Helsinki +40: What could be Italy’s role in bridging the way for Co-operation and Security in Euro-Mediterranean Relations?

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1. Introduction

With the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union the European Union has concentrated (with Germany’s help) all of its attention towards East, without taking into account it’s relationship with the Mediterranean states. Now however, after the period of instability that the North African and Middle Eastern countries have experienced, a shift of attention is more than necessary towards these countries both in the political sphere as in the economic one, avoiding however, dictating their agenda. The correct attitude, towards the problems facing the Mediterranean, is that of an egalitarian co-operation, aimed at finding the nodes which are to be unravelled that are limiting the needs of these countries. The European Union both as an entity and both with its individuals have to answer to the real needs of these countries. There are several levels through which this can be done through project of co-operation between the northern coast countries and the southern coast countries of the Mediterranean, in order to find, together, shared solutions to overcome political and economic difficulties that currently plague the waters of the Mediterranean.

The Fields of Co-operation could be:

1. Peace, Security and Democracy
2. Economic Development and Sustainability
3. Cultural exchanges and Universities
4. Migration Justice and Social Integration

The European Union currently undertakes bilateral co-operation in the ‘Euro- Mediterranean Association Agreement’. The multilateral dimension is provided for in the ‘Neighbourhood Policy’. In any case, we must keep in mind that any type of resolution or co-operative measure might be sabotaged by one of the many political crises that are present in the Middle East, of which, the Syrian crises, the Israel-Palestine crises, the Libyan instability, Cyprus-Turkey and Western Sahara.

What the countries of the Mediterranean need is to regain their identities in forming a greater Mediterranean basis, on part of the southern shore countries, there should be efforts towards political stability and security measures, these may come from within the countries as from without. From within, the developed countries of the Northern shore will have to for the last time play the colonial role in a more positive way than has been done in the past, trying to foster institutions in these countries rather than pursuing extractive policies and extractive institutions.

Under the auspices of the Helsinki +40, which aims to re-enact the past success of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the fortieth anniversary, which will take place in 2015, wishes to create dialogue for initiatives to all the members of the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE), in order to find a way towards the Mediterranean. A space for dialogue to be established on several occasions such as Rome, Turin, Moscow, Helsinki, Washington and Belgrade, aiming to create a global Mediterranean, in order to rejuvenate this region with a wind of economic prosperity and stability. It is to be assessed if the way forward to this objective may follow the same path of the initial treaty, when at the time; diplomacy was a zero sum game, where there were only two big players. The reality of our days sees a larger set of actors all with a word to say in International Politics.

Currently however, in our ‘Developed world organizations’, there seems to be an absence of a Mediterranean voice, and neither does it seem that in the near future that this voice will be fuelled, unless, a country who for centuries has been amongst the main players
of the region, awakens. Surpassing its internal difficulties and using its current hegemony of European Council Presidency and High Representative for Foreign Affairs in the European Union. The country that will and should regain this leading role towards convergence in the Mediterranean should be Italy. It has always been considered as the aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean, as the bridge towards the Southern Shore. Its history sees this country deeply endowed with this region, but in the last decades, there has been a policy abandonment towards the southern shore. How can Italy, be the country to fix the situation in the Mediterranean, how can it be the one to foster economic convergence in the region, or at least be the one country to bring back the theme of the Mediterranean into the European Union. What are the objectives that it can set itself along with an agenda setting power in the Union thanks to the Helsinki +40 process on part of the organization for security and co-operation in Europe? How can this country, bring back to the Mediterranean economic interest and prosperity along with economic and social convergence creating stability, while also shifting away the interests of extra regional countries which involve strategic goods or displays of power politics?

Hogre, Graffiti in Rome, depicting a Suffering Mediterranean filled with blood. 

- Notice, how the first recognizable thing of this image, is 'bridging' Italy

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2. What kind of crises Plague the Mediterranean?

We are observing, not the end of history, but a sudden acceleration of pace: with all the difficulties that may follow, such as the adaption and assimilation of populations. What we know of our Mediterranean is that our spaces have become much larger, all the actors now act horizontally and not vertically, there has been a power shift internally in the societies of the Mediterranean. Northern Africa has become subjected to a very dense network of interconnections, which lead to the possibility of criminal, or seemingly criminal networks to form. There is a situation that with Realism alone will not be understood and will thus need a renewed conceptual approach.²

Instead of having to resort to ex post crisis resolution, we will have to develop more accurate and shared prevention systems with the simultaneous help of Diplomatic, Political, Economic, Institutional and Cultural instruments.³ Keeping in mind that all crises consist in a concentration of problems.

We have always had an underestimated look towards the situation that really crossed the region we found ourselves southwards from our European Union. When the Arab Spring had exploded our first reaction was that to think that the Tunisian chaos was driven by a ‘bread revolt’ such as that, that took place from 1983-84, a revolt that was brutally repressed by Bourguiba with 80 dead.⁴ Europe mistakenly believed little of the real potential of the situation such that the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie even proposed to Ben Ali, that if Tunisia needed. French police could have served to ‘discipline’ the revolt that was taking place⁵. Not many people had actually thought through the deeper Malaise that was crossing that country, along with the ones neighbouring leading up to the Arab Spring. Not many had heard the shout of the populations for a greater liberty and a greater respect for human dignity⁶. The world had to open its eyes more to see that these people were ready to come under police fire to fight for what they shouted as their need.

The beauty of the West has been its incapability to analyse the Arab societies with the same sociological instruments that we would’ve applied if these events had happened between our doors, on the other side of the Mediterranean, people have ignored the complexity of these societies.⁷ This, on one hand, can be seen as incompetence or an incorrect shift of attention of the western world and on the other hand a successful censorship policy followed by the Dictator of the time Ben Ali. This is a characteristic seen in Tunisia as in all of the Arab world, these societies have for centuries been kept a secret and seen as ‘immobile’ entities for decades thanks to the dictatorial rule that has exercised effective censorship regimes.

Our good intentions towards this ‘grey’ (as seen by us) region start after the Second World War, when the European Integration machine starts to ignite. The Mediterranean will gain an important role in the dilemma of what should be the relationship between colonized countries and colonizer countries. A dilemma that will however, remain economic and not political. The main concern of the European countries will be to maintain this situation of

³ Ibid
⁴ Franco Rizzi, Dove va il Mediterraneo? (2013 : pg11)
⁶ Franco Rizzi, Dove va il Mediterraneo? (2014 : pg11)
⁷ Ibidem pg 12
privilege in trade that they had with these ‘developing countries’, no attention was given to the historic role of these lands in the Mediterranean.

The countries of North Africa will always have this tie characterized by the ‘scramble for Africa’. Each country was a ‘protectorate’, decided upon due to hegemonic control and partitioned through not well thought through map divisions that did not keep into account religious, cultural and identity differences. The ferment of the Middle East was due not only to struggles against foreign powers but also to the rivalries of the Middle Eastern nations among themselves and to the social conflict between ruling elites, the emerging middle classes and the masses of poor. To put emphasis on this point below there is an extract explained from a British point of view:

‘Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary in the Labour government of 1945, was clear about the choice facing his country. He resisted arguments that Britain’s post-war weakness would force her to give up a dominant role in the Middle East. He knew perfectly well that Middle Eastern societies were backward and feudal and that social upheavals in the long run were inevitable. He was a socialist at home and an imperialist abroad. Britain’s standard of living was dependent on Arab oil, and what mattered was the immediate future. But there was a solution: imperial dominance might be made more palatable by creating a framework of Anglo-Arab partnerships. If this meant partnerships with feudal princes and kings, so be it; British interference in the internal affairs of Arab nations would otherwise only arouse the Arab cry of imperialism.’

These types of ‘partnerships’ and economic-interest driven concordats, have created a marriage between imperial power and ruling hegemons in the Arab world. Not paying attention to the actual needs of the people, has delayed a build up of emotions that were sooner or later going to blow up. We should well be aware and cautious of the different measures that may be adopted singularly by countries or by the various future partnership frameworks. Will the countries adopt a financial strategy addressed in not repatriating capital, will they have a desire to acquire strategic goods for Europe or will they simply have a desire to better control the maritime routes crossing the Mediterranean?

What we must understand is that currently the Arab Spring has liberalized this vast array of cultural expressions of societies. Previously, the social structures were held in place thanks to the repression of the Dictators that were present. This wave of ‘discovery’ has brought the desire to affirm the regional, tribal and confessional identities on part of the civil societies present in the region. These identities were sought to push for democratic reforms, economic and social rights. However, some of these reforms have been accompanied by a revival of ‘segmental logics’, which have weakened the new born state.

This period of newly born states, was in some sense a novelty for these countries, in fact, after the creation of these states, there have been very controversial results because as is also shown in game theory, the more the players, the larger the polymorphism, meaning, the wider the array of results. Be it a state of European creation under short term mandates such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon or under an external tutorage like that of Libya, the newly formed states were being questioned for their legitimacy causing it to be weakened and

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9 Jean François Coustilliére et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginairie et Fracture (2014 : pg42)
10 Anna Bozzo et Pierre-Jean Luizard, Polarisations Politiques et Confessionnelles, (2015 : pg5)
11 Brian Skyrms, Commitment (1996 : pg 33)
12 Anna Bozzo et Pierre-Jean Luizard, Polarisations Politiques et Confessionnelles, (2015 : pg 6)
exposed to radicalisms. The challenge that the Salafis-Jihadists threw towards these states did not have the same effect everywhere; In Iraq there has been a caliphate with an exclusively Sunni unitary logic\(^{13}\) (the caliphate as a unifying element for the different regional identities in the name of a traditional Sunnis), in Libya there has been a triumph of individual identities that for long have been repressed, Libya has also been characterised by a plurality of communities, local, tribal, regional which exhibit a strong rivalry between one another; this is explanatory of the social fragmentation Libya is experiencing today.

A long-term solution to these regional problems, also in the light of extra Mediterranean Countries’ interest, would be to multiply the regional trade by strengthening the harbour network and the trajectories crossing the coasts. We need to favour a complementarity of the productivity of our sea, being happy with medium sized logistics larger in number compared to big sized logistics. We need to develop the south/south commerce and invest more in the famous ‘sea highways’. We can create free trade agreements either singularly as countries or with the European Union as have already done Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco\(^{14}\). This type of interconnectedness would transform our Mediterranean from a ‘transit area’ (East-West) to an integrated economy (North- South Trade).

2.1 The Balkans

The Balkans are usually overlooked during Mediterranean talks, but it’s ancient connection to USSR and current source for preoccupation of the European Union is definitely a factor that may hinder the setting of an agenda towards Mediterranean issues as, the policy the EU has been following of allowing eastern ‘lesser’ states may have more priority, also in the light of the events of geopolitical strategy undertaken by Russia in our contemporary times.

The Balkans in particular the Yugoslavia region have been filled with ethnic and religious diversities that have with time created long lasting tensions that still have not found a resolution. After the fall of the USSR, ex-Yugoslavia has rediscovered her ethnic cleavages that were frozen during soviet power\(^{15}\). The Croatians, the Serbs, the Slovenian and the Bosnians have put into question the definitions of their borders: conflicts of which some are still open today. The causes are ethnic, cultural, political and economic; they rest on religious fractures that divide populations creating around 1 million refugees\(^{16}\).

The first war of this region after the USSR dominion was that of Slovenia in 1991. A region that was mainly catholic but was under the regime of Yugoslavia that was mainly Orthodox and Muslim. Slovenia was characterized by being a richer country compared, to the other states part of Yugoslavia, being so close to the rich European frontier (Italy and Austria) and being a catholic country has fostered a passion for independence which will be executed in 1992.

The second war was that of Croatia from 1991 to 1995 that for religious reasons (9 out of 10 were Catholic in Croatia\(^{17}\)) wanted independence and sovereignty. With a vast blood

\(^{13}\) Anna Bozzo et Pierre-Jean Luizard, Polarisations Politiques et Confessionnelles, (2015 : pg6)
\(^{14}\) Jean François Coustilliére et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture. (2014 : pg42)
\(^{16}\) Jean François Coustilliére et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture (2014 : pg65)
\(^{17}\) Ibidem
trail this country managed to do so, poisoning all future relations with Serbia but sharing a boarder.

The third war was that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This war was fought between Croat, Bosnian and Serbian populations on the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina in 1992. The war unleashed when a Yugoslav army attacked Bosnia-Herzegovina that had just declared its independence. A few years later and with help of NATO the war was put to an end on December 14th 1995 with the treaty of Dayton, which decided that Bosnia-Herzegovina was going to be a two-entity confederation; The Croatian-Bosnian Federation (51% of territory, 65% population) and the Serbian-Bosnian Republic (49% of territory, 35% population).18

The fourth war was that of Kosovo. The Republic of Kosovo is a country formed mainly by a Muslim population, it is a Republic not universally recognized in Southern Europe and not member of the United Nations. Kosovo exercises its authority on a population of mainly Albanians. 15% of its northern province is under the Assembly of Kosovo-Metohija, which desires a re-attachment to Serbia. Kosovo is still today considered as a Serbian province after the facts ranging from 1996 to 1998, where Kosovo created an army of liberation and the Serbs responded with military measures. The situation will follow a downturn that will force NATO intervention. What will follow is that under resolution 1244 of the security council of the United Nations, an interim mission for Kosovo will be set up and in 2008 a constitution will be made. However, this Republic is not recognized by most states, especially by Russia.

The fifth and last war of the Balkans was that of Macedonia. A country which will gain independence in 1991 but will have a constitution that will define the state as of ‘the Macedonians’ without taking into account the numerous Albanian, Turk and Rom minorities. One of the effects of this constitution that particularly created resentment was the fact that it was to impose Macedonian as the only official language. This will create problems for the minorities where the Albanians (the largest of the minorities) will initiate an upheaval in 1995. A few countermeasures where taken by the international community with the cease-fire of 2001 under UN and NATO direction. The situation however is very delicate and fragile as these treaties are not always respected and violence is feared to be behind the doors.

2.2 Greek-Turkish Tensions

There are tensions in the Mediterranean as regards Turkey and Greece; they show a rivalry at times on the field of maritime transit along with border definition and at times rivalries in the field of their aerospace.

The rivalries have started in 1910 and with the aftermath of the First World War as regards the treatment of minorities, the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea question. It was a question has to who was to have legitimacy over which islands, which as we can see from any map, the Aegean Sea is plentiful of. Some of these Greek islands are at times just a few kilometres away from Turkish coasts thus putting into question the territorial water limits which are granted by International Law, the same goes for aerospace which is that directly on top of these islands. We can thus imagine the economic problems that these may bring as well as the general sovereignty clashes.

The countries dispose of 6 miles of extension considering that they have to share territorial waters, Greece however demands unilaterally 12 miles according to the Convention

of Montego Bay (1982)\textsuperscript{19}, which Turkey refuses and does not recognize. The same goes for the aerospace, where Greece claims 10 miles while Turkey recognizes only 6, like those of territorial waters.

Other questions of debate due to these sovereignty clashes are those of naval transit of civil boats as the military boats of Turkey. If Turkey were to respect International Law, it would have to transit at the further Eastern side of the Aegean Sea, trying to remain inside their border. However, under the Montego Bay convention, inoffensive passage is allowed, but the definition of this last term is to be scrutinized. Mainly due to Turkey’s ambitions to sail with military boats through Greek waters to reach the further out Mediterranean waters, this may clearly be alarming for Greece as their relationship with Turkey has never been amongst the most flourishing ones.

We may thus understand the tensions that are created because of this, especially on a NATO level, of which both countries are members, it imposes restrictions on both naval civil and military transit and on aerospace civil and military transit, compromising any type of intervention and co-operation that may be needed in that region of the Mediterranean, what we should remember when dealing with this topic is that Greece and Turkey are not exactly the smallest countries of the Mediterranean.

\subsection*{2.3 Cyprus}

Cyprus has been, throughout the centuries, an island with different dominations, ranging from the Persians to the Greek. From the Romans while maintaining a Greek culture. From a Byzantine colonisation in 1192 to a venetian one in 1489, from an ottoman one in 1571 to a British one in 1878.

The latest transition of Cyprus is that from an Ottoman rule, which will cede it to a British administration in 1878 under the name of the Ottoman Empire, which will retain the formal sovereignty. A sovereignty that the Ottoman Empire might lose as Britain will propose to cede Cyprus to Greece the latter’s participation in the war. A proposition that did not succeed. Turkey will later renounce her sovereignty to Cyprus with the Lausanne Treaty. We will thus now see a British Cyprus in 1925, a rule that will foster auto-determination movements on part of the Greek Cypriotes that will want to form a union with Greece and also on part of the Turkish Cypriotes. The latter will culminate in 1931 in a revolt against Great Britain. In 1955 we will see this auto-determination movement emerge once more, only to be opposed by Great Britain which will become the main antagonist of the area against Greece and Turkey, she will exploit this antagonism to her own will in the face of decolonisation demands. This situation will persist until 1959-60 where Cyprus will become independent with the guarantee of survival from Ankara-Athens-London.

Unfortunately, there will be in 1963 inter-communitarian conflicts, which will force resolution 186 of the UN to be adopted; a treaty that was to monitor the cease-fire. In 1974 after a coup d’état a Turkish hostile president will take power, sustained by the Greek government from 1967\textsuperscript{20}. Turkey saw this as a threat and decided to launch operation ‘Northern Attila’ in order to protect the Turkish Cypriotes. It was an operation that would divide the island of Cyprus from east to west with the help of the ‘blue helmets’. The new division will be called the ‘green line’. De facto, this will create two semi autonomous regions, which will be officially recognized, and in 1977 under the UNO Cyprus will become

\textsuperscript{19} Jean François Coustillière et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture (2014 : pg68)
\textsuperscript{20} Jean François Coustillière et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture (2014: pg71)
a federal state with a dual-community, a dual-territory and a dual non-alignment. The Turk Republic of Northern Cyprus will be proclaimed in 1983. As an answer to these events, Greece will sign with Cyprus a defence agreement in 1995 right after a few incidents along the green line (which will persist).

There will be several attempts for peace resolutions, to re-unite these two countries; one attempt will be in 2002 with Kofi Annan, which will fail. In the meantime on the 1st of May 2004 the Republic of Cyprus will become part of the European Union.

A strong British presence on the island with two military bases (fully autonomous from Cyprus) in Dikhelia and Akrotiri will help to create further tensions that will balance out the ones of Turkey colonizing Northern Cyprus.

Through this brief history we may understand the mix in population that we may find in Cyprus, with 1,200,000 people of which the majority are Greek. A region which is divided between a EU country and a non-EU country domination (Turkey), diverging economies of which the Turkish Republic of Cyprus is the least developed one with a very fragile financial system as shown by the crisis of 2013. This entire Cypriote story worsens Greek-Turkish relations, as if it weren’t enough, the recent discoveries of gas reserves are feared to be a source of future international crises in that region.

Cyprus is an important strategic point for any future action to control the Middle Eastern region due to its proximity. Its hard relationship between Greece and Turkey create this void of co-operation for any type of organisation that wishes to intervene in that region, both from a Cypriote point of view as for a Greek and Turkish co-operation. Although of lesser immediate importance in resolving the Mediterranean upheavals, the Cyprus area represents this tripartite conflict that is afflicting the North-Eastern coasts of the Mediterranean, what we will need in the future to come, also in face of Horizon 2020 is to have a more comprehensive Mediterranean ready to put away past misunderstandings for future mutual benefits. As of now, it is still questioned whether her choice has really been beneficial for its country and for the EU in general.

2.4 Sanjak of Alexandretta

Sanjak of Alexandretta is today called Hatay, here we will find an actor that has characterised some of the other crises that we have discussed. Hatay is under the control of Turkey and claimed by Syria as part of her territorial boundaries.

The story goes that before world war I, this region was part of the Ottoman Empire but was then annexed to Syria under a French mandate in 1918. In 1920 it will become autonomous with an administration that will recognize the Turkish minority in the Sanjak.

Her population was heterogeneous and with a strong Turkish speaking minority. Sanjak was of an undeniable strategic importance as a way through from Turkey to the Arabic peninsula and also because it is a great harbour for the whole region.

In 1936 Sanjak of Alexandretta will become more problematic as France will recognize it’s independence, the question now was, should it remain with Syria or is it to become part of Turkey? Turkey demanded it, for it’s strong ethnic minority, France opposed this. This mini-crisis will fall under scrutiny of Paris, London and Ankara and on 23 July 1939.

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The government of Damascus does not recognize this territorial ‘amputation’. On her official documents, the old Sanjak of Alexandretta is still part of her territory, however, to relieve some of these tensions, from 1990 there are free trade agreements between Syria and Turkey in that region, the whole situation remains however, very delicate.

2.5 The Israel-Palestine conflict

This rivalry concerns Israelis and Palestinians in the framework for the creation of a Palestine state along with the issues of Cisjordan and East-Jerusalem. Until 1917 Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. Between 1915 and 1917 the European nations of which Great Britain France and also Belgium, will contend their appropriation of the area.

During the conflict, in the declaration of Balfour, Great Britain will promise the Zionists a land to live in, in Palestine. At the same time however, Britain will foster the Arab nationalism against the Ottoman enemy by making promises also to the Arabs, promises that will be conflicting with the ones made to the Jewish population. Strongly responsibly for the facts in Palestine, the British Diplomacy, Britain will abandon nonetheless the protagonists face to face after the Partition plan of the United Nations in 1947. In 1948 the State of Israel will be born and recognized by the United States, USSR and others. Its life will start in a very ‘active’ way as it will be witness of the first Arab-Israeli war, and also winner. From this moment on the Palestinian problem will be considered as just a problem of ‘refugees’.

The first war will not be the last, as several other conflicts will arise such as those of 1948, 1967 and 1973. Palestine will become increasingly more under control of the Jewish state that will exercise full military authority to repress any kind of uprising and terrorist attack; this will cause the spread of Palestinians into the neighbouring countries such as Jordan (Black September 1970) and Lebanon (1975 civil war) where more problems will emerge.

The United States will try to find solutions without a lot of results in the: Conference of Madrid, Israeli–Palestinian peace process, Oslo agreements, Wye Plantation agreements, Sharm El-Sheik summits, Geneva agreements, Arab Plan, Camp David summits, Mitchell report, Annapolis conference and the list continues.

On the United Nations side, not much was done after 1967 and Resolution 242, resolutions are worked for but not much is concluded.

Gaza in another story, it was liberated in 2005 from a Jewish occupation and of the 9000 Israeli living there. Gaza was taken over from an electoral movement on part of the Islamic movement of Hamas from 2006. This region will subsequently face frequent blockades on part of Egypt and Israel and up until present times there will be a constant tensions build up between Hamas, Gaza and Israel.

Today the situation remains blocked, after the conflicts in Syria and Libya, this everlasting crisis has come second in importance in the International community. We currently see reluctance from Netanyahu to actively participate in the negotiations, growing tensions between the two opposing factions in the Gaza line, Fatah and Hamas and thus a region that is

24 Jean François Coustillière et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture. (2014 : pg74)
25 Ibidem
28 Jean François Coustillière et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture. (2014 : pg74)
thought to have to live these conflicts for many years to come, until the regional differences are not resolved.

2.6 Arab-Israeli Conflicts (Lebanon- Syria)

Since Israel’s independence in 1948, it has found itself engaged in several armed conflicts with the surrounding Arab countries: Some of which, Egypt and Jordan with which now, it has finally signed peace treaties. Israel however remains in conflict with the states of Lebanon and Syria, with different contested territories not recognized by some non-state actors. The Territories of this matter are the Shebaa farms and the Golan Heights.

Israel- Lebanon

It all started in 1978 when a Palestinian commando attacks from Lebanon nearby to Tel-Aviv. Israel in response will attack under operation ‘Litani’. The UN in response will create resolution 425 ordering Israel to retreat until the International Frontier where an interim force will be instituted (FINUL).

In 1982, Israel will attack once more under operation ‘Peace for Galilee’ in the south of Lebanon, west of Bekaa.

May 2000 Israel will unilaterally recall her troops in Lebanon, the latter will not intervene militarily bit it will not stop the Hezbollah in its actions towards Israel either.

In 2006 there will be a vast aerial and maritime attack on part of Israel against Lebanon after Hezbollah caused Israeli casualties. A Hezbollah that will be seen to be unbeatable by Israel, re-enforcing its political power in Lebanon but also amongst the other neighbouring countries, be them Sunni or Shi’a.

Today, Israel does not have its forces in Lebanon aside from the Chebaa farms, which are still a contested area. There are small problems of de-stabilization but this is a perfect chance for Hezbollah to accuse Israel of not fully have recalled its troops. With the current Syrian crisis this dispute has come second in Foreign Policies, but in the future we are to not expect a calm territory. This is due to unresolved disputes, the recent discovery of oil in the seas neighbouring Israel and Lebanon and Hezbollah’s desire to be the spear of resistance against the Jewish state.

Israel- Syria

Another question comes at hand in the same region, namely that of the Golan Heights. In 1948 after the proclamation of the State of Israel, 5 states will attack it, of which Syria which will be the last country to sign the armistice in 1949. Several ‘accidents’ will happen in this region: such as, in 1967 the ‘War of Six days’, where Israel will attack Syria and occupy the Golan Heights. In 1973 Egypt and Syria will counterattack in the Golan and Sinai during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, there will be heavy losses and Israel will disengage from Golan and lose some of the territories in 1967. A tampon-demilitarized area was also created and an international peace force FNOUD introduced for surveillance of the agreements taken. The relations between Israel and Syria will however, never be again be easy, several attempts where made, from Hafez du Bashar Al-Assad but all failed.

Although its fall of importance, a solution will need to be found as, along with all the other regional conflicts, this impedes any type of development and peace for the region.

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30 Jean François Coustillére et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture. (2014: pg76)
question remains open as to whether the belligerent parts will find an agreement more easily in the future or not.

2.7 Spanish Enclaves

The Spanish Enclaves situation is composed of several islands and territories that are along the Moroccan coasts but are considered as occupied by Spanish since the 16th century. Some of these are: Mellila, Ceuta, Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, Cofarines islands and Alhucemas islands, which are all regularly claimed by Morocco.

These enclaves are not the result of colonization but they are the result of war facts. In the 18th century the Moroccan sultans will oppose the Spanish by attacking these enclaves (which will resist the attack). In 1791 a peace treaty will make Spain lose some of these territories of which Oran and Mers El-Kebir. There will thus be a problem of Moroccan piracy so, the English, the French and the Spanish will unite to keep the coasts safe, Spain’s role will be that of maintaining these enclaves.

In present days, Spain has shown itself available to open talks on the various enclaves aside from Melilla and Ceuta after the Moroccan complaint at the United Nation’s General Assembly of anachronistic colonial behaviour exercised by Spain in these territories.

It seems that the Moroccan king, after the different waves that have crossed the country such as the Islamic movements and economic difficulties, would like to strengthen his position by bringing nationalism back into the game by regaining these territories not reclaimed after the independence from France. Perhaps for this reason in July 11th 2002 Morocco will try to install a surveillance outpost in the name of the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration31 which will spark up Spanish fear, creating a little diplomatic accident, which will fortunately remain contained.

There are other reasons for which Morocco has an interest in regaining the remaining territories of Ceuta and Melilla. They are mainly economic as the Spanish use these areas as a ‘contraband area’ where many goods, weapons and drugs pass through, but Morocco is missing out on financial and commercial gains in these areas. Spain is however finding difficulty with the backlash of the Arab springs with the immigration problems since 2012. The question thus arises as to why the Spanish wish to keep this territory as their strategic use is not relevant in our modern times. It must remain acknowledgeable that if this dispute where to be settled by means of the population, the latter will choose to remain Spanish to the reasons tied to the living standards of being Spanish compared to Moroccan. The situation may, having acknowledged these difficulties, risk continuing for a long time.

2.8 Gibraltar

At south of Spain, after the Columns of Hercules, we find a territory of British Occupation of frequent Spanish controversy due to its proximity to Spanish territory and its undeniable distance from the British one. Great Britain occupies this piece of rock since 1704. It allows it however to be ruled by its own local government, at the exception of the naval base that Great

31 Jean François Coustillière et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture. (2014 : pg79)
Britain has there. Since 1999, after the United Nations’ declaration that each population should have a right to self-determination, there has been a referendum in 2002 that saw an 87% desire by the population to remain under British domination. In the light of the earlier case of the Spanish enclaves the Moroccan monarchy remains with a vigilant eye on the situation, ready to put forward its demands on the Spanish enclaves.

There are however some present disputes on the whole situation between Spain and England. They mainly concern the financial advantages and territorial questions such as the right to fish. Gibraltar with its 7km$^2$ and 30,000 inhabitants is a fiscal paradise that lives of contraband, traffic of activities and bookmakers. It is of strategic importance for the access into the Mediterranean coming from other seas. After the accident of 2013 when the Spanish authorities started to control the fishing borders and the British responding by sending her own ships is indicative of a possible future risk in the region for security and peace.

### 2.9 Western Sahara

Western Sahara is an area of 266,000km$^2$ in North Western Africa, sharing a border at North with Morocco, Algeria at the North East, Mauritania in the East and South, Western Sahara’s Western coast faces the Atlantic.

Western Sahara is a non-autonomous territory according to the UN, it has remained without a true identity since 1976, when the Spanish, ex-colonizers of the region, left. Since their departure there has been Sahrawi independentists of Front Polisario, which have opposed the Moroccans. This Territory is now claimed, by Morocco and by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, while it is occupied by Front Polisario. Front Polisario tries to keep the region independent and is sustained by Algeria.

This type of rivalry due to territorial claims is one of the halting factors for the creation of a Union for the Maghreb (UMA).

From 1884 to 1976 Western Sahara was a Spanish colony. In 1975 the Sahrawi Moroccan allies, will attack the Spanish troops, but with a French-Spanish tandem they will be repelled. In 1966 resolution 2229 of the General Assembly in the UN will ‘invite’ Spain to allow the Saharian population to exercise their right of self-determination through a referendum. In 1973 Front Polisario will be created and as such the Spanish will disengage their troops. Morocco will not lose this chance and it will initiate the ‘Green March’ (350,000 men at the southern Moroccan frontier), which will be severely frowned upon by the Security Council which will demand disengagement in resolution 380.

In November 1975, the Madrid agreements will divide the Western Saharan territory with 2/3 to Morocco and 1/3 to Mauritania. In 1976 the Polisario Front will create the Arab Sahrawi Democratic Republic.

In 1977 Polisario will raid Mauritania with a Moroccan sustainment, followed by a French one (operation Lamentin). Fire will cease only in 1991 where a United Nations’ mission will intervene. After this event the main objective will be that of unifying the electors for a future referendum for self-determination.

After the 1991 cease-fire, Morocco controls and administers around 80% of the region while the remaining 20% if controlled by the Pulsario Front, behind the ‘belt of security’ or Moroccan wall that has become the new frontier for the region. The region is now under United Nations surveillance, they control around 500,000 people, but many Saharian people are refugees in Algeria in the Tindouf region (90,000 - 160,000).

Morocco wishes to re-unite the countries. Algeria supports self-determination, even if stressing her non-implication. Algeria supports the adoption of the various resolutions that have

This conflict will not in the near future evolve into an armed conflict, however, it acts as a brake for peaceful Moroccan-Algerian relations, blocking partnerships such as that of the Maghreb Union. Until crises like these are not neutralized, a peaceful Mediterranean is unforeseeable.

2.10 Sykes-Picot Agreement

In a certain sense, ISIS are correct in saying that there isn’t a problem with the current states, but there has been a foundation problem in the creation of the states in the Middle East. The source of this ‘evil’ is the Sykes-Picot Pact of 1916 that imposed centralized states, on part of Great Britain and France, without keeping into account the different cultural and religious identities present in the area. For time this has created several tensions in the area of which we are currently seeing the outburst. Sykes Picot is responsible for the fragmentation of our modern Middle East; proof of this is that when in 2014 ISIS was bulldozering its way through the Syrian-Iraqi border, they claimed to have destroyed Sykes-Picot.

Sykes.Picot has divided the region in a completely arbitrary way by the French, English and Russians, without keeping into account the differences that the populations of these territories had. They paid no attention to different ethnicities and religions, thus cursing the area to instability. As matter of fact, these states are now crumbling; Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Lebanon. As a result of this, the populations have reverted their trust into identity groups of sectorial and tribal nature. Thus creating the birth of extremist groups varying in degree.

The question comes as to why people such as Lawrence of Arabia have not been heard by the developed world. He profoundly understood the Arab way of thinking, he understood of this tribal nature that vested Northern Africa, he understood that a centralized state would have not worked in those regions due to the different identities present, he understood that a light and ‘easy’ state would’ve been the best option. Legitimacy is the key to creating a solid-state identity in the Middle East.

The Desert Campaign was to end gloriously with the conquest of Damascus by Lawrence lead, but a political crisis will follow before such an event due to Great Britain’s double promise of Syria to both the Arabs and the French. The French would receive Syrian and Lebanese coasts, while the Arabs would have mainland Syria (dominated by French Advisors). Great Britain would instead leave the Arabian Peninsula to King Hussain of Higiza father of Prince Feisal, while taking herself most of what was left along with Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine. Nothing was done on part of the Arabs due to the secrecy.

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32 Jean François Coustillière et Pierre Vallaud, Géopolitique et Méditerranée. La Méditerranée: un Espace Imaginari et Fracture. (2014 : pg83)
33 John C. Hulman, To Begin the World Over Again: Lawrence of Arabia from Damascus to Baghdad (2009 : pg 198)
35 John C. Hulman, To Begin the World Over Again: Lawrence of Arabia from Damascus to Baghdad (2009 : pg 201)
36 Ibidem
that was kept by this treaty, secrecy that was exposed by ‘mistake’ by the Russians in 1917 during the Russian Revolution, triumphantly on part of the Bolsheviks.

The Arabs were deeply convinced of the British campaign and a future stabilization of the regions thanks to the latter, but the truth was that the British did what they could to keep the Arabs on the field against the Ottoman enemy of the First World War. Needless to say that this meant the British had betrayed the Arabs a hatred that is still not forgotten.

The Ottoman administration was in some sense more successful than the British one, it had foreseen the different regional differences and had thus divided the region into three sub regions with administrative centres: Bassora, Baghdad and Mosul, controlled respectively by Shi’a, Sunnis and Kurds. The British administration instead announced that Baghdad was to be the administrative centre of the entire Mesopotamian region, not keeping into account the three areas imposed by the Ottomans. They decided the laws that were to be imposed, the citizenship modalities, they globally demonstrated a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Arabs. This a regime, followed also by Saddam Hussein’s centralized and artificial state, which has ignored the teachings of the past. Iraq’s case is that of a country historically tied to religious and ethnic factors, not a population of homogenous individuals. We now find ourselves with an Iraq, that even though it is tight to one administration, it is a highly differentiated country as it is composed of mainly Sunnis, 20% Shi’a and 20% Kurds37 and an 8% which varied between Christian, Jewish and other minorities38.

The solution to the Iraqi question is to push the Iraqi administration to create a confederation dividing these ethnic groups and giving them their own authority as is already happening ‘illegally’. Abadi guiding the Shi’as in the South, Sunni area guided by ISIS in the centre and the Kurd area controlled by Barzani in the North39. Another solution is to simply divide these areas with these authorities fully representative of the political and cultural reality in this moment.

2.11 Libya

Libya like the other Arab countries was dominated by a dictator, which kept the community together by repressing any kind of insurgency. Libya’s dictator was Muhammar Gheddafi.

The contemporary problems of the ex Italian colony of Libya began after the Arab Spring when on the 20th October 2011, the Colonel will be assassinated as a result of the Arab Spring and an interference on part of the international community under the newly founded notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ by resolution 1973 of the United Nations. In the country this event was acclaimed due to the Colonel’s repressive regime, and in the international community, especially in the European quarters, there was a general relief as the Colonel would have not been able to reveal embarrassing secrets in front of an international tribunal40. Everyone was happy, the following Sunday, Libya would be vested in celebrations, even if no one knew what was going to happen now that this leader, who’s hate of had united the revolt against him, was now absent from the Libyan scene.

Gheddafi’s regime that permitted him to govern for more than 40 years involved 3 main pillars: states subsidies due to oil revenues, a balancing of the Tribe’s ‘appetites’ against

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40 Franco Rizzi, *Dove va il Mediterraneo?* (2013 : pg 89)
their hate towards the Colonel and a repressive regime against all those that would dare oppose him.\textsuperscript{41} There were also positive things which Gheddafi was allowed to perpetuate through his excessive control of Libyan life, such as: the world’s largest irrigation system and the his ambition towards a single African currency based on the gold dinar; some say that NATO intervention in 2011 was due to Gheddafi’s intent in continuing this monetary ambition.\textsuperscript{42}

With the end of the Colonel’s all controlling regime, the various tribal entities of which Libya is composed will now have to fight for supremacy and control of this now void land. A void, not so empty due to the presence of the ‘National Transitional Council’ which is trying to re-unite the scene, but it does not yet have the power and oppressing tools to represent the various tribal factions which appear stronger and better organized for the occupation of the Libyan territory. The challenges awaiting the NTC are: adequately represent the tribal entities, assure a reconciliation between the ex-regime followers and the rebels, create a democracy with ample elements of federalism to answer to the different tribal regional needs such as access to water\textsuperscript{43}.

Another challenge for Libya will be that of guaranteeing security by putting an end to the chaos of weapon diffusion by disarming the various faction militias and uniting them under a single national army. However probably the most important challenge for Libya will be that rendering it a State that will have no interference on part of foreign powers, a difficult task considering that the entity that liberated Libya was NATO, an entity that hardly acts just for humanitarian purposes\textsuperscript{44}. The main reason for this is Libya’s appealing pool of natural resources such as crude oil and gas, which are still mainly uncovered/unexploited. Such kind of resources may be for the Libyans a source of extreme richness or an agent bringing the country to a decline; local fragmentations and rivalries may find themselves exasperated by the excessive foreign interference that these resources may bring.

\section*{2.12 Islamic State}

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a terrorist group which is led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, which is active in Syria and Iraq and which has unilaterally proclaimed itself to be the new caliphate of the modern area.

Its birth resides in understanding the facts following the second Iraqi invasion of 2003. At the time, after George W. Bush’s announcement of the beginning of war, Bin Laden would follow by transmitting through an Al-Jazeera report that the forces loyal to Saddam Hussein should have joined Al-Qaeda against the new colonialists of 2003\textsuperscript{45}. Ten years later, when the American troops were retiring back home, the only worry for president Al-Maliki was the union of Sunni Arabs that was forming against his government\textsuperscript{46}. These would be persecuted by the government, forcing intense rivalry passions to be born and thus due to repressions and the economic hardship of those times, these groups would join ISIS, which was born from an Al-Qaeda internal split. ISIS at the time was in Syria to fight against the regime of Assad after the 2011 Arab Spring. Due to the Iraqi’s government repression, some ISIS militants would move to Iraq in order to fight alongside the Sunni rebels. Between 2012 and 2013 the ever-worsening repression will force the military forces of Saddam Hussain’s army to join ISIS,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{41} Ibidem pg 92
\bibitem{42} https://urbantimes.co/2014/05/libya-under-gaddafi/ (accessed 25/5/15)
\bibitem{43} Franco Rizzi, \textit{Dove va il Mediterraneo?} (2013 : pg 97)
\bibitem{44} Ibidem pg 98
\bibitem{45} Francesca Maria Corrao, \textit{Islam Fede e Politica} (2015 : pg 6)
\end{thebibliography}
the latter would bring great benefits to do the organisation both from a military and organisational perspective and also from an institutional one.

This Islamic State was initially funded by Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti Emirates, as both these countries support the Sunni Arabs of which ISIS was formed of, by the money belonging to the Mosul banks, once conquered and from the black market sales of oil, along with illegal archaeological stolen artefacts. It auto legitimated itself as a Caliphate in June 2014 in the Mosque of Mosul but such a proclamation is not legitimate at all. It doesn’t have the qualities to be a good Muslim governor, aside for perhaps its distant belonging to the Quraish clan (Saddam Hussain had also claimed such a belonging to the family of the prophet Muhammad)\(^47\).

This new Islamic state led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi\(^48\) is led by the desire to revive the ancient sentiment of a pan-Arabism that has been characterized all throughout history, from the wars of the Prophet Muhammad to the Caliphs of the Omayyad’s and The Abbasids\(^49\), the methods they use to sustain this principle are however very questionable, they do not follow one line of Islam, they kill whoever opposes their idea of Islam\(^50\). This is not what Islam is about, the first step in counteracting this is by acknowledging our western world of the fact that they should not identify this radicalism as representative of a whole religion. Our job in the Western world is to sensitise our populations so that a more healing action may be taken and the Islam phobic trend that is arising, extirpated.

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\(^{47}\) Francesca Maria Corrao, *Islam Fede e Politica* (2015 : pg 7)


\(^{49}\) Francesca Maria Corrao, *Islam Fede e Politica*. (2015 : pg 10)

\(^{50}\) Ibidem
3. Helsinki +40, what does it propose to do? How does it aim to do so?

The Helsinki +40 process wants to be a continuation of what was the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed in the Finnish Capital; a constitutive act leading to the creation, amongst other things, of the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE).

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is a result of the Helsinki negotiations that had been taken up in 1973 and terminated only in ’75 during stage II of the process. These negotiations were thought of during the middle of the cold war in the bigger project of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, they sought to ameliorate the relations between the Western and Eastern block that faced Europe during that period, namely the Communist bloc and the Western Bloc. The objective was to recreate a dialogue between East and West as the post-war year were characterized by increased tensions throughout all of Europe and in ‘influenced’ countries; Korea, Cuba etc. The main thing that happened at these negotiations was the recognition of the post-war borders in Europe, such as divided Germany and Berlin in exchange for a harsher respect of human rights on part of the Soviet Union. The Final act was signed by 35 participating states. The backbone of the process and the organization are the following:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
- Refraining from the threat or use of force
- Inviolability of frontiers
- Territorial integrity of States
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Non-intervention in internal affairs
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief)
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
- Co-operation among States, and Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.  

These areas of activity are divided into three dimensions or ‘baskets’, the first one is political and military aspect of security, the second one, economic and environmental aspects of security and the third dimension involves human aspects to security.

The Helsinki +40 process, wishes to review the progress made since 1975. Assessing the objectives undertaken and the performance of both single actors, participating individual states and of the Organization as a whole; focusing on practical ways to apply the OSCE principles in the 21st century challenges.  

The OSCE has formulated 8 thematic areas for discussion, covering all three of the OSCE dimensions and cross-dimensional issue during the two years of build-up to the end of the process; 2013-2015. These were decided upon in 2013 in Vienna, assigning eight Helsinki +40 Co-ordinators appointed from among the OSCE Ambassadors for each of the thematic areas, identifying and promoting the areas of agreement on concrete proposals during the thematic debates and the informal working groups, some of which those of Turin in June 2015 and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy in Rome, September 2015.

The 8 thematic areas are:

1. Fostering military transparency by revitalizing and modernizing conventional arms control and confidence and security building regimes;
2. Further enhancing OSCE capacities in addressing transnational threats;
3. Further strengthening OSCE capacities across the conflict cycle;
4. Striving for tangible progress towards the settlement of protracted conflicts in a peaceful and negotiated manner;
5. Enhancing the strategic orientation of the economic and environmental dimension;
6. Strengthening the human dimension;
7. Enhancing the effectiveness and efficient of the OSCE;
8. Increasing interaction with the Partners for Co-operation and with international and regional organizations.

The real scope for which OSCE was born was mainly to be able to create dialogue with the Soviet Union; it did however retain a small paragraph regarding the Mediterranean as peace in Europe was seen as essential for peace in the Mediterranean and vice-versa. Being now the 40th anniversary, at the light of the Arab Spring, the Helsinki +40 should aim its arrow towards the Mediterranean while keeping an active role also in the now more pacific East, in particular due to the Ukraine crisis, Especially due to re-uniting countries of both these spheres under the same roof in the organisation, in fact aside from NATO, OSCE re-unites amongst the European and Mediterranean countries, also those of Eastern Europe, Russia included. It is however believed that this may be too much job for one organisation and that the failed attempt of creating a Middle Eastern equivalent would have been more suitable, but the member states of this organisation and the powers of consultancy that OSCE ambassadors have is very promising for a more peaceful Mediterranean region. It has to be stated that this is a difficult moment in history to be discussing any sort of co-operative engagement in the Mediterranean region. There are many reasons for this: severe geopolitical shifts are taking place, alliances are changing and new players are becoming involved in the region. The situations in Syria, Middle East, Iraq and Libya have all flared up and will need to be addressed before co-operative structures can be focused on. Transnational threats in the Mediterranean region (migratory pressures, trafficking of human being and terrorism etc.) are not adequately addressed.

The first step taken in this Helsinki +40 perspective is the creation of a new research network called New-Med track II Network (New-Mediterranean). The purpose of this network is to re-unite all of the think tanks and policy centres of the Mediterranean so as to foster the creation of ideas and possible options for the Policy Makers around the whole sea, and not only. It aims to be the ‘academic coordinator’ of all that regards Mediterranean issues. This should set in motion, a greater cooperation amongst states as also a greater understanding to the sensitivity of different issues and brands. This network is relatively young as it was born on the 4th of June 2014 but it has already started to make important contributions such as creating workshops and reports on key issues such as those of migration, intercultural dialogue and security.

57 http://www.osce.org/node/124279 (Accessed 10/6/15)
3.1 The Evolution of OSCE’s Mediterranean engagement

- What are the major features and areas of evolution in OSCE’s Mediterranean Partnership?
- What are the existing fields of cooperation?
- What have been so far the most effective instruments of cooperation?
- Is there sufficient awareness of existing cooperation arrangements?
- What issues identified in the Mediterranean chapter of the Helsinki Final Act remain unaddressed and why?
- Should the relationship between the OSCE and Southern Mediterranean countries be reframed in the context of ‘Helsinki +40’ or just updated?
- Should the focus be on practical cooperation projects or on larger political initiatives?
- How can ‘track II’ activities help towards making progress in future cooperation?

OSCE’s effort has been for now seen as not implemented to its full potential. This has been due to the shift of attention to other priorities inside the organisation. The Mediterranean before the Arab Spring had not been considered as a significant area of interest and priority for OSCE. While maintaining a certain link of cooperation with the participating countries, there has been reluctance for dialogue on part of the six so-called Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. The process has been felt as more process-driven rather than result-driven, almost ritualized rather than being responsive to events on the ground. There has to be an upgrade for the Mediterranean engagement on part of OSCE, tempered by a sense of realism.

The extension of dialogue should be amplified, but there are some frictions for this to happen. Since 1998 there have been no additions aside from Jordan. The Palestinian national authority and Libya have requested to become Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, but this has not been allowed. It is believed that there should be a process for which the aspiring MPCs have to become more transparent and there should be a certain set of criteria’s set out so that new countries may join, but these should be specifically spelled out. This however may be seen as hindering the process for peace, as not many countries would like to apply due to the excessive conditions that may follow. This is something which is considered by some scholars comparable to Putin’s fear of having a standardizing community such as the European Union taking hegemony in it’s sphere of influence, as the role of policy convergence of the Union may not always be positive or chain-freeing for some countries. In this respect, OSCE should perhaps rethink singular membership criteria with certain countries; it may be seen as more attractive for countries wishing to be part of the dialogue. This should be seen as positive, since one of the aspects in the recent evolution of the OSCE-Mediterranean Partnership has been the growing engagement and rising expectations on part of the MPCs, which have been more forthcoming in sharing their priorities with OSCE participating States. As these priorities and preference do not always fully align, individualised partnerships or separate action plans could be considered as a promising development.

Furthermore, the reach of the dialogue can be extended by taking into account more often-other multilateral and regional organisations, this would avoid a duplication of efforts while maximising synergies, which have managed to succeed in the case of the creation of the Barcelona process and the Mediterranean equivalent of OSCE. OSCE already has strong ties with organisations such as the Council of Europe and the UN Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights. OSCE should concentrate on creating contacts with regional and sub-regional organisations, and where already present, it should strengthen more these contacts; examples are the League of Arab States or the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), these should also be complemented by regional organisations of slightly more dislocated entities such as those present in Iran, the Gulf states and a stronger African Union.

Contexts such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) have focused on specific projects such as cooperation while leaving out that of security, these are perfect spaces of action for an OSCE intervention, based not on the idea of transferring principles from Europe to the MENA region but on learning from positive and negative lessons that can be drawn from the OSCE experience in European security\(^61\). This indirect approach is being tested through specialised training and workshop activities in which experiences are shared, rather than taught.

The OSCE-Mediterranean dialogue should include participants from the non-governmental world such as academics, journalists, parliamentarians, youth, teachers and civil society representatives, providing for more ownership and visibility, making the Organisation better known and its potential contribution more appreciated. In this respect the New-Med Research Network, a track II initiative, earlier explained wants to bring together individuals from both sides of the Mediterranean for a dialogue on security and co-operation in the region. This would raise awareness and would foster ideas for policy makers, creating the right impulses and synergies and academic levels as well as professional levels, it would especially bring people together, to a better understanding of this sea, that will hopefully cease to divide the ‘Mediterraneans’. In this respect, keeping in mind the idea of bringing people together, the projects of ‘Erasmus’ and ‘Erasmus Mundus’ should be strengthened with amongst the Mediterranean countries\(^62\). The numbers of student exchanges are far too little from the Arab countries compared to those from Northern Europe or Latina America.

3.2 The future of regional cooperative security

- What is the future of cooperative security in the more interdependent but also more plural Mediterranean of the 21\(^{st}\) century?
- Can relevant regional and international organisations, such as the EU, the UN, the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States, as well as regional initiatives, such as the Union for the Mediterranean and the ‘5+5 Dialogue’, OSCE, cooperate more closely in regional security and how?
- What other actors or organisations could be involved in new initiatives?
- What are the prospects for new regional security arrangements to emerge?
- Has the idea of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) become more or less attractive in the post-Arab Spring context?
- Does the recurrent vision of a Mediterranean security community still have some relevance for policy debates or should more limited aims be set going forward?

Currently in the Mediterranean we see that the biggest threat is that of security. There is a vast insecurity in the region, which is prevailing at the regional, state and domestic internal level. There are every growing security challenges due to the growing terroristic


threats and those of territorial disputes as explained in chapter 1 of this thesis. This insecurity is reflected also in the international organisations which no longer take the time to respect their self declared goals, instead they seem to act on impulse and singularly rather than with organisations as a whole. OSCE should try to promote in a Helsinki +40 perspective a regional cooperative security strategy that should take into account the deteriorating realities on both shores of the Mediterranean. A Global Mediterranean Security Community, based on formal and institutionalised structures is not easily foreseeable, but it is very important to have a common reciprocity towards this subject on part of the two shores, focused on limited but fundamental objectives; like containing the spread of violence and neutralising points of interest for terrorist exploit, or that are in general aimed to create conflict in the Mediterranean, such as terrorist groups operating in Iraq and Syria at the moment. This, as explained before, should be a dialogue extended also to civil societies actors that will be the main impetus in promoting a broadening of agendas and inter-state dialogue.

OSCE in this security framework can be a facilitator, or ‘an honest broker’; the EU countries have always tried to look onto the Mediterranean with a Euro-Centric perspective, hoping that there would be regional cooperation and integration through process such as the Barcelona, 5+5 and UfM, whose role has been made more difficult to the continuous conflicts. OSCE ambassadors, holding the power of being allowed to encounter heads of states with no refusal, in order to hold them into account for their government’s operations, can be a moving force towards the raise of awareness to the heads of state of the influence that their actions bring to the partnership processes.

It is undeniable that OSCE’s role in the Helsinki+40 process is to account the Mediterranean governments for the current situation of their countries in the global context of the Mediterranean, aiming to implement policies on security, because without security, peace cannot be lived, and without peace, creativity, innovation and development cannot flourish. To properly understand the significance of the CSCE, then and now, one has to underline the method used to achieve the written agreements. Each negotiation piece was started with a thorough “review” of the participants’ behaviour in that particular field. It is important that there is the participation of also extra-regional actors to the talks, which now play important roles such as Russia, China and USA, because of their every-growing importance and influence in the region.

What OSCE should keep in mind while fostering this European Security renovation, is that it should not divide neither the European countries nor the divide between North and South Mediterranean. The role that OSCE will need to cover is that of sharing the experiences on security rather than teaching them to the Arab countries. Arab countries, whose security experiences have been those of brutally repressing populations and insurgencies. To achieve this objective, there will be the need of help from state and non-state actors, together, so that the Arab countries may slowly exit their vertical administration of the country and so that civil society can be adequately represented in the positions of power, creating a horizontal hierarchy of power in these countries which have for decades been characterized by a strictly vertical structure of power.

A further pressing question is that of the Mediterranean ‘Public Goods’; there a number of common issues that concern the countries of the Med namely, maritime safety and security, the management of sea-based resources, Mediterranean energy and the Mediterranean environment, human and personal security related to migration flows, and food security among others. These are all perfect sphere for investment as for co-operation, the

countries should re-unite in periodical Mediterranean ad hoc forums to discuss these thematics, the New-Med network that is to be born, should reserve a sector of it’s organisation to overlook these processes of ‘less political’ importance. These will be the key elements of the future Mediterranean agenda, and there should be an ever-growing list of topics for which the countries of these two shores comes together, ranging from the political, to the street dimension, ranging from New-Med researcher networks to children ‘penpal-ing’ each other across this sea. What better time and actor, now that Italy, the main bridge across the Mediterranean holds the High Commissioner of European Foreign Policy, along with its just passed presidency of the European Council?
4. What is the role that Italy can play, in a Helsinki +40 perspective, towards the Mediterranean?

The European powers have each had their own way of facing the Mediterranean through their own policies since 1945, in many occasions these policies were conflicting against one another.

After world war two there has been virtually no real policy regarding this region, so close to the European states. The only type of alignment that there has been was that of following the United State’s points of view on the region. At the exception of this behaviour we find France and Great Britain, which will retain their hegemonic role as colonizers in Northern Africa and the Middle East, by leading battles that will seek to fortify their role in the region.

Great Britain will abandon this aim after the failures of Egypt and Sudan starting in 1954. It will also fail in late 1960s to direct its influence towards the Gulf States. France will be put aside from the administration of Syria in 1945 and will give independence to Algeria in 1962, by keeping however a small regret for its influence in the regions of the Maghreb and Lebanon, a regret fuelled by the Entrepreneurial class, which especially in Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon will seek to create ties with the French mainland.

The creation of the European Union will not institute a common policy towards the Mediterranean as would be expected considering that such an entity has all of its Southern Front facing towards this tumultuous region. A region, whose umbilical cord of colonialism hasn’t been cut; only in 1973 will Europe remember this region after the Arab-Israeli war of that year, where the oil prices will be redefined. This awakening will however have no real effect on a consistent European intervention of any kind in the region. The only kind of policy that will be followed by the Europeans, will be that imposed by the United States until the Gulf crises; while instead there should be an understanding that the mechanisms of peace and co-operation will not set into motion without political co-ordination.

Great Britain has an inexistent Euro-Mediterranean or Arab policy. Hers is an unconditioned alignment with the policies of the United States as those of the other Anglophonic countries. This is due the future intentions of creating a population bloc of English speaking countries that will share values concerning capitalism and bourgeoisie democracy, creating a front of solidarity towards other cultures. De Gaulle was the first European to understand this set of policies concerning Great Britain, and for the future to come; it is without a doubt that a British participation in the European Institutions will reflect a negligence and reluctance in following an only European policy towards the Mediterranean without any American interference.

Germany has also herself no real policy towards the Mediterranean, for different reasons as those regarding Great Britain; she will also probably not formulate one in the years to come. Due to Germany’s unlucky division and statue, the Federal Republic has always agreed to concentrate its efforts on economic development maintaining a low political profile while remaining on the trail of ‘Europeanism’. Germany right now is characterized by the wills of dominant political forces (conservatives, liberals and social democrats) that aim at expanding German capitalism towards central and oriental Europe.

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66 Elisabetta Brighi e Fabio Petitio, Il Mediterraneo nelle Relazioni Internazionali. (2009 : pg 102)
68 Elisabetta Brighi e Fabio Petitio, Il Mediterraneo nelle Relazioni Internazionali. (2009 : pg 103)
69 Ibidem
Considering the weight that the German economy has compared to the other European states, this means in a significant shift of attention towards Eastern Europe instead of facing a more Euro-Mediterranean optic in the economic integration perspective, European common strategy and the political level.

France’s positions have been more defined, it is an Atlantic country as a European one, heir of a vast colonial empire, winner of the second world conflict; France has however not managed to impose herself as a power, even though the economic and financial situation of the country allow it to.\textsuperscript{70} During the first decade of the post-war period, the French governments strived to maintain their colonies through an Atlantist, Anti-Communist and Anti-Soviet perspective. With De Gaulle this will change, as he will seek to bring ahead 3 objectives; modernization of the French economy, decolonization substitute by a soft neo-colonialism and to solve problems that may regard economic maturity by following the dream of European integration. Sadly, starting from 1968 this Gaullist idea of French Politics will surpass its creator. The succeeding governments will return to their old positions, looking towards a more restricted vision of a European Union characterized mainly by a common market objective, with a face to face with France and Federal Germany and an incitation from Great Britain for France to join the EEC (a United States horse of troy\textsuperscript{71}). This meant that France will no longer have its ambition of maintaining a mercantilist regime, but it will now have to concentrate on this re-unified Germany and it will live in the fear of the past of an ever-growing stronger Germany.

Spain and Portugal are also amongst the important states in the geostrategic framework towards the Mediterranean. The axis Azzorre-Canaries-Gibraltar create a perfect monitoring triangle for all the naval transits inside of the Mediterranean and to overlook into the Atlantic for any type of movement. For this reason, starting from the Second World War, the US forges an ally with these two states. Future developments in NATO will see these countries prepare themselves militarily for the occasion of a ‘southern front’.

Turkey holds the most advantageous position for what regards the Middle Eastern countries, its historic ties with the region and its involvement aside the allies during the Great War and the Gulf war depict this country as one of the main actors of the region, working both for peace and for war. Turkey wishes to play a bigger role in this area, it remains to decide if it will be on the Europeans side, or on her own. For now it’s biggest conflicts regards the Kurdish recognition, its conflicts with her neighbouring countries regarding disputed territories and territorial waters and airspace and the fear on part of the regional actors of Turkey’s desire for expansion towards countries such as Azerbaijan, this fear is particularly felt from Iran.

In general we see that the most countries follow a strategy towards the Mediterranean on the trail of the ex east-west conflict, following American hegemony. The countries of the Mediterranean should, through an adequate leadership of which Italy is the best candidate, re-invent their strategies towards this common sea.

4.1 Italy’s Hegemony

Italy by definition due to its geopolitical position should be the main shareholder of the ‘Mediterranean cause’ due to its role as the main entity involved in this region’s sensitive problems. Given this pretext, reality has not been similarly reflected, for a long time, Italy has been marginalized from capitalist development. Italy was forced to put it’s Mediterranean ambitions aside into a framework of policies and ideas decided upon by the

\textsuperscript{70} Elisabetta Brighi e Fabio Petitio, Il Mediterraneo nelle Relazioni Internazionali. (2009 : pg 104)
\textsuperscript{71} Ibidem
more decisive European powers. Italy is nowadays not that of the 1860-1945 period, it has been witness of one of the greatest capitalist development ‘miracles’, of the post-war era. It is now considered to be a fully developed European country and it may thus follow its own policy towards the Mediterranean or have a bigger say in the European discussions regarding the Med, which have so far reflected American influenced country’s worries.  

Italy’s long-term policy trajectory tendencies involve four different themes: ‘Atlantism’, ‘Universalism’, ‘Mittel-Europeanism’ and ‘Mediterraneanism’.

Atlantism involves maintaining a low political profile following the trail of American policies; in the past we have already seen this type of behaviour on part of the Christian Democrat governments starting from 1947. This is a particularly appreciated policy on part of the laic bourgeoisie (Republicans, Liberals, Socialists) while the Christian Democrats are more moved towards the Universalism of the Catholic tradition. A Universalism, that is especially exercised by the Vatican towards the Arab world; such as the recent declaration concerning Palestine. The ‘Mittel-Europa’ tendency desire an upkeep of the North South divide, this policy line is particularly withheld from the Milanese bourgeoisie which is more in line with the German point of few of capitalist expansion towards eastern Europe. In Italy’s case, that would mean interests in Croatia. This would mean a marginalisation of Italy in the political scene and an abandonment of any policy towards the Mediterranean. ‘Mediterraneanism’, even if it remains weak, involves a non coordinated political strategy where Italy while make business throughout the whole Mediterranean, bilaterally or trilaterally but without creating a multilateral scene, where Italy will vest the noble role of economic initiative that would give it political and economic autonomy especially in a European context, making it an even more important power with a heavier decision-making weight. The economic gain would not involve just Italy but also the Arab countries involved in this ‘great convergence’, possibly challenging Europe in the future, especially if projects such as the African Union’s one of a single currency is to be undertaken.

Italy is lost now in an image that depicts it as unprepared and incapable of acting on her own towards threats to her security. It has lost power and influence at the doors of its borders, showing geopolitical problems that inevitably affect the development of its economy. Those times that Italy did take action it was after an appeal to international institutions such as the UN, Europe and NATO, organisations that constantly argue amongst the decisions to be taken. For Italy, it would be more useful to intervene little but with more clarity and decisiveness, as untailored interventions may result in a loss of political power internationally.

4.2 A Dynamic Past

Italy’s hegemony however was once more firm and appreciated, especially for what regards the subject matter of this thesis, the Mediterranean. Italy’s diplomatic efforts have intervened numerous times such as in 1998 when Italy managed to re-unite the Euro-Mediterranean partnership of Barcelona in Palermo in order to sew back international

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72 Elisabetta Brighi e Fabio Petitio, Il Mediterraneo nelle Relazioni Internazionali. (2009 : pg 105)
73 Ibidem
relations facing the crisis of that year and saving the partnership as a whole, also thanks to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry of Affairs Amr Moussa\textsuperscript{78}.

The cases of Italian excellence are many, as soon as a new issue would arise, the mechanism of peace would initiate itself automatically, often under Italian impulse, which tried to re-unite the conflicting parties together in order to create a dialogue. Dialogue that would then be continued by the major proponents of the region, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; which would then see France, Spain, Portugal and Malta involved. These were the countries from which the 5+5 process was inspired along with the ‘Mediterranean initiative’ brought about by Mitterrand. Later there will be an entry into the game on part of Greece and Mauritania, while Saudi Arabia would remain a discussant, separated only geographically.

Libya had chosen not to participate in any of the two groups of dialogue but Italy and Tunisia would make it participate indirectly in the dialogues. However after Gheddafi had launched two ‘SCUD’ missile on Lampedusa aiming for a US base that was supposedly to attack Libya\textsuperscript{79}, the Craxi government of the time managed to create a level of consultation between the two governments that would strengthen the relations between these two countries (also with the intervention of Andreotti later on). This will create greater cooperation between the two countries and after an insistence on part of Gheddafi a dialogue for ‘reparations’ of colonialism will be initiated\textsuperscript{80}, reparations that will be demanded also on part of the ‘Association of National Repatriated Italians from Libya’, due to the unjust expulsion of this community on part of the Colonel\textsuperscript{81}, after they have given Tripoli (at the time of colonialism) the status of ‘most beautiful city of North Africa’.\textsuperscript{82}

\section*{4.3 The Libya Case}

Recent International Relations have demonstrated to us that in moments of crisis, unfortunately, countries act on their own arbitrarily without the support of our international organizations such as the European Union. In this latter respect, of the four G7 countries on the global scene, we see an Italy that does not actively participate or fails to impose itself and give valuable contributions to the community, even though the burden we bring upon us all these crises and risks of terrorism at our doors, would induce us to pick up a greater role.

The Libyan case is to be concealed if we are to foresee some sort of peace in the region. The crucial point for Libya would be the creation of an embryonic form of government that pushes towards a national unity. Once this is formed, Italy, along with other member states should entertain active and positive relations with this new government, so as to demonstrate mutual reliance and not to revive the ancient colonialist sentiments, which some of these countries may fear. An example of such a reliance was the ‘Treaty of Friendship’\textsuperscript{83}, that was to strengthen the relations with the Colonel Gheddafi in order to overcome his diffidence and to transition to peace relations without awakening the tribal spirit of the country, which we are assisting to today. A Treaty, that of Friendship that could have been invoked by those whom had the right to do so at the

\textsuperscript{81} Scontrino, Francesco. \textit{Il Dramma Della Libia}. (1971; pg 49)
\textsuperscript{82} Fusceika, Mohamed Ben Massaud. \textit{Storia della Libia}. (1956 : pg 10)
dawn of the offensive planned by Nicolas Sarkozy with the influence of Bernard-Henry Levy\textsuperscript{84}. All that was necessary in that occasion was for Italy to accord itself with Germany to buy time and to investigate on the supposed genocide that Levy had called for to Sarkozy, perhaps avoiding a mas operation as was that of Libya in 2011 and finding another solution to the problems of the country and Benghasi.

Currently the International community seems to not have actively intervened in this case, aside from creating the new ‘Responsibility to Protect’ dogma. For the moment being, the Libyan case should be left to rest as in the future it is possible that between the Islamic Government of Tripoli (not recognized) and the ISIS lead groups there might be a fracture, however, at the same time, closing completely such a dossier is not possible due to the growing importance of the ISIS advance and of the movements close to the Muslim Brotherhood, even if we see an apparently declining threat of Al Qaeda\textsuperscript{85}.

\begin{center}
\textbf{4.4 Italian Diplomatic Offensive}
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Given the modern developments of International Relations and the eradication of terror (Of also failed states that might rebuild –A Kurdistan reality is not to be underestimated), Italy has the chance to regain its Diplomatic importance that has been missing in the past years. It has the chance to stand through the different crisis as a producer of peace, facing problems head high.

Our political system for the past 25 years\textsuperscript{86} has experienced fragility and instability; this is inevitably reflected in the conduction of Italy’s Foreign Policy. The fall of the Berlin wall and the East-West divide combined with the belief that market and democracy were the only elements for a harmonized world have influenced Italian politics into thinking that closing Italy into a state of welfare was the way to continue, but this belief revealed itself to be both fragile and provincial. A surprising result considering Bettino Craxi’s ‘Ostpolitik’ in the 1980s pushed for economic expansion of Italian SMEs towards the residual countries of the imploded Comecon, countries such as Hungary and Poland.

Today we have perhaps lost our identity as a G7 country bringing ahead the objectives set by the latter. Objectives that we ourselves have enforced against an Anglo-French tandem which wanted to submit these objectives to the G5. In today’s diplomatic scenario we have the impression that the West is in decline due to the growing shares of global trade on part of the BRICS, we also see a Great Russia aiming to be born under Putin. Given this global context we may thus understand as to why Europe and especially Italy have been overcome by the rise of radical Islam and wild capitalism non-adjusted by good governance. Italy had the chance to stand a firm ground in the European Union and in the G7 and thus to be able to manage better the Arab Spring, making the union understand that these revolts were not a fight for democracy but rather it was a fight for the conquest of human dignity so that they may later, on their own, decide the fate of their countries, even if it may go against our western model.

Due to the absence of such a key player of the region, the west has adopted dubious policies, which fostered the gateway access to the creation of new war fronts completely unattended of by everyone. These have forced the populations of these countries to flee their homes in search of shelter by crossing the dangerous path of the Mediterranean with

\textsuperscript{86} Ibidem
overcrowded boats: by making our sea, the Mediterranean, ‘A Grand Cemetery’\textsuperscript{87}. For this reason, amongst many others Italy must take up the situation and forage the stabilization and development of our southern frontier, a frontier for us, of always-greater strategic importance. Also a frontier of shared development and assured convergence.

### 4.5 Where to Act

Italy’s main objective as of now should be to aim for the economic growth and political stability in her domain and in the Arab countries, acting as a bridging agent with the ‘other’ European member states to intervene, in particular soliciting intervention as soon as new tension spheres appear; intervention means to use conflict as a last resort.

The first problem to tackle is the perception of Islam along with radical Islam and how it is interpreted as an interreligious dialogue tool, which seems today to be too emphatic and out of focus while it has relied on a single purpose and order, not reverting into violence.\textsuperscript{88} Along this line a problem to tackle is that of the conflicts plaguing the Mediterranean described in the first chapter, along with all of the deep African conflicts which force people to seek for refuge in the developed world. It is also a matter of security, because without peace, development cannot be foreseen, there will have to be a coming down to agreements of co-existence of Sunni Arabs and Shi’a Arabs, such as solicited by the Grand Imam Azhar Al Tayib.

Jihadism represents around 3\% of Sunni Arabs\textsuperscript{89}, even though the number is small and seems to be contained, it is a value that should not be underestimated. The rise of the ‘Islamic State’ which currently holds around 270m\textsuperscript{2} of territory compromising Syria and Iraq has rendered fanaticism of Jihadism more brutal which in turn, uses Islam as an excuse for wars of power. This type of State is bound to be disbanded in the future due to the hatred that it has generated throughout the Arab world, but what cannot be assured is the creation of an even more violent terrorist group/s after the fall of ISIS. While responding to terrorism, it is important to acknowledge that the mother of all tensions remains this sense of oppression, injustice, discrimination of the Arab world on part of the Western world, seen as Israel’s uncritical ally.

The Palestinian situation remains an open wound; previous Italian governments have been firm believers of Palestine’s independence risking conflicts with its major ally, such as that of the Sigonella case. Italy must return to the peace negotiations trying to involve the United States, Israel and the Arab countries. The bases have already been deployed from 2 initiatives that seem to have been forgotten: The Saudi Arabia Peace Initiative\textsuperscript{90} and the Annapolis, Maryland conference\textsuperscript{91} in 2007 sponsored by George W.Bush.

November 1984, Kind Fahd, asked Craxi to dialogue with Simon Peres, in order to work with Arafat towards a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, an initiative that was promising until in 1985 it failed in Amman due to generous concessions requested to Simon Peres. Today the success of such an initiative could have been crucial for the development of peace talks. The European Union failed to bring the peace process back on track, failing to make Israel recognizes its status of ‘Aggressor state’. This, amongst other occasions is another reason for being depicted, in the eyes of the Arab world as inconclusive diplomats.

\textsuperscript{88}Bausani, Alessandro. L’Islam. (1999 : pg 172)
4.6 The Southern Frontier: not just a shore of problems for Italy but also of great development opportunities

The aftermath of the Arab spring has made us witness of the biggest humanitarian crisis ever experienced in the post war era. UNHCR has estimated that around half the population of Syria is now a refugee with around 7.6 million still in national territory and 3.3 million\(^{92}\) seeking refuge outside of Syria. While in all of the Middle Eastern and African area since 2011, the refugees are around 50 million. During the previous regimes the Northern African countries would act as a hit softener reducing the flow of people onto the Italian coasts but now that some of these regimes such as that of the colonel are no more standing or are suffering from threats to stability, thus security and thus development, we are feeling the full hit of the movement of people. This is to be seen as a calamity but also as an opportunity for Italy. These countries that now have stalled economically are more open to investments and opportunities for growth and stability, if correctly connected to Italy (and other EU member states) and led under one big political wave (as there already many initiative, but all are dispersive and inconclusive).

A strong coordination on part of Italy can foster economic activity in this now forsaken land that is Northern Africa; Italy may act as the flag holder for prosperity and Mediterranean convergence, something that has been absent so far. To no surprise China is now Africa’s biggest trade partner, UNCTAD statistics of 2013 show us that of the 1 trillion dollars of economic interchange China holds 156.4 billion, the US 72 million and Italy a mere 40 million (overtaken by India, Spain and France\(^{93}\)).

As far as investments are concerned, Italy does better by ranking third after Great Britain and the United States. Particular stress should be added to agriculture, mining and infrastructural sectors\(^{94}\) through the forces of public and private investments following multilateral initiatives such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments\(^{95}\), which will have a pool of 315 billion euros to employ in the coming years starting from 2015. These will have to be accompanied by more positive global governance on part of the Institutions of Bretton Woods so that they may act in a more constructive way towards the African continent; acting more rapidly, than has done China, to the requests of help on part of the African countries\(^{96}\). With such a vast region it is unthinkable that outer regional actors are to bond in stronger economic ties than, European countries, which are the Northern shore of this African continent, shores that have been for centuries interconnected and have now the opportunity to flourish.

4.7 Bilateral, Multilateral Projects in a European perspective

For a successful peace project in the Middle East it is first of all necessary that the UN organs begin to work towards peace policies, especially the Security Council. On part of the Western World there will have to be a more effective diplomatic action in favour of re-establishing relations as the world is no more controlled by one single hegemon as was in the past, the West. The world is now composed of ever more emerging powers that play


a bigger role in the International game. The first step towards stability is to institute a real embargo on weapons going to war plagued countries, if this is not done, countries such as Libya will not foresee a peace in the short run. This even in spite of Italy’s vast production should be Italy’s cardinal objective and it should be the one developed power to foster this type of embargo.

Italy has the chance to begin once again the talks of Mediterranean partnerships, after of course analysing the causes of the past failures. Italy could take up in her hands the 5+5 process and the subsequent Union for the Mediterranean by allowing Egypt and Greece to join, in order to at least begin the talks for policy and economic convergence in the region useful for everyone. These countries will have to rely on a mix of intergovernmental policies and common policies that Germany and the European Union will just have to be convinced to accept.

In the past such an initiative was taken up, more specifically, in 1990 there was the CSCM (Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean)\textsuperscript{98}, which was an initiative by the Italian and Spanish governments for an institutionalized dialogue for the south eastern shore of the Mediterranean towards peace. It was deemed to succeed thanks to its predecessor’s success, namely OSCE, in re-establishing talks between the two Europes divided by the Berlin wall. An Israeli-American opposition halted this initiative for the CSCM. It is a shame that such an idea did not see the dawn of its days, as at the same time the Barcelona process of 1995 would have worked on the other side of the Mediterranean thus creating a double action which could’ve have sparked a general convergence in the fields of Politics, Economics and Society-Culture. A Barcelona process that also failed to see its birth after a successful kick-start during Italy’s European presidency January-June in 1996\textsuperscript{100} that will be halted\textsuperscript{101} by the election of Netanyahu in April 1996 that will make the success of this process be lost in the technical bureaucracy of Brussels.

Italy’s time to act is now, as it cannot play a passive role in the Mediterranean game, in the eyes of the refugees the first shore of salvation that is met is that of Italy, that alone will not be able to continue containing such a calamity, Italy should act, but it also needs the support of the European Union. The Triton initiative is almost considered as waste of time, as while it requires fewer budgets to maintain, on a humanitarian and efficiency level it is incomparable to Mare Nostrum\textsuperscript{102}. In response to such an operation former Italian Foreign Minister Emma Bonino declared that a Commissary for the Mediterranean should be instituted in the European Union\textsuperscript{103}. Such an important proposal has not been yet given voice to, but especially with Italy’s outgoing role in the Union’s presidency along with Ms Mogherini role in being the High Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the European Union, the institution of such a role is more easily foreseeable and would represent the Union trying to tend their hand towards its southern shore, a hand that might in the future become a bridge. This new Commissar under Italian impulse should aim to establish a dialogue between Sunni Arabs and Shi’a Arabs so as they may acknowledge co-existence amongst one another thus, rendering the peace process with the creation of

an OSCE equivalent smoother. The conference’s objectives would then be to first look into the Iraq and Syria case. On this last subject, Iraq will be a hard task to achieve without the help of the biggest regional actor, Iran, the same goes for Syria. It is a country that is however now being kept aside due to the threat of nuclear weapons it imposes to the west. Worthy of mention is that former Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, was the first western leader to meet Khatami\textsuperscript{104} (leader of Iran) which did not try to act as the ‘Horse of Troy’ for Shi’a influence, but on the contrary, he asked for a cooperation without interference between western world and Iran by showing how fructuous their relations may be. 

The main issue that should be addressed is a thought for future European strategy and a change in Europe’s current foreign policy along with a redistribution in the way it employs its funds. This of course does not mean to abandon the fiscal battle to stabilize national balances in Europe; it means that the Union needs to understand that without a common foreign policy, the union risks to become a ‘Non Entity’\textsuperscript{105}. This kept in mind, it seems paradoxical that a country such as France, which is actively concerned with matters of International Security, is constantly being told off by German technicians for what regards the conformity of the Fiscal Compact. It is unavoidable that there will be more spending for defence that will go over the 3% limit, in this latter respect FEIS funds could be employed somewhere along these lines.

4.8 Method: Toolbox for the Mediterranean

Aside from a political strategy and a security plan on a national level (minding the balance of payments of a country), the real instrument on which Italy and other member states should rely on should be a grand partnership between public and private sphere. The European Union did not continue its objective of political construction that the Council of Europe in 1985 in Milan had disclosed. Instead the Union has worked through the conservatives and sustained by a Technocratic Brussels towards an economic-financial orientation instead of following a more political-institutional one. There was been an absence of vigilance on part of National Parliamentarians on this subject, in name of a Europeanism that had almost become a pretext in order to not deal with subjects which the entrepreneur class did not seem both lenient and prepared on.

The Introduction of the FEIS funds will be an open theatre of action where member states will have the chance to regain their own initiatives against the ones that have seemed to be dictated by a Technocratic Germany. There is the chance to revisit the automatism of the Union with what seems almost a loss of sovereignty on part of the Member States. The Greek case will be symbolic for the evolutions of the Union.

As far as Italy is concerned, the organisation of the public structures should be revisited in order that they may be able to interact with the private sector so that the government is able to activate, if necessary command power levers (of economic and political background) useful for foreign policy, international economy, and security policies, these should be concentrated in our case towards a more prioritized Southern Mediterranean. It should become our main objective so that this imaginary bridge may be built towards Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa along with Middle Eastern countries, ranging from those of Iran to the Arabian Gulf.


In order to maintain and sustain this process there should be the creation, in the Italian Council of Presidency, of two specific Committees. The first one should be on the Politics of Globalizations: with the job of monitoring the effects of Globalisation and the causes of its internal faults, with a ‘ante and post’ analysis of decisions at a multilateral level, including communitarian directives; the second one should analyse, for the Government, the possible options for possible changes in international institutions so that the imbalances may gradually diminish due to a mediocre governance and so that a more efficient one instead may be put in place.

The Secretariat of the two committees would be held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who’s organisational structure will have to be revisited in order to uphold this new function. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be in charge of coordination with the more ‘technical’ ministries and through them, coordination with the private sectors of business and finance. This will serve the purpose of being able to submit to the government, detailed and reliable analysis for the emanation of general trails of policies to undertake so as to drag the medium and small enterprises with the formation of networks and groups of research for funding on part of the Sovereign Wealth Funds.

An added value could be given by the creation of a ‘Bank for Development’ inside of the ‘Cassa Depositi e Prestiti’ as dictated under law n.125 of 2014, so as to reduce the costs in the sector, SIMEST (Organisation for Foreign Italian Firms) may become a key part in the organization of such a bank.

In this respect there is friction in keeping separate two different instruments of internationalisation, namely SIMEST (with temporary stock markets in Joint Ventures of foreign firms) and those offered by art.7 of law n.49, 1987, which is now under direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Union on the two along with all the different proposals that involve the MAE, we will find a more smooth and agile role on part of the Ministry making it void of any kind of executive duties which will thus render it more capable of realizing efficient coordination with foreign policy actions and multilateral institutions coordination, of which the financial ones, that will allow targeted and eclectic manoeuvres.

4.9 Coherent Italy

Italy is known to not be a great power, neither does it have ambitions to become one. Italy is however a great nation that should be able to easily respond in its areas of competence, acting as a hegemon in its regional sphere and as a peace keeper in the conflicts near it. Italy needs to confirm, in front of the world but also to our Mediterranean partners, that it is willing to walk along the realistic road towards peace negotiations, so as to reach just solutions for everyone and recognizing the rights of States and populations of the aforementioned regions. The formula to follow should be that of traditional democracy that our country has always brought ahead of its statutes. Italy has to regain its control over the Mediterranean with an active and positive role aiming to build a grand area of cooperation. Italy wants to work aiming for development, cultural richness, traditional values, human skills and material goods in a Mediterranean that will one day be a sea of peace and progress.

107 Ibidem
5. Conclusion

The Mediterranean is currently divided, we have a developed and wealthy Northern shore with a more turbulent and deprived Southern shore. Some say that after the Arab Spring the situation have began declining. The truth is that since the beginning of colonialism the situation has declined, it began with an excessive colonizer presence and slowly became replaced by local groups or dictators taking the place of the all-controlling colonizers. These have left the countries of the Mediterranean naked to exploitation and have left them void with a good political structure as well as governance one. The only thing that was holding them in place were the dictators through their oppressive regimes. After the fall of the later due to the Arab Spring, the countries found themselves plunged into disorder, representing security problems, humanitarian problems and economic problems.

Only now have the International Organisations awoken to the problems of the Southern Shores. Now there aren’t anymore the dictators, which would tie pacts with the developed world in exchange for oil trade. These countries now represent a threat to stability for the developed world and for only this reason they are now worthy of International attention. On top of the threats brought about from the Post-Arab Spring there are several regional issues which also hinder the peace development, just to name a few, the Moroccan-Algerian tensions, the Greek-Turkish ones, the Saudi Arabia- Iran tug war, the presence of the ‘Western Protectorate’ of Israel- Arab Hate. Either Europe chooses to coordinate itself with Africa so that the Mediterranean may become a single geopolitical reality, or Europe will be exposed to direct conflicts from all types of forces that will desire to attack the Union, once this will happen, when Africa will feel the absence of an illusive liberty that will bring birth to new forms of slavery.¹⁰⁸

The past efforts have not been very successful in creating dialogue between these countries, the Barcelona process, the 5+5 and the Union for the Mediterranean have not seen the dawn of their ambitions, not so much on a reluctance of dialogue on part of the Arab states, but of a reluctance on dialogue between them. On many occasions the Arab country representatives are invited to forums in which they participate but essentially, they do not say a word in fear of what the reactions of their neighbouring countries might be.¹⁰⁹ There is still a trust problem in Northern Africa and a general reluctance to cooperate amongst one another.

The Helsinki +40 process will aim to seek for a formal debate and conclusion on the Mediterranean case, the propositions are many and so are the fields of discussion, one such field, is the investment in renewable energy sources, which may terminate all the wars for oil that plague Northern Africa and the Middle East¹¹⁰, eliminating a reason for invasion and foreign interference in domestic policies. Through the process, OSCE should aim to become the cardinal organization fostering security in the region, it has a greater relevance compared to the other organisations due to its experience in smoothening the Western Eastern bloc peace and due to the fact that it re-unites many of the Eastern European countries of great strategic importance for the region under the same roof, such

as Russia. This organisation has the potential to affirm itself as the key institutions in the eyes of the Arab countries. The road is certainly not easy, but it may be achieved especially if there are countries, which are willing to take on the challenge and duty to bringing this cause onto the international scene.

Italy seems to be the best candidate for leading this march towards a more stabilized Mediterranean. It has all the tools to do so; it has now the outing role in the Presidency of the European Council as also the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Mrs.Mogherini. Italy has the chance to regain the diplomatic importance that it is lost in the last years, the options to follow are many, such as that of redirecting the FEIS funds of the European Union towards strategic and eclectic investments in the Mediterranean markets. Fostering a sort of bilateral-trilateral, multilateral relationship between these countries, working towards economic convergence and rendering these countries more independent. The areas for investment will have to be those of agriculture, infrastructure, renewable energy (a solar energy with which all of the Mediterranean is kissed with) and mining. Hardly we will find products in our markets deriving from these southern shore countries, yet these are resource rich, many of their resources are not full used, with the exception of Morocco, which is reaching an ever-closer stage of development.

Italy can make a diplomatic effort in this sense, redirecting European attention towards this region, for example as said before, by redirecting structural funds such as those of FEIS which amount to 315 billion euros\(^\text{111}\), towards strategic points in the Northern Africa. What seems as given to us may not be the same for other countries; investments in Infrastructure are key for any good economy to work. Italy should be the promoter of economic convergence in the Mediterranean basin by following policies that aim to invest in these countries with a return, yes to Italy, but also to the countries themselves. There should be a policy of giving these countries the tools in order that they may stand on their own two feet. Exploitation should be a thing of the past in the mind of small and middle-sized enterprises. To this, Italy will have to first of all create a Mediterranean commission in its Parliament, headed by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A commission always accounting for what is happening in the Mediterranean and how Italy can in someway intervene through correct governance, governance that along with the several civil societies present throughout the basin can foster a more horizontal level of politics. All in all it is what the Mediterranean now needs, after experiencing decades of very strict vertical political and power hierarchy.

Italy should be the prime promoter, also inside the Union, for the exchange of Mediterranean youth. The Erasmus programme should be expanded to all angles of the Mediterranean, increasing the exchanges of students, creating connections between the societies of both shores. It creates a network of connections amongst the youth that will with the years to go strengthen, creating interconnectedness, Italy should promote any kind of initiative that promotes this kind of objective. Italy, needs to exercise it’s influence in these countries so that they may seek assistance to Italy, bringing mutual benefits for both, both on terms of economic convergence as social interconnectedness. Connections which areas in Italy deeply desire, such as the South of Italy who have always had ties with Northern Africa, from the modern colonizers to the, Omayyad caliphate in the post-roman era\(^\text{112}\). There are still very strong cultural ties, such as regards traditions, language expressions and popular culture such as the stories of Giufà\(^\text{113}\).

The Mediterranean is now coming to a point where it is reaching saturation in its political sphere, it has all the elements to become a great region, but there are a few place


where it is still tripping up, in particular for what regards Libya, Syria and Iraq. In order to successfully transition to a more stable and peaceful region, there are a few conflicts that need resolving, fostered by the ‘developed’ nations. The United States and Russia and China all have an active involvement in the area, but the true nation, for its geopolitical position, that is rightfully to be, the bridge across the Mediterranean is Italy. It has the chance to regain its important diplomatic world; it has the chance, not to become a superpower (of which it has no ambition), but to become a great nation. Italy should become a country upon which Northern Africa can rely on, as can the European countries. Italy is to once again regain the positive hegemony it used to exercise at the time of the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean, is to become, once again a ‘Mare Nostrum’.
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**Abstract in Italian**

**Riassunto : Helsinki +40**

L'Unione Europea, dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino e la dissoluzione dell'Unione Sovietica, ha concentrato (sotto la spinta della Germania) tutta la sua attenzione verso Oriente, lasciando in sordina i rapporti con gli Stati Mediterranei. Adesso, però, dopo il periodo d'instabilità, che hanno attraversato e tutt'ora attraversano i Paesi del Nord-Africa e del Medio Oriente, uno spostamento di attenzione nei confronti di questi Paesi si dimostra più che necessario, sia nell'ambito politico, che in quello economico. Bisognerà, peraltro, evitare lo stile coloniale e post-coloniale di dettar loro l'agenda. L'atteggiamento corretto, nei confronti dei problemi che affliggono il Mediterraneo, sarà quello di avviare una cooperazione egualitaria, volta ad individuare i nodi che limitano lo sviluppo di questi Stati. L'Unione Europea, sia come entità, sia bilateralmente con i suoi Paesi membri, deve lavorare e predisporre in maniera tale da poter rispondere alle reali esigenze dei Paesi del Sud e dell'Est del Mediterraneo e trovare quindi insieme soluzioni condivise, volte a superare le difficoltà politiche ed economiche che affliggono le acque del "Mare Nostrum".

I Campi di una possibile e fruttuosa cooperazione potrebbero essere:

1. Pace, Sicurezza e Democrazia
2. Sviluppo economico e Sostenibilità
3. Scambi culturali e Università
4. Giustizia nella Migrazione e Integrazione Sociale

L'Unione Europea è impegnata attualmente sul piano bilaterale con l'"Accordo Euro-Mediterraneo di associazione". La dimensione multilaterale è prevista nella 'Politica di vicinato'. Ad ogni modo, dobbiamo tenere a mente che qualsiasi decisione o misura di cooperazione potrebbe essere vanificata da una delle tante crisi politiche che sono presenti intorno al Mediterraneo.

I Paesi del Mediterraneo necessitano una riacquisizione della loro identità nella formazione di un grande Mediterraneo. I Paesi della sponda sud dovrebbero adottare misure per la stabilità e la sicurezza politica. I Paesi sviluppati della sponda Nord dovrebbero giocare per l'ultima volta un ruolo coloniale, ma in un modo più positivo di quanto sia stato fatto in passato. Essi, piuttosto che perseguire politiche estrattive, dovrebbero cercare di stimolare le istituzioni dei Paesi ex-coloniali ad adottare misure per lo sviluppo.

L'OSCE (Organizzazione per la cooperazione e la sicurezza in Europa) in vista del quarantesimo (che avrà luogo nel 2015) anniversario dell'Atto finale di Helsinki, concluso nel 1975, ha lanciato il processo cosiddetto di Helsinki+40, che si propone di rivivere la gloria passata, rivolgendo l'attenzione dei suoi Stati membri, non solo verso l'Europa dell'Est come avvenuto finora, ma anche verso i Paesi del Mediterraneo. Lo scopo è quello di creare un foro di dialogo volto a trovare nuove vie per la sicurezza, la prosperità economica e la stabilità del Mediterraneo, tenuto conto che con l'OSCE avrebbero maggiore voce in capitolo, nella soluzione delle crisi, i Paesi dell'Europa dell'Est: in primis la Russia. Sarà da valutare se la strada verso quest'obiettivo potrà seguire lo stesso percorso del trattato iniziale, quando in quel periodo storico, la
diplomazia era una partita a somma zero, dove vi erano solo due grandi giocatori (USA vs USSR). La realtà dei nostri giorni vede un insieme più ampio di attori nella grande arena della politica internazionale.

Tuttavia, nelle nostre “Organizzazioni da Mondo Sviluppato “, sembra assente una voce per e del Mediterraneo, nè sembra probabile che in un prossimo futuro, questa voce possa venire alimentata, a meno che, un Paese che per secoli è stato tra i principali attori della regione mediterranea, si risvegli dalla sua inattività: l'Italia. Superando le difficoltà interne, essa potrebbe raggiungere un ruolo egemonico nella regione, grazie alla sua presenza in tutte le istituzioni europee e alle possibilità offerte dalla carica di Alto rappresentante per gli Affari Esteri dell’Unione Europea.

L'Italia, da sempre considerata come una portaerei nel Mediterraneo o come un ponte tra la riva nord e la costa meridionale, dovrebbe riconquistare questo ruolo chiave/guida nel Mediterraneo. La sua storia mostra radici profonde nella regione Mediterranea, ma negli ultimi decenni, si è notato un rallentamento della politica verso la sponda sud. Come potrebbe l’Italia divenire il Paese in grado di dare una spinta al miglioramento della situazione nel Mediterraneo? Come potrebbe promuovere la convergenza economica della regione o almeno essere l’unico paese a riportare il tema del Mediterraneo nell’Unione europea? Quali sono gli obiettivi che essa può imporre a se stessa ed indicare anche ai vari organismi dei quali fa parte, quali appunto l’Unione Europea e l’OSCE del processo di Helsinki+40? Come potrebbe l’Italia riuscire a riportare l’interesse sul Mediterraneo, favorendone la convergenza economica, al fine di generare stabilità nella regione? Come potrebbe l'Italia favorire uno spostamento in un’ottica più Mediterranea degli interessi di paesi extra regionali che sono coinvolti nella ricerca di beni strategici o in manifestazioni di politiche di potenza?

Hogre, Graffiti a Roma, Mostra un Mediterraneo sanguinante.¹¹⁴


-Notare come la prima cosa identificabile è il ponte Italiano.
Il Mediterraneo è attualmente diviso, abbiamo una sponda del Nord sviluppata e ricca, con una sponda equivalente a sud, turbolenta e priva di stabilità. Alcuni dicono che dopo la primavera araba la situazione è iniziata a peggiorare; la verità è che fin dall’inizio del colonialismo la situazione è peggiorata. Tutto iniziò con una presenza eccessiva colonizzatrice, che lentamente è stata sostituita da gruppi locali o dittatori che presero il posto dei colonizzatori. Questi dittatori, dopo le crisi degli anni recenti, hanno lasciato i Paesi del Mediterraneo scoperti allo sfurttamento e privi di una buona struttura politica, nonché con una governance fatiscente. L’unico collante, che teneva questi popoli uniti, erano infatti i dittatori con i loro regimi oppressivi. Dopo la caduta di questi ultimi, i Paesi si sono trovati spiazzati, piombati nel disordine totale, caratterizzato da problemi di sicurezza, problemi umanitari e problemi economici.

Solo ora le organizzazioni internazionali sembrano risvegliarsi di fronte ai problemi della sponda sud. Ora non vi sono più i dittatori a stringere patti con il mondo occidentale, in cambio di petrolio. Questi paesi rappresentano oggi per il mondo sviluppato una minaccia alla stabilità e solo per questo motivo sono ora degni di attenzione internazionale. In cima alle minacce indotte dal ‘dopo Primavera Araba’ ci sono diverse questioni regionali che ostacolano anche lo sviluppo della pace, solo per citarne alcune, le tensioni Marocchino- Algerine,, quelle Greco-Turche, il braccio di ferro Saudita - Iran , la presenza del ‘protettorato occidentale’ di Israele – l’odio Arabo verso quest’ultimo assieme all’Occidente. O l’Europa sceglierà di coordinarsi con l’Africa in modo che il Mediterraneo diventi un’unica realtà geopolitica, oppure l’Europa sarà esposta ai conflitti diretti da tutti i tipi di forze che desidereranno attaccarla, una volta che questo accadrà, quando in Africa si sentirà l’assenza di una libertà illusoria, nasceranno nuove forme di schiavitù.

Osservando, infatti, i Paesi che si affacciano sulle coste del Mediterraneo, ci imbattiamo in tutto l’arco di questo mare in crisi di diversa natura, più o meno devastanti politicamente. Come accennato, troviamo quella dei Balcani che vede una ex-Jugoslavia ancora in subbuglio, caratterizzata da desideri indipendentisti e da lotte etniche e religiose. Seguendo la costa, troviamo poi il rapporto tumultuoso fra la Grecia e la Turchia, che si affrontano sul piano giuridico per la definizione dell’ampiezza delle acque territoriali, che riducono il raggio di azione Turco sul mare e quello Greco nell’aerospazio; senza contare le tensioni create dalla questione di Cipro, divisa in due fra Grecia e Turchia. Quest’ultima affronta anche altri problemi: la questione del Sanjak di Alexandretta, che crea tensioni con la Siria, inoltre la questione armena e la questione curda. Come non citare la questione Israelo-Palestinese che tiene il mondo con il fiato sospeso. Gli arabi nutrono una profonda avversione per Israele, considerato un protettorato occidentale, e di conseguenza rivolgono la loro avversione anche verso il mondo occidentale. Avversione accentuata dai passati misfatti provocati dall’accordo segreto Sykes-Picot, accordo che ha arbitrariamente diviso la regione della ex-Mesopotamia in maniera inopinata sulla base dei desideri ed interessi Anglo-Francesi. Nè sono da trascurare gli enclavi spagnoli presenti in Marocco e la questione di Gibilterra fra Spagna, Inghilterra e Marocco. Sempre in merito al Marocco troviamo il problema che riguarda il Western Sahara che si aggiunge alle difficoltà diplomatiche con l’Algeria. Queste crisi non facilitano i rapporti fra il Nord e il Sud del Mediterraneo e tra gli stessi Paesi della riva sud che invece avrebbero tutto l’interesse a cooperare fra di loro.

Queste tensioni lungo il Mediterraneo culminano ora nella minaccia della Libia sull’orlo del fallimento. L’assenza politica della ex colonia italiana crea quasi un muro attraverso quei paesi del Nord-Africa, che faticosamente si stanno sollevando...
economicamente ed istituzionalmente. Inoltre questa assenza politica è particolarmente minacciosa per l’Europa in quanto quel cuscinetto ‘accogli immigrati’ che vi era prima, adesso è venuto a mancare ed è anche per questo che il Mediterraneo rischia di diventare un grande cimitero a causa dell’emergenza immigrati, che a centinaia di migliaia tentano di raggiungere l’Europa.

In aggiunta al problema libico, adesso è comparso il problema dello Stato Islamico, che vuole essere il nuovo Califfato della ex-Mesopotamia; ancora è da capire se sarà una vera minaccia per la stabilità a lungo termine. Quello che è certo è che adesso toglie la pace ai Paesi occupati, limitando a causa della guerra in corso, qualsiasi tipo di relazione diplomatica e di opportunità per una crescita economica.

Gli sforzi del passato non hanno avuto molto successo nei tentativi di avviare un dialogo costruttivo tra Paesi "occidentali" e Paesi della riva est e sud del Mediterraneo. Il processo di Barcellona, il 5 + 5, l’Unione per il Mediterraneo non hanno visto il realizzarsi delle loro ambizioni, non tanto per via di una riluttanza al dialogo da parte degli Stati arabi con l’Occidente, ma di una riluttanza al dialogo tra Paesi arabi. In molte occasioni i rappresentanti dei Paesi arabi non dicono una parola ai forum a cui accettano di partecipare, essenzialmente per timore di quelle che potrebbero essere le reazioni dei Paesi loro vicini di confine. E’ evidente la permanenza di un problema di fiducia nel Nord Africa e una riluttanza generale nel cooperare con l’un l’altro.

Il processo di Helsinki+40 avrà lo scopo di creare un dibattito formale, volto ad indicare le linee guida di azione politica sul caso del Mediterraneo. Le proposte sono molte, come anche i temi di discussione nei relativi tre cesti (Sicurezza; Co-operazione nell’Economia, Scienza, Tecnologia ed Ambiente; Co-operazione Umanitaria ed in altri campi). Uno di questi temi, è l’investimento in fonti di energia rinnovabili, che potrebbero in prospettiva ridurre fino a farle terminare le guerre per il petrolio, che affliggono l’Africa del Nord e il Medio Oriente, eliminando il motivo principale per l’invasione ed interferenza straniera nella politica interna dei Paesi produttori. L’OSCE, con Helsinki+40, dovrebbe mirare a diventare la principale Organizzazione di promozione della sicurezza nella regione, come da suo intento iniziale. Essa rispetto alle altre organizzazioni ha maggiore rilevanza per la sua esperienza maturata nel conciliare la pace fra il blocco occidentale e quello orientale. Inoltre, come accennato, essa riunisce sotto lo stesso tetto, molti dei paesi dell’Est Europa di grande importanza strategica per la regione Mediterranea e Medio Orientale, come ad esempio la Russia. Quest’organizzazione ha il potenziale per affermarsi come l’istituzione chiave agli occhi dei paesi arabi. La strada non è certo facile, ma l’obiettivo può essere raggiunto, soprattutto se vi saranno Paesi disposti ad accettare la sfida e a portare questa causa sulla scena internazionale.

L’Italia sembra essere un ottimo candidato per condurre la marcia verso un Mediterraneo più stabile. Non le mancano gli strumenti per farlo, cominciando dalla posizione geografica favorevole e finendo con il ruolo affidato all’Italia di Alto rappresentante per gli affari esteri dell’Unione Europea. L’Italia deve recuperare l’importanza diplomatica che ha perso in questi ultimi anni; le opzioni da seguire sono molte, come quella di spingere l’U.E. a reindirizzare i fondi FEIS dell’Unione europea verso investimenti strategici nei mercati del Mediterraneo. Essa potrebbe, inoltre, promuovere una sorta di rapporto bilaterale-trilaterale, multilaterale tra Paesi del Nord-Africa, in modo da coordinare assieme le loro iniziative per una maggiore convergenza economica e rendere tali Paesi più indipendenti. Le aree di investimento dovranno
essere quelle dell'agricoltura, delle infrastrutture, dell'energia rinnovabile (energia dal sole, che bacia tutto il Mediterraneo) e delle attività minerarie. Infatti nonostante questi Paesi siano ricchi di materie prime, molte delle loro risorse non sono utilizzate a pieno; fa eccezione il Marocco, che sta raggiungendo una fase sempre più avanzata dello sviluppo.

L'Italia dovrebbe porre in essere un grosso sforzo diplomatico in questo senso, cercando di portare l'attenzione europea verso questa regione, ad esempio come detto prima, riorientando i Fondi Europei per gli Investimenti Strategici (FEIS), che ammontano a 315 miliardi di euro, verso i nodi strategici del Nord Africa. Quello che sembra scontato per noi, potrebbe non esserlo per altri Paesi; gli investimenti in infrastrutture sono fondamentali per qualsiasi economia per lavorare e funzionare bene, per svilupparsi. L'Italia dovrebbe divenire il promotore di una convergenza economica nel bacino del Mediterraneo, seguendo politiche che mirino ad investire in questi Paesi con un ritorno, sì in Italia, ma anche nei Paesi stessi. Si dovrebbe attuare una politica intesa a fornire loro gli strumenti necessari perché possano camminare con le proprie gambe. Lo sfruttamento dovrebbe divenire una cosa del passato nella mente delle piccole e medie imprese. Per questo, l'Italia dovrebbe prima di tutto creare una commissione per il Mediterraneo nel suo Parlamento, guidata dal suo Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Una commissione che analizzi e presenti ad ogni momento, tutto ciò che accade nel Mediterraneo e in che modo l'Italia possa intervenire attraverso, una buona politica, il governo e la corretta gestione della propria governance, che insieme alle varie società civili presenti in tutto il bacino Mediterraneo possa favorire un livello più orizzontale della politica, più distribuito, cioè sulla società civile. Tutto sommato è ciò del quale il Mediterraneo deve ancora fare esperienza, visto che sin ora, esso ha soltanto sperimentato dei decenni caratterizzati da una gerarchia politica e di potere severamente verticale.

L'Italia dovrebbe divenire il promotore principale, anche all'interno dell'Unione, dello scambio di giovani nel Mediterraneo. Il programma Erasmus dovrebbe essere esteso a tutti gli angoli del Mediterraneo, aumentando gli scambi fra studenti, creando collegamenti tra le società delle due sponde, sfruttando anche la presenza in Italia di studenti delle varie nazioni. Così facendo, nascerà una rete di rapporti tra i giovani, che con gli anni andrà a rafforzarsi in interconnessioni sempre più strette; l'Italia dovrebbe promuovere qualsiasi tipo di iniziativa che miri a questo tipo di obiettivo. L'Italia, attraverso questi scambi di giovani, dovrebbe riuscire a creare zone di influenza in questi Paesi in modo che essi possano chiedere assistenza all'Italia, portando benefici reciprocì, sia sulle condizioni di convergenza economica che di interconnessioni e coesione sociale. Tra l'altro L'Italia ha con i paesi arabi dei legami profondamente radicati nella propria società. Il sud Italiano detiene da sempre rapporti con il Nord Africa, sin dall'epoca romana, per continuare con il califfato Omayyade e per finire con i colonizzatori moderni. Di conseguenza, vi sono ancora fortissimi legami culturali, per quanto riguarda le tradizioni, le espressioni linguistiche e la cultura popolare (come le storie di Giufà).

Il Mediterraneo sta cercando di raggiungere l'equilibrio nella sua sfera politica; ha tutti gli elementi per diventare una grande zona di cooperazione e scambio, ma vi sono delle importanti tematiche sulle quali si può ancora inciampare; particolare riferimento si fa alle vicende della Libia, Siria e Iraq. Per passare con successo ad una regione più stabile e pacifica, vi sono alcuni conflitti che devono essere conciliati, favoriti dalle nazioni "sviluppate". Gli Stati Uniti, la Russia e la Cina hanno tutti un coinvolgimento attivo nella zona, ma la vera nazione, che per la sua posizione geopolitica, dovrebbe
giustamente avere il titolo di 'Ponte sul Mediterraneo' è l'Italia. L'Italia ha la possibilità di riconquistare la sua importanza nel mondo diplomatico; ha la possibilità, non di diventare una superpotenza (di cui non ha l'ambizione), ma di diventare una Grande Nazione. L'Italia dovrebbe diventare un Paese su cui il Nord Africa possa contare, così come anche gli altri Paesi europei. L'Italia deve recuperare l'egemonia positiva e culturale, che esercitava una volta. Il Mediterraneo, dovrà diventare, ancora una volta il 'Mare Nostrum'.