



Hong Kong and Macau: power and struggle
from the post-colonial period to today

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Abstract

La questione democratica messa in rilievo attraverso le manifestazioni studentesche di Hong Kong dell'autunno 2014, dimostra la volontà di un popolo di uscire dal sistema verticistico ed accentrato diretto da Pechino. Hong Kong essendo una Regione Amministrativa Speciale (RAS), gode sotto il profilo costituzionale, di un alto grado di autonomia negli ambiti delle politiche economiche, sociali ed amministrative. Non le sono al contrario riconosciute prerogative nei settori della difesa e degli affari esteri, che permangono sotto il totale controllo dello Stato unitario. La regione dovrebbe dunque godere di un'ampia sfera di autonomia amministrativa e gestionale con un governo regionale distinto da quello della Repubblica Popolare Cinese (RPC) almeno per quanto riguarda i settori cui sopra: dicotomia da cui deriva il principio "Un-Paese-Due-Sistemi". Utile in questo contesto di analisi del sistema esecutivo, nonché legislativo del centro finanziario cinese per eccellenza, è sicuramente il manuale *Hong Kong in Transition. One Country, Two Systems* scritto da Ash e Ferdinand nel 2003 nel quale vengono sottolineate le peculiarità del sistema e delineata la nozione di "accountability" nei confronti del potere centralizzato di Pechino.

L'influenza che esercita il Partito ed il governo centrali sulla struttura politica di Hong Kong viene egualmente ed esplicitamente descritta nel Codice Civile della regione, secondo il quale il governo pechinese gode di un alto livello di discrezionalità nella scelta dei candidati che andranno poi a ricoprire incarichi di governo della regione. Il Capo Esecutivo della regione, infatti, viene eletto dal corpo elettorale fra candidati scelti dal governo centrale e da questo pertanto graditi e influenzati. Questo sistema di democrazia "pilotata", dove gli elettori possono scegliere di votare per un numero ristretto di candidati selezionati dall'alto i cui programmi politici, logicamente, non variano più di tanto rispetto alle direttive dello stato centrale e non recepiscono quindi le specificità della regione, è stato un elemento scatenante delle rivolte studentesche avvenute nell'Agosto del 2014, dominate anche dall'aspettativa di poter arrivare alle prossime elezioni del Capo Esecutivo che si terranno nel 2017, in un contesto di maggiore trasparenza politica e più autentica democraticità del sistema.

Durante quell'autunno, si susseguirono una serie di manifestazioni spontanee ed autoorganizzate del movimento studentesco, anche grazie al passaparola sul web: le strade di Hong Kong si paralizzarono, i punti di snodo della città, come Kowloon Station o Causeway Bay, furono invasi da gruppi di giovani che diedero vita ad assembramenti spontanei, le numerosissime attività commerciali del quartiere di Admiralty si bloccarono.

Ma la rivolta è pacifica, anche se a tratti repressa violentemente dalle forze armate. Le strade si dipingono di giallo, colore simbolo della speranza, e si popolano di persone di tutte le età che leggono, discutono, commentano gli obbiettivi della "Umbrella Revolution". In questo caso, anche la stampa locale dedica agli eventi di quei giorni lunghi articoli di cronaca e commenti che costituiscono altrettante fonti informative per chi cerca di ricostruire ed interpretare quel che sta accadendo. Testate come il *South China Morning Post* o l'*Hong Kong Post* coprono quotidianamente gli sviluppi del movimento e ne danno puntualmente conto anche se la loro imparzialità viene spesso contestata e messa in questione.

Un'attenzione particolare in questo elaborato è dedicata ad un'ulteriore domanda: perché a Macao, città limitrofa, non sono stati rilevati movimenti di protesta analoghi? Il dubbio sorge spontaneo per una serie di fattori. Il sistema politico che governa l'ex-colonia portoghese è identico a quello di Hong Kong, vale a dire che anche Macao è una RAS nonostante la pesante influenza di Pechino nei criteri di eleggibilità dei candidati. Generalmente, i movimenti sorti per un'obiezione ideologica hanno un effetto contagioso, nel senso che spesso altri popoli, trovandosi in situazioni affini, cavalcano l'onda delle rivolte per farle esplodere anche sul loro territorio. Ma questo a Macao non accade. Di conseguenza, potrebbe risultare interessante cercare una spiegazione coerente alla divergenza di comportamenti nella prospettiva di un'analisi politologica e storica del fenomeno.

Affinché questa ricostruzione sia sintetica ma approfondita, questo scritto prenderà in considerazione maggiormente gli anni successivi alla proclamazione della Repubblica Popolare Cinese nel 1949. In tale periodo, mentre la Cina conosceva una crescita economica tumultuosa, Hong Kong e Macao si confrontavano con processi di trasformazione istituzionale imposti, rispettivamente dalla Gran Bretagna e dal Portogallo.

Il contributo *Public Administration in South-East Asia* di Berman, illustra accuratamente le problematiche incontrate durante questi processi, fra l'altro inseriti nel contesto della guerra fredda.

Nella precedente epoca coloniale, le ambizioni che i paesi europei nutrivano nei confronti delle due città portuali presentavano significative analogie. Infatti, si può dire che fino agli inizi del 20esimo secolo, entrambe le penisole erano diventate, seppure in misura diversa, dei centri di scambio di beni pregiati tra l'Europa e l'Estremo Oriente. Praticamente fino al 1990 le due città si svilupparono quasi in modo inarrestabile. Hong Kong divenne molto presto uno dei centri globali specializzati nel campo del business e delle transazioni finanziarie, godendo della percentuale più alta di residenti miliardari sulla totalità della popolazione. Il prodotto interno lordo si è decuplicato durante il “miracolo economico” avvenuto negli anni 1960-1980. Macao, dal suo canto, si è trasformata nella Las Vegas dell'Asia con innumerevoli casinò e lussuosi hotel, focalizzandosi nell'industria del turismo e del gioco d'azzardo. In entrambi i casi il livello di ricchezza garantisce un tenore di vita alla popolazione tale da sopportare gli inevitabili problemi inflazionistici che colpiscono regolarmente le economie moderne. In tale diversificazione, Hong Kong che produce ricchezza, Macao dove si spende la ricchezza, si può individuare un tratto di innegabile complementarità fra le due economie.

Tuttavia, seppure possa sembrare che queste due città siano cresciute in simbiosi, vi sono state delle differenze notevoli che potrebbero in parte spiegare perché le rivolte studentesche si sono svolte unicamente a Hong Kong. Differenza demografica a parte (Macao conta meno di un decimo degli abitanti della sua vicina città portuale che ne annovera 7 milioni), vi si possono trovare altre divergenze più interessanti se si analizza maggiormente la storia contemporanea delle due regioni.

Grande attenzione nel corso di questo elaborato è dedicata al periodo di “passaggio” di sovranità delle due città alla RPC. A Hong Kong, il Capo Esecutivo Tung Chee-hwa giunse al potere proprio nell'ultimo anno del controllo britannico sulla regione, nel 1997. Il suo governo, fortemente influenzato da Pechino, ha implementato una serie di politiche nell'intento di riformare l'economia del paese dopo la recessione provocata dalla Crisi Finanziaria Asiatica dello stesso anno. In tale intento, furono varate politiche economiche

dirette principalmente al rilancio della crescita, ma a discapito delle istanze sociali. Infatti, gli abitanti di Hong Kong della metà degli anni 1990 soffrivano, d'un lato, per la crescita continua della popolazione e, dall'altro, per la mancanza di alloggi disponibili, con la conseguente insorgenza di problemi urbanistici, logistici e sanitari. Le politiche realizzate da Tung Chee-hwa, in effetti, oltre a non venire incontro alle esigenze sociali, furono inoltre attuate troppo velocemente e non diedero modo alla popolazione di adattarsi al nuovo contesto economico e sociale.

Da considerare peraltro che la Rivoluzione Culturale cinese aveva avuto un'effetto boomerang sulla città meridionale dato il fatto che le rivolte urbane tra i Comunisti filocinesi ed i Liberali filobritannici hanno suscitato grande preoccupazione negli anni 1966-1967. Successivamente, le rigorose politiche governative della Londra di Margaret Thatcher, hanno contribuito all'instabilità sociale che già da tempo differenziava Hong Kong da Macao. Si può dunque dire che nell'ex colonia britannica i fermenti sociali non fossero una novità.

D'altro canto, l'ex colonia portoghese non ha sofferto particolarmente di disagi sociali, data l'attuazione progressiva e graduale di politiche rivolte anche a risolvere le questioni sociali. L'amministrazione di Edmund Ho della fine degli anni 1990 ha fatto crescere Macao sia da un punto di vista economico, con il vero e proprio boom di casinò culminato nei primi anni 2000, sia da un punto di vista sociale, con la messa a disposizione di numerosi alloggi per famiglie con reddito medio-bassi.

Un'ulteriore elemento interessante da analizzare è come si sia svolto il trasferimento di sovranità a livello pratico. A Macao, i dirigenti portoghesi si sono imbattuti nelle difficoltà tecniche per quanto riguarda l'insegnamento delle nuove procedure alla futura classe dirigente, prevalentemente cinese. Da un lato, l'ostacolo evidente della lingua e tutti i problemi legati all'interpretariato hanno reso difficile la comprensione delle nozioni, dall'altro, il fatto che molti Cinesi ben istruiti si siano trasferiti nella vicina provincia cinese di Guangdong per lavorare in una delle zone economiche speciali ivi situate, ha ulteriormente eroso la mano d'opera qualificata disponibile per prendere in mano la nuova gestione di Macao. È stato notato che l'impronta "latina", abbia fatto sì che i Portoghesi siano stati in grado trasmettere ai loro "discenti" cinesi una cultura del rispetto delle regole

stabilite dalla autorità, circostanza che ha creato le condizioni di una maggiore stabilità sociale tale da rendere Macao una città invitante e gradevole.

A Hong Kong, la Crisi Finanziaria Asiatica del 1997, per quanto i suoi effetti non siano stati tanto forti come in Indonesia, in Corea del Sud o in Thailandia, ha comunque messo a repentaglio la solidità sociale, affliggendo il livello di soddisfazione e di benessere dei cittadini, confrontati ad una volatilità dei prezzi non indifferente. La situazione è divenuta ancora più ingestibile quando da fonti interne o esterne iniziarono a giungere notizie che descrivevano il diverso tenore di vita negli altri paesi. La questione democratica è divenuta di urgente attualità anche in relazione alla diffusione sempre più capillare, della stampa libera sul mercato cinese. La Città fù egualmente scossa da vari scandali concernenti la libera circolazione delle informazioni, ufficialmente introdotta nella Carta dei Diritti di Hong Kong, ma poi ignorata nella pratica. Le varie censure a giornali che hanno limitato la libertà di stampa e causato plurimi licenziamenti, più o meno mascherati di molti giornalisti, sono tutti pezzi di uno stesso puzzle.

A Macao, seppure tutti i giornali disponibili sul mercato siano sotto il controllo dell'Ufficio per l'Informazione, che è a sua volta controllato dal Capo Esecutivo, il numero di quotidiani e settimanali di natura informativa abbonda, rendendo Macao la città con la più alta densità di stampa per abitante del mondo. Interessante è anche il fatto che in entrambe le RAS la popolazione abbia accesso a Google e a tutti i programmi collegati al magnate californiano; fattore risultante in una più ampia accessibilità all'informazione di cui gli abitanti della Cina continentale non possono godere.

La domanda posta all'inizio dell'elaborato sottindeva una differenza di struttura tra le due regioni. La verità è che seppure le organizzazioni dei poteri di Hong Kong e Macao siano identiche, come descritto nei rispettivi Codici, vi sono state delle differenze notevoli che vi si possono trovare, analizzando il periodo storico degli anni 1990 in particolare, tali che le due diverse amministrazioni hanno prodotto risultati divergenti, che non è possibile classificare sotto lo stesso titolo. Le manifestazioni sopravvenute a Hong Kong, colorando di giallo l'autunno 2014, ne sono la prova vivente. Per scrupolo di critica, si può comunque dire che, sempre nel 2014, in parallelo alla rivolta studentesca di Hong Kong, vi è stato un tentativo di appoggio da parte di Macao che si è tradotto in un referendum improvvisato

con il fine di raccogliere firme per l'introduzione di un sistema più democratico. Questo referendum, analizzato nell'ultimo capitolo di questo scritto, sebbene non avesse raccolto più di 8.000 firme, è stato represso dalle forze dell'ordine per dei motivi pretestuosi, il che può far pensare che anche a Macao si stia sviluppando una maggiore consapevolezza della situazione politica e sociale e della carenza della democrazia.

Non è ancora possibile giungere ad una risposta compiuta sul perché a Hong Kong si siano sviluppati certi processi e a Macao no. Occorre analizzare approfonditamente i vari risvolti delle politiche attuate in entrambe le RAS e metterle a paragone con il tenore di vita dei cittadini e la situazione dei loro diritti. Infatti, potrebbe anche semplicemente essere che i cittadini dell'ex colonia portoghese, riuscendo a garantire ai propri figli uno standard di vita più elevato grazie ai ricavi dell'industria del gioco d'azzardo e alle politiche più *society-conscious*, non abbiano così tanto interesse nel far scatenare un movimento, seppure pro-democratico, che possa in qualche modo mettere a rischio la loro situazione attuale.

In ogni caso, questo elaborato è un primo tentativo di ricercare, anche attraverso l'analisi storica delle due RAS delle spiegazioni plausibili al perché le istanze studentesche e libertarie si siano manifestate solo a Hong Kong e non nella gemella e complementare Macao.

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Introduction

Not many people in western societies could be able to locate the city of Macao on a world map; its case has not been studied in great depth in European literature, simply because generally, when we study the Portuguese colonial empire, there are much greater examples of states and regions that have had a more serious impact on the Iberian country. Angola and Brazil are commonly the most studied examples while talking about Portuguese history. Not to mention that the literature that probably exists on the topic comes from China and surely Portugal; thus making the understanding of it rather difficult as we encounter the obstacle of language. Nonetheless, although information on the case of Macao has been relatively scarce compared to his neighbor counterpart, articles in newspapers, writings from academics of the University of Macao and research papers as well as statistics and economic data reports have contributed to the shaping of this essay.

However, it needs to be said that recently, since the “handover” back to China in 1999, that will later be discussed, Macao has gained more notoriety. Today, in the Asian culture, the city is known as the “Monte Carlo of the Orient” thanks to his astonishingly developed tourism sector comprising the industries of gambling and gaming. The countless casinos and luxury hotels have shaped a strong Macao: economically prosperous, albeit with some difficulties in very recent times, and politically respectful. In fact, as will later be argued, the political structure of Macao is overall complied with as it guarantees rights to its citizens in a fair way. But it was not always this way. For the sake of simplicity and for an issue of length, the historical background provided for Macao will not begin in the 16th century, when the first colonizers arrived, but rather the starting point will be the year of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, namely 1949.

Same thing goes for the other player of this essay, Hong Kong whose historical notions that will be touched in further depth will be post-1949, just as China, which is the third invisible fundamental force with great influential power in this paper, was about to start the great ascendance which brought her 50 years later to the superpower she is today. Unlike Macao, Hong Kong benefits from a great deal of literature recalling her history and present situation. This is surely also due to the fact that the city being an ex British colony, English language is still commonly used and therefore makes it easier to retrieve information. Of

course, everyone has heard of Hong Kong as being one of the world's leading financial centers. Capitalism and "laissez-faire", which some have argued is not the most precise word for it but would rather use the term "positive non-interventionism", are key words in describing the economic boom Hong Kong has had in the second half of the 20th century. Therefore, the various economic and financial policies have had a great importance in the city's history. However since this is not a paper on economics, they will only be mentioned but not analyzed in great depth. It is nevertheless important to understand that they have played a pivotal role in the shaping of the city.

This essay has been written precisely based on what happened in Hong Kong in fall 2014. The "Umbrella Movement" pacific student demonstrations that paralyzed the city for months in the hope of acquiring free and fair elections, gained much attention in the Asian-speaking world because it shook Beijing's sense of governance and put it into question, albeit only partially fulfilling the task of doing so. In fact, the riots and sit-ins were set up to demand the right to democratically vote for the upcoming Chief Executive elections in 2017 as well as for the Legislative Council ones in 2020. The protest was an attempt to stab the political structure of Hong Kong, whereby Beijing has the last word in (too) many subject matters in the internal governance of the financial center.

One may ask oneself therefore, why are Macao and Hong Kong in the same essay if only one of them has witnessed the revolt in 2014? Precisely for that reason: because only citizens in Hong Kong opposed the system. But Macao and Hong Kong have a very analogous political system described in their respective Basic Laws since Hong Kong too was "handed over" back to China in 1997. So, why have Macanese citizens not taken advantage of the situation by protesting as well? Both cities since the end of the 1990's are under the Chinese principle of the "One-Country-Two-Systems" approach, which means that both cities benefit from a large degree of autonomy except in the fields of defense and foreign affairs. This is why, they are both Special Administrative Regions (SARs), where the economy, administration, society are all under the local government jurisdiction.

However, the contradiction lies with the acknowledgement that being ultimately Beijing in control, since she gets to chose the candidates that can run for office as Chief Executives in both cities, only one of the two regions tried to fight against the system. In this essay will

be analyzed the main historical developments that have sculpted both cities, in the attempt to find an explanation further back in time, for the divergence in social behavior between Hong Kong and Macao in 2014. As soon as the introductory current political and economic situation will be settled, the essay will develop the evolution and transformations of society as well as of the political structure encountered since 1949. The second part of the essay, on the other hand, will deal with the major institutional changes occurred in the transition period of the “handover” and will finish with an overview on the discrepancies of the fundamental rights, which could also explain the turmoil in Hong Kong.

Chapter 1 – Introductory Notions of Geopolitics of Macau and Hong-Kong

1.1. Geographical position and Demography of the region

Situated in one of today's global "hotspots", Macau and Hong Kong are two peninsulas that overlook one another separated by the Pearl River delta, almost creating an archipelago of wealthy and business-driven islands. Both of them are located just at the border of the most southern province of China, Guangdong, as they almost drip off in the South China Sea.

With 79.1 million permanent residents and about 31 million migrants, the province of Guangdong has earned herself the title of most populous province in China since January 2005¹. Although neither Hong Kong nor Macau officially pertain to the province aforementioned, as they are Special Administrative Regions (SAR), that will later be analyzed, both of them count an enormous part in the People's Republic of China's demography, albeit to different degrees. As a matter of fact, Hong Kong's weight population is more than ten times that of Macau, reaching an estimate of 7, 234, 800 inhabitants² and positioning herself to the higher ranks of the world's demographic mega-cities, while its brotherly counterpart only accounts for 642, 900 permanent residents³. Additionally, the width of the areas where they developed is very different in size; while Macau's population lives on an area of just about 11.6 sq mi, making it the most densely populated region in the world⁴, Hong Kong has an area of 426 sq mi.

Due to the region's mainly tropical climate and highly urbanized territories in this relatively small area, there is scarce arable land, pastures, forests and woodlands. However, the region of Hong Kong being much larger in size has been able to create many natural reserves and national parks securing her way towards a greener economy, albeit what many may think. Nonetheless, both cities, as will shortly be illustrated, are very poorly self-sufficient in providing to their respective populations the basic foods and goods they need, making them

¹ China NBS: 6th National Population Census - DATA

² "Mid-year Population of 2014". Census and Statistics Department (Hong Kong) 12 August 2014

³ "Demographic Statistics for the 2nd Quarter 2015" Statistics and Census Service of the Government of Macau SAR 10 August 2015

⁴ Current Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC)

great importers of fruits, vegetables, meat and cereals from mainland China and neighboring countries⁵. Being peninsulas, one might think that these two cities may have important fishing industries, just like many other coastal towns; however, due to high levels of water contamination in the South China Sea and the Chinese companies operating on it being mainly under Beijing supervision, maritime traffic of the region is mainly dedicated to transportation in the form of containers of foreign imports, as opposed to feeding the population with actual fish⁶.

Despite their poor natural resources and limited territory, Macau and Hong Kong have learned to gain their economic successes through other means so as to provide their populations with very high life standards, making them two unique Chinese cities.

1.2. Today's economic and political positions

When Ambassador Thomas Roe delivered his speech to the European Union Commission in Hong Kong and Macau SARs, he announced that “the European Union has an ongoing relationship with Macau and also with Hong Kong, which is completely compatible with the ‘One-Country-Two-Systems’ principle”⁷. In this sentence appear two very important features, two sides of the same coin: the economic aspect as well as the unique political, governmental structure of the two cities.

Further along this essay, the questions of when and how did the two cities prosper as well as the evolution of their political systems, will be addressed. For the time being, it will suffice to analyze today's economic figures and political data so as to understand why the major economic actors of the world are wooed by this seemingly remote region.

Capitalism, extreme laissez-faire, free trade and low taxation are what made Hong Kong one of the world's power houses of global financial transactions⁸. Being one of the Four Asian Tigers, Hong Kong experienced an unprecedented economic growth from the 1960's

⁵ Nations Encyclopedia, Macau - Agriculture

⁶ *Labor*, Hong Kong census, “Census labor data” 14 March 2007

⁷ Cardinal P, Costa-Oliveira J (2009) *One Country, Two Systems, Three legal Orders* p.5

⁸ Huw Jones, *Reuters*, “Hong Kong named top financial center for second year” 31 October 2012

all the way through the 1990's, where its Gross Domestic Product grew an outstanding 180 times securing her a spot at the top levels of today's global wealthy rankings. Despite the infamous Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Hong Kong has been able to redress herself to the business-driven center it always was and regained all her assets making her the fourth city in the world for the highest percentage of millionaire households with 8.5% of all households owning at least one million US dollars⁹. Hong Kong's unique policy of "positive non-interventionism", firstly implemented by British former Financial Secretary of Hong Kong Sir John James Cowperthwaite in 1971, definitely helped shape the city everyone knows today, with a current GDP of US\$289.2 billion¹⁰.

Unlike Hong Kong, Macao's great revenues derive mainly from tourism, hospitality and gaming, although a smaller share is just the same represented by financial services. As a matter of fact, more than 50% of Macau's GDP comes from tourism which also represents more than 70% of the government earnings¹¹, making Macao a sort of Asian Las Vegas, out of which the local government strives and prospers. The numerous and attractive casinos and luxury resorts had Macao reach an astonishing GDP of US\$55.5 billion by late 2014¹². And with these huge earnings, the local governments play a pivotal role in the development of the region through the aforementioned One-Country-Two-Systems approach.

In 1999, with regards to both cities' special autonomy, Albert A.Y. Chen explained that "One-Country-Two-Systems as demonstrated by the cases of Hong Kong and Macao is basically a form of organization to grant autonomy to a region within a sovereign unitary state. Two facts deserve mention [...] Firstly, the degree of autonomy [...] is very high because it encompasses matters such as finance and taxes, monetary and currency issues, customs and economic external relations. Secondly, because this autonomy is quite innovative. It is not so much referred to [...] linguistic or cultural differences within the

⁹ Study by the Boston Consulting Group "Global Wealth continues its strong recovery with \$9 trillion gain, but pressures on Wealth Managers persist", 31 May 2011

¹⁰ HKTDC Research Center for Investment and Business opportunities – DATA 2014

¹¹ Government Information Bureau of Macau SAR 2007 *Macau 2007 Yearbook*

¹² www.tradingeconomics.com/macao/gdp

same state. [...] Instead, this autonomy aims at allowing the functioning of a capitalistic economy within a single party state, which legitimacy derives from communist ideas”¹³.

Put into different terms, Macao and Hong Kong enjoy a great deal of autonomy except in the fields of defense¹⁴ and foreign affairs¹⁵, subject matters that are under the control of the Chinese unitary state. Both cities, nonetheless exhibit the three regular pillars of governance, which, at least in appearance correspond to the western forms of government. Both executives are headed by a Chief Executive, currently Fernando Chui in Macao and Leung Chun-ying in Hong Kong. Both Chief Executives are recommended by a local election committee and then appointed by the Central People’s Government, according to basic law. The legislative branches of both cities vary only in number and proportions, both have no more than 70 members which can be either directly elected by the people or indirectly elected as functional constituencies through smaller electorates. In Macao, 7 members are appointed by the Chief Executive¹⁶. In both regions, however, judicial power is embodied by judges who are selected by a local commission and then appointed by the Chief Executive, who is in turn, appointed by Beijing.

One can easily notice how despite the autonomy accorded to both regions, there is a very strong presence of the unitary central government, and although in both Macao and Hong Kong, decisions are taken at a centralized level reflecting a centripetalist approach to governance, the electorate can only take so many decisions regarding implementation of laws and the general functioning of the territory. Now, will be analyzed why this aspect is important in understanding the issues related to the protests of 2014.

1.3. Riots and protests in 2014

Considered to be the initiator of the campaign Occupy Central with Love and Peace, Benny Tai Yiu-ting is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Hong Kong, who brought to the attention the issue concerning universal suffrage for the upcoming 2017

¹³ Cardinal P, Costa-Oliveira J (2009) *One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders* p.745

¹⁴ Content of Basic Law of Macau, University of Macau 7 January 2008

¹⁵ The *Sino-British Joint Declaration* section 3(2) 19 December 1984

¹⁶ “Introduction of the Legislative Assembly of the Macau Special Administrative Region” 5 September 2006

Chief Executive elections as well as for the 2020 Legislative Council Elections¹⁷ in Hong Kong. Devoted to the question of free and fair elections, Benny Tai was even criticized by one of his former pro-Beijing Legislative Council colleague Priscilla Leung who stated in her speech to the Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong on February 20th 2013 that “Benny TAI, a legal scholar whom [she] had known for more than 20 years, has unexpectedly called upon people to intentionally violate the law”.

September 28th 2014 is considered to be the day the peaceful protest commenced. Very soon Hong Kong’s busiest streets in the financial districts of Mongkok and Admiralty flourished in bright yellow colors, from tent encampments to simple installations of umbrellas symbolizing the will and need for a more democratic political involvement¹⁸. Key street intersections were occupied by the various Student associations, paralyzing for more than 70 days, good deal of the city traffic and jeopardizing many businesses, most importantly in the areas of Admiralty and Causeway Bay¹⁹. Interestingly enough, most of Chinese-backed media covering the story, put forward almost as a propagandistic element, the fact that the Western, anti-communist countries had “instigated” the revolts²⁰.

The months of the second semester of 2014 were characterized by street occupations, civil disobedience and internet activism. Joshua Wong, the 18-year-old leader of the pro-democracy student protest movement has even become the face representing Hong Kong’s democracy cry campaigns by going on an astonishing 4-days-long hunger strike as a sign of dissent²¹. The urban demonstrations started with the main goals of acquiring genuine western-style universal suffrage as well as obtaining both the resignation of Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying and the abolition of the functional constituencies mentioned earlier²².

¹⁷ Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, *How I occupied Benny Tai’s Lunch Hour*, 13 April 2013

¹⁸ Isabella Steger, *China Real Time*, “Hong Kong democracy protests: a journal of the final day” 10 December 2014

¹⁹ Chris Buckley, *The New York Times*, “Violence Erupts in Hong Kong as Protesters Are Assaulted” 4 October 2014

²⁰ Anne Applebaum, *The Washington Post*, “China’s Explanation for the Hong Kong protests? Blame America” 27 January 2014

²¹ Alan Wong, *The New York Times*, “Hong Kong Protester Ends Hunger Strike” 6 December 2014

²² Demetri Sevastopulo, *Financial Times*, “Hong Kong group launches civil disobedience campaign” 27 September 2014

The strategy behind the collective sit-ins, encampments and street occupations was of course to declare objection to the Beijing-controlled system by freezing and attacking what Hong Kong is most known for: the commercial activities and businesses that contributed to her development. Impressive traffic jams and queues at underground stations were caused by the massive urban blockades²³, and as more and more people opted for walking, taxi drivers have seen a remarkable decline in their income, so much so that the Hong Kong Taxi Owners Association reported an estimated 30% decline in income since the protest started²⁴. Not only that but also, according to the *South China Morning Post*, primary and secondary schools along with many kindergartens have had to close for several weeks before reopening on October 9th 2014. Nevertheless, the economic and commercial effects the Occupy Central movement had intended to generate resulted dubious. Economic downturn was extremely localized such as in the Hong Kong Tramways Company which officially witnessed a harsh drop of US\$ 1 million in revenues²⁵, but had very little, if any, repercussion at the national level²⁶. Still, the *Shanghai Daily* reported on the 4th of October that the protests had cost Hong Kong an estimated US\$ 5.2million, which hit mainly the sectors of tourism and retail.

As more than 100 000 people showed up to the protests in autumn 2014, the actual sit-ins gradually diminished and the “Umbrella Movement” slowly lost its previous figures, until eventually came the turning in of the originator Benny Tai along with two other co-founders, Chu Yiu-ming and sociologist Chan Kin-man on December 3rd 2014²⁷, putting a disappointing end to the movement. Concessions from Beijing were not made; the status quo in Hong Kong stayed the same at the political decision-making level. However, autumn 2014 surely marked an interesting turning point in the political involvement of citizens,

²³ *The Strait Times*, “Hong Kong ‘Occupy’ leader Benny Tai admits protest out of control amid traffic paralysis” 28 September 2014

²⁴ “Hong Kong residents slowly losing patience with protests” 28 October 2014

²⁵ Emily Tsang, *South China Morning Post*, “Tramways loses HK\$7.8 million revenue after being stopped in its tracks” 25 December 2014

²⁶ Diana Chan, John Ruwitch “Hong Kong protests at crossroads, talks to start on Friday” 7 October 2014

²⁷ Jonathan Kaiman, *The Guardian*, “Occupy Central leaders surrender to Hong Kong Police” 3 December 2014

particularly among the young who were considered apolitical up to that point, who discovered the passion for political activism and social partnership²⁸.

²⁸ Mary Ma, *The Standard*, "Zen 'unfriends' Lai..." 9 October 2014

Chapter 2 – Macau and Hong Kong, a colonial past and its legacies

2.1. Notions of the Portuguese experience

400 years of Portuguese rule definitely shaped Macau in a way still visible to this day. Its inhabitants inherited mixed cultural features, coming from both Chinese and Portuguese cultures in terms of architectural design of the city, local cuisine and general daily habits. Of course, public administration was equally very much influenced by the Latin presence, so much so, that when Macao's government was criticized for it being too inefficient and sometimes guilty of corruptive practices prior to the transition period starting in 1987, that will later on be developed, scholars would justify the matter using the pretext of the Portuguese laid-back and relaxed behavior, believed to be typical of their culture²⁹.

The protocol signed in 1887 stating that that the occupation and government of Macao was effectively Portuguese but that the European state could not alienate the Asian city without prior authorization from Beijing³⁰, remained intact until the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949, when Mao Tse-tung declared it invalid. Surprisingly however, Beijing was not willing to govern the province at the time so Macao kept the status quo. As Portugal was a neutral power in World War II, Macau was left basically untouched, except for a brief period of Japanese protectorate, and focused on the growth of the gambling industry firstly introduced in 1847³¹, as well as establishing, to a lesser extent, industries in the fireworks and incense business.

Later, at the apex of the Cold War, purges were carried out and civil riots led by pro-Communist protesters erupted in the streets of Macao. In December 1966, Despite the Portuguese military intervention, rule was not reestablished³²; and after a general strike in January 1967, Portugal tried to hand back the province to China, which still remained

²⁹ Berman Evan M. (2011) *Public Administration in South-East Asia* p.463

³⁰ Wright, M., Stanford University Press (1957) *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874*

³¹ Fairbank, J., Harvard University Press (1953) *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854*

³² Weiss, Idit. Gal. John. Dixon, John (2003) *Professional Ideologies and Preferences in Social Work: A Global Study*

reluctant in taking it back. Despite the 1966 Chinese Cultural Revolution backlashes, from the 1960's through the 1980's, Macao's economy grew steadily³³ and although the new socialist Government of Portugal in 1974, declared all Overseas Provinces independent³⁴, China was still holding onto her position not to control Macao. It was not until the 8th of February of 1979 that China and Portugal exchanged diplomatic recognition and Beijing acknowledged Macao as Chinese territory under Portuguese administration. After four rounds of talks, on April 13th 1987, the "Joint Declaration on the issue of Macao" was drafted establishing the process by which Macao would return to Chinese sovereignty as a Special Administrative Region³⁵. After six years, China passed the "Basic Law of Macao" declaring that the province was to maintain a capitalist economy and maintain a high degree of political and administrative autonomy for 50 years³⁶. What follows are the transition years that will later be discussed. As a brief overview of the main notions of Portuguese rule over Macao is drawn, it is important now to go over the main features of Hong Kong's colonial period, which in some cases, are connected to Macao's.

2.2. Great Britain and Hong Kong

With the Communists gaining control in Mainland China starting from 1949, Hong Kong's fate was uncertain and dubious. Great Britain, reminiscent of the horrors of the Second World War, saw the communist advance as a dangerous threat and strongly believed Hong Kong needed to stay a capitalistic open-economy hub, with nonetheless a small degree of communist influence, so that the Chinese would tolerate British presence on the territory. They also realized that merely handing back Hong Kong to Beijing in that period would have signified a loss to the Communists³⁷. Therefore, the status quo remained and Hong Kong was still a British colony in the 1950's.

³³ Chan, S. S. (2000) *The Macau Economy*, University of Macau

³⁴ "Treaty between the Government of India and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on Recognition of India's sovereignty over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and related matters" 1974

³⁵ Yee, H., (2001) *Macau in Transition. From Colony to Autonomous Region*

³⁶ Macau Yearbook (2007) p.519-520

³⁷ Wiltshire, Trea (1987) *Old Hong Kong (Volume III)* p.5

Very soon, business-driven villagers, rich farmers and more generally capitalists started to flee mainland China in order to find better conditions in Hong Kong. Population increased astonishingly until reaching 2.2 million in 1953 and by the early 1960's the British colony had one of the highest population densities in the world³⁸. Interestingly enough, with these mass migration waves also came many criminals who founded in that period the infamous organized criminal companionship, the Triad society³⁹.

Nonetheless, the capitalistic tendency to have employees work long hours in less than favorable conditions in order to gain low wages is what brought to the first real social upheaval in 1956 sparking tensions between Nationalists and Communists⁴⁰. Scared that the latter would generate anti-British sentiment, London ordered the Government of Hong Kong to stick to its pro-capitalistic policies.

Stability and economic growth came in the 1960's when demand for labor was vast in the manufacture and textile industries, Hong Kong's income engine for most of its residents. The number of factories more than tripled in the period 1949-1965⁴¹ while population steadily increased thanks to the baby boom generation peaking at 3 million inhabitants⁴². Despite infrastructure and urban development in the 1960's, Chinese Cultural Revolution backlashes had Hong Kong's population revolt a second time, yet this time harder than ever. As a matter of fact, political chaos coming from Beijing in 1967 drew Hong Kong's leftists to demand for a communist regime, defying British rule which eroded political relations between China and Great Britain. So much so that in the 1970's when scandals involving corruption and Triad relations within the government were at *l'ordre du jour*, the then-governor of Hong Kong, Murray MacLehose enacted a series of reforms so to save Hong Kong from further humiliation⁴³.

³⁸ Chan, Shun-hing; Leung, Beatrice (2003) *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1995-2000* p.24

³⁹ Gertz, *The Washington Post*, "British authorities in colonial Hong Kong dubbed the groups triads because of the triangular imagery"

⁴⁰ Wiltshire, Trea (1987) *Old Hong Kong (Volume III)* p.7

⁴¹ Dorn, James A. (1998) *China in the New Millennium: Market Reforms and Social Development*

⁴² Manion Melanie (2004) *Corruption by Desig: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong*

⁴³ Fitzpatrick, Liam, *Time*, "60 years of Asian Heroes" 13 November 2006

As a matter of fact, until 1982 MacLehose governed the city with numerous reforms such as the Ten-Year Housing Program put forward in 1972 or the construction of Mass Transit Railway facilities⁴⁴ to alleviate the growing weight of the population and to boost the economy. Moreover, under Margaret Thatcher, London issued the very important British Nationality Act put into effect on the 1st of January of 1983 renaming all her colonies to “dependent territories”⁴⁵ and although the act did not change de facto Hong Kong’s government, it had the People’s Republic of China realize that taking Hong Kong and its capitalistic system back was not going to be easy. This marked the beginning of what was later baptized the “One-Country-Two-Systems” approach which on the 19th of December of 1984 took the form of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. According to the pact, Hong Kong would keep its liberal capitalistic system until the 1st of January of 1997 within the People’s Republic of China but after which it would become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China⁴⁶.

The 1980’s in Hong Kong were characterized by a great period of economic prosperity with the sectors of services and finances developing thanks to low taxation and lack of foreign-exchange controls, which helped boost the city’s competitiveness⁴⁷, while satisfying the growing money demand as population had reached more than 5 million inhabitants. What happened in the 1990’s, however changed everything. The transition years, so they are called, will be dealt with later on.

2.3. Financial and Economic inspirations

Since 1513, Portuguese thirst for trade of silk, gold, silver and porcelain had the Chinese tolerate, albeit not encourage, the European settlements in Macao, turning it into one of the biggest centers in Asia for international trade between Europe, China and Japan, whose main port at the time was Nagasaki.

⁴⁴ Betty Yung, case study in social justice “Hong Kong’s Housing Policy”

⁴⁵ Yahuda, Michael B. (1996) *Hong Kong: China’s Challenge*

⁴⁶ Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, Government of the HKSAR “The Joint Declaration”

⁴⁷ Ngai, J et al (2005) *Economics and You 5*

By the mid 16th century, Macao had become the hub for trade in the aforementioned resources of the region connecting Europeans to Asians and reciprocally. Meanwhile, a land lease was signed with annual rent paid to Xiangshan County in 1582 which paved the way to Macao's official self-government by 1586⁴⁸. It goes without saying that behind the urge to improve commercial activities globally was also a Portuguese desire to spread Catholicism to China and Japan. However, this was not an easy task as China regularly put restrictions on the various Catholic groups, such as the Franciscans or the Jesuits to preach on Chinese territory⁴⁹.

Nevertheless, by the 1750's, after two centuries of intense commercial trade, Macao had earned herself the position of principal European trading port on the Southern China coast, which had her maintain an important monopoly over the entire region up until the British takeover of Hong Kong in 1841. It was not until the "Opium Wars" of 1840 and 1860 that the situation changed because of the Chinese opening of her own trade ports⁵⁰.

As a matter of fact, the first Opium War of 1839-1841 changed Macao's control of the Pearl River Delta. The small share of British settlers in Macao left the peninsula to evade harsh Chinese prohibitions regarding opium trade and transferred their commercial activities first to Lintin Island and then to Hong Kong⁵¹. The opening of Canton as a new Chinese commercial entryway to British traders, the cessation of Hong Kong to Great Britain, as well as Lisbon's decline from the mid 18th century were all elements that made Macao a much less viable port than it had been up to that point⁵² and attention shifted to Hong Kong.

Nonetheless, Macao's real economic prosperity originated in the 1850's when Portugal authorized the development of the gaming industry with the opening of more than 200 gambling houses offering Chinese-style games and who had to pay a relatively high rent to the government⁵³. But it wasn't until the late 1960's that the first western-style casino in the Lisboa Hotel was built, by the multi-millionaire Stanley Ho, head of the former Sociedade

⁴⁸ Collis, M. (1946) *Foreign Mud*, New York: Norton and Co

⁴⁹ Ride, L., and M., Hong Kong University Press (1999) *The Voices of Macau Stones* p.18-19

⁵⁰ Ride, L., and M., Hong Kong University Press (1999) *The Voices of Macau Stones* p.69

⁵¹ Hsin-pao Chang (1964) *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*

⁵² Crossley, P., Oxford: Blackwell Publishing (1997)*The Manchus*

⁵³ Chan, S.S., University of Macau (2000)*The Macau Economy*

de Turismo e Diversões de Macau founded in 1962, now called Sociedade de Jogos de Macau. Soon, investors from Las Vegas and Australia started pouring in to gain a share in a very promising land. Today the city has more than 33 casinos and the government's revenue depends mostly on the gambling industry. From the early 1960's through the 1990's Macau's gambling revenue accounted for more than half of the city's GDP and today it still represents more than a third⁵⁴. Experts say that the decrease in the gaming revenues is probably due to the increase in internet gaming.

Needless to say that Macao became one of the world's hotspots for the gaming industry attracting clients from Mainland China, Hong Kong and all over Asia eager to play and contribute to the wealth of the "Monte Carlo of the Orient".

But the Asian Las Vegas is not the only in the Pearl River delta to have had economic growth, obviously. In fact, Hong Kong, devastated after the Second World War and affected by the Korean one as well, witnessed an "economic miracle" in the 1960's becoming one of the four Asian Tigers, along with Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. In merely 40 years, its GDP was multiplied by nine, and today its purchasing power is the 13th highest in the world⁵⁵.

Until the late 1960's, Hong Kong's economy relied primarily on manufacture and textile but with the increasing price of land and high salaries, the sector began to decline and transferred itself to the near special economic zones of the Guangdong province⁵⁶. In the late 1970's relations between Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China of Deng Xiaoping were great which explained why commercial trade and foreign direct investment coming from Hong Kong were at their peaks precisely in the Guangdong province⁵⁷. But at home things were going great as well. As a matter of fact the shift from a manufacture-based economy to a services-focused one contributed to Hong Kong's development remarkably. Interestingly, many disagree with Milton Friedman's "laissez-faire" term when describing Hong Kong's system, and prefer the term "positive non-interventionism" which was a policy implemented in 1971 by John Cowperthwaite who realized that the economy

⁵⁴ Bloomberg, "Macau Casinos Top Las Vegas as Adelson", Wynn, Battle Stanley Ho, 1 March 2007

⁵⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook. Country Comparison: GDP per capita (PPP) 2012*

⁵⁶ Montreal Economic Institute (2013) "Hong Kong: The Ongoing Economic Miracle"

⁵⁷ Catherine Schenk, *op. cit.*, note 4

was doing well without governmental help but still needed the regulatory and physical infrastructure to ease market transactions⁵⁸. The details of the fiscal policies implemented in the 1980's in Hong Kong, such as how the interest rates are determined by the individual banks⁵⁹ or the implications of the Electronic finance trading⁶⁰, will not be analyzed as it is not the goal of this essay.

What matters is to understand that both Hong Kong and Macao were manufacture and textile powers until the 20th century after being both to different degrees, focal points in commercial trade between Asia and Europe. In the post-1949 period, both cities developed differently: Macao centralized its revenues in the gaming industry while Hong Kong became a major services and business hotspot.

⁵⁸ Journal of Contemporary China (2000), 9(24) 291-308

⁵⁹ Gough, Neil; Sang-Hun, Choe *The New York Times*, "Asian Financial Regulators Examine Local Lending Rates" 19 July 19

⁶⁰ "Trade and Investment" (PDF) unescap.org

Chapter 3 – Towards Independence and Autonomy

3.1. The rise of Chinese power

1949 is probably the most important date in Chinese contemporary history since it marked the end of the civil war, with the Communists rising to power led by the famous and charismatic Mao Zedong, which gave birth to the still-alive today People's Republic of China⁶¹. The aforementioned leader gave the newly established State an astonishing boost as he helped develop an independent industrial system as well as promoting the production of nuclear weapons, in a society that was in constant demographic expansion⁶². In fact, during his leadership that lasted until his death in 1976, the Chinese population almost doubled, going from 500 million inhabitants to an extraordinary 900⁶³.

One of Chairman Mao's substantial reforms was the policy called Great Leap Forward enacted from 1958 to 1961 designed to basically revolutionize the country's economic system. Until then, China was considered mainly an agrarian economy; however Mao's plans for a rapid industrialization and collectivization turned the country into one of the principal examples of socialist societies of the 20th century⁶⁴. Despite many scholars thinking this policy caused the death of more than 40 million people because of the infamous Great Chinese Famine that derived from it⁶⁵, there is no doubt that the campaign for renewing China's society had a marvelous effect on the long run.

The establishment of the socialist society came with a will to impose Mao's Marxist ideology on the Party and on the citizens more generally. Needless to say the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976 was a way for the Chairman to purge away as many dissidents or suspected capitalists that remained in the country, guilty of

⁶¹ UCLA Center for East Asian Studies, "The Chinese people have stoop up" 18 February 2009

⁶² "A Country Study: China" icweb2.loc.gov 24 July 2015

⁶³ Madelyn Holmes (2008) *Students and teachers of the new China: thirteen interviews* p.185

⁶⁴ Perkins, Dwight (1991) *The Cambridge History of China*, volume 15 "China's Economic Policy and Performance" chapter 6

⁶⁵ Akbar, Arifa *The Independent*, "Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years'" 17 September 2010

potentially harming the well-being of the newly socialist state⁶⁶. The violent factional struggles that exploded all across the country, including public humiliations, arbitrary imprisonments of alleged dissidents, sustained harassment and seizure of property froze the country both politically and economically causing great distress⁶⁷. For instance, in Jiangxi province, some 15 900 traders and about 18 800 employees of the collectively-run shops that had been shut down by the government to ensure that all signs of capitalism were eradicated, were forced to move to the countryside and were assigned special jobs in the agricultural sector, where economic growth was still steady, albeit to a slower pace than before⁶⁸.

Nonetheless, in this period of severe internal struggle, the People's Republic of China still managed to gain a seat as a permanent member of the UN's Security Council in 1971, which comes to show, that albeit the difficulties and numerous violations of human rights during the Cultural Revolution, China was progressing notably and becoming a very important player in the international community⁶⁹. Not only that but, with the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took the lead, albeit only figuratively since he was never officially Head of the Party or Head of the Government, and enacted a series of economic reforms to alleviate the harsh legacy of the Revolution by loosening the governmental grip on people's lives and activities and ensuring a more mixed-style economy⁷⁰. From 1976 onwards therefore, a more breathable economic environment settled in, based upon Deng's convictions that China had to perfect its "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" by greatly focusing on the Four Modernizations, agriculture, industry, science and technology and military⁷¹.

The more-open economy of the 1980's contributed to Chinese growth and surely helped the country stabilize at the political level, which can be shown by the adoption of the current Constitution on 4 December 1982. Deng Xiaoping's rule lasted until 1992 and the period

⁶⁶ Tang Tsou (1986) *The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective*

⁶⁷ Jin, Qui (1999) *The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution*. P.25-30

⁶⁸ Liang Bai, *Economic Legacies of the Cultural Revolution*, p.12-13

⁶⁹ Michael Y.M. Kao (1988) *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, "Taiwan's and Beijing's campaigns for Unification" p.188

⁷⁰ Hart-Landsberg, Martin; Burkett, Paul "China and Socialism: Market Reforms and Class Struggle" 30 October 2008

⁷¹ John Gittings (2005), *Oxford University Press*, "The Changing Face of China"

was characterized by growing Chinese international relevance albeit the infamous episode of the student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, followed by government officials' brutal arrests which was not only harshly denounced by Western governments and media⁷² but Chinese economy was also hit by a decrease of foreign loans by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and foreign governments⁷³.

Nonetheless, China entered the 1990's with a strong administration led by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji which, allegedly brought out of poverty 150 million Chinese peasants⁷⁴ and assured an annual average growth rate of 11.2% of GDP⁷⁵. Therefore it is with no doubt that China grew immensely strong and the impact of her growing strength will also be reflected onto Macao and Hong Kong.

3.2. Hong Kong as a SAR

The period going from 1984 to 1997 has marked the political transition that Hong Kong underwent after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration mentioned earlier. As London and Beijing had decided that Hong Kong could stay under British colonial rule until 1997, when it would become a Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR), the growing middle-class in Hong Kong, confused and bothered by the decisions taken without their consent, jeopardized social stability. By the same token, the city was also undergoing a series of economic restructuring policies as many manufacturing industrialists transferred their businesses in Guangdong, South China. In order to tackle the political instability very much present in this period, the government adopted new public management reform measures (NPM) so to extinguish, as famous Chinese scholar Cheung argued in 1996, the crisis of legitimacy and credibility in the political sphere⁷⁶.

Hong Kong officially became a SAR on the 1st of July of 1997, after 155 years of British rule, and the promised "One-Country-Two-Systems" approach was effectively

⁷² State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "China: Aftermath of the Crisis" 27 July 1989

⁷³ Thakur, M., Burton, G.E. & Srivastava, B. N. (1997), *International Management: Concepts and Cases* p.404-405

⁷⁴ *China Daily*, "Nation bucks trend of global poverty" 11 July 2003

⁷⁵ *People's Daily*, "China's Average Economic Growth in 90's ranked 1st in the World" 1 March 2000

⁷⁶ Berman Evan M. (2011) *Public Administration in South-East Asia*, p.245

implemented, assuring that the city would benefit from a high degree of autonomy except in the areas of defense and foreign policy. At the institutional level, Hong Kong's Basic Law simply intends to maintain the political, economic and administrative institutions erected under colonial rule, most importantly, it aimed at keeping an executive-directed and capitalistic system⁷⁷. The former Governor had now become Chief Executive, who is advised by an Executive Council, which in turn is only partially democratically elected since citizens can only vote through universal suffrage for half of the members of the legislature⁷⁸.

Amidst the social turbulence generated by the political transition years, another element that further eroded the new SAR hit the economy. As a matter of fact, 1997 was also the year the Asian Financial Crisis erupted and although Hong Kong was one of the regions less affected by it, the crisis still deeply hampered the economic boom the city was witnessing by bringing in 1998, GDP growth down to -5.3% and shooting budget deficit to an astonishing HK\$70 billion in 2002⁷⁹. Unprecedented volatility in stock markets was hitting the currency hard and according to some, interest rates peaked at an unbelievable 280% just as speculators were taking advantage of the economic emergency⁸⁰. Therefore, it should come with no surprise that the top priority in 1998 was to alleviate the financial crisis. However, the political transition not being fully operative, the executive leadership as well as administration and more generally policy decision-making were showing signs of failure and deficiency, which brought even greater social distress as citizens were demanding more government accountability and decision-making power⁸¹. Interestingly, it is in 1997, just after the "handover", that the first annual mass rally was instituted with the purpose to claim universal suffrage, democracy, protection of freedom of speech, rights of minorities and so on⁸².

Overall, the economic damage caused by the Asian Financial Crisis was relatively limited in Hong Kong considering that its open-market economy makes it more vulnerable to

⁷⁷ Berman Evan M. (2011), *Public Administration in South-East Asia* p.246

⁷⁸ Basic Law of Hong Kong, Chapter VII

⁷⁹ Berman Evan M. (2011), *Public Administration in South-East Asia* p.246

⁸⁰ Bayani Cruz, *The Standard*, "We will hold on to blue-chip shares" 29 August 1998

⁸¹ Ash R., Ferdinand P.e.a. (2003) *Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems*, p.55

⁸² Wong, Yiu-Chung, *One Country, Two Systems in Crisis: Hong Kong's Transformation Since the Handover*

exogenous factors. The government, through strong economic and fiscal policies such as outsourcing, public-private partnership or corporatization surely saved Hong Kong's system which was based on "financial conservatism"⁸³. However, needless to say that the large middle-class, eager for more democratic opportunities, gave birth to a more active and politically-demanding society.

3.3. Macao as a SAR

Public administration during the early 1990's was still under Portuguese leadership, and albeit the Iberian country's notorious law rigidity, Macao's government was being frowned upon by Beijing because of its inefficiency and corruptive behavior⁸⁴. Which is why on the 31st of March of 1993, the People's Republic of China issued the resolution on the city's Basic Law to secure the "One-Country-Two-Systems" principle. Conditions of the Basic Law of Macao are the same that Hong Kong's, meaning that it too shall stay in vigor for 50 years. The only difference is that Macao's official acknowledgement of it being a SAR came into being on the 20th of December of 1999.

The main institutional issues in the preparatory years of the transition were on "localization", which was the task of teaching and training Chinese employees to take on the Portuguese civil service. However, due to problems related to language and to the relocation of many engineers in mainland China⁸⁵, this policy was hard to implement. Nonetheless, thanks to a strong enforcement of the law in the Latin culture, the new mainly Chinese civil servants were taught to stand by it. A series of policies were applied to reduce for instance, the disproportionate size of 18 000 civil servants for a population of just over half a million, or to come up with an anti-corruption organ so to reduce inefficiency-related issues and so on⁸⁶.

After the 1999 "handover", Macao citizens were overall pleased by the new system, also because the new Chief Executive Edmund Ho was determined to tackle the problems the

⁸³ Berman Evan M. (2011), *Public Administration in South-East Asia* p.248

⁸⁴ Berman Evan M. (2011), *Public Administration in South-East Asia* p.464

⁸⁵ Lo Shiu Hing (1995), *Political Development in Macau* p.116

⁸⁶ *Macao Justice Daily*, February 6 2003, p. 1

Portuguese administration had earlier, by gradually reforming the new administration. In fact, his slow but steady changes avoided any social upheaval and reduced the chances of social chaos and managed to build a stable civil service able to operate functionally⁸⁷.

But the real economic boom arrived in Macau in the early 2000's when the government transferred his monopoly of the gambling system onto the Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, a company founded in 2001 by Stanley Ho Hung-sun, controlling all sorts of gaming operations from Mass Market table gaming to VIP table gaming, thus turning Macao into the Asian Las Vegas, everyone knows today⁸⁸. Moreover, in 2007, when the first super-luxury resort The Venetian Macao was inaugurated, many other 5-star, casino-equipped resorts started appearing turning Macao's landscape much brighter and much richer, as well as pulling down unemployment rate to an unprecedented 2% in 2013 and providing the government with great tax revenues⁸⁹. With the growing expansion of the casino business, also started the construction of the staggering 550 000 square meters super resort Galaxy Macau, inaugurated in 2011 but planned to be fully finished in mid-2015⁹⁰, which secured employment and further charmed entertainment tourists.

As the government was earning more than ever with the gambling business, of course, the city expanded territorially, albeit remaining in the borders set by Beijing. Large-scale investment in infrastructure led to the completion of the third bridge, the Sai Van Bridge, connecting Macao city to the neighboring Taipa Island in 2004⁹¹ and a year later, the government launched a plan of mass housing building with an extraordinary 8 000 new apartments available since 2013⁹². Finally, on the 27th of June 2009, the government, upon Beijing consent, declared that it would massively invest in the relocation and expansion of the University of Macau to turn it into a world-class institute of excellence⁹³.

⁸⁷ Berman Evan M. (2011) *Public Administration in South-East Asia* p.465

⁸⁸ Farah Master, Charlie Zhu, Chris Lewis, *Asia Entertainment and Resources and Reuters reports*, "Factbox: How Macau's casino junket system works", 21 October 2011

⁸⁹ Max-Leonard von Schaper, "Macau: Unemployment Rates during the past 8 years", 3 November 2013

⁹⁰ prnewswire.com, "Galaxy Macau™ Phase 2 – A new chapter begins", 26 April 2012

⁹¹ CONSULASIA, Consultores de Engenharia e Gestão, Lds, "Macao – Taipa Third Bridge (Sai Van Bridge) (design checking)

⁹² Instituto de Habitacao, "Social Housing", 30 December 2013

⁹³ "University of Macau – History" 25 July 2015

Today, although gaming revenues are decreasing since the first half of 2014 having experts worry that if the decline persists; the government will have no more revenue to support its population⁹⁴, the government's social responsibility assures a level of satisfaction among its citizens which have much less reasons to protest than their Hong Kong counterparts. As a matter of fact, on the other side of the Pearl River Delta, where polices have been implemented quickly and swiftly, citizens have not had the time to adapt. The next final chapter will analyze the question of rights and freedoms sometimes denied in both regions.

⁹⁴ Howard Stutz, *Las Vegas Review Journal*, "Macau casinos experience 14th straight monthly revenue decline" 3 August 2015

Chapter 4 – Freedoms and Prohibitions in the two regions

4.1. Human Rights

According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration stipulated in 1984 for the fate of human rights in Hong Kong, the “SAR Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws [...] including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the right to raise a family freely”⁹⁵. Another important document is the Bill of Rights Ordinance enacted in 1991⁹⁶, which is primarily the adaptation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that states the numerous freedoms the citizens enjoy as well as the provisions set by the international community.

As far as Macao is concerned, the Fundamental Rights charter is incorporated in the Basic Law which has been promulgated by the People’s Republic of China’s National People’s Congress of 1993 and states among other things, that “all Macao residents shall be equal before the law, and shall be free from discrimination, irrespective of their nationality descent, race, sex, language, religion, political persuasion or ideological belief, educational level, economic status or social conditions”⁹⁷.

It is interesting to analyze two examples of rights that are supposed to be protected but that in actuality, things are different. Article 32 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and Article 15 of the Bills of Rights, for instance guarantee freedom of all religions. However, the practice of Falun Gong, officially legal in Hong Kong⁹⁸, has been challenged in 2003 when Falun Gong protesters were arrested for obstruction of a public place after having peacefully demonstrated outside an important government building. Although the protesters’ charges

⁹⁵ *Sino-British Joint Declaration*, Elaboration by the Government of the People’s Republic of China of its Basic Policies Regarding Hong Kong

⁹⁶ Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Chapter 383

⁹⁷ Basic Law of Macau, Chapter III on Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents, Article 25 (1993)

⁹⁸ Mark Landler, *New York Times*, “Hong Kong Bows to Beijing. Except When It Doesn’t” 22 July 2001

were dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal⁹⁹, nothing can be said for the repeated refusal of entries in Hong Kong to the religion's practitioners because of "political reasons"¹⁰⁰. On the other hand, Macau's religious freedom is stated in the Basic Law as "The Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region, consistent with the principle of religious freedom, shall not interfere in the internal affairs of religious organizations or in the efforts of religious organizations and believers in Macao to maintain and develop relations with their counterparts outside Macao, or restrict religious activities which do not contravene the laws of the Region. Religious organizations may, in accordance with law, run seminaries and other schools, hospitals and welfare institutions and to provide other social services. Schools run by religious organizations may continue to provide religious education, including courses in religion"¹⁰¹. Religions peacefully coexist and since the "handover" there have been no major religious disputes.

Another interesting example to point out is the right to equality, with special regards to the protection of the rights of women. The Bill of Rights of Hong Kong of 1991 asserted that "Men and women shall have an equal right to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in this Bill of Rights"¹⁰². However, in 2000 a famous Hong Kong secondary school was accused of practicing discriminatory behavior towards girls. In fact, boys and girls were marked separately and boys' grades were being boosted based on the fact that according to science, boys tend to develop their mental capacities later than girls. As a result, girls were asked to do better as their examinations were marked in a stricter way. The High Court of Hong Kong managed in the end to declare the system unconstitutional¹⁰³. As far as Macao is concerned, rights for women are guaranteed in its Basic Law stating that "the freedom of marriage of Macao residents and their right to form and raise a family freely shall be protected by law. The legitimate rights and interests of women shall be protected by the Macao Special Administrative Region. The minors, the aged and the disabled shall be taken care of and protected by the Macao Special

⁹⁹ *Yeung May-wan and Others v HKSAR FACC* No.19 of 2004

¹⁰⁰ Nishika Patel, *The Standard*, "Falun Gong discrimination claim rejected", 14 February 2008

¹⁰¹ Basic Law of Macau, Chapter IV on Culture and Social Affairs, Article 128 (1993)

¹⁰² Bill of Rights of Hong Kong, Part II, Article 1(2), 1991

¹⁰³ *Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education* No.1555 of 2000

Administrative Region”¹⁰⁴. In Macao, there have not been any notorious particular cases of female discrimination. According to the China Society for Human Rights Studies, Macanese women even enjoy a high level of development and emancipation, even higher than the world’s average. A special Women's Affairs Advisory Committee of the Macao Special Administrative Region¹⁰⁵ has even been instituted in recent years in order to monitor the conditions and developments of the protection of women’s rights. An additional interesting element has been the “Labor Relations Act” that entered into force in 2009, going even further in the protection of women’s rights securing, among other things, the protection of women in family relations regarding for instance divorce issues, or the protection of women’s personal safety with regards to sexual crimes, for example¹⁰⁶.

Hong Kong and Macao do not differ a great deal when it comes to setting up protection of human rights clauses in their Basic Laws. However, enforcement of such rules may just distinguish one system to the other. The level of protection of society helps understand why Hong Kong citizens are more prone to protest while Macanese seem calmer.

4.2. Civil and Political Rights

In this section, will be taken two other examples to see in what fashion civil and political rights are carried out. The first is the inviolable freedom of expression, which concerns the right for every person to express their opinion without the fear of government censorship or retaliation. In Hong Kong, where this right is guaranteed by both Basic Law and the Bill of Rights¹⁰⁷, sometimes observers have put it into question. In Macao, the right to the freedom of expression is implicit to Article 27 and Article 32 of the Basic Law¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁴ Basic Law of Macao, Chapter III on Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents, Article 38 (1993)

¹⁰⁵ Vong Hinfai, *China Society for Human Rights Studies*, “Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests in Macau

¹⁰⁶ No. 7/2008 law of Macao ‘s “Labor Relations Act” 1 January 2009

¹⁰⁷ Basic Law of Hong Kong, Article 27; Bill of Rights Ordinance, Article 16

¹⁰⁸ Basic Law of Macao, Chapter III on Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents, Article 27; Article 32 (1993)

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, an example of case that stands out for the wrong reasons is the case of the Edison Chen photo scandal that took place in early 2008, in Hong Kong¹⁰⁹. In that same year, Commissioner of Police Tang King Shing advised that the mere possession of obscene and indecent articles, without necessarily implying their distribution, might be considered illegal and unlawful. Sparked by the provocation, political activist Leung Kwok-hung denounced the police of spreading “white terror” among the citizens and eroding the right to the freedom of expression. The police later stated that possessing or simply sending the photos of nude celebrities via email to mutual friends was not unlawful although posting them on websites to the public, is. Eventually, the public opinion led the government to review and modify the Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance¹¹⁰. As for Macao, the only incident that triggered doubts upon the absolute right to the freedom of expression since the “handover”, took place early August 2014 when University Professor at University of Macau (UMAC) had his contract suspended because he had allegedly been accused of “imposing his political beliefs on students”¹¹¹ during the Portuguese rule of the region. Professor Chou was eventually suspended without pay for 24 days, after referring to Macau’s Labor Affairs Bureau complaining about the University’s lack of proper disciplinary procedures, but still could teach in the institute afterwards since UMAC declared the behavior not being unlawful unless there were actual complaints. In other words, the decision did not require any judiciary procedure so the issue was limited to a very small sector of the society, namely the UMAC student body.

Another interesting example to take into consideration is the right to vote in the two regions. Article 26 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong guarantees the right to vote stating that “permanent residents of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have the right to vote and the right to stand for election in accordance with law”¹¹². Except for the protests that took place in August through December 2014, which are the core of this essay, the only incident looked upon by the press, involving the right to vote, referred to when two

¹⁰⁹ Li Yi, *Apple Daily*, “The Biggest Lesson of ‘Sex Photos Gate’ is the Exposure of Hypocrisy” 12 February 2008

¹¹⁰ Review of the Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance (<http://www.coiao.gov.hk/en/home.htm>)

¹¹¹ Raquel Carvalho, *South China Morning Post*, “Macao academic sacked for ‘imposing his political beliefs on students’” 18 August 2014

¹¹² Basic Law of Hong Kong, Chapter III on Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents, Article 26

incarcerated men Chan Kin-sum and Choi Chuen-sun, while serving time in late 2007, claimed their right to vote even though they were in jail. The complaint was backed up by legislator Leung Kwok-hung, who had also served time in the past, who contributed to the cause since the court agreed to have inmates vote for the first time in Hong Kong history in territory elections¹¹³. On the other hand, Macao's guarantee to the right to vote can be found in the Basic Law whereupon "permanent residents of the Macao Special Administrative Region shall have the right to vote and the right to stand for election in accordance with law"¹¹⁴. However, the article has been challenged in recent times when police forces closed down several voting stations set up to gather signatures for genuine democratic elections. Allegedly, referenda are not to be found in the constitution but as elections for the Chief Executive were closing in and the only candidate was the incumbent Fernando Chui Sai-on, who benefits from Beijing essential consent, 7000 Macanese voters had signed the unofficial referendum. Four organizers were detained by the police on the grounds that the signatories had given personal information to the pro-democracy groups, but were soon let free as the Court of Final Appeal stipulated that organizing referenda is not unlawful¹¹⁵.

In Hong Kong, obviously the biggest representation of the infringement of the right to vote democratically has been seen from August to December 2014, and has been examined in the first part of this essay. Macao citizens are catching up, as they too, have limited voting rights in democratic and fair elections.

4.3. Freedom of the Press

An interesting case regarding rights and freedoms concern what the public opinion, considered as a "watchdog"¹¹⁶ in western countries need to say about media coverage, or in other words, what citizens have the knowledge to say about what is happening around

¹¹³ Sahil Nagpal, *Top News*, "Hong Kong judge gives convicts the right to vote" 12 August 2008

¹¹⁴ Basic Law of Macao, Chapter III on Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents, Article 26

¹¹⁵ *Global Voices*, "Macau Authorities Crack Down on Pro-Democracy Activists Who Want the Right to Vote for Their Next Leader" 28 August 2014

¹¹⁶ AshR., Ferdinand P.e.a. (2003), *Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems*, p.195

them. The delicate issue of censorship deals with just that. After the “handover” both regions had to adapt to the new Chinese system and therefore, were under strong pressures from Beijing¹¹⁷.

The issue in Hong Kong goes back to the period 1994-1995, just when the region was preparing for the “handover”, since many journalists found themselves in the delicate position of having to self-censor themselves due to increasing pressures from up north¹¹⁸. Famous academic Alan Knight conducted surveys revealing that it was mainly the Chinese language press that cut politically sensitive topics, edited the newspaper so as to show the critical news in the last pages, or used politically correct words to write articles, while the English press, it was found, stayed much more objective with regards to news and global affairs¹¹⁹.

More specifically, the incidents regarding the Chinese language newspaper *South China Morning Post* reveal just how much pressure Hong Kong press was enduring. Few years prior the “handover”, there had been stories about compulsory departures of several staff members who were dismissed because of allegedly showing offensive material towards Beijing leadership, such as the cartoonist Larry Feign, dismissed in May 1995 or humor columnist Nury Vittachi, dismissed in 1997¹²⁰. But even after the “handover”, in 2000-2001, more than a couple contributors to the *South China Morning Post* have been let go of, such as the editor of editorial pages, Danny Gittings who took advantage of his dismissal to complain about the continuous “pressure to tone down coverage of politically sensitive issues”¹²¹, or even the editor of the pages dedicated to Chinese politics Willy Lam, who left the office after being publicly criticized by Malaysian tycoon Robert Kuok¹²². As can be easily seen, there have been numerous analogous stories regarding early and forced dismissals in the Hong Kong press, which can show how much censorship does in fact affect public opinion, which has started to raise their voice.

¹¹⁷ AshR., Ferdinand P.e.a. (2003), *Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems*, p.195

¹¹⁸ *Dateline Hong Kong* edited by Alan Knight, summary of findings in Knight (1997)

¹¹⁹ Bonnin (1995); Cullen (1997); CNA (1-15 August 1998)

¹²⁰ Rey Chow (1997), *Larry Feign, Ethnographer of a 'Lifestyle': Political Cartoons from Hong Kong*, Volume 24, No. 2

¹²¹ Rushford, Greg, *Rushford Report*, “Cover Story: Hong Kong at a Crossroads” April 2002

¹²² Vanessa Gould, Nelson Lee & Bryan Lee, *The Standard*, “SAR defends rights record” 28 February 2001

As far as Macao is concerned, freedom of the press is guaranteed under article 27 of the Basic Law, which states that “Macao residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike”¹²³. Although, as it has been shown earlier, the freedom of expression has been challenged in recent times, it seems as the freedom of the press and media more generally has been quite well respected. Interestingly, Macao benefits from the world’s highest “media density” per inhabitant with nine Chinese dailies, three Portuguese dailies and another three English ones, not to mention all the other weeklies and monthly newspapers that come both from Macao and from abroad including Mainland China, the Philippines and Taiwan¹²⁴. Despite there not being significant cases of violation of the freedom of the press, it is still interesting to note that all the newspapers cited above, are under the direct control of Macao’s Government Information Bureau, which is in turn solely responsible to the Chief Executive¹²⁵, which is, as mentioned earlier, heavily influenced by Beijing.

Therefore, one can easily pinpoint the issue, which is the control of the government of the People’s Republic of China over media coverage in both SARs. In Hong Kong, the situation escalated resulting in various early departures while in Macao there have not been any official story recording similar incidents.

¹²³ Basic Law of Macao, Chapter III on Fundamental Rights and Duties of Residents, Article 27

¹²⁴ Kogan Page, *Asia and Pacific Review 2003/2004* p.136

¹²⁵ Basic Law of Macao, Chapter IV on Political Structure, Section 1 on the Chief Executive, Article 50

Conclusion

Finally, one can deduce that albeit the two regions' deep intrinsic differences, they nonetheless show some signs of similarity that make an outside observer ask himself why and for what reasons have riots erupted only in one of the cities. Furthermore, generally these protests, if taking place within similar political systems, have a spill-over effect onto other neighboring regions that might suffer from analogous deficiencies spurring them to object as well.

In this case, however, such a thing has not happened. One could argue that the next Chief Executive elections in Macao are due for 2019, so citizens may not fully feel the pressure for a more democratic system just yet. Hong Kong's elections are scheduled to be held in 2017, so the proximity of the date may have helped the citizens reflect on the procedures regarding the election of candidates. Even more so to this day as the abundance of information circulating globally, albeit at times unofficially, contributes to the questioning of one's living circumstances by comparing them to other countries'.

Still, it is interesting to note that both cities that have shared a common colonial heritage and are administered today under the same political system have not experienced the domino effect one usually finds himself dealing with. In fact, whether it was under Portuguese rule for Macao or British rule for Hong Kong, the period going from the 16th century to the 19th has overall been dictated by the colonizers' aspirations of turning the Pearl River Delta into a trade hub connecting Europe to Asia. The institutional developments that were brought to the cities during the 20th century were a direct consequence of both the international status quo being the Cold War and the parallel exponential growth of China, affirming herself to become one of the region's superpower.

However, everything changed in the 1990's when Beijing opened the rounds of talks with Portugal and Great Britain on the questions of Macao and Hong Kong. The Basic Laws of the two regions were erected and they became Special Administrative Regions of the People's Republic of China in 1997 for Hong Kong and 1999 for Macao. The "One-Country-Two-Systems" approach was applied so that both cities could benefit from a large degree of autonomy except in the fields of defense and foreign affairs. Along with the Basic

Laws, also came the question on the rights and duties of the citizens, as well as the various freedoms inhabitants could enjoy. The first manifestations of social distress arising from the questioning on the accountability of the local political class came in Hong Kong with small, rather contained incidences that sparked a light in the minds of citizens. The gradual repressions and dubious behaviors from above led to the student movement of September 2014 causing great social upheaval in a land considered a focal point of today's business transactions.

The point of this essay was to try to figure out, on the one hand, why the Occupy Central movement erupted in Hong Kong, and on the other, more importantly, to explain why an analogous uprising did not take place in neighboring Macao.

As similar as the two SARs may appear, they have interesting differences that may in part be able to answer the second question, as the first is rather straightforward. The "Umbrella Movement" developed since there are very limited democratic elements in the election of the Chief Executive. As a matter of fact, in both cities, it is Beijing who decides which and how many candidates to present; therefore it should come to no surprise that citizens would like to enjoy a higher degree of political representation. More interestingly, one should focus on why there was an absence of pro-democratic movement in Macao also.

Part of the answer may simply lie in demographics: it is easier to generate a massive social movement when the number of total citizens surpasses 7 million rather than creating a parallel campaign with little more than half a million inhabitants. But the question needs to be analyzed in further detail. The transition period of Macao during the "handover" has been characterized by the administration of Edmund Ho who, unlike his counterpart in Hong Kong, Tung Chee-hwa, has had the ability to gradually and slowly adapt his population to the new Chinese-led policies. His attention to social issues as well as his devotion to the expansion of Macao's greatest asset, the gaming industry, has produced a very positive outcome as far as society's satisfaction levels are concerned.

Maybe the answer lies just at the intersection of these elements. A relatively small population driven by the enormous income levels derived by the tourism and hospitality sectors, has been easier to manage and easier to please. Most of Macao's population lives

off casino-related jobs that guarantee, albeit their very recent decline in revenues, levels of satisfaction and well-being higher than the world's average. It may simply be that, although elections have not been carried out, and will presumably still not be carried out in the future, in the most democratic way, Macanese citizens do not feel the need to address the question of political representation, since their daily needs are overall met.

However, one must still recognize that this paper has not dug into the details of the fiscal policies that have been implemented in Hong Kong, it being one of the world's financial hubs. The economic and financial policies that have not been dealt with here, could give a further explanation as to why the population has experienced such unrest. As it was not the goal of this essay to analyze how monetary guidelines may or may have not influenced the well-being of Hong Kong's society, one should still bear in mind that it could be an additional element that led to the massive unrest of 2014.

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