussion, as already mentioned. The procedures will be simplified: less requirements will be demanded from the Commission, all the sectors will follow the same rules and set of guidelines (except for agriculture), the CFCD will have less projects to manage.

For the monitoring and evaluation, the plan of IPA II is to introduce a performance bonus method, founded on impartial measurement mechanisms that will necessitate a well-functioning monitoring system: every project or programme will be linked to specific and clear targets, measurable through performance elements, quantifiable indicators that should be identified as
obtainable before the beginning of the project/programme.

Therefore, will IPA II overcome the problems linked to IPA I, or will the story repeat itself? From its premises, it looks like IPA II could work out. However, there are still shadows on some key aspects: for example, we still do not know how the sectoral approach is going to be implemented in practice, its definition remains blurry, we do not know if the beneficiaries will be able to increase the percentage of co-finding, how they are going to quantify the performance indicators, especially for the institutional building, is still unknown.

Will IPA II be effective in terms of the accession process? This thesis demonstrates that even if IPA turns out to be successful, there are three main problems that the country could encounter anyhow. These are the same reasons why the Macedonian accession process is currently at an halt. First of all, the risk with IPA (and other aid programmes) is that the country may be aligned to the EU standards only theoretically, but when you scratch the surface, the main problems may still be there, just like it happened in Romania and Bulgaria, which neither, at the time of their accession, “were believed to have yet completed the unfinished preparations for EU membership” (Trauner, 2009). It may occur that the Republic of Macedonia will accomplish the targets established by IPA II, but that does not necessarily mean it will be able to fulfill the conditions of membership and to contribute to the EU budget. Second, the name issue and the consequent Greek veto (to which now one must add also the Bulgarian rejection) are still the major reasons of the halt to the Macedonian accession, impeding the country to look forward.

Last, but definitely not least, changes have occurred in the European political scenario, especially in the last elections of the European Parliament,
which have seen a significant rise of the Eurosceptics, that make both Europeans and future-to-be Europeans doubt on the benefits of the enlargement process. As stated by Chiodi (2014) “it is glaring that the ongoing enlargement process is politically less relevant today than in the past for the EU, while the EU, with its economic and identity crisis, is less attractive to the Balkans now than ten years ago”. So on one side, we have a Macedonian reality that gradually takes distance from the European world, and on the other, there is the Commission President-elect Jean-Claude Juncker, that declares a pause in the EU’s enlargement process for the next five years: “Our citizens need a pause from enlargement so we can consolidate what has been achieved among the 28. This is why, under my Presidency of the Commission, ongoing negotiations will of course continue, and notably the Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take place over the next five years” (Juncker, 2014).

As regards the role of the other international and regional organizations in helping this country reach the European dream, it is clear that most of the organizations present in the country are actively involved, in different ways, in helping the country overcome its main obstacles in order to make it become a democratic state, competitive internationally, and closer to the European Union.

For example, the United Nations has achieved both successes and failures in the country. For two decades, it has been an associate of the Macedonian government, helping it to bring stability within the territory and social justice among its citizens, though its peacekeeping forces, namely UNPROFOR, and UNPREDEP. Through the very specific Security Council Resolution 817, regardless of the initial uncertainties due to the Greek veto, it accepted the country as a member state. Today, the UN, through Ambassador Matthew Nimetz,
Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for the talks between Athens and Skopje, is still involved in the settling of the name dispute, in view of the EU and NATO accession, for which the UN agencies and organizations are actively involved. However, so far, a solution has not been found.

NATO has also been very active in the country’s territory through its operations “Essential Harvest”, “Amber Fox”, “Allied Harmony” and “NATO Liaison Office Skopje”, and from its side, the Republic of Macedonia has showed its support through the involvement in KFOR and ISAF and its participation in the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in the Membership Action Plan. Nevertheless, despite the 2011 International Court of Justice’s judgment which recognized a violation of the 1995 Interim Accord from Greece in stopping the Macedonian entrance into NATO, NATO’s accession goes side by side the EU’s: both have not found an “happy ending” yet.

In the final part, I show how other regional and international organizations have been actively involved in the country, especially in view of the European accession process. The first one is OSCE, with its long-lasting Spillover Monitoring Mission in Skopje, an extension of the former European Community Monitoring Mission, created at the beginning to bring peace and stability in the country, then to take care of broader topics, which help bring the country to a higher level of democratization. The second is the Council of Europe, which assists the country in dealing with complicated multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society, (especially after the fragile situation of 2001 which led to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement) and with improving freedom of expression. The Republic of Macedonia can take advantage of its membership to make itself a bit closer to meeting the EU’s criteria, especially the ones of Chapters 23 and 24 of
the accession negotiations. The third international organization is the World Trade Organization. Once again, “in addition to making extensive trade-related commitments in the WTO, trade and investment policies have been oriented towards the goal of accession to the EU” (World Trade Organization Secretariat, 2013, pag. 7). Moreover, since the country became a WTO member, it has concluded five Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs), including one with the EU. The World Bank has taken a major role in IPA, taking the management of funds that have been reallocated from Component V to Component I due to the low absorption capacity of the state and has joined efforts with the European Union in assisting national bodies in better coordination of external resources and in taking out the best from donor assistance. The last international organization I examine is the International Monetary Fund, which, thanks to the cooperation with other international organizations as the World Bank, is also indirectly involved in the EU accession process, expressing concerns regarding the “Uncertainty with respect to EU accession” (International Monetary Fund, 2014a, pag. 5).

In conclusion, after all the difficulties highlighted with the ongoing IPA I and the possible way out through the future IPA II, after all the efforts of the regional and international organizations in assisting the country in achieving the European membership, we can definitely state that Macedonian’s road to accession has not been a smooth process, and the road will still be rocky. We do not know if the country will ever be ready for European membership, maybe one day it will be compliant to the acquis, even if only on paper. But today the country is not ready yet, for example, to contribute to the European budget or to successfully absorb funds, like the structural and cohesion funds, that are meant for the European member states. IPA can help, the UN or the WTO can help, but
changes cannot be imposed by an external actor, they must come from the inside. Worst than not entering the European club, is the possibility of remaining unreformed by the European accession process. However, even if the country may successfully conclude its IPA homework, I believe that this will not be enough to overcome the inescapable conditions that must be solved first: the name issue and the new Eurosceptical trend. So, is the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union just a dream or a real possibility? For the time being, it appears only a dream.


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