Hua-Yi Identity and Chinese Non-Expansion Commitment: A Study on Wars During the Early Period of Tang Dynasty

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Introduction

Long peace is not an unbelievable but a common situation in ancient East Asia. Regarding to the term, East Asia, there is far from consensus of its meaning and scope. However, most literatures relate long peace to the narrowest meaning of ancient East Asia, that is, cultural East Asia. Compared to modern long peace in the relative terms, such as the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana, Sinic Pax is different in a sense that the underlying logic and operational principle is different form modern international system. First, rather than veneration of material power, cultural achievement and superiority was more important in deciding their position in the system, which is more like constructivism’s distribution of idea than realism’s distribution of power. Furthermore, in this hierarchic relations, China not only took the gravitational role as the centricity of system but also functioned in connecting states and then weaving a network to including all states, thereby constructing an international system of self-fulfillment and self-completion in modern sense. Last, the only one way for states to join this system is acceptance of rules, norms and institutions devised and promoted by China, which were consequently confirmed as basic requirement for inclusion of ancient East Asian system.

Regarding to long peace in ancient East Asia, there are several theories and explanations. However, these theories and explanations tend to take Chinese non-expansion commitment as granted or set it as premise. Without deep research on why China was willing to constrain itself from invasion or expansion, blind acceptance of stipulation of Chinese non-expansion commitment is irrational and self-deceptive. Because it hard to image that a hegemony will not try to transform its formidable power and incomparable wealth into territorial expansion in an anarchic world, which might help to survive in the sense of defensive realism, or which might reflects its success of pursuit of power in the sense of offensive realism. All theories and explanations reduce Chinese non-expansion to premise are doomed to fall into the utopian pitfall, which idealizes and then beautifies China as benign and kind hegemony without ‘evil’ ambitions according to Chinese pacifist and inclusive rhetoric written down by proficient Confucian officials of Chinese Dynasties. In contrast with scholarship believing China’s non-expansion commitment, some scholarship focuses on Chinese expansion and then put forwards that China seldom invaded its neighbors because China was absent of capacity to do it or China could get less or even lose to do it. In the sight of this sect, Chinese non-expansion commitment is more like consolation deceiving itself of maintenance of predominance and superiority and swindle diluting its neighbors’ vigilance than reality.
Therefore, there is a crucial need to find out whether such commitment existed in ancient East Asia and to what extent that it was accepted by Chinese tributaries. In order to explain it, identity will be applied here. According to logic of determinant influence of identity to interest and indirectly to activities, this commitment existed as a result of China’s effort to conserve Hua identity, which required observation binding obligation originated from Hua-Yi identity, and this commitment would be accepted by its neighbors in different levels varying with the level of their acceptance of Yi identity. Then quantitative examination of these two hypotheses focuses on wars during early period of Tang Dynasty.

The framework of this thesis is as following. In the first chapter, East Asia will be define in terms of international system on the basis of analysis of two main definition of East Asia in terms of culture and political interaction respectively. Then, short introduction of long peace in ancient East Asia in the end of the first chapter will lead to the main questions of this thesis in the beginning of the second chapter. Regarding to numerous explanation on Chinese non-expansion commitment, I divide them into two groups. One groups labeled as rational explanation focuses on material factors and cost-benefit calculation to explain this commitment, which another group labeled as cultural explanation focuses on cultural factors, such as traditional political thoughts, common identity, hierarchic relations. On the basis of introduction and criticism of these two groups of explanations, I put forward my explanation in the third chapter. At first, I will introduce identity’s role and function in international relations and then apply ontological security to explain why identity can impose certain obligations on states. Then, I will describe Hua-Yi identity’s emergence, evolution and connotations. In the last part, I will propose my hypothesis based on two assumptions. In the fourth chapter, I will explain my methodology and design for examination of hypotheses. And concrete examination will be in the fifth chapter.

Chapter 1: Long Peace in Ancient East Asia and China’s Gravitational Role

Since entrance of 21st century, East Asia has been rising in the world as an economic and political pivotal region. Even during the Cold War, East Asia had shown its economic potential and vigor, which was reflected first by Japanese economic take-off and its surpassing federal German and then by the quick pace of development of Four Asian Tigers and Tiger Cub Economies. In addition, integration of Southeast Asia has been playing a stimulative and coordinative role in East Asia not
only during the Cold War but also to date. More importantly, since adoption of the reform and open policy, especially after the end of the Cold War, China has been rising at a marvelous and unprecedented pace and, after the new century arrived, China revitalized its economic and political status as a center, to some degree, in East Asia and even in the world, with which suspicion, worry, and fear, (Roy 1994; Roy 2003; Bernstein and Munro 1997; Friedberg 1993; Betts 1993) and welcome, expectation, and trust, (Kang 2003a; Kang 2010b; Wang 2011; Huang 2011) on the other hand, were along. Although ambivalence towards China’s rising, whether China can play a gravitational role in maintaining order and keeping peace in East Asia, as what it did in the pre-modern time, attracts increasing attentions and researches.

However, unlike recent disintegration of East Asia, it was an integrative regional system of self-fulfillment and self-maintenance in the pre-modern time, within which China had played a gravitational role. For example, after examination of implementation of treaties of the West in China and even the whole East Asia, Hamashita points out that “tribute trade system integrated East Asia as a system, and, ever further, the outside economic circle need to be included into this system before they performed commercial activities”. (Hamashita 1986: 47~50) Not only in the economic field, East Asia as a system had its shadow in the cultural and political field as well. As a result of spread of culture of China into its neighboring states, Nishijima depicts East Asia as “a cultural cycle of self-completion in which Chinese civilization was located in the center”. (Nishijima 2000: 3~5) Regarding Chinese profound political and cultural ideas and values, which were closely copied by some of its neighbors, partially experimented by others and resisted by still others, Kang delineates the common political practice of the inner core of this system (namely Korea, Vietnam and Japan), which followed the Chinese model despite the extent and depth that they realized and acquitted themselves. These sinic states not only emulated China to set up “centrally administered bureaucratic systems based on the Chinese model”, but also adopted Chinese “calendar, language, and writing system, bureaucracy and educational system”. (Kang 2012: 25~49) Furthermore, some scholars of English School have claimed that East Asia was not only an international system, but also an international society. Although it’s not easy to equate international system to international society, as Bull asserts, “certain international systems have quite clearly been international societies”, one classic example of which was “international system of China during the Period of Warring States”. (Bull 2002: 15) Since Bull only points to the era of Warring States and only in China, whether East Asia could be treated as international society as well remains ambiguous. However, once “the common feature of these historical international societies, that is a common culture or civilization,” (Bull 2002: 15) is applied to analyze ancient East Asia, it can be seen as an
international society as well for Confucianism functioned as a common culture to amalgamate East Asia into an organic fabric. Zhang and Buzan even goes further in this issue. Through application of Reus-Smit’s constitutional structures and fundamental institutions, they outlines that imperial China as an international society had three main constitutional structures, which are “promoting cosmic and social harmony as moral purpose of state, ordered (sovereign) inequality as organizing principle of sovereignty, and ritual justice as systemic norms of procedure justice,” and one fundamental institution, that is, tributary system. (Zhang and Buzan 2012: 13-19) Furthermore, this approach is accepted by other scholars as well. As Kang, for example, thinks, “within the larger tribute system, early modern East Asia operated in two very different international societies based on two different sets of rules.” (Kang 2010: 595) Contrast to the logic of construction of international society suggested by English School, Wang and Liu holds that “international society in ancient East Asia was dominated by Great Power, China, in context of absence of common culture, in which China helped to establish some kinds of functional institutions through which regional order was maintain and common culture was gradually recognized by its members in the process of interaction.” (Wang and Liu 2013: 155)

However, East Asia as a geographic and academic concept remains indistinct and controversial varying from different scholarship concerning ancient East Asia, despite it functioning as a integrated international system. Partially, it can be ascribed to the concept of East Asia per se, which was an exogenous concept envisioned by the West for the sake of differentiating and marking their global colonies. Although whether it’s reasonable to claim that this concept is “the product of self-centered division of World by the West ideologically” cannot be answered without any bias, (Wang and He 2014: 161) East Asia as a operational term is prevailing in the scholarship and daily life as well. This prevalence can be imputed not only to that most of East Asian states had not choice but to accept this exotic identity as a result of their subordinate status of colony of the western great powers,¹ but also to that this term was adapted and transformed by the political and academic elites in East Asia by which they propagated and justified their claims. (Gan 2005: 47~48) Along with acceptance and adjustment of East Asia, it is no long as the same as what it was explained by the West.

Furthermore, East Asia and China are so entangled that it’s difficult to separate one from another in analysis of inter-state relations. That is, when analyzing ancient East Asia, China is always put in

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¹ Japan was an exceptional case. Unlike the colonized states, Japan was willing to accept East Asia, as its “moving out Asia and entering into Europe” policy, in order to challenge the historically existent concept, Tianxia, and Chinese superiority. However, Japan utilized and transformed, instead of merely accepting, it on the basis of Tianxia View.
the core of East Asia, if not equal to it, thereby arousing ambiguity in analysis of ancient East Asia as an international relations. For example, although Japan is seen as a detached state from the Chinese-dominated system, it kept itself in the Chinese World Order and utilized rules and institutions to deal with its foreign relations, despite its ambivalence toward China. As Pollack notes, “the Japanese were preoccupied with China from the beginning of their recorded history.” (Pollack 1986: 3) Therefore, a clear-cut should be set up between these two concepts.

1.1 Cultural Ancient East Asia and its Chinese Origins

Ambiguity of ancient East Asia as a scholar term is embodied in its constitutive states or political units. Owing to attention to different aspects of ancient East Asia of scholars, its constituents varies from only 3 states or political units to more than 30. However, within numerous delineation of scope of ancient East Asia, two main criteria can be concluded, according to which ancient East Asia is defined and distinct from other international systems.

The most applicable criterion for definition of ancient East Asia is the common culture shared by the alleged “Confucian states”\(^2\). Ancient East Asia defined by this criterion is also call “East Asian cultural cycle” (Gao 2008: 227–236), “the Confucian space” (Kelly 2011: 414), “the inner core of the Chinese-dominated regional system” (Kang 2007: 25–29; Kang 2012: 25–53). Given this criterion’s culture-oriented nature, states within East Ancient shared the common knowledge related to Confucianism and, as a result of Confucianism’s trait that it not only included philosophical and ideological values and ideas, but, more importantly, offered a set of political principles, norms and rules to establish an ideal state “governed by a sage according to principles of ‘rites’ (Li) and ‘virtues’ (De)” (Chan 2007: 69), such Confucian states tended to established their states in the model of Confucianism. That is, they tended to share a common idea about political issues and dealt with them according to the same standards. Aside from the political preference of Confucianism, scholar-bureaucrat, who got their civil positions through deep study of Confucianism and participation of national civil-servant examination, helped to transform the Confucian ideal into practices, which, in turn, consolidated the interactive relations between culture and politics in East Asia.

Regarding to the members of East Asia, numbers of Confucian states are fluctuant chronologically.

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\(^2\) Regarding to relations between sinic culture and Japanese one, Huntington thinks they are different, but both of them are the offspring of Chinese civilization but Japanese civilization went on a way of self-construction. However, Huntington doesn’t explain what is the most different or what is similar between them. He makes Japanese civilization as a independent catalogue, in my view, partly because he tries to conciliate with “most” scholars who insists “Japanese as distinct civilization”. Furthermore, he doesn’t negate Japan’s incorporation of Confucianism. (Huntington 1996: 40–55)
However, three states, apart from China, can be seen as Confucian states constantly: Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, although Vietnam was established more later than Korea and Japan, and had been incorporated into China as a prefecture since its independence in 968. (Fairbank 1968:1; Han 2009: 53–54; Gao 2008:228) Additionally, several historically existent states can also been seen as Confucian states, such as Balhae, Ryukyu Kindom. However, unlike the classic and existing to date Confucian states, they were annihilated and then incorporated into other states. For example, Balhae, which located in the modern Northeast China, was destroyed by Liao Dynasty and eventually integrated into China. Ryukyu, a special case for research of multi-level tributary institution, was annexed by Japan and became today Okinawa prefecture of Japan. Some of these marginal states constituted the peripheral East Asia compared to the central East Asia, as a result of their unique experience and recognition of identity. (Lim 2004)

Within these states, several aspects can be concluded as embodiment and expression of this cultural criterion, based on which the Confucian states can share a sense of “we-ness”. These aspects include Chinese characters, Confucianism, statutes system, (Sinicized) Buddhism, technology, customs and conventions, suzerain-vassal relationship, emperor institution, bureaucratic system, educational system and so on. (Fairbank 1968a: 1; Feng 2004: 1–3; Gao 2008: 227–235; Kang 2012: 33–49; Nishijima 2000: 5–7; Wang 2008a; Wang 2008b) Four fundamental characteristics, inter alia, can be extracted from the above lists as the most distinctness from other cultural cycles or other international systems.

First, Chinese characters can be seen as symbol of this cultural area, one of the most obvious example of which is that this cultural cycle is also call Chinese-Character cultural cycle. (Feng 2004; Gao 2008: 238; Li and Wu 2011) Its importance is attributed to its functioning as medium. On the one hand, Chinese characters were served as universal writing language for diplomatic activities. As diplomacy in ancient East Asia took the documentary form, which was in Chinese, each interactive state, in order to maintain the relationship with China, had no choice but to use Chinese characters in completion of document and tributary ritual, despite the difficulty of learning Chinese characters for its phonography, pronunciation, one-to-one correspondence between characters and meanings. (Nishijima 1985: 7–12) On the other hand, it helped to promote domestic civilization and political progress, whose main impulse was elite. Out of doubt, writing language’s emergence started the process of civilization. With the spread and prevalence of Chinese character in East Asia, the cultural power and preference behind it had influenced these Confucian states profoundly and deeply.

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3 Sakai and Ch’en investigates dual tributary relations of Ryukyu with China and Japan detailedly and comprehensively. (Sakai 1968:112–134; Ch’en 1968: 135–164)
The case of Japan can exemplify Chinese character’s politically deep-seated imprint. Since introduction of Chinese character into Japan⁴, it functioned as official writing language not only in issuing political direction and laws, such as the momentous seventeen-article constitution authored by Prince Umayado, but also in historiography, such as Kojiki and Nihon Shoki. Furthermore, Japan started its nation-building mission by taking advantage of Chinese character, through which Japan got to know the useful experience of China and classical ideas and principles of Confucianism. Therefore, Chinese character had become “the cardinal tool for internal governance and diplomatic activities” (Zhang 2004: 137). Moreover, as “history writing [written in Chinese] became a major form of ‘boundary maintenance’ by Vietnam and Korean centers and their elites against Chinese hegemony,” (Woodside 199) Chinese characters can mitigate tension over territorial issues and thus maintain peace between sinic states.

Second, Confucianism, as the soul of Chinese civilization, played a key role in connecting these states and maintaining the hierarchic order of East Asia. Although Confucian can be traced back to the Spring and Autumn period retrospectively and its achievement as a complete school was during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period, it didn’t become mainstream of Chinese literati and achieve predominant status in all aspects of Chinese dynasties until the period of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, who accepted and carried out Dong Zhongshu’s advice, “deposition of other schools and solo veneration of Confucianism”. Confucianism has a firm preference vis-à-vis interaction between China and alien states, if not international relations, that is Hua-Yi distinction. Upholding this bias’s pivotal role in foreign affairs is rule in ritual and ideal of the “great unity”. (Chen 214–224) Regarding to ritual in the context of Confucianism, hierarchy is of most importance in regulation of relationship, from family relations as its minimal form to international, even cosmopolitan, relations as its maximum form. It requires actors to perform according to their status and position in the society. Just as Confucius’s answer to Duke Jing of Qi:

“Let the Prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father and the son a son (The Analects 1999: 131).”

In the field of international relations, it requires actors to perform according to their identity, Hua identity or Yi identity. In brief, China with Hua-hood bestows investiture and offers protection to the Yi states and, more important, civilizes them; in turn, Yi states should pay submission and tributes to China, requires China’s recognition for their succession of kingship or emperorship, use Chinese

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⁴The precise time of introduction of Chinese character remain controversial. The first officially historical record about it is “King of Na golden seal” presented by Emperor Guanwu of the Eastern Han Dynasty to one state of the temporal Japan in Jianwu Zhongyuan 2nd year (57 AD). (HHS: Vol. 85, p. 2821) And this seal was confirmed in 1784 when a farmer discovered it in Fukuoka prefecture and then was identified as genuine.
calendar and reign title. However, transformation is possible from Yi-hood to Hua-hood (this will be
discussed detailed later). And under the name of the “great unity”, Yi states will eventually be
incorporated into Chinese world order, which means Tianxia (all under the heaven) is unified.
According to this rationale, Zhao has advocated Chinese traditional worldview (the Tianxia view) as
a true cosmopolitan paradigm, which transcends the limit posed by nation-state and treats the whole
world as an integrated one. (Zhao 2005; Zhao 2009: 76–124)

Third, political institutions reflected as Confucian ideal and shaped by Chinese experience were
adopted by the Confucian states, despite of various degree and domestic modification of each state.
“China had little interest in actively exporting its own ideals and values,” as Kang points out, “this
allows the surrounding peoples and polities to contest, modify, and adapt Chinese ideas to their
ends”. (Kang 2012:25) Regarding to difference between Chinese prototype and the adaptive versions
of other Confucian states, Korean and Vietnamese emulation is closer and more similar the Japanese,
because, on one hand, Korea and Vietnam were under Chinese authority as a prefecture before their
unification or independence, and because, on the other hand, Japan was intentional to keep a
distance away from China and to stay on the sidelines of East Asian System seemingly. The most
important and adoptive political institutions, inter alia, include bureaucratic system, civil-service
examination system, statutes system, prefecture and country system and household registration. For
example, Silla, who unified Korean peninsula at the first time, initiated a wholesale reform to
embrace institutions of Tang comprehensively and actively, because Taejon Muyeol, who got his
credit for leading the unification, marveled at and then admired Tang’s prosperity and civilization
during his diplomatic mission to Tang, despite, partly, owing to his failure to ally with Koguryo one
year before his diplomatic trip to Tang and his intention to ally with Tang. (Han 2005: 48) In turn
this reform helped to suppress local powers and to establish a centralized system, which paved the
way for the later unification.

Last, Sinicized Buddhism was believed universally and persistently in these states, although it was
mixed with the local religion, such as amalgam of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism in China,
bundle of Shintoism and Buddhism in Japan. As a result of transmission of Buddhism by China,
Chinese adaption and modification was inescapable in process, and this characteristic made
Buddhism in East Asia different from its prototype. Chronologically, Buddhism was spread into

5 Japanese marginality is reflected as its sporadic and short tributary relations with China. Furthermore, Tycoon
diplomacy expressed Japanese further consideration about independence from and challenge against China under
the Hua-Yi world. (Nakamura 1974)

6 Korean admiration to China had become a distinctive character of Korean political and cultural thoughts in the
pre-modern time. The most classic example is Chosön’s Shida foreign policy, namely policy of small state waiting
upon the big one, towards Ming Dynasty. (Sun 2002; Sun 2008)
Koguryo in mid-fourth centuries firstly and into Japan in mid-sixth centuries lastly. Through the introduction of Buddhism, monks and officials could, indeed, be seen as taking diplomatic acts, for its political purposes, activities and manipulation. (Han 2009:201~205) Influence of Buddhism on Korea and Japan was heavier than on China, despite the date of introduction, because Buddhism conflicted with Confucianism and the significant political ideas and thoughts originated from Confucianism and, as a result, Buddhism suffered great restriction and even suppression in China. On the contrary, Korea and Japan, with such historical burden, treated Buddhism as state religion, and monks enjoyed a high social status and participated in politics. However, “as a result of great influence of Buddhism of Sui and Tang Dynasties and East Asian states’ adoption of Sinicized Buddhism”, just as Han says, “Buddhism had bonded East Asia together and had become the common cultural feature of it”. (Han 2009: 67)

1.2 Political Ancient East Asia and its Chinese Centricity

Another criterion for defining East Asia is political interaction between states of East Asia. That is, if there exists substantial interaction politically and such interaction influences each state’s, both internal and foreign, policy-making, these states constitute East Asia. According to it, East Asia is a regional space comprised of China Proper, Confucian states, Inner Asia, and, sometimes, Southeast Asia. As a result of this criterion’s focus on interaction with China, its members was in flux. For example, number of states during Tang Dynasty is more than it during Song Dynasty.

Compared to the cultural criterion, this criterion has its own advantages in analyzing ancient East Asia. First, if the Chinese cultural cycle were taken into consideration, it will be easy to discern, however, that Chinese foreign policy is not as reasonable and coherent as it should be. For example, after Silla unified Korean peninsula, Tang’s toleration and retreat from Pyongyang to Liaodong (in today Liaoning Province) is unbelievable since Tang had put so much military and economic resources to overthrow Koguryo and Paekche, if Tibetan military threat was neglected. 7 (Chen 1979: 328; Gao 2008: 146~147) As Fairbanks points out, “Chinese history has embraced both the Chinese People and the Inner Asian non-Chinese who have repeatedly invaded the Chinese state and society and become integral components of them (Fairbank 2006: 25).” Moreover, as Zhang insists, “China’s relations with its northern neighbors more or less constituted the core of its political history (Zhang 2009: 559).” Therefore, East Asia is not only the arena of states of Chinese Cultural Cycle

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7 Han disagrees with the western military threat and claims that, as Silla paid submission to, instead of challenging, Tang, its unification was approved by Tang, whose purpose was not to annex Korean Peninsula but to recover the order of Tianxia. (Han 2009: 272~276)
but also of numerous states interacting with each other around Chinese pivot.

Second, although steppe nomadic polities seldom adopted Chinese institutions and culture and maintained their own customs and conventions, mutual learning and, even, convergence did happen, especial in the frontier area between China Proper and Inner Asia, let alone the alien Chinese Dynasties that got themselves sinicized as a result of admiration for the splendidness and superiority of Chinese culture and in order to rule the Han nationality who outnumbered them. Unlike the clearly demarcated borders between China and other Confucian states, the frontiers between Chinese Dynasty and the nomadic polities was zones, “an ambiguous area where political control, organization, and institutions,” just as Kang writes, “gradually diminish and intermingle with other ideas, institutions, rules and peoples”. (Kang 2012: 139) Admittedly, “the frontier zone was a liminal space where cultural identities merged and shifted,” Perdue notes, “as peoples of different ethnic and linguistic roots interacted for common economic purposes”. (Perdue 2005:41) This is the reason for why the Chinese living in the frontier was seen as barbarized and discredited for a long time in Han Chinese Dynasties, and for why Chinese Dynasties were keen on delimiting an artificial borderline between itself and the outsiders, such as the Great Wall⁸, which aimed “not at keeping the nomads out but at keeping the Chinese in”. (Perdue 2005: 42)

On the other hand, that there was not learning and adoption of cultural and political ideas between the Chinese and the nomadic is not true as is thought. In Nishijima’s definition of East Asian world, unlike other cultural definition, Mongolian Plateau, Tibetan Plateau, and area between them are included for their absorption of Chinese culture. (Nishijima 2000: 4~5) And the cultural and institutional influence is not always one-way but, in the most time, two-way. That is, the Chinese had learned from the barbarian as well. For example, Tang Dynasty, one of the few Han Chinese Dynasties unifying the whole China, had absorbed institutional heritages of Northern Wei Dynasty, Northern Qi Dynasty, Western Wei Dynasty and Zhou Dynasty, which were established by Yidi (barbarian). (Chen 1979: 1~150) Regarding to the alien Chinese Dynasty, such absorption is more obvious. After exploring the origins of Qing’s Mongolian policy, Farquhar indicates that Qing conceived this policy on the basis of Mongolian innate institutions and what Qing did was just transformation and refinement of these institutions to fix them with temporary Chinese situation. (Farquhar 1968)

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⁸ The Great Wall (Chang Cheng) was first built by sinic states for defending against attacks from alien states during the Warring States period, and then unified by Qin Dynasty. Since then, there were more than 20 states involved in building or repairing the Great Wall, and the Great Wall today was masterpiece of Ming and Qing Dynasty.
1.3 Ancient East Asia as an international system under Chinese Superiority

Ancient East Asia, as an international system of self-fulfillment and self-maintenance as discussed above, should be defined as operational as possible. Therefore, ancient East Asia is an area as international system of hierarchy comprised by political units interacting with each other around China as center so deep that their internal and foreign policy-decisions are influenced by other states and sharing a common cultural recognition despite the extent varying from realization and pragmatic utilization to adoption into state-building and institution-design and sinicization.

First, ancient East Asia included not only Confucian states but also the nomadic states. Although Kang views the former as nation-states, for that “[they] have been recognized sovereign entities with power over a geographic area;” (Kang 2005:57) that is “government defined over territory with a monopoly over domestic violence.” (Kang 2010: 601) However, as nation-state is a combination of nation in ethnic terms and state in politically authoritative terms, whether people of these states in the ancient had an ethnic sense and linked it with its political construction is far from determined. Furthermore, Kang’s nation-states only include the sinic states, as a result, nomadic states being excluded, which is contrast to the definition above. Therefore, instead of applying nation-state as nature of political units in ancient East Asia, inventing a new term to describe them may be more helpful for the sake of different characters of them from modern political form of organization. According to Wang, both of them can be term “pre-national entities”, including “Kingdom, Empire, Minority Government”, for convenience of analysis (Wang 2009b). Although pre-national entities in the pre-modern were not nation-state, it did not deny their status as international actors. “States are not and never have been the only international actors;” Waltz writes, “international structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city states, empires, or nations.” (Waltz 1979: 93, 91) However, actors should meet two principles that “not only must each claim independence of any political superior for itself, but each must recognize the validity of the same claim by all the others.” (Wight 1977: 23) As these pre-national entities in the ancient East Asia, such as empire, confederation of clans, kingdom, enjoyed internal authority and independent ability of diplomacy and they recognized each other of such claim although there existed formal hierarchy, they can be treated as the primary actors in ancient East Asia.

Second, that there only exist actors doesn’t means establishment of system, because “a system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them,” as Bull notes, “and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.” (Bull 2002: 9) In ancient East Asia,
interaction between states was connected with China directly and indirectly. On one hand, Confucian states maintained their connection and political relationship, always formally suzerain-vassal relationship, with China through tributary trip to and investiture from Chinese Dynasties. Although Japanese case was something different for it abandoned this contact since the period of mid-Tang Dynasty and recovered it for a short time during the Ashigawa Shogunate, it still kept an indirect connection with China, mainly in the economic field, through third party, such as Ryukyu. On the other hand, contact between Chinese Dynasties and the nomadic states take forms of plunder from steppe and defence of China in most case, but it doesn’t exclude tributary relations between them.

Last, these pre-national entities should shared knowledge about common culture, Confucianism, to some extent like “constitutional structures” of international societies coined by Reus-Smit, regardless of whether or not they accepted it and adopted into their policy-decision and to what extent. Given degree of recognition of Chinese culture, Confucian states were more willing to accept and internalize it than the nomadic states. Nevertheless, it does not means that the nomadic states are destitute of knowledge about Chinese culture, and they, instead, absorbed it gradually and indiscernibly and were good at utilizing it to establish relations with China for the sake of trade with and request for help from China as a result of it being the only requirement and criterion for entrance into Chinese World Order. For example, Emperor Daozong of Liao viewed his state as Hua-hood by reference with Confucian standards. (Ye 2000: 76)

1.4 Long peace in ancient East Ancient and Chinese Security Commitment

There was a long peace in ancient East Asia defined above, especially in Chinese Cultural Cycle. Although it is call long peace, or the Pax Sinica, it doesn’t means that peace in ancient East Asia is continuous and without any interrupt. Looking back through history, it can be discerned that peace in ancient East Asia was intermittent, despite that duration of peace in Chinese Cultural Cycle was longer than it between China Proper and Inner Asia. However, if taking nearly 2000-year history of East Asia as a whole, long peace did exist and sporadic conflicts and confrontations within it, just like military clashes during the Cold War, didn’t change its nature.

9 After invasion of Ryukyu by Satsuma Domain, it was under Satsuma’s surveillance and acted as a transfer station between China and Japan because Japan had not right to trade with China as a result of its absence of tribute to China. In order to keep Ryukyu functioning smoothly, Satsuma not only kept a close eye on Ryukyu and manipulated its political decisions, but also hid its political supremacy over Ryukyu for fear of China’s detection. (Sakai 1968; Ch’en 1968)

10 “Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of inter-subjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action.” (Reus-Smit 1999: 30)
Peace means absence of war in its most universal form. However, regarding to that peace is a philosophical term, its meaning is also varied from different purpose. For example, peace (“heping” in Chinese) does not just means absence of war, but, more importantly, a kind of state of harmony, which resembles but transcends Kantian culture, within which “the rule of non-violence” and “the rule of mutual aid” will be obeyed, (Wendt 1999: 298–299) for harmony means not only peace and mutual help, on a hierarchic basis, between China and alien states but also harmony and integration between man and nature, that is interaction between Man and nature (tianrenganyi) (Cheng 2006; Ding 2007) On the other hand, even outside Chinese context, peace can be divided into different type from military sense to political and social sense, from philosophical sense to meta-psychological sense, such as negative peace, positive peace, interpersonal or inter-subjective peace and divine peace. (Webel 2007) As a descriptive term, peace depicts a macroscopic picture of a certain but rather vast area, such as continent, civilized area and globe. Therefore, peace is used in a relative term in most of time, such as Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, Pax Americana. That is, peace, in its relative terms, means absence of wars of large scale and acquiesce in military clashes of small scale. Therefore, long peace in ancient East Asia means absence of war of large scale and existence of military clashes of small scale in application to delineate the long peace in ancient East Asia.

In spite of this, peace is always intermingled with or subordinate to stability and security in political analysis. For example, realism values stability so much that peace loses its status as end and “war functions as a tool to maintain balance among autonomy-preferring actors” (Kelly 2011: 409). On the other hand, security dilemma can dilute the value of peace and, even, leads to misunderstanding of peace as a tool of rivals. But if a painstaking investigation is applied to analyze these three terms, it will be detected that there exits substantial difference among them notwithstanding overlap between them. Generally speaking, stability means constant state, in most cases, in terms of distribution of power in its static meaning, and means orderliness of regular change in its dynamic meaning. Security, in its broadest meaning, is the state of absence of threat. Commonality among them is absence of direct or indirect violence. And under certain conditions, such as “equilibrium of structure of international system, equality and compatibility of process of international system, corresponding institutional constraint and commitment”, (Zhou and Zhang 2004: 50–52) these terms can be included in the same context. But in most cases, they are different from each other. For example, security cannot be gained in the context of peace as a result of threat originated from asymmetric attainment of power, in other words, worries about relative powers. Likewise, stability can be lost in the context of peace owing to change in distribution of power. Furthermore, stability can heighten small and weak states’ perception of insecurity as a result of
their subordinate status.

In ancient East Asia, peace, stability and security have their distinctive expression respectively. Regarding to peace, there were few wars between pre-national entities, especially between Confucian states. According to table 1-1, not only quantity but also frequency of war in ancient East Asia remains a very low level. At average, the number of wars initiated by China intentionally per year is around 0.14 and percentage of wars between China and other states per year is around 0.57, both of which are increased by adding three periods that China had not been unified, Northern Song, Southern Song and Ming. If China is in divided state, it has no choice but to pay its all energy and resource to its internal affairs, that is unification of China, and, it, thus, cannot offer public good and maintain the regional order. As a result, there were more wars in these three divided periods. Additionally, Yuan and Qing are left out of account because both were established by non-Chinese community and held an identity as Yi-hood, which is not in the scope of analysis in this thesis.

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11 Although Ming Dynasty is usually used by scholars to analyze Tribute System, given its relations to Northern Yuan, Ming cannot be treated as unification under the context of Chinese traditions. Rather, Ming and Northern Yuan’s relations are more like the relations between Southern Song and Jin, and even the situation in Southern and Northern Dynasties. (Hu 1984)
### Table 1-1: Wars in East Asia During Han Chinese Dynasties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynasty</th>
<th>Longevity of Dynasty</th>
<th>① Wars waged by China intentionally</th>
<th>② Wars between China and other states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number (Per year)</td>
<td>Percentage (①:②)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier Han</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Later Han</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sui</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Song</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Song</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>168</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Regarding to stability, China, more precisely Chinese Dynasties irrelevant to who established, maintained its gravitational status, or hegemony in modern term, and, on the other hand, other states, regardless of the Confucian states or the nomadic states, maintained their contact through China directly or indirectly and legitimated their authority through Chinese recognition in the form of reception of investiture from China, which was more apparent in the Confucian states. Although during replacement of old Dynasty by new Dynasty, there would arouse unrest and turmoil in China Proper and chaos and instability in East Asia, Chinese gravitational role had not been changed,
despite being challenging, and other states in ancient East Asia kept their suzerain-vassal relations\(^\text{12}\) with states which claimed itself China (old dynasty or new dynasty). On the other hand, great threat was posed by the nomadic states in terms of their military capacity, which was embodied as raids and plunders in the frontier zone. However, as Perdue discovers, “it was almost never the ambition of a steppe leader to conquer China itself. Steppe leader staged raids on the Chinese frontier to plunder it for their own purpose [mainly the daily necessities].” (Perdue 2005: 520) As a result, Chinese Dynasties maintained itself as center of East Asia even under threats from the nomadic states with purpose of attainment of booty. Moreover, ancient East Asia system perpetuated stability so long that when states of ancient East Asia entered into modern international world, they feel awkward to accommodate themselves with it actively.

With respect to security, as Chinese commitment that this “dominant state will not exploit the subordinate states,” (Kang 2010: 611; Kang 2012: 62) security dilemma was a rare case in ancient East Asia. The very example for it is that Korean military might kept in a low level ever after invasion from Japan, which is unbelievable in anarchic circumstance. According to Park’s statistics, only “ten-thousand battle-worthy men”, which was the minimal requirement of domestic security and policing, was maintained by Chosŏn. (Park 2006: 6) This anomaly seems go against the western traditions. In the Westphalia System characterized by anarchy, equal states fall into security dilemma for subsistence because there is no authority to protect them and they have not choice but to increase their might to against the potential invader. However, same rationale as common sense shared by all states leads to arms races and consequently heavier insecurity with more arms. In order to get rid of security dilemma, several resolutions were envisaged, such as balance of power, international institutions, global democracy, and so forth. On the contrary, ancient East Asia is a hierarchic system, which emphasized “formal hierarchy among states,” as Kang indicates, “while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war (Kang 2003a: 67; Kang 2010a: 54).” Kang only points out one side of the coin and another side is that China functioned as a blocked zone between the Confucian states and the nomadic states, by

\(^{12}\) Suzerain-vassal relations is not the perfect term to describe the relationship between China and its tributary states, for vassals, in Chinese political and philosophical context, can be seen as independent sovereign states, although they need to get Chinese recognition to legitimate their regime. But such recognition cannot influence legitimacy of tributary states, despite it of great importance in the establishment period of the regime. Furthermore, China has not substantial power to intervene the tributary states’ internal or foreign affairs. Last, and more important, relations between China and tributary states are based on the relations between emperor of China and head of tributary states, regardless of their title, such as King, Khanate, Tiannou (emperor in Japanese). That is, relations between China and its tributary states are, more precisely, individual relationships between two head of states, and it is, in nature, monarch-subject relationship. (Gao 2008: 20~23)
which threat from the nomadic states was diluted and consequently the Confucian states’ perception of security was heightened.

Although peace, stability and security have their own expression and manifestation respective, they cannot be analyzed separately for strong ties bonding them together. On one hand, peace was the result of maintenance of stability and security, which diluted and even removed motives to wage a war. On the other hand, peace provided clear evidence to persuade China’s neighbors to believe that security dilemma could be resolved by then norms and institutions with Chinese origins and characteristics. In sum, peace, stability and security are overlapped and fused when discussing long peace in ancient East Asia.

Chapter 2: Chinese commitment of Non-Expansion

In order to preserve such a long peace in a so vast area, given the basis nature of ancient East Asia being hierarchy under anarchy, China, as a hegemon, not only need to restrain itself from exploiting the lesser states, but also should bear its responsibility to mediate conflicts between the lesser states. The latter is well discussed under the title of “tribute system”, which functions not only in political and economic ways but also in cultural, intelligent, technological and educative ways. Through tribute institution\(^\text{13}\), China, on one hand, can buy in its neighboring states to pacify its frontier and, intentionally or unintentionally, mediate dispute and conflicts between its neighbors as an authoritative adjudicator, and, on the other hand, its neighboring states, especially nomadic states, can got what they need at a low cost compared to plunder China, despite suffering formal subordinate status, classic example of which is kowtowing unacceptable for the western counterparts when they first arrived China, and secure Chinese protection and military assistance, such as Ming’s military aid for Chosŏn against Japan in the Imjin War. However, when public good provided by hegemonic China was saturated with discussion and surely criticism, the former seldom attracts scholar’s attention, even though the former is more significant and fundamental to the long peace in ancient East Asia than the latter. Trying to imagine that China is an expansive state with a never insatiable desire to expand its territory as far as possible and to gain power as much as possible, just like German during the WWII, how this long peace can survive? Imagining once more that China is an arbitrary and unilateral hegemon so that it can wage war to subject the disobedient subordinates, just like U.S.A., though “constrained” by the so-called established international institutions and

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\(^{13}\) Tributary practice and its related regulations, rules, norms and organizations in this thesis will be termed “tribute institution” rather than “tribute system”, because tribute institution is one of several fundamental institutions originated from and embodied as Hua-Yi view, which ensures smooth functioning of ancient East Asian system as its purpose.
organizations, how these institutions conserving the long peace can function and play a role?

However, some disagree and claims that all states in ancient East Asia were vassals of China and lacked sovereignty so that the only thing they could do was revere and obey China, and China, on the other hand, as a suzerain, is “the sole source of legitimate authority, confers status on the rest and exacting tribute or other marks of deference.” (Wight 1977: 23) Therefore, the above questions are no questions any more because states are not sovereign states but rather Chinese vassals. China had not need to invade its vassals because they were all under Chinese authority regardless of extent to which they accepted and recognized Chinese superiority. Although nation-states advocated by Kang is rejected for its anachronistic appliance and difficulty to prove the relations between ethnic nation and political state, that states in ancient East Asia can be treated as sovereign state should never be suspected. On one hand, each state had absolute authority to decide its internal and foreign policy, though more like autocracy, because China’s influence over its tributary states is more like formal and ritual than that of substance and politics. On the other hand, each of them recognizes and, to some extent, respects others’ authority. Even though China enjoyed a superior status and subjected its tributary states, political ties only existed between two heads of states, which is uniqueness of hierarchy in ancient East Asia and is called “personal relations of hierarchy between emperor and its ‘subject’” (discussed later), and, as a result, these personal hierarchic relations didn’t imperil sovereignty of states.

After clarifying sovereign nature of states in ancient East Asia, the above two questions were unavoidable desperately. Key to unravel these mysteries is the former requirement of long peace, that is, Chinese commitment of non-expansion. Once this commitment is proved efficient and perpetual, long peace will be explained from the basis. However, such commitment of non-expansion is taken for granted by some scholars. As Kang thinks, for example, “as long as the barbarian states were willing to kowtow to the Chinese emperor and show formal acceptance of their lower position in the hierarchy, the Chinese had neither the need to invade these countries nor the desire to do so.” (Kang 2005: 57) Furthermore, “with the restoration of order in China conflict among the peripheral states ceased, and intraregional relations remained relatively peaceful for several hundred,” as Kang put it more general, “the dominant power had no need to fight, and the secondary powers had no desire to fight.” (Kang 2003a: 176) From Kang’s rhetoric, it can be concluded that once China receives its neighboring states’ recognition and enthrone it as the common leader in the Tianxia, which is mainly reflected by sending tribute, China will fell so satisfactory that it has no desire to expanse its influence and even to enlarge its territory. However, it’s without ample evidence to prove whether this psychological satisfaction really matters in dealing
with foreign relations. And if so, it is at odds with Chinese military practice. For example, although Koguryo had paid its submission to Sui and Tang, it could not escape from these two dynasties’ punitive expedition, if not expansive war. Similar cases are beyond count and will not listed here. The importance of these counter-examples reminds us not to postulate that China was so benign that it only needs formal and ritual achievement but abandons material and substantial benefit. That is, Chinese commitment of non-expansion is not an independent variable but a dependent variable of need to be questioned and explained.

According to above consideration of Chinese non-expansion commitment, several questions listed below remain unsolved, and to some extent are neglected intentionally by international relations scholars. First, what factors leaded China to make and observe this commitment? Second, how creditable was this commitment? Third, did creditability of this commitment vary with some elements, such as types of pre-national entities? Fourth, how did this commitment function in dealing with foreign affairs and, more importantly, military conflicts? Fifth, whether or not did this commitment experience evolution during era of imperial China? If so, what was this evolution and what influence and consequence did this evolution bring about? Sixth, how did this commitment disappear in the pre-modern time? Last, whether or not dose this commitment still has an impact on contemporary China? Given the length of this thesis and capacity of author, only the first four questions will be discussed and the last three, unfortunately, will be omitted, however, with hope that all these questions will be studied detailedly and systematically some day.

2.1 Rational Explanation

Although there exist numerous evidences that can be extracted from “the historical field of data”, some still stresses China indeed wanted to invade its weaker neighbors but it cannot do that as a result of capacity, or if it do that, cost will outvalue benefit. As Acharya notes, “The Chinese did acknowledge the status of overseas rulers whom they could not subjugate by force. … Against lesser states, the Chinese did not refrain from threatening or using force (Achaya 2003: 154).” With resort to cost-benefit calculation, Cohen holds, “With lesser power, when they perceived force to be effective, as with the Zungaris and Nepalese, they did not refrain from applying it as ruthlessly as circumstances required. When their estimates were wrong, as in Burma and Vietnam, they did not hesitate to accept face-saving solutions and cut their losses (Cohen 2000: 243–244).” All these explanations and similar ones will be termed as “rational explanation” for its emphasis on material power and ration of benefit to cost.
2.1.1 Destitute of Capacity

Although China possessed so great power and might that it can maintain its superiority and dominance for nearly 2 millennia, it doesn’t mean that China can defeat any disobedient states, overturn their government, enslave their subjects and even incorporate them into Chinese territory. Regarding to geographic obstacle around China, “there were no ‘natural’ limits to China,” as Perdue points out, “in this direction [Inner Asia], despite the towering peaks dividing east and west Turkestan,” (Perdue 2005: 24) and Chinese maritime capacity make it easy to cross its surrounding ocean to reach Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and even, at farthest, India, Western Africa. For example, according to Xiong’s calculation, according to accommodation of 6~7 hundred passengers of each Tang’s ship there were at least 725 ships carrying 100 thousand soldiers, 30 thousand land force in at least 350 ships and 70 thousand navies in at least 375 ships during Tang’s expedition against Paekche. (Xiong 2002: 19) In addition, according to Zhuang’s analysis, shipbuilding industry reached a high level in Song and Yuan Dynasty, in terms of scale and quantity of ships, large ship, for example, with weight of 5~6 hundred tons and accommodation of 5~6 hundred passengers, and it’s not only for military purpose but also for private and commercial purpose. (Zhuang 2005: 71) Therefore, as China possessed so substantial maritime might and carrying capacity, let alone Ming and Qing Dynasty, whose maritime capacity can be reflected by Admiral Zheng He’s seven times maritime adventure, there didn’t exist formidable water obstacle imposing restrictions on Chinese maritime expansion. In sum, there was no intractable natural barrier restraining China from expansion not only to Inner Asia but also to its overseas neighbors.

Even though China can march westwards and northwards and sail eastwards and southwards, it doesn’t mean China is sufficient to expand its influence to and even annex these areas, because the following two factors bottle up its capacity of expansion: supply of horses and insufficiency of logistics. First, supply of horses was a serious issue in ancient time, especially for China that had to utilize horse for distant projection of army and, in some cases, logistical transportation. However, as China was a sedentary agricultural states whose economy depended on farming and, as a result, less attention could be paid to horse-breeding. Just as Perdue says, “the horse was … essential element in warfare which the sedentary civilizations could not breed in sufficient numbers for their own needs.” (Perdue 2005: 34) Although horses were always in a situation that demand exceeded supply, given horses importance in military field as weapon for cavalry, tools for transportation, communication and investigation, and threats posed by its western nomads coveting China’s property, horsy policy was in a top range of internal affairs, especially military policy, one example of which was that there
was a special chapter regulating horses and its related issues. “There was no ruler of Central Plains with outstanding capacity in Chinese history,” as Ma points out, “underestimating policy of horses.” (Ma 1983: 78) Regarding to such precious resource, Chinese Dynasties tried its best to get horses as more as possible in 2 main ways. One is breeding horses by officials of Chinese Dynasties (nation-breeding horses) and by individuals living on horse-breeding (private-breeding horses), though the latter not being legal all the time. In order to breed horse of considerable quantity with competent quality, ensuring ample pasture with advantage for grazing is the most important issue of horsy policy and other issue of similar importance is corresponding policies and institutions. On the other hand, once nation-breeding horses is sufficient for military and logistical purpose, private horse-breeding will be banned, which will be abolished by open-minded emperors, though unusually. Another one is purchase of horses from its nomadic neighbors, which seems not a profitable enterprise compared to breed horse by China itself. However, “the trade of products of horses,” as Perdue indicates, “seemed advantageous to both sides [China and nomadic states].” (Perdue 2005: 35) Taking Tang for example, during emperor Taizong and emperor Gaozong, horse-breeding reached a peak in ancient China compared to, antecedently, Han Dynasty and, subsequently, Northern and Southern Song Dynasties. According to Ma’s calculation, there were “at least 1 million horses” held by Tang (Ma 1983: 80). However, waning had been in process since it, though a recovery interrupting, and horses were in serious shortage from mid-Tang onwards, and this situation even “lasted to Five Dynasties period without any hope of revitalization” (Du 1998: 65). Facing such shortage, purchase of horses from its neighboring states, especially nomadic states in the northwest, was a main avenue to attain horse, but price of horse increased as the demand of horse increased. For example, one horse was cost from 40 or so bolts of silk in mid-Tang to 66 or more bolts of silk in Five Dynasties (Du 1998: 67). If vicissitude of horsy situation is compared to Tang’s trans-border military practice, surprising correlation will be found that, since supply of horse turned out to be in shortage, Tang had stopped its military expeditions despite internal factor that might be another important factor.

On the other hand, destitute of logistical capacity was more like a matter of success and fail in a fundamental sense than shortage of horses that crippled army’s strength, especially cavalry’s capacity of assault and penetration. After analyzing Han’s logistical operation, Liu concludes six types of logistical supply by land, that is, “supply from rear through transportation, carrying supply by expeditionary force, self-sufficiency through tun tian (agricultural garrisons), feeding horses on the spot, attainment of food by plunder of enemy, and purchase in military market (Liu 2010: 252–254).” Additionally, shipment of war material and food was another important method of
military logistics with advantages compared to transportation by land, that is, “larger freight volume, less labor requirement, lower transportation cost” (Shangguan and Wen 2004: 10). Despite diversity of methods of military logistics, logistical capacity and cost was still a question constraining Chinese expansive ambitions in ancient China, though in its most prosperous and powerful times. During Emperor Qianlong of Qing Dynasty, a time of peace, order and prosperity in Chinese history, rebellion in Vietnam influenced China adversely and China had decided to send an expeditionary force to help Vietnam Court to suppress it. After arriving in Hanoi successfully, given cost of logistics, Qianlong rejected the suggestion of Sun Shiyi, commander of this expedition, to march forwards the base of rebels who escaped to their southern bases as soon as arrival of Qing’s army (Lam 1968). Generally speaking, just as Perdue notes, “from the Han Dynasty up to the mid-Qing, no Chinese army could last more than ninety to one hundred days in the steppe. … Nomad military strategy take advantage of the logistical limitations of Chinese steppe incursions (Perdue 2005: 40).”

Although shortage of hoses and incapacity of logistics indeed existed in China historically and periodically, it cannot be exaggerated so much that China is treated as lack of capacity for expansion. In reality, when China was in its powerful and prosperous times, mainly during the first several decades after the establishment of dynasties, China possessed so formidable and availably military might and prowess that it could unify all China, defense against nomadic assaults and plunders, and even put them back or incorporate them. However, vicissitude of state is something inevitable no matter due to internal conflicts or external expression, even though the former was always the key to explain Chinese case. Likewise, China suffered waning in fact and when waning of China started, China retreated its influence and concentrated of military force from the ambiguous frontier zone on clear borderline conceived by China that demarcated itself from its nomadic neighbors. These seemingly defensive actions reflected decline Chinese confidence for projecting its military existence and influence in a mass scale as a result of consideration about its financial bearing capacity, military cost and burdensome internal affairs, but, given Chinese vast territory, efficient bureaucratic system and vigor economy, it didn’t negate Chinese ability to wage an expedition of rather considerable scale against certain enemies. For example, in 1590s, Japan waged two campaigns against Chosŏn in order to defeat and invade China by trooping through Chosŏn. At that time, Ming Dynasty had suffered a rather long time of decline compared to its establishing era and confronted serous threats or conflicts from diverse dimension, such as Mongols and Burma, it could also send massive military assistance to Korea in Ijim war (1592~1598). After Chinese giant military might and Korean people’s struggle, Japan was eventually defeated thoroughly and expelled from Chinese World Order. Similar cases are countless in East Asian history and will not listed any more
here, but what these cases means, important to this thesis, is that China had not suffer absolute
insufficiency of hardware, such as supply of horses, logistics and fighting capacity, and its
contraction of projection of power mainly reflected its prudence of financial pressure originated
from massive military activities but not its complete loss of expansive capacity.

2.1.2. Tribute-Trade Exchange

Except for destitute of capacity of expansion, tribute was treated as alternative reason for Chinese
non-expansion commitment, although it, to some extent, was a result of Chinese lack of expansive
might and calculation of cost and benefit. Fairbank, *inter alia*, offers a classic model of tribute
system. According to Fairbank, “China’s foreign relations were suzerain-vassal relations conducted
through the ancient forms of tributary system. … All types of international intercourse, if they
occurred at all in the experience of China, were fitted into the tributary system --- spying out the
enemy, seeking allies and all manner of negotiations (Fairbank: 1942: 129, 137).” And this tribute
system extended its influence as long as the first several decades after China was forced to “join”
and “accept” the treaty system as a result of Chinese defeat in the first Opium War (Fairbank 1968b),
and even influenced the modernization of East Asia which is thought by most scholars as a result of

Precisely, Chinese tribute system included two aspects, tribute and trade. Just as Fairbank and
Têng points out, “in practice, it [tributary system] had a very fundamental and important commercial
basis, and it served as the medium for Chinese international relations and diplomacy (Fairbank and
Têng 1941: 137).” Therefore, Fairbank’s knowledge about tribute system can be simplified as
tribute-trade exchange. However, regarding to the nature of tribute system, it can be defensive,
offensive and even stable. As “to be used by the rulers of China for political ends of self-defense
(Fairbank and Têng 1941: 137),” tribute system, in nature, can be treated as some kind of buy-in
policy that China bestowed gifts and, more importantly, sanctions on the tributaries and the
tributaries, in turn, ceased to plunder and invade Chinese frontiers. Defensive feature of tribute
system was added by neo-Confucianism that was influenced so deeply by Southern Song’s bitter
and humiliated suffering from its beastly but formidable counterpart, Liao Dynasty and later Jin Dynasty,
to its north that neo-Confucianists turned to an isolative and exclusive foreign policy in order to cut
off potential threat hiding in the international relations and accepted costs of buying in its tributaries
in order to tame them to observe Chinese superiority according to Chinese rules and norms.
However, just as Fairbank expounds, “the [tribute] system could be used by China for defense quite
as much as for aggression. Broadly speaking under the Sung it appears to have been used mainly on
the defensive, while under the Mongols it served for expansion and under the Ch’ing it promoted stability in foreign affairs (Fairbank 1942: 137).” It means that through tribute system, China can achieve its ends of expansion, though, in the form of the tributaries paying submission and thus tribute, as a sign of its submission, to China. For example, Admiral Zheng He’s maritime expedition can be treated as a classic example for China’s expansion of its tributary sphere. Although what factors encouraging Emperor Yongle of Ming Dynasty to unleash such an unprecedented and magnificent maritime adventure remains controversial, but, “as a direct result,” implied by Wang, “these states visited by Zheng were incorporated into Chinese World Order officially (Wang 1968),” a sign of which was their submission of tribute brought back with the fleet.

Regarding to tributary system, China and its counterparts, the tributaries, had different interests, based on which tribute system operated successfully so that East Asia System remained rather stability. On one hand, China needed to get legitimacy required necessarily to prove its ruler’s status as the son of heaven, who received appointment from the heaven to rule the secular world, from its neighboring states, states far from China but acknowledged by China, and even states that China had not known before. “Tribute had prestige value in the government of China,” as Fairbank notes, “where prestige was all-important tool of government (Fairbank 1942: 135).” On the other hand, what matters in the view of tributary states was sanction of trade by China through which they could get necessities and make profit. As Fairbank unravels, “That tribute was a cloak for trade has been a commonplace … in the minds of the tribute bearers, [tribute] was merely a formality connected with trade (Fairbank and Têng 1941: 139, 140).” In brief, tribute-trade exchange of tributary system functioned through that China tamed its neighboring states lacking rite to observe Chinese ritual that represented Chinese cultural supremacy, through which Chinese Dynasty got itself legitimized internally as orthodox one supported by the heaven and internationally as ruler of the secular world appointed by the heaven, and alien states accepted Chinese requirement, such as submission, tribute, adoption of Chinese reign-title, that is calendar, Chinese character and so on, which was treated as some kind of acceptable ceremony of economic intercourse, given its tremendous profit, without any political or cultural discrimination.

Without doubt, tribute-trade exchange model also attracted numerous criticisms inevitably, such as “its over-emphasis on Sinocentrism, its incapacity to explain Chinese aggressive ambition for expansion, and its exclusive attentions to sinic states (Zhang 2009: 554–560).” However, what need to be pointed out here is that this paradigm makes little contribute to explain why Chinese non-expansion commitment was creditable for its neighbors, although it can explain the reason for why China would make such commitment that what China required was legitimacy gained by
tributaries submission and recognition. Historically, expansion was not a rare notorious offence committed by Chinese Dynasties and it was well known by its neighbors. Regarding to Chinese aggression, “expansion and conquest were not alien specialties of the so-called ‘conquest dynasties’ such as the Yuan and Qing,” as Zhang points out, “but also essential skills of Han Chinese Dynasties like the Qin, Han, Tang, Song, and Ming (Zhang 2015: 5).” Given such bloody but fresh experience, it’s very difficult to suppose Chinese commitment would possesses so high creditability unless its neighbors were all irrational in dealing with their foreign affairs, a matter of life or death. Although this paradigm can be defended plausibly that it was built on a defensive basis that China needed to isolate itself from its belligerent neighbors in case of their attacks, Fairbank and the followers of this paradigm mainly apply it to explain the international intercourses during Ming and Qing Dynasties that was two period of China featured by prosperity, splendidness and powerfulness, which is obviously contrary to its basis. Although trade’s importance to Chinese Dynasties, which always neglected and degraded trade rhetorically, was proved by increasing scholarship (Deng 1997; Kang 2005: 65~71; Kang 2012: 107~138), whether tribute is in reality the cloak of trade and whether, more fundamentally, trade is embedded in tribute in its prototype remain disputed and such controversy cannot be solved in the foreseeable future. For example, as Chen specifies, “there existed reverse force, that is, increasing trade with the thriving of tribute and investiture, in traditionally Hua-Yi international Order. … Pursuit for material profit gradually overwhelmed the care for the value of ritual. [As a result,] Tribute and investiture was losing its original meanings increasingly and Hua-Yi international order was in the process of declining (Chen 1996: 220, 222).”

### 2.2.3 Cost-Benefit Calculation

Although tribute-trade paradigm retains some features of cost-benefit calculation, there are some distinct and decisive differences between them. The most different one between them is that the former is based on Chinese defensiveness, regardless of its sporadic aggressiveness, and Chinese material power and emphasizes both cultural and material interest, but the later is based on merely on Chinese material power and merely pays attention to material profits which are calculable. However, between them lies similarity that what both take into account mainly is both sides’ interest and comparison of bilateral power instead of mere cultural superiority centricity of China.

As a sedentary state, cost of waging a war was expensive for ancient China in practice, not only given costs related to mobilization, projection, logistics and supply, but also given how to assemble nationwide resources and to utilize them. As Bang describe thrillingly, “there was nothing like military operations drain away imperial revenue and thus threaten the creation of the desired surplus
Moreover, unlike nomadic states that waged predatory wars against China for purpose of booty, China would not get so much that the cost of waging a war could be made up even though China defeated its enemies successfully and incorporated their lands, which meant little to China for these land was not suitable for farming. And it was well considered in ancient China. As Ban Gu, a historian of Later Han Dynasty, writes in Han Shu, “the land is not suitable for cultivation and thus not able to be harvest, and the people of that area is not able to governed (Ban 1964: 3834).”

According to same logic, Zhou Fangyin applies game theory to explain how stability was maintained as a result of strategic interaction between China and peripheral states, although his theory is based on Chinese advantageous power and Chinese defensive nature. According to Zhou, China has two kinds of strategies, that is conciliatory policy and punitive expedition, and peripheral states have two kinds of strategies as well, that is harassment and submission. Therefore, there are four types of interactions between them, that is A (China, conciliatory; peripheral states, harassment), B (China, conciliatory; peripheral states, submission), C (China, punitive expedition; peripheral states, harassment), D (China, punitive expedition; peripheral states, submission). In order to make it calculable, each type of interaction is assigned to certain value, that is A (x,2), B (2,1), C (-1,-2) and D (0,-1). On the side of peripheral states, A is the most valued strategy for them but they need to run a risk from the uncertain x. Moreover, C is the most unfavorable strategy for them because they will lose most under this strategy. On the other side, B is the most desirable strategy for China and acceptable, up to a point that there is no loss, for peripheral states. However, which is the most unfavorable strategy remains ambiguous for x is a critical value of, though, uncertainty. Therefore, this strategic cycle starts from A and China will accept it until x surpasses -1, loss of which is brought about by punitive expedition waged by China. The value of x is accumulative with increase of number, frequency and scale of peripheral states’ harassment. That is, if peripheral states maintain their harassment under a certain frequency and scale, up to a point that China believes that these raids and plunders are less costly than punitive expedition, A can be kept on for a rather long time, just as Ming-Mongol relations. However, once harassment’s cost is considered larger than expedition, China will wage a war, without any doubt, to punish its bad-mannered neighbors and to recover peace and stability in its frontiers. According to Zhou’s assumption, such punitive expeditions will definitely successful owing to Chinese supremacy of power and peripheral states will rethink their relations with China and then change to pay submission in order to reduce loss. However, D is abnormal case and transient for Chinese defensiveness. As Zhou explains, “this [D] causes China to shift to a conciliatory policy. D represents a short-term, transitional phase in the
bilateral relationship (Zhou 2011: 153).” Consequently, D will turn into B inevitably, after which there are two ways, one being that B is retained and other one being that B will turn into A and whole cycle will operate again. (Zhou 2011)

The most classic model of cost-benefit calculation, offered by Zhou, unravels that China needs to compare cost of initiation of war and that of buy-in, in the form of peace-making marriage, bestowal of gifts, sanctions of trade and so on, before it makes a decision. Only China can get more benefits dose it wage a war. According to the same logic, Chinese non-expansion commitment can be explained as China believes that benefits from expansion are less than from status quo. Admittedly, land of nomadic states is useless, in Chinese view, for cultivation and nomadic people are so rude and discourteous that China cannot govern and educate them. However, it cannot explain why China abandons its ambition for the sinic states whose land is suitable for agriculture, given the facts that China had incorporated them several times. Moreover, as nomadic lands, though not suitable for farming, are fertile for horsy cultivation, given horse’s importance for military, it seems irrational to give up annexing these lands. Last but not least, although cost-benefit calculation seems rational and scientific for it provide a calculable perspective, as Zhou’s game theory, there exists fundamental and even essential defect that the underlying assumptions are taken as granted to support valuation of certain strategies but these assumptions are far from consensus.

2.2 Cultural Explanation

Although rational explanation offers plausible interpretations about Chinese non-expansion commitment seemingly scientifically and falsifiably, it only opens a window of this antique mansion of ancient East Asia, which is more featured by culture instead of mere material. As Zhang and Buzan’s criticism against Zhou’s instrumental analysis of stability of tributary system, “this is a tributary system, so to speak, without soul (Zhang and Buzan 2012: 7).” According to the same logic, rational explanation can be blamed for its pursuit for totally value-free but loss of core of issue owing to its myopic concentration on the façade of ancient East Asia merely.

Unlike rational explanation, cultural explanation pays more attention to Chinese culture, philosophy and traditions in order to find out the internal factors that determine China’s strategic view. Within cultural explanation, some emphasize Confucian ideal about just war, others emphasize Confucianism functioning like democracy in creating ‘we-ness’ within Confucian states, and still others emphasize Confucianism offering rules, norms and institutions of a hierarchic international system. Although emphases varies, Confucianism as a shared culture by sinic states and, up to a point, nomadic states can be seen as the key to explain Chinese commitment of non-expansion.
2.2.1 Confucianism’s Prudence on War

Although it’s difficult to elucidate whether Confucianism’s prudence on war is the product of summary and calculation about costs and profits of war between China and its counterparts, such prudence indeed existed in the form of just war in ancient China. As Ni points out, “Confucian ideas on war and violence have two levels, the ideal and the practice. … In an ideal society, there are no violent phenomena, including war. … [Confucius] endorses the idea of ‘war to restore the ritual order’ in the real world (Ni 2007: 206~207).” In Confucian view on great power, there are three types, that is true kingship based on moral and ethical leadership, hegemony based on formidable power and strategic candour as a result of its inferiority of moral and ethical power compared to kingship, and might based on material power. And each type of great power leads unique state of international order. That is, under true kingship, international order is peace and stable; under hegemony, relations between great power and its allies are peace and stable but relations between great power and non-allied states are chaotic; under might, international order is chaotic, just as in the state of nature. (Yan 2008) Admittedly, neither ideal world nor true kingship was a fact of pre-modern China but rather a utopia pursued by successive aspirational scholar-bureaucrats who got promoted through deep study on Confucianism and a myth weaved by constant historians and officials of Chinese Dynasties in order to keep Chinese superiority and identity intact, but such ideal had its imprint on Chinese strategic selection and decision about foreign policy and military activities.

A debate about whether official monopoly of salt and iron should be abolished, which can be seen as a cloak of whether Han’s aggressive policy against Xiongnu should be changed, on the Court of Han Dynasty provides a classic example about how Confucian ideal of war was incorporated into state affairs and especially its foreign affairs. Huan Kuan, a official of Han Dynasty, recorded this bitter but influential debate in Yan Tie Lun (On Salt and Iron). On this debate, officials of Han Court, leaded by Sang Hongyang, in order to maintain monopoly policy, insisted the importance of military activities for protection of national security. For example, official says, “Emperor Wu evaluated the might of alien states and calculates the strength of barbarian army. As they were weak and easy to defeat, military expedition against them is both efficient and successful (Huan 1992: 79).” On the other hand, unlike officials who represented legalism, Confucian literati downplayed military expansion and, instead, condemn military activities’ adverse effects, such as social unrest, heavy taxation, ignorance of cultivation, etc. Regarding to foreign relations, literati insisted the importance of morality (de), benevolence (ren) and education (jiaohua). For example, “army is instrument
boding for tragedy and misfortune. And sturdy shield and sharp weapon will bring about unrest and chaos for the world. Like mother taming her children, great power should treat foreign states morally so that they can requite a favor with favor, which can last for a long time (Huan 1992: 557).”

Theoretically, Confucian insists that great power should concentrate on moral and ethical power in dealing with foreign states so that they can pay submission to China voluntarily and gradually be acculturation. In Confucian world, there is no boundary between China and foreign states because all states should be submitted to emperor, the son of Heaven, who bears responsibility appointed from the Heaven to govern the world. However, this is the ultimate phase, before which China should spread its morality and ethics so that foreign states can get to know Chinese cultural superiority and thus submit to China. That is, “if such a state of affairs exists, yet the people of far-off lands still do not submit, then the ruler must attract them by enhancing the prestige of his culture; and when they have been duly attracted, he contents them (Analects 1999: 187).” Within this process, violence or force doesn’t have their place. As Chan concludes, “while Confucianism has a strong element of cultural elitism, it has no advocacy of brutal suppression or forceful domination of the ‘inferior’ by the ‘superior’ cultural group (Chan 2007: 76).”

However, before the world was incorporated by Chinese culture, there exists wars and confrontations. Regarding to them, “the highest aim of Chinese strategy is ‘breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting’ (Ni 2007: 206).” However, the highest aim was always invalid in the history of relations between China and its neighbors so that war was not rare situations in practice. In order to justify wars, Confucianism believes just war can be utilized as a legitimate instrument. As Zhang notes, “Confucianism, in fact, never renounced force as a legitimate instrument of statecraft for waging ‘appropriate wars’ in the form of punitive expedition (Zhang 2015: 6).” Unlike just war in the view of western part, as Stroble warns, “war for the Chinese, then, is not justified by the necessity for creating public order, but is in itself a sign of the failure to achieve such an order (Stroble 1998: 165).” Furthermore, just war should meet the following conditions, concluded by Bell, “that the ‘conquerors’ must try to liberate people who are being oppressed by tyrants, that the people must demonstrate, in concrete ways, the fact that they welcome their conquerors, that punitive expeditions must be launched by rulers who are at least potentially virtuous, and that the leader of justified punitive expeditions must have some moral claim to have the world’s support (Bell 2007: 235–237).” However, rather than liberating the oppressed people, in Confucian tradition, punitive expedition is more like punishment imposed by the son of Heaven on disobedient foreign rulers, who don’t fulfill their duties as vassals of China to govern their states and educate their subjects, so that they can rectify themselves and carry out their duties. That is, “the most serious punishment is
imposed by army (Wu, Hu and Li 1994: 122).” This corrective expedition is not only applied to the tributaries, but also applied to the states without tributary relations with China. Just as Gao observes, “when China maintain the order of Tianxia, theory that loss of ritual leads to punitive expedition is applicable in the area of outside vassals regardless of whether Jimi (loose rein) protectorate was established (Gao 2008: 59).”

Additionally, Johnston has put forward a more operational explanation about Chinese strategic culture. In his definition, strategic means “an integrated ‘system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious’ (Johnston 1995a: 46).” Types of strategic culture are ranked by three variables, that is “frequency of conflict in human affairs, zero-sum nature of conflict and efficacy of violence (Johnston 1995a: 46–47)”. Within it, there are two classic types of strategic culture, one of which standing for realism is “hard realpolitik” or “the parabellum paradigm” and another of which standing for culturalism is “soft idealpolitik” or “the Confucian-Mencian paradigm”. The former one holds that conflict is inevitable, that conflict is a zero-sum game, and that the most effective way to deal with threat is utility of war; and the latter one holds a diametrically contrary standpoint that war is not only escapable but also not zero-sum game and the most effective way to tackle with threat is not using force. In order to find out Chinese strategic culture, Johnston review the Wu Jing Qi Shu (Seven Military Classics), and 120 Ming memorials about its Mongol policy and three military treaties. And he figures out that although anti-realpolitik culture is implied by Chinese traditional literature about strategic thoughts and practices, offensive strategic culture dwarfs defensive and accommodationist ones and this realpolitik was not only persistent from pre-Qin era up to Ming Dynasty but also influenced Ming’s strategic decision. Furthermore, Johnston ascribes Chinese flexibility between offensiveness to quan bian (observe the change), which means that China will display its offensiveness when it has material advantage but when its power declines it chooses to cloth it with defensiveness. (Johnston 1995b)

Regarding to ascription of Chinese non-expansion commitment to Confucian ideal on war, it’s not easy to verify it through scientific method as a result of its cultural orientation. For example, Johnston makes an intriguingly tentative attempt to prove that Chinese defensiveness is some kind of myth instead of fact in a rather scientific way. However he was crowed with numerous criticisms in no time. Loh criticizes that his choice of military texts for analysis and of the Ming Dynasty as the
date is “in-build bias” and his conclusion of grand strategy of China is invalid for the sources referred by him is predate emergence of China (Loh 2008: 284–288). Zhu and Zhou tries to overturn Johnston’s conclusion that Chinese strategic culture is realpolitik by statistic of military data of 8 Han Chinese Dynasties, which shows a different picture that China’s strategic culture is rather defensive and pacifism (Zhu and Zhou 2011).

2.2.2 Confucian Long Peace Theory

Unlike mere concentration on China, Robert E. Kelly focuses cultural community, that is Confucian states including China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam, in ancient East Asia and proposes a Confucian long peace theory. In Kelly’s understanding, “although states are distinct polities, the underlying citizenries of a cultural peace space do not feel themselves culturally distinct (Kelly 2011: 410).” And the shared culture functions to incur member states of the cultural community to hold a sense of “we-ness” which limits and constrains the choice of war. As Johnston notes, “states with weak in-group identification, or states which perceive other states as sharing values characteristic of the in-group, are more likely to be influenced by idealpolitik strategic culture (Johnston 1995a: 60).” Confucian states in East Asia sharing the common cultural element, generally Confucianism, tended to perceive others to perform like themselves within the framework set by Confucian rules, norms and institutions. However, whether peace can emerge and then persist is determined by the nature of culture and its binding force to the member states. Kelly holds that “Confucianism was ethically opposed to the use of force, both at the individual level and as a tool of statecraft, especially between Confucianized people,” and that “Confucianism created a unique diplomatic language for Confucian states … that smoothed communication and provided distinct in-group cultural artefacts (Kelly 2011: 411–413).” As a result, whether peace exists varies with the types of states. As Kelly specifies, “the shared Confucian ethic strongly discouraged the use of force against those who had adopted the enlightenment … lesser Confucian states recognized China’s formal superiority, but were de facto independent and unmolested … non-Confucians would not fall into these categories (Kelly 2011: 413).” Generally speaking, such Confucian peace existed merely promisingly among Confucian states and, just like that peace is not predictable within democratic states and non-democratic states according to democratic peace theory, relations between Confucian states and non-Confucian states are far from cultural influences but contingent. After examining wars between China and its Confucian counterparts during Ming Dynasty and comparing it with control group, that is classic Greece, Western Christendom and modern Arab state system, Kelly finds that “the proposed Confucian Long Peace is real (Kelly 2011: 422).”
Although Kelly’s methodology is rather scientific, it cannot overcome its in-built shortcoming as well as Johnston cannot escape criticisms focusing on his biased selection of cases. In Kelly’s case, whether Ming is an ideal case is far from consensus. Given inclusion of all Confucian states, China’s material advantages and exhaustive historical documents, Kelly chooses the last years of the Confucian system and, given Qing’s expansionist tendency, eliminates Qing from her examination. First, however, just as Loh criticizing Johnston’s selection of Ming, “since the Ming followed the Mongol Yuan, how is that ‘one can be somewhat more confident’ that Ming strategic culture, has not been ‘contaminated by interaction with Mongol strategic culture (Loh 2008: 285)?’” That is, how to explain the last phase is as same as the prototype of Confucian, especially after China suffered more than 400 years’ alien threat, exploitation and even governance, is tactically dodged. And Kelly subjectively omits Qing according to Qing’s notorious expansive deeds, which seem breach scientific principle but rather chooses some suitable cases in order to make theory more plausible instead of verifying theory. More seriously and importantly, whether such we-ness is indeed shared by China needs further researches. As is well-known, ancient East Asia is a hierarchic system, where China enjoyed a gravitational status and all other states were naturally subordinate to China. Therefore, it’s not an easy task to make China share a seemingly equal sense and status with Confucian states. In contrast, China saw all other states the same, that is “the idea of impartiality (Wang 1968)”, which means, in the eyes of China, both Confucian states and non-Confucian states are the same, which breaches the underlying basis of Confucian long peace theory that requires “a shared sense of underlying ‘we-ness’ (Kelly 2011: 410).”

2.2.3 Hierarchic System

Apart from the above two approaches applying culture merely to explain China’s non-expansion commitment directly or indirectly, David C. Kang suggests a third way that combines structural features of ancient East Asia and Confucian culture. Kang defines hierarchy as “a rank order based on a particular attribute (Kang 2012: 17),” and he insists hierarchy is a result of consensus of its members. Therefore, within this hierarchic system, balance of power is a rare case and, instead, China’s neighbors are more willingly prefer to bandwagoning, accommodation and submission (Kang 2003a; Kang 2003b; Kang 2005; Kang 2010a). The reason for subordinate states agree on Chinese hegemony and pay their submissions to China is ascribed to China’s cultural superiority and their reverence for China’s culture is reinforced by their learning, adoption, acculturation and internalization of Confucianism, despite China being disinteresting in propagating its ideas and values (Kang 2010b: 602–611; Kang 2012: 25–53). On the other hand, as Kang adds, “hegemony is
a form of hierarchy that involves more than material power. It also involves a set of norms – social ORDER- that secondary states find legitimate (Kang 2012: 23–24).” That is, hierarchic system in ancient East Asia functions as international society where “a group of states … have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements (Bull and Watson 1984: 1).” Just like Kang’s specification, “the tribute system had evolved into a set of rules, norms, and institutions with China clearly the hegemon, resulting in a clear hierarchy and very long peace (Kang 2010b: 602).”

Within this hierarchic international society, China had no desire to exploit or invade its subordinates as long as they respect Chinese superiority and pay their submission to China in the form of tribute, investiture, adoption of Chinese calendar, etc. As he insists, “with such a large central power in China, other states did not wish to challenge China, and China had no need to fight (Kang 2005: 72).” And subordinates can expect China’s assistance to solve dispute and even warlike conflicts. That is what Kang says, “the tribute system on the whole provided a range of flexible institutional and discursive tools with which to resolve conflicts without recourse to war. Defining territory and establishing the legitimate sovereignty of different political units are two the most basic tasks in international relations (Kang 2010b: 611).” On one hand, clear demarcated borderline represents a symbol of status quo between China and its tributaries, which was seldom changed, though, after wars. As Kang notes, “the countries remained essentially the same after war. Boundaries and borders were relatively inflexible, and nations did not rise and disappear (Kang 2005: 72).” On the other hand, as China recognizes sovereignty of its tributaries as legitimate, one sign of which is China rarely interfere with its tributaries’ internal or foreign affairs, relations between China and the tributaries can be operated within the framework of international society rather than within “secondary state-system”. Once territorial disputes breaks out, conflictual parties can resort to rules, norms, and institutions of hierarchic system, during which tribute relations will be established, though in an unequal form, and China will recognize sovereignty of the rivals, which, in turn, constrain China’s aggressiveness as a result of responsibility originated from China’s hegemonic status. Consequently, threat about invasion and exploitation from China will not be perceived by Chinese tributaries and they can pay more attentions to their domestic affairs without excessive anxiety about survival, which leads to balance of power. As a result, stability and peace can be perpetuated in ancient East Asia with a strong China as centricity of hierarchic system. Just as Kang emphasizes, “historically, it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved (Kang 2003a: 83).” However, like Kelly’s theory only applied to Confucian states, Kang’s theory is only pertinent to relations between China
and states adopting Chinese ideas and values. That is, what Kang warns, “it was much harder to establish stable relations with political units that rejected China’s vision of the world (Kang 2010b: 619).”

Kang tries to apply approach of English School about international society and hierarchic structure of international systems altogether to explain the long peace and stability in ancient East Asia, but, regarding to Chinese non-expansion commitment, he takes it for granted and believes it was creditable for Chinese tributaries. However, this question needs further researches, not only for whether China feel responsible for this commitment according to Kang’s understanding of hegemonic duty, but also for whether the tributaries think it as trustful as Kang suggests. For example, relations between Chosón, the model tributary state, and Ming Dynasty was not mutual believable as Kang suggest, which was achieved after Japanese invasion of Chosón (Song 2012: 168–170). Second, Kang faces the same question as Kelly that he concentrates on sinic states only and reduces East Asia into a Confucian society, which seems not always in prominent place in China’s foreign policy. Because China needed to consider threats from its northern and western nomadic or semi-nomadic neighbors, which distracts Chinese military powers from potential invasion or exploitation of sinic states to defense its frontiers. Last, Kang didn’t offer a satisfactory answer to Chinese invasion of sinic states, partly because of his selection of case focusing on Ming and Qing, and partly because of treating it as anomaly.

**Chapter 3: Hua-Yi Identity and Non-expansion Commitment**

Apart from the above explanation, identity, a basic term to analyze international relations since Constructivism first applied it as a variable in the end of last century, can pave for the road to understand why China voluntarily made such commitment and why foreign states trusted this commitment to the degree that, though, varies with their acceptance of subordinate identity, Yi, compared to the permanent superior identity, Hua, held by China. However, some scholars have applied Hua-Yi distinction for explaining Chinese foreign policy, even though they focus historical description but seldom pay attention to summarize a general theoretical framework, let alone efforts on constructing a deductive theory as an iron law. As Chan emphasizes, “a kind of international relations based on Chinese centricity … given that it based on principles of Hua-Yi relations, can be termed as ‘Hua-Yi international order’. And this term, compared to ‘Chinese World Order’ coined by Western scholars, puts ideational connotation of traditional Chinese diplomacy in the spotlight apparently and attractively (Chan 1996: 216).” He even says that “except for ‘Hua-Yi’ order, there is no an international order, including capitalist system international relations since the modern times,
with so long history and inherent coherence (He 1998:30).” Furthermore, regarding to security issue, Hua-Yi distinction is applied as a core factor for Chinese defensiveness, if not pacifism, as well. Xue, for example, holds that “Hua-Yi order offered a unique framework about security for Chinese Dynasties,” which made China with defensive character, and security ideas of national defense of imperial China includes four features, that is “dynasty outweighing state, idea outweighing force, status quo outweighing expansion, and culture of absence of army (Xue 2013).” In this field, Li even goes further. He notes that “Han Chinese Dynasties, under the constraint of traditional Hua-Yi view, found it difficult to transcend the line between Hua and Yi and thus adopted loose rein policy or even ignorant attitudes towards frontier zone, which obstructed the process of territorial formation of China; but alien Chinese Dynasties, which was free from such burden, challenged and broke Hua-Yi view perpetually and fulfill the formation of Chinese territory successfully in the end (Li 2004: 1).”

Unlike historical approach focusing description of origin, evolution and content of Hua-Yi distinction, manifestation of Hua-Yi distinction in specific foreign policies, significance and disadvantages of Hua-Yi distinction, etc., Hua-Yi distinction will be applied theoretically for explanation of correlation between Hua-Yi identity and Chinese non-expansion. Hua-Yi identity will be treated as an independent variable and Chinese non-expansion commitment will be treated as a dependent variable. Furthermore, Hua-Yi identity will be treated as three levels according to state’s acceptation of it. Generally speaking, as a null hypothesis, the higher level of acceptation of Hua-Yi identity the state is, the more creditability the non-commitment of China is and the more likeness peace or peaceful settlement between China and foreign states is.

However, three caveats should be paid attention to here. This thesis doesn’t pursue to construct casual relations between these two variables for identity, as a subjective concept based on self-identification, though, in the process of interaction between ego and alter, can not be verified quantitatively but whether correlation exists and how strong the correlation is can be proven through quantitative analysis. Second, all states interacting with China will be included into three types of Hua-Yi identity rather than focusing sinic states merely for the sake of taking ancient East Asia as an integrated international system defined above. Last but not least, there is no ambition to rank states in ancient East Asia according to their adoption of Chinese culture, partly because transformability from Yi identity to Hua identity is more like an ideal rather than a fact, in particular, since Qin’s establishment from which China entered imperial phase, when Hua-Yi distinction functions as a standard to differentiate China and its neighbors and whether or not adoption of Chinese culture means little for their subordinate status compared to China. Alternative, whether or not and to what degree state accepts Hua-Yi identity is the mere standard to discriminate its type in East Asian
3.1 Identity and Self-Constrain

Since identity was introduced into analysis of international relations, it played an increasingly role in security issue. For example, powerful states do not always consider to expand its territory or to show off its power, such as America. Therefore more interior variables can better explain such prudence of great power than pure material variables, like power, cost-benefit calculation, etc. As new variables, such as identity, norm, rule, language, sex, was gradually applied to analyze international issues, states get rid of mechanical determinism and regain its ‘humanity’. That idea matters became an important view in international relations study. However, even rationalism, which advocates that international relations researches should be free from value, takes idea into its framework of analysis, despite taking it as an exogenic variable. As Kang notes, “the most sophisticated theoretical treatments from both the rationalist and constructivist paradigms have concluded that understanding preferences and identity is vital to being able to draw any conclusions about state behavior (Kang 2007: 19).” For example, Walt believes that alliance behavior is reaction to threat, which is affected by aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions. As he stresses, “although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat (Walt 1990: 21).”

However, identity is less developed than norm although both variables are introduced by Constructivism as basic variables. Norm research achieves increasingly maturity as its agenda extends to concept, definition, construction, evolution, spread, decline and even disappearance. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink try to build a dynamics of international norms. They propose there are three stages of norm called norm life cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, identity is not as fortunate as norm, which is not only reflected in its controversial definition and formation but also embodied in research approaches and its significance for international relations. As Abdelal etc. points out, “despite this flurry of activity, the social sciences have not yet witnessed a commensurate rise in definitional consensus on the concept of identity (Abdelal etc. 2009: 17).” Despite that, identity functions to help state get rid of mechanic determinism and to recover its ‘humanity’. Efforts on identity, therefore, are not deficient since its introduction. Among numerous literatures on identity, logic framework of identity of Wendt, who introduces identity as an analytical variable systemically, remains substantially important to inspect identity’s emergence, evolution and influence on agent’s activity.
3.1.1 Identity and its Construction

According to Wendt, identity is “a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an intersubjective or systemic quality (Wendt 1999: 224).” Furthermore, Wendt classifies identity into four catalogues: personal or corporate identity, type identity, role identity, and collective identity. The last two types of identity are result of interaction between actors, while the first two are intrinsic properties. Difference between the last two is their inclination. Role identity stresses difference between Ego and Other, while collective identity, on the basis of role identity and type identity, inclines to merge Other into Ego. Among four types, role identity can be applied to analyze state’s preference of foreign policy, where the extent of role identity’s influence is determined by intimacy or interdependence. As Wendt notes, “when intimacy is high, … even if a state wants to abandon a role it may be unable to do so because the Other resists out of a desire to maintain its identity (Wendt 1999: 228).” Interest bridges identity and action. As Wendt points out, “states are actors whose behavior is motivated by a variety of interests rooted in corporate, type, role, and collective identities (Wendt 1999: 233).” Identity cannot determine state’s action but it can influence state’s interest. In Wendt’s understanding, interest of state includes autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem, other than physical survival, the only interest of state suggested by realism. Certain identity will influence state’s perception of ranking of interests, thereby influencing state’s certain activities.

As role is a concept of social character, attainment of role is result of interaction between actors. Before interaction, states possess only intrinsic identity but not social identity.14 By application of symbolic interactionism, Wendt believes that social identity is constructed as a result of interaction between states. After ego shows its initial act, it need to wait for alter’s reaction which based on alter’s perception of ego’s act, despite physical qualities playing an important role in this process. Once alter reacts to ego, ego can compare self-image and alter’s image of me, and then it reinforce or rectify its identity. The same process is experienced by alter. Wendt notes, “this process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a ‘social act’ and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings (Wendt 1992: 405).” If it proceeds long enough, within which certain

14 Regarding to whether states possess social identity before interaction, Qin gives an alternative idea that states have social identity before interaction, which is reflected in the cultural and social institutions and norms (Qin 2010: 144).
identity will be supported in form of reward and other will be obsolesced as a result of loss of benefit, a rather stable social structure will be constructed and identity and interest will be defined within this structure. Social structure includes culture inherently and culture is reflection of predominant role identity. Therefore, different role identity will lead to different cultures. Precisely, enemy identity leads to Hobbesian culture, which was prevailed before 17th century; rival identity leads to Lockean culture, which emerged first in Europe and then prevail in contemporary world; friend identity leads to Kantian culture, whose omen can be seen in Europe despite in initial and immature form (Wendt 1999: 260~308).

### 3.1.2 Ontological Security and Commitment of Self-Constraint

Briefly, identity is what I am as a mixture of what I suppose I am and what I find I am from other’s view. Therefore, before enduring social structure is constructed, identity is not static but in a dynamic process, within which my expectation of myself is always suffered from other’s interpretation of me in the form of certain interactive mode. Therefore, state not only faces physical security but also confronts with ontological security, which means consistency and stability of identity. Construction of identity implies certain mode of behavior of ego that can be perceived by other as ego and other have common ideas or culture presuppose identity. However, once identity cannot persist or is in change all the time, certain role identity cannot be constructed, let alone enduring social structure. However, physical security and ontological security is not always the same. Rather, they may confront with each other. As Mitzen points out, “states might actually come to prefer their ongoing, certain conflict to the unsettling condition of deep uncertainty as to the other’s and one’s own identity (Mitzen 2006: 342).” It resembles Wendt’s point about relations between intimacy of role identity and foreign policy. That is, if a state accepts an identity so deep that it believes change of identity will risk uncertain disadvantages despite with hope of better physical security. For example, Israel-Arabic relations, to some degree, can be seen as both sides’ intentional effort on preservation of their respective identity.

How to maintain a stable identity is the key of ontological security. As Mattern emphasizes, “if a particular Self is to survive it is necessary to vigilantly protect the sociolinguistic matrix that produces it (Mattern 2005: 601).” Regarding it, biographical narrative and corresponding mode of action is two keys in maintenance of identity. Biographical narrative is how state records, recounts, and interprets its past, present and future. Through it, state can fuse its past identity to with current identity and extend it to its future one. That is, state keeps its identity intact in discursive form. However, biographical narrative always glorifies identity of oneself. For example, when USA
constructs itself as guard of democracy, it tends to dilute its overseas invasion by emphasis of its contribution for peace and stability of world, through which its identity is conserved. However, discursive method to maintain identity play a more efficient role in self-identification of identity than in other’s perception of identity of ego. As social identity is production of interaction, biographical narrative does little to maintain it despite its great contribution for intrinsic identity. In order to keep social identity intact, states should perform like what their biographical narrative proclaim. In simple terms, state should make itself of what it suppose and this artifactual effort should be admitted by other states. For example, China tried its best to show its intention to join contemporary international society since its opening and reform policy. Aside from its official propaganda of its desire, China did a great job to convince other states by massive and wide-scale participation into international organizations, its deep involvement into international economic structure, and positive response for UN’s peace-keeping missions. Although worries about and even fear of China’s rise exists, no one can negate that China is no longer a detached state. If state succeeds in keep consistency of discursive and behavioral construction of identity, it can solve its ontological security.

Therefore, if state wants to maintain its identity, it should restrain itself from breaching it. In the same token, if the identity is so important for a state, especially a hegemony, that it is willing to conserve it by self-constraint, commitment originated from identity is creditable. Precisely, a state need to constrain itself from obedient movement that obviously contrast with what it proclaim it is. For example, as the unique hegemony after the Cool War, USA will not try to invade the evil states termed by it, despite intentions of overthrowing its government under the title of humane interference, as a result that USA view itself as the leader of democratic world, within which respect for sovereignty still prevail though confronting more criticism for its shortcomings in dealing with global issues. Therefore, once states constructed certain identity and the identity persist rather long, commitment, as discursive expression of identity in biographical narrative, is creditable and even can be utilized to achieve physical security by the subordinate states. As Wendt and Friedheim reveals, “recognizing the sovereignty of subordinate states imposes certain restrains on dominant states, and knowing this gives the former some security from the power of the latter, as well as the appearance of choice in deciding to align (Wendt and Friedheim 1995: 704).”

In this thesis, I apply ontological security into analysis of Chinese non-commitment. As China tried its best to maintain Hua-Yi identity as the underlying principle for foreign affairs, it would constrain itself from infringing the requirements and obligations implied by Hua-Yi identity. Originally, Hua-Yi identity implied co-existence of China and its tributaries and absent interest of
China to annex or sinicize\textsuperscript{15} its tributaries actively. In order to maintain itself as Hua and therefore superior status in ancient East Asian system, China needed to fulfill its commitment. Although it sounds ideally rather than realistically, Chinese effort to observe its commitment had lasted for nearly two thousand years, except for alien Chinese Dynasties’ expansive activities. Furthermore, this commitment was well trusted by states, especially Confucian states, in ancient East Asia as a result of their acceptance of Hua-Yi identity. In order to perform like a state with identity of Yi, Chinese tributaries needed to observe certain requirement and obligations derived from their identity, Yi identity. In turn, they could feel secure or free of threat from the monster China with formidably material power and gloriously cultural edge. However, creditability of the commitment varies with the level of their acceptance, like Wendt’s degree of intimacy of role identity. The deeper they accept Hua-Yi identity, the creditable the commitment will be.

\subsection*{3.2 Hua-Yi Identity}

Since identity was widely applied for analysis of international relations, different sets of identities are proposed, such as status quo identity versus revisionist identity, liberalist identity versus evil identity, etc. However, these identities share a common underlying feature, equality between states. As a primary institution, sovereign equality was taken as granted in analyzing international relations, but when it was applied to ancient East Asia, inescapable problems emerges. Within them, the most significant and unsolvable problem is that ancient East Asian system is hierarchic, within which formal equality is absent regardless of substantial equality in the form of non-interference of China to its tributaries’ internal and foreign affairs. That is, in terms of identity, equality was absent in ancient East Asia, and, alternatively, identity emerged in form of hierarchy, which was Hua-Yi identity.

The term, Hua-Yi identity, differentiates all states under \textit{Tianxia} (all under the heaven) into two types roughly. One is state with Hua identity and there is only one legitimate and successive state with Hua identity, that is China. Literally, Hua means grandeur, magnificence, civilization and virtue. In etymological term, Xia is as same as Hua and these two terms is replaceable. More important is that both Hua and Xia refer to ‘central kingdom’ (China) in origin. In pre-modern East Asia, central kingdom is not a specific term referring to China as a state but a flexible term with several meanings. According to Wang’s statistics and analysis of ‘central kingdom’ in pre-Qin literatures, ‘central

\textsuperscript{15} Although Chinese rhetoric or biographical narrative emphasizes Chinese kindness for educating and moralizing its tributaries, China seldom realized it actively (Kang 2012: 25). Rather, China tended to maintain its tributaries backwardness in terms of culture. For example, embargo is imposed on historical books (Wang and He 2014: 134), which can be seen as a main resource for education.
‘central kingdom’ has five different meanings that are “capital, interior of state, Chinese domain, medium state, and central state (Wang 2003).” Although ‘central kingdom’ possesses so many meanings, it points to domain of Sinic origin and culture in the most time, which accounts for 81.5% in Wang’s statistics (Wang 2003: 371). Therefore, given convenience of analysis, both Hua and Xia are equated to China in modern time in this thesis, regardless of chronological variations historically. On the other hand, Yi is a general term describing all states surrounding China or holding relations with China. However, in narrow sense, Yi refers to nations and states in the east of China and aside from Yi, Di, Rong and Man refer to respective nations and states according to their direction. In Gun Pu’s annotation of Erya, the first Chinese dictionary, he points out: “Yi is in the east, Di is in the north, Rong is in the west and Man is in the South (Erya Zhushu 2000: 221).” Although there is a specific division of foreign states according to their direction, Yi, sometimes with Di, is used to refer all foreign states.

3.2.1 Origins and Evolution of Hua-Yi identity

Distinction between Hua and Yi can be traced back to as early as Shang Dynasty, whose oracle bone script recorded related information. In Shang Dynasty, Yi, or other like terms, is a term to discriminate China from its neighbors according to their styles of life and production, such as housing, clothing, food, appearance, totem, languages and so forth. It means that Hua-Yi identity was of little relation with culture and thus had no contemptuous implications. As Quzhi’s refutation against accusation of leakage of secret recorded in Zuo Zhuan, “We, each tribe of Rong, eat and dress in different form from the Chinese (Li 1998: 711).” As Han points out, “there is no disdain in the title of Yi or Di per se, and the Chinese didn’t ostracize them. … Hua-Yi distinction was based on intra-national common recognition of disparity of objectively existent culture and convention (Han 2009: 12).”

However, with Chinese achievement of high productivity partly because of application of iron, mixed with development of Chinese cultural complication, Hua-Yi distinction started to possess implications of superiority of China and contempt towards Yi as early as the Spring and Autumn period, which were reflected in Chinese classic texts. For example, in Zuo Zhuan, Guanzhong replied Duke of Qi: “People of Rong and Di is wolf, and their desire cannot be satisfied (Li 1998: 173).” In the same manner, regarding to requirement of peace from Wuzhong, a state of Rong, Duke of Jin held: “because people of Rong and Di not only neglect kinship but also is greedy, it’s better to send a punitive expedition against them [instead of pacifying them] (Li 1998: 647).” Regarding to the reason why the Chinese started to despise Yi and Di, Fu Chen’s reply for King Xiang of Zhou
offers an intriguing answer. Fu stresses: "those who cannot hear five tones are deaf; those who cannot distinguish five colors are ignorant; those who cannot hold morality and justice as principles are mischievous; those who cannot say in loyalty and honesty are treacherous. People of Di possesses these four kinds of evil by following the above examples (Li 1998: 284)." That is, since the Spring and Autumn period, Hua-Yi distinction was not only a criteria to distinguish objective disparity between the Chinese and the alien, such as lifestyle and mode of production, but also a cultural standard, according to Chinese ethical and moral principles, to delineate a clear-cut borderline between the Chinese and the alien. And the latter, from the beginning, implied Chinese contempt and disrespect towards the alien as a result of Chinese superiority of culture. According to Han’s analysis, this contempt includes two types. Han distinguishes: “one belongs to ethnic contempt and another one belongs to cultural discrimination (Han 2009: 13~14).”

As Hua-Yi distinction was gradually accepted by China and alien states, Hua identity and Yi identity gradually became two kinds of roles in ancient East Asia for intercourse and interaction between China and its alien states. As Wendt explains, “the mechanism here is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others. If repeated long enough, these ‘reciprocal typifications’ will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction (Wendt 1992: 405).” That is, China reinforce its confidence of cultural superiority and even ethnic excellence compared to the alien states in the process of interaction with the alien states for a rather long time. In turn, alien states was force or out of self-interest to accept the Yi identity as cultural subordination to China. Although Yi identity implied a subordinate identity in nature, alien states accepted and utilized it in the intercourse with China. For example, in diplomatic document of Zhao Tuo, king of Nan Yue, to Han Court for apology, he called himself “Great Elder of Man Yi and subject of Han Court (Sima 1963: 2970)”. Moreover, when then Japanese king’s reception of envoy of Sui Dynasty, the king said modestly: “I heard that there was Great Sui Dynasty, a state of rite and morality, in the west of the sea and thus decided to send tribute. I, man of Yi, reside in remote corner of the sea and have not heard about rite and morality, thereby staying in state and having not gone to visit emperor of Sui (Wei and Linghu 1982: 1828).”

Although Hua identity and Yi identity was established in the Spring and Autumn period at the earliest, as China had not been divided into several kingdoms competing against each other and pursuing to unify whole China as Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, Hua-Yi identity was not incorporated into Chinese foreign policy, to some extend that there was not an integrated China but several self-alleged ‘central kingdoms’. As a result, there existed plural but different ‘central
kingdoms’ in the Spring and Autumn period and Warring states period, and the scope of Hua and Yi differed in the mind of head of each main state. According to Hirase’s comparison and analysis of three explanatory works of *Chun Qiu (The Spring and Autumn Annals)*, each work describes a unique understanding of the domain of central kingdom and Chinese states. For example, *Gong Yang Zhuan* and *Zuo Zhuan* both justify the subordinate’s surpassing the superior, though the former focuses on legitimacy of Tian family in succession of Qi and the latter emphasizes Han’s virtual predominance in governing people of Yin and recovering divine sacrifice of Xia Dynasty, but *Gu Liang Zhuan* goes on a different way and negate such logic of the subordinate’s surpassing the superior, and, as a result, Xianyu is considered as a Chinese state but as a state of Yi identity in other two works (Hirase 2007: 64–68). Furthermore, as domain of the Chinese was ambiguous, state with Yi identity was possible to coexist with Chinese states within Chinese domain, which was constructed by seven great states. For example, Lu Hun of Rong resided between Jin and Shu. However, during the Warring States period, such possibility of states with Yi identity existing within Chinese domain was gradually eliminated. As Nishijima notes, “interior Yi and Di disappeared because they were all under the governance of Chinese states and incorporated as farmers, and Yi and Di, therefore, referred to existence on the outside of seven states (Nishijima 2000: 13).”

Since Qin unified China, China became a single term referring to Chinese Dynasty, although there were still plural Chinese Dynasties during divided period, such as the Three Kingdoms period. By application of ‘pilgrimage’ termed by Benedict Anderson, Wang explain how an imagined integrated China was established by Qin Dynasty through application of centralization of authority and absorption of local literati into state machine, which was different from plural Chinese states possessing respective identification and loyalty during the Warring States period. As he notes, “Chinese world was a holistic existence to some extent because new imperial order broke out borderline set up by states in pre-Qin era and circulation of talents was beyond state inherently. However, under Qin and Han Dynasties’ pursuit for and effort to ‘unification’, new imperial constructed a ‘new’ ‘Chinese world’ different from pre-Qin era in terms of connotation (Wang 2007: 176–177).” As a result, China as a holistic political unit became the single state with Hua identity and confirmed itself as the superiority, in both material and cultural terms, along with increasing interaction with alien states. As He emphasizes, “since the first emperor of Qin unified China and established a unprecedentedly large empire, Chinese foreign relations was put on the agenda theoretically. … ‘Hua-Yi’ idea originated in the ancient times was introduced into Chinese empire’s foreign relations since Han Dynasty (He 1998: 31, 32).”

From Han Dynasty on, Hua-Yi distinction functioned as a basic principle directing Chinese
foreign policy (discussed later). In the same time, achievement of Chinese recognition was treated as a principal way to justify legitimacy of state in the view of alien states, which was based on implications of Hua-Yi distinction. As the mere state with Hua identity, China was in nature the center of Tianxia and its emperor, the son of heaven, was appointed to govern the world from the heaven. As a result, all alien states should observe China theoretically and their legitimacy to rule their states was derived from Chinese recognition, precisely recognition of the son of heaven, which was reflected as Chinese investiture to the head of alien states or ministers of alien states. For example, Former Yan Dynasty offers an insightful example about how alien sovereign treats Hua-Yi identity. At the beginning, Former Yan tried to get rid of Hua-Yi identity’s constraint, which was reflected in its invasion of Fuyu. Although Former Yan destroyed Fuyu, as a result of Jin Dynasty’s assistance, Fuyu reestablished its state, which led Former Yan to start to consider and thus accept Hua-Yi distinction. At last, Former Yan sent a tribute trip to Jin to ask for investiture of Murong Gui, sovereign of Former Yan, as King of Yan, which means that Murong Wei accepted Jin as legitimate China and viewed itself as subordinate to Jin. Just as Zhao notes, “as soon as Murong Wei established his state, Former Yan was incorporated into ‘Hua-Yi order’ of Western Jin Dynasty, regardless of whether or not Murong Wei was willing for it (Zhao 2010: 279).” Xianbei Murong was not the only one that got its polity legitimate through reference to investiture of China. As Zhao notes, “in the mind of then people, Hua was still superior to Yi, which was reflected by that many political units got themselves legitimate through asking for investiture form Eastern Jin and successive Southern Dynasties, such as Song, Qi, Liang and Chen (Zhao 2012: 152).” And with Sui and Tan unified China again since overthrow of Han Dynasty, despite transient unification fulfilled by Western Jin Dynasty, “Hua-Yi” distinction achieve its climax in relations between China and alien states. As Chen notes, “Tang Dynasty with incomparable material and cultural predominance further confirmed and reinforced Hua-Yi view having existed since ancient time (Chen 1996: 215).” However, since Tang declined and eventually ceased to exist, “Hua-Yi” identity experienced several variations. After the collapse of Tang Dynasty, China was divided into two parts, one of which was occupied by Chinese states and eventually unified by Song Dynasty, and another of which of occupied by alien states, Liao Dynasty and successive Jin Dynasty. And the first subversion of Hua-Yi distinction was brought by Liao Dynasty. As Wang mentions, “before destruction of Tang, traditional ‘Hua-Yi’ structure and order that the Chinese is interior and the Barbarian is exterior was intact up to a point that it was not overturned totally. In history of China, Liao Dynasty established by Khitans brought about the first subversive destruction to ‘Hua-Yi’ structure and order (Wang 2009c: 77).” In order to establish his own dynasty, Shi Jingtang asked for military assistance from
Khitan at the expense of becoming subject of and ceding territory to Khitan. After Shi’s succession of establishment of Later Jin Dynasty, he dressing in clothes of Khitan accepted investiture from Taizong of Liao Dynasty as emperor of Great Jin and call him father, which was later changed into only calling Liao Dynasty grandfather and eliminating submissive status as vassal of Liao Dynasty after death of Shi. However, this was only the outset of humiliated history of the Chinese suffering from its northern ‘barbarian’ neighbor with formidable military power. After Northern Song unified the south part of China, this disadvantageous situation of China against Liao Dynasty didn’t change. After signature of Chuanyuan Treaty, Northern Song was required to pay for Liao Dynasty three hundred thousand annually. With Northern Song’s assistance, Jurchens overthrew Liao Dynasty and established Jin Dynasty, which started a more humiliated history of Song Dynasty. Facing Jin’s invasion, not only were two emperors of North Song kidnapped and eventually died there, but also Northern Song was overturn and its successive Southern Song excised sovereignty over a rather small part in South China. Furthermore, in order to appease Jin to cease invasion, Southern Song signed Shaoxing Treaty with Jin and became Jin’s vassals. Relationship between Jin and Southern Song was changed from suzerain-vassal relations into uncle-nephew relations under Southern Song’s effort. However, with Mongol’s rising, humiliation deteriorated into extinction. With Mongol’s invasion, South Song was eventually destroyed, despite its lasting resistance for nearly 50 years. Although Mongol’s Yuan Dynasty adoption of Chinese culture, political institution and traditional “Hua-Yi” rhetoric, the fact that Hua-Yi identity was overturn completely and thoroughly cannot be changed. It can be said that from the end of Tang Dynasty to the end of Yuan Dynasty, more than 400 years, Hua-Yi distinction was transformed into a variation that Hua was not the pure form as prototype but a mixed form combining the Chinese and acculturated barbarians who occupied the territory of past Han Chinese Dynasty partly or completely. In order to justify these ‘conquest dynasties’, cultural significance was once again emphasized as the core of Hua-Yi distinction, before which culturally conversion from Yi to Hua seemed more like a hypocritical encouragement rather than a viable promise. Anyhow, by adoption of variational Hua-Yi distinction, the myth of China as the only one state with Hua identity remained intact.

As the least sinicized dynasty, Yuan Dynasty was overturn within 100 years by revolts led by Zhu Yuanzhang. After establishing Ming Dynasty, Zhu and his successors tried their best to recover Hua-Yi distinction as its prototype, which was achieved by reference to the mandate of Heaven. However, the mandate of Heaven, lost by Yuan within 100 years, was also lost by Ming within 300 years or less. Still, Ming’s recovery of prototype of Hua-Yi distinction was rather successful. One classic example is Chosŏn. It took Chosŏn a long time to accept Qing Dynasty as a state with Hua
identity as a result of Chosŏn’s acceptance Qing’s cultural attainment. And Chosŏn, therefore, maintained its reverent policy towards Ming Dynasty in dealing with Qing Dynasty. As an alien Chinese Dynasty, Qing Dynasty was acculturated more deeply and intensively than Yuan Dynasty and adopted traditional Chinese foreign policy in dealing with foreign states so that there was unperceivable difference from Han Chinese Dynasty. In the same token, Qing Dynasty inherited Hua identity as the gravitational state of ancient East Asia. In the last five hundreds years before China was completely incorporated into modern international system and consequently Hua-Yi identity was replaced by nation-states of equality, Hua-Yi distinction still functioned as fundamental principle upholding Chinese hierarchic foreign policy.

However, with two times of significant Hua-Yi conversion, so-called Confucian states developed some kinds of replacement of China as the state with Hua identity. The most apparent state was Japan who had insisted itself as ‘China’ since its retreat from Chinese world order in mid-Tang era. As Gan points out, “in Japanese archipelago, Yamato kingdom called himself polity of governance of Tianxia (all under the heaven) no later than the late five century. When statutes system was established in eighth century, Japan further confirm its kingship as “Zhongguo (Central Kingdom)” and the territory ruled by him as “Tianxia” (Gan 2009: 123).” Therefore, it can be said that except for China, Japan was another ‘central kingdom’ in Tianxia, although, unlike China being recognized by other states in ancient East Asia, Japanese status as “central kingdom” and thus Hua was nothing but self-conferred. However, Japan paid exaggerating attention to justify its orthodox status as “central kingdom”, especial after Neo-Confucianism was introduced into Japan. The effort of justification of Japan as orthodox status as ‘central kingdom’ or Hua was reflected in the most famous Confucianist Yamaga Sokō’s work, called Chucho Jijitsu. In Chucho Jijitsu, Yamaga believes that although both China and Japan can be called “central kingdom” for corresponding to the first two principles, that is territory and sages, of qualification as central kingdom or Hua, Japan was superior to be the central kingdom for its divinity originated from Tennō (emperor) institution (Okamura 1942). On the other hand, since mid-seventeenth century, opinion that China was transformed from Hua into Yi as a result of Qing’s replacement of Ming Dynasty had been talked and discussed frequently. The symbolic expression of this discussion was Kai Hentai (Chinese metamorphosis) edited by Hayashi Hōkō, which recorded information collected in Nagasaki. As Zhou finds out, “editor of Kai Hentai abides by the cultural standpoint constantly that Ming Dynasty was Hua and Qing Dynasty was Yi (Zhou 2014: 3).” Challenge against China’s identity as Hua was not only from Japan, but also from the model tributary, Korea, who proclaimed itself ‘the junior Sinic’. As Zhao notes, “in ‘Hua-Yi order’ system of East Asia, although Han nationality was Hua
and all others are Yi, Korea (then Chosŏn) was the only one fulfilling transformation from ‘Yi’ to ‘Hua’ and thus it was the only candidate who qualified for inheritance of Sinic civilization (Zhao 2013: 78).” Vietnam joined into the tendency of self-proclaiming as Hua, which was reflected in the relations between Vietnam and its vassals, although it maintained humbly as vassal of China (then Qing Dynasty) and revered China as only state with Hua identity by calling itself Yi.

3.2.2 Criteria of Hua-Yi Distinction

Although China was the only state that can be called Hua, there are several criteria to judge who is qualified as Hua. As there is possibility that “China will be the new barbarian (Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan Zhushu 2000: 595),” though which is more like caveat than fact, fixed and concrete criteria are required to justify China as Hua and all other states as Yi. According to traditional political thoughts and Confucianism, there are three main types of criteria, one of which is mode of life and production, another one of which is ethnic, and still other one of which is culture.

As discussed above, utilization of mode of life and production as criterion to divide Yi apart from Hua was the earliest one, which can be traced back to Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties. In Li Ji, Hua-Yi distinction is determined by it, which doesn’t include any contempt of Yi. It writes:

“Nature of people varied with local climate, cold or warm, arid or wet, and native topography, hill or river, and, as a result, people living in different climate and topography developed into different conventions and traditions, such as different characters, stubborn or compliant, reckless or prudent, quick or slow, etc., different preferences of tastes, different designs and structures of machines, different materials and styles of clothes. … Chinese people and people of Rong and Yi have their unique characters respectively, which is unchangeable by force. Barbarian living in the east is called Yi, who gets their hair disheveled and their body tattooed, and some of who eats uncooked food. Barbarian living in the south is called Man, who gets their forehead tattooed and feet crossed, and some of who eats uncooked food. Barbarian living in the west is called Rong, who get their hair disheveled and dresses in hide, and some of who eats meat of beast instead of five cereals. Barbarian living in the north is called Di, who dresses in fur and hide and lives in cave, and some of who eats meat of beast instead of five cereals. China, Yi, Man, Rong and Di have their unique comfortable accommodations, biased tastes, suitable clothes, favorable tools and necessary instruments respectively. People from wu fang (all over the world) talk in different languages and has different preferences and necessities. In order to communicate with China, there are interpreters, who in the east are called Ji, in the south are called Xiang, in the west are called Diti, and in the north are called Yi. (Liji Zhengyi 2000: 466–467).”
According to this criterion, what makes China different from Yi is climate and topography, which leads to different mode of life and production. And these differences include nothing more than objective description of respective situations without any contempt. And they can communicate and understand each other, which reflects that there is no man-made discrimination among them.

The second criterion is ethnic. Although Confucianism doesn’t emphasize ethnical factor in judging Hua from Yi, ethnic played a more important role in China’s self-identification as Hua in Han Chinese Dynasties, which was accepted by the Confucian states as a criterion to judge which one was China. In Zuo Zhuan, it writes: “those who are ethnically different from us are not in the same line with us (Li 1998: 538).” If ethnic bias was not so apparent that Hua-Yi transformation was possible in practice during the Spring and Autumn period and Warring states period, after Qin’s unification of China, ethnicity played a practical role in demarcation of Hua and Yi and consequently ejection of Yi from central plains. Furthermore, although there were several times of impact from Yi when Han Chinese Dynasties declined, this ethnical discrimination remained vigorously. Let alone Yuan Dynasty which was featured as less sinicized, Qing Dynasty, a alien Chinese Dynasty nearly copied all ritual and political ideas and institutions of Chinese traditions and Confucianism, was not able to escape from censure originated from its origin of Yi. As Duara notes, “despite the undoubted success with which the Qing made themselves acceptable as the legitimate sons of heaven, they were unable to completely suppress the ethnocentric opposition to their rule either at a popular level or among the scholarly elite (Duara 1993: 5).” The most typical expression of Qing’s failure of complete conversion into Hua is reflected by Sun Yet-sen’s slogan of revolution --- to expel the northern Barbarian and to revive Zhonghua (Chinese recovery of identity as Hua). It may be right that, as Pines supposes, “probably held by certain members of the educated elite, for whom a descendant from the ‘barbarian’ tribe or country would remain barbarian forever, no matter how refined his behavior was (Pines 2004: 72).”

The last but most referred criterion is culture, precisely ritual. The importance of ritual in differentiate Hua from Yi can be found in the caveat of the possibility that “China will be the new barbarian”. According to the annotation explaining the reason for this degeneration, “China is different from Yi and Di, because China can revere the superior. Court of kingdom is unrest but without willingness to rescue it, and hierarchy between monarch and subjects is confused, which can be seen equally as germination of barbarian deeds (Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan Zhushu 2000: 595).” That is, without ritual, there is no different between China and barbarian. It’s because of absence of ritual that Yi is seen as beasts, or “insufficient human as creatures ‘with human face and beasts’ hearts (Pines 2004: 62)”. As Chen notes, “existence of rule in ritual is a sign for Chinese superiority
to its surrounding areas and states (Chan 1996: 210-211).” Literally, ritual means certain types of rites and etiquette. But ritual in ancient East Asia means more than it. It can be equated to social, political and moral rules, norms and institutions based on hierarchy. In family level, ritual means obedience of the younger to the elder and love of the elder to the younger. In domestic level, ritual is hierarchic relationship between emperor and its subjects, within which the former is superior and should be revered while the latter is subordinate and subservient to and should pay their loyalty and sometimes their lives to the former. When it is used on the international level, it requires Yi (barbarian states) to adopt Chinese political institutions and ideas and to perform like subjects in domestic level in its relations with China (Hua) so that legitimacy of Yi is determined by China’s recognition, that is, investiture like modern diplomatic recognition up to a point. Precisely, Yi should pay submission in the form of tribute to China, adopt Chinese calendar, keep the frontier between itself and China pacified and offer military assistance for Chinese punitive expedition as a sign of recognition of Chinese superiority and show its loyalty, while China should give investiture and seal to the sovereign of Yi, and sometimes to the subjects of Yi, pay respect to its tributaries in form of non-interference with domestic and foreign affairs of them, constrain itself from military exploitation of its tributaries and provide military force to help them deal with domestic rebellion or foreign invasion as a sign of Chinese kindness and benignancy. Furthermore, in Confucian idea of ‘Great Unity Theory’, Hua-Yi distinction based on ritual can be blurred and thus eliminated. As a result of Hua-Yi convergence into an integrated world, China will extend its influence and substantial control over Tianxia. From this view, there will be no boundary between China and its neighbors as a result of incorporation of its neighbors into China in the form of cultural assimilation.

Although three criteria have different emphasis, since Qin established the first unified China, ethnic criterion functioned more importantly in shaping China as a state with complete sovereignty through viewing itself as a unique ‘ego’ compared to ‘alter’, namely Yi. However, it doesn’t mean cultural or ritual criterion had no space in Hua-Yi distinction. Indeed, cultural or ritual criterion is more than legitimate defence of alien states and alien Chinese Dynasties. There are two types of time period that cultural or ritual criterion absorbed excessive attention. One is the epoch of split of China when alien states was established by alien leaders and became powerful rivals of Chinese Dynasties in the competition of unification of China. These alien states proclaimed their legitimacy through cultural conversion into Hua, despite proclaiming kinship with ancient Chinese kings or emperors before Tang Dynasty. However, during this time, ethnic criterion will be exaggerated by Chinese Dynasty in order to negate alien states’ legitimacy, on one hand, and to build up confidence of unification of China by itself on the other hand. Relations between Northern Song Dynasty and Liao
Dynasty and Relations between Southern Song Dynasty and Jin Dynasty offers a most typical case of these two criteria advocated by respective state to proclaim their Hua identity. On the side of Song Dynasty, it emphasized its ethnically inheritance from passed Han Chinese Dynasties and thus proclaimed itself as the unique state of Hua identity, while both Liao Dynasty and Jin Dynasty stressed their deep acculturation and thus proclaimed that they were Hua as well as Song Dynasty, which means there were plural Huas. In the same token, Japan argued that it and China could both be treated as Hua, although Japan insisted that it was superior to China in this issue. The other one is the epoch of alien Chinese Dynasties unifying China when the alien ruler searched for their legitimacy of the son of Heaven by reference to cultural criteria of conversion from Yi to Hua. In domestic level, their declaration of cultural conversion into Hua was for buying support of Han nationality that accounted for the largest part of populace of China. In international level, their announcement was for justifying their succession of traditional Chinese hegemonic status of ancient East Asian system. In sum, instead of saying that Hua-Yi distinction is based on ethnic or cultural criterion merely, Hua-Yi distinction is more like legitimate rhetoric utilized by both Han Chinese Dynasties and alien Chinese Dynasties who unified China and became the hegemony of ancient East Asia, for whom Hua-Yi distinction was a ego-alter image that helped to set up a hierarchic international system and confirm China’s gravitational status.

### 3.2.3 Conversion between Hua and Yi

If cultural criterion is true and well-accepted by the Chinese, in nature, Hua identity and Yi identity are transformable, although that this transformability is one-way from Yi to Hua or two-way is controversial. Based on Chinese superiority to alien states, there seems only one-way transformation, that is, from Yi identity to Hua identity. Mencius is the typical representative for this one-way appeal. He insists: “I have heard of the conversion of the barbarians by the Chinese but not of the conversion of the Chinese by the barbarians (Mencius 1999: 121).” Transformation from Yi to Hua requires achievement of ritual, broadly cultural evolution. As Han points out, “by reverence to Zhou emperor and application of Chinese culture and institutions, Yi can transform into Hua, within which the key is not only the conversion of mode of life and production, but also, more importantly, the conversion of social and political institutions, that is application of Chinese culture of rite and music (Han 2009: 17).” The most typical example of successful conversion from Yi to Hua is referred by Mencius. He writes, “Shun, a native of the Eastern Tribes, was born in Zhunfeng, moved to Fuxia, and died in Mingtiao. King Wen, a native of the Western Tribes, was born in Qizhou, and died in Biying.
Their native places more than a thousand li apart, and their times were separated by more than a thousand years. But when they achieved their ambitions in the Middle Plains, they tallied each with what the other did. The principles of the two sages were the same though one came earlier than the other (Mencius 1999: 175).”

However, by reference to cultural criteria differentiating Hua and Yi, two-way conversion seems possible as well because once state of Hua identity degenerates culturally, it cannot but fall into Yi. Instead of narrow view on conversion of Hua and Yi, Confucius, teacher of Mencius, emphasizes the possible of degeneration of Hua into Yi. Han annotates, “when Confucius wrote Chun Qiu, dukes and kings who apply barbarian rite should be treated as barbarian; barbarian who was incorporated into China should be treated as Chinese (Han 1986: 17).” According to Confucius, the distinction between Hua and Yi is not inborn but acquired. If barbarian states are ambitious to acculturate to Chinese culture and ritual, revere Zhou emperor and apply Chinese norms and institutions, they can get rid of their barbarity and achieve statue of Hua. During the Spring and Autumn period, there were ample of successful cases of conversion from Yi to Hua. In Gu Liang Zhuan, case of Wu is recorded that “Wu was state of Yi and Di originally and its people cut their hair and get tattooed. Duke of Wu wanted to request hats and clothes from Zhou emperor by reliance on ritual of Lu and power of Jin. By sending tribute to Zhou and revering Zhou emperor, Wu conversed into a Chinese state (Chunqiu Guliangzhuan Zhushu 2000: 396~397).” And barbarian states’ pursuit of conversion into Hua and attainment of Chinese education is well reflected in Shang Shu. It writes: “western Yi is unsatisfied with Chinese expedition towards east and northern Di is unsatisfied with Chinese expedition towards south, because they complain why China leave them later [to be civilized] (Shangshu Zhengyi 2000: 235).”

However, as discussed above, cultural criterion has been more referred by alien states or alien Chinese states for justify their regime since China entered into imperial time. Whether such cultural conversion was a fact rather than a myth remains controversial. If China is taken as a political unit and identity of China as Hua as a symbol differentiating China and its neighbors, there will be not room for conversion from Yi to Hua or from Hua to Yi. Instead, Hua was an inherent identity, despite self-orientation of China, which had been identified and then reinforced by an extremely time-consuming process since ancient times within which China interacted with its neighbors who was viewed by China as barbarian first for their different mode of life and production and their ethnicity and, after achievement of China in material and cultural terms, for their subordination of culture and absence of ritual of China. On the other hand, state as Yi, which had not capacity to join
the competition of unification or invasion of Central Plains, had little ambition to transform into Hua, a typical sign of which was their persistent conservation of their own traditions, conventions and culture. Admittedly, state of Yi identity, which possessed material capacity to invade and even unified partial Central Plains, like Liao Dynasty and Jin Dynasty, or whole Central Plains, like Yuan Dynasty and Qing Dynasty, will tried their best to verify their Hua identity, which was in the form of plural Hua identities when complete unification of China was impossible, and which was in the form of mixed Hua identity of Sinic traditions and norms and alien ethnic when complete unification of China turned into realization.

### 3.3 Hypothesis on Relations between Hua-Yi identity and Non-expansion Commitment

As Hua-Yi distinction is rather fixed and unchangeable, if alien Chinese Dynasties is treated as anomalies, Hua and Yi can be a pair of corresponding identities, which point to China and non-Chinese states respectively. If so, as identity inherently influences state’s preference and thus imposes self-constraint of binding-force on state’s foreign policy, Hua-Yi identity instinctively imposes certain constraints and prerogatives on both state of huaih and state of Yi identity. That is what will set up as null hypothesis here that Chinese non-expansion commitment is a result of self-constraint imposed by identity of Hua and there is a positive correlation between this commitment’s creditability and the level of acceptance of foreign states in ancient East Asia.

Additionally, hypothesis of relations between Hua-Yi identity and non-expansion commitment is built up on the basis of two assumptions, which will be taken as granted here. Before explanation of these assumptions, features of background will be stipulated first. In ancient East Asia, although which was featured as hierarchic system, anarchy was the only structural feature. It means there were no higher authorities than state and state will act according to their interest. Although Waltz defined anarchy by comparison with hierarchy (Waltz 1979: 104~107), it cannot say that these two concepts are incompatible or unable to coexist. As Lake notes, “we have not inherent reason to believe that process of establishment of authority must end in the national level. … Hierarchy is still the fact of international politics (Lake 2013: 1,2).” Furthermore, English School has paid substantial efforts in reconciling international society of anarchic world and hegemony, which implies hierarchy. For example, Clark stressed the importance of legitimacy of hegemony conferred by the member of international society (Clark 2011: 15~70). Kang even says more directly that “hierarchy involves a rank order of states, and anarchy and hierarchy are not incompatible (Kang 2010b: 591).” In sum, anarchy will be treated as the only structural feature of ancient East Asian system, within which
hierarchic relations between China and its tributaries is more like a result of prolonged process of social, political and military intercourse, through which respective identity will be reinforced by force or willingly.

3.3.1 First Assumptions: Hua-Yi Identity and Fundamental Institutions

The first assumption is that Hua-Yi distinction is the underlying principle of Chinese foreign policy. Hua-Yi distinction means China and alien states should act according to fixed rules, norms and conventions, that is, according with ritual. Generally speaking, as Hua means superiority, China should take the role of centricity and lead the world into right direction, while, as Yi means subordination, alien states should submit to China and long for Chinese civilization and moralization. Practically, it means all international institutions set up by China is based on responsibilities and prerogatives originated from Hua-Yi identity. Roughly speaking, there were three fundamental institutions in ancient East Asia. First, tributary institution, a well discussed one, functions for establishment foreign relations between China and alien state through which alien states pay their submission to China. In nature, Hua-Yi identity means a hierarchic relationship between China and alien states and if alien states want to establish foreign relations with China they should meet certain obligations like subjects or vassals to emperor according to requirement of Chinese traditions, which are embodied as a set of complicate and meticulous rites, such as kowtow, the most famous but unacceptable one for the Western states. Furthermore, in the process of tribute, according to Han’s research, there are two more impacts on the tributaries. One is that they can feel Chinese powerfulness and prosperity, while another one is that they can absorb Chinese culture and technology (Han 2009: 31~44). Although in the view of Fairbank, tribute and trade were two side of a coin of relations between China and alien states (Faribank 1941; Fairbank 1942), tribute doesn’t include more than subordinate states’ reverence to China and willingness to accept Chinese education for its superior culture. After detailed research on Sino-Korean tributary relations, Chun points out that reason for maintenance of tributary institution, rarely profitable for China, is better explained by political factors instead of economic or cultural factors. In his word, the purpose of China to maintain tributary relations with Korea was for ensuring Korean obedience to China (Chun 1968: 109~111). However, tributary institution was embedded with a potentially destructive factor innately. As Chan warns, “Chinese feudal dynasties wanted to realized the purpose that all barbarian paid their submission to China through tribute and investiture institution and they only cared for realization of Confucian value of ritual and morality; however, in the view of tributaries, they paid more attention to material benefits from trade during tribute and investiture trip when they accepted
morally acculturation by rule in ritual (Chan 1996: 220).” It may be true that relations between China and alien states during Ming and Qing Dynasty can be consistent with Fairbank’s tribute-trade paradigm, which focused merely on this ear, as a result of the innately adverse factors and variation of Hua-Yi identity.

The second one is investiture institution. Unlike tribute, investiture is more like bestowal from benign the son of Heaven, on one hand, because state of Yi identity get itself legitimate from China’s investiture in ancient East Asian system and, on the other hand, because these states should use the seal to verify that themselves were included into Chinese world order and therefore they were qualified for diplomatic relations with China. The most extremely case of investiture’s impact of conferring legitimacy was Ryukyu during Qing Dynasty. Since 1609 Japanese expeditious invasion of Ryukyu within 2 months, Ryukyu was submitted to Satsuma although it remained formal independence, which was designed by Japan for the purpose of utilization of Ryukyu as a transfer station for trade between China and Japan for Japan was absence of sanction from China to trade. As a result, Ryukyu became vassal of both Japan and China, although its relations with the former are more substantial and coercive than with the latter (Sakai 1968). However, double-vassal status did little to investiture of Ryukyu, for which cost of sending a tribute mission did matter. As a result of expensiveness of request for investiture, Ryukyu was always delay its trip for investiture. Therefore, even though new king ascended the throne, he cannot proclaim himself as king but as heir apparent for its illegitimate status in ancient East Asian system. As Ch’en notes, “investiture was a ritual without relations with political authority of king and it functioned merely to confirm the position of king (Ch’en 1968: 138).” However, if time went backward to 5th century, Chinese investiture was important for political authority when alien states were in process of state-building. The most impressive case is Japan, a wanderer of ancient East Asian system. According to Chinese official history. From 421 to 50216, there were 10 tribute missions sent by Japan, 8 times out of which was involved in investiture. However, tribute mission disappeared after the last tribute mission in 502. Regarding to the reason, Nishijima offers three tentative explanations, one of which is that “given Japanese domestic change in terms of political situation and consciousness of state, it became impossible or unnecessary to send tribute mission (Nishijima 1985: 65).” As Japan had finished state-building roughly in the end of 5th century, legitimacy was derived from domestic consciousness as an independent state rather than from Chinese recognition. On the other hand, through investiture,

16 Although the first time Japan sent tribute mission to China was recorded in 413, according to analysis of Sakamoto Yoshitane and Nishijima Sadao, as there was no request for investiture from “Japanese” envoy, it may be a tribute mission made up by Japanese captives of Koguryo for the sake of display of its strength (Nishijima 1985: 59).
tributaries were ranked by China according to bestowed title, which was correspondent to Chinese domestic official title, most often, titles of generals. Through investing foreign sovereigns or their subjects with domestic official title, China intended to transform foreign sovereigns from external vassals into internal vassals (Gao 2008: 51–55, 116–121). The higher title China invested them with, the higher rank they are. For example, the first investiture for Japan in 421 was Andong General of third rank and the second-to-last investiture was Zhendong Great General of second rank, which means that Japan heighted its status in ancient East Asian system.

Expeditionary institution is the last one, which was taken into action when ritual order was breached by alien states. As discussed above in the part of punitive expedition detailedly, there will be added something untouched briefly here. If tribute and investiture are institutions designed for facilitating operation of ancient East Asia system, punitive expedition is design for rectifying and recovering deviation of ancient East Asia system, which means, generally, stabilization of system by force in case of revisionist with ambitions to change the status quo or to myopically grab material interests or disobedient state without observation of ritual requirement originated from its identity. For example, in diplomatic edict of emperor Wen of Sui to Paekche, it writes: “in previous years, as Koguryo didn’t fulfill its duty as a vassal to sent tribute as a sign of vassal’s loss of ritual, I ordered my general to wage a punitive expedition against it. For fear of expedition, Gao Yuan [then king of Koguryo] sent envoy to hand over diplomatic documents to show their submission and to beg for apology. Therefore, I pardoned it and stop such expedition (Wei etc. 1982: 1819).” From this edict, it can be found that military method is the last resort when other kinds of methods, including deterrence, were invalid. Furthermore, punitive expedition’s applicable objects include both tributary sates and non-tributary states. For example, in court discussion, emperor Xuan of Tang Dynasty said: “king of Tibet’s diplomatic documents to me was in an arrogant tone and thus discourteous so that I want to send a punitive expedition against it and there is no room for peace (Liu etc. 1975: 5230).” Last, punitive expedition even functioned to keep state from destruction or help state to restore after its destruction. For example, in 285, Fuyu was destroyed by Murong Wei, and its king committed suicide and king’s sons and brothers flee to Wozu and defensed themselves there. Fortunately, under Jin’s positive military assistance, Yi Luo recovered Fuyu. Regarding to the reason Jin decided to help Fuyu to restore its state, edict of emperor Wu of Jin Dynasty said: “Fuyu for generations observe loyalty and filiation, but it was destroyed by Murong Wei. I am so pity for it. If there were residual people of Fuyu who can fulfill restoration of Fuyu, we should plan for them for the purpose of survival of Fuyu (Fang, etc. 1974: 2532).”
3.3.2 Second Assumption: Maintain Distance of Hua from Yi

Although great ambition of moralization of Yi and thus transformation of Yi into Hua was included in Confucian classic texts and imperial aspiring rhetoric, in practice, keeping state of Yi away from the Chinese was always the most important idea of imperial China. In Gong Yang Zhuan, it writes: “true king doesn’t rule barbarian. When Lu Rong comes, we don’t shut him out, but when he goes away, we don’t chase him ( Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan Zhushu 2000: 35).” That is, whether there will be intercourse between China and alien states is determined by whether alien states are willing to observe Chinese rule, norms, and institutions. If so, relations will be established; if not, China will not ambitiously force alien states to join Chinese world order. Furthermore, to some extent, fundamental institutions designed by China functioned to maintain appropriate distance between China and alien state in case of too frequent intercourse between China and alien states. For example, frequency of tribute embassies was strictly required by China according to the rank of state in ancient East Asian system. If alien states held a higher rank, it could send more frequent tribute mission to China, and vice versa. For example, in Qing’s regulation of tribute, Korea can send tribute mission annually but Burma can send tribute mission every ten years (Wang and He 2014:114~116).

Originally, Hua-Yi distinction implied fixed zones resided by the Chinese and barbarians, which is called Jifu (Zones) theory. As Yü notes, “according to this [five-zone (wu-fu)] theory, China since the Hsia Dynasty had been divided into five concentric and hierarchical zones or areas (Yü 1986: 379).” There are three different versions of Jifu theory. First, in Guo Yu (The Discourses of the States), it specified 5 zones in the word of Moufu who wanted to admonish King Mu to give up expedition against Quan Rong. Moufu said: “according to the deceased kings’ regulation, Dian Fu (the central zone) is within Wang Ji (zone of king), Hou Fu (the lords’ zone) is outside Wang Ji, Bin Fu (the guest zone) is outside Hou Fu, Yao Fu (the controlled zone) is zone of Man and Yi, and Huang Fu (the wild zone) is zone of Rong and Di (Wu 1994: 1)” Although Moufu differentiated five zones, he had not specified the size of each zone. This gap was filled by Shang Shu (The Book of History). In Shang Shu, size of each zone is defined as 500 li, but, in its specification, Bin Fu is replaced by Sui Fu (the pacified zone) (Shangshu Zhengyi 2000: 199~204). The last version is recorded in Zhou Li (The Rite of Zhou). Zhou Li extends it to nine zones, that is, from inner to outer, Wang Ji, Hou Fu or Hou Ji, Dian Fu or Dian Ji, Nan Fu or Nan Ji, Cai Fu or Cai Ji, Wei Fu or Wei Ji, Man Fu or Man Ji, Yi Fu or Yi Ji, Zhen Fu or Zhen Ji, and Fan Fu or Fan Ji. Except Wang Ji

17 At first, Korea can send tribute mission four times per year, but later was adjusted into one time per year.
whose size is 1000 li, other zones’ size is 500 li (Zhouli Zhushu 2000: 897, 1030). Correspondingly, each zone is intrinsically embedded with certain obligations, generally, tribute missions. And it can be seen as ancient mode of tributary institution. However, this division of areas is more like an ideal situation and, with Qin’s unification of China and expansion southwards, territory of China was far larger than the presumed size of five or nine zones. But it also matters for it reveals the basis idea of China about how to deal with its barbarian neighbors.

With expansion in early stages of imperial China and immigration of barbarian to Central Plains, a new question emerged. As so many barbarian moved to Central Plains, how to maintain a clear borderline between China and alien states confused Chinese Dynasties. There are two basic views. First, ambitiously, it believed convergence of Hua and Yi is possible by incorporation, if not invasion, of Yi into Hua. And this view can be seen as by-product of Chinese relative predominance of material power. For example, emperor Wu of Han Dynasty waged expedition against Xiongnu and, as a positive consequence, China incorporated a large part of Western Region. However, this view was not always the mainstream of China, compared to the second view that barbarian should be expelled from China. The most typical expression of dislodgement is in Jiang Tong’s Xi Rong Lun (On Dislodgement of Rong). In the background that Men Guan defeated and captured Qi Wannian, commander of Di Qiang as a reaction to Qiang’s frequent harassment against China’s frontier, Jiang was worried about that China would be overturned by Si Yi (Yi from surrounding) and thus wrote down this work. In Jiang’s word,

“According to implication of Chun Qiu (The Spring and Autumn Annals), intimacy should be paid for Hua but distance should be kept from Yi. Because their languages and currencies is different from ours and their rites, laws and conventions are weird and of odd kinds, or partly because they live in the remote areas where are featured as dangerous rivers and precipitous valleys and so far from China that there is seldom interaction between us and them, and it’s impossible to collect tax from them and to apply our calendar there, therefore, it’s said that ‘the Way of the son of Heaven is defence against Yi.’ … Therefore, emperor of the Way should keep an alert mind and be on guard ordinarily in dealing with Yi and Di. Even though they kneel and pay tribute, defence of frontier should not be slack. Even though they arouse unrest and commit crime, punitive expedition is not recommendable. The only hope is pacification of China and avoidance of invasion against frontier (Fang 1974 1529–1530).”

However, Jiang’s suggestion was not adopted by emperor. Chen may be point out the fundamental reason for emperor’s hesitation in dislodgement of alien populace. He thinks: “it’s a long time for Yi
and Di who immigrated into China Proper, to live with Han people and to be sinicized. If they were forced to come back to their homeland and then were isolated from Han people, it would lead to unrest and turmoil (Wang 2000: 81).” But the consequence of disorder brought about by barbarian verified Jiang’s insightful view. In practice, idea of dislodgement of Yi played a more important and practical role in ancient China, no matter China was strong or weak.

Another implication of maintenance of distance from Yi is that China had no ambition to change Yi. As discussed above, the Chinese believed that nature of Yi was unchangeable, although ambitious rhetoric hoped for their moralization and education with help of China. Unchangeability of nature of Yi thus became a key in Chinese foreign policy towards Yi. It is reflected typically in the edict of emperor Yang of Sui Dynasty for negative reply of request to emulation of Hua from Qimin, Khan of Turks. The edict writes:

“When deceased emperors established dynasties, they made conventions and customs of Hua and Yi respectively different. Sage educates subjects without requirement of changing their conventions. … Deceased emperors educated barbarian in accordance with native conventions and customs and thus the Great Way of deceased emperors enhanced and spread. Why should it require other ethnic nations to change their clothes and accessories? This is the principle of adherence to respective nature and reflects Chinese inclusive manner. Difference of clothes not only highlights the difference between Hua and Yi, but also reflects actual situations of the world (Wei etc. 1973:1874).”

Intentional maintenance of difference between Hua and Yi is extension of maintenance of distance from Yi. Apparent difference, reflected in clothes, hats, languages, customs, conventions and so on, functions, along with traditionally view about superiority of Hua to Yi, as active barrier keeping the Chinese from interacting with Yi. Furthermore, China seldom actively extended its administrative institutions to its new territory from invasion of Yi, even though these areas were, to some extent, important as buffer zone for China to defense against barbarian raid or invasion. Instead, China will build up Jimi (lose rein) institutions to administer these exotic territories.

Regarding to nature of Jimi institutions, some scholars stress its importance for transforming alien states as external vassal into internal vassal as a result of their relations with China being incorporated into state system. For example, Gao writes: “political order between central government and local government [that is, Jimi prefectures and counties] is Tianxia order and, in narrow terms, state order (Gao 2008: 34).” Han points out that Jimi prefectures and counties functions for changing them into internal vassals by bestowing them domestic official position (Han
Furthermore, Cheng lists four criteria, to prove that *Jimi* prefectures and counties. According to Cheng, these four criteria are “whether be incorporated in local administrative system,” “being the subject of central dynasty or being independent vassal state,” “whether there is political relationship of subordination,” and “whether developing into establishment of ethnic area or being replaced by treaty system (Cheng 2014).” As *Jimi* prefectures and counties are incorporated in local administrative system, are the subject of central dynasty, hold subordinate relations with China, develop into establishment of ethnic area, they are the “inner ring” of tribute system different from “outer ring” that should be treated as foreign states.

However, above opinions pay excessive emphasis either on Chinese political rhetoric about Chinese inclusiveness and borderless or on how to apply contemporary nationalism to explain ancient Chinese political ecology despite risking dressing ancient political unit, imperial China, strangely in modern clothes. For example, Cheng instantiate her judgment that *Jimi* prefectures and counties are incorporated in local administrative system by reference to two kinds of acceptance of tribute. She holds states paying their tribute to local government in the frontier zone are incorporated in local administrative system and uses Japan giving its tribute to the Court as a typical example. However, frontier government manage tribute was common in ancient China. Furthermore, Japanese direct tribute happened in the early time of emperor Guangwu’s establishment of Later Han Dynasty, which required alien states’ tribute to show its superiority and legitimacy. And except for this time, there was no another tribute sent by Japan until Wei Dynasty.

Therefore, how to determine the nature of *Jimi* institution should referred to how the ancient Chinese treated it in the form of reading Chinese official history’s introduction about it. Fortunately, *Xin Tang Shu* (*New History of Tang Dynasty*), an official history finished by Song officials, offers an interpretative description. It writes:

> “When Tang rose, it paid little attentions to barbarians in the beginning. [However,] since emperor Taizong pacified [Eastern] Turks, states in the northwest and Man Yi paid their submission to the Court gradually. Therefore, prefectures and counties were established in their tribes. Prefecture-generals will be established in bigger ones of them where leaders of barbarians hold the post of *Du Du* (military governor) or *Ci Shi* (prefectural governor) and these posts were hereditary. Although there was no need for them to hand over taxation and census register to the Court, military or prefectural governors should write down education and policy from the Court in decrees (Ouyang and Song 1975: 1119).”

According to the text, there is little different between rhetoric of Chinese education for alien states
and rhetoric on relations between Jimi area and China. On one hand, posts of leaders are hereditary but need to be invested by emperor, which is the same as investiture for alien rulers by Chinese emperor. On the other hand, since these Jimi areas can keep their taxation and census register, in addition to their rulers’ political authority, they possess a complete set of political, economic and cultural “sovereignty”. Therefore, they can be treated as independent units. As Yang notes, “these Jimi prefectures and counties nominally belong to system of prefectures and counties constructing frontier zone, but they are indeed a kind of feudal system in frontier zone (Yang 1968: 31–33).” Rather than incorporation of them into Chinese administrative system, Jimi institution is more like Chinese traditional foreign policy --- yi i zhi i (utilizing barbarians to control barbarians). Therefore, Jimi prefectures and counties will be treated as independent states de facto with majority of sovereignty, regardless of their nominal incorporation as Chinese local administrative unit.

However, a caveat should be emphasized here. In Chinese thought of logic, “correlativity” is in a predominant place (Hall and Ames 1998: 235). Although China intentionally kept a distance from barbarian states, it needed them to participate the international system constructed by China. As Qin emphasizes, “actors that are not in relations are non-actors and event that are not in process are non-existent (Qin 2010: 138).” Ancient East Asia is the same case. Without state with Yi identity, there is no state with Hua identity. On one hand, although it requires at least 2 states in constructing international system suggested by Bull (Bull 2002: 9), a well-functioning international system should include states locating in the system as many as possible. If not, institutions and norms losses its supposing functions. For example, according to punitive expedition, China needs to mediate two conflicting states and tries to pacify their dispute. But if one side of conflictual parties is detached from Chinese world order, there is no way for China to cease the potential escalation into bloody war. On the other hand, reverence from tributary states is one aspect of legitimacy of Chinese Dynasties. If there is destitute of tribute relations between China and foreign states, Chinese Dynasties, viewing itself as successor from precedent Chinese Dynasties, which can be traced back to Zhou Dynasty, will face dilemma of domestic identity. Furthermore, as Hua-Yi identity is originated from Chinese domestic identity, or self-identification, dilemma of domestic identity will weaken its gravitational status. Therefore, China will try its best to include surrounding or remote states as many as possible. For example, since Song lacked material, especially military, advantage vis-à-vis Liao Dynasty and later Jin Dynasty, it turned to the states overseas, which were unprecedentedly important for China. Another typical case is Admiral Zheng He’s maritime expedition in Ming Dynasty, through which substantial states were formally incorporated into Chinese world order, despise its character of self-deceit.
In sum, while China concentrated on construction of ancient East Asian hierarchic system where China as centricity was surrounding by alien states, China tried its best to escape too frequent interaction with alien states not only for self-consciousness of superiority but only for maintenance of security from its immoderate neighbors. And this type of inclusiveness of Chinese foreign policy is termed here as ‘limited inclusiveness’.

3.3.3 Hypothesis on Chinese Non-Expansion Commitment

According to above two assumptions, I put forward the null hypothesis here that Chinese non-expansion commitment was determined by its idea about Hua-Yi identity. As long as China preserved its self-identification as Hua, China will seldom progressively and ambitiously extend its direct control over domain of Yi.

However, this self-constraint doesn’t exclude possibility that China will exert its influence over domain of Yi in order to make sure its frontier zone pacified and stable. But this type of extension of influence is more like monarch-subject relationship between emperor of China and sovereign of its tributaries than suzerain-vassal relationship between China and its tributaries. Through establishment of individual relationship, China incorporates foreign states into an integrated but hierarchic international system, where emperor of China, the son of Heaven, is the only authority whose status came from appointment from the Heaven. Therefore, in theory, there is no need for China to annex foreign states’ territory, because monarchs of foreign states are appointed by China to rule their states. As they are appointed by China, they should bear the obligations like subjects, that is, tribute, and their status should be legitimized by China, that is, investiture. If they want to breach the monarch-subject hierarchic relations, China will try to recovery it while imposing punishment on the obedient states, that is, punitive expedition. On the other hand, China will escape from expansion over foreign states for its intentional maintenance of distance from barbarian. Although individual relations between emperor of China and monarchs of foreign states are established, there will be no direct projection of authority or influence of Chinese emperor to subjects and populace of foreign states. Preservation of individual relations can escape from frequent interactions between common peoples from both sides, although it became more like myth after trade’s importance grew and increasing growth of the Chinese started to do business. Last but not least, as hierarchic relations between China and its tributaries is in individual level, it imposes little, if not totally no, substantial control or inference to domestic and foreign affairs of foreign states, which, in turn, makes submission to China less humiliated and, to some extent, acceptable or pursuable for foreign stats, who could get protection from military assistance of China and profit from trade with China.
Unlike Kang’s assertion that there was formal hierarchy but substantial equality in ancient East Asia (Kang 2003a: 67; Kang 2010a: 54), I prefer to say that there was ritual and formal relationship in the form of hierarchy in the individual level, although in ancient East Asia this individual, emperor of China or sovereign of foreign states, represented or was equated to his state in nature, but there was equal and mutually independent relations between China and alien states in the international level. On one hand, that the hierarchic relations were established between heads of states implies China was superior to all its tributaries. On the other hand, this superiority was ritual and formal and it could not extend downwards into domestic and foreign affairs of its tributaries. Furthermore, as China achieve its ultimate ideal of and necessary legitimization by bing tianxia (unification of the world) through ideationally absorption of foreign states into China as a result of their sovereign being Chinese subject, there is no need to risk militarily invade and then annex foreign states. However, if this type of relationship is absent, China will actively lure or force alien states to establish relations with China, such Admiral Zheng He’s maritime expedition. Still, it also excludes invasion and annexation for what China needs is tributaries’ recognition of Chinese superiority and thus submission to Chinese as a sign of monarchic relations of hierarchy between China and its tributaries.

Regarding to creditability of this non-expansion commitment, there is positive correlation between it and level of acceptance of Hua-Yi identity. That is, the higher level foreign states’ acceptance of Yi identity is, the higher creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment is as a result of less threat that they perceive from China.

Concerning the level of acceptance of Hua-Yi identity, there is no need to question the level of Chinese acceptance of Hua, because Hua is considered as intrinsic feature of China by the Chinese. For alien states, two criteria are applied to determine their level. They are observation of fundamental institutions of ancient East Asia, tributary institution and investiture institution, and acculturation of Chinese culture and Confucianism. I define three levels of alien states’ acceptance of Yi identity, that is, internalization, acknowledgement, and utilization. If certain alien state meets both criteria, it will be classified as the first level, internalization. Specifically, for accordance with the first criterion, it should observe both fundamental institutions. On one hand, it should send tribute to China to express its submission; on the other hand, it should request Chinese investiture, adopt Chinese reign-title and use seals bestowed from China to show their inclusion of Chinese world order. For accordance with the latter, it should use Chinese characters, learn Confucianism, establish bureaucratic system like China, etc. As it internalizes Hua-Yi identity, it will perform itself according to interest originated from its identity. The deeper they acculturate itself to Chinese...
culture, the more likely they perform in accordance with Yi identity. As Chinese culture inherently expresses Chinese disinterests in territorial annexation but willingness to educate and moralize barbarian to get them civilized, the deeply acculturated first level states will feel little or no threat from China. As a similar case in contemporary international relations, Dominica was destitute of worry about American annexation when its identity was subordination because it takes American commitment originated from “relational authority contract” as granted (Lake 2013: 3–7). In same token, state in the level of internalization will not fear for Chinese annexation because it takes Chinese non-expansion commitment as granted. Therefore, non-expansion commitment is accepted in the highest level.

The second level is acknowledgement, which means states in this level view acceptance of Yi as a result of their recognition of Chinese superiority. The decisive difference between the first level and the second level is whether state recognizes Chinese superiority in terms of material and culture meanwhile. If so, state will be treated as the first level. Because Chinese culture and Confucianism intrinsically includes implication of superiority of China and subordination of alien states, once alien states start to acculturate and then internalize Chinese culture and Confucianism, they will change their identification of what they are intrinsically and profoundly. It can be said that since they imitate and learn Chinese culture these states have change their type identity, which help to build up collective identity between them and China. However, if they only recognize Chinese material predominance but reject or be indifferent to Chinese cultural ascendancy, they accept Yi identity as a result of cost-benefit calculation. To some degree, what they do is bangwagoning that means states inactively ally with the potential expansionist state of incomparable power for the sake of avoidance from invasion. As Walt points out, “states are attracted to strength (Walt 1990: 20).” If the potential expansionist state seems more powerful and its material advantage is more accepted by small states, they will more likely to ally with great power even in an unequal form. It is the same logic for the second level states. That they submit to China and take Hua-Yi identity when they interact with China is the result of their trust of Chinese formidableness and their pragmatic strategy of confirmation of security that carter to Chinese rhetorical and ideological assertion. Concretely speaking, if states are in the second level, they need to observe two fundamental institutions, that is, tributary institution and investiture institution. However, the purpose of observation of these institutions is a bit different from the first level. Display of their submission through tribute mission and adoption of Chinese investiture is more for appeasing China, by which they can avoid Chinese military exploitation and attain opportunity to get benefit from trade with China. As their acceptance of Yi identity is based on material comparison, if they perceive that they can get more from
disobedience or China undergoes decline so that there is no need to fear Chinese potential invasion, they may be predisposed to take more aggressive and rapacious acts. That is why nomadic states’ policy toward China is so conditional that they only submit to power instead of education and moralization of China. Although the second level can be lifted up into the first level by acculturation, it was rare case in 2000 years of imperial history of China. Therefore, creditability of non-expansion commitment perceived by the second level states is rather low.

The third level is utilization of Hua-Yi identity for sake of entrance of Chinese world order. Because China only established diplomatic relations with its tributaries, there is not choice but to send tribute as a sign of paying submission to China if alien states want to trade with China. Therefore, states that only pay tribute mission to China can be classified as the third level. However, this type of states seems to feel less threat from China because of their remote location from China. Therefore, they seldom care about Chinese potential invasion. In their view, submission or acceptance of Yi identity is more like etiquette or requirement for trade. Consequently, non-expansion commitment is seldom important for them and creditability of non-expansion commitment is the lowest.

Regarding to three levels, Japan can be served as a classic case about change in these levels. Before Sui Dynasty, Japan can be classified as the first level state. However, from Sui Dynasty to Japanese retreat from Chinese world order in mid-Tang Dynasty, it can be classified as the third level as a result of completion of state-building and emergence of national consciousness (Nishijima 1985: 166~180). After its retreat, Japanese broke away from Chinese world order, which was reflected its intention for competition with China for Zhongguo (Central Kingdom) and was unraveled by its ambition to annex China by first incorporation of Korea, which was broken as its failure in the Imjin War. However, in period of Ashikaga Shogunate, Japan came back to Chinese world order but stood as the third level for economic purpose mainly. After Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s death shortly before Japanese’s failure in the Imjin War and Tokugawa Ieyasu’s establishment of Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan once again broke away from Chinese world order though it kept economic relations with China through indirect ways.

Chapter 4: Methodology

In above chapter, I put forward two hypotheses that will be examined in the next Chapter both quantitatively. In the first hypothesis, I focus on the positive correlation between Hua-Yi identity and Chinese commitment. Specifically, if China find itself responsible for obligations originated from Hua identity, it will constrain itself from invasion and annexation. Therefore, China will
promise its non-expansion commitment. In the second hypothesis, I concentrate on the correlation between Hua-Yi identity and alien states’ perception of creditability of Chinese commitment. Specifically, if alien states accept Yi identity, they will feel little, if not totally no, threat from China as a result of their trust of Chinese non-expansion commitment. Moreover, as different alien states accept Yi identity in different level respective, I further propose that there exists positive correlation between levels of thier acceptance of Yi identity and degree of their perception of creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment. That is, the higher level their acceptance is, the higher creditability their perception of Chinese non-expansion commitment will be.

In order to examine my two hypotheses, I frame my method of examination into four parts. In the first part, I will choose one section of historical period as my case study’s object and explain why I do so. In the second part, I will classify war within the selective time period into 2 groups according to intention of China, intentional war and unintentional war. And both kinds of war possess possibility of territorial expansion of China. In the third part, I will specify how I calculate the efficiency of two correlation suggested by me.

4.1 Selection of Case

Since Shang Dynasty, Hua-Yi distinction has been created by the Chinese, intentionally, for differentiation between themselves and barbarians. And Hua-Yi distinction ceased to exist after China entered the contemporary international system, which process started from Opium War in 1840s. Therefore, Hua-Yi identity had existed for nearly 3600 years. However, it was not until China was unified that Hua-Yi identity was applied as fundamental principle for foreign affairs. Although Qin was the first Dynasty unifying China, given Qin’s untimely death within 15 years, Han Dynasty can be viewed as the first Chinese Dynasty applying Hua-Yi identity for foreign relations. Therefore, timeline of Hua-Yi identity in foreign affairs provides only 2000 years for research of data.

Within 2000 years of imperial China, given uniqueness of China, only Chinese Dynasties of unification of whole China will be taken into consideration. Because ‘Great Unity’ theory was so rooted at the Chinese that each Chinese Dynasties treated unification of whole China as their ultimate goal, which implied that relations between these split dynasties were not international relations but like relations between different parties of civil war. Before unification, each Chinese Dynasties tried their best to destroy its rivals and to annex their territories and thus the situation in split period of China was like state of nature. But when unification was achieved, recognition and, to some extent, promise of other states’ existence was the leading nature, which can be viewed as beyond Lockean culture but under Kantian Culture. As Meng points out, “the premise for taking
inter-state relations of ancient Chinese as data into examination of international relations theory is fully understanding of nature of inter-state relations in different periods of ancient China (Meng 2012: 26).” Therefore, differentiation between unified Dynasties and split Dynasties is in place. From Han Dynasty to Qing Dynasty, there are only five unified Dynasties: Han Dynasty, Western Jin Dynasty, Sui Dynasty, Tang Dynasty, Yuan Dynasty and Qing Dynasty. Regarding to Ming Dynasty, although scholars tend to treat is as the start point of complete tribute system and to pay most attention to it for the sake of discovery of mystery of Chinese foreign relations (Fairbank and Têng 1941; Fairbank 1942; Kang 2010a; Kang 2010b; Kang 2012), it cannot be treated as unified for that it competed with Northern Yuan Dynasty, the successive Dynasty of Yuan Dynasty overrun by Ming (Hu 1984; Meng 2012).

Within these seven unified Dynasties, given this thesis focuses on Hua-Yi identity, which is related to ethnic as discussed above, differentiation of ethnicity of Chinese Dynasties is in place. According to ethnicity, Chinese Dynasties are classified into two groups, one of which is Han Chinese Dynasties established by the Chinese, another of which is alien Chinese Dynasties established by barbarians, such as Mongol, Jurchen, etc. As discussed above, no matter how successful alien Chinese Dynasties were in recognition by the Chinese as orthodox dynasties successive from deceased Han Chinese Dynasties, identity issue was always a sensitive and fatal. Furthermore, during alien Chinese Dynasties, identity of Hua was in a mixed form, which was far different from its prototype although traditional idea on Hua-Yi identity didn’t exclude it. Therefore, in order to keep the unique variable as clear and undisturbed as possible, only Han Chinese Dynasties will be taken into considerations. Consequently, only three dynasties are left: Han Dynasty, Western Jin Dynasty, Sui Dynasty, Tang Dynasty.

In order to avoid criticism about Chinese incapacity of military projection and territorial annexation, Western Jin Dynasty will be intentionally omitted. Although Western Jin Dynasty succeeded in unification of China in 265 by defeating and consequently annexing Shu Dynasty and Wu Dynasty, alien state took advantages of cleavage of Jin Courts from 291 to 306, 26 years after its unification, which was expressed as the devastating War of the Eight Princes, and opportunistically entered into Central Plain. Therefore, Western Jin’s unification was just a flash in the pan. And capacity of the residual three candidates to project their expeditionary armies and to expand northwards, westwards, and even eastwards was reflected by their military activities. According to the statistics in the table 1-1, number of war waged by China intentionally in Han, Sui and Tang Dynasties are 54, 14 and 47 respectively.

Within these three dynasties, only Tang Dynasty will be selected as case in this thesis. First,
regarding to Han Dynasty, Chinese foreign policy was in the process of creation, modulation and accommodation. In other word, a complete and rather stable model of foreign relations was far from formation. One classic example for it is Han’s change of foreign policy after Emperor Wu from aggressive expansion to benign and defensive rule in ritual. And the latter one was gradually confirmed as the fundamental and principal model of Chinese foreign polity. Second, as Sui Dynasty, the most short-lived unified Dynasty except Qin Dynasty, died within 38 years, and Sui was more aggressive than other Han Chinese Dynasties, which led to its early death, therefore, in order to keep a rather persuasive and classic examination, Sui Dynasty will be omitted as well. Last but not least, in case of criticism on Chinese incapacity of military projection and territorial expansion, only a segment of period of Tang Dynasty will be examined here. Before Emperor Taizong (626–649), Tang proceeded in stabilization and recovery, and after Emperor Xuanzong changed its reign title from Kaiyuan (713–741) to Tianbao in 742, Tang started its decline and one of most significant turning point of Tang’s decline was An Lushan Rebellion from 755 to 763. Therefore, I will examine 116 years’ wars from 626 to 741, that is early period of Tang Dynasty.

Although some scholars hesitate to use Dynasties before Vietnam’s independence in 1070 for the sake of inclusion of all alleged Confucian states into analysis (Kelly 2012: 414), as whether alien states were Confucian or not is not the core nature of variable, this worry is absent here. Admittedly, acculturation of Confucianism serves as a criterion for degree of their acceptance of Hua-Yi identity. But this criterion is not the most important variable here, and its function is not more than classification of states into different groups. Another caveat put forward by scholar is historical records’ completion and diversity (Krasner 2001). There is no doubt that study of ancient East Asia is based on resources written by the Chinese to large extent, which cannot avoid being mixed by bias of the Chinese and whitewashed by certain political purposes of them as a result of the above discussed biographical narrative. This worry is absent here as well, because only war data will be examined quantitatively here and there will be little effort to deeply refer to historical record.

4.2 Classification of Wars

According to initiators of wars, wars in examination will be classified into two groups: unintentional wars and intentional wars. Unintentional wars, like war of self-defense, means wars waged by China as reaction against alien states’ harassments, raids, plunders and attacks. However there raises a question here whether harassments, raids and plunders can be treated as wars (Kang 2012: 88–89), because nomadic states aimed at economic profits rather than invading China (Perdue 2005: 518–546; Kang 2012: 141–142). However, all military clashes between China and alien states
will be treated as wars here, because it is not easy to determine whether this war includes territorial ambition originally or with successful process before the end of war. For example, China may defensed itself by sending armies to fight against alien force. On the other hand, intentional wars are wars waged by China deliberately for certain purposes, such as military assistance for its tributaries suffering invasion, punishment of obedient states, stabilization of region and pacification of disputes, annexation of territory.

Although it seems more possible that intentional wars will lead to expansion of China, here, both kinds wars are possible for territorial annexation. For intentional wars, China might wage a war for territorial purpose though in its rhetoric this purpose was under a veil all the time. For unintentional wars, territorial expansion might as a result of China’s change in strategic purpose when China succeeded in expelling and then defeating its enemies. Therefore, there are four possible endings of wars: unintentional wars without territorial expansion, unintentional wars with territorial expansion, intentional wars without territorial expansion, and intentional wars with territorial expansion.

4.3 Design for Examination of Hypotheses

In order to verify my two hypotheses, clear and operational approach will be designed as follow. As I propose that if Hua-Yi identity functions in theory, China will constrain itself from annexation of alien states. However, as I mention above, China will establish Jimi institutions for new-comings territory, which can be seen as substitute of preceding individual relations between emperor and sovereign of alien states. Through establishment Jimi institutions, the individual relations keep intact but in a different form, where China nominally possess territories of alien states but these alien states remain large part of sovereignty. Therefore, I will set up a loose criterion for verification of my first hypothesis: if percentage of wars, both intentional and unintentional, including territorial expansion is low, hypothesis that Chinese non-expansion commitment is determined by Hua-Yi identity is efficient.

Regarding to second hypothesis, I suppose different levels of acceptance of Yi identity will influence state’s perception of creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment. How to establish correlation between subjective perception of creditability of commitment and war is not an easy task. Despite that, I try to make a detour to set up this correlation. As Yi identity inherently requires states to submit to and revere China, the deeper level acceptance of Yi identity is, the fewer possibility that alien states challenge China or plunder China. In other word, if states internalize Yi identity, it will constrain itself from plundering, attacking and challenging China. If states acknowledge Yi identity as a result of their disadvantage of material power, they will plunder and attack China when they
perceive that disobedience is more profitable than obedience. Unlike the above two types of states, there is no necessary need for the third level states to consider whether Chinese commitment is creditable for their remote distance from China, which ceases their worries about invasion from China. Although, given existence of some states locating near to China but proactively retreating from Chinese world order, such as Japan and small states to the southeast of China, possibility of wars between China and the third level states exists in practice, number of wars between China and the third level states is small.

In sum, if the second hypothesis is efficient, percentage of unintentional wars between China and the first level states should be very low, despite the ideal situation being absence of unintentional wars; unintentional wars between China and the second level states will increase with material growth of these states; and there will be a bit of wars between China and the third level states.

Chapter 5: Wars During Early Period of Tang Dynasty

5.1 States interacting with Tang Dynasties

According to two criteria, observation of fundamental institutions and acculturation of Chinese culture and Confucianism, states interacting with Tang Dynasty will be classified into three types: the first level states internalizing Hua-Yi identity that will be labeled as A states, the second level states acknowledging Hua-Yi identity that will be labeled as B states, and the third level states utilizing Hua-Yi identity that will be labeled as C states. According to Gao’s statistics, there were 107 states recorded in official historical resources of Tang Dynasty (2008: Gao 44~51). It means there were at least 107 states holding relations with Tang Dynasty. However, according to official historical resources of Tang Dynasty, I only take 88 states into account and then classify them into three types, because relations between some of omitted states and China is too rough to determine whether diplomatic relations between them and China had been established and to analyze what type of state they should be classified as, and because some of omitted states cannot be call ‘states’ but tribes of certain states. Chumi and Chuyue, for example, are tribes of Xueyantuo.

In order to classify these 88 states, I mainly refer to four official historical resources and Gao’s statistics as well. The first official historical resource is Jiu Tang Shu (Old History of Tang Dynasty; JTS for short thereafter) written by Liu Xu in 945. The main volumes on foreign states are from Volume 194 (I) to Volume 199 (II), totally 9 volumes. The second one is Xin Tang Shu (New

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History of Tang Dynasty; XTS for short thereafter)\textsuperscript{19} written by Ouyang Xiu, Song Qi, etc. in 1060.
The main volumes on foreign states are from Volume 215 (I) to Volume 222 (III), totally 14 volumes. The third one is Tong Dian (Comprehensive Institutions; TD for short thereafter)\textsuperscript{20} written by Du You in 801. The main volumes on foreign states are from Volume 185 to Volume 200, totally 16 volumes. The last one is Tang Hui Yao (Institutional History of Tang Dynasty; THY for short thereafter)\textsuperscript{21} written by Wang Pu in 961. The main volumes on foreign states are from Volume 94 to Volume 100, totally 7 volumes.

Table 5.1: States interacting with China

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<th>Names of States</th>
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\textsuperscript{19} Ouyang, Xiu and Song, Qi (1975) Xin Tang Shu (New History of Tang Dynasty), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
\textsuperscript{20} Du, You (1988) Tong Dian (Comprehensive Institutions), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.
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<td>JTS Vol. 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touhe</td>
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<td>JTS Vol. 197</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wuluohun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>JTS Vol. 199(II)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>JTS Vol. 199(II)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Xi Tianzhu (Western India)</td>
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<td>Xiasaban Guo</td>
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<td>XTS Vol. 221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yanqi Guo (Karasahr)</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
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According to Table 5-1, there are 4 first level states, 42 second level states and 42 third level states. An inescapable issue is that since Japan sent Sui ambassadors and Tang ambassadors to China for sake of learning Chinese advanced culture, political institutions and so on, why is Japan labeled as the third level? First, Japan only sent tribute mission, along with which Sui or Tang ambassadors went to China, but didn’t request for Chinese investiture. Therefore, Japanese mission to China was more for cultural purposes in order to initiate its domestic reform and process of centralization, than for political purpose. As Gao notes, “the main purpose of Japanese tribute mission should be educated and moralized by China (Gao 2008: 52).” Even though Gao’s judgment that Japan should be included into Chinese Cultural cycle is plausible, it cannot deny that there was absent of political purpose of Japan to acknowledge Chinese superiority. Second, since Sui Dynasty, Japan showed its disposition to equate itself with China (then Sui Dynasty and Tang Dynasty). It is reflected classically and obviously by its diplomatic document for Emperor Yang of Sui Dynasty and etiquette for reception of Tang’s envoys. The diplomatic document for Emperor Yang was in the form that equated Japanese emperor with Chinese emperor. In the diplomatic document, it writes: “the son of Heaven in the state that sun rises writes to the son of Heaven in the state where sun sets (Wei and Linghu 1982: 1827).” Although some scholars hold that there is no contempt but reverence expressed by the document (Han 2009: 205~209), there’s no doubt that Japan tried to challenge hierarchic relations between itself and China and to transform it into a rather equal relations tentatively, which breached Hua-Yi identity fiercely. Regarding to etiquette issue, there were two main events. The first one is argument between Gao Biaoren and Japanese king about etiquette of acceptance of seal and document. This event is recorded by both Chinese official history and Japanese official history. Both records that Gao returned without giving Japanese king seal and document (Ouyang and Song 1975: 6208; Nihon Shoki 1897: 403~404), but only Chinese official history explain the reason that Japan didn’t fulfill its ritual obligation (Ouyang and Song 1975: 6208). Another one is Japanese reception of Sun Xingjin by fanguo zhi li (etiquette of reception of barbarian), for which Gao believes it’s falsification by Japan, because only Japanese official history records it and there is no opposition of Sun recorded in Japanese official history, which is unreasonable for it.
breached Chinese traditions obviously, and because there is no relative record in Chinese official history (Gao 2006 209–213). Regarding to Japanese desire to attainment of equal status compared to China even under risk of offending China, Nishijima may offer a plausible answer. He thinks Japan’s rejection of Chinese investiture is for the sake of maintenance of superiority over Silla and Paekche, and if Japan accept Chinese investiture, Japan will be treated as equal to Silla and Paekche (Nishijima 1985: 168). That is, Japan tried to view itself equal to China and superior to Silla and Paekche in the meantime, which reflects Japanese ambitions to construct another set of Hua-Yi identity, in which Japan was Hua, despite China being Hua as well, and other states are all Yi and subordinate to Japan. Therefore, Japan had started its own process of construction of Hua-Yi world and only unwillingly but necessarily accepted Yi identity imposed by China when it interacted with China. According to above reasons, Japan will be labeled as the third level.

5.2 Measuring Wars in the early period of Tang Dynasty

In order to count the numbers of wars and analyze the natures and results of wars, two main resources will be referred to. The first one is Chinese official historical texts. Unlike counting numbers and differentiating states interacting with China, only two books, JTS and XTS, listed above will be referred to. Additionally, Zi Zhi Tong Jian (History as a Mirror; ZZTJ for short thereinafter), written by Sima Guang in 1084, will be referred to in order to supplement, rectify, and augment JTS and XTS. Another resource is Zhongguo Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao (Chronology of Wars in China Through Successive Dynasties; ZLZN for short thereinafter). ZLZN has records the vast majority of wars from legendary period to the end of Qing Dynasty. Although it provides basic description of wars, there are several inadequacies. First, it record wars briefly and sometime doesn’t write down the result of war, which is pivotal for this thesis because whether territorial annexation happened will lead to different evaluation. Second, its records are not consistent with official historical texts, though, on occasion. Last, it omits some wars. Therefore, when I mainly refer to ZLZN to outline a general framework and then count and analyze wars, I will compare it with JTS, XTS and ZZTJ in order to complement, rectify and amplify it.

According to above resources, during the selected time range, there were 82 wars in ancient East Asia. However, 10 wars within them are either domestic rebellions of China or wars between alien states. Therefore, only 72 will be analyzed in the table 5-2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>States Warring against China</th>
<th>Levels of States</th>
<th>Types of Wars</th>
<th>Expansion of Territory</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>635</td>
<td>Tuyuhun</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>638</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
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<td>U</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>640</td>
<td>Gaochang</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Karasahr</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Xue Yantuo</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Baishui Man</td>
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Table 5.2: Wars between China and Alien States During Early Period of Tang Dynasty
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<td>N</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Koguryo</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Tibet</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Silla</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Koguryo

Japanese military assistance for Paekche
5.3 Analysis of data of wars

According to design of examination of hypotheses, if the first hypothesis is efficient, there will be low percentage of wars including territorial annexation by China in loose standard, if not absence of expansive war in rigorous standard. On the other hand, if the second hypothesis is efficient, there will be absence of unintentional wars. However, given states divided into three types, verification of the second hypothesis will be different: there will be very low percentage of, if not absence of, unintentional wars between China and the first level states; percentage of unintentional wars between China and the second level states will rather high and increases with growth of material power of alien states; seldom wars between China and the third level states will emerge.
5.3.1 Examination of the First Hypothesis

According to table 5-3, within 116 years, there were 71 wars between China and alien states and the number of war between China and alien states annually is 0.6121. Within 71 wars, there were 35 intentional wars (49%) and 36 unintentional wars (51%). And if wars as a positive response for military assistance in order to stabilize regional military clashes are eliminated, there were 29 intentional wars with aggressive purpose (41%). Even though number and percentage of intentional wars is not small and low, number of intentional wars per year (0.4930) is in an acceptable criterion that proves Chinese absence of aggressiveness. Furthermore, all wars resulting in Chinese territorial expansion are intentional wars. There were 17 intentional wars with territorial expansion of China, accounting for 24% of all wars and 48% of intentional wars. Within 17 expansive wars, 11 wars happened between China and the second level states, which accounts for 65% of all expansive wars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Wars</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Number (Per Year)</th>
<th>Percentage (of all wars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.6121</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional Wars</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.3103</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Expansion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) level states</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(^{nd}) level states</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(^{rd}) level states</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Expansion</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.3103</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Wars</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.3017</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Expansion</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.1466</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) level states</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0345</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(^{nd}) level states</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0948</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(^{rd}) level states</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0172</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Expansion</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.1552</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although it cannot prove that China kept its commitment all the time and firmly, it can be proven
that China tried its best to honor its pledge. First, as explained above, unintentional war may lead to territorial expansion of China, if China gets overwhelming success in expelling its enemies and further conquer its enemies in case of future raids or attacks. However, from statistic, there was absence of any transformation of unintentional wars into expansive wars, even though China overwhelmed raiders. Second, in 35 intentional wars, China defeated its enemies for the most part, but it only indeed transformed its military success into territorial annexation in less than half of cases. Furthermore, when China incorporated territory of alien states, it didn’t treat them like China Proper and administer it directly. Alternatively, China established Jimi Fuzhou institution (loose rein institution). That is, annexation of territories of alien states is more like preemptive war for the sake of constraining their attacks or plunders than expansion in pure terms.

In sum, according to low percentage of war resulting in Chinese expansion (24%), hypothesis can be proved in a rather loose criterion, even though it may be far from verification in a rigorous criterion.

5.3.2 Examination of the Second Hypothesis

According to Table 5-4, within 71 wars, there were 10 wars between China and the first level states, 55 wars between China and the second level states, and 6 wars between China and the third level states. That is, the number of war between China and the first, second, and third level states annually is 0.0862, 0.4741, and 0.052 respectively. According to Table 5-5, only 24 states had experience of war against China, despite the nature of war, which accounts for 34% of all states interacting with China. Within them, most states are the second level states, accounting for 54% of states warring against China. In other word, most states lived with China peacefully. Generally speaking, it can be said that there was a rather peace and stable situation in the early Tang Dynasty.
### Table 5.4: Wars with Different Types of States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Of States Warring with China</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Number (Per Year)</th>
<th>Percentage Of Corresponding Type of Wars</th>
<th>Percentage Of All Wars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.6121</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First level states</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0862</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.0862</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second level states</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.4741</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.1897</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.2845</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third level states</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.5: Number of States Warring against China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of States</th>
<th>Number of States</th>
<th>Percentage of this type of states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that warred against China</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that didn’t war against China</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Level States</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that warred against China</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that didn’t war against China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Level States</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that warred against China</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that didn’t war against China</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Third Level States</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that warred against China</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States that didn’t war against China</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding to the first level states, these data accord with my prediction that there will be low percentage of unintentional wars or absence of it. Although nearly all first level states had experience with China, except Bohai Mohe that was established in 698 which is in the latter part of my time range, all of them had not intention to challenge or attack China. Furthermore, 3 wars can be treated as Chinese intention to stabilize Northeast Asia, despite intentions of punishing Koguryo and Paekche, by settling military clashes because China waged war against Koguryo or Paekche as a positive response for Silla, which suffered from invasion of Koguryo and Paekche. As I have no intention to explain the complicated situation between China and three states in Korean Peninsula, sometimes, accompanied with Japan,\(^\text{22}\) no unintentional war between China and the first level state is ample to prove my proposition.

Regarding to the second level states, these data accord with my prediction that as they hold their Yi identity as a result of their material disadvantage, they seldom believe Chinese non-expansion commitment and potentiality of unintentional wars increases with their growth of power. According to Table 5-2, from 635 to 669, there were only 5 unintentional wars between China and the second level states and the frequency of it was rather low (0.1429 war per year). However, since 670, shortly before which Tibet started to rise and challenge China (Twitchett and Wechsler 1997: 285–286), frequency of unintentional wars has been more than double to 0.3684 per years. That there were 12 unintentional wars between China and Tibet from 670 to 741 can reflect that Tibet took Yi identity, which was reflected by its acceptance of Chinese investiture and request for marriage to princess of Tang Court, as a pragmatic expedient in order to ensure a peaceful international circumstance for its domestic development and that once Tibet thought its power had grown into adequate level to challenge China, it would not hesitate to take it into action. Another evidence for my proposition is Eastern Turkish revolt. In 630, Tang waged an intentional war to destroy Eastern Turks and succeeded in subjugation of most tribe of Eastern Turks, most of them under control of Jimi prefecture, that is Chanyu prefecture-general and Anbei prefecture-general. However, with growth of power, Eastern Turks had started to revolt and raid China since 679. From 679 to 741, there were 11 unintentional wars between China and Eastern Turks, before which there was absence of it. Therefore, my proposition that the second level states seldom believe Chinese non-expansion commitment and they will raid and attack China when they believe they can get benefit from it as a result of growth of power can be verified.

\(^{22}\) Detailed information and insightful interpretation of situation in Northeast Asia from Sui Dynasty to Mid-Tang Dynasty can be found in works of Han, Gao and Nishijima (Gao 2008: 131–223; Han 2009: 175–282; Nishijima 2000: 52–112).
Regarding to the third level states, as discussed above, they seldom worry about Chinese invasion as a result of their remote location. However, given some of them living not so far from China, they may be involved with wars against China. According to Table 5-5, the vast majority of them had no experience with China. And seldom wars happened between China and them. Therefore, my proposition can be proven to large extent.

**Conclusion**

According to above examination of wars during the early period of Tang Dynasty, both two hypotheses can be proven to large extent. On one hand, as a result of low percentage of expansive war of China, despite 24% that is not as ideal as I propose, that China constrain itself from expansion or annexation as a result of its intrinsic identity, Hua identity. On the other hand, the second hypothesis is verified more efficiently than the first hypothesis. Regarding to the first level states, there was absent of unintentional wars, which means that the first level states internalized their Yi identity and possessed no ambitions to raid to China for economic profit or to challenge China for political rising. Regarding to second level states, as they held instrumental view of Hua-Yi identity as a result of their material disadvantage and observation of requirement and obligation originated from Yi identity bringing more profits than disobedience or detachment from Chinese world order, they tend to tactically possess Yi identity to appease China but their perception of Chinese non-expansion commitment is lower than the first level states. However, when they get improvement in material, especially military, terms, they will try to disobey and even to challenge China as a result of their cost-benefit calculation, in which they tend to believe they can get more and lose less in raid, plunder, attack and challenge than observation. Data on wars reflect this disposition efficiently. Before 670, the second level states were under shadow of Chinese formidable might and tried not to provoke China, for example, Tibet, the later main rival of Tang Dynasty, trying to appease China in traditional Chinese form, owing to which China successfully realized its ambition of punishing Koguryo that had disobeyed ritual requirement since Sui Dynasty. After 670, with material growth, Tibet and then Easter Turks started to challenge China in their own region. Regarding to third level states, low rate of emergence of war support hypothesis that they accept Yi identity as a way to get intercourse with China for economic benefits instead of incorporation into Chinese world order and they have no need to worry Chinese potential invasion as a result of their remote distance from China.

However, several questions remained unsolved here and require further research. First, as I only
examine my hypotheses in segment of the most powerful and prosperous period of Tang Dynasty, in order to eliminate suspicion of Chinese incapacity of military projection and territorial annexation and, to some extent, due to my incapacity of analysis of so large data in a rather short time, other Han Chinese Dynasties are omitted intentionally. However, if all unified Han Chinese Dynasties are taken into consideration, aggressiveness and non-expansion commitment will be verified further. As Lewis notes, “during the sixth and seventh centuries both the Sui and Tang Dynasties, hoping to be heirs of the Han, devoted large amounts of time and resources to recovering lost Han territories (Lewis 2009: 145).” For such a dynasty with cosmopolitan ambition, its impulse to incorporation of alien states into Chinese culture, as a result of its echo of traditionally ideal rhetoric about transforming Yi into Hua, may increase its aggressiveness and lift up its possibility of expansion. The same tendency can be found in Sui Dynasty as well. Furthermore, if period of emperor Wu of Han Dynasty is to be taken into consideration, same pattern will be clear. However, if these short segments are put into complete period of respective Dynasties, expansion or aggressiveness is more like interlude and it will be soon transformed into defensive orientation after cosmopolitan emperor’s death. Furthermore, the tendency of incorporation of Tianxia (all under the Heaven) mainly emerged in the early period of Chinese Dynasties, when they unified China Proper and excel at military activities. Potential expansion in these time ranges is more like inertia and after-effect of their preceding unification, when ideal rhetoric of borderless of Tianxia ruled by China and change of Yi into Hua as a result of education and moralization of China was exaggerated excessively and maniacally. Therefore, full range of certain Dynasty instead of segment of it and all-including selection of Chinese Dynasties will be more useful and insightful for systematic examination of my hypothesis, despite existence of risk of dubiousness of whether China are capable to subjugate its neighbors militarily instead of merely culturally.

Second, methodology applied in this thesis may raise questions as well. As I want to find out whether my hypothesis can be verified in a rather scientific sense, I choose quantitative method to calculate wars and to examine correlations between independent variable and dependent variable through implications reflected by wars. However, certain drawbacks exist. On one hand, identity, as a rather subjective variable, is hard to measure. Furthermore, more difficult is to set up relations between identity of agents and activities of agents. For example, according to Wendt’s classification of role identity, some states with Lockean role will perform like state with Hobbesian identity for certain purposes, such as British in the Second Boer War, Germany in the second World War, America in the Vietnamese War. In other words, how to determine states’ acceptance of their identity according to their behavior is not an easy task. For it, I try to classify states into three types
according to their observation of fundamental institution based on Hua-Yi identity and their acculturation of Chinese culture. However, there exists possibility that even the most acculturated state, Korea (then Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla), only took Yi identity as a defensive instrument and an appeasing tool for the sake of avoidance of invasion of China and attainment of assistance of China. Furthermore, how to set up connection between wars and acceptance of identity to reflect their perception of creditability of Chinese non-expansion commitment ultimately is difficult as well. Although I take a detour to equate acceptance of identity to absence of unintentional wars, that is absence of their challenge to China as a result of intrinsic requirement and obligations of Yi identity, it’s so difficult to explicate how efficient this equations is and whether absence of unintentional war is merely the product of their rational calculation that challenge brings low profit or even devastating loss.

On the other hand, quantitative examination of theory on explain ancient China is no a common method, despite insightful and increasing efforts to theoretically and scientifically explain ancient China or East Asia by international relations scholars, such as Kelly, Kang, Zhu and Zhou, and so forth (Kelly 2011; Kang 2012; Zhu and Zhou 2011). As quantitative examination cannot escape from simplification and reduction of certain historical events into certain evaluation criteria, for example, in this thesis, intentional or unintentional, with expansion or without expansion, intricacy of certain events and relations between certain events and the former ones or the latter ones need to be omitted intentionally. Otherwise, it cannot form a clear and concise result to judge whether hypothesis works or not. However, it may be suffered criticisms for its ahistorical utilization of history. As Hobson criticizes, “to the extent that contemporary mainstream international relations theorists have concerned themselves with history, they have generally employed what might be called an ‘instrumentalist’ view of history, where history is used not as a means to rethink the present, but as a quarry to be mined only in order to confirm theories of the present (Hobson 2001: 5).” Although my hypotheses can escape from its lack of soul as a result of including cultural factor, examination of hypotheses cannot escape from criticism of misunderstanding of history unfortunately. Admittedly, in the process of quantification of wars, concrete and significant detail will be cut and contributions of historical figures will be erased, which is a necessary procedure to make quantitative analysis possible at the expense of homogenization of all wars with especial features respectively. For example, Tang’s zeal for punishing or even devastating Koguryo is sharply contrast to its peaceful rhetoric on world order if there lacks knowledge about Koguryo’s disobedient movements since Sui Dynasty and ambitions of recovery of Han’s magnificence and grandeur. Furthermore, statistical method applied here is rather primitive. Although I plan to use
logistical regression and chi-square test as a result of discontinuity of dependent variable, I find it difficult to take it into effect for expression of correlation between independent variable and dependent variable is difficult to apply these statistical methods. For it, I want to quote Mearsheimer and Walt’s words that “theory creating and hypothesis testing … the former is ultimately more important (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013: 427).” Instead of highlighting my hypothesis testing, I pay more attention to set up my theoretical explanation for a stipulated but far from decisive issue that China promised non-expansion commitment to its neighbors.

All in all, in order to study how hierarchic system functioned in stabilization of ancient East Asian system, why Confucian states would constitute a rather long peace, why tributary institutions could serve to maintain peaceful co-existence between China and alien states, the underlying issue that China promised a non-expansion commitment and this commitment was creditable for its neighbors, despite of these states’ purposes and its level of creditability, is the key. Only China promise non-expansion, to some extent that it resembles self-constraint, will there be possibility for a international society to emerge, in which certain rules, norms and institutions regulate and stabilize relations among states, punish disobedient states, reward obedient states and offer a predictable pattern on how to interact in ancient East Asia, despite in a hierarchic form. Hua-Yi identity made it possible since it had been incorporated into Chinese foreign policy and then construction of ancient East Asian system since Han Dynasty. Constrained by Hua identity intrinsically, China showed no interest to incorporate alien states and transform barbarians into the Chinese, despite ideal rhetoric of changing Yi into Hua, as a result of superiority of China and subordination of alien states and intentional maintenance of distance from alien states. When this commitment spread to its neighbors and was verified by Chinese observation of it for a long time, alien states tended to accept it in order to defend themselves owing to their material disadvantage and to get interact with China for the sake of economic profits and cultural promotion. However, the level they accepted Yi identity was different. The deeper level they accepted their Yi identity, the more creditable they fell Chinese non-expansion commitment. Therefore, as the fist level states according to their observation of tributary institution and investiture institution and their acculturation of Chinese culture, Confucian states internalized Yi identity and performed themselves in accordance with it. Consequently, owing to that they seldom needed to worry Chinese invasion and that Chinese honored its pledge, Confucian long peace is possible. On the other hand, peaceful co-existence was promised if states accepted rules, norms and institutions devised and promoted by China and then fixed as fundamental features of ancient East Asian system. Therefore, both hierarchic system and tributary system can preserve smooth functioning of ancient East Asia. In sum, Hua-Yi identity confered different
interests on different states according to hierarchic principle, and therefore this ancient international system lasted for nearly 2000 years with trivial changes.
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