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The community of Sant'Egidio, a non-governmental transnational actor acting within the international order: Sant'Egidio's peacemaking endeavors in Mozambique, Algeria, and Kosovo

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Abstract

We evolve today in a world in constant mutation. The centre of power is not anymore in the hands of states. A plethora of non-state actors are filling the vacuum by putting into question the leadership of official actors. The game of politics appears more complex than ever; every type of actors is trying to influence the political process by enhancing their own method of action. As we will see in the subsequent lines, unofficial actors are climbing the ladder of politics. Softly, they empty official actors from their initial substance; their *raison d'être*. In this fashion, the community of Sant'Egidio is an original example that demonstrates in practice how and why non-state actors are trying to privatize political field such as diplomacy.

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"The culture of peace is rooted in repsect for law;in a spirit of mutual respect, goodwill and toleration; and in in the acceptance that real peace cannot be achieved by threat or force" (Frederick Willem de Klerk, Nobel Peace Laureat 1993)

Acronyms

ANP: Armée Nationale Populaire

CSE : Community of Sant'Egidio

CSOs: Civil Society Organisations

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut

FLN: Front de Libération NAtionale

FRELIMO: Frentede Libertagaode Mogambique

TNR: Transnational Relation

NGOs: Non-governmental organizations

RENAMO: Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana

RNGOs: Religious organizations

UN: United Nations

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Introduction

The current research is concentrated on the community of Sant'Egidio, a non-governmental transnational actor depicts as an extra-state confessional entity for which its transnational diplomatic actions as well as its charity projects undeniably epitomize a post-westphalian order. Seeking to build and be embedded in a connected world, Sant'Egidio gives a great importance to its capacity to mobilize itself and to create

linkages and closeness when the initial purposes are either tackling poverty and delivering relief services or managing and mediating a contemporary crisis that impairs citizens and elites to live peacefully together. Qualified as a Christian association, a community of faith or a NGO, we expressly treat with an original type of non-state actor that gradually climbs the ladder of politics. Indeed this study is inspired by the political and cultural changes of the contemporary world. Alongside states, today world politics involve many new categories of non-state actors, which aim at redrawing the map of diplomacy long dominated by either a Westphalia system or the topography of international organizations privileging exclusively official and formal political entities.

Thus, it appears interesting to look at the *mechanisms* of the contemporary changes in world politics. Evolving in a *borderless* world where the globalisation fosters continuously new type of skill and technologic revolution, people seem more able than ever to be interconnected with each other but above all to be responsive to issues that dehumanize the world. New skills, new scope of research and new ambition may gradually emerge shedding light on group of people who manage to build together grassroots organization with the aim to act collaboratively at transnational level. As we will notice in the present study, those *bottom up* initiatives reveal a smooth but powerful structuration of a transnational civil society having the ability to reframe the course of action by encouraging the establishment of worthy linkages inside and outside traditional diplomatic channels.

Today, these new unofficial diplomatic actors claim their rights to be listened and considered as authentic and valuable performers having the skills and required attitudes to deliver services to people or countries that find themselves in complex and delicate position. Clearly we are dealing with new actors and venues that completely change the landscape of diplomacy. Contemporary diplomatic actors such as NGOs, eminent person diplomats or faith-based actors are changing the rule of the game of politics acknowledging that precious and historical prerogatives of states are gradually privatized: the exercise of diplomacy in a context of a process of mediation is an illustrative example. The puzzle of politics is more complex than ever; the mechanism of the privatization of diplomacy sheds light on states that appear either powerless or overwhelmed by *how and why doing politics*. On the contrary, unofficial actors, which represent – in our study – grassroots religious movement appear to be willing to enhance their *raison d'être* and to help the weakest; the people or country which do not find an answer to their problem in state or intergovernmental proposals.

Living in a world where official diplomacies seem old-fashioned in dealing with new categories of conflict, informal actors are willing to fill the vacuum by seducing target leaders and audiences with a new plethora of instruments and strategies. However, we should not keep in mind a linear and peaceful line of conduct when we address *the process* of diplomatic interventions carry out by unofficial actors: complementary methods of action may be useful in certain circumstances. Despite the probability to see the emergence of different type of synergy between official and unofficial actors, non-state actors are intriguing to study mainly because they open a new *toolbox,* which encompasses *a soft power* able to work with or overtake the traditional *hard power* used by institutional bodies.

In our present study, the community of Sant'Egidio typifies a faith-based actor that is willing to adjust the politico-cultural imperfections trigger by a world, which lacks leadership, authenticity, transparency and legitimacy. However, the community of Sant'Egidio does not aim *to be the pilot of the aircraft* when diplomatic emergencies are at stake. The community of Sant'Egidio is a small but reliable community of faith, which seeks to use its entire human, spiritual and democratic resources in order to cure the illness that impairs the world to progress peacefully towards new pattern of thought. But methods, means and attitudes used to pave the way towards peace are not an easy task, however. A long way backs for us in the understanding of the scope and pace of peacemaking's efforts promoted by the community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique, Algeria and Kosovo.

Research question and Hypotheses

Starting from this observation, this study investigates into a question regarding circumstances that may be useful to understand and measure *the process* by which the community of Sant'Egidio is able to build peace though a process of mediation. More specifically, we must ask ourselves *"under what conditions does the community of Sant'Egidio is able to build a process of mediation in order to embrace effectiveness?"*

A full and complete understanding of this research question can only be made through the study of Transnationalism and Network paradigms. Throughout our research, these two theories will enable us to precisely position the peacemaking activities fostered by such an original non-state actor *beyond* the inter-states relations. In other words, this reasoning will drive us towards an encompassing word that mobilizes both conventional diplomatic actors and unconventional diplomatic actors. Therefore, their resulting strategies, efforts and attitudes will be examined. Eventually, as I stress the conditions that must be met in order to enhance a process of mediation, we will look at both the concept of mediation and faith-based mediation in order to have a complete understanding of its *character*, *procedure,* and *methods.*

Three hypotheses will direct the reflection used throughout the redaction of this thesis.

First, the identity of the third-party is critical to enhance a process of mediation (H1).

Second, the embeddedness of the networking of relevant stakeholders coming from the community of Sant'Egidio is conducive to the setting up of a comprehensive process of mediation (H2).

Third, the peacemaking's efforts foster by the community of Sant'Egidio are enhanced by the conjunction of official actors (H3).

I decided to focus on theses hypotheses because both *internal* and *external* factors had to be analysed in order to suitably measure proceedings during mediation. (H1) sheds light on peculiar characteristics that frame the personality and originality of the CSE. Therefore, it will be interesting to assess the *impact* of this identity when we refer to a process of mediation. (H2) relates to the integration of the CSE within a specific politico-civil society. The aim will be to value what sorts of inclusion enables the CSE to build a comprehensive, solid and lasting process of mediation. (H3) highlights the *potential* implementation of synergy – implicit or explicit - between the CSE and political and institutional bodies. The objective will be principally to observe the role of official actor both *inside* and *beyond* the constituted framework for organizing the peace talks

Data and Methodology

I used a qualitative method based on an interpretive position where the main objective was to gather relevant information and interpretation provided directly by actors who have been – or still are - connected to our study. This qualitative method is based on semi-structured interviews. In other words, I decided to let participants shared their story in conjunction with a set of questions that I assembled in an interview-guide. Moreover, a triangulation's method has been added to the semi-structured interviews. I rely on different sources - mainly books, articles and official statements – in order to create an atmosphere conducive to an accurate observation and evaluation of our research.

I interviewed Celine Francis who is a researcher in conflict resolution who worked at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and now starts working for the CSE in Brussels. It should be noted that her expertise was very useful to *envelop* – not to analyse - the framework as well as the case-study of my thesis. Second, I interviewed François Delooz who works for the CSE in Brussels and he is the president of the NGO Viva Africa. It should be noted that both Céline Francis and François have been interviewed at the same time. Third, I interviewed Roberto Morozzo della Rocca who is professor at Roma Tre University and who works for the CSE since the outset. Moreover, he was one of the mediators during the process of mediation in Kosovo. Fourth, I interviewed Don Angelo Romano who is working in the department of international relations of the CSE. Additionally, he participated to the process of mediation in Algeria. Fifth, I interviewed Leone Gianturco who was secretary of the Mozambique talks. Sixth, I interviewed Jan De Volder who is a historian and journalist specialized for the religious world. He is involved in the community since his youth. It must be noted that it was not an easy task to find the right persons who has been directly involved in the process of mediation in Mozambique, Algeria and Kosovo. Moreover, I have been in contact with Tanguy de Wilde d'Estmael, a professor in international relations at Leuven Catholic University who knows the community of Sant'Egidio. Unfortunately, he could not answer to my specific questions. I interviewed Christian Laporte, journalist for La Libre Belgique, who follows the religious activities of the CSE for 25 years. Unfortunately, his answers were well-founded but he could not give me specific details about the process of mediation in Mozambique, Algeria or Kosovo. However, for the transparency and the respect of the interviewee, I inserted his interview with the others. Eventually, I have been trying to reach Andrea Riccardi, Mario Giro, Mario Raffaelli and Matteo Zuppi but I never received any answer in return.

1. Theoretical framework

1.1. Theoretical approach for the present study: Transnationalism and Network theory

I decided to divide this section in two parts. First, I will discuss on transnationalism, a paradigm detailed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Second, I will explore the Network Theory developed in international relation.

Authors of their seminal study *"Transnational Relations and World politics" (1972)*, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye are deemed as the pioneers of the critical thinking of the realist school and of the neo-realism originated by K. Waltz.[1] Before giving more details of Keohane and Nye's theories, I would like first to categorize it. Transnational relations mean *"regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization "*.[2]

Consequently, when we refer to "transnational relations", we are interested in studying contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments: Multinational business enterprises; trade unions; NGOs and scientific networks and communications activities are instances that illustrate the decentralisation of world politics.[3] Transnational interactions may involve governments, but not exclusively: nongovernmental actors must also play a significant role. Hence, on the one hand, transnationalism identifies new actors such as individuals and the CSOs as unique and influential players of world politics; on the other, it underscores the bonds of interdependence connecting all group of actors, state and non-states.[4]

Distinguishing transnational relations from interstate relations; interstate politics where the focus is on the agencies of the governments through which societies deal politically with each other, the authors underline the necessity to recognize the capacity and the autonomy of individuals and organizations as players in world affairs. *"They may play direct roles vis-à-vis foreign governments or foreign societies and thus bypass their own*

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[1] TELO, Mario, *Relations internationales. Une perspective européenne,* troisième édition revue et augmentée,Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2013, p. 100.

[2] RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas, "Bringing transnational relations back in : introduction", in Thomas Risse-Kappen (dir.), *Bringing transnational relations back in,* Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 1995, p. 3.

[3] World politics is defined as political interactions between any significant actors whose characteristics include autonomy, the control of substantial resources relevant to a given issue area, and participation in political relationships across state lines.

[4] BATTISTELLA, Dario, *Théories des relations internationals,* Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2003, p.178.

governments".[5] Examining transnational relations means also taking into account the exteriority's dimension, leading the authors to exclude from transnational relations the activities of transnational organizations within their home states if the organizations maintain such national identifications. Nonetheless, this does not signify that they are either represented by citizens of the world or controlled by individuals from several states. Certainly, most transnational organizations remain linked primarily to one peculiar national society. Even if we assign horizontal-management to such transnational interactions, a head office does exist and citizens from the home state often rule it.[6]

We are living in a world where buzzwords such as globalization and interdependence shape and alter institutional and human actions; there is no longer the same focus on the hegemony of the states. The relationship between states do not prevail anymore in international relations where sub and extra-governmental units more and more fit into the stages of the political agenda. Concentrated on the nature of the actors and their respective position, the authors attempt to demonstrate how the level-of-analysis problem is transcended by the incorporation of new actors that may cause the hard shell of the nation state to fall apart.[7] As shown in the figure[8], we are confronted with six types of actors: States as units; governmental subunits; international organizations as units; subunits of international organizations; transnational organizations as units and subunits of transnational organizations - also certain individuals. The state-centric paradigm covers only four of the 36 possible types of politically relevant interactions across state boundaries that are diagnosed in the world politics paradigm. Eventually, this method suggests the richness of possible transnational coalitions that may determine outcomes in world politics.[9] In point of fact, we must improve the classical approach by using terms such as "transnational society", a system typified by socio-political interaction between societal actors belonging to different national systems.[10]

Certainly, transnational relations might foster *international pluralism* where the emphasis is on the linking of national interest groups in transnational structures – a form of organizational linkage. As we evolve in an interconnected world with an increasing specialization of societies associated with the rise of transnational communication, travel, and transportation, citizens from all ranks may imagine transnational organizations as

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[5]S. NYE, Joseph, O.KEOHANE, Robert, " Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction",
International Organization, vol.25, No. 3, summer, 1971, p.333.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 336.
[7] S. NYE, Joseph, O.KEOHANE, Robert, " Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion",
International Organization, vol.25, No. 3, summer, 1971, p.730.
[8] Annexe 1, p.
[9] *Ibid.,* p.732.
[10] BATTISTELLA, Dario, *op.cit.,* p.181.

tangible conduits for their opinions. The final outcome might be the blurring of national borders. Transnational relations may induce the formation of dependence and interdependence. Living in a complex world incorporating multiple channels that connect societies, there is a huge shift in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions that engender transcontinental flows and networks. Those channels contribute to the cultivation either of informal ties among nongovernmental elites or connections between actors with a different socio-political profile.[11] One of the result may be that states become dependent on transnational organizations, especially if those organizations provide something relevant and necessary – goods, services, information, relieves, managerial skills, religious legitimacy. The effect of interdependence suggests that governments are losing autonomy over the management of domestic and transnational issues, making the image of a Leviathan apparatus wholly outmoded.

Willing to depart from a state-centric view of world affairs, the authors consider that international or transnational actors appeal to citizens (e.g. farmers, students, workers, intellectuals, religious actors, elites…) especially because the nature of the issues (e.g. the conditions of humans being, poverty, trade, terrorism, political-civil war…) as well as the means needed to alleviate those ones might exceed the skills of nation-state: a dual loyalty seemed to emerge.[12] We should not deny the importance of the modern communications technology that has greatly increased the possibility for citizens as well as for political entities to interact with each other. Philosophically speaking, we should also ascribe the relevance of the liberalist thought that on the one hand frees citizens to think, to act, to move and to believe, on the other democratizes and decentralizes the governmental institutions. One of the results erupting from the fragmentation of state power is the proliferation of inter-societal interactions with significant political importance as well as transnational actors operation procedures happening regularly if not all the time on the ground of a nation-state. This socio-political flux of transactions escapes governmental control: the sovereignty of the state can be called into question. [13]

Psychologically speaking, these transnational actors generate both a new cross-border identity and a sense of cooperation-coordination that must be met in order to potentially frame and regulate the new political challenges. Generating changes in attitudes, face-to-face communications between citizens of different states may certainly alter the assumptions and perceptions of reality of elites and non-elites within national societies.

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[11] O. KEOHANE, Robert, S. NYE, *Power and Interdependence,* New-York, Longman, 2001, pp. 21-22.
[12] S. NYE, Joseph, O.KEOHANE, Robert, " Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion", *loc.cit.,* p. 728.
[13] HABERMAS, Jürgen, *L'intégration républicaine. Essais de théorie politique,* Paris, Fayard, 1998, p.97.

New attitudes can also be triggered by transnational organizations as they construct new myths, symbols, and norms to provide legitimacy for their activity and as they pursuit the replication of some life-styles, beliefs or social practices worldwide.[14] Without question, the normative dimension that naturally followed the bloom of the transnational actors is paramount regarding their weight in setting the global agenda. As Thomas Risse underlines, epistemic communities, networks of defence organizations as well as other transnational actors are now capable of substantially influencing the political agenda of states specifically through the creation of international norms, values and ideas - human rights, democracy, international security or the global environment, for example - and the establishment of those norms in domestic practices.[15]

In other words, these transnational relations boost the sensitivity of societies to one another and thereby modify socio-political proximity within and between governments.[16] However, the observation about changes in world politics do not refute that governments remain the most important actors in the political arena. They note a certain gradual loss of control by governments concerning their national environment. Nowadays, governments have to cope with new tasks that require an even greater specialisation or expertise in a respective areas of actions: offloading a greater burden on the available instruments of policy and resulting, eventually, in a "control gap".[17] Nevertheless, we must differentiate which chessboards are we talking about. According to the authors, distinctions between *high and low politics* are of decreasing value in current world politics. In contemporary world politics not all actors on important chessboards are states, and the fluctuating terrains of the chessboards dictate state behaviour. Some are more suited to the use of force, others almost totally unsuited to it. In point of fact, this research will tend to demonstrate how one of the most prestigious sovereign prerogative, diplomacy, may appear to be nowadays privatized through the hands of non-state actors.[18]

Having examined the scope of transnational relations, I would now like to discus the Network Theory currently applied in politics. As we will see in the next section, transnational activities can sometimes moves towards a stage of transition: the construction of transnational networks.

Network analysis puts stress on the connections determined by links among nodes (or agents). Nodes can be individuals or corporate actors, such as organizations and states.

[14] S. NYE, Joseph, O.KEOHANE, Robert, in "a conclusion", *loc.cit,* p.338.

[15] RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas, *op.cit.,* pp.4-5.

[16] ROSENAU, James N., *Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 125-126.

[17] S. NYE, Joseph, O.KEOHANE, Robert, in "an introduction", *loc.cit.,* pp. 342-343.

[18] S. NYE, Joseph, O.KEOHANE, Robert, in "a conclusion", *loc.cit.,* pp. 728-729.

Concentrated on the associations among nodes, the network analysis is based on three principles. First, nodes and their attitude are mutually dependent, not autonomous. Second, ties between nodes can be used as means for the exchange of both material (e.g. money, weapons) and non-material products (e.g. beliefs, norms, information). Thus, the ties channel the transmission of information through the network. Third, the connectedness among nodes generates structures that can delineate, permit or impede the behaviour of nodes.[19]

In addition, it would be meaningless to highlight such interactive features without stressing on their respective political and institutional forms. First, cooperation is shaped by a loosely structured, horizontal relationships expanded through repetitive practice. In this regard, the absence of hierarchy is paramount. Second, the participation within networks is most commonly organized by informal or, at least, non-legally-binding arrangements, and involves habitual peer-to-peer modes of harmonization and cooperation between interdependent actors that is "trust-based". Thirdly, the network metaphor helps to understand the relationship of both public and private actors from different institutional "levels" - national, regional and international - in a system in which action is implemented through synchronized and routinized practice. In fact, such networks often function to blur the distinction between the public and private realms. The concept of a network thus highlights the shift from a hierarchical form of organization to a more flexible, responsive, multi-layered structures of "networked governance".[20]

Networks are depicted as a mode of organization that enables collective action and cooperation, exercises influence, or serves as a means of international governance. Network analysis seeks to discern the design and system of relationships, such as hubs, cliques, or brokers, and to connect those relations with results of interest. Giving prominence to structural relations, the network reasoning considers connections among people as intrinsically dynamic.[21] Therefore, it permits structural investigation at multiple levels of analysis. For the purpose of this study, it will be useful to analyse one stage of such a collective process. The network analysis may be focussed on a simple network that connects pairs or *dyads*. The aim of a network research may be to know *why* people come together. According to Charles Kadushin, there are two principal factors that may foster an association between two persons. First, there are forces such as *propinquity*; agents are

[19]HAFNER-BURTON, Emilie M., (and al.), "Network Analysis for International Relations", *International Organization,* Vol.63, No. 3, 2009, p.562.

[20] FENWICK, Marck, (and al.), "Introduction: Networks and Networked Governance", in Marck Fenwick, (and al.) (Ed.), *Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law,* New-York/Dordrecht/London, Springer, 2014, p. 4.

[21] HAFNER-BURTON, Emilie M., (and al.), *loc.cit.,* p.561.

more likely to be associated to one another, other conditions being equal, if they are geographically close to one another. Second, there is the concept named *homophily* which describes a mechanism where people are more likely to have a connection or association if they have common attributes and/or purposes (political, ideological or simply thematic affinity).[22] Accordingly, we may have two categories of relationships: Simple relationship (they are not connected) and Directed relationship (directional relation). Within the Directed relationship, we may find three different connections: Symmetric relationship (for instance the status of the peers are the same), Anti-symmetric relationship, and Relationship through an intermediary (node 1 is connected to 3 via node 2). Eventually, this network connection may cover two kinds of codes of conduct. First, the relationships may be reciprocal or non-reciprocal. Second, the relationships may be concentrated on the concept of *mutuality*. Mutuality indicates first that relations are reciprocal - that is, they entail a give and take between the two parties - and second, that domination or asymmetry in the relationship is of little importance. It has to be noticed that "mutuality" is strongly influenced by the social and cultural structure within which the dyads are embedded.[23]

Furthermore, regardless of the level of study, network analysts agree that we may find at least three interrelated fundamentals when network activities materialize. First, the *relations between actors* may epitomize by itself the sense and the utility of creating affinity and liaison among different actors. The core of the network analysis is to understand the interactions between actors in order to dispel any individualist, essentialist and atomistic assumptions.[24] In other words, network theory is principally an approach that grants great importance to the relational dimension where units enmeshed in a transaction may extract their meaning, relevance, creativeness and identity from the transforming functional roles they play in that interaction.[25]

Second, the focus on *embeddedness* appears to be crucial to the way that human attitude is perceived as rooted in networks of interpersonal relationships. As people logically develop network activities on the basis of either mutual-benefits or natural mutual closeness (both can be met at the same time), embeddedness may be encouraged or naturally generated because the nature of the exchange relationships is built on the three pillars of trust,

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[22] KADUSHIN, Charles, *Understanding Social Networks: Theories, concepts, and findings,* Ney-York, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.18-20.
[23] *Ibid.,* pp.13-21.
[24] BALKUNDI, Prasad, KILDUFF, Martin, "The ties that lead: A social network approach to leadership", *The Leadership Quarterly,* Vol.16, 2005, p.942.
[25] EMIRBAYER, M., "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology", *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol.103, No.2, 1997, p.287.

reciprocity and transparency.[26] Third, there is a strong belief that network connections embody *social capital* that in turn provides values, power, leadership, mobility, employment, individual performance, individual creativity, entrepreneurship and team performance. Consequently, it should be asserted that such positive feedback might be created because of the nature (symmetric relationship for instance) and the intensity of a person's ties (weak or strong ties) or network's position. In contrast, we may also be confronted with the negative consequences of social capital. In that context, social ties may detain actors in maladaptive situations or enable unwanted behaviour.[27]

Finally, examining network activities allowed us to constitute a comprehensive but restricted toolkit for identifying and measuring the persistent patterns of relations that structure and shape the ties between the agents but also the behaviour of the individuals taken separately. Even though it may exist more properties attached to a network analysis, we can, nonetheless, respond to questions such as *why* do people want to be connected to one another; *how* do they create network activities; *who* may be willing to be embedded in a connected system and *when* a network platform may be built.[28]

1.2 Towards a post-westphalian order: the implosion of the state-centric approach in international relations.

1.2.1 Change in World Politics: a new type of governance and order?

Alongside states, contemporary world politics entails many non-state actors who interact with each other, with states, and with international organizations. Many scholars now acknowledge that the state no longer has a monopoly over public affairs, describing the sphere of international interactions under a variety of appellations: disaggregated governance, transnational relations, international civil society, "world society".[29] It might appear that these descriptions of a world in constant mutation tend to characterize a system of governance that is increasingly multilevel and global. Differing from the word government, governance does not suggest activities that are specifically backed by formal authority. Rather, it endorses the phenomenon of encompassing every socio-political body - subnational, informal, non-governmental, and formal - that will unite individuals with a purposive behaviour and goal - oriented activities. Accordingly, states no longer look

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[26] BALKUNDI, Prasad, KILDUFF, Martin, *loc.cit.,* p.942

[27] P. BORGATTI, Stephen, C. FOSTER, Pacey, " The Network Paradigm in Organizational Research: A review and Typology", Vol.29, No.6, *Journal of Management,* 2003, pp.993-994.

[28] HAFNER-BURTON, Emilie M., (and al.), *loc.cit.*p.559.

[29] MILNER, Helen V., "Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers", in Helen V. Milner, Andrew Moravcsik (Ed.), *Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 5-11.

unitary from the outside. Increasingly dense interactions among individuals, groups, NGOs, actors from states and regional and international institutions appear to be involved in decisional processes: a new map of power relationship must be drawn.[30]

Needless to say that we face today a global political system that is plural encompassing diverse forms of authority, either formal or informal, both influenced and altered by the power of globalization. Undeniably, the processes of globalization undermine the domestic analogy and the prospect of centralized authority. The lack of centralized authority at a global level may be explained by the weakness of the states and the porosity of their boundaries; by the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations because of the increasing mobility and education offered to citizens; by the nature of the issues becoming more transnational; by the privatization of the public spaces and by the building of collectivities in a dense network transcending nation-state.[31]

The mechanism of the globalization is manifold - social, economic, technical, political and cultural - its intensity as well as its complexity is pushed towards a new perception of the sovereignty of the states which is becoming more permeable. Based on the growing impact of interdependence, the communication and technological revolution (ICT), the global movements of persons, the globalisation of production, the democratization fostering a more democratic and liberal society, we can discern a global transformation which cherishes a shift in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions - evaluated in terms of their extensity, capacity, pace and impact - provoking transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of movements.[32] Indeed, the production of networks and overlapping communities of fate enhance the impact of interdependence and connectedness. As David Held résumés *"nation-states are drawing together by complex processes of interdependence on problem such as AIDS, migration, human rights, crime, trade, environmental pollution and new challenges to peace, security, and economic prosperity that spill over national boundaries".[33]*

Stressing the emergence of a borderless world, some scholars have argued that we have entered a new world of global governance often called Neo-Medievalism. As in the Middle Ages, citizens or groups have a myriad of sovereign or corporate loyalties, a

[30] ROSENAU, James N., "Governance, order and change in world politics" in James N. Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), *Governance without government: order and change in world politics,* Cambridge, Cambridge university press, 1992, pp.1-7.

[31] ROSENAU, James N., *The study of World Politics: globalization and governance*, Vol. 2, Oxford, Routledge, , 2006, p. 96.

[32] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, "Civil society, global governance, and the quest for legitimacy", in Mario Telò (Ed.), *Globalization, Multilateralism, Europe: Towards a better global governance?,* Bruxelles, Ashgate, , 2013, pp. 301-3012.

[33] NORRIS, Pippa, " Global Governance and Cosmopolitans Citizens", in Joseph S. Nye, John D. Donahue (Ed.), *Governance in a globalizing world,* Cambridge (Massachusetts), Brookings institution press, , 2000, p. 156.

phenomenon that might highlight the existence of multiple authorities exercised over the same individuals, communities, transactions, relationships, events or bodies of law. Acknowledging the collapse of a monolithic system of governance, we deal nowadays with a variety of species of entities that can use their power over matters of international concern. The relocating of authority has involved either inward relocation toward actors representing the civil society (such as NGOs) as well as subnational group (such as local governments) or upward relocation toward international organizations (such as the UN), regional bodies (such as the NAFTA) or supranational organizations (such as the EU). Definitely, world politics have evolved and are evolving towards a mosaic of governance.[34]

Moreover, we should assert another contemporary pattern that also identifies itself with the concept of New-Medievalism: the principle of crosscutting communities and governance. As David Bederman puts it in his study *Globalization and International law, "Transnational contacts across political borders were typical in the feudal era, but were gradually constrained by the rise of centralized nation-states. Now sovereignty is changing".*[35] Indeed, the relocating process has also moved toward more encompassing collectivities that transcend national boundaries.

Undoubtedly, the process of globalization contributed - on the one hand - to diminishing the centrality of the states in the management of international affairs. On the other, it opened spaces for other non-states actors embedded in the catchword *civil society organisations* (CSOs). CSOs include community groups, non-governmental organisations, social movements, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, media academia, diaspora groups, lobby and consultancy groups, think thanks and research centres, professional associations and foundations.[36] From a bottom-up perspective, we can easily assert that the growing inclusion of such actors in global affairs - either through the recognition of their participation in the UN system or the establishment of coalitions or networks - may completely change the old conception of the rules of chess. In this new line-up, states are no longer the main rulers with extensible prerogatives. What may be essential to bear in mind when we observe the current process in the administration of global affairs is that citizens working at the *micro level* of politics

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[34] J. BEDERMAN, David, *Globalization and International law,* first edition, New-York, Palgrave macmilan, 2008, pp. 147-155.
[35] S. NYE, Joseph, *Understanding International conflicts: an introduction to theory and history,* sixth edition, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 237.
[36] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, in "civil society, global governance and the quest for legitimacy", op.cit., p.302.

may either penetrate the *macro level* or leverage on decisions concerning *the high politics.*[37]

Living in a world characterized by the acceleration of interaction and by the encompassment of local and global, citizens, through non-state actors such as individuals, NGOS, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), networks, faith-based groups and transnational social movements (TSMs), are willing to take the lead and drive their own future. Dramatically and sensitively influenced by the recognition of the existence of global-transnational issues- poverty, migration, war etc. - citizens, through an adequate socio-political structure, may be in "*the attempt to go beyond the centrality of the sovereign states towards forms of political participation that enable subjects to get into transnational politics from which they have been excluded so far*". [38] In other words, such a downsizing contributes to a further decay of the nation-states and to the proliferation of parallel networks of power.[39]

Ruling in an ever more complex and interdependent world, the freedom of action of governments and states may be constrained by the blurring of the boundaries; their accountability, legitimacy and autonomy to bring constructive political responses may be criticized as inadequate or challenged by the diffusion and disaggregation of the source of authority. There is a common perception among the actors serving a civil society that the traditional national political device is insufficient to tackle contemporary issues. Shedding light on the idea of setting up different systems for the delivery of services and public goods - such as disaster relief and education - NGOs proposed a different alternative to the corrupt and inefficient delivery systems of states. Moreover, states institutions appear less incline to guarantee participatory mechanisms while NGOs often serve as advocates for local, often silenced voices, which now can be heard because of their integration into the nationally or internationally organised advocacy networks.[40]

Accepting such a *civilizational process,* we may therefore be agreed with an emerging global governance depicted as more broad, dynamic and complex and with wide-ranging decision-making capabilities. States and intergovernmental organizations may now accept, as a norm of world politics, that they must cultivate constructive relationships with informal actors. Bearing in mind the appreciation that we may evolve towards an equality of status between governments and NGOs, the Commission on Global Governance (report

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[37] S. NYE, Jospeh, *op.cit.,*p.238.

[38] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, "Mapping alternative models of global politics", *International Studies Review,* 11, 2009, pp. 133-134.

[39]KRATOCHWIL, Friedrick*, op.cit.,* p. 242.

[40] KRATOCHWIL, Friedrick, *The puzzles of politics: Inquiries into the genesis and transformations of international relations,* Oxford, Routledge, 2001, pp. 267-274.

written in 1992) clearly underlined the structuration of a new world order where nation states have no other choice than to collaborate with non state actors and civil society, generating a "global neighbourhood"; a conception similar to "We the Peoples of the United Nations", the famous preamble of the UN Charter.[41]

Welcoming such a pluralist approach may mean that the management of global governance is calling for *good governance* where transparency, participation and accountability must be respected. Admitting the omnipresence of NGOs in world politics - non-state actors able to have a crucial role as norm creators, agenda setters, providers of services and monitoring bodies - such a posture underscores that the likelihood to give reliable answers to contemporary issues goes beyond only capacity of states. Indeed, nation-states may need NGOs' expertise and field-work in order to help drawn up better action plans.[42]

To conclude, we can easily discern a serious vacuum that is opening up in the international order; governments are not becoming obsolete but their strategies and policies are increasingly adjusted due to the redirection of mechanisms of power embedded in multiple regional and global political networks.[43] Even though we observe *a shift of the distribution of power,* we should not, however, underestimate the role of the nation-state. Yes, states are transforming, but they are not disappearing. Yes, state sovereignty has eroded, but it is still actively defended. Yes, governments are weaker, but they still possess considerable resources.[44] Namely, even though some CSOs may climb up *the ladder of legitimacy*, still their operations are taking place in a framework largely regulated either by national constitutions or by international treaties; letting us think that such new legal bodies are definitely effective and persuasive but not totally free to act following their own norms of conduct. Nevertheless,

1.2.2 The rise of a global civil society: a bottom-up perspective

Inhabiting in a decentralized global system undergoing endless process where authority is impaired and relocated, citizens, who have been accustomed to governance being sustained by governments, are developing a new definition of their citizenship in order to be *active* and not *passive*. Surely, the mentality, emotion and identity of citizens must have been altered by a rapidly changing interdependent world in which the division between

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[41] MURAZZANI, Maria Ludovica, "NGOs, Global Governance and the UN: NGOs as "Guardians of the Reform of the International System", Transition Studies Review, Vol. 16, issue 2, 2009, p.502.

[42]*Ibid.,* pp.503-505.

[43] T. MATHEWS, Jessica, "Power shift", in David Held and Anthony McGrew (Ed.), *The global transformations reader: an introduction to the globalization debate*, second edition, Cambridge, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 204-205

[44] ROSENAU, James N. *The study of World Politics: globalization and governance, op.cit.,* p.32.

national and international affairs is continually complicated. Consequently, aware of an emerging globalized space, citizens have been directly affected by an epochal transformation that triggered a new world view on the nature of human affairs resulting in a complete a new way of thinking about how politics should be done may have been created.[45]

As Cardinal Fiorenzo claimed *"our perception of the church has broadened, to the point of reaching really global dimensions. You can't reason any more with a national mentality, and not even a Continental one".[46]* In other words, the infiltration of ideas and goods shaped our reflections; states are not able anymore to regulate the socio-political landscapes being either supplemented or replaced by ethnoscapes, financescapes, ideoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, and identiscapes.[47] On that account, we can expect a smooth but real change in the traditional codes of conduct; the increased global interconnectedness in the lives of citizens may have generated a new category of citizens: the world citizen.[48] The concept of "Citizens of the world" suggests that the *debordering effect* of globalization as well as the hybridization of actors and of authority structures have eroded national identities and produced more cosmopolitan's affiliations. This cosmopolitan identity is best defined according to the acknowledgment of individuals as self actors, the emergence of rhetoric on Human Rights, universal justice, social-democratic and liberal values.[49]

The rising perception of issues as global has fostered people's willingness to mobilize at a transnational level. Aware of the probable boomerang effect of such issues as poverty, migration, wars and AID, and ever more sensitive to the inequalities in the distribution of wealth as well as towards people living in precarious situations, citizens decided to cultivate cross-border relationships and activities endorsed by collective actors-networks, CSOs and social movements – all means for alleviate those burdens autonomously.[50] Certainly, the rise of a global civil society plays a significant role in global governance. In the last 30 years, and specifically after the end of the Cold War, CSOs were becoming progressively influential in international affairs. As Raffaele Marchetti puts it *"They have played a role in agenda setting, international law-making and governance, transnational diplomacy (tracks II and III), and the implementation and monitoring of a number of*

[45] ROSENAU, James N., *The study of World Politics: globalization and governance, op.cit.,* p.51.
[46] *Ibid.,* p. 104.
[47] Ibid., p.23.
[48] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, "Mapping alternative models of global politics", *loc.cit.,* p.133.
[49] BROCK, Lothar, "World society from the bottom up", in Mathias Albert, Lena Hilkermeir (Ed.), *Observing International relations: Nicklas Luhman and world politics,* London, Routledge, 2004, pp.89-93.
[50] PIANTA, Mario, MARCHETTI, Raffaele. "Global Justice Movements. The transnational dimension", in D. Della Porta (Ed.), *The global justice movements. A cross-national and transnational perspective*, *"sine loco"*, Boulder, Co: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, p.30

crucial global issues ranging from trade development and poverty reduction, from democratic governance to human rights, from peace to the environment, and from security to the information society".[51] Therefore, we must underline the explosion of international initiatives performed by civil society actors on a variety of issues. " *Citizen associations have emerged to solve local problems, provide needed services, advocate for better government, associate with like-minded groups from other societies, and reshape the emergent processes of international governance.*" [52]

Accordingly, catch-words as self-organisation, participation, solidarity, commitment, the spread of demands for democratisation are such features that supported this civilizational process; a proceeding that may exhibit on the one hand a willingness to modify the political debate *from below*, on the other a maturity stage wherein individuals, together, may have the intention to control the circumstances of their own environment.[53] Put it differently, a bottom-up perspective that conceptualizes a global society formation implies that social interactions beyond the state are getting thicker; individuals may become rational subjects targeting the global horizon with common purposes.[54] However, how could such a global citizenship take form? We saw earlier that such a vast transformation happening at the macro level of politics engendered changes taking place among citizens at the micro level. Now, I would like to explore the ground-level reality of this kind of process by performing a case study of the l*ambda citizens*, a peculiar intellectual development that may have contributed to either the maintenance or expansion of the dynamics unfolding at macro level. Stated still another way, the micro level may be a source as well as a consequence of global changes. [55]

Residing in a world adjusted by the complicatedness of post-industrial dynamics, the ever-extending interdependence of economies, the shock of the microelectronic revolution, far-reaching levels of education, the travel of immigrants, refugees, and tourists, people in every corner of the world can be identified as having obtained more analytic skills and capacities, enabling them to figure out where they fit in to world affairs, to scrutinize the virtues of collective action, and eventually to be operating in the squares of the world's cities. Therefore, entrenched in a progressive process of learning, the skills of people

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[51]MARCHETTI, Raffaele, in "civil society, global governance and the quest for legitimacy", op.cit., p.303.

[52] L. DAVID, Brown, (and al.), "Globalization, NGOs, and Multisectoral Relations", in Joseph S. Nye, John D. Donahue (Ed.), *Governance in a globalizing world,* Cambridge (Massachusetts), Brookings institution press, , 2000, p. 272.

[53]KALDOR,Mary, "Global civil society" in David Held and Anthony McGrew (Ed.), *The global transformations reader: an introduction to the globalization debate*, second edition, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, pp.559-560.

[54] PIANTA, Mario, MARCHETTI, Raffaele. " The Global Justice Movements. The transnational dimension", *op.cit.,*pp. 30-31.

[55] ROSENAU, James N., *The study of World Politics: theoretical and methodological challenges,* Vol.1, Oxford, Routledge, 2006, pp.154-156.

broadened and thereby allowed them to carry out better the tasks of group membership and to engage more energetically in different kinds of citizenship behaviour. The enhancement of such competencies, nevertheless, has not to be understood as a linear trend. Still, it persists huge differences in the skills of people living in disparate regions of the world.[56]

Pointing out such a powerful *Skill Revolution*, citizens - anchored in a world in flux - may have become critical and rational human beings able to focus emotion as well as to investigate the causal consequences that sustain the course of events. The result has been the formation of a global stage being ever more crowded with diverse collectivities encompassing ever more skilful leaders and followers. Mobilizing their capacity to defend their transnational purposes, such new spheres of authority further the idea that the disorder of the world may be increasingly manageable; even by bypassing the formal path. As long as people were disconnected from world affairs, it made sense to conceive them as a constant variable and to look to fluctuations at the macro level for explanations of the course of events. Today, however, *the Skill Revolution* has broadened the learning capacity of individuals, developed their cognitive maps, and refined the schemes according to which they predict the future.[57]

1.3 Towards a multi-centric model in International Relations: qualification of the main relevant actors for the present study

1.3.1 Religious NGOs

The context of the emergence of NGOs, together with their increased infiltration of international discourse, allowed that religious NGOs (RNGOs) be treated on an equal footing. Sometimes named *the religious Globalization* - the overtaking of state regulated world affairs and, simultaneously, the transnational-international penetration of activities relating to global issues - RNGOs have increasingly proliferated in fields such as the Development of societies, the defence of Human Rights, Humanitarian aid, Sustainable development and peacemaking missions.[58]

More precisely, while they have brought some relief and assistance to citizens in perilous situations, RNGOs have also benefited from the creation of new public spaces that allow

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[56] ROSENAU, James N., "Citizenship in a changing global order", in James N. Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Ed.), *Governance without Government: order and change in world politics,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 77-83.
[57] N. ROSENAU, James, *The stu -dy of World Politicc: globalization and governance, op.cit.,* pp.38-107.
[58] DURIEZ, Bruno, (and al.), "Introduction", in Bruno Duriez (and all.) (dir.), *Les ONG confessionnelles: Religions et action international,* Paris, L'Harmattan, 2007, pp.9-11.

closer relations between politics and the religious order. The EU -with its programme " a soul for Europe" - or the UN - with its Summit of the Millennium - exemplify this expression of, on the one hand, an international recognition of the importance of faith-based actors in the new management of World Politics and, on the other, a progressive institutionalisation of their respective agendas at the international level. Even though the process of institutionalisation is not the main focus of this study, we must, nevertheless bear in mind that the secularization of politics did not mean the end of religion *stricto sensu.* Indeed, it is important to note the surge of links between religious and secular ideologies in the public sphere, a merger widely nourished by the recognition of the limits of a purely non-religious approach to curb its own economics, political, social and environmental burdens. [59]

RNGOs or – as they are sometimes called - faith-based NGOs, are defined by Julia Berger *"as formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level".[60]* Nonetheless, identifying RNGOs is not an easy task, especially because it depends on a subjective perception of the religious identity of the organization.[61]

Far from being homogenous, the RNGOs constitute organizations that produce a diversity of methods for the allocation of goods and services, but where the faith is necessarily intrinsic to the structure of the religious entity.[62] Indeed, based on the work of Gerald Clarke, we may differentiate five forms of RNGOs: First, we find *faith-based representative organisations or apex bodies* which govern on doctrinal matters, rule and drive the faithful and symbolize them though commitment with the state and other actors. Second, we have *faith-based socio-political organisations* which clarify and redistribute faith as a political or a socio-cultural construct, setting and assembling social groups by reason of faith identities but in pursuit of expansive political or socio-cultural aims. Third, we may meet *faith-based charitable or development organisations* which stimulate the faithful in sustaining direct interventions in developing countries to lift people out of poverty and/or fund or organize projects with the intention of focusing on the living

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[59] MABILLE, François, "Vers une gouvernance des ONG confessionnelles sur la scène internationale", in Frannçois Mabille (dir.), *Politique, démocratie et développement: du local au global, "sine loco",* L'Harmattan, 2003, pp. 123-134.

[60] BERGER, Julia, "Les organisations non gouvernmentales religieuses: quelques pistes de recherché", in Bruno Duriez, et al., (dir.), *Les ONG confessionnelles: Religions et action international,* Paris, L'Harmattan, 2007, p.24.

[61] BERGER, Julia, "Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An exploratory Analysis", *Voluntas,* Vol.14, No.1, 2003, p.22.

[62] BRADLEY, Tamsin, "A call for clarification and critical analysis of the work of faith-based development organizations (FBDO)", *Progress in development studies,* Vol.9, No.2, p. 103.

conditions of impoverished people. Fourth, there are *faith-based missionary organisations* which attempt to expand key faith messages and principles. By promoting the faith among other faith communities, they seek to convert people; an action characterized by an intensive proselytization. Last but not least, we detect *faith-based illegal or terrorist organisations* where the final aim is to generate political violence combined with a religious discourse.[63]

In other words, as Tamsin Bradley points out, faith frames RNGO's identity and leverages their practice. The religion moulds the way they conceive the world. They may use their faith and experience for the benefit of others or the faith may propel fellows towards counterproductive, selfish or even hazardous strategies. Ultimately, RNGOs are organizations where faith is lodged in the organizational structures inducing a diversity of approaches to drive confessional practices.[64]

Additionally, RNGOs have many characteristics that distinguish them from the secular NGOs, in particular the fact that they focus their work on moral and spiritual values that enable them to attract and mobilize their members the communities in which they are involved. Consequently, they are remarkably networked both nationally and internationally and are profoundly entrenched in political contests and in process of governance.[65] Truly, representing either congregations, confessions, spiritual orientations or even all members belonging to a particular religion, the RNGOs - through the acknowledgment of the sacred nature of the human life as well as the strong conception of social justice - have access to considerable social networks and crucial resources thanks to their long-standing integration - moral or physical- in every corner of the world.[66]

In conclusion, the religious component, represented by a constant interest for solidarity, ethics, and values (in most of the cases), has also obtained transnational visibility either through the conduct of protest campaigns - like the so-called Jubilee's campaign in 2000, which aimed to supress the debt of the Third-World - or through the achievement of acts of solidarity in areas affected by humanitarian crises As we have seen, RNGOs are fully connected with international as well as national politics, operating and coordinating with different sectors of local and global civil society. Committed to issues of morality and society beyond narrow questions of faith, contemporary RNGOs are not only cultivating interfaith initiatives but are becoming increasingly inclined to join networks with secular

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[63] CLARKE, Gerald, "Faith matters: faith-based organisations, civil society and international development", *Journal of International Development,* Vol.18, p.840.
[64] BRADLEY, Tamsin, *loc.cit.,* pp.102-103.
[65] CLARKE, Gerald, *loc.cit.,* p.845.
[66] BERGER, Julia, "Les organisations non gouvernmentales religieuses: quelques pistes de recherché", *op.cit.,* p.27.

organisations to find out solutions concerning issues of peace, sustainability, human rights, poverty and education.[67]

1.3.2 Towards a new form of Transnational Collective Action: the relevance of Transnational Networks

A transnational network[68] can be understood as an interactive platform that facilitates the aggregation of different CSOs (and sometimes experts). However, even though the constitution of transnational networks are often if not always initiated from below (NGOs are often those which initiate actions and pressure more powerful actors to take positions), they may also encompass other actors such as local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, intellectuals, parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations and even parts of governmental apparatus and politicians. [69] Sharing same values and objectives, those actors practice activities that cross the borders of several countries. Undeniably, the centrality of value and the belief that individuals can make a difference are crucial to any kind of transnational network. The network agents are inspired and assembled according to shared values or principled ideas incorporated in international human rights laws. In turn, the embodiment of these ideas or values may shape their work: to disseminate progressive ideas, to help institutionalize values by embedding them in the political process and to bring governmental practice into accordance with established norms. Despite the emphasis on values, we must also recognize another common characteristic: cooperation and coordination among actors. Undoubtedly, agents in a network interchange information, resources, services and personnel.[70] Their relationships are said by Donatella Della Porta to be *"characterized by voluntary and horizontal patterns of co-ordination, which are trust-centred, reciprocal, and asymmetrical. In fact, networks are non-static organizations; flexibility and fluidity are two major features which allow for adapting effectively to changing social circumstances and to keep porous the organizational boundaries"[71]*.

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[67] DELLA PORTA, Donatella, (and al.), *Globalization from below: transnational activists and protest networks,* Vol.26, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2006, p.39.

[68] Transnational epistemic communities (scientists and experts), activist networks such as transnational ideological networks, transnational social movements, transnational human rights network and transnational advocacy network can be deemed as two types of activities that enter in this category.

[69] M. OWEN IV, John, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010,* Princeton/Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2010, p.33.

[70] TANG, Min, "Transnational Human Rights Networks", *Political Studies review,* Vol. 7, 2009, p.229.

[71] DELLA PORTA, Donatella, MARCHETTI, Raffaele, "Transnational activisms and the Global Justice Movement", in DELANTY, Gerard, P. TURNER (Eds.), Stephen, *Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory,* London/New-York, Routledge, 2011, p.429.

Focussing on specific global issues, transnational network enterprises may be driven either through the form of joint campaigns, forums, conferences or social mobilisations against common targets at national or supranational level. Deemed a constructive instrument for conducting and influencing social struggles, transnational networks especially enable and foster the assemblage of social forces, the advancement of common identities and visions, the formulation of campaign strategies and the implementation of political struggles.[72] As Raffaele Marchetti puts it, *" while embedded in global civil society, they provide political innovation to a broad archipelago of activism in terms of its conceptualisation, organisational forms, communication, political skills, and concrete projects".[73]*

Fostering typical fundamentals such as equality, justice, pluralism, solidarity, peace, human rights, autonomy, and environmental protection, transnational networks' communicative methods may vary according to the nature and the seriousness of the issue. Acknowledging the presence of a global issue and, simultaneously, the opportunity to leverage in this specific global issue area, transnational networks may therefore select or combine a range of techniques of persuasion in order to be heard but also to nourish a strong feeling that this unjust situation could be curbed through its activism.[74] Consequently, transnational networks may use diverse techniques. Firstly, *information politics* can be depicted as a method to transfer politically functional message swiftly and reasonably to where it will have the most impression. In this case, activists may express issues in terms of right and wrong (testimonial, technical and statistical information) in order to heighten the worry and interrest of formal actors (officials) but also of the media and of the awareness of public opinion. Secondly, *symbolic politics* can be understood as a process exploiting symbols, actions or stories that illustrate a specific situation for an audience. Thirdly, *leverage politics* can be qualified as the ability to persuade influential actors to transform a situation where unconvincing members of a network are unlikely to generate a source of leverage: they are concerned with political effectiveness. Finally, *accountability politics* characterizes the willingness to oblige more dominant actors to implement the more vague policies or principles they formally endorse but ignore in practice. The aim is to convince governments and other actors to shift their positions on issues.[75]

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[72] PIANTA, Mario, MARCHETTI, Raffaele. " The Global Justice Movements. The transnational dimension", *op.cit,* p.44.

[73] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, in "civil society, global governance and the quest for legitimacy", op.cit, p.306.

[74] PIANTA, Mario, MARCHETTI, Raffaele. " The Global Justice Movements. The transnational dimension", *op.cit,* p.44.

[75] E. KECK, Margaret, SIKKINK, Kathryn, "Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics", *International Social Science Journal,* Vol.51, Issue 159, 1999, pp.95-97.

More precisely, despite the methods that may be used to either convince or remind states that such an unfair situation is intolerable, the actors embedded in a transnational network often demarcate their transnational mobilisation in several different phases. The point of departure would be to ensure that the issue at stake is judged as problematic, imperative, and yet solvable. Second, the agents who are connected transnationally must spread the knowledge and design frameworks that would enable a rapid and perspicacious interpretation of the issue at stake. Third, the representatives and workers of such an interconnected structure must proceed to the external propagation and tactical use of such knowledge in order to appeal to the cognitive structure of the people and to generate a general interest.[76]

To conclude the fertilization of transnational network activisms, we may discuss on two elements that influence the way the work is done. First, I would like to stress the importance of internal factors that modulate the pathway to transnationality. We may identify four trajectories upheld by CSOs when they engage in transnational collective action. Moreover, we must add two variables. One is related to the actors' degrees of internationalization. In some cases, CSOs may internalize, or domesticate strategies or claims. This highlights the degree to which action is or not continuous. First, we may discern *periodic internalization* as a pathway exploited by CSOs when they attempt to leverage international decisions, or reflection cross-border matters, by concentrating on domestic audiences, procedures and tactics, and coalition-building strategies. Second, we may observe a *sustained internalization* used by the participants in order to found their commitment mostly on issues of domestic politics. Using most of their means in coalition building at the domestic level with the ambition to influence domestic actors, these activists do not limit their performance to one specific campaign but to several. Third, we may distinguish a *periodic transnationalization* characterizing a "yoyo-like movement" by which CSOs alternate their operations across the domestic and international scales. In that context, they conserve their national roots, but join sporadically international movements, coalitions and events. [77]

Finally, we may single out a *sustained transnationalization* whereby CSOs perceive the international arena as a unique and real window of opportunity to foster the political action by building up coalitions and alliances and to appropiately bargain for transnational frames. Obviously, those pathways are not fixed as they are continuously reformed by

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[76] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, in "civil society, global governance and the quest for legitimacy", op.cit., p.307.
[77] VON BÜLOW, Marisa, *Building Transnational Networks: Civil Society Networks and the Politics of Trade in the Americas,* New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.25-26.

CSOs. In other words, CSOs may determine their collective agendas by tacking into account the politics of place and the politics of time in order to react to an international situation.[78]

Now, I would like to insist upon an external factor: the political opportunity structure. Indeed, socio-political circumstances may shape the way transnational activism operates. The political opportunity structure is helpfully defined by Mario Diani as *"the set of social and institutional variables that are likely to affect the development of collective action".[79]* When we refer to the political opportunity structure, we may differentiate between the domestic and the international political opportunity structure. The domestic opportunity structure characterizes itself by how unclosed or closed domestic political institutions are to CSOs influence.[80] In other words, depending on whether it is democratic or authoritative, a political system may either encourage or constrain the works accomplished by transnational networks workers. In contrast, the international political opportunity structure is related to the proportion of openness of international institutions to the involvement of transnational NGOs, networks and coalitions.[81] It is commonly recognized that, as Marchetti puts it, *" international institutions such as the UN or the EU may provide opportunities for creating political spaces and mobilising resources to the advantage of transnational networks and national activism".[82]* Indeed, such a political arena may enhance the availability of channels that transnational actors can exploit against the national government's position in order to change the course of action. Certainly, we should be aware that what really forges the contrast between the national political environment and the international one is that for the former, CSOs are more constrained by the legal-legislative apparatus and the production of codes of conduct while for the latter, CSOs may be acting more voluntarily and spontaneously because of a normative-gap and the lack of a rigorous well-defined institutional framework.[83]

Consequently, if the national political arena blocks the burgeoning of grassroots movement, transnational networks, defending and representing regularly the voiceless, would support their causes by triggering boomerangs patterns. The boomerang pattern is a mechanism meaning that when pathways between the state and its domestic actors are

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[78] *Ibid.,* p.27.
[79] DIANI, Mario, *Green Networks. A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement,* Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995, p.14.
[80] SIKKINK, Kathryn, "Patterns of dynamic multilevel governance and the insider-outsider coalition", in Donattella della Porta, Sydney Tarrow, (Eds.), *Transnational protest and global activism,* Lanham, MD, Rowman and Litterfield Publishers, p.157.
[81] SIKKINK, Kathryn, "Patterns of dynamic multilevel governance and the insider-outsider coalition", *op.cit.,* p.156.
[82] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, in "civil society, global governance and the quest for legitimacy", op.cit., p.310.
[83] *Ibidem.*

obstructed, NGOs bypass their state and directly seek international allies-foreign government or international institutions- to squeeze their states from outside. [84] In conclusion, the establishment of transnational network activities is not something *innate; it is a scheme of action that takes form only if stakeholders share a same *identity* and *purpose*. Even though the participants my decide the *scope* and *pace* of their performance, the domestic and international context may be, however, an important source of power able to encourage, join, shift or constrain the initial nature of their programme and procedure of action.

1.4. Towards the privatization of diplomacy: the rise of peace NGOs

1.4.1 New conflicts, new actors: the rise of unofficial actors in peace management

Today we face new conflicts that have been on the ever-increasing rise since the Cold War. We are not coping only with inter-states conflicts but also with intra-states conflicts. Michael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen indicate that for the period 1989-2003, a period that symbolized the end of the Cold War, there have been only seven interstate armed conflicts, two of which kept on going through 2003: The U.S.-led coalition and the insurgents and operatives of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the India-Pakistan war over Kashmir. In contrast, during this same period there were 116 conflicts active in 78 countries. Undeniably, the amount of intrastate conflicts rose sharply at the end of the Cold War.[85] Since 1990, more than a third of the world's countries have been directly impaired by alarming societal warfare. Almost two thirds of these states have experienced armed conflicts. These contemporary conflicts or "new wars" have also been categorized as "protracted social conflicts", "deep-rooted conflicts", and "intractable conflicts". [86]In the literature, all those conflicts are also often interpreted as "ethnic conflicts" or "identity conflicts" given that, as Michelle I. Gawerc puts it in " Peace-building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives ", "*that communal groups are the focus, group rights are at issue (fundamental rights as security, recognition, access), and furthermore, it speaks to the way the conflict has been interpreted by the majority of the people involved* ". Drawing a new map of conflicts, it is, therefore interesting to notice where new actors have entered onto the scene and challenged older actors to find responses to these new categories of wars.

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[84] E. KECK, Margaret, SIKKINK, Kathryn, *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,* Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1998, p.12.

[85] ERIKSON, Mikael, WALLENSTEEN, Peter, " Armed conflict, 1989-2003 ", *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol.41, No. 5, 2004, pp.625-636.

[86] I.GAWERC, Michelle, "Peace-building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives", *Peace and Change,* Vol.31, No.4, 2006, p.436.

The United Nations and some states were the most popular and leading actors before the end of the Cold War. Now some NGOs as well as experienced individuals are redefining the peacemaking landscape. [87] Since conflicts became more asymmetrical and multi-dimensional, comprising with them hostilities that deteriorate significantly the life of local citizens, it seems reasonable to think that a new weighting of forces emerged in order to settle disputes. Indeed, new instruments, schemes of thinking, and politico-cultural approach had to be developed in order to suitably measure the intensity as well as the reasons of this new category of conflict: the use of hard power seems more and more inadequate to solve deep-rooted issue dividing or alienating citizens for years. In other words, unofficial actors develop an approach that aims at looking for and handling causes of conflicts by repairing the social fabric of the communities affected by the hostility. Consequently, there is a need to infiltrate into the crisis, to grasp the nature and intensity of the conflict and finally to shift the mutual-perception of groups' identity and interests in order to pave the way towards peace. [88]

Likewise, the changing international security agenda has transformed the role and nature of civil society as well as the functions previously operated by States. Pointing out new global conflicts, new transnational participants simultaneously came up with new expertise and technique, new types of legitimacy and new programmes of action to question the perception of nation-states' position on the world politics 'map. Alongside NGOs self-empowerment through the professionalization of disputes' settlement, we must also acknowledge that states, currently, play a reducing role as service providers both domestically and internationally. As a result, there has been a kind of privatization of world politics, leaving a gap that has been filled civil society actors organizing their operations both locally and transnationally. Thus, many NGOs are behaving and recognized as diplomatic actors. Operating transnationally, NGOs' deployment may fall into five broad categories: anti-poverty organizations; health and medical organizations; human rights organizations; environmental organizations; and business or political interest representation organizations. [89] Their legitimacy - output legitimacy - is mainly appreciated by the global public in terms of how effective they are accomplishing what they set out to accomplish. Even though relationships between NGOs and a government may vary considerably - the NGO can perform as a subcontractor, a facilitator, or a joint manager – nowadays NGOs often operate in place of governments to distribute the types

[87] DE SOTO, Alvaro, "Diplomacy and Mediation", in Mary Kaldor and Iavor Rangelov (Eds.), *The Handbook of Global Security Policy,* Malden/Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2014, p.307.
[88] MARRET, Jean-Luc, *La fabrication de la paix, nouveaux conflits, nouveaux acteurs, nouvelles methods,* Paris, Editions Ellipses, 2001, pp.99-115.
[89] ALLEN PIGMAN, Geoffrey, *Contemporary Diplomacy: Representation and Communication in a Globalized World,* Cambridge/Malden, Polity Press, 2010, pp.90-93.

of services that traditionally only governments delivered to populations: services ranging from disaster food relief for the poor, delivering social services like education or rural health care, and conflict management.[90] In other words, many of the prerogatives previously carried out by governmental actors have migrated to civil society in the fields of development and diplomacy. Indeed, since the 1980s, development assistance has been progressively conveyed through NGOs.[91] In Marchetti's words, *"Developed states and international organizations have outsourced the implementation of aid programmes to local and international NGOs, while mediating and retaining political discretion regarding its overall direction".*[92]

Accordingly, on the basis of conflicts' management, we may discern a peculiar framework of action manoeuvred by peace NGOs. *Conflict management* [93] takes place when parties embarked on competition to seek goals that are recognized as contradictory and when these conflicting purposes stimulate our behaviour.[94] An outside mediation might be fruitful for assisting the negotiations that previously took place in a bilateral way.[95] The situation in which the parties look for a *third party* for support in grasping a mutually satisfactory solution is called *mediation.* Mediation is a continuation of the negotiation process that entails intervention by a suitable third party who has small or no imposing decision making power.[96] Thus, mediation leaves decision-making authority primarily in the hands of the parties involved in the conflict. As Jacob Bercovitch explains, *"It is predicated on the need to supplement conflict management, not to supplant the parties' own efforts".*[97] The intervention is non-violent and non-binding and mediators enter a conflict in order to affect it, resolve it or influence it in some way.[98] Additionally, mediation means the intervention of a third party unaccustomed to the conflict - reliable, unbiased and aiming to be neutral. A mediator may employ cunning skills – of the carrot or sticks variety - to influence the parties in achieving a mutually acceptable settlement on the issues in dispute. Fostering channels of communication between the opposing parties, the very task of a mediator is developing the requirements for an open dialogue and

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[90] *Ibid.,* p.91.
[91] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, Tocci, Nathalie, "Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict", *Global Change, Peace and Security,* Vol.21,No.2, 2009, p.204.
[92] *Ibidem.*
[93] The notion of mediation will be adapted in the next section when we will discuss on faith-based mediation.
[94] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, et.al, "Introduction: The Nature of Conflict and Conflict Resolutions", in Jacob Bercovitch, et al. (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* London, Sage, 2009 p.5.
[95] HOPMAN, P. Terrence, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts,* South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press, 1996, p. 222.
[96] MOORE, Christopher W., *The Mediation Process. Practical strategies for resolving Conflict,* Second Edition, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996, p.8.
[97] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, GARTNER, Scott Sigmund, *International Conflict Mediation. New Approaches and Findings,* New-York, Routledge, 2008, p.5.
[98] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, "Mediation and Conflict Resolution", in Jacob Bercovitch, et.al, (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* London, Sage, 2009, p.343.

guaranteeing the parties involved in conflict freedom of speech, and, above all, autonomy in decision-making.[99]

In the same vein, for Galtung, *a third party approach* is actor-oriented – e.g. consisting of a mediator ready to assert a human link between the first and the second parties. Obviously, there is a vast range of options as to the nature of this link. The third party may meet with one of them at a time, or with both, in a setting of carefully controlled communication or in free association. The general purpose is to increase awareness of the wider situation in order to better appreciate and penetrate the contentious relationship. In sum, a mediator may provide recommendations to resolve the incompatibility, meaning that compromises are essential.[100] Indeed, the mediator endorses the role of a facilitator, educator or communicator who manages to interpret and simplify issues, identify and treat emotions, and eventually foster new alternatives. [101]

Moreover, the management of hostilities may focus on both structural and perceptual factors affecting conflict systems. In Nimet Beriker's words, *"One understanding in this regard is that parties are bound to their perceptual frames in evaluating their interactions with their opponents". All conflicts can be reframed given that the perceptions of parties change.* [102] When we refer to conflict management, we should conceive it as a dynamic process embodying different techniques. The presence of a third party may use means based essentially on communicative tools such as dialogue, persuasion and *reframing*.[103] Even though the objective of a third party would be to help conflicting parties enter into an agreement that resolves their central discrepancies, encourages each other's continued existence and stop the bloodshed against each other, the main purpose would be that parties themselves perceive their respective effect on the conflict process. Indeed, change in attitude and the building of a trust-relationships are paramount. [104] Consequently, in order to foster an environment of peace, creative initiatives have to be established to boost confidence between the parties and to surmount prejudices and stereotypes that obstruct problem-solving processes. The significant point may be the establishment of a conference format to enhance dialogue between the conflicting parties. Aiming to unlock the positions

[99] HOROWITZ, Sara, "Mediation", in Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (Eds.), *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies,* Oxford/New-York, Routledge, 2007, pp.51-54.
[100] GALTUNG, J., "Three realistic approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding", *Impact of Science on Society,* No. 26, 1976, pp. 107-108.
[101] *Ibid.,* p.110.
[102] BERIKER, Nimet, "Conflict resolution: the missing link between liberal   s international relation theory and realistic practice", in Denis J. D. Sandole, et al., (Eds.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution,* London/New-York, Routledge, 2009, p.266.

[103] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, Tocci, Nathalie, "Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict", *op.cit.,* p.212.

of the targeted parties, a third party may also set up confidence-building measures in the social, economic, cultural and political areas in order to change the spirit of the conflict.[105]

Without question, by reformulating a disagreement so that it can be perceived as a common issue to be solved collaboratively, the ambition of a third party is to set up a collaborative atmosphere through the use of enlightening, opening and merging behaviors.[106] As Ellen Raider writes, *"Among the major conceptual and practical contributions of the conflict resolution field are integrative bargaining, problem-solving workshops, conflict assessment frameworks, stages and dynamics of conflict, and third party intervention ".[107]* Therefore, we may expect that especial role peace NGOs play a role in conflict management comes from their ability to rebuild inter-communal links, facilitate reconciliation and address the root causes for conflicts. By attempting to interpret and remedy the frustration, fear and anger shared by civilians, peace NGOs may also support – depending of the political structure of the country - the commitment of civilians in working for peace. The question of representation is hence central.[108] Even thought we expect that the warring parties "represent the people", grassroots support is critical for diminishing or eliminating a national conflict. Many argue that without concentrated grassroots engagements and a strong interactive platform built for civil society, mediations at the official level will not be able to "bring" either peace or justice.[109]

Eventually, mediation is particularly fruitful in international relations when a conflict has gone on for some time and reached an impasse or stalemate: when neither party tolerates further escalation of the dispute, when they are prepared to meet directly or indirectly for dialogue and when they are prepared to accept external help and surrender some control over the resolution process.[110] However, it is commonly perceived that NGOs may play at least a secondary or a marginal role in achieving peace through bargaining. Consequently, disputing parties rarely agree that a peacemaking parlay should be held by an unofficial actor.[111] But as we will see with the CSE, it seems that the exception proves the rule. However, even though peace NGOs are regarded as more flexible, adaptive and innovative than governmental and intergovernmental institutions, it is possibly reductive to consider

[104]WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System,* London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2002, p.8.
[105] WALLENSTEEN, Peter, *op.cit.,* pp.37-38.
[106] RAIDER, Ellen, et.al., "Teaching Conflict Resolution Skills in a Workshop", in Morton Deutsch, et al., (Eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution,* Second Edition, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2006, pp. 699-700.
[107] *Ibid.,* p.267.
[108] McDonal, John W., "The need for Multi-Track Diplomacy", in John Davies, Edward kaufman (Eds.), *Second Track/ Citizens' Diplomacy: An overview. Cocncepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation,*Lanham, Rowman and Littlefied Publishers, 2002, p.56.
[109] I.GAWERC, Michelle, *loc.cit.,* p.411.
[110] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, GARTNER, *op.cit.,* p.6.
[111] MARCHETTI, Raffaele, Tocci, Nathalie, "Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict", *op.cit.,* p.210.

NGOs the unique performers when an national conflict erupts.[112] Definitely, a division of labour does exist between formal and informal actors; the process to reach peace can neither be top-down nor bottom-up. Joint and complementary strategies may be implemented in order to reach a more effective outcome.

1.4.2 The concept of Multi-Track diplomacy in global relations

In any study of the concept of Multi-track diplomacy, it is crucial to understand it as a systemic approach deeply influenced by the power shift and fragmentation that occurs in most societal conflicts. Indeed, political capacity is no longer produced byoffcial actors. It is distributed over multi-levels and with multiple new participants. Accordingly, the whole system of international decision-making and diplomacy has become much more complicated and dispersed. Conflict management can no longer be addressed only in a state centric perspective, but need to include the new transnational actors as well.[113]

The Multi-Track System[114] is an approach developed to give dynamic and synergetic responses to peace. Usually, in the literature, we may find ten tracks that manage to cultivate their own methods, structures and conceptual frameworks in order to be active at a specific stage of the dispute settlement's process.[115]

Track One is formal, well-designed, official, and often involves rigid government-to-government interaction between delegates or agents of sovereign states. [116] It is a diplomatic endeavour, according to Louise Diamond and John McDonald, where states or official international organisations mediate *"to enhance trust, confidence, and understanding among nations as well as to provide negotiation, mediation, crisis intervention, conflict resolution, and seeks to prevent war"*. [117] In contrast to other tracks, officials actors working in Track One diplomacy may be able to use incentives and tools such as financial, political, military (coercion or force) in order to adequately manipulate strategies to persuade the adverse party to take a new direction. Based on the basic notion of relative power, *"stronger nations use coercion, leverage, threat, control of resources,*

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[112] VERKOREN, Willemijn, *op.cit.,* p.56.

[113] WEHRENFENNIG, Daniel, "Multi-Track Diplomacy and Human Security", *Human Security Journal,* Vol. 7, 2008, pp.82-83.

[114] Annexe 2

[115] For the present study, only track one; track two, and track one and a half will be detailed. Track seven will be developed in the next section.

[116] McDonald, John W, "The Track Not Taken", *Harvard International review,* Vol.22, No.3, 2000, p.68.

[117] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonal, John W., *Multi-Track Diplomacy. A Systems Approach to Peace,* Third Edition, West Hartford (Connecticut), Kumarian Press, 1996, p. 26.

intelligence sources of knowledge, rewards, punishments, and force or arms to influence or control weaker nations."[118]

Based on state power, this track is hence filled up with high-ranking government officials, diplomats or heads of state who share a common aim: using some sources of leverage to shape the political power structures. In other words, Track One diplomacy, often considered the primary peacemaking tool of a state's foreign policy, relies on the the authority and power of an official entity. The skills, resources and interests from these officials directly affect the performance, conduct and outcome of track one diplomatic activities.[119]

Even though we may depict Track One diplomacy as a diplomatic channel that provides leadership or authority for the system, the system itself, however, may be sceptical about its rigidity, exclusivity, elitism and its potential abuse of power.[120] Too often corrupted by power, the state's authority can be a drawback to durable peace, rather than a facilitative instrument. Power can hold in check the underlying issues of weaker parties, thereby weakening the continuity of a peace agreement. Moreover, diplomatic missions are normally non-operational at the apogee of conflicts, thereby decreasing communications and the exchange of information when it is needed most. Moreover, affected by electoral cycles, officials cannot freely position themselves against their nation-state's foreign policy maxims. They may either be too strict and inflexible or postpone negotiations through discussions with their leaders at home.[121] Eventually, Chadwick F. Alger contests, we may expect that in some cases *"representatives of states often do not resolve conflicts, but tend instead to arrange settlements that "paper over" underlying grievances which will be the source of escalating conflict in the future. This is because representatives of states sometimes do not adequately represent the needs of all that will be affected by the settlement"*.[122] Likewise, while diplomats retain an important role in engaging in debate with other governments and political elites, they are often not the ideal agents for engaging with broader foreign civil societies. Lacking credibility, they often lack the necessary detailed knowledge of the issues at stake. [123]

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[118] *Ibidem.*
[119] BÖHMELT, Tobias, *International Mediation Interaction. Synergy, Conflict, Effectiveness,* first Edition, Germany, VS RESEARCH, 2011, pp. 85-88.
[120] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonal, John W., *op.cit.,* p.33.
[121] MAPENDERE, Jeffrey, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks", *Culture of Peace online Journal,* Vol. 2 (1), pp.67-68.
[122] ALGER, Chadwick F., *Peace Research and Peacebuilding,* Vol.9, Columbus (Ohio), Springer, 2014, p.44.
[123] RIORDAN, Shaun, "Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy", in Jan Melissen (Ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations,* New York, Palgrave macmilan, 2005, p.190.

Track Two diplomacy, on the other hand, is nongovernmental, informal, unofficial, and analytical. *" Unlike in Track One, where all the players are part of a single, formal, bureaucratic political system, in Track Two the actors come from many settings and do their work individually rather than through their formal affiliation."* [124] Encouraging problem-solving dialogue[125] between private citizens who are skilled, educated - most key players have either Ph.D or J.D degrees - experienced, and informed, Track Two diplomacy's procedures occur outside the formal government power structure.[126] In this case then, initiatives originate from a grassroots level because of the necessity to build strong and reliable popular support for the erection of a solid civic society, nurturing a positive perception of that project as a long-term peace strategy. In other words, this grants a win-win position for people moving away from the traditional zero-sum game.[127]

A flexible innovative approach, Track Two diplomacy seeks to ease the anger, tension and fear among adversarial parties through the formation of interactive platforms as well as through communal activities that aim to understand and repair the human needs aspect of a conflict. By instituting a "workshop diplomacy", persons involved in Track Two efforts aim to understand the psychological repercussion a state of opposition between ideas and interests in order to arrive at the most suitable peacemaking strategies.[128] As Joseph Montville points out, Track Two diplomacy is *"unofficial, non-structured interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations that is directed toward conflict resolution by addressing psychological factors".[129]* Although states have more resources such as coercion or exercising power, an approach that entails less average can in fact further more effective outcomes. Indeed, Track Two diplomacy overcomes such fears of competitiveness or biased interests, especially due to the development and maintenance of a wide network of contacts that cultivate respect and trust among the opposing parties: the final purpose would be to arrest the dehumanization process. Uninhibited by political or constitutional power, Track Two diplomacy offers a non-binding and flexible way to resolve conflicts.[130] Moreover, by examining the root causes of conflicts, the overcoming of psychological barriers is a priority enabling to smoothly reframe the crisis as a shared

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[124] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit,* p.38.

[125] The activities of Track Two are varied: problem-solving workshops, involvement as mediators or consultants, private one-on-one diplomacy, conferences, seminars, training and education events,dialogue groups, networking, confidence building, instititution building and acting as messengers or go-betweens (DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit,* p.39.)

[126] McDonald, John W. , "The Track Not Taken", *loc.cit.,* p.68.

[127] GROZEV, Kostadin, BOYADJIEVA, Nadia, "Setting the research and Teaching Agenda of Transatlantic Security Studies: Some Notes on Multi-track Diplomacy and International Intervention", *Managerial Law,* Vol.47, No. 3/4, 2005, p.64.

[128] GROZEV, Kostadin, BOYADJIEVA, Nadia, *loc.cit.,* p.63.

[129] MONTVILLE, Joseph, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,* Lexington, Lexington Books, 1990, p.535.

[130] BÖHMELT, Tobias, *op.cit.,* pp.89-90.

issue that must be resolved conjointly.[131] As Louise Diamond and John McDonald puts it, *"Track Two diplomacy is transformational, positing a worldview in which power politics is superseded by mutual empowerement".*[132]

Put another way, the aim of Track Two diplomacy is to constitute socio-political programmes that may influence the public opinion - changes in the mindset of the people - as well as to develop managerial strategies for collecting human and materials resources that might ease the settlement of disagreements which divide the entire society. Additionally, the establishment of a transnational network of relationships takes form because the persons involved aim at de-escalating conflicts by improving communication and mutual understanding. [133] Paradoxically, the integration and development of networking activities should not be perceived as a replacement for Track One endeavours, but rather as a crucial laying down of the groundwork for reaching a potential agreement signed by officials.[134] In his " The Track Not Taken ", John McDonald explains that *"In no way is Track Two a substitute for Track One; instead, it complements and parallels the goals of Track One".* [135] On one side of the coin, As Kyle Beardsley notes, the *socialization* process gathers the "intellectual elites" allowing *to filter* common ideas and interests and *to transmit* the frame of reference to policy makers.[136] Therefore, we may recognize that Track Two is able to offer *opportunities* for policymakers and the public to accurately assess the value and effectiveness of work done in the service of conflict management. [137] On the other side, Track Two facilitators must acknowledge that if their scheme of action is productive, they will probably have to merge with Track One finally. Governments are ultimately accountable for mediating, signing, and ratifying treaties and other formal documents that may be required to secure a successful Track Two initiative. Even though Track Two facilitators might instinctively reject such a compulsion - because they generally explore policies that Track One disagrees with or neglects - their projects must be fed into and work cooperatively with that of Track One.[138]

Track One and a Half, in contrast to Track One and Track Two, is a *"public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third-party not*

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[131] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit.* p.37.
[132] *Ibidem.*
[133] GROZEV, Kostadin, BOYADJIEVA, Nadia, *loc.cit.,* p.64.
[134] McDonald, John W., "Guidelines for Newcomers to track Two Diplomacy", *The institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy,* Occasional paper, No.2, 1993, p.1.
[135] McDonald, John W. , "The Track Not Taken", *loc.cit.,* p.68.
[136] BEARDSLEY, Kyle, "New Approaches to Resolving Old Conflicts", *International Studies Review,* Vol.10, No.3, 2008, p.647.
[137] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit,* p.42.
[138] McDonald, John W., "Guidelines for Newcomers to track Two Diplomacy", *loc.cit.,* p.7.

representing a political organization or institution. The aim of such interaction is to influence attitudinal changes between the parties with the objective of changing the political structure that caused the conflict".[139] Track One and a Half diplomacy's central premise is that diplomatic initiatives are eased by unofficial entities – in the form of a third-party -, but it ultimately also includes officials from the conflict in question. In such a context, the facilitator-unoffical provides the setting, constructs the atmosphere, constitutes the norms, and grants occasional interventions that make it possible for such a process to evolve.[140]

There are five common characteristics contributing to the uniqueness of Track One and a Half diplomacy. First, the third parties often have an *international visibility*. As in the cases o the Carter Center or the International Council for Conflict Resolution, third party bodies will usually constitute theirs own sources of influence or notoriety in order to exercise suitable leverage during the peacemaking processes. Second, they often have a high *academic visibility*, being compiled with mainly of scholars and/or practitioners who will have worked already either in Track Two diplomacy or Track One diplomacy. Third, *national and/or international respect* is often embodied in such facilitators. Deemed reliable persons because of their anterior socio-political activities, Track One and a Half diplomats can gain easier access to other world leaders or relevant actors in conflicts around the world. Fourth, *trust* between the respective parties is considered essential for the achievement of common interests among parties without bias. [141] Fifth, Track One and a Half diplomacy is intended to embody and promote *"nonpartisanship, trustworthiness, a political prominence, a lack of real political power, respect for and by both parties, and honesty".*[142]

Deemed *hybrid diplomacy,* it resists categorization within either the official mediations of Track One diplomacy or the unofficial activities of Track Two diplomacy. Track One and a Half diplomacy unites the official leverage of Track One and the unofficial approaches of Track Two.[143] By carrying out its diplomacy activities either privately- in the tradition of Track Two - or publicly – in the tradition of Track One -, Track One and a Half's perspective may be to rely on lower-level mediation forms to gain the confidence of the

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[139] MAPENDERE, Jeffrey, *loc.cit.,* p.69.
[140] KELMAN, Herbert C., "Informal Mediation by the scholar / Practioner", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Mediation in International relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management,* New-York, St. Martin's Press, 1992, p.65.
[141] MAPENDERE, Jeffrey, *loc.cit.,* p.71.
[142] MAPENDERE, Jeffrey, *loc.cit.,* p.73.
[143] NAN, Susan Allen, "Track One and a Half Diplomacy: Searching for Political Agreement in the Caucasus", in Mari Fitzduff, Cheyanne Church (Eds.), *NGOs at the table. Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict,* Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p.57.

parties when a direct, official-bureaucratic intervention is not conceivable. In this fashion, its diplomacy agility allows the third parties to attain lower-level indirect approaches to peacemaking such as the implementation of humanitarian operations or the deployment of sources of influence of facilitative and educative nature in order to reach the trust of the parties.[144]

Indeed, Track One and a Half may come up as an answer to the issue when formal actors have no inducements to take part in a conflict and/or Track Two endeavours display no effect at grassroots level.[145] In the similar vein, we may detect three ways through which Track One and a Half facilitators may have access into peacemaking proceedings. Their activities may be accepted by virtue of an invitation by one or both parties; via requests for intervention by other concerned outsiders; or through initiation by third parties themselves.[146]

Despite clear advantages that Track One and a Half diplomacy may bring to the peacemaking processes we may, however, outline some weaknesses. First, the foreign facilitator may be perceived by the negotiating parties as self-interestedly representing his/her own country's foreign policy interests. If that home country has an aggressive foreign policy towards one of the parties, then such a position is likely to imperil the conflict management process. Second, the scope and pace of activities of the third parties may impose limits on its capacity to drive incentives and mediation techniques because they do not have the political power to administer resources. Track One and a Half diplomacy doesn't have the technical, financial, and military resources needed either to support a settlement or to implement the peace agreement. Thus, moral authority and prestige may be one of the fundamental characteristics that nourish influence *(infra)*.[147]

Eventually, the potential for peace along these lines must be driven towards the aggregation of the three tracks in order to supplant all weaknesses and to build synergies and collaborative processes.[148] Instead of putting Track One at the top of the hierarchy, with all the "unofficial" tracks at the bottom with the only function to alter the direction of Track One, we must have a picture of all tracks interconnected in a circle. Without a doubt, as Louise Diamond and John McDonadld notes, *"the lines of relationship determine pathways of communication, sharing of resources, and opportunities for collaborative action and mutual enrichment. When the relationships are adversarial or*

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[144]BÖHMELT, Tobias, *op.cit.,* p.90.
[145]BÖHMELT, Tobias, *op.cit.,* p.86.
[146] MAPENDERE, Jeffrey, *loc.cit.,* p.72.
[147] MAPENDERE, Jeffrey, *loc.cit.,* p.74.
[148] GROZEV, Kostadin, BOYADJIEVA, Nadia, *loc.cit,* p.65.

undeveloped, of combative or indifferent energies, the system is operating with unfulfilled or distorted potential."[149] To draw to a close, no one track is more essential than the other, and no one track is autonomous from the others: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.[150]

1.5 Towards a humanized and moralized diplomacy: " the soul and the heart before the sword"

1.5.1 Religion as a powerful medicine: a harmonious and humanistic identity

Today, it is widely admitted that religion is a source– rather than a solution – to many of the world's aggressive conflicts. Almost daily, the media broadcast news showing religious radicalism and religiously charged wars. We may acknowledge that contemporary conflicts concern issues of religious, national, or ethnic identity. And religious teachings are often exploited to legitimize wars and all forms of barbarism.[151] Through our long human history, religion has been a principal responsible of war, slaughter, enmity, and intolerance. Yet, as Marc Gopin points out, *"religion has also developed laws and ideas that have provided civilization with cultural commitments to critical peace- related fundamentals, including empathy, an openness to and even love towards strangers, the suppression of unbridled ego and acquisitiveness, human rights, unilateral gestures of forgiveness and humility, interpersonal repentance and the acceptance of responsibility for past errors as a means of reconciliation, and the drive for social justice."*[152] In his 2002 report on the prevention of armed conflict, for example, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan affirmed: *"Religious organizations can play a role in preventing armed conflict because of the moral authority that they carry in many communities."*[153] He went on to note that certain religious groups and leaders *"possess a culturally-based comparative advantage in conflict prevention"* and can help to *"emphasize the common humanity of all parties . . . [and] mobilize non-violent alternative*

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[149]DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit,* p.156.

[150]NOTTER, James, Diamond, Louise, "Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice", *The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy,* Occasional Paper, No. 7, 1996, p.5

[151] TANENBAUM CENTER for Interreligious Understanding Program on Religion and Conflict Resolution, "The Peacemakers in Action", in David Little (Ed.), *Peacemaker in action. Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution,* Cambridge/New-York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.3-4.

[152] GOPIN, Marc, *Between Eden and Armagedon. The future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking,* Oxford/New York, Oxford Univeristy Press, 2000, p.13.

[153] UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General,* New-York, 10017, p.78.

ways of expressing dissent prior to the outbreak of conflict"[154]

Taking a functionalist approach that emphasizes the social and cultural consequences of religion, R. Scott Appleby defines religion as the human response to a reality perceived as sacred. On those terms, we may discern religion as a force that ascribes a transcendent source and significance to human existence. Thus, ambitious religion embodies a formidable array of symbolic, moral and organizational resources: religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a confessional community. A creed has to be understood as the standard of beliefs and values concerning the ultimate origin, meaning, and purpose of life. It develops from myths - symbols-laden narratives of sacred encounters - and finds official expression in doctrines and dogmas[155] A cult encompasses the prayers, devotions, spiritual disciplines, and patterns of communal worship that give richly suggestive ritual expression to the creed. Eventually, a code of conduct defines the explicit moral norms governing the behaviour of those who belong to the confessional community. Thus, religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of shaping personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience, emotions and behaviour in profound ways.[156] Additionally, as Kristian berg Harpviken and hanne Eggen Roislien put it *" religious faiths are comprised of a number of dogmas that constitute normative systems. Every religion rests on a normative basis, that, when accepted, serves as a directive for how each individual believer should live her or his life".[157]* Thus, religion is both descriptive - explaining why things are the way *they are* - and prescriptive - prescribing how things *should be.* By constituting a system of meaning, religion may hence legitimize a specific encompassing social order, aiming to support actions judged as good and desirable, and exclude attitudes that may impact negatively on the spiritual and moral well-being and behaviour of citizens.[158]

By their nature, religions aspire to be motivated to peaceful coexistence as a value or virtue in principle as well as in practice.[159] Their core values often transcend the social, political and economic problems of a society, incline to inform and reconstruct the

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[154] *Ibidem.*

[155] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation,* Lanham/New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publsihers, 1999, p.8.

[156] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* pp.8-9.

[157] HARPVIKEN, Kristian Berg, ROISLIEN, Hanne Eggen, "Mapping the Terrain. The role of Religion in Peacemaking", *International Peace Research Institute,* for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2005, p.8.

[158] *Ibidem.*

[159] The study of Religion will not deal with the 'black side" of its activities but as a means to bring and sustain peace.

material and cognitive aspects typifying a community.[160] Specifically, religions nourish a strong belief in the unity of the human family, a perception of the nature of humans that promotes love and humanity and may therefore be a useful means for arriving at peace and resolving conflict: tolerance and pluralism – certainly in the case of Christianity- is a clear asset in the management of peace. As Louise Diamond and John McDonald explain in their study, this usually involves the identification of humanity as a unifying characteristic, a value that defines and connects all people and is reinforced by the religious conviction that every person reflects the divinity of God.[161] Indeed, peace *"exists as our divine birthright and grows from within the inner experience of the individual to encompass our relationships with one another and with the earth itself. Peace is seen as an inherent divine gift or quality: it is our sacred duty to bring it forth"*.[162]

Moreover, as Marc Gopin points out, we may meet six core-values - or at least one of them - when we consider the importance of faith-based actors in conflict management theory. First, *empathy* is a crucial concept in terms of advocacy and long-term education, or, more directly, in the conflict workshop setting. By attempting to understand each other's needs and aspirations, the final aim would be to generate a common bond between enemies. Second, *nonviolence and pacifism* appears to be a decisive cultural tool for transcending ethnic and social boundaries. By strengthening the basis for discussion and debate, this humanist conception may reframe and redirect the guidelines of the conflict. Indeed, for the first two elements, we may refer to attitudes that embrace the nonviolent management of differences and qualities such as forbearance, patience and the sacrifice of ego.[163] Third, *sanctity of life* is deemed as a central to process of reconciliation and joint commitment. Fourth, *interiority* means that religious discipline concentrates on the inner life of the individual: prayer, meditation, the experience of divine love, guilt and repentance. Focusing on such aspects of human experience may be critical to penetrate the *inside* of individuals and to instruct new ways of thinking and believing.[164] Fifth, *religious discipline* can be perceived as essential instrument to the preservation and enhancement of religious traditions and as important means by which a religion can adapt - without entering in contradiction with - the norms of conduct in order to restrain itself to adopt inappropriate behaviour related to specific circumstances and conditions. Sixth,

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[160] APPLEBY, R. Scott, "The new name for peace? Religion and Development as partners in Strategic Peacebuilding", in Atalia Omer, et.al, (Eds.), *The Oxford Hanbook of Religion, Conflicts and Peacebuilding,* Oxford/New-York, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.197.

[161] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit.,* p.97.

[162] *Ibidem.*

[163] LITTLE, David, APPLEBY, R. Scott, "A moment of opportunity ? The promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict", in Harold Coward, Gordon S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding,* New-York, State Univeristy of New-York Press, 2004, p.15.

[164] GOPIN, Marc, *op.cit.,* pp.20-22.

imagination is fundamental to the fostering of a sense of creativity, enabling a religious society to conceive of and finally build a new human social order based on core-principles of social justice and social criticism. However, we should note that the listening to the needs expressed in a conflict must precede the exploration of any religious ideas, values, or norms judged suitable for its regulation.[165]

Thus, by providing the spiritual impulse, the idealism, and the ethical foundation of they system of thought, religions, are able to diagnose the problems at the root of a conflict and enhance *"the spiritual truth of the interconnectedness of all life; social action; a prophetic imperative to seek justice, feed the hungry, heal the sick, and minister the poor; equality and justice; forgiveness, contrition and reconciliation; a beloved community; hospitality; full and loving presence with the poor; the fostering of hope; the life with an open, loving, and compassionate heart; nonviolence and pacifism, and services".[166]* So, such a belief system is based on a wide share of responsibility for social welfare and the common religion nourishes a heightened consideration to subtle as well as open sorts of social intolerance, political repression and other forms of unfairness. Elevating the consciousness of fellow citizens is the raison d'être of such prophets.[167]

In this fashion, we may expect that a religion's ethics, rituals, and disciplines can promote humility, compassion, and discernment in its practitioners.[168] Since the end of the Cold War, religious peacemakers have been framing indigenous and culturally suitable methods of conflict management by adopting and adjusting concepts, methods and vocabularies from universal rights discourse in order to diffuse a core set of skills and ideas that can be applied with sensitivity on a specific culturally oriented basis.[169] Using their moral status and perceived neutrality as a foundation for engaging with multiple actors - both officials and unofficials - faith-based actors manage their operations with the aim to transform the meaning and cognitive systems as well as to boost hermeneutic developments of the respective disputing parties. [170] In conclusion, the power and the religious knowledge rooted in the virtues of religious traditions and practiced by veritable community of faiths, found a specific cultural and religious identity able to transcend and stimulate political actions as well as to enhance individual accountability. Clearly, the objective is to

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[165] *Ibid.,* pp.22-26.
[166] DIAMOND, Louise, McDonald, John W., *op.cit.,* p.99.
[167] LITTLE, David, APPLEBY, R. Scott, *op.cit.,* pp.3-6.
[168] LITTLE, David, APPLEBY, R. Scott, *op.cit.,* p.14.
[169] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.7.
[170] GOPIN, Marc, *op.cit.,* p. 52.

establish durable and constructive interactions that promote mutual enrichment and tolerant visions of the world.[171]

1.5.2 Faith-based actors in mediation's process: the emphasize on the "anthropological dimension"

As this thesis focuses on the practice of a catholic community involved in mediating conflicts, it is necessary to analyse the dynamic and the scope of mediations carried out by equivalent unofficial and informal diplomatic actors. Relying on what we have already mentioned about *mediation* and the presence of an *outside party,* faith-based diplomacy mainly refers to the inclusion of a third-party that may direct its efforts through the use of religious creed and objects (i.e. symbols, texts, images). Thus, faith-based intervention is distinguishable from secular intervention by its emphasis on spirituality and religious identity, the use of religious texts and religious values, the centrality of humans *as creators*, and the participation of faith-based actors as third-parties.[172] As Appleby points out, the most common, direct, decisive and productive involvement by religious actors comes when they initiate the granting of good offices and serve effectively as mediators.[173] Establishing a new authenticity and a new affinity among the disputing parties, the main objective of such faith-based actors during the mediation process may be to dismantle the old antagonistic recognition through the application of religious values but also through the cultivation and maturation of human relationships. [174] Constituting bridges for improved connection and forming unity out of diversity by appealing to an acute moral suasion is part of the main project endorsed by such faith-based actors in the management of conflicts.[175]

As David Little and R. Scott Appleby highlight, we may depict four general hallmarks that characterize the success of Christian peacemakers. First, the religious mediators display a personal and friendly knowledge of the language and culture of persons in in crisis' situation. Second, they use with satisfaction the access to first-hand information about the conflict as it progresses. Third, they gain control or draw upon political expertise. Fourth,

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[171] VASSORT-ROUSSET, Brigitte, "Religion, identité et politique international", in Philippe Portier, Frédéric Ramel, *Religieux et recherche stratégique, Les champs de Mars, No.* 26, Paris, pp. 38-40.
[172] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, KADAYFCI-ORELLANA, S. Ayse, "Religion and Mediation: The role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution", *International Negotiation,* Vol.14, 2009, pp.183-185.
[173] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.*
[174] DOUGLAS, Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy. Trumping Realpolitik,* New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp.18-19.
[175] *Ibid.,* pp.16-17.

they contribute to elaborate and embrace a long-term prospect of peace for the conflicted society.[176]

Concerning the resources, we may differentiate three primary reasons why such faith-based actors can be deemed accountable and respectful third parties. First, as we already discovered in the previous section, the moral legitimacy - spiritual leverage - sustained by a particular set of religious values, norms and traditions afford them a unique status that enables them to re-frame the conflict in ways that are acceptable to the target communities. Persuading the parties through transcendental forces, the main point is that such unofficial actors administer a new socialization process - at the grassroots level as well as at a higher level - on the basis of their uniqueness oriented to faith and the common benefit in believing in *human's capacity to change*.[177]

Second, such a pervasive status and influence in the community enables the third-party to generate and to rely on *human resources* that portray the socio-psychological aspect of the conflict in question. First and foremost, it is important to note that religious groups are likely to have a substantial social base because of the causes and faith that they want to defend. As Jacob Bercovitch writes, *"This broad bases provides a wide pool from which to draft committed and unwavering staff that can devote the necessary time to mediation and reconciliation as part of service of God"*.[178] As the conflict needs to be seen and read properly, external faith-based actors may also benefit from their impartial and religious identity to foster networks among civilians and top leaders and between high rank officials and representatives of the civil society. As their status is recognized at both levels, faith-based mediators are perceived as mid-range leaders, a perception which allows them to communicate information to different segments of the political society, especially when communication' channels have become disconnected.[179] Because they are in proximity to the scene of events, in a relaxed attitude and/or position with many actors, and accustomed with the specialized vocabulary and the issues at stake, they are able to open doors between all spheres of influence.[180] As Scott R. Appleby puts it, faith-based actors are *"widely respected for their ability to influence and mobilize their congregations and to provide a stable social infrastructure for community development projects: we were here long before the government or NGOs and will remain long after you are gone"*.[181]

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[176]LITTLE, David, APPLEBY, R. Scott, *op.cit.,* p.11.

[177] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, KADAYFCI-ORELLANA, S. Ayse, *loc.cit.,* pp.187-188.

[178] *Ibid.*, p.188.

[179] *Ibidem.*

[180] BARTOLI, Andrea, "Christianity and Peacebuilding", in Harold Coward, Gordon S. Smith (Eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding,* New-York, State Univeristy of New-York Press, 2004, p.158.

[181] APPLEBY, R. Scott, "The new name for peace? Religion and Development as partners in Strategic Peacebuilding", *op.cit.,* p.198.

Third, recognizing that faith-based mediators have no coercive or rewarding resources for affecting the parties, *the time* as means is even more important. We should not view mediation as a short-term, isolated event simply characterized by the signing of an agreement.[182] Behind the signature of common terms aiming at diminishing or eliminating any *pocket of conflicts*, we should acknowledge that mediation is a time-consuming process requiring daily contact with the masses, a proven record of charitable and humanitarian services, and a reputation for integrity.[183] Widening a constructive and integrative approach to mediation in order to be perceived as honest brokers, faith-based actors' have a level of skill, awareness, knowledge, experience and training developed though years of cross-community fieldwork. In the context of an interdependent process that involves various conflict management mechanisms and actors, these qualities are needed to help construct a durable state of peace, to promote nonviolence and dignity in order to renew a process of dialogue and to build peaceful relations between disputing parties. But trust and persuasion cannot be substantially attained without entering into a long process of commitment to the target communities.[184] Eventually, it has to be understood that faith-based actors often have a long history of service and involvement in community affairs, which manifests its great interests and sensitivity to the conflict and reinforces the credibility and legitimacy so critical to any mediation effort. In other words, religious actors are willing to invest time and energy especially because they draw on human resources and motivations originating from their religious or spiritual belief systems.[185]

With reference to strategies enacted by faith-based actors, one of the most daunting obstacle would be an inflexible elitism that exclude the opinions of the people in elaborating who should bear the burden, and who should enjoy the benefits.[186]Acknowledging a minimum indirect participation of lambda citizens through means as consultation, faith-based actors during mediation process often enhance the quality of their pluralistic heart in order to be as inclusive as possible in eliciting values, insights and interests, being sensitive and responsive to marginalized and aggrieved groups. In other words, even though mediation can be held in secret without the interference of the people, faith-based actors, along with representatives of the civil society, may count on their long-term groundwork in order to bring a guarantee that

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[182]BERCOVITCH, Jacob, KADAYFCI-ORELLANA, S. Ayse, *loc.cit.,* pp.188-189.

[183] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.8.

[184] LYNCH, Cecelia, "Religious communities and possibilities for justpeace", in Atalia Omer, et.al, (Eds.), *The Oxford Hanbook of Religion, Conflicts and Peacebuilding,* Oxford/New-York, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.605.

[185] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, KADAYFCI-ORELLANA, S. Ayse, *loc.cit.,* p.189.

[186] APPLEBY, R. Scott, "The new name for peace? Religion and Development as partners in Strategic Peacebuilding", *op.cit.,* p.195.

citizens' fears, interests and needs are interpreted during the talks.[187] Certainly, before and/or during a mediation process, faith-based actors act as *observers* and *educators*; such functions are endorsed because the facilitators aspire to first understand and measure the intensity of the conflict and subsequently educate and modify the state of mind of target persons. Observers can be depicted as a physical and moral presence, intended to deter violence, corruption or human rights violations. Educators carry out a more performative role through training seminars and long-term services devoted to the populace or to the elites: healing and reconciliation are the final purposes.[188]

Aiming to elicit a new *praxis* that will not jeopardise the respective sense of belonging of the disputing parties, faith-based actors adapt their methods to a contextual framework; the objective is to penetrate the heart of the conflict and detect values that can mould a basis for lasting peace through a change in the warring sides' attitudes.[189] Thus, avoiding being seen as missionaries or simply actors imposing their own unilateral programmes, religious actors need to practice transparency by open communication but also by the proving that a real and honest engagement will be pursued. Indeed, it is crucial to take strong measures towards breaking down mistrust and preventing the aggravation of difference.[190]

Consequently, deemed as trustworthy, credible and legitimate, faith-based actors can exploit communicative, procedural technics to help parties reach an agreement.[191] The main strategy may be to concentrate on *the state of relations* between the rival parties. By disseminating a soft power, the mediator's concern may be to repair and reconceptualise the parties' bonds by opening up a new frontier recognizing the emotional, psychological, material and spiritual needs of the parties.[192] As Jacob Bercovitch puts it, *"This also serves to build trust between the parties as well as between the parties and the mediator, thus adding credibility and legitimacy to the mediation process".[193]* As follows, we should adopt the image of a transformative platform: on-going social and relational spaces where people in interconnection produce responsive initiatives for constructive change based on trust and respect. Indeed, faith-based mediators' primary aim is to lessen as long as possible the costs and the harm in such bleeding society.[194]John Paul Lederach provides useful analysis of such a strategy: *"This strategy is not driven by the concern of how to*

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[187] *Ibid.,* p.196.
[188] LITTLE, David, APPLEBY, R. Scott, *op.cit.,* p.10.
[189] DOUGLAS, Johnston, *op.cit.,* p.19.
[190] APPLEBY, R. Scott, "The new name for peace? Religion and Development as partners in Strategic Peacebuilding", *op.cit.,* p.197.
[191] BERCOVITCH, Jacob, KADAYFCI-ORELLANA, S. Ayse, *loc.cit.,* p.192.
[192] MITCHELL, C.R., *The structure of Intrnational Conflict,* London, The MacMillan Press LTD, 1981, p.313.
[193]BERCOVITCH, Jacob, KADAYFCI-ORELLANA, S. Ayse, *loc.cit.,* p.192.
[194] MOORE, Christopher W., *The Mediation Process. Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict,* Second Edition, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996, pp.14-17.

end the immediate and most pressing symptoms of the conflict, but rather focuses on how to create and sustain a platform capable of generating adaptive change processes that address both the episodic expression of the conflict and the epicenter of the conflictive relational context". [195]

2. The Community of Sant'Egidio: a lay transnational Catholic NGO devoted to helping the needy and mediating in international conflicts

2.1 Contextualisation of the emergence of Sant'Egidio: the categorization of the subject

Sant'Egidio is a lay Catholic community founded in 1968 in Trastevere (Rome) by a group of students who studied at Rome's Virgil High School. The CSE is recognized by the Holy-See as a lay public association and as an NGO by the UN. It also posseses a civil personality admitted by the Italian state.[196] Perceived as a catholic movement endowed with a peculiar community project, the CSE aspired to form a voluntary charitable organization through which they could claim their Christian commitment to ecumenical and interreligious dialogue and social concern for the poor.[197] This non-state transnational actor establishes transnational networking activities joining social actions in direction to population stemming from emigration, the support of the sick and the most deprived persons, the fight against AIDS, alphabetisation and solarisation's campaigns for minors, development aid as well as emergency humanitarian aid, the promotion of solidarity without borders in the line of Vatican II, the oecumenical dialogue, and numerous operations–public or secret- of international mediations.[198]

Willing to take distance itself from deep-rooted abstract and ideological debates, the identity imprint of the CSE was to reform society and to give a second breath to Christian values mixing the Vatican II's fundamentals with the counter-culture's elements of the sixties.[199] As its founder, Andrea Riccardi asserted *" (…) the world had to change, that we*

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[195] LEDERACH, John Paul, *The moral imagination. The art and soul of building peace,* Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.47.

[196] BALAS, Marie, "Sociologie d'une diplomatie: derrière l'internationalisation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio", in Bruno Duriez, et al., (dir.), *Les ONG confessionnelles: Religions et action international,* Paris, L'Harmattan, 2007, p.185.

[197] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.155.

[198] DUPUY, Emmanuel, "Géopolitique de la diplomatie informelle: l'exemple de la communauté de Sant'Egidio", *Géostratégiques,* n°.16, Les O.N.G., 2007, p.154.

[199] MARRET, Jean-Luc, "Les ONG et la médiation de la paix: l'exemple de la communauté de Sant'Egidio", *AFRI 2000,* Vol.1, Bruxelles, p.56.

have to question ourselves on the manner to change it, that we had to create the future, change the rules of the game, draw lines of development". [200]

The community was created and inspired by the conjunction of the internal revolution in the Catholic Church triggered by the Second Vatican Council between 1962 and 1965 as well as the protest movements of the *Sessantotto* organized by students and workers claiming new rights, protections, and a new politicization to guarantee a decent well-being.[201] Acknowledging *a shifting of the borders,* the CSE bloomed in an era where the Catholic Church came to undertake new directions towards a spiritual entity that seemed more approachable, less vertical and centralized [202], more human and more like a *mater et magistra* than a serious, authoritarian father. [203] The Second Vatican Council was a critical example of a victory in the battle for a new openness to the world. It sought to defend the religious liberty, promoting solidarity and dialogue with non-Christian religions as well as a religious pluralism that might emphasize tolerance, human rights, and peace. [204] Alongside the Second Vatican Council, we should also highlight the enactment of diverse documents that demonstrate the shift occurring in the Catholic Church: *Pacem in Terris* (1963) which maintained a natural law framework; *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965), which declared and defended the religious freedom as well as the inviolable rights and liberties of the human person; *Populorum Progressio* (1967), which encouraged the human development; and the conciliar constitution, *Gaudium et Spes* (1965).

All of these symbolized a new awareness of the contemporary injustices that affected the entire world. [205] As Appleby puts it, *" Vatican II both legitimated a more activist Catholicism and provided resources for directing it. Structurally, the council's policy of decentralization both created new transnational networks in the church and urged initiatives adapted to the local level of the church's life".* [206] The combined effect of these conciliar actions was to impel Catholicism into human rights by the implementation of new transnational networks characterized by new actors endowed with new resources and aims. Therefore, it is a "Church World" depicted as a polycentric space for actions that materialized in the sixties where grassroots organizations could redress the rights of the

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[200] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio Rome et le monde. Entretiens avec Jean-Dominique Durand et Régis Ladous,* Paris, Beauchesne, 1996, p.6.

[201] MERCIER, Charles, "Les fondations de la Communauté de Sant'Egidio et de la Société de Saint-Vincent-de-Paul", *Archives de sciences sociales des religions,* N°. 149, 2010, p.58.

[202] We should notice a new emancipation and contestation over the Holy See's monopole in the action and international representation of the Christians worldwide.

[203] VALLIER, Ivan, "The Roman Catholic Church: a Transnational Actor", *International Organization,* Vol.25, N°.3, Transnational Relations and World Politics, 1971, p.484.

[204] DUPLEIX, André, *Le Concile Vatican II,* Bruyères-le-Châtel, Nouvelle Cité, 2012, pp.93-106.

[205] MABILLE, François, "L'action humanitaire comme registre d'intervention de l'Eglise Catholique sur la scène internationale. L'exemple du CCFD, *Genèses,* N°.48, 2002/3, p.38.

[206] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.48.

poor and the search for justice. The CSE was one of a group of new movements to benefit from this.[207] Indeed, the CSE is a lay catholic NGO borne out of the aim to build a new way of life for the church and to change the human activity through the valorisation of reforming values, prayer, charitable activity and solidarity with the poorest and weakest.[208] The CSE consists of a worldwide network of Christian communities, located in seventy different countries where religious devotion goes hand in hand with putting the gospel into practice by personal commitment to the impoverished people living in precarious conditions. [209] Thus, through their diverse and wide social services network they work for the achievement of a more just and humane society and aspire to fulfil the message endorsed by Pope John XXIII: *"the Church is a home for everyone, especially for the poor".*[210] Aiming to generate a bond a friendship with the poor[211], the CSE wants to transmit an image of a good Samaritan embodying a religious and spiritual ethos committed to bringing peace and justice in solidarity with the deprived.[212]

Enlivened by a Christian responsibility, the CSE believes that the Christian faith has always opened the heart of the believers beyond their horizon and stable frontiers.[213] As Andrea Riccardi points out, " *(…) the John's Gospel said: he gave us one body. The one who is held in Rome considers the Indians as part of his own body. What can be the same for such a community?"*[214] Dreaming of generating a culture of solidarity with every type of persons, the CSE also stresses the need to cultivate a profound dialogue with others because it would allow to go out of monolithic homogeneities and simultaneously to embrace proximity and confidentiality.[215] In other words, dialogue is the acceptance of others at every level, even though we are different in nature.[216] Moreover, as we will notice in the following section's focus on *diplomacy*, dialogue may represent a primary source of knowledge because inter-human contacts enhance the capacity to suitably and softly apprehend and understand both personal feelings and the reasons for violence in an intra-state conflict.

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[207] MABILLE, François, *loc.cit.,* pp.46-47.
[208] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio Rome et le monde. Entretiens avec Jean-Dominique Durand et Régis Ladous,* Paris, Beauchesne, 1996, pp.8-19.
[209] *Ibid.,*
[210] GIRO, Mario, "Sant'Egidio's diplomacy of friendship", *The UNESCO Courier,* 2000, p.33.
[211] In the Community's vocabularies, the word "poor" doesn't only mean people who are homeless careless in the sense that we could notice a lack of material means. The word "poor", however, encompasses many differents status: people who are sick, people who are restricted in their daily-lives cause of the wars,…
[212] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot,* Paris, Bayard, 2001, pp.21-27.
[213] PALARD, Jacques, "Médiation et institution catholique", *Archives de science sociales des religions,* N°.133., 2006, pp.22-23.
[214] *Ibid.,* p.49.
[215] COLONOMOS, Ariel, E*glises en réseaux. Trajectoires politiques entre Europe et Amérique,* Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2000, pp.274-275.
[216] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.120.

2.2 Service to peace: a transnational NGO dedicated to making the world more human

2.2.1 The implementation of a religious diplomacy: the interreligious dialogue under the spirit of Assisi

Every year since the Autumn of 1987, in the continuation of the session convened by Pope John Paul II at Assisi in 1986, the CSE has organized an interreligious session named *preghiera internazionale per la pace or rencontres Hommes et Religions.* Internationalized and mediatized, this meeting gathers religious representatives as well as representatives of the associative, university/cultural and political' world around to take part in debates rooted in the difficulties of civilizational dialogue. This session concludes with a public ceremony where all participants are invited to make a call for peace.[217] Willing to support the core idea of a universal fraternity, the CSE invoked the spirit of Assisi mainly because the creation of spaces for exchanging opinions and values among diverse sectors and scales of the religious, political and social life produces an atmosphere based on the respect of differences. Working and interacting during three days, these actors must face serious themes such as the management of the cultural, political and religious plurality in civil society, wars and peace, the role of identity and religions in peace processes as well as the informal settlement of new directions to fabricate a common and honest framework that will raise the call for peace in all communication's channels.[218] Giving their testimony on conflicts that concern their respective regions as well as religious groups, participants contribute to the formation of a *mesodiplomacy or infra-diplomacy* that relies on the articulation between the institutional character of the gathering and of its transversal and reticular dimensions.[219]

The CSE strongly believes that religions, whether Christian or not, must participate to the construction of peace worldwide and not fall into a complex and ambiguous sacralisation of war. It also believes such a contribution must go through a negotiation process that assimilates the paradigm of plurality.[220] Based on the ethics of dialogue, the CSE perceives *la pace* as a structuring motive of its socio-diplomatic activities, where an interactive and constructive sense of pedagogy must be performed in order to embrace a

[217] BALAS, Marie, "Sociologie d'une diplomatie: décrire l'internationalisation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio", *op.cit.,* p.192.
[218] BALAS, Marie, "Dire la pace per farla: il dialogo interreligioso a Sant'Egidio", *Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa,* 1/2008, pp.15-18.
[219] BALAS, Marie, "Sociologie d'une diplomatie: décrire l'internationalisation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio", *op.cit.,* p.192
[220] COLONOMOS, Ariel, *op.cit.,* pp.279-280.

broad awareness on the feasibility of peace.[221] As Andrea Riccardi states, the faith in the Gospel of Jesus allow the CSE to cultivate a real interest and love for all men. To dialogue would mean to find out a common language that expresses an emotion and proximity, a closeness, fellowship and friendship that can flourish through an intense and transcendent interreligious dialogue.[222] Fostering a religious approach of cultural plurality, the main purpose is to associate and connect the religious otherness in order to fabricate *a living together* capable of freeing forces of integration.[223]

Moreover, we should be aware that such *seminar diplomacy* constitutes an institutional space of socialization that could give rise to mediations. For instance the CSE's initiative in Algeria in January 1995 came from the request of Algerian's participants who attended the interreligious session in September 1994.[224] In this way, contributing directly to the stabilization and legitimation of the CSE's diplomacy, the spirit of Assisi generates peace energy where bonds of friendships and trust can break through the wall of incomprehension. Willing to go out of the narrow frame of their country, stakeholders want to create new relationships in order to address issues through a different politico-religious channel. Thus, theses meetings are remarkable occasions.[225]

Eventually it should be noted that through the achievement of such a religious diplomacy, the CSE doesn't only have a religious or moral position of testimony in favour of peace but also substantially intervenes to seek durable solutions and raise mutual confidence in building a nonviolent world. Thus, the CSE is not only pacifist; it actively brings key actors together in the interest of moving away from words as war, violence or discrimination and directly affecting the actions of men.[226]

2.2.2. Local communities and preventive diplomacy: pacification from the bottom

Illustrated by the former General Secretary of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with his "Agenda for peace. Preventive diplomacy, restoring of peace, and preservation of peace", the CSE's trajectory clearly reveals on the one hand, the transformation occurring in the

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[221] BALAS, Marie, "Dire la pace per farla: il dialogo interreligioso a Sant'Egidio", *loc.cit.,* p.21.
[222] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,*p.67.
[223] BALAS, Marie, "Le pluriel "Civilisé": Sant'Egidio, une grammaire pluraliste?", in A-S Lamine (dir.), *Quand le religieux fait conflit. Désaccord, negotiations ou arrangements,* Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014, coll. "Sciences des religions", pp.207-208.
[224] BALAS, Marie, "Sociologie d'une diplomatie: décrire l'internationalisation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio",*op.cit.,* p.192.
[225]RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.59.
[226] RICCARDI, Andrea, "Introduction", in Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca (dir.), *L'art de la paix. La communauté de Sant'Egidio sur la scène internationale,* Paris, Salvator, 2012, p.7.

international system - and especially with a new articulation between different levels powers, either *soft or hard* – and, on the other, a deficiency of the international system concerning the sense of the human being and of social contacts., The CSE is indebted to this context, since its peace-promoting activities rest on a clear division of labour, and it is specifically interested in working at the local level.[227]

The CSE is an organization remarkably internationalized and reticular. Sharing both local, national and transnational perspective, it is structured in specialized and spatialized movements which penetrate diverse sectors of the society, tacking care of a specific parameter of social or humanitarian intervention. Organized on a concentric model, these collectives' actions are often depicted as structures of assistance and of socialisation - intercommunity and/or interreligious - aimed at relieving people of their fears and of their marginalisation.[228] Working in countries hit by a crisis -humanitarian, ethnic, religious -, the comprehensive and inclusive communities develop intercultural, charitable and advocacy actions with the objective to conduct deep-rooted ethnographic analyses of the region at stake.[229] Relying on workshops, intercultural learning and humanitarian projects such as DREAM,[230] the implanted communities strive to build a preventive peace and a social reconstruction from the bottom up. They do this through the diffusion of a *soft power* entrenched in Christian and Pontifical values and codes of conduct, as well as through the dissemination of specific skills allocated to target citizens.[231] Thus, each local community aims at assisting and transforming the poor, while also spreading their connexions within other religious and political communities, as part of their worldwide mission.[232] The members - often volunteers - operate in habitual jobs; they are not obliged to take vows, although they do guarantee that they will pray together, assist deprived persons and provide friendship to people of every faith or philosophy. Even thought their actions may appear to be *depoliticized,* their activities clearly endorse the political aim of restoring peace and justice through preventive educational programmes[233] So, depending of the nature of the conflict, the CSE, via a dense network of locales communities, mainly work out for the formation of an atmosphere of dialogue and of cohabitation with the

[227] BALAS, Marie, "C'est different des diplomats et des chercheurs". Genèse et institutionnalisation d'un hybride: les mediations de Sant'Egidio", in Philippe Portier, Frédéric Ramel, *Religieux et recherche stratégique, Les champs de Mars, No.* 26, Paris, p.129.

[228] BALAS, Marie, "Le pluriel "Civilisé": Sant'Egidio, une grammaire pluraliste?", *op.cit.,* pp.1-2.

[229] BALAS, Marie, "Quand la sémantique du "miracle" dépolitise une médiation: la carrière d'un motif thaumaturgique", in Y. Ben-Hounet, et al., *justice, religion, réconciliation,* Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. "Religions en question", 2014, p.2.

[230] Acronym for Drug Resource Enhancement against AIDS and Malnutrition.

[231] *Ibid.,* p.130.

[232] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.156.

[233] HUME, Cameron, *Ending Mozambique's war. The role of Mediation and Good Offices,* Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994, pp.16-17.

objective to transform interpersonal relationships and the sense of *individual accountability* in ameliorating life's conditions[234]

Developing transnational networks that speed up the elaboration of models for typical mode of actions, the CSE claim that the taking into account of locale cultures as well as of the social psychology is two fundamentals that ease the management of *a citizen's diplomacy.*[235] This cosmopolitism from the bottom up, encompassing ordinary people as well as local elites, aspires to transform the social fabric along with individual's representations affected by a culture of war and of a process of dehumanization. The endgame is to reconstitute the coexistence between all neighbours. Through these organized meetings and information sessions, the CSE is able to transmit social and cultural techniques as well as values that overcome stereotypes and prejudices that impede *the living together.*[236] Promoting non-adversarial solutions, the CSE rely on a *toolbox*, means and techniques such as religious rituals and therapeutic devices that vary according to the socio-cultural and political contexts, with the purpose of adopting an interactive resolution to conflicts as an inclusive and pluralist methods consisting in updating common norms and references.[237] Characterized by a civic awareness and by an absence of corporatism, the CSE, through an internal organization typified as flexible and democratic, perceives its efforts to guarantee peace as the natural continuation of its motivations to help deprived people in need.[238]And at this level, we must be aware that actions with a more diplomatic or peace-promoting agenda are connected to each other, at least viatheir motivations, objectives and human values. The war appears then as the mother of all poverty, making everybody poor, even the most influential people.[239]

Finally, the building of dense transversal network relationships, installed in more than seventy countries as well as in every demographic core, generates the necessary foundations for effecting diplomatic action among high official politicians. Therefore, through its advocacy network activities which urge that there is nothing worse than the war and offer an exit to countries blighted by bloodshed and poverty, the CSE puts itself in a credible position from which to approach the ruling class. It should be noted, however, that the presence of archbishops, priests or any structures linked to the Holy See

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[234] DUPUY, Emmanuel, *loc.cit.,* p.159.
[235] COLONOMOS, Ariel, *op.cit.,* p.275.
[236] LEFRANC, Sandrine, "Du droit à la paix. La circulation des techniques internationals de pacification par l bas", *Actes de la recherche en Sciences Sociales,* N°.174, pp.52-53.
[237] *Ibid.,* pp.54-63.
[238] BALAS, Marie, "Sociologie d'une diplomatie: décrire l'internationalisation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio", *op.cit.,* p.197.
[239] RICCARDI, Andrea, "Introduction", *op.cit.,* p.18.

diplomacy may also represent local resources for launching and nourishing networking activities at the local and transnational level. [240] Indeed, the CSE's diplomacy aspires to use all channels, activate all the levers, and draw on all possible resources of civil society in order to approach *"the devil and to offer its services only if at the end of his trident, the CSE feels that a chance to embrace peace does exist"*. [241]

2.2.3 The diplomatic activities of Sant'Egidio within a mediation process: the arrival of the white helmets.

Often called the "UN of Trastevere", the CSE's peacemaking endeavours should not be perceived as the diplomatic arm of the Holy See, officially acting in the interests of the Catholic Church. Portrayed as an international subject which is autonomous and impartial, the diplomatic apparatus of the CSE is composed of around thirty members, hailing from Italy's intellectual classes, whether they be academics, journalists, theologians or trade unions leaders. [242] They divide up files according to geographical geographical regions where each practitioner has developed an expertise. Believing that peace is possible in any situation – no matter how barbarous, incomprehensible or senseless -, the CSE utilises its acute understanding of the divergences on the ground as well as the opposite claims of the war-makers to develop an all-encompassing, democratic and non-static method of convincing the disputing parties that war is a useless massacre and a journey without return.[243] Before shedding light on the main characteristics that personify the diplomacy of the CSE, we should recognize that, in most of the cases, a peculiar religious' trajectory gives rise to the materialization of their mediation endeavours: the defence of Christian minorities as well as religious liberty that are often embedded in humanitarian issues. By giving protection to the faithful, the CSE regularly received moral support from Pope John Paul II; an endorsement that has brought with it a vital boost to the organisation's credibility in the eyes of belligerents.[244]

According to Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca, the method used by the CSE *"implies reconciliation, and its handling requires time, dialogue, building trust in the mediators and shaping common language among the conflicting parties. The pursuit of uniting the*

[240] BALAS, Marie, "Sociologie d'une diplomatie: décrire l'internalisation de la Communauté Sant'Egidio", *op.cit.,* p.193.
[241] *Ibid.,* p.198.
[242] RICCARDI, Andrea, "Introduction", *op.cit.,* pp.6-8.
[243] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", in Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Rostelli, et al. (Eds.), *Italy's Foreign Policy in the twenty-first century: A contested nature?,* first edition, Oxford/New York, Routledge, 2015, p.168.
[244] BALAS, Marie, "C'est different des diplomats et des chercheurs". Genèse et institutionnalisation d'un hybride: les mediations de Sant'Egidio", *op.cit.,* pp.125-126.

opposing sides is more relevant to Sant'Egidio than criminalizing one of the parties".[245] Being inseparable from its spiritual and social side, the CSE's peace-making efforts focus on refined and simple instruments like dialogue, human relationships, social psychology, emotions and patience. In a context where men are perceived as *Homo homini lupus,* the CSE's purpose is to understand the combatant's psychology in order to modify an antagonistic mind-set that has developed over years.[246] So, the CSE's project is to generate peaceful and egalitarian tools that penetrate and simultaneously transform the attitudes and *habitus* of the disputing parties in order to better conceive the reasons and feelings - fear, self-pity, painful memory, diffidence - that animate their respective positions. Each party must listen to all other party's reasons and motivations. This is a process that takes time and only succeeds if the mediators create an atmosphere conducive to rust and confidence rather than hostility.[247]

Therefore, we may be confronted with a process of maturation on the part of the target parties, who perceive each other no longer as enemies but rather as a socio-political entities to be softly and legally envisioned in the political landscape: the choice to live peacefully together demands a transformation in the way each side perceives the other.[248] Realizing that unilateral victory is impossible without causing more pain and bloodshed, this de-demonization of the enemy, which enables the establishment of *a seminar diplomacy,* occurs mainly because disputing parties abandon any sense of self-reference and embrace instead a sense of meeting as a form of art.[249] Without renouncing any party's convictions and identity, the CSE's practices aim at enacting a common, pluralist and adaptive language that is inclined to overcome personal hates and move towards *"the acceptance of the other as one's legitimate antagonist, and the passage from a purely military to a political mindset"*.[250] In other words, the mutual recognition by fighting parties emerges mainly because the CSE emphasizes what the opponents have in common in order to pave the way for peace. In focusing on what unites and setting aside what divides, the CSE hence chooses a method that we may call *"step by step",* whereby the objective is to give rise to a small but compact common language between factions that previously intended to destroy one another.[251]

Nevertheless, persuading a government to shift its mentality from one that criminalizes to one that accepts its opponent - an armed adversary perceived as a political interlocutor and

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[245] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *op.cit.,* p.168.
[246] *Ibid.,* pp.170-182.
[247] RICCARDI, Andrea, "Introduction", *op.cit,* p.10.
[248] *Ibid.,* p.11.
[249] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *op.cit.,* p.171.
[250] *Ibid.,* p.173.
[251] RICCARDI, Andrea, "Introduction", *op.cit.,* pp.14-16.

antagonist – is of course no easy task. [252] Certainly, this process of politicization must be supported by guarantees for both sides. Even thought the use of a constant dialogue breeds familiariy and knowledge of the other – necessarily reducing feelings of blind hatred between rival parties - such a technique must also ensure the construction of a stable political framework for the future offering common rights, liberties and guarantees to live decently. Indeed, a real and tangible democratic praxis must be formulated to consolidate these emotional breakthrough.[253]

Acting as an *outsider or as a super partes*, the CSE present itself as weak, not endowed with the means available to official diplomatic channels - such as the use of military pressure or the mandate to write enormous cheques that will put an end to military conflict. Characterized by a *weak force* that is moral, spiritual, and human and seeks to create dialogue as a means of transforming men through social relationships, the CSE uses this friendship and its sense of humanity as a power to peacefully and slowly persuade opponents to rebuild their own state together. [254] Calling for the mobilization of consciences as well as the use of reason, the CSE sheds light on the application of a *soft power* that must not be suspected to serve a hidden agenda or its own interests.[255] As Morozzo puts it, *"If this attitude is adopted while engaging with two sides' representatives on a personal level, then both sides have a guarantee that they will be able to speak out without pressure in a positive atmosphere".*[256]

Thus, the inherent power of this force is appear not to have any vested interests at political or economic level, and to be engaging in mediation solely to achieve peace only via cultural, social and spiritual weapons. [257] It should be noted, therefore, that a civil society mediator is logically deemed more impartial and less disposed to dictate an agreement. As Morozzo goes on to say, *"For one thing, this kind of mediator is chosen by the parties themselves. This ensures they feel the peace process as something they are responsible for".*[258]Avoiding a climate of mistrust or of imposition, the CSE aspire therefore to have the role of facilitator and of pedagogue without taking over prerogatives belonging to the

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[252] RICCARDI, Andrea, "Introduction", *op.cit.,* p.12.

[253] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.p.42.

[254] DE VOLDER, Jan, "La communauté Sant'Egidio dans le monde: pour une grammaire de la réconciliation", in Charles van der Vaeren (dir.), *Promouvoir la paix,* Bruxelles, De Boeck Supérieur, "les intelligences citoyennes", 2004, p.170.

[255] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.54.

[256] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *op.cit.,* p.183.

[257] DE VOLDER, Jan, *op.cit.,* p.170.

[258] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *op.cit,* pp.184-185.

parties involved: secret, mutual respect and loyalty are such values that may surround a mediation process guided by the CSE.[259]

Eventually, the CSE never wants to substitute the official diplomacy. Rather, formal channels must support the seminar diplomacy deployed by the CSE so that the two types can collaborate and emphasize each other's strengths. Avoiding being called *a parallel diplomacy,* the *CSE* believes in the synergy of resources and interventions in order to enrich any peace process. [260] Acknowledging that international organizations and governments play an essential role as guarantors and providers of services such as in logistics and meetings *behind the scenes* with the ruling class, the CSE, as asserted by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, develop different techniques but at the same time are complementary with those approved by the professional diplomats. These informal methods are founded on the discretion, in harmony with the official work conducted by governments, and the respect of the parties in conflict.[261] Undeniably, this unique mix of the strengths must not involve the loss of flexibility or adaptability on the part of the CSE. As Morozzo concludes, *"Sant'Egidio must not become a quasi institutional body. This would make its work meaningless and reduce it to an agency offering its expertise. Without the contribution of each player, there cannot be a real success strategy. If different, potential mediators from inside and outside the international sphere were to compete, the peace process would fail.*[262]

3. The peacemaking's efforts of the community of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique, Algeria and Kosovo

3.1 The process of mediation in Mozambique: a success story

3.1.1 Mozambique: from colonialism to one country, two systems: the FRELIMO and RENAMO

Mozambique finally gained its independence in 1975, after ten years of struggle and of resistance against a Portuguese colonial regime who had ruled through an oppressive,

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[259] *Ibid.,* p.185.
[260] DE VOLDER, Jan, *op.cit.,* p.170.
[261] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une médiation insolite,* Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997, p.19.
[262] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", in Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Rostelli, et al. (Eds.), *Italy's Foreign Policy in the twenty-first century: A contested nature?, op.cit.,* p.180.

opportunistic and racialist system there since 1498.[263] The Mozambique Liberation Front, the *Frentede Libertagaode Mogambique* (FRELIMO), was broadly made up of members of the Mozambican resistance movement. Supported by the Soviet Union and China in the transition towards the establishment of a new government, their chief Samora Machel, signed the Lusaka Accords guaranteeing independence of Mozambique on 7 September 1974. This was Machel and FRELIMO's moment of triumph.[264] However, coming to power without holding democratic elections can be a factor of destabilization to an underdeveloped country liberated overnight.

The FRELIMO settled a single party-party regime in Mozambique that did not recognize tribes, traditional local authorities, regions, race, religious belief and the use of churches as a symbolic and religious site for the prayers. The FRELIMO only recognized Mozambicans who were equally exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution. Clearly, the FRELIMO sought to spread its legitimacy through a program that aimed at modernizing, disciplining and socializing the country.[265] At the outset, the new government was largely backed by the majority of Mozambicans because of its independence struggle. Advancing a Marxist-Leninist platform to govern and orient the country, Samora Machel, who became the first president of Mozambique on 25 June, 1975, initially rode the wave of euphoria that followed indepence.[266] But very soon, many experts and neighbors countries came to understund that structural reforms imposed from the top could not fit a country deeply marked by its rural economy, poverty, analphabetism and heterogonous development between the north and the south.[267] Practicing a policy aiming at ostracizing the traditional tribal system, Machel and his lack of trained or experienced personnel drove a government that started nationalizing enterprises and farms and tried to replace the market with a socialist system based on a planned economy.[268] Forcing peasants to gather in "communal villages", the Machel's government also implemented an aggressive policy that contributed to forced displacements from cities to re-education camps. Clearly, the liberator was not anymore perceived as a responsible and egalitarian leader.[269] Clearly, as Leone Gianturco puts it, the Marxism-Leninism 's paradigm framed the grammar of FRELIMO in order to run a country hit by poverty. But

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[263] *Ibid.,* p.4.
[264] CHRISTIE, Lain, *Machel of Mozambique,* Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988, p.85.
[265] FINNEGAN, William, *A complicated war. The harrowing of Mozambique,* University of California Press, London, 1993, p.112.
[266] GIANTURCO, Leone, "la paix au Mozambique", in Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca (dir.), *L'art de la paix. La communauté de Sant'Egidio sur la scène internationale,* Paris, Salvator, 2012, p.25.
[267] DINERMAN, Alice, *Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa. The case of Mozambique, 1975-1994,* New York/London, Routledge, 2006, pp.49-53.
[268] *Ibid.,* pp.52-53.
[269] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* pp.25-26.

those proceedings rapidly created violent resentment in some sectors of the population.[270] The most critical security question that Machel's government had to cope with was the war in Rhodesia to end Ian Smith's white minority rule. Deploying spy and intelligence activities to keep pressure on Machel's government, Smith's military troops, in 1977, constituted a Mozambican insurgency movement called the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) animated by a desire to cancel out all communist practices and ideologies within the political and civil society. Afterwards, the group was called *Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana* (RENAMO).[271]

The Rhodesian war was a heavy burden for Machel's gouvernement to bear. However, in 1979, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain as well as her foreign secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, the region of Rhodesia could find a compromise towards a smooth democratic transition. As Hume puts it, *"Carrington convinced the Rhodesian parties, black and white, to accept the broad lines of his plan and to work out the details needed for implementation. No country had been more affected than Mozambique by the war in Rhodesia, and the formal transfer of power to Zimbabwe's new government in 1980 was a sign of hope for Mozambique as well.[272]* Even though it could leda us think that Machel's government was from now on able to quietly concentrate on domestic policy, he was soon faced with confrontations.

Hit by drought and a world recession[273], the government's socialist policies started alienating important segments of the population: political repression and economic failures indirectly favored the RENAMO. In 1979, the RENAMO lost its fetish leader, Andre Matasangiassa, dead in fighting with the government. Alfonso Dhlakama became the new leader, endorsing a politics based on similar lines to his predecessor: namely, to disarticulate the country's economy and system of government in order to weaken FRELIMO's position, and simultaneously to force the latter to negotiate. [274] The RENAMO's strategy was to harness the anger of the people against the government. However, even though the RENAMO cultivated a real political project - a political program in opposition to FRELAMO's policies since the independence[275] - the latter also adopted an image of *bandidos armados* capable of killing and taking hostage indiscriminate numbers of Mozambican citizens. *"Renamo had destroyed 840 schools,*

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[270] Interview with Leone Gianturco, p.220, (02/09/2015), (08.42 min)
[271] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* pp.9-10.
[272] *Ibid.,* p.10.
[273] The economic situation was a disaster in Mozambique. It was one of the poorest country worlwide where hunger and education were two broad issues.
[274] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une médiation insolite, op.cit.,* pp.47-59.
[275] RENAMO was considered as "a movement of reaction".

twelve health clinics, twenty- four maternity clinics, 174 health posts and 900 shops. Renamo guerrillas mutilated, decapitated, raped, boiled alive, burned alive, asphyxiated, drowned, shot to death, beat to death, and axed, bayoneted, disemboweled and knifed to death defenseless civilians, including children". [276] It should be noted that the guerillas as well as the government's soldiers were guilty of terrorizing and killing innocent civilians. Thus, we face a violent civil war where none of the sides can be taken as blameless. [277] Supported militarily and economically by South Africa in the mid-eighties, the RENAMO started controlling large parts of rural Mozambique, while the FRELIMO only imposed its rule over the cities. Certainly, the RENAMO killed, raped and tortured but it should not be depicted only as barbarous "Khmer rouges of Africa". Indeed it provided and produced both arms and food. It is a real hybrid identity.

Following the mysterious death of Samora Machel in a 1986 airplane crash, the FRELIMO, under the new president Joaquim Chissano, started showing signs of weaknesses while simultaneously nurturing their diplomatic networks [278] within the international community.[279] Seeking to isolate the RENAMO, the FRELIMO deemed it inconceivable to start a dialogue with them for three key reasons. First, Maputo considered any negotiation with RENAMO as taboo because they acted as *bandidos armados,* lawlessly destroying what they had been long-fought for and finally achieved on the day of Mozambique's self-determination. Labeling their enemies terrorists, FRELIMO didn't want to open up communication channels with RENAMO in order to satisfy foreign interest. Linked to the second point, the governmental forces were convinced that a diplomatic solution was unworkable mainly because they perceived RENAMO as a puppet for the South African government as well as for the international reactionary forces. In other words, the apartheid's government should stop giving support to RENAMO Third, FRELIMO perceived a way out of the conflict only through the use of arms: the war was one of their main instruments for shaping human relationships.[280]

Consequently, it seemed like Mozambique was set on a path of destruction. Clearly, this civil war illustrated high and intensive hatreds between the two adversaries. This antagonism could not be overtaken, as many people thought, through the progressive international detente typified by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. *"It was necessary to*

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[276] DINERMAN, Alice, *op.cit.,* p.54.
[277] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* p.26.
[278] Even if FRELIMO maintained intensive contacts with the eastern bloc, the latter started to soften its diplomatic channels with western governments such as the English. Politically and economically talking, the FRELIMO became more independent from the Soviet bloc They became more pragmatic.
[279] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une médiation insolite, op.cit.,*pp.47-58.
[280] *Ibid.,* pp.50-67.

act on the intern elements that have determined and nourished a war becoming an endemic factor, a veritable conflict, with its own dynamics, leaving not so much grip to the official diplomacy".[281]

3.1.2 The pre-mediation process: a fructuous integration in a lost country

The link between the CSE and Mozambique started in 1976 when a young Mozambican priest studying in Rome, Don Jaime Goncalves, joined the community and became a precious friend. Named archbishop of Beira the following year, he returned to Rome explaining to the CSE that the Marxist-Leninists' grammar of FRELIMO prevented the free use – nationalization - of Churches, church schools and clinics. Considering the Catholic Church as a remnant of the Portuguese colonialism, believers could not live peacefully on the basis of their religion. Indeed, it should be noted that the first reason which motivated Sant'Egidio to intervene in Mozambique was due to the poor condition of Mozambican's Christians who were blamed and attacked by government's restrictive policy.[282] As Leone Gianturco points out, *"(…) we had this Mozambican priest who became bishop and asked for help and told us that they had a problem with the church because they close the church, that they couldn't ring the bell anymore, so we thought that we should do something for this people and so we tried to understand more, we talked to the Italian communist party and asked them if they could help us to understand their communist party".*[283]

At this stage, thanks to its " embryonic political network", the CSE enabled a meeting between Enrico Berlinguer – the leader of the Italian Communist Party - and Goncalves in order for the former to use the weight of the fraternal party to convince Samora Machel that communism and Catholicism can cohabit: the religious liberty must be respected. We should be aware that Italy and Mozambique tied strong relationship in the seventies. Indeed, the Italian government massively engaged in the country by promoting and building economic and social development's programmes. Thus, as Italy, especially the PCI, was deemed a good and honest friend in the eyes of Mozambican's authorities, the relaxation of the relationship between the state and the church started taking a slow but new expression.[284] These first contacts, with the support of the Italian government, allowed a timid but real dialogue between the rulers in Maputo and members of Sant'Egidio. Observing that the Catholic Church could gradually acquire the right to

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[281] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* p.28.
[282] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* p.17.
[283] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.221, (14:22)
[284] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp.23-33.

citizenship, the CSE decided to facilitate confidential contacts between Mozambican's leaders and the Holy See. First, in 1985, Samora Machel met the pope John Paul II in Vatican. The pope said to Samora *" (…) I know that you are not a real Marxist, I know that you are a nationalist. Im polish, I know the Marxists, you are more nationalist than Marxists And the president of Mozambique was very impressed and changed his mind about Catholic Church. And so the change of this relation brought also to the possibility of the church to be part of this biger mediation with Sant'Egidio for peace."*

[285] Second, following the death of Samora in 1986, Joaquim Chissano met twice the pope. The last meeting was in Mozambique in 1988 and the pope asked vigorously to Chissano what were his initiatives to bring peace to his country. The pope insisted on the path towards reconciliation and dialogue between the interested parties: a humanitarian sentiment should prevail all reasons of the conflict. At this stage, the CSE judged that relationships between the state and the Church could be considered as regularized. [286]

A bit earlier the relaxation between the Mozambican's government and the Catholic Church, the CSE was hit by another phenomena: the food crisis. Indeed, their contact in Beira, Mgr Goncalves launched a call for help to send urgent aids in Mozambique. The CSE, with the financial help of the Italian foreign ministry, started sending both planes and ships filled with food and medicine in order to relieve the majority of the most deprived. It should be noted that the sending of these humanitarian reliefs happened during three periods of time: 1984, 1985 and 1988.[287] As De Volder recalled, *"I was 17 years old but I remember that there were fund-raisings in the stores in Rome. We sent food and ships with letters. (…) It was really the friendship for the people or the love for a country which suffered."* [288]

Moreover, we must keep in mind three crucial outcomes resulting from this humanitarian mobilization. First, *"a parallel network soon appeared inside Mozambique, often as part of the local parishes, to help orphans, students, and others suffering from the war."* [289] Second, the deployment of humanitarian support served as credentials for Matteo Zuppi and Andrea Riccardi with the civil authorities. Combined with their sincere generosity to help the country, the diplomats of Trastevere, through their regular meetings with Mozambican's ministers in order to set up the delivery of humanitarian convoys, had the

[285] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.222, (18:30)
[286] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp.37-45.
[287] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* p.30.
[288] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.201, (1:32)
[289] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* p.18.

exclusive opportunity to develop a personal relationship based on honesty and transparency with the authority of Maputo. Third, even though the Mozambique was hit by a wave of drought and poverty, the diplomats of Trastervere were rather convinced about another explanation: *the war is the mother of all poverty.* In other words, without peace, it was not imaginable to embrace an absolute development in one of the poorest country in the world. Indeed, by attending FRELIMO's fifth party congress, Andrea Riccardi made an emotional speech on the values of peace stressing on the need to perceive all Mozambicans capable to understand each other but also on the moral and political power of the government to achieve a generous peace: something was changing, talking about peace started penetrate the mindset of the rulers.[290] Furthermore, we must say that this diagnosis of the situation in Mozambique was especially fostered by the gradual integration of the CSE within the civil and political society in Mozambique. They started learning their language and reasons that nourished the domestic crisis.

And as the CSE had already approached the FRELIMO, it had now to engage in a new trust-based relationship with the RENAMO, the armed resistance movement, in order to eventually have a complete picture of this *failed-state.* Thanks to a contact in Rome, Junito Bertuzzi, Zuppi and Riccardi had the opportunity to be in connection with the responsible for Foreign Affairs of RENAMO, Arthur Da Fonseca. After a series of reunion between Goncalves and Da Fonsesca, the CSE decided to organize a secret meeting between Goncalves and the leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama. It should be noted that RENAMO did not trust many countries or people but Goncalves was perceived as a friend especially due to his lack of sympathy towards the government of Maputo. However, this flexibility granted by Chissano to launch some exploration's missions in order to understand RENAMO ended quickly. In 1990, the leader of FRELIMO asked for help to Kenya and Zimbabwe to set up a meeting first in Nairobi and later in Malawi between the two antagonistic sides. Yet, this attempt of mediation was totally unsuccessful; the region lacked the necessary impartiality to solve the conflict and Zimbabwe was deemed as too close to FRELIMO.[291] At the same time, however, the CSE felt that something was changing in the attitudes of the leaders: mutual trust was the key to allow a constructive process of mediation. The CSE decided to foster its reliable relationship with RENAMO by inviting Dhalkama in Rome in February 1990. This meeting was meaningful to enhance trust as well as to set conditions on the necessity of dialogue between FRELIMO and

[290] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp.32-34.
[291] *Ibidem.,* pp.76-88.

RENAMO.[292] In this fashion, Delooz clearly identifies the asset of the CSE. *" As Céline said, when a governmental actor or group of rebel contact us, there is no obligation. And the great advantage* for *one of the two or both* belligerents, *is that it can be initially done in a confidential environment."[293]*

Despite the substantial distrustfulness between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the CSE felt that the desire for peace was spreading. In spring 1990, the antagonists eventually made a decision to send delegations to the community's headquarters in Rome. As Gianturco asserts, "*the idea was to bring them to Rome but we didn't know what to do, we let them meet each other and then they chose us as mediators. They also wanted observers and other government who never showed up, Kenya, Zimbabwe because they were perceived as: Kenya friend of RENAMO, Zimbabwe friend of FRELIMO.*" [294] He goes on saying " *(…) the trust came up as a divine coincidence when both sent a letter saying ok: lets meet this people. Who are in the room stay in the room. No contact with people, journalists and then 2 years of negotiation without any journalists involved.*" [295] Thus, the choice of the Italian government as mediator, represented by deputy Mario Raffaelli, especially appeased the request of FRELIMO that wanted an authoritative and trusted mediator. Additionally, the preference for Archbishop Goncalves as mediator clearly comforted Dhalkama to not fall into a trap schemed by the government of Maputo. Eventually, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi were the two mediators representing the CSE.[296] It should be noted that the choice of the CSE as mediator was not insignificant. As Leone Gianturco puts it, " *(…) I think the diplomacy of Sant'Egidio is always starting with the personal encounter which becomes a collective encounter with the situation of human distress in which we try to play our comparative advantage inasmuch we are not a government or a structure of organization and this may help us to gain the trust of others because we do not have vested interests.*" [297]

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[292] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* p.35.
[293] Interview with Céline Francis and François Delooz (27/08/2015), p.138, (16:16)
[294] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.95, (28:32)
[295] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.95, (29:03)
[296] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp.106-111.
[297] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.87, (3:30)

3.1.3 The mediation process: time, synergy and trust are the clue

In Mozambique, the mediation was characterized by eleven exhausting rounds that lasted 27 months. From 8 July 1990 to 4 October 1992, the four mediators had to deal with a crisis that had peculiar internal causes. Even though we may recognize that the positive – even complicated – evolution of the mediation process could have been certainly influenced by the international context, – end of the Cold War and simultaneously the slow death of the communist paradigm, the independence of Namibia, the negotiations for a peace agreement in Angola and De Klerk's era in South Africa - the CSE emphasized on the need to understand the belligerent's psychology that motivated such a culture of warfare.[298] Seeking what unites rather than what divides, the CSE was convinced that the nature of the discussions had to be exclusively based on a political and human approach in order to correctly apprehend this typical African post-independence state of affairs. Even though both sides gradually agreed on being Mozambicans or brothers belonging to a same family, the core issue that crossed these eleven round of talks was to bring an answer to a challenging and painful question: who should govern and how.[299]

Indeed, even though disputing parties didn't call themselves anymore *bandidos* or *murderers,* their mutual perspective about the organization of the political agenda differed radically. FRELIMO aimed at first establishing a cease-fire, after which RENAMO members would be reincorporated into Mozambican society. The government strongly maintained that its new constitution and objective for elections be approved by RENAMO. RENAMO, however, wanted agreement on shifting the nature of the system, including the constitution before any talk on a ceasefire. Indeed, RENAMO would not change its military position if they did no receive any guarantees concerning their physical security, democratic elections and the set up of new but inclusive political system. [300] As we can imagine, this long mediation process was a hard task for the mediators mainly because there was a continuous fear to be manipulated by the opponent. As Gianturco underlines with an illustrative example, *" (…) they introduced, FRELIMO, a multi party constitution after years of one party ruling the country. It was RENAMO request. And Chissano thought that it would make them happy. No. They were wild. You know why? Because it was decided without consulting them. So he was giving them about what they asked for*

[298] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", *op.cit.,* pp.181-182.
[299] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp. 117-128.
[300] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* p.34.

many years. They were very angry: no, this is what you want, you want to dictate us in a multi party system. The multi party system has to be the result of our negotiation. It cannot come from you, it comes from us." [301] However, even in this context of mistrust and weak mutual recognition, the international community gave their support to the CSE to further their efforts in finding a comprehensive peace agreement between the belligerent's parties. At the first stage of the process, we should identify two types of diplomatic activities used by governments and international organizations. First, through a resolution passed by the Italian Parliament, the Italian government had the financial and material means to support the peace process. Indeed, the cost of hotels, planes, restaurant, and taxi meant a lot of money for the delegations, especially for RENAMO which was close to be in bankrupt. Second, it is mainly through symbolical and political statements that Italy – already present at the table of the mediation -, the European Economic Community, United States, the Holy See, regional countries, and at a lesser extent Portugal – they wanted to attract the disputing parties in Lisbon – issued a positive and encouraging support for this unusual diplomatic platform.[302] As De Volder points out, *" it is only at the end the observers, if I remember correctly, that states, as other African states as well as Portugal have been invited to support our process of mediation; the UN, of course, had to handle all questions relying on disarmament."* [303]

Backed by the international community – the question of time will be however subject to heated debates -, the CSE knew that they had developed an important culture of dialogue with the parties before the implementation of the peace talks and such an appeal could contribute to establish slowly a collaborative environment.[304] The most important issues at the table of the mediation were the creation of a partial ceasefire, the creation of zones of peace or *couloirs* where the Red-Cross could intervene to provide relief services, the solving of the issue concerning the presence of Zimbabwean forces in the country, the elaboration of a political agenda that comprised the political and electoral parties acts, the democratisation of Mozambique as well as constitutional issues, and finally the necessity to create a joint army, the security police, a new productive civil administration, and the role of the international community – especially the UN – in the process of *peacebuilding and peacekeeping* activities. Concerning the first two points, a military agreement was

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[301] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.238, (1:08:21)
[302] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* pp.32-37.
[303] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.213, (34:05)
[304] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* p.134.

signed establishing a ceasefire within the Beira and Limpopo corridors. Regarding the third point, the parties agreed to limit the presence and activity of the Zimbabwean army (ZNA) within the Beira and Limpopo corridors. Moreover they conjointly decided to set up a joint verification commission – formed by eight countries and representatives of the delegations - to oversee both the respect of zones of peace as well as the military activity of the ZNA.[305] Relating to the fourth point – the most contentious one -, after the signature of the political parties act, mediators had to work very hard to eventually convince that all constitutional questions had to be treated before the ceasefire. In addition, the delegations agreed that both presidential and parliamentary elections were to be organized together within one year after a ceasefire began the transition period.[306] The last three points were solved especially due to the establishment of a *summit between* Chissano *and Dhlakama* from the fourth to seven August, 1992 in Rome. The two leaders agreed to commit themselves in guaranteeing the unity of the nation; the symbol of peace would be beyond question the creation of a single army.[307]

Throughout all the process of mediation, the CSE aimed at changing the pathological pattern of the delegations' relationship by changing their position – and self-perception - in Mozambique: they had to be treated on an equal footing. The fundamental characteristic that we should pinpoint was the need to change the antagonism from a military to a political level. Both sides had to develop a democratic culture as well as a political minsdest in order to confront each other no more with guns but with words: an anthropological transformation was critical to reach mutual trust as well as the final peace agreement.[308] As Gianturco states, *" (…) you see for years and years, RENAMO people were considered by FRILIMO people as animals, as bandits, as butchers. But they started to understand that RENAMO people were people and they had a story, a people's story. And also RENAMO started to change, they started to understand that the military solution will bring them nowhere and also that the political solution must replace their military solution and so they started to give up weapons, and they became politicians. And then FRILIMO started to be afraid because RENAMO were improving negotiation techniques, at the beginning they were irrational."* [309] And he goes on telling us, *" so the attitude*

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[305] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp.155-162.

[306] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* pp.84-93.

[307] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp. 251-265.

[308] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", *op.cit.,* pp.182.

[309] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.227, (34:52)

changed. Guerrillas started to think that they could become a member of the parliament and they became members of the parliament, they had a salary, a car, they entered in the town with a car not anymore in the bush. That was a big change. And FRILIMO people started to accept that RENAMO could exist. (…) It was an overwhelming step change to see the acceptance of the existence of RENAMO people. It was incredible, unthinkable. [310]

Supporting a humanistic approach that maintained the idea of the personal transformation of each stakeholder, the CSE, via the establishment *of a step-by-step* agenda, assumed that both delegations had the resources to progress towards a real anthropological mutation. We should mention an unthinkable breakthrough during the mediation process: the signature of the *Preamble.* This document, attesting a real mutual recognition of the right to exist, highlighted that RENAMO was ready to accept the legitimacy of the government under the current legal framework. The government, in turn, accepted the existence of RENAMO as a political movement, assigning hence a full political citizenship.[311] Thus, the political confrontation was fruitful. The two delegations, with their own rhythm, became ready to embrace change and to overcome their fear. As Cameron Hume points out, *"the mediators concentrated on developing mutual recognition and respect, rather than relying on outside leverage to push the parties together."* [312] Even though the CSE could be perceived as a weak actor deprived of the use of *stick politics*, the latter benefited from a large liberty of action that enabled to build a discernible credibility in the eyes of the leader of both delegations. The CSE never imposed an agenda, solutions, deadlines or a line of conduct: it never imposed peace. As De Volder notes, the working team was remarkable in the way that they took time to listen their fears, their resistances, and their ideas.[313] The stakeholders had to find themselves, through the assistance of mediators in the dialogue, the path towards the Mozambican's common house. There is no doubt that reciprocal trust between delegations and mediators was crucial in order to pave the way towards peace.[314] And this trust went necessarily through the position of the CSE in world politics. As Gianturco underlines, *" (…) vested interests is not just a nice word, but in practice, Sant'Egidio started activities knowing that it will not receive anything in return. (…). The gospel is to and not asks for in return. So it is a practical way to put into*

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[310] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.228, (36:37)
[311] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* p.44.
[312] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* p.146.
[313] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.209, (23:00)
[314] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, *Mozambique, de la guerre à la paix. Histoire d'une mediation insolite, op.cit.,* pp. 16-17.

practice the gospel. We don't want a return, we may have a return, but it comes later one, there is no relationship." [315]   Recognized as smart people who were able to understand the Mozambican culture, the CSE was clearly *independent* in terms of the outcome. The CSE had a different credibility compared with the one of the states and institutions: this catholic community did not have any political or economic interests in Mozambique.[316]

Furthemore, we must understand that an exceptional and encompassing environment was blooming during the mediation process. A virtuous and dynamic framework was taking form both *inside* and *outside* the mediation's room. As Gianturco explains, *"(…) the moral suasion, the knowledge of the people, the understanding of the psychology, the human factor. We were everywhere, we were drivers, we drove them to the cinema, to the football stadium, we translated their text, we brought them suits, we tried to do everything to get them together, when they were drunk we called the meeting off, informing the other party that they were undisposed. So we tried to do all we could from a human point of view. Also we were advocate of the voiceless. I mean the Mozambican people couldn't say anything a part from the postcards. We took the time. You can't just shout at people."* [317] He goes on telling us that *" you have to make people know that the others are suffering but you have to tell them in another way. So look them in the eyes and try to understand, to listen to them and I think that moral suasion, the firm convincing that peace was the only outcome. Prayers also helped us a lot. Every evening, there were prayers in Sant'Egidio. Since we started at Sant'egidio in 1968 we do a prayer in the evening for an half an hour, it's not a mass. So for all those times people were going to the meeting room on the left and on the right there was the praying room, with other people praying for peace in Mozambique. Everyday, all of group of Europe, of poor people, everybody know Mozambique and Sant'Egidio because they pray for peace in Mozambique. This gave us the strength. The moral suasion is imperative for peace. And also the trust that Matteo and Andrea built on them. It was enormous. And also the fact that we didn't link anything to journalists, the rules were very good."* [318]

Certainly the religious identity of the CSE played a significant role in establishing a transparent and human climate. As De Volder observes, *" (…) the status of the community as a religious actor, the fact that we prayed, the fact that they listened prayers at night,*

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[315] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.223, (20:21)
[316] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* p.38.
[317] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.229, (40:08)
[318] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.230, (41:48)

they knew that we prayed for the peace in Mozambique. Yes, it contributed to build a calm atmosphere that promoted the process." [319] However, even though the religious attributes of the CSE have played a role, there was a limit to their transcendental strength. As Gianturco points out, *" it played a role when you are part of a mosaic of respect, or values for example. Moral values, the prayers were very important. But I don't think that it was enough. It was a condition but not enough to become as we became negotiators to achieve peace. It's not enough especially in those situations dealing with governments, armies, guerrillas. Ok, Ok priests go to the church... I have my business to do. So in a way you have to gain you legitimacy day by day and of course your church background helps you, it is an asset you have; which others don't have like universities, professionals, or loose-peace mediators, they don't have this background. And especially the fact that we weren't paid. They knew we have that job. None of us was paid to do that by Sant'Egidio, they knew that. And also we never gave money out which is very important in this kind of situation. We only bought some whiskies sometimes." [320]*

In this fashion, its institutional lightness as well as its moral status enabled the CSE to be gradually flexible in the exercise of its diplomatic activities. Indeed, it should be noted that very often when there was an impasse at the table of mediation, the CSE stimulated *bilateral dialogue* with each negotiator or leader in order to unblock the situation. Moreover, we must recognize that official diplomacies became gradually implicated in the mediation process. *" They played a fundamental role as guarantors, reassuring the two players by acting as referees, but within a framework already set up and defined by Sant'Egdio's mediators. By that time, negotiators had succeeded in getting both sides to adopt a common political language and to accept a dialogue of some sort. Synergy was crucial at that point." [321]* As Gianturco asserts, the nature of the contribution of Track one was critical at some stage of the process. *" I think it was the best way because the official track was the parallel track. It was like compounding something. But the parties did not want any governments to be involved except for the Italian government. So Cameron Hume came, and he was happy to be there, and we organized meeting with the US, trying to understand their point; he tried to make the point of the USA. But then RENAMO declared war to him. They officially declared war to the US during one of this meeting. (…). Of course we didn't have the power to impose, to direct the United States to be out of*

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[319] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.211, (29:14)
[320] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.232, (47:45)
[321] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", *op.cit.,* p.183.

the process but the parties didn't want the United States. But we knew that at some stage we had to bring them in as observers." [322] Thus, during the process of mediation mediators had to deal with three kind of official diplomatic activities. First, as we already observed *supra,* African States (Bostwana, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) and donors (France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States) backed and encouraged the peace talks.[323]

Second, as certain peace initiatives covered technical, military and at a lesser extent political issues, the CSE had to work in tandem with institutional agencies, civil society and governments in order to facilitate the process of mediation. Representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Russia, South Africa and the UN were active as *observers.* Moreover, military, civil experts and jurists were present as specialists who could ease and clarify the talk by joining their skills and expertise at the table of the mediation. Thus, as we can see, a concrete institutional framework enveloped the process of mediation in order to bring guarantees and legitimacy to this unusual form of mediation. Without question, the implementation of the agreement and the transitional period had to be overseen and regulated by the international community.[324] As Gianturco indicates, *" Cameron Hume gave us a very important supporting role especially in helping the RENAMO to understand that there was a world around them, starting to educate them about the international community, international organizations, they didn't know anything about international organization, the UN, you know. They only knew about Germany because Schtrauss of the CDU used to support them and gave them some financing, they knew about the Portuguese parties. So Hume was like a reality check for them. He was collaborating and helping us and many times he was there as a person, the time he tried to be the big US guy he lost."* [325]

Eventually, the scope of official diplomatic activities also went beyond the table of mediation. The United States, Italy, European Economic Community as well as African statesmen regularly put friendly pressure on Chissano and Dhlakama to remain committed in finding comprehensive solutions to lift Mozambique out of a state of war. And it was especially when mediators faced deadlock that governments and institutional agencies were called in order to both increase their participation in the mediation process and to

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[322] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015),), p.234, (59:31)
[323] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* p.146.
[324] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* pp.47-48.
[325] Interview with Leone Gianturco (02/09/2015), p.237, (1:05:02)

assess the possibility to establish informal meetings with disputing parties' representatives in order to constitute an inclusive network which would bring a legitimate support to the good offices of the mediators.[326]

On the four of October, 1992, Chissano and Dhlakama conjointly signed the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique in the hall of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This peace agreement was composed of seven protocols and a series of annexes. The main aim was to put an end to hostility that had taken almost one million lives and caused millions refugees inside and abroad Mozambique. The UN, throughout the so-called ONUMOZ mission, implemented a timetable with the help of mixed commissions in order to ensure the phase of transition. The ONUMOZ mission was a success, the respect of the peace agreement was a success: the perception of peace was absolutely immediate.[327]

3.1.4 Preliminary conclusion

In response to our first hypothesis (H1), we noticed that the position and identity of the CSE represented a strong appeal to convince the two delegations to go further by gradually elaborating a new valuable relationship. Indeed, the CSE sought to build a confident atmosphere wherein it will not endorse the role of a person who behaves in an authoritarian manner: there was no imposition, only initiatives and proposals. In other words, this humanistic approach prevented any manipulative pressure; the disputing parties could proceed peacefully without judgment or discrimination. Moreover, both sides felt safe during the process of mediation mainly because they were dealing with mediators who were completely impartial and neutral. Indeed, by demonstrating a real flexibility, liberty and transparency of action, the identity of Sant'Egidio gained the trust of the parties mainly because of the absence of any kind of vested interests. They knew that the diplomats of Trastevere were not paid and were completely independent in terms of the outcome; what motivated the CSE to launch such a diplomatic initiative was to restore the Mozambican's family. Furthermore, the moral and human status of the CSE was essential means to set up a framework based on respect and reciprocity. Indeed, by using *a soft power* based on moral suasion, the main aim of the CSE was to listen to the protagonists' arguments in order to change their psychology: no brutal means was used to convince both sides to changed their direction. Additionally, even though the religious identity became supplanted by *politics*, the prayers organized in Sant'Egidio supported this mosaic of

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[326] HUME, Cameron, *op.cit.,* p.147.
[327] GIANTURCO, Leone, *op.cit.,* pp.49-51.

human and pluralistic values already implanted since the outset of the peace talks. As a result, we must say that (H1) is confirmed.

In response to our second hypothesis (H2), we observed that the CSE gradually integrated itself within the civil and political society of Mozambique. First, The friendship of the catholic community with the Archbishop of Beira, Goncalves, allowed them to tie efficient personal connection with FRELIMO through the solving of both church and humanitarian's issues. As the party-unique started valuing positively the human and religious efforts of the CSE to relieve the country from its maladaptive policies, the spillover effect was the establishment of trust-based relationship with the "official" ruling class. Perceived as honest, transparent and credible in the eyes of FRELIMO, the CSE began seducing the whole party of FRELIMO with catchwords such as peace, family, power and capacity. Eventually, the penetration of Sant'Egidio on the ground enabled to shift the strategic and rational position of FRELIMO tending towards a smooth but tacit acceptation of the CSE as the most suitable partner to launch a process of mediation with RENAMO.

Second, the creation of link with Arthur Da Fonseca, join by the respected reputation of Goncalves, allowed the CSE to establish precious and secret meetings with the leader of RENAMO. Forging new sincere relationships with the CSE, Dhlakama was perfectly aware of what the CSE was doing for his country; a behaviour favourably perceived knowing that such informal actor continuously nurtured its good-looking in front of the rebellion. Eventually, we should not underestimate the role played by Goncalves in the construction of such confidential and reliable relationship between the CSE and RENAMO. Indeed, Goncalves had already built friendship links with the rebellion; he was the man who created virtuous bridges between the diplomats of Trastevere and the "unofficial" government. However, it should be noted that none of my interviews mentioned the idea that the embeddedness of the CSE *during the process of mediation* proved to be useful to explain the final outcome. Indeed, both the disputing parties and the CSE were totally absorbed by the *political* process. Even though the CSE faced a drama characterized by an extreme humanitarian crisis, it appears that the regulation of the conflict occurred *strictly* at the headquarter of Sant'Egidio. Thus, it was a political and military proceedings articulated by men who learnt how to behave as *politicians* and *diplomats.* Even though there was no parallel groundwork implemented in Mozambique by the CSE during the process of mediation, we must say, however, that the embeddedness, at the first stage of the process, was powerful enough to embellish the reputation of the CSE, to widen its book of contacts and eventually to seduce both sides

that good offices must be held in part under its auspices. Eventually, by launching early religious and humanitarian operations, the CSE was able to take a comprehensive picture of the nature of the conflict at stake: it understood that peace would the medicine and nothing else. As a result, we must say that (H2) is confirmed.

In response to our third hypothesis (H3), our analysis clearly demonstrates a fruitful synergy of forces. There was a convergence of diplomatic channels, both governmental and non-governmental, when the process of mediation faced either politico-military or technical issues. Even though official actors were present as *observers,* the nature of their contribution was critical at some stage of the process mainly because they brought with them *instruments* such as expertise, legitimacy and moral support to facilitate the mediation. Moreover, the question of the internationalisation of the conflict could be solved through the gradual penetration of officials in the management of the crisis. More precisely, while remaining in the peculiar framework constituted by the CSE, the formal Track One actors involved *intensively* in final stages of the peace talks when it had to deal with debates such the relevance of guarantees, the enforcement of the agreement and the management of the transitional period. The role of the CSE has never been passive, however. We should just be aware that concerning certain steps of the process, the CSE this official-legal support to implement the agreement.

Moreover it must be recalled that since the outset of the process of mediation, Italy, with Mario Raffaelli, was present as a mediator. Thus, the nature and quality of *the good offices* were in some way automatically institutionalized and highly politicized. As we have seen, both the Italian Parliament and the government have mobilized their energy and time to bring a support conducive to the proper conduct of the process of mediation. Furthermore, we have noticed the erection of parallel network established between the CSE and official diplomacies in order to give impetus especially when the mediation encountered deadlocks, apprehension and nervousness. Even though Track One did not need the approval of the CSE to be involved in the process *beyond* the setting, we remarked that none of official actors – either westerners or African – wanted to hamper the proceedings: they acted as guarantors pushing smoothly the disputing parties to move forward. As the international community proved its willingness to proceed in conjunction with the work performed by the CSE, we must say that (H3) is confirmed.

3.2 The process of mediation in Algeria: the abortion of a unique peace process

3.2.1 A new Algeria? The path towards an authoritarian and military state

On the 5th of July 1962, Algeria commemorated its independence from France, closing a violent eight-year war of national liberation. *"The war of independence had begun on November 1, 1954, and the ceasefire agreed to in Evian, France, between Algerian revolutionaries and President's Charles de Gaulle's government had been in effect since March 19, 1962".*[328] Together the ceasefire and subsequent independence celebrations symbolized Algeria's transformation from a department of France to a nation in its own right. Among the important consequences of the decolonization process were the departure of thousands colonists and technically skilled workers (the so-called *pied-noirs)* and the long-establishment of authoritarian rule that put an end to all optimism for embracing democratic reforms and multi-party elections.[329] As professor Corrao puts it, *"since the end of colonialism, in most Arab countries, the military elites that had won the battle against the foreign rulers had systematically cancelled the few liberal rights acquired under foreign rule. (…) For the sake of nation-building the leaders called for solidarity to implement the structural changes needed to improve the economic conditions of the country".*[330]

Since the war of liberation, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its military wing, the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP), the last of which gradually gained control over the government - were the two bodies responsible for setting up a road map for the reconstruction of postcolonial Algeria.[331] The constitution of 1963 gave full power to a one-party regime ruled by the president Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-1965). The ANP was directly integrated in political processes and activities, especially in the rebuilding of economic and political structures within the system of the party.[332] Looking inward to redirect the country, Ben Bella took a heavy-handed approach to the managing socio-economic policies, envisioning and creating an Algerian power structure based on two strong pillars, FLN and ANP. Neither group organically connected with the civil society and they justified their firm control of the country as a means of defense against internal

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[328] LE SUEUR, James. D., *Between terror and democracy. Algeria since 1989,* Halifax/London/NewYork, Fernwood Publishing/Zed Books, 2010, p.11
[329] *Ibidem.*
[330] CORRAO, Francesca Maria, "Arab Revolutions: the Cultural Background", in Gabriella d'Agostino, *Archivio Anthropologico Mediterraneo,* Università degli studi di Palermo, Annno XII/XIII, N°13 (2), Semestrale di Scienze Umane 2011, p.12.
[331] LE SUEUR, James. D, *op.cit.,* p.14.
[332] WERENFELS, Isabelle, *Managing instability in Algeria. Elites and political change since 1995,* London/New York, Routledge, 2007, pp.32-33

groups who threatened to damage independence. Put differently, the nature of the social contract between the rulers and the governed was mainly divided in two assumptions: the population agreed to not being involved in politics (political power) as long as the regime was taking care of its well-being. Thus, the legitimacy of the ruling class was mainly grounded in a social and economic order functioning as a distributive system of goods and services.[333]

In a socio-economic context, we should also notice the implementation, since the independence and throughout the seventies and eighties, of policies that were preferential towards useful cities, such as desert developments rich with petrol and gas, over the useless villages of rural Algeria. As a result of these preferential policies, Algeria saw a marked rise in the number and size of crowded, precarious shanty-towns.[334]

When Houari Bouamedienne came to office in 1965, he set Algeria on a strong state-centered socialist path. Prioritizing industrial progress (mainly gas and oil), he set about nationalizing industrial and economic activities and neglected the need to invest in vital sectors such a such as the agriculture field. The consequences were disastrous for a population stuck in a demographic boom.[335] Indeed, as Benjamin Macqueen puts it, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the FLN/ANP state *"gradually took over the most repressive parts of the colonial apparatus as a means of maintaining direct coercive control over society, coupled with economic incentives promoting political apathy akin to the model of the rentier state".*[336]

As well as considering these tough and socially unequal attempts to restore Algeria to greatness, we should also apprehend the autocratic and dictatorial leadership of Bouemedienne in the light of civil rights and freedoms. No rooms was left for individual or collective expressions and a culture of censorship dominated the political, religious, civil and journalistic arenas. Thus, brutal tactics were used to influence and condition the behavior of citizens.[337] Equally, it should be pointed out that a dysfunctional economy, the lack of a cohesive social vision or a clear social contract impaired the legitimacy and the credibility of the Algerian state in its adoption of a comprehensive ideological approach for the efficient rule of the country. This failure to find a strong and peaceful cohesion in

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[333] WERENFELS, Isabelle, *op.cit.,* p.33.

[334] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", in Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca (dir.), *L'art de la paix. La communauté de Sant'Egidio sur la scène internationale,* Paris, Salvator, 2012, pp.58-59.

[335] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* pp.20-26.

[336] MACQUEEN, Benjamin, *Political Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Arab World. Lebanon and Algeria,* Victoria, Melbourne University Press, 2009, p.92.

[337] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* p. 20.

ruling both horizontally and transversally Algeria will intensify under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid.[338]

Furthermore, under the presidency of Bouamedienne, the army seized control of and transformed Algerian politics. The constitution was suspended, parliament dissolved and a Council of the Revolution installed as the prevailing political body, piloting and overseeing the government's apparatus. Isabel Warenfels explains that *"Army involvement in politics became institutionalized and in 1976 – at least indirectly – backed legally with the Charte Nationale and with the new constitution based on this charter. Direct military intervention in politics thus only became necessary when the control of the army or the 'revolutionary politics' were seen to be threatened "*.[339] As Addi puts it, Le *Pouvoir* was identified as a power structure severely characterized by the prominence of the army and it helped develop clientelistic patterns of power within a network-based system of power in order to extensively supervise and dictate the incentives and purposes of government.[340]

After Boumedienne's early death in 1979, it was the army who chose Colonel Chadli Bendjedid (1979-1991) to stand as the new president. Chadli set about moving the Algerian state away from state-centric development and towards new programs of liberalization and privatization. This shift symbolized an increasing rupture with the past, especially the legitimacy drawn from the regime's revolutionary links where the single ruling party, having fought for the independence, had set up a strong ideological cohesiveness.[341]

In the light of the generational change that was occurring in Algerian society at the time (the revolutionary, post-independence generation was steadily being replace by a younger, less protectionist one), Chadli's macroeconomic and political plans evolved in total inadequacy with the real conditions and aspirations of the majority of the population. Indeed, the economic mismanagement - the rise of unemployment, the fall of the oil prices, the corruption, food and housing shortages -, the political stagnation, the non-respect of basic civil rights and freedoms, the degradation of customs as well as the manipulation of symbols, and the mismanagement of an increasingly younger population undermined the Algerian state in terms of both its functional ability and legitimacy.[342] In Macqueen's words*" Such effects were highly detrimental for the state that had based its post-independence development plans on state management and state-led*

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[338] MACQUEEN, Benjamin, *op.cit.,* p.93.
[339] WERENFELS, Isabelle, *op.cit.,* p.34.
[340] ADDI, Lahouari, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions", *Journal of Democracy,* Vol.7, N°3, 1996, p.96.
[341] MACQUEEN, Benjamin, *op.cit.,* p.93.
[342] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, *op.cit.,* p.59.

development".[343] Even though the main task of the FLN/ANP was on the one hand to ensure their hegemony over the socio-cultural civil society in terms of impeding any forms of rebellion, on the other to prevent the burst of autonomous and genuine political movements that could aim at toppling the regime, such socio-political injustices had to become prejudicial to the incumbents.[344]

3.2.2 The short journey of the Algerian Glasnost

In a deteriorated social climate, anti-government unrest materialized in the form of bread riots at the beginning of October 1988. Even though it was widely disorganized and spontaneous at its outset, the youth protests against the basic commodities shortages caused by Chadli's economic restructuring and political mismanagement gathered enough people to project an unpopular image of the tyrannical regime. Starting from Algiers and spreading to other urban centres in Algeria, youth's movements came together groups of workers to clamour for sweeping reforms. This unstable position had a devastating effect on the increasingly illegitimate government. [345] At a loss as to what to do, Chadli's government initial reaction was to send in the ANP to crush the uprising, killing more than a thousand unarmed people, most of them were youths. Therefore, it should be noted that the use of force to restore the order marked the end of the FLN's political legitimacy in Algeria. Moreover, the incident eroded the army's image as a noble force that legitimised the old guard. As Le Sueur puts it *"neither the Algerian state nor the military would ever be able to reverse the gravitational pull of absolute power or fully regain the public trust".[346]*

Along with these protest movements, we should also mention the boost these given to Islamists propaganda by the deterioration of the regime's legitimacy and the misery and despair that hit the youngest generations who represented more than 70% of the entire Algerian population. Feeling that they could fill the vacuum by stressing simple but emotive catching-words, the Islamists promoted a reaction as well as a full-blown, multi-pronged campaign against an arrogant and corrupted regime that was unable to feed the people. Indeed, the wealth exhibited by the *nomenklatura* of the FLN or the ANP was felt as an insult by Algerians had experienced a steep decline in their standard of living. [347]

On October 10, Chadly announced his intention to hold a referendum on the 1976 constitution, as a preamble to the foundation of new constitution that would extensively

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[343] MACQUEEN, Benjamin, *op.cit.,* p.93.
[344] WERENFELS, Isabelle, *op.cit.,* p.36.
[345] MACQUEEN, Benjamin, *op.cit.,* p.94.
[346] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* p. 32.
[347] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, *op.cit.,* pp.59-60.

widen freedoms and rights. In a referendum on February 23, 1989, 73, 4 percent of the population approved a more democratic constitution that would enable political changes and an economic liberalization based on the market economy. Neutralizing all references to socialism, Mouloud Hamrouch, the Algerian prime minister, ensured that constitutional reforms were introduced to all sectors of the Algerian society. [348] Among these constitutional reforms, we should especially look at the political ones; measures that seemed to address the rupture across the country: the right to constitute political associations and parties (multi-party politics), the guarantee of the freedom of conscience and opinion, the guarantee of basic human rights and of individual and collective freedom, the settling of an independent judicial power capable of protecting rights and freedoms of Algerians, and the scheduling of municipal, national legislative and – finally - presidential elections for the following years. In other words, these constitutional reforms ended the single-party era *de jure.[349]*

As a result, politicized Algerians began organizing and forming political parties. Even though at this time Algeria had nearly sixty parties, a political dynamic enhancing an impressive polarization of the political arena, five "mainstream political parties" were particularly important: The Socialist Forces Front (FFS) represented by Hocine Aït Ahmed; the Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA) personified by Ahmed Ben Bella (in exile since 1984); the Trotskyst Party (Parti des Travailleurs); the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) led by both the Sheikh Abassi Madani and the Sheikh Ali Belhadj and the FLN led by Abdlhamid which became very estranged from the state because its political survival was at stake in such a multi-party system. The result was the divorce between the army and the FLN. The FIS, however, while remaining attached to its roots by claiming that "Islam is the solution", quickly emerged as the most powerful revolutionary opposition capable of electorally attracting all the disappointed and underprivileged Algerians mainly through the provision of services in the health or education sector; sectors widely abandoned by the regime.[350]

Nonetheless, the abolition of the single-party's formal monopoly in 1989 signified little. As Hugh Roberts observes, *"the party had been a façade for the real power structure; the introduction of pluralism in 1989 replaced a monolithic façade with a pluralistic one, but this fell a long way short of a substantial change to the form of government".[351]* Even though a degree of freedom of speech and association was introduced, these constitutional

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[348] *Ibid.,* pp.40-42.
[349] MACQUEEN, Benjamin, *op.cit.,* p.94
[350] *Ibidem.*
[351] ROBERTS, Hugh, "Algeria's Veiled Drama", *International Affairs,* Vol.75, No. 2, 1999, p.386

reforms, were being freely granted by the authorities on a stunned public, not seized from them by a developed civil society. There was hence every reason to value them as ephemeral if not suspect.[352]

3.2.3 From the rise of the FIS to the authoritarian backlash in 1992: the blow up of a civil war

The first round of municipal elections were held on June 12, 1990 with approximately 65 percent voter turnout. The FIS won a majority with 54 percent of the votes, followed by the FLN with 28 percent. Taking control of the *wilayas*, 32 in total, the FIS exerted a tight control over both the local and provincial governments declaring that all localities under its rule are "cities of Islam". Grasping a popular mandate, the FIS started to actively campaign for the forthcoming national legislative elections as well as for presidential ones being held at the same time.[353] It should be noted that the reason why the FIS had won the first democratic and pluralist elections held in independent's Algeria was mainly because this useless and abandoned territories and sectors represented the groundwork of the FIS: charity and assistance embellished the role of the islamists in the Algerian civil society. Eventually, the FIS also attracted the consensus of the traditionalist's bourgeoisie mainly through the diffusion of its religious values.[354]

In 1991, before that national legislative poll occurs, the Chadli's government, with the General Nazzar as minister of defence, made up their mind to change the electoral system[355] in order to weaken the electoral forces of the FIS and to ensure the victory of the FLN. Perceiving theses changes as a direct threat, the FIS leaders, join by other parties, declared a general strike on May 23 to express their strong opposition against the shifts in the electoral law. Persuade that the FIS will not from now on be a danger to the electoral longevity of the FLN, President Chadli unilaterally announced that legislative elections will be held on June 27. Nevertheless, the escalation of violence could not be avoided. Willing to invade whole streets in Algiers, the FIS's leaders aimed at exerting violence against the state through the carrying out of *Jihad*. However, at the time when the ANP seized control of the streets in Algiers, Madani and Belhadj, charged with plotting to overthrow the government, were arrested and sent to jail.[356]

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[352] *Ibidem.*
[353] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* pp.43-44.
[354] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, *op.cit.,* p.60.
[355] The number of constituencies was doubled – principally rural area where the implantation of the FIS was timid – and only the first two parties could be present in the second round of elections.
[356] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* pp. 47-48.

Confident that the declaration of state of siege as well as many arrests and exiles had sufficiently undermined the commanding political position of the FIS, the military, which during the same period of time benefited from the nervous and modest stance on the part of the "civilian government" to impose their dictum, decided to postpone the legislative elections until December. However, the policies backfired when the result of the national legislative ballot announced that FIS had a landslide victory -47,5 percent - claiming 188 seats over 430 seats in the national assembly. In contrast, the FFS won 26, the FLN 15 and others picked up what was left. This was a shocking result, both for the FIS and the ruling class. Indeed, as only the first two parties were allowed to defend their program in the second round, the FLN was shut completely out of the political landscape.[357]

Acknowledging that the FIS would have won the elections in the second round, the military was not going to remain silent, however. On January, 4, 1992, the National Assembly was dissolved, highest-ranking officers forced Chadli from office and created a High Council for Security aiming at both invalidating the electoral results and instituting a Haut Comité d'Etat composed of five persons – led by Mohammed Boudiaf - to run the country. By imposing a wide state of emergency, the new rulers outlawed the FIS and its leaders were prisoned for indefinite terms. It should be noted that these acts received international backing, especially from France and the United States that panicked to see the arising of an Islamic government in Algeria. Eventually, we should mention the peculiar nature of the role played by the military during the political crisis. Even though the new constitution diminished the status of the army to that of *safe-guarding national independence and defending national sovereignty*, the army considered its new function also as that of the protector of the democratization process. This signified that it did not position itself outside of politics but above politics.[358] As the FIS wanted to implement an Islamic state by imposing the Sharia law as well as the Caliphate, the army perceived – in a manipulative way -these points of action as a threat for Algeria secularist tradition as well as for its political and cultural customs.[359]

Since the 1991 military coup in Algeria, the country leaped into a state of terror where clashes and reprisals between the army and Islamist factions, the GIA as its Islamist Armed Group, supported by other autonomous movements fighting the same goals caused more than 70 000 victims. "*According to many, a military solution of the Algerian crisis is impossible. The army, even with the help of the militias, does not have the power to put a*

[357] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* pp. 50-51.
[358] WERENFELS, Isabelle, *op.cit.,* p.43.
[359] LE SUEUR, James. D., *op.cit.,* p.40.

stop to the wide- spread violence that reigns in the country. A political solution to the crisis was indispensable and urgent".[360]

3.2.4 Pre-mediation process: to find a light in the shadow

Before the military coup in 1991, the CSE had already implanted transnational networking activities in Algeria that nurtured trust and constructive relation with the country. More specifically, since 1984, the CSE established strong links with the church in Algeria where many group of young people started undertaking interreligious as well as intercultural meetings on both sides of the Mediterranean.[361] Fostering a spirit of *collaboration* and *cohabitation,* those inter-faith exchanges, as Don Angelo Romano asserts *" (…) enhanced a knowledge obtained from young people, but it was a knowledge made on the ground; we had perceived that inside the country there was this tension, this hope for democracy (…)."* [362] Entering smoothly in Algeria through ecumenical activities, the CSE tied relevant relations with religious personalities as the cardinal Duval, Mgr Teissier, Mgr Claverie as well as other respected priests and religious persons from the monastery of Notre-Dame-de-l'Atlas. It should be noted that all of these religious persons, especially cardinal Duval, peacefully fought for the protection of this wonderful interreligious cohabitation.[363]

Developing an intense friendship with the church in Algeria, the CSE hence has been able to be in contact with important Muslim leaders; leaders that will be in the following years present at Assisi in 1986. Moreover, as Romano points out, these personalities of the Muslim world were precious for widening the address book of the CSE: religious and political connections started merging to eventually found a receptive group of contact.[364] Cultivating close-relationship with the Muslim community in Alger, the CSE started being regularly questioned about their absence of motivation for launching a similar platform of discussion that took place in Mozambique.[365] However, the idea of a possible initiative in Algeria matured in the head of the diplomats of Trastevere. As Andrea Riccardi recalled during the prayer for the peace in 1994 *" Some Algerian Muslim friends repeated us: why Christians, who often mobilize to defend human rights, remain*

[360] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "The St. Egidio Platform for a peaceful solution of the Algerian crisis", in David Smock (ed.), *Private Peacemaking. USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofits Organizations,* Washington, United States Institute of Peace, No.20, 1998, p.10.
[361] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", *op.cit.,* p.67.
[362] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.55, (41:59)
[363] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.13.
[364] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.185 (39:48)
[365] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.203 (2:22)

immobile when a Muslim country is involved? It sounded like a challenge which needed to be quickly accepted " [366]

Heading towards the path of reason and faith, the CSE, the same year, had been seriously affected by the assassinations of Father Henri Vergès and Sister Paule-Hélène Saint-Raymond, who were close friends to some peacemakers of Trastevere. With this new tragedy in the balance, the CSE understood that a lot of blood would flow if the Algerian crisis does not find a route out of the conflict. [367]

3.2.5 The mediation process: the encounter with a polarized political society

Immediately a group of work composed of Mateo Zuppi, Marco Impagliazzo, Mario Marazziti and Mario Giro started assessing the chance of a peace initiative in Algeria. They tried reaching all relevant political parties that have performed an electoral result concerning the recent elections. Nearly all political formations gave a positive answer to the opportunity offered by the CSE. The main reason was that the establishment of a national dialogue in Algeria had recently failed. There was an impasse because no peaceful and free space to enhance an interactive debate existed among stakeholders: political pressure and malaise was the psychological climate in Algeria. Even though there was a longstanding hatred among these political and religious leaders, they all perceived the idea to set up a conference on Algeria based on values of authenticity and freedom as a real opportunity to stop the bleeding in their country.[368] As Romano explains " *when we received the acceptance from the FLN, FFS and FIS, we noticed that there were accessibilities and then we said to ourselves we move forward. Sant'Egidio had to be only a room for discussion, we did not have solutions, we did not want to impose a definite plan. We aimed at giving our discussion space to Algerians.* " [369] And he goes on telling us *"(…) the answer surprised us, there was a climate of enthusiasm and pain for the situation that lived Algeria. But also a climate of positive reaction in relation to the national humiliation that the country had just experienced. It was a national humiliation.* " [370] In this fashion, the first round of talks, *Colloque sur l'Algérie,* was organized in Rome, at Sant'Egidio's headquarters on November 21-22, 1994. The FIS was represented by Answar Hadam; the FLN was embodied by its General Secretary Abdelhamid Mehri; the FFS – Front des forces socialistes – was represented by its president Ait Ahmed; the

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[366] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", *op.cit.,* p.66.
[367] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, " The St. Egidio Platform for a peaceful solution of the Algerian crisis", *op.cit.,* p.11.
[368] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *Algeria in ostaggio. Tra esercito e fondamentalismo, storia di una pace difficile,* Milano, Angelo Guerini e Associati,1997, pp.66-67.
[369] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.182, (28:38)
[370] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.185, (40:27)

MDA – Mouvement démocratique algérien – was represented by Ahmed Ben Bella; the movement Islamic rebirth Ennahada was embodied by its president Abdallah Jaballa; the Movement for Islamic Society-Hamas was represented by Mahfoud Nahnah; the Party for Algerian Renewal (PRA) was embodied by Noureddine Boukrouth; the party Jeunesse Musulman Contemporaine (JMC) was represented by Ahmed Ben Mohammed and Louisa Hanoune as the spokesperson for the Worker's party. We should add in the picture trade unions as the UGTA – Union générale des travailleurs algériens – and the UNFA – l'Union national des femmes algériennes. Finally, respected personalities were present for directing the debate. We should take into account the two shuyukh, Madani and Bekhadj as well as Ali Yahia, lawyer and president of the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH).[371] It should be noted that the Italian government played a key logistic role for allowing the organization of such a democratic forum. As some political figures, especially from the FIS, could not obtain their passport from the Algerian authority, the Italian government enabled the participation of such " illegal leaders " by granting them a visa to come on time at the conference.[372]

The Algerian military government qualified the opening provided by the CSE as *a non-événement, " (…) the position of the Algerian military power has been a total closure, an all-out attack. (…) It was a total closing. It was; you are interfering in our internal affairs." [373]* Indeed, as many newspapers were controlled by the military authority, the proposal of setting-up a democratic and peaceful space offered by a catholic community has been briskly criticized by the Algerian press. From *Pax Romana* to a veritable threat against the national sovereignty, De Volder correctly summarizes the situation: *"obviously this played negatively for the propaganda of the government; a government that has done everything to discredit and render Sant'Egidio less credible. Thus, here the submarine of the Vatican, (…), Christians, a sect." [374]* Even though the Algerian politico-military context was not conducive for such a proposal, the Algerian political parties, however, were strongly motivated to overcome their fears and to establish a joint meeting based on a common language: the respect and the listening to the other, even with a long-standing enemy, were two fundamental conditions for fostering a sense of unity. The first round of talks was more symbolical than technical or political. The first conference enabled interlocutors to accept gradually each other as critical partners for allowing a possible shift in the mindset of the illegal rulers: it was a common project that had to be worked out by

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[371] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", *op.cit.,* pp.65-66.
[372] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* p.68.
[373] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.187, (45:42)
[374] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.214, (30:38)

Algerian stakeholders. As we will notice with the second round of talks that culminated into the writing of " the Roman platform for Algeria ", the FIS, which has been dissolved and radicalized following the illegal coup – only a part of the FIS transformed its political actions towards armed struggle – had to accept a genuine process of re-socialization and of re-politization in order to actively take part of discussions.[375] Indeed, the main task was that the FIS learns the art of politics and releases from its political isolation.

But generally speaking, all sides aimed at achieving a real political pluralism as well as an efficient self-discipline against tyranny and despotism. Indeed, the main outcome would be to implement a democratic transition enabling the demilitarization of the Algerian civil society. [376] We must be aware that the *Colloque sur l'Algérie* encompassed famous and honourable people who have written the history of their country; who felt they had a sacred mission to restore the image of their nation and to prevent a horrible second war in Algeria. As De Volder asserts, *" we witnessed extremely hard things with the birth of the GIA for instance. But the people around the table, it was responsible politicians who had an enormous love for their country, and which, for this, they were also ready to engage in a dialogue with the opponent. Obviously, they disagreed with the FIS. But they understood that perhaps it existed a way to condition them in a pluralist context. " [377]* Interacting in such a climate of trust, they all agreed to close the first conference by advocating the end of violence. More importantly, they all agreed to not pointing one responsible: we are all responsible and we have to work together through such a peaceful and honest space provides by the CSE. The final communiqué – seven points - that everyone signed, with the exception of the Hamas and the PRA, stated the need to carry on the exchange of opinions and the gathering of free and continuous information about the crisis. The statement also encouraged the CSE to keep going in its endeavor to provide a place for further dialogue when the conditions would be favorable.[378]

At this stage of the process, we must emphasize two dynamics that are relevant to understand the scope of the facilitation process. Firstly, the first meeting held in Rome was not secret. Nearly 250 journalists were accredited. As Romano affirms *"(…) but why on the Colloque sur l'Algérie have we done this openly? It was the only way to foster transparency. Even doing this, the government accused us of making interference. (…) We must pay tribute to the courage of the people who have participated, they had*

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[375] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", *op.cit.,* pp.69-70.
[376] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* pp.74-75.
[377] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.216, (39:18)
[378] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* pp.84-85.

extraordinary courage. They were exposed. " [379] He goes on saying that *" there was anything to gain first; we were Christian believers who before a friendly country (…) which is close to plunge into a chasm of horror, did something. It gave us credibility. It was not the Vatican, the Italian government. It was Sant'Egidio. Thus, it was not a government that tried manipulating the Algerian political framework. Not at all."* [380] Secondly, even though the Italian parimentary commissions were involved in this initiative, it was truly a peaceful approach enhanced by the CSE. Feeling a real impotence of the international community, Romano points out that *" it was a different world, Algeria was far, it was the beginning of change, Gorbatchev had fallen, it was the beginning of the Yeltsin's presidency, the world was distracted by something else. There were other preoccupations. The attention of European governments was focus on Eastern Europe and the Balkans."* [381] Indeed (synonym ?), before and during the first round of talks, France, Spain, and other Mediterranean countries were very interested by the initiative but they only supported it through official statements. Therefore, there was not diplomatic involvement trying to supplement the work done by both the CSE and the stakeholders: the international community sticks to a symbolic that we may call *applaud without moving*. However, we must recognize that the United States, via its Under Secretary of State responsible for the Middle East and North Africa, Robert Pelletreau, attempted to persuade the Algerian military government to open a dialogue with the oppositions in order to ensure both the enforcement of legitimate election in Algeria and the building of a democratic society that protects human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unfortunately, this was an unanswered letter. [382]

As the war carried on killing and torturing hundreds of citizens, the political and religious leaders who attended the first meeting decided, in the following weeks, to maintain a common dialogue through *the good offices* of Sant'Egido. But the scope of this new encounter in Rome changed, however. The stakeholders – who now have decided to send a delegation accompanied by their chief - now wanted to achieve concrete results by setting up a real strategy that would lead to serious negotiations. Despite the possibility to find a secure and comfortable space in Roma, the stakeholders fully trust the CSE as the right facilitator to address the Algerian crisis. Convinced of the good faith of the CSE, the Algerian constituent parts met a Catholic community that had a real spirit of gratitousness. As Romano states, *" we did that* for free, *it was a gesture as if you see a*

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379 Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.191, (59:26)
380 Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.193, (1:04:02)
381 Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.198,(1:17:32)
382 IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* pp.70-94.

person fall into a hole saying: stop I will help you to get out. " [383] Moreover, as the CSE was clearly identified as a religious actor that certainly did not have interests for oil, Romano goes on saying *"(…) Everyone knew who was there, they knew that we do things for the poor, they knew that we were praying, they saw us pray as believers. It is very important for the respect, to talk with others, to meet others. It is very important to have a clear identity. (…) When they came, when there were prayers, we showed to Algerians all people who were in the Santa Maria church, a full church. They were absolutely dazzled."* [384] To resume, this emotion for the promotion of social justice was very appealing to Algerian stakeholders.

In this light, Algerian stakeholders met on 8 of January 1995 behind closed door at a secret place in Rome. Even though debates were sometimes ardent because of heterogonous political and religious positions – the place of the Koran and the role of Islam, the role of the army as the protector of the national unity and the potential incrimination of the military authority -, they all agreed to reach a concrete, peaceful and credible political solution devoted to the military authority in order to softly realize a democratic transition to keep the country alive. Wiling to set a new political, legal and institutional framework, the stakeholders started formulating a plan aiming at delimiting the scope of the process of negotiation with the regime and its responsibility for the Algeria of tomorrow.[385] Despite a difference between *hard* and *soft* attitudes, participants have assented to adopt a reflexive strategy that neutralized their bitterness as well as their selfish interests. They carried on discussing on constitutional foundations for the forthcoming legislative and presidential election, political rights such as the creation of a multiparty system as well as the separation of power, the significance of certain values and principles – for instance the question of people sovereignty, human rights, and the perception of violence -, the integration of the civil society as well as the role of a free press in the democratic process, the role of women and the question of the religious liberty. Moreover, several other conditions have been underlined in order to embrace a comprehensive plan of negotiation with the regime.[386]

As the achievement of a national contract started taking form, we must indicate the positive and real evolution on the part of the FIS. Indeed, addressing topics based on democratic and peace concepts, the FIS has completely distanced itself from his ideological traditions. Becoming a consistent modern democratic force, the FIS accepted

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[383] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.193 (1:05:52)
[384] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015), p.194, (1:06:17)
[385] MPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* pp.109-113.
[386] *Ibid.,* pp.113-131.

fundamentals such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – encompassing the religious tolerance – as well as the need to put aside from the negotiation process the heated debate over the *Shari'a.* Moreover, it should be noted that it accepted the annulling of the last election; a gesture that plenty demonstrates the political progress on the part of this political formation. In other words, to achieve the potential national transition, first the FIS had to transform itself towards a mature democratic political party. [387] Creating a national pact based on the standard of non-interference – only Algerians had to negotiate with the regime – as well as on the principle of a step-by-step reconstruction of dialogue and order jointly with the appropriate authorities, *the Sant'Egidio platform for a peaceful solution of the Algerian crisis* was both signed by all parties on January 13, 1995 at the CSE's headquarter and presented in front of the international press.[388]

Even though most of the stakeholders believed that it would lead to the opening of new path towards peace, the Algerian government repudiated the platform document in all its details arguing that it consisted of " *an interference in Algeria's internal affairs; as a plot of international forces, including the Vatican; and as an attempt to manipulate the Algerian political debate. This remains its position, despite the fact that the Platform was negotiated and signed only by Algerians (…).* " [389] Moreover, despite the rigidity of the regime, *the Roma Platform* was welcomed by many countries and institutions such as the United States, the French Government, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Parliament, Spain and Italia. But as Romano points out, " *a support yes, in the sense yes congratulation. A support in the sense we talk with the Algerian government and we propose solutions and conditions, no. Arriving at a kind of major diplomatic pressure on the Algerian government to accept the peace offer, no. (…)*" [390]

In the same vein, we should look at two essential countries that were indirectly involved in the mediation process. First, Italy, as we have seen, gave a technical support for allowing the realization of the *Colloques sur l'Algérie in Roma.* In spite of welcoming the CSE's initiative, the Italian government adopted a conservative reaction regarding the political improvements occurring on its soil. More exactly, we must highlight two factors that directly conditioned the Italian position. Foremost, Italy was dubious about the real possibility to contain the violence perpetrated in Algeria, especially the barbarism executed by the GIA. Secondly, Italia had important economic and energetic interests in

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[387] *Ibid.,* p.131.
[388] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", *op.cit.,* pp.70-71.
[389] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, " The St. Egidio Platform for a peaceful solution of the Algerian crisis", *op.cit.,* p.12.
[390] Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015) , p.65, (1:12:40)

Algeria that hindered the practicability to assume a strong stance towards the Algerian regime. [391] Second, France was sincerely interested in the process of dialogue that materialized in Roma. The democratic and peaceful options had to supplant the military one, they said. However, we must pinpoint two factors that completely paralyzed France to invest more energy and time in the attempt to convince the regime to change its reflection about the Algerian crisis. First, operating in a government of cohabitation, Alain Juppé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Charles Pasqua, Ministry of Interior, both advocated two different projects to solve the Algerian conflict. Juppé was favorable to open a dialogue with the FIS and to use peaceful means in order to decrease the level of violence in Algeria. Pasqua aimed at rewarding the regime mainly because his primary preoccupation was the potential return of the Islamists in the political arena. He was scared of a violent Islamization in Algeria and of its repercussion in France especially concerning a new migratory flow. Second, as it had a colonial relationship with Algeria in the past, France would have seriously sustained the peaceful negotiation process in Roma only if those discussions ensured the preeminence of French interests – economic and energetic - in this North-African country.[392] Thus, as François Delooz puts it, *"(…) the French government at that time did not want. It did not mean that they were against. For them, the diplomatic opportunity relates to Algeria was: if we support this platform vis-a-vis the Algerian government that had said no since the outset, it would put us in a difficult position."* [393]

Acording to De Volder, *" (…) this text really deserved a strong support and it would have been a different story in Algeria."* [394] The western governments had to overcome their fear and to put aside their selfish-interests because the involvement of official authorities *" was necessary, of course. To constrain, to force the army and the power to accept the text or at least to engage in a negotiation. They could do that, but they stayed immobile."* [395] Finally, the Algerian civil society had to wait April 1999 with the election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to notice a remarkable decrease in the violence as well as the enactment of a " civil concord " that enabled the enforcement of the spirit of Sant'Egidio's platform in Algeria.[396]

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[391] MPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* p.98
[392] MPAGLIAZZO, Marco, GIRO, Mario, *op.cit.,* pp.96-133.
[393] Interview with Celine Francis and François Delooz (27/08/2015), p.146, (40:29)
[394] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.215, (37:55)
[395] Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015), p.215, (38:14)
[396] IMPAGLIAZZO, Marco, "La Plateforme de Rome pour l'Algérie", *op.cit.,* pp.81-86.

3.2.6 Preliminary conclusion

In relation to our first hypothesis (H1), we noticed that in spite of offering an authentic and free space to launch the peace talks, *the identity* of the CSE played an influential role in gathering and enhancing contacts among the Algerian constituent parties. In the case of Algeria, we must divide the identity of the CSE in two parts. First, its gratuitousness, impartiality, neutrality and friendship relationship with Algeria clearly encouraged Algerian stakeholders to entrust the facilitation process to the CSE. Additionally, they perceived a religious community that was definitely reliable in the sense that its activities were transparent and honest aiming expressly at helping its friends who were bleeding. Moreover, the CSE did not impose an agenda with clear definite rules and conditions; it is the participants who determined the rhythm of the discussion. In this fashion, the CSE could not have been perceived as a manipulator; the simple reason is that it constructed a peaceful environment that automatically impeded the adoption of such a behavior: the diplomats of Trastevere were never above the fray. Second, the religious identity of the CSE was a key-element to get a long-standing *consensus* among the Algerian contributors. According to them, such a Christian community who organized prayers to spiritually relieve the Algerian people as well as to initiate a message of hope to stop this civil war was a sign of respect. By showing its generosity and its mobilization to find out a comprehensive solution to Algeria, Algerian political and religious leaders understood that *the good offices* of the CSE represent a real opportunity to rebuild an Algerian society ruined by the ashes and tears. Eventually, despite the importance of the CSE's identity, we also discovered that the identity and personality of Algerian participants represented an essential source of motivation to sign the comprehensive agreement. As most of them loved and had written the history of Algeria, they certainly did not want to abandon their country to ruthless people. Accordingly, they deemed as primordial that Algerian representatives lead the example that Algeria is a family composed of brothers and sisters. In conclusion, (H1) is confirmed.

In response to our second hypothesis (H2), we observed that *before* the process of mediation began, the implantation of interreligious and cultural activities enabled the CSE to be in contact with both the Algerian church and the Muslim community. Those exchanges' programs were relevant because it allowed the CSE to take a picture of the country from the grassroots level but also to tie necessary transnational networks with Christian and Muslim leaders. Furthermore, as the CSE was not anymore an unidentified subject, its position gained in legitimacy, respect and credibility that fostered contacts with the Algerian political arena. *During* the good offices offered by the CSE, however, we

noticed the absence of the implantation of community working in Algeria or humanitarian aid deployed during the crisis. As Romano and De Volder explained, the CSE had to deal with an authoritarian military regime, which excluded any attempt to proceed on the Algerian soil: the reason of non-interference in internal affairs impeded the CSE to look after the poorest and the neediest. Nevertheless, the transnational ecumenical activities enhanced by these disparate religious actors permitted to embellish the reputation of the CSE; a reputation that will be added to its Christian status. Therefore, *this soft power* seduced spiritual leaders and eventually persuaded the political elites that the handling of the Algerian crisis should be held under the facilitation work of the CSE. Consequently, we must say that (H2) is confirmed.

In response to (H3), we have seen that the Italian government has played a crucial function by letting pass Algerian stakeholders on its soil. Despite this logistical assistance, we must emphasize that the *Colloques sur l'Algérie* were an initiative coming and driving exclusively from the CSE: no official actors joined the conferences. Even though the American diplomacy tried reasoning the Algerian regime to renew contact and accept a negotiation process with the opposing parties, all official actors – governments, institutions, organizations – were confined to applaud and welcome such a historical initiative. Thus, we notice a real absence of synergy both *at the table of the mediation* and *beyond* the process of mediation. Even though we may understand why no official diplomacies have been able to join the platform – mistrust and domestic issue were the main arguments -, these latters never mobilized their diplomatic channels – informal meetings for example - to give an additional support to the initiative of the CSE. Moreover, they never used *stick politics* to force or at least persuade the Algerian regime to embrace solutions that have been strictly debated between Algerian's representatives. Targeting especially Mediterranean countries, we easily witnessed for which reasons and purposes Italy and France did not have the ambition to harden their position towards Algeria. Between business interests and fear of increasing violence and immigration, both countries chose a conservative and passive stance in order to avoid the nightmare of the closed valve. As Track I did not actively merge with Track II diplomacy, we must assert that (H3) is not confirmed

3.3 The process of mediation in Kosovo: the shatter of a historical peace process

3.3.1 The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the conflict of Kosovo

Before going through the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, we must keep in mind four dynamics that transcended Kosovo for centuries. First, according to the Serbian perspective, Kosovo was, during the Great Migrations of the 7th century, the region where the Serbs first settled in order to latter constitute, along with Metohija, the Serbian medieval empire.[397] By this time, Kosovo was deemed as the heart of Serbia. Building monasteries and the first Serbian Othodox Churchs, Kosovo was thus perceived as *"the state, political, economic and cultural centre of the Serbian Nation".*[398] Considered as the spiritual nucleus of Serbs, the region of Kosovo formed the idea of the "the Great Serbia"; an empire where Kosovo embodied the seal of Serbian's identity and national liberty. Subsequently, Kosovar's Serbians have been very affected by the violent migratory flux that engulfed the region of Kosovo in the 18th century resulting to a critical alteration of the balance of power among both Serbs and Algerians : the penetration of thousands of Albanians completely reshaped the ethnical homogeneity of the region. This phenomenon joined by ethnical cleansing on both sides during the 19th and the first part of the 20th clearly transformed their mutual perception: a feeling of animosity was critical. [399] Second, according to Kosovar's Albanian perspective, however, their rights over the region of Kosovo were founded on the basis of their presence dating back over millennia to the ancient Illyrians. Thus their ethnic and cultural continuity with the Illyrians may hence explain the refutation arguing that Albanian's settlement in Kosova (Kosovo for Albanians) stretched back to the 19th century; an argumentation defended by Serbs that may, however, correspond to the first important Albanian's migrations around and inside Kosovo. Therefore, for the Albanians, it is Serbs who have committed efforts during the medieval era to denationalize the others in accordance with the Serbian expansion. [400]

The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia[401], a socialist federation led by its famous leader Josip Broz Tito, took form under the 1946 constitution allowing the reincorporation of Kosovo as an autonomous region into Serbia. But the constitution of 1946 made clear that every nationalities and minorities must be treated on an equal footing: the political supremacy cannot be assumed by one ethnical group. Indeed, the core idea of *titoism* was

[397] BOGDANOVIC, Dimitrije, " La question du Kosovo hier et aujourd'hui", *Revue des etudes Slaves,* Vol.56, No. 3, 1984, p.388.
[398] DASKALOVSKI, Zidas, " Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-determination", in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski, Lodon/Portland, FRANCK CASS PUBLISHERS, 2003, p.12.
[399] BOGDANOVIC, Dimitrije, *loc.cit.,* pp.391-392.
[400] KER-LINDSAY, James, *Kosovo. The path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans,* London/New York, I.B. Tauris, 2009, p.8.
[401] Composed of sixth republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia – and of two regions (later provinces) named Kosovo and Methohija.

to prevent the threat of a great Serbia.[402] At this stage of the process, we could already make two assertions. First, the status of Kosovo, for the Kosovo's Albanians, was very poor regarding their expectation to see this autonomous entity to become either a veritable Yugoslav republic – detached from the claws of Serbia – or incorporated into Albania. Second, avoiding to inherit the most numerous ethnical group, the Serbs, Marshal Tito decided that Kosovo had to be considered as an autonomous enclave under the rule of the constitution of Serbian republic.[403]

Allowing to enhance Albanian's cultural and educational developments as well as the practicing of their maternal language, it should be noted, however, that it is the communist Yugoslavia that enabled the crystallization of the national identity of Kosovo's Albanians. Recognizing the status of Albanians as a national minority - 17,2% in 1974 - as they lived in the Serbian territory, the latter ethnical groups becoming more organized, cohesive and confident with itself, undeniably benefited from both internal and external conditions that bolstered the capacity to gradually claim the delicate project of " rebuilding a Grand Albania", or at least that Kosovo be not usurped anymore by Belgrade. Still, we should not deny that " Albanian minorities " had a subordinate status that only allowed them to create their own cultural and social rights. Yet, this inferior status had a *transformative dimension.*[404]

In the sixties, in a context of an acute decentralization, Kosovo started being a veritable constitutive element of the Yugoslav's federalism as it became a federal category with an extensive autonomy: a Supreme Court was established, the Pristina University was founded – giving lectures in both Albanian and Serbo-Croat -, and the enactment of independent political decisions was possible. The Albanian's elites, along with educated people, understood that a path towards the recognition of Kosovo as a republic was underway; they started leading demonstrations in 1968 but without any conclusive results, however.[405] Reaching the edge of constitutional and administrative reforms, it should be noted, however, a huge shift in the position of Kosovo within the communist Yugoslavia with the fourth and final 1974 constitution. "*In 1974 Kosovo was upgraded from an autonomous region to an autonomous province of Serbia. (…) As a result, it now came to enjoy almost all the rights and privileges granted to a republic, including its own constitution, assembly and seat on the federal council. Crucially, though, it was denied the*

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[402] DUFOUR, Pierre, "La non-violence et la guerre au Kosovo", *Autres temps, cahiers d'éthique sociale et politique,* No.67, 2000, pp.14-15.

[403] KER-LINDSAY, James, *op.cit.,* pp.9-10.

[404] BOUGAREL, Xavier, "Kosovo: Une crise peut en cache une autre", *Politique étrangère,* No.3, 63ième année, 1998, p.634.

[405] KER-LINDSAY, James, *op.cit.,* p.10.

right of self-determination – a privilege theoretically enjoyed by republics".[406] Yet, even though the new status was a significant step forward for Kosovo's Albanians as they received some sovereignty's attributes, pressure for the province to be accepted as a republic – with the slogan "Kosovo republic" - kept on growing and soon Albanians proceeded to harassments, murdering or raping against Serbian persons. It should be noted that such violent and secessionist movements were in contradiction with international law. Even though a national minority should not be deprived of its allocated rights, the latter, however, do not have any rights to have a state through the argumentation of *people's rights to self-determination.*[407]

With Tito's death, national's germs in both camps, especially in the Serb one, will rapidly hatch tending either to keep control over their initial position or to go further by adopting strong and intolerant policies. Observing the flee of more than 400,000 Serbs, Belgrade, in 1986, began denouncing the *balancing policies* of Tito judged unfavorable to the Serbian Great Nation. According to them, it was time to purify the Federation and to stop the demographic invasion of Albanians inside Kosovo, the cradle of the Serb nation. Indeed, the ethnical balance was largely compromise since the percentage of the Serbian population drop from 23.6 percent in 1961 to 13.2 percent in 1981.[408] Hit by both a feeling of weakness and of precariousness, Kosovo's Serbian, intellectuals, politicians and the Orthodox Church, started to awaken the Serb's nationalism. It should be noted that cross-sectorial debate over the question of Kosovo was join with the coming six-hundreds anniversary of the famous battle of Kosovo: the rise of Serbian nationalism was already set up. Thus, the politicization of the question of Kosovo in Serbia will eventually lead to the organization of a memorandum regarding the potential reassertion of the Serb's authority over the province.[409] The result was, when Milosevic assumed the Presidency in Serbia in 1989, the suppression of the province's autonomy and the imposition of a martial law: an apartheid's regime started blossoming. Certainly, the initial aim was not simply to reestablish the Serb's sovereignty over this province, but also to modify the ethnical composition by depriving Albanians from its elites as well as by pushing them out of Kosovo.[410] Following the elimination of Kosovo's autonomy status, Albanian's riots materialized aspiring to express their dissatisfaction. Violently crushed by the Serbian police as well as by the Yugoslav's army, Ibrahim Rugova constituted the moderate

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[406] *Ibidem.*
[407] KOCHTOUNISTA, Voyislav, *Entre la force et le droit. Chroniques du Kosovo,* Lausanne (Suisse), l'Age d'Homme, 2002, pp.16-18.
[408] DUFOUR, Pierre, *loc.cit.,* p.15.
[409] KER-LINDSAY, James, *op.cit.,* p.10
[410] BOUGAREL, Xavier, *loc.cit.,* p.635.

nationalist party LKD party and in June 1991, before the approbation of a clandestine referendum declaring the independence of Kosovo – directly recognized by Albania -, was appointed as president of the unofficial "Kosova republic" urging softly and peacefully for an eventual UN recognition.[411] Despite the creation of a nonviolent parallel system that tried to cover all branches of public life (for instance, the Serbian state schools and the University of Pristina were boycotted by the Albanian students, an alternative educational and health and systems[412] were introduced and the deployment of diverse humanitarian associations such as Néma Térésa), the International Community never considered "the Republic of Kosovo" as a political reality legally founded.[413] Indeed (synonym?) *"in 1992, the Badinter Arbitration Committee, a body set up by the European Union to consider the legal issues arising from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, concluded that the six formal republics of Yugoslavia were states emerging from the collapse of the federation, and thus could be recognized. Crucially, though, Kosovo was not mentioned".* [414] Therefore, the internationalization of the question of Kosovo based on a peculiar wisdom of "non-violent politics" (renouncing to any maximalist idea such "the Grand Albania") fostered by Rugova and his party, the LKD, remained obsolete in reaching their initial claims. And this strategy *of giving all but receiving nothing in exchange* was even more confirmed when the peace talks in Dayton started off to put an end to the civil war in Bosnia. Although many Kosovo's Albanian, at first Rugova, thought that it was a chance for their own claims to be addressed, they quickly realized that the question of Kosovo will be kept off the agenda.[415] Indeed, *"Milosevic got angry, refusing to talk about this "Serbia's internal affair", and announcing that if the question was discussed, he would stop his mediation between Croats and Bosnians. The westerners, willing to quickly grasp the peace, have given up".*[416] In consequence, Rugova's pacifist policy as well as the LKD party were both marginalized. As a result, this lack of credibility, caused by a policy of passive resistance, conned Algerian's people into thinking that the only way to secure independence was to support the military solution. In February 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA-UCK) began their guerilla campaign against the institutions of the Serbian state as well as its police and refugees.[417] Taking over control of many parts in Kosovo in 1996-1998, the KLA's strategy was to set off unrests that the Serbs ultimately

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[411] THOMAS, N., MIKULAN, K., *The Yugoslav Wars (2). Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 1992-2001,* Oxford/New York, Osprey Publishing, Elite 146, 2006, p.32.

[412] It should be noted that in 199, the Government of Belgrade decided to dismantle all the Albanian's educational system comprising high schools and Universities.

[413] DASKALOVSKI, Zidas, *op.cit.,* p.15.

[414] KER-LINDSAY, James, *op.cit.,* p.11.

[415] *Ibidem.*

[416] DUFOUR, Pierre, *loc.cit.,* p.25.

[417] THOMAS, N., MIKULAN, K, *op.cit.,* p.32.

would feel compounded to fiercely react, *"thereby escalating the conflict and compelling the West to intervene, thus forcing the Serbs to grant Kosovo independence. Its covert agenda was to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of Serbs and other minorities".* [418] At this point of the Kosovo's conflict, we could already anticipate three predictions for the future of the region. First, as the US special envoy the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, puts it, KLA's activities shed light on a military organization identified as terrorist. [419]As a result, KLA's military actions deepened the Albanian national community crisis especially because it impeded Kosovo's Albanian elites to gather a responsible, cohesive and representative group of negotiators capable to activate diplomacy's channels.[420] Second, Milosevic could not stay mute. From 1998 onwards, he launched the " Operation Horseshoe " to reimpose Serb power over Kosovo by murdering and driving into exile thousands of Kosovo's Albanians: his initial aim clearly was to repopulate the province with Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. *" By Aug 1998 they had retaken 90 per cent of Kosovo, forcing the UCK to abandon most of its territory; hundreds of fighters and civilians were killed, and about 360,000 civilians (36 per cent of the total Kosovar-Albanian population) were driven from their homes, many fleeing to Albania and Macedonia".*[421]

Third, the international community started understanding that a new ethnic conflict was taking form, and its deep-violent crystallization would cause socio-political damages in the neighboring countries. Therefore, in March 1998, the Contact Group – Russia, United States, Britian, France, Germany and Italy – advocated that formal negotiations had to be set up among the disputing parties. Endorsing the initiative, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 which denounced both Serbia's immoderate force and the acts of terrorism organized by KLA: the talks should be focus on autonomy and serious self-determination. *"Responding to this, Washington initiated a peace process between the two sides. It was short lived. Although a meeting was held between Milošević and Rugova in mid-May, the process collapsed when Serbian security forces launched another major offensive against the KLA. By now, Western patience was already beginning to fray. At a meeting in June, NATO leaders authorised military commanders to begin planning for action".* [422]

3.3.2 The pre-mediation process: by where to begin ?

Before organizing any *individual* meetings with Milosevic and Rugova, the CSE was

[418] *Ibid.,* p.47.
[419] KER-LINDSAY, James, *op.cit.,* p.12.
[420] BOUGAREL, Xavier, *loc.cit.,* p.641.
[421] THOMAS, N., MIKULAN, K, *op.cit.,* p.48.
[422] KER-LINDSAY, James, *op.cit.,* p.12.

already present since 1990 in Albania, especially in the Tirana's observatory where the group of CSE composed of Mgr Vincenzo Paglia, Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Paolo Rago, Mario Giro and Andrea Riccardi started being very worried about the seriousness of the situation in Kosovo. As the situation in the Balkans deteriorated, with the forthcoming of the Bosnian war, the CSE proceeded to extend its contacts in the former Yugoslavia to encourage dialogue and peace. [423] As Roberto Morozo della Rocca puts it, "*the Community's effort had two goals—to facilitate dialogue among the religious communities engaged in the Yugoslavian war, that is, among Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim leaders; and to work on a settlement of the conflict in Kosovo*".[424]

 Even though ecumenical relationships between Orthodoxs (Kosovo's Serbians), Catholics (5% Kosovo's Albanians) and Muslims (95% Kosovo's Albanians) were very difficult to establish because of historical and psychological considerations, the CSE's interreligious orientation enabled the settlement of crucial diplomatic and religious contacts to smoothly approach top-leaders such as Milosevic and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. [425] From a Serbian perspective, it should be noted that thanks to a friendly relationship established between the CSE's diplomats and orthodox bishops, the latter supporting and enhancing the work pursued by this generous catholic community to find a solution for the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia, the delegation of CSE composed of Paglia and Morozzo had the opportunity to meet top-leaders of the Serbian government in 1993 in Belgrade. Furthermore, the interreligious platform organized each year also contributed to preserve good relationships and open new ones with critical religious personality representing the Serbian side. [426] Indeed, as Morozzo points out, "*(…) among the serbs, the catholic church was perceived in a friendly way in Belgrade with the patriarcha*".[427] It was crucial that the CSE maintain a good relationship with the orthodox churches mainly because it enabled to plan " *(…) a first meeting with Milosevic that took form thanks to the mediation of a Serbian bishop, a vojvodina's bishop, who was in the central synod of the Serbian church*".[428] From an Albanian perspective, the proximity developed with the Albanian's government, especially with the Albanian president Sali Berisha in Tirana, allowed Paglia, Riccardi and Morozzo to meet Rugova at the beginning of 1993. It should be noted that the meeting with Rugova

[423] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", in Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca (dir.), *L'art de la paix. La communauté de Sant'Egidio sur la scène internationale,* Paris, Salvator, 2012, p.187.

[424] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Community of Sant'Egidio in Kosovo", in David Smock (ed.), *Private Peacemaking. USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofits Organizations,* Washington, United States Institute of Peace, No.20, 1998, p.13.

[425] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontières. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.85.

[426] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.188.

[427] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.162 (12:08)

[428] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.162, (14:41)

has engendered consecutive ones in Rome at the headquarter of the CSE; all fermenting a friendly and peaceful relationship among the concerned persons.[429]

At this stage of the process, the CSE, due to the internationalization of their legitimacy obtained earlier with the peace agreement in Mozambique as well as of their precious network relationships with religious communities and officials, performed an informal groundwork capable to adequately induce a breakthrough in the respective mindset of both Milosevic and Rugova. But quickly representatives of Sant'Egidio understood that they will be confronted with *two peoples, two opposites reality* that did not ambition to live peacefully together.[430] Indeed, at the outset of the peace talks, the two parties categorically refused any facilitation process. As we have seen *supra*, Serbians and Albanians cultivated a sort of deeply rooted pathological memory that impeded both sides to recognize what united them.[431] According to Milosevic, Kosovo embodied an internal political question: "*Bosnia, it is Disneyland with regard what could happen in Kosovo*".[432]

As Serbs felt military powerful in this province, they could not have imagined granting the autonomy of Kosovo; a scheme of thinking that would mean the possible surge of "Great Albania". Regarding Albanians' perspective, however, Kosovo must not be deemed as a Serbian domestic question. On the contrary, it has to be perceived as a thorny affair that must be politically internationalized. Consequently, arguing that Albanians represented around 90 % of Kosovo's inhabitants, Rugova did not have the ambition to re-reach an autonomy status that would look like as an empty shell but asked directly for independence. Thus, their recommendation went farther than those sustained by Serbians: a wall seemed insurmountable in the eyes of the CSE.[433] Indeed, working in a province where two separate societies had a reciprocal hate for centuries did not pave the way for developing flexible strategies on the parts of CSE. And the creation of a parallel system in response to *the stick politics* planned by Serbia even more worsened the situation between both disputing parties mainly because it illustrated their unwillingness *to cast out old demons* and to develop new inclusive communicative channels. Thus, facing a strong inflexibility on the two parts, the specialists of the CSE 's efforts to relax the situation during 1994 and 1995 through individual sessions did not prove to be very optimistic. [434]

Despite this rigidity in both camps, the diplomats of Trastevere sustained their dialogue's

429 MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.188.
430 APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.290.
431 MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", *op.cit.,* p.175.
432Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.34, (23:44)
433 MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.188-190.
434 MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Community of Sant'Egidio in Kosovo", *op.cit.,* p.14.

efforts because they knew that their relationships with the respective parties could positively evolve towards the implementation of a mediation process. As Morozzo points out, *"(…) when we are with men, it will produce a relationship of friendship".* [435] At this stage of the process, we should emphasize external and internal circumstances that directly contributed to install a climate of trust – conducive for dialogue -, at least in appearance for the Serbs, between antagonist parties and the representatives of CSE. First, Albanians, specifically Rugova with his passive resistance policies, were convinced that the question of Kosovo would be resolved through the peace talks at Dayton. Put differently, *"Rugova, on his parts, the first two and three years, he had a great hope that Americans would support their causes but the thing that has made up the mind of Rugova to entrust us the mediation was that at Dayton, we did not talk about Kosovo. It was a great delusion to the Albanians. Then at this moment Rugova told us: the solution is in your hands".* [436]

Moreover, we should be aware that Albanians seemed like increasingly tired and psychologically and physically wounded due to a difficult humanitarian situation. Indeed, (synonym?) the parallel system rapidly became obsolete, children could not have an easy access to educational structures and hospitals were taking the form of improvised sanitary centers. The risk of thousands of stateless persons was enormous.[437] Second, concerning the shift in the Serbian position, Morozzo explains us that *"(…) Milosevic probably desired a reintegration within the international community and perhaps for himself it was important that there was, how to say, an international support for the mediation".* [438] In other words, we could understand the move undertaken by Milosevic as tactical in the sense that after the war in Bosnia and Croatia, he needed to "restore his image" to be partially reaccepted in the concert of nations as a responsible leader able to prove some novel attitudes: the reducing tension in Kosovo was certainly a piece of the puzzle. Eventually, we should not underestimate *"that Serbia was exhausted by sanctions, his direction was losing its unity. The public spirit, among Serbians, was depressed, the economy was devastated, the emigration important, the nationalist excitation with which Serbians had affronted the successive Yugoslav wars was just a faint souvenir".* [439]

In a context where specialists of the CSE detected an opening, both Serbs and Albanians eventually accepted CSE as the facilitator. From a Serbian perspective, having rebuffed several other offers of international mediation, Serbs judged convenient that such informal

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[435] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.169 (33:53)
[436] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.166, (23:44)
[437] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.193.
[438] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.167, (25/58)
[439] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.193.

diplomats could promote dialogue on a private, humanitarian and unofficial basis. They mainly welcomed the CSE's proposition of facilitation because of its good contacts, goodwill and impartiality. From an Albanian point of view, however, they deemed the CSE as a reliable religious entity because it was politically autonomous of the Serbian state. Therefore, they were convinced that it would speed up the internationalization of the question of Kosovo. [440] Therefore, both Serbian and Kosovo's Albanian authorities perceived the CSE as *"a honest entity, without particularistic interests, with the advantage to be known by the diplomacies"*. [441] As Morozzo specifies, the status of the CSE was essential to convince the disputing parties that a religious identity was better than a political, economic, financial or military one. *" For a mediation, it was better to be a religious entity because a religious entity doesn't have direct material interest".[442]*

3.3.3 The mediation process: a historical process destroyed by war

The establishment of direct mediation between representatives of Milosevic and of Rugova took time, however. The main point of contention that hampered any imaginable progress between the mediators was that the issue of the status of Kosovo had to be kept off the agenda: a step-by-step approach with potential spillover effects had to be adopted. [443] In order to unblock the situation, Rugova asked for some concessions such as the opening of border posts between Yugoslavia and Albania in 1996. Willing to find out a solution to the issue of Kosovo, Milosevic stopped behaving as an obstinate and tenacious leader and positively answered to Rugova's request: Albanians hence recognized that Serbs were proving their goodwill to accelerate the dialogue. By temporarily renouncing to construct their argumentation on the basis of *the maximum program* - the dialogue should not, however, bias the longer-term objective of independence -*,* Albanians overnight agreed, with the approval of Serbs' officials, to concentrate the mediation on a narrow set of questions out of political and institutional matters. By enhancing a step-by-step method of action stressing on concrete issues such as education, health care, judiciary, police, sport and culture, Paglia and Morozzo quickly acknowledged that for the first time, Serbs perceived Albanian population as a distinct community.[444]

When representatives of CSE started being seated more comfortably on the mediator's chair, they began initiating two types of diplomacy activities, humanitarian and observatory-advocacy ones, that have to be read in parallel with the work accomplished

[440] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.290.
[441] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.194.
[442] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.169, (33:12)
[443] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", *op.cit.,* p.188.
[444] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* pp.196-197.

during the Track 1.5 mediation process. First, members of CSE started penetrating the Kosovo's civil society by essentially giving humanitarian aids to people deprived of liberty and dignity. As Morozzo indicates, " (…) *yes humanitarian aids were medicals, for schools and it was things that were necessary for the population. But at the political level, it meant the elaboration of confidence building measures. (…) It is a demonstration of trust, interests and proximity and it was important for the native people"*.[445] Second, as the potential future agreement must be supported at the grassroots level, diplomats of Trastevere started endorsing a *workshop diplomacy* – Serbs on one side and Albanians on the other - with common people, local leaders, teachers and pupils in order to convince them that forthcoming peace talks are well and peacefully founded. This bottom-up strategy was capital in the first stage of mediation: specifically the organization of educational institutions.[446] As Morozzo clarifies, *" I traveled Kosovo and Serbia, I met the most possible people in order to understand, to get elements of discussion, to have information. We were not stick on a top-down approach. We had to see people and understand if a school was really given or used; what the youngest were thinking, if they were agreed with the mediation"*.[447] Therefore, by demonstrating a humanitarian interest rather than private ones, the unofficial diplomats increasingly built friendly personal relations at both official and grassroots level: the pubic opinion on both sides appeared enthusiastic.

Following multiple meetings in Rome between July and August 1996 between representatives of both sides, the educational agreement on school and university was signed on the first of September. Both Milosovic and Rugova, without having met each other, signed it respectively in Belgrade and Prestina. It was decided, through a general normalization of the educational system in Kosovo, that 300.000 Albanians children and teachers could go back to school and 12.000 to university after five years. Moreover the agreement asked for the setting up of a commission of three representatives from the government and three from the shadow Albanian government.[448] We should be aware that the international community deeply backed and encouraged the technical and humanitarian agreement achieved thanks to the CSE's commitment. The Contact Group, the European Commission, the United States, Italia and Great Britain were the most relevant actors that gave to mediators their tacit support. As we will also notice with works completed under the Commission 3+3, *" (…) substantially there were diplomats but without strong efforts*

[445] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.163, (17:12)
[446] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Sant'Egidio diplomacy in crisis areas", *op.cit.,* p.189.
[447] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.164, (19:14)
[448] KOFOS, Evangelos, THANOS, Veremis, "Kosovo: Efforts to solve the impasse", *The International Spectator, Italian Journal of International Affairs,* Vol.33 (2), 1998, p.135.

sought by governments. They appeared happy that the CSE was present at this moment. The European Union always supported us with statements and even the Americans have collaborated, first with Gelbard and after with Holbrooke to our mediation. And it was important for Milosevic and Rugova".[449]

On the aftermath of the ratification of the agreement, however, many obstacles and delays hindered the implementation of the agreement.*" Serbs for example, initially objected to Sant'Egidio's eventual role as chairman of the 3+3 commission established to implement the agreement, arguing that a domestic issue should not be resolved by means of international mediation."* [450] Nonetheless, Milosevic wanted to overcome its international isolation. He understood that CSE's proposal to lead the chair of the mediation was a unique opportunity to save time as well as his image. Indeed, the commission 3+3 represented a unique platform for enhancing dialogue between Serbs and Albanians; a platform that the international community failed to implement.[451]

The identity of the third-party played a role in building trust relationship with Rugova and Milosevic during the 3+3 commission, *" it was not something technical, it was a human question. We tried to understand the individual, to be understood and to free to share how we are, to show a psychological attention".* [452] Nevertheless, this sense of humanity, honesty and openness could not face the political turmoil that the mediation had awakened. Even though the 1996 agreement was theoretically perceived as a humanitarian platform designed to improve basic commodities in Kosovo, *the game and power of politics* systematically seized the mind of leaders as well as their respective representatives. Both camps did not want to irritate the nationalism and patriotism of their people. Both avoided seeming weak in the face of an historic enemy. Moreover, both sides started being pulled from their own ethnical group. Milosevic had to cope with an internal political crisis in 1997 – controversial elections, popular demonstration, and international sanctions as well as interventions about the quality of Serbian democracy – that urged him to re-establish a high-profile politics. In the meantime, Rugova's reputation was critically spoiled by the increase implicit recognition of Serbian authority: UCK forces started initiating their guerrilla.[453]

In this fashion, the implementation of the 1996 agreement could be imaginable only by concessions made by both antagonist parties. And it seemed like the CSE alone could not

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[449] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.136, (25:58)
[450] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.290.
[451] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.201.
[452] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.169, (35:22)
[453] *Ibid.,* p.203.

be able to convince both parties that became even more politicized by the stakes of the agreement: Track 1.5 had to function in balance with Track 1 in order to accelerate the process. Even though powerful nations and institutions never seated at the table of the mediation, we should not underestimate the diplomacy channels activated by such official actors. As Morozzo argues, *" there was the European Union, the Europeans. I remember there was an ambassador of the United Kingdom, an English who was very favorable to the mediation and had succeeded to create a personal relationship with Milosevic. He helped us."* [454]

Moreover, following this statement, we should also add in the picture the role undergone by both the Italian government which was vey enthusiastic with the initiative and the United States which supported the Albanian side. In this case, the Italian government, through its diplomats, expressed a collaborative approach for sustaining the activity of CSE especially by giving political contacts and information because the "word peace" had to envelop all squares of Kosovo. But, it was only a symbolical and sometimes technical support; the diplomats of Trasteveve were the only ones who directly regulated the peace talks. [455] Concerning the American involvement, we should keep in mind three influential names: Robert Gelbard, Richard Holbrook –diplomats from Washington – and Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State. Gelbard, a US special envoy, started building a dialogue with Milosevic and gave him two options: *"either be constructive in finding solutions to the Kosovo/a problem, or be punished by further sanctions and isolation if violence escalated in the region".* [456] Albright, considering the community as wonderful people, often unblocked the situation in order to convince Albanians that a participative and flexible approach should be adopted within the commission 3+3. [457] Eventually, the Contact Group regularly supported the work achieved by the CSE through statements. Even though the character of these declarations is often symbolical, we observe a real political commitment – through technical or political assistance – to ensure the implementation of the 1996 agreement. [458] Moreover, it should be noted that since February 1998, the Contact Group expressly denounced the act of violence and threatened Belgrade for the instauration of package of sanctions if Kosovo's Serbs did not stop

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[454] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.171, (40:25)
[455] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p.172, (42:58)
[456] ABAZI, Enika, "The role of international Community in Conflict Situation. Which way forward? The case of the Kosovo/a conflict", *Balkanologie,* Vol.VIII, No.1, 2004, p.24.
[457] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,*p.204.
[458] Contact Group, Statement on Kosovo, Bonn, 25 march 1998, in KRIEGER, Heike, *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documenation 1974-1999,* Cambirdge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.126-127.

crushing Albanian's villages.[459]

Even though a timetable was established, concessions made by Milosevic and its representatives were insufficient [460] in the eyes of Albanians, especially for the UCK that became even more strategic and popular in its military activities when Kosovo's Serbians refused to leave the educational buildings. Indeed, the rise of the UCK – KAL – did not only represent a threat to Serbians but also to Rugova's representatives. [461] Perceived as a complicated element that mediators had to deal with, Morozzo clearly explains us that *"the Albanian guerilla had said to the three representatives that they could do nothing, otherwise they were killed. It was something additional, there was not only directives from Rugova that were important for these three persons."* [462] Indeed, regardless of some opening obtained during the committee sessions, both Albanians and Serbians were hit by a mystic of despair as well as a feeling of pride for their community: the war was coming and diplomats of Trastevere were completely powerless for restoring the situation. Indeed, despite a last attempt on February 1999, where both Serbs and Albanians decided to fully implement the 1996 agreement, the doves of Rugova were too weak to fight with the hawks of UCK. The escalation of violence, with the culminating intervention of NATO forces completely hampered the CSE efforts to prevent the conflict through mediation and dialogue.[463] *"In Kosovo, Sant'Egidio opposed the logic of the wall against the wall, of the reciprocal intransigence, of the ethnical hate."* [464]

3.3.4 Preliminary conclusion

In response to our first hypothesis (H1), the identity of the CSE, for the first time, enabled both parties to sign an agreement on technical and humanitarian matters. As we have seen, it is through its high degree of impartiality, honesty and humanity that the CSE was able to build bridges among diverse sphere of authorities (official, religious, informal). Moreover, we must underline that it is the identity's features of the CSE that persuaded both Milosevic and Rugova to entrust the mediation work to such a Christian community. Milosevic was attracted by its privacy, humanitarian and informal aspects. Even though he

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[459] ABAZI, Enika, *loc.cit.,* p.25.

[460] It should be noted that despite the granting of universitary faculties and campus, the Institute of Albanian studies of the Pristina University has also been transfered to Albanians.

[461] RICCARDI, Andrea, *Sant'Egidio. L'Evangile au-delà des frontiers. Entretiens avec Dominique Chivot, op.cit.,* p.87.

[462] Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, (02/09/2015), p168, (31:21)

[463] APPLEBY, R. Scott, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence and Reconciliation, op.cit.,* p.291.

[464] MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, Roberto, "Kosovo: l'accord Milosevic-Rugova", *op.cit.,* p.214.

strongly maintained that Kosovo's question was a domestic issue, he tolerated an unofficial actor for bringing new opportunities and solutions to facilitate the dialogue between both disputing parties. The position of Rugova, however, was easier to uncover. As a sense of guarantee, he accepted the CSE's proposal mainly because it was an independent's actor from the Serb. Furthermore, the antagonist's sides agreed to continue working with the CSE because both the step-by-step approach proposed for the educational dialogue and the accomplishment of humanitarian aid shed light on an actor that did not have any selfish interests to reach: only a psychological attention on the conflict predominated. Eventually, we could say that some religious values can be founded in the manner of how the CSE drove its process of mediation. The idea of friendship, closeness and respect were key-elements that fostered peace talks among the rival parties. Thus, there was the creation of a *consensus* at the beginning of the process of mediation. The latter, however, gradually evaporated rendering the agreement void and null. Moreover, the identity of the CSE did not bring peace at all. As conflict proceeds, we easily identified that the goodwill of the CSE was becoming powerless with deep-rooted issues covering essentially political and psychological facets of Serbian and Albanian's daily lives. The dove of Sant'Egidio started losing its feathers when both UCK and Milosevic's army brutally fought against each other. In my opinion, we should say that (H1) is verified. If we stick to the *process,* we must say that identity of the third-party played a constructive and encompassing role in building, at least in the beginning, an apparent recognition between both disputants. And this process was historical when we know that their cohabitation for centuries was based on ethnical cleansing and mutual hatred.

In response to the second hypothesis (H2), we easily identified two types of embededdnes. *Before* the process of mediation, diplomats of Trastevere were already present since 1990 in the region. In other words, they had already taken an alarming picture of the situation in Kosovo. Their initial embeddedness permitted to successfully tie network relationships with both officials and religious leaders. This friendly closeness enabled to open a window of opportunity: the planning of consecutive individual meetings with Rugova and Milosevic, followed by their respective representatives. Indeed, from a Serb's perspective, we should take into account two factors that have contributed to forge links with Serbian rulers. First, interreligious activities shed light upon a religious community that aimed at finding a durable solution for the conflict in Kosovo. Second, the close-relationship with orthodox bishops enabled the CSE to widen its contacts embracing specifically the political sphere. From an Albanian's perspective, the friendly relationship with the

Albanian President, Sali Berisha, allowed the CSE to gradually approach political leaders living in the province of Kosovo. Moreover, it should be noted that the question of reputation and prestige accumulated by the CSE also increased the creation of linkage with both antagonist's groups. *During* the process of mediation, they used two different instruments that permitted to construct a real but difficult relationship with Kosovar inhabitants: the deployment of humanitarian aids and the organization of a workshop diplomacy. This human interest to find out a solution to the crisis or at least to diminish its intensity demonstrated to the population as well as to political leaders that the CSE had to be integrated as a key player in the game of politics. In my opinion, the second hypothesis (H2) is confirmed.

In response to the third hypothesis (H3), we easily observed that the activation of official diplomatic channels helped the CSE to promote its peacemaking's endeavors. Even though they were never seated at the table of mediation, the role played by the Contact Group, United States, United Kingdom and Italia (at a lesser extent) was very precious to either widen political strategies – stick's politics - and opportunities or to directly – face-to-face meeting – rationalize the rival parties that the concluded agreement must be respected and implemented as soon as possible. Additionally, as we have seen with both the United Kingdom and the United States, official diplomats have been trying to tie close relationships with either Milosevic or Rugova in order to convince them that the elements of the agreement were more than satisfactory. Moreover, the participation of officials was relevant because it seemed like the CSE faced a lack of resources and authority to bring parties to enforce the 1996 agreement. Thus, as the commission 3+3 became spoiled with the merciless political and ethnical context, the CSE alone could not deal with an atmosphere deeply imprinted of high-politics concerns. In my opinion, the third hypothesis (H3) is confirmed in the sense that an implicit fusion - *beyond the table of mediation* - between Track 1 and Track 2 was necessary to encourage – for a short period of time – the implementation of the agreement.

4. Conclusion

Throughout our study, the objective has been to characterize and measure the emergence of an unofficial actor, the community of Sant'Egidio, active in the oldest and cherished prerogative of the nation-state: diplomacy in the process of mediation. Our theoretical framework allowed us to both raise our awareness and give proper tools to discern the diplomatic activities endorsed by such an informal-authentic actor. First, by choosing Transnationalism and Network paradigms, we have been able to understand the

mechanisms that distinguish interconnection encompassing a plurality of actor – both states and non-states actors –from interconnectedness happening exclusively at a state-centric level. Even though those paradigms do no claim that states are out of the interconnected world in which we live today, it demonstrates, however, that relationship between states do not prevail anymore in international relations. Moreover, taking distance from a monolithic political world, those paradigms made us receptive towards new forms of association as a mechanism, which is not static: dynamism, interdependence and continuous political penetration highlights these new type of human mobilizations. Providing us a toolkit for identifying and measuring the persistent patterns of relations that structure and shape the ties between agents, this theoretical background enabled us to appreciate the dynamics and scopes of human relationships when process of mediations are occurring in country spoiled by violence, fear and poverty.

Second, we attempted to organize the structure of our theoretical framework by keeping an eye on *the process* and *conditions* that motivate informal actors to seek peacemaking initiatives worldwide. It was particularly relevant to look at reasons and factors – internal and external – that explained us in which circumstances civil society's organizations have been able to build new ties and ambitions to deal with such a world in continuous mutation. In other words, observing a shift in the distribution of power, we tried to understand not only the *sources* of this new mosaic of governance but above all the *consequences* that could help us to perceive this new bottom-up process. Evolving in an interdependent world where borders seem just like a drawn on a map, we noticed that people are more inclined to reason beyond a national framework: mentalities and citizenship shifts in part because of this *debordering effect*. Thus, we must say that a new type of identity emerges; cosmopolitan's affiliation appears to push these sensitized individuals to set up transnational operations in order to defend their *ethos* but also to spread human values and principles aiming at fostering a sense of responsibility and capacity.

In other words, in a context of decentralisation's processes where the source of initiative and energy shifts from the top to the lower level of human organization, we have been suitably immersed in the study of the raising awareness of the people who are henceforth active and not passive in the conduct of international relations *inside*, *outside* and *between* their home country and foreign nation-state.

Additionally, this background allowed us to better appreciate two crucial changes regarding the regulation and implementation of diplomacy in emergency situations. Today,

peacemaking activities, *understood in the sense of the management of conflicts through the use of mediation*, appear to be gradually privatized: civil society organisations enter in the room of high politics by setting up transnational operations aiming at achieving peace. Despite a remarkable self-empowerment regarding the formation of citizens' mindset – an informed and receptive citizen of the current developments happening worldwide -, the realization of grassroots strategies to handle bloody crisis is occurring mainly because of two reasons. First, we noticed that states downsize their role as service providers both domestically and transnationally.

Second, we face today new categories of conflict: we are not coping only with inter-states conflicts but also with intra-states conflicts. Qualified as deep-rooted or intractable conflicts, peacemakers are dealing with complicated asymmetrical and multi-dimensional conflicts that shed light on the unconformable position on the subject of official actors: the use of hard power seems more and more ineffective to solve deep-rooted issue dividing or alienating citizens for years. Indeed, our theoretical background explained us that new instruments, schemes of thinking, and politico-cultural approach had to be advanced in order to suitably assess the intensity as well as the reasons of this new category of conflict. In other words, the appeal of unofficial actors is mainly because they rely on strategies that aim at looking for and handling causes of conflicts by repairing the social fabric of the communities affected by the hostility. In this fashion, as our study analyses the peacemaking's efforts fostered by a catholic community, we discover another politico-cultural direction that had to be read in parallel with the phenomenon of the privatization of diplomatic channel: the humanization and moralization of diplomacy.

As we have seen there is a need to infiltrate into the crisis, to grasp the nature and intensity of the conflict and finally to shift the mutual-perception of groups' identity and interests in order to pave the way towards peace: the understanding of the conflicting parties' psychology is therefore critical. Faith-based actors, putting the emphasis on core-values such as family, empathy, pacifism, the sanctity of life, attempt to penetrate the inside of individuals by diffusing a soft but powerful medicine based on human and moral concepts. Displaying a new type of transcendental identity, faith-based mediation was explored in order to understand the activation of this anthropological dimension in conflict management's situation. Undeniably, our research on the traditional way to proceed *before*

and *during* a process of mediation allowed us to perceive the main pillars of such a diplomatic intervention.

However, as we have seen through the concept of Multi-Track diplomacy, we could not have any rights to assume that official actors are definitely obsolete when we refer to a process of mediation. Even though Track II – nongovernmental process encompassing many different type of actors - or Track 1.5 – proceeding of mediation between nongovernmental and official actors - helped us to adequately perceive the scope and the strength of a process of mediation managed under the good offices of such original actors, the theory enlightened us also towards another scheme of thinking: collaborative action and synergy between all actors is often conducive for grasping better outcomes. Indeed, the share of opportunities and resources may produce mutual enrichment. Finally, we decided to categorize and understand the community of Sant'Egido from the inside in order to first confirm the theoretical contribution and second prepare the ground for the analysis of our case studies. This section was particularly relevant because we learned what were the different diplomatic channels promoted by the community of Sant'Egidio. First, we noticed a *preventive diplomacy* through the embeddedness of the relevant stakeholders working for the religious organizations. Second, we explored the *interreligious platform* organized each year by the community of Sant'Egidio; a peculiar space that enables on the one hand free politico-religious debates between politico-religious leaders; on the other, the creation of new relationships and linkages. Third, we look at the moral status, methodology, source of power, and core-values enhanced by the community of Sant'Egidio in order to correctly value its ability as well as its propensity to engage in a contemporary conflict. Eventually, it should be noted that the religious and moral background enabled us to envelop with more adroitness the diplomatic activity cultivated by the community of Sant'Egidio.

Therefore, it is on this theoretical basis and to answer to our research question *"under what conditions does the community of Sant'Egidio is able to build a process of mediation in order to embrace effectiveness?"* that we opted to a qualitative analysis – in conjunction with books and formal statements - based on semi-structured interviews. The exploitation of these interviews aimed at discussing on the three following hypotheses.

The first hypothesis postulated that the identity of the third-party is critical to enhance a process of mediation. Our three case studies have confirmed the hypothesis. The transcendental power of the identity of the community of Sant'Egidio was effective both

before and *during* the process of mediation. It should be noted that antagonist parties from Mozambique, Algeria, and Kosovo have been willing to entrust the process of mediation – facilitation for Algeria – to the community of Sant'Egidio because they knew that this faith-based actor had no political or economic vested interests in their respective country. Moreover, the autonomous status of the community of Sant'Egidio, join by its transparency, – through informal meetings and parallel activities -, gratuitousness, and honesty – its humanitarian approach and reputation - boosted target stakeholders to improve their trust in such an actor that had the only ambition to bring peace and serenity in territories shattered by war.

Additionally, the lack of leverage and manipulative means attracted target negotiators because they knew that Sant'Egidio did not have the capacity to impose a scheme of action for paving the way towards peace. Animated by a pluralistic heart, we must underline that the impartial and neutral positions of the community of Sant'Egidio shed light on its willingness to never choose one side in particular: both sides were systematically treated on an equal footing. Gradually a confident atmosphere was built. The implementation of a humanistic approach based on respect and generosity allowed the disputing parties to evolve in a peaceful and confident atmosphere; a climate conducive to a mutual recognition because *step-by-step* they learned a new common language. This new language was penetrated by a vocabulary emphasizing moral and human values such as the sense of the family, unity, and reciprocity. Embedded in a peaceful language, the identity of the community of Sant'Egidio did not simply *attract* disputing parties to join the table of the mediation, it also *transformed* their attitudes and methods of reasoning by implementing an authentic space of discussion that could not be found in their home country. Moreover, even though the religious identity was less powerful in Kosovo, it contributed to the consolidation of this virtuous framework. Join by the use of moral suasion, the organization of prayers impacted on the psychology of the antagonist parties: it was perceived as a sign of respect. In conclusion, the identity of the community of Sant'Egidio brought guarantees as well as trusts before and during the process of mediation. The disputing parties never had doubt over the scheme of thinking of the parts of the community of Sant'Egidio.

The second hypothesis presupposed that the embeddedness of the networking of relevant stakeholders coming from the community of Sant'Egidio is conducive to the setting up of a comprehensive process of mediation. Our three case studies have validated the

hypothesis. By fostering humanitarian campaigns, interreligious and cultural dialogue or interests to take place in the region in order to develop a constructive proximity with key political or religious leaders, the community of Sant'Egidio has been able to penetrate slowly the politico-civil society. The consequences are multiple. First, this local settlement enabled Sant'Egidio to develop a profound *understanding* of the crisis situation and its origins. The knowledge of the conflict situation was capital for two mean reasons. On the one hand, to nourish and extend the awareness as well as the reflection of the community of Sant'Egidio. On the other, to transmit an image of a faith-based actor that is *interested* in meeting native people – official or unofficial – in order to constitute its own appreciation of the circumstances at stake: it was capital for gaining the trust of the parties.

Second, in connection with the first point, the relevant stakeholders have been persisting in building network relationships with key persons in order to constitute worthy human interconnections. In our three case studies, we observed that it was nearly always *via* religious contacts – Christian or Muslim – that the community of Sant'Egidio entered in connection with prestigious and central political leaders. This spillover effect was essential to set up *early talk:* a learning process took place slowly enabling the parties to show their true face. Third, the implementation of relevant stakeholders coming from the community of Sant'Egidio allowed unveiling their unique personality. Indeed, the question of transparency and goodwill were paramount in order to convince opposing parties that they were dealing with an actor, which *cares* about the collateral impacts of the conflict situation. This human and/or humanitarian appeal was often considered as a first step for producing a *breakthrough* inside the target political society. Just to be clear, in the case of Algeria, it was mainly through the long-standing ecumenical dialogue with both Christian and Muslim communities that the community of Sant'Egidio has been able to shed light on essential values such pluralism and tolerance. In conclusion, the question of embeddedness was crucial to prepare a fertile ground for the subsequent good offices's operations launched by the community of Sant'Egidio.

The third hypothesis postulated that the peacemaking's efforts foster by the community of Sant'Egidio are enhanced by the conjunction of official actors. Our three cases studies have partially confirmed the hypothesis. Even though we may agree that there was a favourable enthusiasm for the three diplomatic initiatives - resulting in the adoption of politico-legal statement endorsing the course of action - the international community has

not been active either *inside* the process or *beyond* the table of mediation in Algeria. We highlighted many reasons but the most important ones were: first, the argument of non-interference on the parts of the regime; second the strategic position of western countries such as France and Italy that paralyzed them from the outset. As a result, we had to deal with a passive and conservative position on the parts of the most essential official players that could have a productive impact in the conflict situation. Neither *stick* nor *carrot* politics have been used by the international community in order to put pressure on the regime to accept the agreement.

However, for Mozambique and Kosovo, we noticed the activation of Track One diplomatic channel *beyond* the table of mediation. Indeed, even though the nature of these conflicts is radically different, the international community committed itself to put pressure on – friendly for Mozambique and more aggressively for Kosovo, especially regarding Milosevic – the disputing parties to move forward in order to accept the peace/technical agreement. Indeed, in both cases, when the mediation was blocked, secret or informal meetings took place directly between the international community and the target negotiator. In this case, the *raison d'être* of the activation of Track One was not simply to support or to boost the process of mediation; it was also to ensure that a spirit of friendliness and trust lasts until the signature of the agreement. Therefore, the implementation of a parallel diplomatic channel has been perceived as efficient to foster the process of mediation: synergy and complementarity strategies were effective.

Moreover, in the case of Mozambique, we had to deal with a specific situation where Track One was directly *involved* either as mediator or observer. First, Italy was present at the table of the mediation. Its presence was legitimated mainly because it contributed directly to the internationalisation of the conflict. Moreover, it ensured a slight institutional framework where both parties could discuss freely while keeping an eye on the scope of the outcomes: guarantees were fundamentals. Observers joined the table of mediation for two mean reasons. First, when there was an impasse, a broader flexibility started flourishing. Observers never had an active role but they had the power to meet the disputing parties – in the attempt to reason the disputing parties – and to provide advices and information to mediators about eventual opportunities or plans of action. Second, as the peace agreement was based on politico-military issues, the international community gradually join the table of mediation in order to give its expertise: technical issues had to be solved by experts. Moreover, the question of the implementation of the

agreement as well as the transitional period had to be elucidated with the presence of key players as the UN or the United States. The community of Sant'Egidio had to accept the cooperation with such official leaders in order to enforce the agreement. At different stage of the process, new complementarities had to be created in order to ensure that the peace agreement will last. The case of Mozambique is an illustrative example of the implementation of the Multi Track system.

We are conscious that our observation is strictly limited on our case study as well as on the content of our interviews. By attempting to establish a comparative system based exclusively on three case studies, we highlighted concrete conclusions that could be useful to analyse other conflicts situations where non-state actors are playing the role of mediator. The Carter Center is good example. Moreover our method to analyse the evolution of the process of mediation may have been original in order to grasp *internal* factors that motivated and legitimated the community of Sant'Egidio in its action of good offices. However, it seems reasonable to think that only a part of the puzzle has been resolved. Other factors and hypotheses could have been asked in order to widen our field of study. I think personally to the political structure of the country that could help us to better understand and measure the scope and level of influence of the diplomatic strategies developed by the community of Sant'Egidio. Therefore, our observation and conclusion must be completed by additional reflections. But it can also represent to us a fertile ground on which we could elaborate new method of analysis.

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Annex 1

Actor	A States as units	B Governmental subunits	C International organizations as units	D Subunits of international organizations	E Transnational organizations as units	F Subunits of transnational organizations; also certain individuals
A States as units	IS	TG	IS	TG	TN	TN
B Governmental subunits	TG	TG	TG	TG	TN	TN
C International organizations as units	IS	TG	IS	TG	TN	TN
D Subunits of international organizations	TG	TG	TG	TG	TN	TN
E Transnational organizations as units	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN
F Subunits of transnational organizations; also certain individuals	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN	TN

IS = Interstate interactions
TG = Transgovernmental interactions
TN = Transnational interactions
TG + TN = Transnational relations
TG + TN + IS = World politics interactions

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Annex 2

Figure 1

DIAMOND, Louise, McDonal, John W., *Multi-Track Diplomacy. A Systems Approach to Peace,* Third Edition, West Hartford (Connecticut), Kumarian Press, 1996, p.15

Annex 3

List of questions that were asked to Roberto Mororozzo della Rocca; Leone Gianturco; Don Angelo Romana and Jan De Volder. It should be noted that most of them preferred to speak in French rather than in English. Leone Gianturco made the interview in English.

1. Comment decriez-vous la communauté de Sant'Egidio?
   How would you describe the community of Sant'Egidio?

2. Comment qualifiriez-vous la diplomatie de Sant'Egidio?
   How would you qualify the diplomacy of Sant'Egidio?

3. Quelles sont les causes/raisons qui ont déclenché le conflit armée au Mozambique, Algérie et Kosovo?
   What were the main causes/reasons that have triggered the armed conflict in Mozambique, Algeria and Kosovo?

4. Quelles sont les raisons/motivations qui ont amené Sant'Egidio à intervenir au Mozambique, Algérie et Kosovo ?
   What were the main reasons/motivations that pushed Sant'Egidio to intervene in Mozambique, Algeria and Kosovo?

5. Comment l'église catholique était-elle perçue au Mozambique, Algérie et Kosovo?
   How the Catholic Church was perceived in Mozambique, Algeria and Kosovo

6. Avant et pendant le conflit, Sant'Egidio s'est-elle implantée localement afin d'apporter une aide humanitaire et/ou spirituelle aux Mozambicains, Algériens et Kosovars? Y-a-t-il eut un impact sur sa légitimité/crédibilité?

Before and during the conflict, did Sant'Egidio embed itself locally in order to provide humanitarian and/or spiritual 's aids towards Mozambicans, Algerians and Kosovars? Was there an impact on its legitimity/credibility?

7. Sant'Egidio a-t-elle établit des liens avec la société civile afin de comprendre et écouter les personnes concernées par le conflit? Ou sommes-nous restés dans une approche top-down?

Did Sant'Egidio establish networks with the civil society in order to understand and listen the people involved in the conflict? Or did we remain in a top-down approach?

8. Quels étaient les principales caractéristiques des parties belligerents? Avez-vous remarqué une evolution dans leur relation?

What were the main features that characterized the belligerent's parties? Have you noticed an evolution regarding their relationship?

9. Pourquoi les parties belligérentes ont-elles fait appel à Sant'Egidio comme médiateur?

Why did the belligerent's parties ask to Sant'Egidio to be a mediator?

10. Le status religieux a-t-il facilité la mediation entre les deux parties?

Did the religious status facilitate the mediation between the two parties?

11. Le status religieux a-t-il alimenté la confiance entre les deux parties?

Did the religious status contribute to set trust between the two parties?

12. Avez-vous remarqué la présence d'acteurs officiels lors du processus de mediation? Si oui, cela a-t-il influencé le cours des médiations?

Have you noticed the presence of official actors during the process of mediation? If yes, did the presence influence the process of mediation?

13. Comment les parties belliérentes se font pénetrer par la paix?

How the belligerent parties are penetrated by peace?

List of questions that were asked to Célien Francis, François Delooz. It should be noted that I did not expect the presence of François Delooz; thus I had to adapt my questions during the interview. The set of questions treat only the question of the NGOs. Céline Francis did not have a great expertise regarding the diplomatic activities of the community of Sant'Egidio.

1. Comment les ONG préparent-elles une mediation pour la paix dans un conflit intra-étatique?
2. Les ONG sont ells capables de construire la paix sans une aide externe? Ou faudrait-il adopté une demarche de synergie entre tous els acteurs concernés?
3. L'identité de l'ONG est-elle une condition préalable à sa réusite ou à son éhec?
4. Pouvez-vous m'expliquer comment les ONG arrivent-elles à être assise à une table de mediation?
5. Les ONG ont-elles besoin de ressources spécifiques afin de rapprocher les parties opposes et d'établir un accord de paix durable?
6. L'identité religieuse permet-elle de favoriser un climat de confiance entre les parties?
7. Afin de se positioner en tant que médiateur, les ONG, au préalable, doivent-elles dan sun premier temps tisser un réeau social afin de gagner en légitimité?
8. Pourquoi les parties concernées voudraient-elles fair appel à une ONG ?

Annex 4: Interviews

Interview with Céline Francis and Francois Delooz (27/08/2015)

M = Martin Balbachewski

C = Céline Francis

F = François Delooz

C: Mon nom est Céline Francis, je travaille à Sant'Egido depuis janvier de cette anée ci. Et donc j'ai travaillé pendant longtemps sur la question de la resolution de conflits. Donc, surtout à l'UCL et à la VUB et j'ai un doctorat sur la question de la resolutions dans le cocase et en particulier sur le conflit sur la Géorgie et l'Abkhazie. Donc j'ai travaillé justement sur la question de la resolution de conflits "Multi-voies", Multi-Track comme on dit en anglais, au niveau de cette region spécifiquement. J'ai un livre qui est accessible online avec toute ma these, si vous en avez besoin.

M: alors on verra en fonction du temps, j'ai plus ou moins sept ou huit questions, elle sont plus l'une de l'autre…. Alors ce que j'aimerais savoir , c'est selon vous les grandes démarches à suivre lorsque les ONG ont la possibilité de participer au processus de resolution des conflits.

Interruption: a new speaker joined us (it was not planned, thus I had to adapt my questionnaire or change it).

M: dans ce contexte ci, on pourrait quelque part se dire que l'ONG avant de se retrouver autour d'une table des negotiations doit faire un travail antérieur, doit être présente sur le terrain. Est-ce que selon vous, c'est une hypothèse ou c'est souvent le cas que l'ONG dans un premier temps doit travailler dans une perspective bottom-up

et vraiment tisser un réseau social afin de monter et de pouvoir rencontrer des personnes plus importantes et de pouvoir fonder sa crédibilité et sa légitimité.

C: Je te propose (à Francois Delooz) que je réponde de manière plus globale et que toi tu puisses des informations concernant Sant'Egidio.

M: Ok, parfait.

C: Donc moi cela sera plus au point de vue générale. Je pense qu'on pas spécialement besoin pour faire de la rsolution de conflits d'être présent sur le terrain. C'est à dire qu on a la possibilité d'avoir de la place pour les différents acteurs. Pour moi, une bonne résolution de conflits, ne se fait pas par un acteur uniquement, et ce fait à tous les niveaux de la société. Donc, tant au niveau local, c'est-à-dire au niveau de la société civile. Puis au niveau politique , plutôt official, formel. C'est ce qu'on appel la voie un. Donc plusieurs acteurs peuvent être nécessaires pour intervenir pour la résolution de conflits et il ya des avantages et des inconvénients mais tout depend du but et d el'objectif qu'on veut atteindre. Si vous parlez plutôt de médiation, vous pouvez tant avoir des médiateurs locaux, c'est-à-dire des médiateurs partiaux ou impartiaux, qui peuvent intervenir. Et qui connaitront le context, qui conaitront particulierment la culture. Ce qui est toujours plus facile pour négocier ou pour conduire une mediation. Mais vous pouvez égalementa voir, ce qui se passé souyvent mainetnat, des ONG qui viennet de l'extérieur et qui vont apporter une expertise. Parce que l'idée d'un facilitateur, généralement, c'est d'avoir quelqu'un qui va inviter les personnes, qui va faciliter la comiunication et donner une ceratine expertise.

M: ce qui est le cas de Sant'Egidio, plus ou moins.

C: ça je laisserai mon collègue parler, moi je parle de générale et je vous laisse parle de Sant'Egidio. Donc, on a ce côté expertise qui peut être apporté par des acteurs qui sont actifs dans d'autres régions du monde et qui ont acquis cette expertise là. Donc, il y a des avantages évidemment à être du terrain, à avoir une présence locale, parce qu'il y-a une connaissance de la culture, de la psychologie, de la manière de parler qui sont extrêmement utiles. Et il ya des avantages et des inconvénients à venir de l'extérieur. L'inconvénient est tant qu'on reste en externe. On est quelqu'un qui n'a

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ura jamais la connaissance exacte de la culture, du contexte, des parties mais qui peut apporter ce point de vue externe et l'expertise nécessaire pour amener à avancer dans les négociations ou dans les médiations.

M: Bien sûr, ok. Vous voulez qu'on procède comment ? Vous pouvez juste vous présenter.

F : mon nom est Francois Delooz et je suis directeur de Viva Africa, qui est l'ONG de Sant'Egidio en Belgique. Donc par rapport à cette question là. D'une part, je dirais souvent dans les médiatiosn dans lesquelles Sant'Egido est engagée il ya aussi des communautés, des groupes au niveau locale. Ce qui fait qu'il ya une connaissance du terrain. Même si ce ne sont pas les personnes de ces groupes qui vont être directement impliquées dans le processus de médiation. Mais fatalement, il y-a une connaissance du grade à cette situation du terrain et l'information peut monter. Les personnes qui vont s'engager directement dans les médiations, donc ce seront disons, la plupart du temps, des italiens, mais qui ont une grande expertise et une grande connaissance de la région. Donc il ya un peu une répartition qui se fait par continent mais aussi au sein d'un contient, où on est quand même le plus présent ; l'Afrique de l'Ouest, l'Afrique Centrale ou monde Arabe. Il y a un peu différentes expertises. Donc je vais dire qu'on combine un peu les deux apsects. Car je crois, en effet qu'il est fondamental que si une ONG intervient dans une médiation, il y a une connaissance de terrain. Si ce n'est pas le cas, on fera plus de dégâts qu'autres choses si on ne connaît pas un minimum la psychologie, le langage, la culture locale. Les résultats ne seront dès lors pas positifs.

M:Mais pour Sant'Egidio on est bien d'accord qu'au niveau du processus au Mozambique, elle était déjà implantée 7 à 8 ans avant.

F: Disions cela a été une réponse en fait… La guerre était là. Un moment clé c'est quand deux jeunes de Sant'Egido ont été tué. Là alors on s'est dit, on ne peut pas rester sans rien faire. Donc c'est qu'à commencer l'engagement e médiation.

M: Ok très très bien. Merci. Mais donc on va directement enchainer sur le concept de Multi Track diplomacy. Donc selon vous, clairement, lords d'un processus de

médiation, il faut prendre en compte une perspective global, qui fera quelque part appel à plusieurs types d'acteurs qui devraient agir ensemble afin de pouvoir déboucher sur un accord de paix. Je pense aux acteurs locaux, aux organisation internationales, aux Etats, aux Etats-voisins, à l'ONU,… Pour apporter un autre type d'expertise.

C: Alors la médiation n'est qu'un aspect de la résolution de conflits ou de la transformation de conflits.

M : moi je me concentre uniquement sur la médiation…

C: Multi Track diplomacy est plus large que la médiation. La médiation est simplement qu'une partie, une action que l'on peut entreprendre dans tout l'ensemble de ce qu'on appelle la transformation du conflits. Et donc la transformation du conflit, selon de ce que j'ai étudié, est véritablement lié au concept de « conflict transformation », donc vraiment la transformation des partis, du contexte, de la structure, du conflit. On a des meilleurs résultats lorsqu'on fait intervenir plusieurs actions. Donc la médiation se fait normalement avec les acteurs officiel, avec la position particluière du Track 1.5 dans lequel Sant'Egidio intervient mais on a également tout ce qu'on appel le track II qui sont des dialogues dans la sociétté civile, les actions dans la societe civile, donc avec les journalistes, avec les scoietes civiles, par exemple on se retrouve dans un conflit où on a des séparations, on essaye de mettre les gens ensembles, lors des séminaires, des jeunes ensembles, et puis tout ce qui se fait au niveau locale, donc cela peut la défense des droits humains. Donc c'est tres globale. C'est comment changer, et tout dépend si on parle d'un conflit interne ou internationale. Mais si on parle d'un conflit interne, c'est comment est-ce qu'on change la société, la culture, la violence, comment est ce qu'on change les mentalités, les divisions. Et ça on l'a vu avec l'Arménie après le conflit du Carabac, dans les années 90, on a eu plusieurs accords qui ont été négociés entres les arméniens et les les Alzaris. Et la population n'était pas inclue dans le processus de résolution et de transformation du conflit. Donc c'est vraiment quelque chose qui se fait au niveau politique et au niveau éleve de la société. Le reste de la population vivait à un niveau de séparation total, de discours, de rejet, par rapport à l'autre population, par rapport aux Alzaris. Il y avait aucun travail qui a été fait à ce niveau là. Et le jours où le

président s'est mis d'accord avec les Alzrias sous un accord et qu'il a présenté à la population, la population a dit non. Elle a dit : si vous acceptez cet accord là, nous on vous chasse du pouvoir et on va trouver une autre solution. Tout simplement, la population n'a pas été préparé. Donc, c'stc e que je veux dire : oui la médiation est importante ou la négociation. Il peut avoir négociation sans médiation. Mais on a besoin d'une approche plus globale. Qui est à la fois top-down et bottom-up. Parce que à la fois la population doit être préparé à un changement. Mais on a besoin de politiciens qui doivent prendre des risques et avancer. Et la médiation est habituellement appelle qu'a un moment où le conflit se prolonge. Où le niveau de tensions est élevé mais les partis sont favorables à une sortie, parce que si on parle à un conflit interne, si on parle par exemple du Mozambique, un gouvernement ,ne fera pas appel à une médiation externe, que si il est obligé. Parce que c'est u comme un état de faiblesse, c'est à dire il n'a pas réussit à traiter lui-même ses affaires internes. Donc là il fera appel à une tierce partie. Donc cela peut être à la fois un organisme internationale, on peut faire appel à l'ONU, à un autre gouvernment, à un pays voisin. Autant on peut faire appel à une organisation qui n'est pas un gouvernement. Avec tout ce que cela suppose, et est ce ce que cela permet de faire plus qu'un gouvernment ou qu'une organisation internationale….

M : Ok. Donc, je vais enchainer directement. Selon vous, quelles seraient les raisons pour lesquelles un état, si on parle d'un conflit interne, les parties opposées feront appel à une ONG et non à un autre type d'acteur. Pourquoi l'ONG à proprement parlé ? Est ce cela serait en lien avec son identité, son expertise, à son impartialité, sa neutralité ? Quelles seraient les facteurs qui rentreraient en compte?

C : Pour moi, le plus grand avantage de faire appel à un acteur non-étatique, c'est qu'on se retrouve aujdourdhui face à de sconflits entres des acteurs étatique et non étatiques, qui posent la question tes fortement du statut. C'est à dire si les états , les gouvernements, ont souvent peur de donner une légitimité à l'opposition. Si ils font entrer par exemple les nations unies ou les un gouvernement voisin, ils ont plus peur que ces représentants, en reconnaissant et en parlant avec l'opposition, leur donne un ceratin statut et une ceratine légitimité à leurs demande. Et donc ne donne trop de poids également. Tandis que de faire appel à Sant'Egidio ou à un autre organization, cela permet de donner un accès sans donner aucune légitimité, Parce que Sant'egidio

va parler toutes les rebellions possible mais ne va pas, mais ce n'est pas parce quelle va parler, en vertu du droit, d'une vision, elle va donner une légitimité à une opposition, ou à un acteur vu comme terroriste. Et cela est un grand avantage des ONG, et surtout à ce que je vois pour la communauté, c'est cette possibilité de parler avec tout le monde. Et donc de pouvoir prêter oreil aux doléances de tout le monde. Ce qui parfois peut poser problème lors de négociations officielles. Car lors des négociations officiels, on a pas toujours le temps d'écouter les récriminations qui datent d'il y a longtemps et qui sont importantes.

M: C'est pour ça qu'il ya une des valeurs de Sant'Egidio c'est d'accorder le pardon, « forgiveness »…

F: Donc, pour un peu regrouper les deux questions d'avant, je crois que la grande force de Sant'Egidio, c'est sa liberté. Et donc, comme disait Céline, donc voilà, lorsqu'un acteur gouvernemental ou une rébellion fait appel à nous, disons il ya aucune obligation. Et le grand avantage pour l'un des deux belligérents ou les deux, c'est ce que cela peut se faire dans un premier temps de manière confidentiel. Donc, dans le cas du Mozambique, de nouveau, les premiers contatcs entre la RENAMO et le FRELAMO, était tout à fait confidentiel, car à ce moement là, il n'aura état impossible de se justifier par rapport à leur bases, du fait qu'ils parlaient ensemble.

M: ok, donc c'est secret…

F : oui, donc c'est vraiment une opportunité je vais dire pour des belligérants avec éventuellement la possibilité de sortir du pays. Donc très souvent, il ya des négociations qui se passent à Rome. Ce qui permet de renforcer la discrétion. Maintenant, c'est certain que pour la conclusion, pour arriver à la conclusion d'un accord de paix, il faut des complémentarités, que Sant'Egidio à cet avantage au départ, mais à un moment il faudra toujours que la communauté international sous toutes ses formes, ONU, les organisations régionales ou pays voisins soient impliqués. Puisque si un accord de paix est conclu, mais que le pays voisin à de grands intérêts et n'est pas d'accord, cela risque de poser problème. Et puis cela dépend des différents stades… donc Sant'Egiido intervient essentiellement dans els stades de médiation et de négociation. Mais pour l'application de l'accord de paix,

elle le fait très peu car cela implique souvent démilitarisation, ce n'est pas notre rôle non plus, l'organisation de nouvelles élections, ce n'est pas notre rôle non plus, et la mobilisation de fonds, ce qu'on a très peu. Mais lorsque il ya un accord de paix, ce qu'on peut faire parfois c'est d'accompagner, il ya des commissions de suivis, commission d'accompagnement, commissions de réconciliation et là évidemment cela reste possible.

M : Si je peux profiter de votre présence, vous êtes plutôt concentrés sur quel conflit. Pace que moi je traite de trois conflits : le Kosovo, l'Algérie et le Mozambique.

F : oui, oui…

M : Vous connaissez les trois, magnifiquement bien ? un des trois plus que l'autre ?

F : Peut-être plus le Mozambique que les autres… Mai je connais un peu des trois…

M : Mais j'aimerais aussi vous poser des questions mais ce ne sont pas du tout les mêmes que celles dédiées à Céline… Ce sont des questions spécifiques… Mais je ne sais pas si vous avez du temps aujourd'hui….

F : oui, oui…

M : Juste pour revenir à cette question d'identité. Pour moi, c'est une de mes hypothèses, l'identité d'un acteur non-gouvernemental peut être favorable ou défavorable lorsque celui ci désirait s'engager dans un processus de médiation. Je pense par exemple à l'identité religieuse de Sant'Egidio. Si on se réfère à un pays catholique, je pense que c'est mieux perçu, d'un point de vue pacifique, elle va apporter ses valeurs humaines, par exemple… Donc cette question d'identité , j'aimerais savoir si c'est important ou pas.

C : J'avoue que là-dessus, je n'ai pas travailler sur la question d'identité même des ONG.

M : Si par exemple nous pouvons faire une différence avec les ONG religieuse, les ONG laïcs, les ONG…

C : De manière scientifique, j'avoue que je ne me suis pas intéressé à cette question là. Je ne sais pas dire si il y a un avantage… je dirais, comme ça, oui… il devrait y-avoir un avantage pour certains pays d'avoir une sensibilité de se trouver avec des ONG d'une sensibilité particulière… mais est-ce que cela aide plus ou moins, je ne pourrais pas le dire….

M : Parce que justement, pour le cas de Sant'Egidio, les personnes que j'ai rencontré me disaient très clairement que le statut de Sant'Egidio, que c'est une ONG autonome, indépendante, qui ne dépend pas du Vatican, de l'Etat Italien.
J'ai rencontré Roberto Morozzo, par exemple, et sur la question des fonds, il me disait tr !s clairement que ces fonds provenaient d'individus, de personnes qui travaillent pour Sant'Egidio… Donc pour revenir sur la question du statut de Sant'Egidio, son importance, c'est son désir d'impartialité, de parler avec les deux parties, qu'il yait aucune différence. Même la personne qui tué des milliers de personnes, il faut le rencontrer.

C : ça c'est un avantage. Il y a un autre avantage que je vois, en dehors de la question d'identité, au niveau de ce que j'ai vu dans mes recherches, c'est la question donc de la liberté, de l'impartialité et aussi la question du temps.
Ces ONG, et en particulier Sant'Egidio, a le temps, n'est pas pressé par de considérations autres, quelles soient politiques, économiques. Si les parties décident d'arrêter les négociations, si elles décident que voilà ce n'est plus nécessaire, une ONG peut se permettre de reculer et d'attendre. Ce qui n'est pas spécialement le cas des Nations Unies ou de l'OECE ou d'un gouvernement parce qu'ils ont de intérêts, là où l'ONG n'a pas. Alors l'ONG peut avoir des intérêts, mais la il ne faut pas mal me comprendre, la question des intérêts financiers est importante pour une ONG. C'est une question qui s'étend autant au niveau du développement que c'est une question pour toutes les ONG qui est la question de la dépendance eau fond. Parce que certaines dépendent de programmes particluers pour avoir leurs fonds. Et donc on a besoin de donner des résultats pour pouvoir avoir des fonds et donc continuer avec une équipe. Ce qui est pour moi de nouveau, un avantage de Sant'Egidio, que j'avais

vu quand je n'en faisais pas partie, c'est cette indépendance et qui n'est pas seulement pour des questions des médiations, des facilitations, mais une question plus générale. C'est à dire que l'on commence un projet sans dépendre de fonds. C'est ce qu'on appel le « ownership », cela nous appartient et on continuera même si les fonds se tarissent. C'est la même chose pour la question de la médiation, c'est à dire, ou de l'aide humanitaire, MSF, la croix rouge, on a une différence. Car MSF et la Croix Rouge ont des fonds propres qui peuvent utiliser lorsqu'une crise en vaut la peine même lorsque les donateurs estiment que cela n'en vaut plus la peine. Donc c'est toujours l'indépendance financière, de l'indépendance financière qui est importante. Mais quand on a une indépendance financière, comme Sant'Egidio la, cela permet d'agir et d'avoir cette avantage d'une ONG en générale qui est le temps.

F : Alors, il ya aussi beaucoup de choses à dire hein…. Sur l'identité, donc l'identité religieuse de Sant'Egidio ne nous as jamais posé de problèmes. Puisque nous sommes intervenus au Mozambique, en Algérie, pour le moment nous travaillons en faveur des Phillipines. Donc, parce que évidemment ce qu'on met en avant c'est une organisation qui est pacifique et basé sur les valeurs de la paix. C'est que l'Evangile est basé sur la paix. Alors ce qui est vrai aussi come tu as dit, que dans ceratins conflits, l'expertise qu'on a déveoppé dans le domaine du dialogue interreligieux, peut être très précieuse. Par exemple, je pense au Nigeria maintenant. Parce qu'évidemment, on aura plus de facilité à comprendre les enjeux religieux que quelqu'un qui n'a pas une expertise dans le domaine. Et puis, bon, on l'a déjà dit, une des grandes forces de Sant'Egidio, c'est notre indépendance, par rapport au Vatican et à l'Etat Italien , on est complètement indépendant.

M : Parce que souvent, au début de mon mémoire, j'avais lu des articles d'auteurs francais comme Jean-Luc Marret qui disait que Sant'Egidio était un bras diplomatique du Vatican. Je suis parti dans une autre direction…. Quand j'ai été voir Roberto Morozzo ou Don Angelo Romano, ils me disaient tout à fait le contraire…

F : Donc ca cela fait partie des légendes, on dit par exemple « le sous marin du vatican »….

M : On pourrait d'ailleurs penser que depuis Vatican II…

F : Non pas du tout parce que justement Vatican II, donne plus de place aux laïcs à l'Eglise. La création de Sant'Egidio, c'est ça. Ce sont des laïcs, qui ont une responsabilité en tant que chrétien. Et donc vraiment il y a aucune … Jamais le Vatican n'a dit tien cela serait bien que… par contre, ce qui est certain, c'est que le Vatican est le plus grand réseau diplomatique au monde et donc il peut y avoir des échanges d'informations, comme on fait avec la diplomatie belge, italienne ou française, en fonction des conflits. Est ce qu'il y a autre chose ?

M : oui j'ai une question générale concernant les ONG et une ou deux questions pour vous concernant Sant'Egido si c'est possible… je voudrais plutôt m'attarder sur la question des ressources qui seraient utilisées par les ONG afin de construire un environnement de paix. C'est à dire des ressources qui seraient utilisées à l'échelle locale ou plutôt officielle. Comme vous l'avez dit avec le concept du track 1.5. Quels seraient les outils, les instruments que les ONG utiliseraient justement pour pouvoir faciliter et construire cet environnement de confiance.

C : Il y en a énormément. En fait il ya, selon la littérature américiane, là dessus on a énormément de moyens qui sont utilsiés par les ONG, les académiques, pour faire ce qu'on appel du track II et 1.5 qui ont été utilsié et lancé dans les années 70 surtout par rapport aux israéliens et palestiniens, qui ont été médiatisé et qui sont maintenant utilisés un peu dans tous les conflits : les dialogues, les séminaires. Donc cela peut être des dialogues où on amène , par exemple, si on prend « conciliation resources », qui est une organisation anglaise, qui fait beaucoup dans une vision différente de Sant'Egidio mais c'est du 1.5 quand même : deux ou 1.5. Ce sont de séminaires qui se prolongent d'années en années, qui ont été arrêté quelques années. Ils donnaient ensemble des officiels et des personnalités de la société civile dans des cadres informels à l'étranger. Et cela permettait d'avoir cet échange, de comprendre le point de vue de l'autre, de créer une confiance ou en tout cas de crée une relation. Et ce qui a permis, par exemple, que des personnalités politiques, Géorgiennes, ont participé pendant des années dans ces séminaires et ont développé une vision différente sur le conflit Abkhaze, si je prends un exemple. Ca c'est quelque chose qui s'est fait pendant des années. On a d'autres choses, qui sont « un one shot ». On a des organisations « one shot « qui amènent des intellectuels des deux côtes d'un autre

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pays. Donc, il y a énormément de moyens et de façons d'améliorer la communication entres les parties qui ont été élaborées pendant des années. Surtout que « la transformation de conflit et la résolution de conflit » est assez dans le vent et donc il y a énormément de littératures là dessus. Si vous en avez besoin, je peux vous en donner. Donc c'est vraiment tous les niveaux, cela peut inclure de plus en plus les business man car on estime qu'il faut inclure le commerce ca le commerce est un perçu comme un moyen de remettre en relation entre els gens, entant que ca peut être un moyen qui peut être dévastateur. Cela peut être entre les journalistes, donc un mélange officiel et société civile. Cela peut être au niveau très local, comment rétablir les relations entre les villages. Donc là on se retrouve face à un monde très vaste.

F : Je dirais par rapport à cela, il y a deux choses auxquelles je pensais. Par rapport aux ressources, spécialement au niveau des ressources financières. Donc, que ce ne soit que des personnes qui financent des missions pour la paix, ça je ne crois pas. On a des collaborations avec par exemple la diplomatie belge, française, suisse, italienne, qui apportent parfois un soutien financier parce que pour des états, eux, ils y voient leurs intérêts, parce qu'ils se disent qu'une organisation comme Sant'Egidio fait un travail qu'on ne sait pas faire. Notamment un travail préparatoire, confidentiel… Un état, pafois, par rapport à des bélligerents, ne pourraient pas dire dan l'opinion publique, pour le moment
On négocie avec ceux-là.

M : Donc, vous diriez, qu'ils délégueraient…

F : Non, je dirais cela rentre dans le cadres des canaux de financement officiels des ministères des affaires étrangères qui disent : là, en analysant un projet, ils y voient une plus value. Alors après cela, nous, on est complètement indépendant. Mais, comme dans le cadre d'une relation classique avec un bailleur de fonds, il y a aura des réunions d'échanges d'informations. Et là, ils pourront avoir accès à des informations auxquelles il n'aurait pas eu accès autrement. Donc voilà…
Mais, comme l'a dit Céline, nous restons indépendant par rapport à cela. Nous, on veille toujours de ne pas être dépendant des financements extérieurs.

M : Et au niveau des ressources que Sant'Egidio utiliseraient sur le terrain, j'ai l'impression que Sant'Egidio combine à la fois la diplomatie track 1.5 et track II. Et souvent track II vient avant.

F : Oui, en tous les cas, dans tous les pays où il y a des groupes de Sant'Egidio qui sont présents, ben voilà, il y a tout cet aspect là qui fait que eux ont des contacts par exemple avec la communauté musulmane et chrétienne, avec les différentes ethnies, avec différents groupes sociaux, culturels. Et donc, cela fait qu'il y a toute une connaissance de base qui est antérieur à l'intervention, des experts, médiateurs. Donc, nous on essaye d'être toujours aussi ouvert que possible.

M : Vous n'avez pas une ligne de conduite….

F : Non, parce que souvent on nous demande si nous n'avons pas une méthode…

M : mais dans le livre : l'Art de la paix. Il y a la méthode de Sant'Egidio…

F : oui, c'est une question qu'on pose toujours mais je vais dire que chaque conflit est propre.

M : évidemment…

F : donc, évidemment, il y a quelques lignes directrices : le temps c'est clairement un des grands avantages de Sant'Egidio. Nous on est plié à aucune élection, par aucun intérêt économique.

M : Par exemple, la question du temps au Kosovo était problématique…

F : Ben disons, alors, au moment pour le Mozambique, on nous a reproché la question du temps : vous négociez à Rome pendant 27 mois et pendant ce temps, les gens meurent. C'est sûr et c'est dramatique : on a toujours dit on préfère prendre le temps et avoir un bon accord que d'être pressé par une échéance ou l'autre , de signer sous la pression là bas, et les gens rentrent chez eux et disent : moi j'ai dit ca et donc…. Voilà je pense que le temps est nécessaire pour que tous les points de frictions qui

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existent entre des belligérantes soient abordés, c'est ca qui permettra à un accord de paix d'être durable.

M : Mais ce qui est intéressant au Kosovo, ils sont partis d'un accord basé sur le volet éducatif. Vous avez pour quelles raisons ?

F : mais ce qu'il y a, il y a toujours une réflexion qui est faite dans un conflit : quel est l'angle sous lequel on pourrait apporter une plus value ? Le domaine où il y a un dialogue possible. Parce que parfois, je ne sais pas, on va vous dire : non là- dessus on ne parle pas de cela. Or là , cela paraissait l'éducation mais aussi parce qu'on était à un stade qui n'était pas du tout un conflit armé ; qui était les divrgences et les oppositions qui existaient entre Albanais et Serbe sur l'éducation au Kosovo. La langue utilisée. Cela a été le point de départ. Puis, c'est vrai, malheureusement, l'accord n'a pas été appliqué et puis cela a dégénéré vers un conflit armé.

C : Pour le dialogue, pour ce qui est track II, les prières pour la paix, sont un lieu, pour moi, dans lequel les leaders religieux sont invités, lié à des contacts informels qui se font. Il y a des dialogues possibles, un dialogue dans le sens, ce n'est pas un discours pour convaincre, ce n'est pas un discours pour se défendre, mais c'est vraiment une écoute de l'autre.

F : Mais et pas seulement le monde religieux, le monde politique aussi. Donc ici, il va y avoir en septembre la rencontre annuelle du 6 ou 8 à Tirana, il y aura des tables rondes sur l'Irak, la Syrie, le Nigéria, les Philippines. Et donc qui sont clairement de conflits et des points de crises. Et donc tous les contacts qu'on a déjà eut avant et ceux qu'on peut avoir là bas permettent de faire des avancées ou pas parfois. Mais voilà, par exemple, sur le Nigéria, il y aura des intervenants représentatifs de haut niveau musulman et catholique. Donc voilà cela permet, par exemple, dans le cadre du Nigéria, ce qu'on essaye, c'est de déminer la nature religieuse du conflit. Parce que Bokoharam , ce ne sont pas des musulmans. Enfin, ils se disent musulman mais c'est comme l'Etat islamique, et ils utilisent le Coran pour justifier leurs traditions. Mais évidemment dans la société civile et dans les provinces du ord, qu'est ce que voit les gens, c'est que Bokoharam attaque d'abord les chrétiens et que du coup il y a des actions de représailles de chrétiens contre les musulmans. Donc c'est vraiment à ce

niveau là qu'on essaye d'intervenir pour que cette dimension religieuse ne soit pas utilisée et qu'il y ait des acteurs de terrain qui puissent rappeler mais non, écoutez l'Islam et le Christianisme, ce sont des religions de paix. Et il y a jamais de justifications du recourt à la violence.

M : Ok, une dernière question par rapport à Sant'Egidio lors d'un processus de paix ; dans mes trois cas d'études, est-ce que vous pourriez me dire si Sant'Egidio a eut besoin de la présence d'acteurs tiers, essentiellement étatiques, afin d'apporter du poids et de la légitimité. Parfois, on a du mal à imaginer qu'un ONG à elle seule pourrait arriver à conclure un accord.

Prenons un exemple spécifique, le cas du Mozambique, quels étaient les acteurs autour du Mozambique et qui étaient présents.

F : l'Italie donnait… il y avait un accompagnateur. Il y avait FRELAMO et RENAMO, Sant'Egidio était toujours le médiateur mais il y avait la présence ou l'accompagnement d'un diplomate du ministère des affaires étrangères italien. Maintenant, cela peut très fort changé d'un conflit à l'autre. Il y a des moments où il ne faut pas de membres de gouvernements ou de diplomatie qui sont là car cela pourrait empêcher toute avancée. Mais évidemment, nous ce que l'on va toujours faire, sauf si c'est vraiment tout à fait confidentiel, qu'on va informer le diplomaties qui ont de l'influence. Par exemple, dans le cas du Congo, il y a des réunions fréquentes entre les envoyés spéciaux : Belgique, Etats-Unis, UE, et UA. C'est quatre acteurs là, on va les informer. Si on parle de la côte d'Ivoire, la France est incontournable. Dans le cas de l'Algérie, aussi. La plateforme de Rome comme on l'a appelé, elle a été conclue en l'absence de tout représentant gouvernemental. Le gouvernement algérien n'a pas voulu. Alors une fois que la plateforme a été conclue, on a présenté les résultats à la France. C'était inévitable. Et, le Gouvernement français à ce moment là, n'a pas voulu. Ce n'est pas qu'ils étaient contre… Pour eux, l'opportunité diplomatique par rapport à l'Algérie, ils ont dit : nous si on appui cette plateforme par rapport au gouvernement Algérien qui avait dit non depuis le début, cela allait nous mettre dans une position difficile. (40 :29)

M : Le cas de la France et de l'Algérie, c'est une histoire très complexe…

F : oui, oui… Très complexe. Donc dans ce cas là, on a vu que le fait disons oui… L'absence d'acceptation du gouvernement algérien officiel a empêché et notamment parce que le FIS était présent. Et c'est un bel exemple où l'on a dit mais : ok le FIS c'est des Islamistes, qu'est ce qu'on entend dans la définition islamiste ? A ce moment là ils n'utilisaient pas la violence… et donc notre raisonnement était qu'a partir du moment où ils sont d'accords de s'asseoir à la table des négociations et de travailler à cette plateforme qui avait un bute pacifique. Ben, nous on est d'accord. Et pour le gouvernement algérien, cela a été niette.(41 :30)

 M : Et concernant les acteurs régionaux, dans le cadre du Mozambique, il y a pas d'acteurs clés qui ont pu jouer un rôle de levier et de décomplexer l'atmosphère ?

F : A l'époque, il y avait un peu le Portugal mais pas tellement. Non, par rapport au Mozambique très peu. Il y avait l'Italie…

M : et le Vatican…

F : c'est-à-dire… c'est intéressant… mais le point de départ et ça je ne sais pas si vous l'avez entendu… Donc il y avait un gros problème de relation entre le l'église catholique et le gouvernement pro-communiste. Et par exemple, ils s'interdisaient aux cloches des églises de sonner. Alors il y a eu un contact qui a été pris à l'époque avec le secrétaire du parti communiste italien ; Enrico Berlinguer en lui disant : tiens écoute il y a tes amis communistes au Mozambique et voilà le problème…. Et Il a contacté le parti communiste mozambician : écoutez, ne pas faire sonner pas les cloches. Regarder, nous on est des communistes pur et dur mais en Italie ce n'est pas un probème que les cloches sonnent… Ah oui c'est vrai… et donc cela a été un élément déclencheur. Donc cette question a été résolue, entre guillemet, et cela a étét un point d'accroche pour démarrer les contacts avec le gouvernement mozambicain. Et pour la Renamo, cela a été plutôt le canal portugais. Mais le Vatican non, pas du tout.

M : Mais j'avais l'impression alors que les acteurs régionaux avaient un rôle…

F : Oui alors dans le cas de beaucoup de conflits, c'est évident… mais dans le cas du Mozambique, mais pas tellement….

M : Et l'Algérie non plus ?

F : Non dans le cas de l'Algérie, ce n'était pas non plus très remarqué….

M : Et dans le cas du Kosovo ?

F : Oui là évidemment. Il y avait la Serbie, l'Italie… par exemple dans le cas du Congo, là c'est clair qu'on ne peut pas signer ou rétablir la paix dans l'Est du Congo si on ne parle pas avec le Rwanda.

M : Et aussi avec la Belgique je suppose….

F : Oui, bein sûr. Donc, la c'est vrai d'une manière générale, par rapport aux conflits, les relations…. Les pays qui ont une influence ou des intérets dans la région, seront souvent des interlocuteurs. Donc dans le cas de l'Algérie, la France. Mais dans le cas du Mozambique….

M : Vous avez dit le Portugal ?

F : Oui, ça oui. Le Portugal a été la manière d'entrer en contact avec la RENAMO.

M : Je pensais que l'UA avait joué un rôle au Mozambique ?

F : oui mais alors souvent c'est plus tard. C'est au moment de mise en œuvre de l'accord.

M : Merci beaucoup.

Interview with Christian Laporte (28/08/2015)

Martin = M
Christian Laporte = C

C : Christian Laporte, journaliste à la Libre et notamment chargé de la chronique religeiuse et donc c'est dans ce cadre là que jai appris à connaître et à suivre à la communauté de Sant'Egidio.

M : ok , depuis 25 ans, cela fait longtemps quand même…

C : Oui certainement depuis 25 ans puisque le premier grand évènement que j'ai couvert autour d'eux était la rencontre dans la foulée d'Assise à Louvain et à Bruxelles.

M : Ok

C : 91….

M : Je n'étais pas encore né….

C : Donc, il y a eut deux jours de réunions à Leuven et cela s'est terminé à Bruxelles à la Grand Place. Comme ils l'ont fait à Anvers. Et donc j'ai fait leur connaissance à travers les responsables belge du mouvement. Donc, la présidente, et jan De Volder qui est aussi journaliste et un expert en religion. Et donc, cela m'a assez bien séduit car c'était des gens très impliqués dans leurs actions, dans l'action quotidienne. Ce n'est pas que des discours, que de la prière, même si ils insistent sur la prière, mais c'est surtout des interventions directes pour aider les gens. Et enfaite, pour remonter plus haut, le tout premier contact a été de les rencontrer après qu'ils aient été épinglés pour la commission des sectes de la Chambre, la fameuse commission Duquesne à la fin des années 80. De manière exagérée, on s'est demandé si ce n'était pas une secte. Mais bon, il joue carte sur table, et donc c'est de là, de fait, que j'ai été les voir à Anvers.

M : Pour savoir si c'était une secte ou pas….

C : oui, voilà… Mais j'étais convaincu au point de départ que cela n'avait rien de sectaire. Mai enfaite il semblerait que c'était la gendarmerie de l'époque pour je ne sais plus quelles raison, ils les avaient dans leur collimateur.

M : Peut-être qu'ils manquaient un peu de reconnaissance a ce moment là, c'était le début….

C : Ben disons, qu'ils étaient moins connus en Belgique forcément, cela faisait plus ou moins 20 qu'ils existaient. Et donc, peut être que cela faisait un peu peur. Mais ils avait déjà une reconnaissance, des évêques à leur côté comme l'évêque auxiliaire de Bruxelles qui s'appelait Monseigneur de Hovre, qui était un évêque tout à fait normal… En fin, bref c'est comme cela que j'ai fait leur connaissance et commencer à els suivre dans leurs actions sur le terrain ; donc ce qu'ils ont développé à Anvers… et après qu'ils se sont implantés à Bruxelles, à Liège et à Louvain la-Neuve.

M : Donc, ils ont des bureaux un peu partout…

C : Enfin, plutôt des sections. Ils ont des gens à eux qui travaillent sur le terrain. Ils font ça, par exemple, je connais bien Louvain-la-Neuve, ils sont très discrets. Ils font ce qu'ils doivent faire.

M : Et les bureaux dans lequel j'ai été au Hall St Gerry, c'est quoi comme section ?

C : Cela doit être Bruxelles…

M : c'était la fédération…..

C : l'église du finistère….

M : c'était en face d'une église….

C : Oui enfin, l'église St Gerry…. Mais c'était pas leurs locaux à eux ?

M : Si, c'était la fédération européenne je pense…

C : Ah oui ?

M : une section européenne….

C : Je ne savais pas qu'ils avaient de bureaux à Bruxelles…. Ils sont encore très basés à Rome…

M : Très basé à Rome…. Mais j'ai été dans leurs bureaux à Rome, à Trastevere, il n'y avait pas beaucoup de personnes mais cela n'a rien d'une secte…

C : Et bon, et alors aussi, dans la foulée, j'ai eu l'occasion d'interviewer au moins deux fois Andrea Ricccardi vu qu'il avait recu un doctorat honoris causa, je ne sais plus en quelles années et bon ben c'est un homme tout à fait intéressant ue j'ai revu à Rome lorsqu'on a crée le nouveau cardinal belge, le cardinal Riske qui venait le saluer aussi. A l'époque il était ministre dans un des gouvernements de transition entre ceux de Forza Italia et les équipes et Renzi. Et donc, c'est un historien, un type tout à fait… ce n'est pas parce qu'il a fondé ça en 1968 qu'il est nécessairement frappé de dieux sait que…. Au contraire ce sont des gens très actifs…. Evidemment, je ne vais pas dire qu'il n'y a pas un attrait du pouvoir quel qu'il soit parce qu'on veut se développer, mais ce n'est pa sn on plus le pouvoir pour le pouvoir. Sinon, il se serait accroché, et il y en aurait d'autres qui feraient de la politique…

M : Je vais vous poser deux, trois questions…. Est-ce que selon vous, comment Sant'Egidio prépare t-elle une médiation pour la paix ? Est-ce qu'on pourrait parler d'une certaine méthode de Sant'Egido ? Comme par exemple dans l'Art de la paix, il est écrit une certaine méthode… Mais on peut bien s'imaginer que cette méthode s'adapte au conflit et au terrain.

C : Pour ce que j'en sais, je dirais que oui, certainement, en tous les cas c'est préparé avec beaucoup de soin. Je pense à la dernière assemblée à Anvers au mois de

Septembre dernier, ben donc ils avaient rassemblé toute une série de gens de haut vol et notamment Jan De Volder s'est occupé de certains dossiers dans certains pays d'Afrique à forte tension. Le Nigéria, Centre Afrique. ET là ils vont vraiment à fond dans la connaissance du dossier, ils vont sur place. Je peux que confirmer que c'est tout à fait sérieux.

M : Vous n'identifierez pas une véritable méthode ? Une étude du terrain ? Par exemple, au Mozambique, ils étaient présents dix ans avant que la crise n'éclate…. Donc une réelle volonté de tisser un réseau…

C : Ben je dirais que le sérieux de Sant'Egidio est qu'avant d'agir, il se renseigne beaucoup et ils essayent vraiment de comprendre la société dans laquelle ils estiment devoir intervenir. Ca j'ai vraiment l'impression quand j'entends parler par De Volder ou par d'autres, ce n'est pas du tout de l'amateurisme… je ne vais pas dire que Koushner ce n'était que cela mais enfin bon ce n'est les French doctors qui débarquent avec leur sac de riz. Ici, au contraire, il y a toute une réflexion. Et en même temps, ce qui est important à souligner, ce n'est pas du tout dans une optique prosélyte, pas ouvert à du prosélytisme. Je ne crois pas qu'un Nigéria ils sont venus faire du chiffre… Et c'est cela qui plait beaucoup c'est cette dimension internationale et en même temps cette dimension pour la pauvreté.

M : On voit souvent qu'ils combinent les deux à la fois. Ils s'occupent d'une médiation et en même temps ils s'occupent des citoyens, de l'aide humanitaire, de la pauvreté….

C : C'est ça qui me plait beaucoup chez eux, c'est qu'ils vivent le message de l'Evangile vraiment sur le terrain.

M : Et selon vous c'est complémentaire ? c'est-à-dire de faire un travail de terrain, s'occuper des citoyens, pour pouvoir avoir accès au table des négociations ?

C : oui… Mais les ONG ont pris pas mal de coup dans beaucoup e conflits comme MSF. Oui, c'st important pour eux d'être pro-actif et d'absolument connaître la situation sur le terrain.

M : Oui, c'est cela…. C'est vraiment récurent… Comme vous l'avez dit, ils ne vont pas venir avec leur drapeau…

C : Non, c'est ça… leur drapeau, leur hôtel portable…..

M : Et donc pour venir là-dessus, donc vous avez parlé de l'Evangile, ils se réfèrent souvent à des instruments religieux pour pouvoir faciliter la médiation…

C : Oui et non… Je crois qu'ils sont tout à fait réaliste, ils s'adaptent à la situation et au contexte politique du pays… Et c'est ça aussi qui attire , ce ne sont pas des gens qui cela uniquement ans une optique. C'est vraiment global. C'est important je pense d'avoir des ONG qui font cela en plus des grandes institutions internationales qui malheureusement ne résolvent pas toujours les questions, c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire…

M : Et Sant'Egidio, on pourrait dire que c'est une ONG impartiale ?

C : je pense… Ils ne mettent pas leur drapeau catholique, chrétien plutôt… parce que bon c'est une dimension qu'on doit souligner c'est que depuis le début, ils insistent sur le dialogue interreligieux. Mais c'est vraiment quelque chose de fondamental chez eux. Quand ils font leur rencontre internationale ils essayent d'avoir un maximum de gens représentatifs de d'autres courants. Mais évidemment attiré par un message de paix…

M : Mais, selon vous, ce message de paix vient de l'Evangile ?

C : A leurs yeux oui… Mais il est ailleurs aussi. On peut avoir une approche humaniste, non-religieuse de la paix. On peut même dire dans les autres religions, il y a aussi des germes de paix. Bon évidemment, ils montent sur le terrain avec ces idées là aussi mais sans vouloir les imposer.

M : Sans être dans une mission religieuse….

C : voilà c'est cela….et c'est ça que bon ils s'inscrivent biens selon moi aujourd'hui dans l'actuel papauté . François est un peu dans le même ordre d'esprit. Et ce n'est pas un hasard qu'il a nommé comme évêque de Liège, Jean Pierre Delville, compagnon de route de Sant'Egidio depuis le début. Et lui est très aussi enthousiaste par rapoort à tout ça…. Mais alors ce qui me plait aussi, enfin me réjouit chez eux, c'est qu'il ya un véritable esprit de corps, communautaire. Ils se démènent tous pour que cela soit une réussite. Et bon évidemment, au fil des ans, ils ont une certaine expertise, ils ont probablement pas mal de moyens, mais il en faut.

M : Et vous savez quelles sont leur principales ressources afin de pouvoir s'implanter dans un pays ?

C : Non, la je dois dire que là, je ne me suis jamais posé la question….

M ; Mais à part les ressources humaines, donc l'implantation, il y a aussi des ressources religieuses,….

C : Oui, m'enfin il y a des moyens j'imagine qui proviennent de grands donateurs, qui donnent d'important dons dans ce genre d'association.

M : mais ils disaient justement qu'ils soulignent que c'est un organisation autonome du Vatican et de l'Etat italien. J'ai lu plusieurs auteurs francais, dont Jean Luc Marret qui disait que Sant'Egido était le bras diplomatique du vatican….

C : C'est un peu du « Wishful thinking », un peu du Sant'Egidio bashing….

M : Parce que quand j'ai dit cette phrase à Roberto Morozzo, il avait limite envie…. Parce que si on part de là, on a une image tout à fait faussée…

C : Ah non non… mais bon il est évident que le Vatican bénéficie de cette diplomatie un peu parallèle et informelle car c'est une bonne image de l'église Catholique à travers eux même si eux sont ouverts à pas mal de monde.
C'est ça aussi qui me plait beaucoup chez eux, cette ouverture d'esprit.

M : Et selon vous, quand vous m'avez parlé de la papauté, Vatican II a-t-il eut un réel impact sur Sant'Egidio ?

C : Bah oui puisqu'ils ont vu le jour en 1968 au cœur même de la traduction pratique du Concile. Cela les a certainement boosté à faire ce qu'ils font. Tout en ayant un côté plus prière, qui joue chez eux un rôle certain pour les dynamiser.

M : Selon vous, est-c que Sant'Egidio est capable de construire la paix à elle seule ou a-t-elle besoin d'une aide externe ? Il s'agit d'une de mes hypothèses car j'ai du mal à imagine qu'une ONG à elle seule peut arriver à construire la paix. On sait très bien qu'une ONG ne peut ratifier un accord de paix… Que ça soit une aide en terme logistique, la présence de l'état Italien, la France dans la crise en Algérie…. Selon, il y a vraiment besoin de ce support.

C : je dirais pour débroussailler le terrain, pour ouvrire la route. Bon parfois, selon le plan officiel, la négociaion a du mal à se nouer, il y a des problèmes politiqus, des tensions… Et le fait d'avoir une ONG un peu marqué certes mais indépendante et autonome cela permet d'entrer dans une autre dynamique. Je crois que c'est comme ça aussi qu'ils ont fait leur médiation au Mozambique et qu'ils ont pu obtenir des résultats. Je ne crois pas que si ils étaient entrés directement comme porte parole officieux d'autres grandes instance, ils n'auraient jamais pu obtenir cela…

M : Et selon vous, ces grandes instances rentreraient-elles en contact avec Sant'Egidio lors d'une médiation afin de….

C : ben j'espère qu'ils ont de contacts, oui surement…. J'imagine puisque sinon si on les laisse faire et que cela s'apprend et que ça marche… Il faut à un moment donner faire appel à la diplomatie officielle pour que cela perdure. Sinon cela reste trop limité… Non mais Ils jouent leur rôle, ils sont très autonomes, très indépendants. Mais ils ne vont pas prendre le contre-pied non plus…

M : et selon vous, quelles seraient les raisons pour lesquelles les états feraient-ils appel à une ONG afin de régler un conflit interne ? Pourquoi pas faire plutôt appel à un état ?

C : D'abord, je suis sur que si on passe par la voie interétatique, cela ne démarre pas vraiment. Il y a vingt ans d'ici, on a tout essayé et ça été quand même la guerre…. Je crois que… Quelle était la sous-question ?

M : La question était de savoir pourquoi un état, donc les parties belligérantes, feraient-elles appel à une ONG ?

C : Faire appel à une ONG, c'est leur laisser probablement aussi plus manœuvre et de possibilité après…. C'est un peu les éclaireurs les ONG… et si ils font ça bien, on peut supposer qu'a partir d'un moment donné, les ONG leur transmet le flambeau… Je suppose que c'est comme ca que ça s'est passé avec toutes les médiations de Sant'Egdio.

M : Souvent, ils font le travail de terrain, ils arrivent à la médiation ; ça à marché et pas marché, après le peacebuilding ; ça c'est pas eux. Donc ils préparent vraiment le terrain.

C : Donc c'est vraiment préparé le terrain, oui… Tout à fait. Et bon, c'est extraordinaire évidemment de pouvoir faire ça et d'avoir des résultats.

M : Et donc, pour en finir, l'identité religieuse de la communauté est un poids important ?

C : A l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur ?

M : les deux

C : A l'intérieur, de toute évidence. Si ils ont eu autant de succès depuis bientôt 50 ans, c'est forcément aussi parce que cela a interpelle pas mal de monde. Et vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, on sait qui ils sont, mais on ait aussi que leur manière d'agir n'est pas une manière agressive, de gagner des âmes… parce que c'est important de participer à ces processus de paix ou pré-processus de paix. A mon avis, cette identité religieuse est importante. Et cela fait partie, je dirais, de leur richesse. Ce sont des gens

extrêmement bien organisés. L'année passée, j'aurais du aller à un anniversaire à Rome. Mais bon j'ai eu un petit problème physique et je n'ai pas su y aller. Je l'ai bien regretté car c'est très bien organisé. Naturellement, ils ont plus de moyens mais je n'ai pas l'impression que c'est pour les enrichir eux.

M : Non, c'est pour enrichir les autres…

C : Quand Riccardi est venu à une grande conférence catholique l'annéee passé ou l'année d'avant, c'est pas une personne qui a besoin de grands luxes. Ce sont des gens qui vivent vraiment ce qui pensent.

M : Ben écoutez un tout grand merci.

Interview with Roberto Morozzo della Rocca (02/09/2015)

M = Martin Balbachewski
R = Roberto Morozzo della Rocca

M : J'ai deux petites questions sur Sant'Egiido avant de parler du Kosovo. Comment par exemple décriez-vous la communauté de Sant'Egidio ? En deux-trois lignes…

R : C'est un groupe d'hommes de bonnes volontés et animés par un esprit humaniste et religieux pour l'objectif de santé laic du monde avec une inspiration religieuse.

M : ok, c'est ça, … Mais on est bien d'accord que Sant'Egidio n'est pas simplement concentrée pour assurer la paix, elle est aussi active par exemple de la snaté, au niveau des pauvres, au niveau de l'éducation…

R : l'inspiration religieuse à apporter le groupe qui s'appel depuis le début à s'occuper des pauvres, même des peuples pauvres. Comme beaucoup de peuple Africains, à travers cet itinéraire de prochaines été aux pauvres et au peuple pauvre , on s'est aussi occupé de paix et de médiation de paix : parce que la guerre c'est la mère de toute les pauvretés.

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M : Ok parfait,

R : (…) De ruine de l'homme.

M : ok. Alors, deuxième question, comment qualifierez-vous la diplomatie de Sant'Egidio ?

R : Euhhhhhh (take time)

M : Parce qu'on parle souvent dans les livres par exemple de diplomatie paralèle, de diplomatie informelle, d'une shuttle diplomacy, il y a plusieurs termes qui qualifient cette diplomatie….

R : c'est une diplomatie qui n'est pas officielle mais qui accepte toutes les synergies et pour le beau de la réussite de la paix et dans cette synergie, il y a même des synergies avec la diplomatie officelle. Dans ce sense, ce n'est pas une diplomatie parallèle mais un acte politique pour arriver à la paix.

M : Donc , on est bien d'accord par exemple, Sant'Egidio, comme vous me l'avez bien rappellé, est une associtaion, une communauté autonome, indépendante. Donc dans ce sense, elle a sa propre vision de sa propre diplomatie. Elle ne reçoit aucune obligation, aucune norme de conduite.

R : Elle n'obéit à personne, des institutions existantes mais elle collabore avec les institutions.

M : Pour arriver à une réelle synergie, de complémentarité, etc… Je pense à une autre question, d'un point de vue financier, comment fonctionne els fonds de Sant'Egido, quand elle part en mission, quand on lit votre livre sur le Kosovo, le Mozambique, comment elle organise les aides humaniatires, les convois humanitaires. D'où vient l'argent par exemple ?

R : Au Mozambique, je me rappel que l'argent pour els navires et avions d'aides venaient de fundraising qu'on faisait dans la société civile.

M : Ok, c'est ça….

R : Par privé, groupes, associations, paroisses, syndicats qui donnaient de l'argent pour aider le Mozambique.

M : Mais donc il n'y a pas un appui de la part du vatican ou de l'Etat italien ?

R : Non, mais je dois ajouter les contributions perosnneles. Mais occasionnelement, on peut avoir de l'argent surtout de l'Etat Italien, de bracnhes de l'Etat italien. Parce que le travail pour la paix au mozambique, l'etat italien payait une partie des frais. Mais il faut rappeler qu'il y avait un représentant officiel, Mario Raffaelli, un des quatre médiateurs. Alors c'était normal que l'Etat italien prenait une partie des frais.

M : Ok parfait, merci. Alors maintenant on va rentrer dans le vif du sujet sur le Kosovo. On le sait, le conflit du Kosovo, c'est à mettre dans le contexte de le conflit de ex-Yougoslavie, c'est un peu compliqué… mais quelles étaient les réelles causes et raisons qui ont déclenché le conflit au Kosovo ?

R : Les réelles ? …

M : Les raisons, les causes entre les albanais kosovars et les Serbes.

R : c'était une confrontation ethnique entre deux peuples qui étaient très différents au point de vue ethnique, linguistique, religieux et coutumiers. C'était…. Et il y avait la domination politique du Kosovo. Cela a duré à peu près depuis 150 ans, de puis la moitié du 19 ième siècle. Auparavant, dans l'empire ottoman, il n'y avait pas cette animosité entre les deux parties. C'est dans l'âge des nations et du nationalisme que commence la confrontation. Avant la révolution française, il n'yavait pas d'idéologie nationaliste.

M : mais par exemple, dans votre livre, vous disiez clairement que selon vous Milosevic n'était pas spécialement un réel nationaliste.

R : Alors les serbes étaient nationalistes. Mais Milosevic en particulier, comme personne, il était un tacticien de banque, mais surtout il était un homme qui était né au pouvoir et utilisait la mouvance nationaliste des serbes pour se maintenir au pouvoir. Et pour arriver et rester au pouvoir. Je pense que le Kosovo n'était pas sa première préoccupation en soi. Mais c'était un point important de sa politique.

M : Ok. Et Rugova, dans l'autre sens, c'était quelqu'un qui voulait réellement défendre la cause albanaise ?

R : Oui, oui… Il était un vrai patriote. Mais plus patriote que homme de pouvoir dans le sens étroit.

M : Ok, ok.

R : Tous les deux exprimaient deux sociétés qui étaient patriotes et nationalistes.

M : Donc c'était extrêmement compliqué…

R : Mais les deux hommes, Milosevic et Rugova, étaient différents comme humanité personnelle.

M : Et Sant'Egidio et vous même, vous avez toujours essayé d'entretenir la même intensité de contact entre les deux hommes.

R : oui, c'était nécessaire. Ce n'ait pas une question de sympathie personnelle, c'était une question de maintenir… Une question de diplomatie pour arriver à la paix. Il fallait que les deux se confiaient à Sant'Egidio. C'était une question de confiance. Sinon, ils n'auraient pas signer l'accord sur l'éducation.

M : Alors, quelles étaient les motivations qui ont amené Sant'Egidio à intervenir, à s'intéresser au conflit au Kosovo ?

R : Il y avait la guerre en Bosnie, une guerre très sanglante, nous avons noté que la question du Kosovo n'était pas d'actualité mais toutefois « était une question très

dangereuse avec la possibilité de massacre, très large et c'était un point des balkans qui étaient une poudrière.

M : Donc, c'était principalement la guerre…

R : Et à cette étape, la communité internationale s'occupait principalement de la Croatie, de l'Ukraine, Croats et des Bosniaques

M : Vous vous essentiellement aux laccords de Dayton qui a été signé en 95

R : et On n'a pas parlé du Kosovo

M : Et justement, dans ce sens, Milosevic ne voulait certainement pas que la communauté internationale, essentiellement les américains s'émissent dans le conflit kosovare

R : Oui, je me rappel dans les premiers colloques avec Milosevic, il avait expressément exclut l'internationalisation de la question du Kosovo. Au contraire c'était le premier but de Rugova, c'était le contraire. Alors il fallait trouver une manière d'internationaliser sans internationaliser. L'idée c'était que Sant'Egidio par son caractère pas officiel de la diplomatie officielle institutionnelle pouvait être agrée à Milosevic car Sant Egidio n'était pas une puissance étatique mais pouvait être même agrée à Rugova parce que Sant' Egidio n'était pas yougoslave, n'était pas balkanique. Elle était une entité extérieure, dans ce sens international (10 :30)

M : Comment était perçu l'église catholique au Kosovo ?

R : parmi les albanais assez bien

M : Il n'y avait pas de conflits religieux au Kosovo ?

R : Les albanais étaient unis, 95% sont musulmans et 5% sont catholiques, les albanais. Mais l'évêque de ce temps la des albanais catholique était populaire parmi tous les albanais, il n'y avait pas de problèmes. Parmi les serbes l'église catholique

était perçue de manière amicale à Belgrade avec le patriarcha. Mais au Kosovo il y avait un évêque qui s'appelait Arthemjie qui était très méfiant envers les catholiques. Un évêque orthodoxe Serbe arthemia.

M : il était méfiant par rapport à Sant Egidio ou pas du tout ? Ca n'avait aucune répercussion ?

R : Il n'était pas intéressé à Sant Egidio, il avait une méfiance générale contre tous les catholiques et occidentaux. il était même un homme anti-communiste et anti-occidentale mais c'était l'hasard parce que d'autres évêques serbes orthodoxes étaient amicales avec l'église catholique. Aujourd'hui, Arthemjie a était limogé de l'évêché du Kosovo. Il a promu une sorte de shiisme de possession ecclésiastique dans l'église serbe. Il est considéré presque comme héretique.

M : et Sant Egidio a-t-elle entretenue une bonne relation avec l'église orthodoxe ?

R : oui, au niveau de Belgrade et sinon de l'église serbe oui.

M : c'était implorant pour le conflit ?

R : oui c'était important pour le confit, si je ne me trompe, la première rencontre avec Milosevic fut grâce à la médiation de l'évêque serbe, d'un évêque qui était l'évêque de Vojvodine, qui était dans la synode centrale de l'église serbe. La première rencontre, je me rappel c'était avec Milosevic et cet évêque je ne suis pas sur mais c'était avant Dayton en 93 ou 94 . Peut-être que dans l'article je suis plus précis

M : Pas de soucis, c'est très bien.

M : Avant et pendant le conflit, avant qu'il y ait la médiation, est-ce que Sant Egidio s'est-elle implantée localement afin de venir en aide, d'organiser une aide humanitaire ou une aide spirituelle au Kosovo ?

R : à coté de la médiation ?

M : Avant, avant

R : Non, avant pas, avant pas. Nous avions invité Rugova à Rome au début de 93 et je me rappelle que Rugova n'était pas connu au niveau international à cette étape là et quand nous faisions une conférence de presse à Rome avec lui il y avait seulement un journaliste qui était intéressé et qui était venu.

M : ok

R : 10 ans après quand Rugova fut libéré pendnat la guerre, non 6 ans après, il fut conférence de presse avec une centaine de journaliste. C'était l'étape de la guerre.

M : Et donc pendant la médiation, donc vous souligniez dans votre livre que Sant Egidio a contribué à organiser une aide humanitaire si je me rappel bien au Kosovo plus au moins. Est ce que cela a contribué à soutenir sa crédibilité et sa légitimité pendant la médiation ?

R : Oui, les aides humanitaires étaient médicales, pour les écoles et c'était des choses qui étaient nécessaire pour la population. Mais au point de vue politique ca signifiait des *confidences building measures*. C'est typique de la médiation adopté comme au temps de la paix Mozambique, Matteo Zuppi avait traité avec la croix rouge Suisse l'envoi de convois humanitaires, d'aide à la population de l'intérieur qui mourrait de faim. C'était une démonstration de confiance, d'intérêt, de proximité, et ça signifie pour les gens qui sont la.

M : donc pour les politiciens, Milosevic et Rugova ça n'avait pas un impact très important le fait que Sait Egidio était aussi active sur leur terrain.

R : Pas trop,

M : Pas trop ?

R : pas trop mais

M : mais ca montrait son intérêt au le conflit ? Ca c'est important.

R : Cela montrait son intérêt humanitaire au conflit, c'était les vrais intérêts, les intérêts humanitaires. Sant Egidio n'avait pas des intérêts privés.

M : Non, mais donc lorsqu'on parle de médiation, il ne faut pas avoir systématiquement une approche Top down donc, simplement être en relation avec le pouvoir et avec la sphère politique mais par exemple le travail que vous avez fait sur le terrain…

R : c'était plus large

M : Bien sur

R : J'ai parcouru le Kosovo et la Serbie, j'ai rencontré le plus possible de personnes pour comprendre, pour avoir des éléments de discussions, pour avoir des informations. On était pas resté seulement au sommet et si nous devions voir les gens au Kosovo pour comprendre si une école était vraiment donnée ou utilisée ; qu'est ce que pensaient les jeunes de la population, s'ils étaient d'accord avec la médiation ; parce que ce sont des choses… Par hypothèse si Rugova nous disait : mais mon peuple ne veut pas continuer. Et si j'avais parlé les jours avant avec une assemblée de professeur d'université, il m'avait dit continuer, continuer, j'aurai pu dire non j'ai vu avec mes yeux que les gens veulent continuer. C'est une hypothèse mais il faut avoir des éléments de la base pour faire une médiation.

M : c'est ça ce que je voulais savoir, pour vous c'était essentiel de créer des liens on parle de Network peut-être avec la société civile donc un soutien du bas.

R : Oui, absolument, parfois, on n'a pas le temps, parfois ca nécessite du temps mais c'est toujours une chose importante.

M : Pour que l'accord puisse se mettre en place ou pour que le peuple accepte que Sant Egidio s'occupe du conflit au Kosovo, les deux je suppose ?

R : Les deux mais je me rappelle bien quand nous avons signé la première consigne de bâtiment au albanais, en particulier le bâtiment de l'institut d'albanlogie qui était très important, symbolique. Et quand j'étais présent quand le secrétaire de Rugova a reçu la clef du bâtiment il y avait un millier de personnes qui étaient sur la route qui ont applaudit. C'était le signe que l'accord était bien reçu. Naturellement il y avait des oppositions parce l'UCK-KLA- était contraire. Et l'UCK a menacé de mort les trois hommes qui négociaient comme représentants de Rugova avec les serbes.

M : Et donc comme vous dites donc cet engouement civil a quelque part mis une certaine pression indirecte sur Milosevic ou pour lui le peuple albanais Kosovare ca n'avait aucune importance ?

R : Ca n'avait aucune importance, surtout les Albanais.

M : Mais pour vous c'était important quand on voit votre travail ?

R : Parfois Milosevic disait que les serbes du Kosovo étaient opposés à l'accord et en effet il y avait une opposition parmi les responsables serbes au Kosovo mais ils ne voulaient pas céder un millimètre mais peut être que Milosevic exagérait l'opposition pour ne pas ouvrir l'application.

M : C'est ça

R : C'est difficile à dire encore aujourd'hui. Je ne sais pas ce qui se passait entre Milosevic et les autorités serbes au Kosovo. (…) C'était secret.

M : Alors, plus à proprement parlé de la médiation, pourquoi les parties opposées ont-elles fait appel à Sant Egidio ? Pour être considérée comme un médiateur ou un facilitateur. Pourquoi Sant-Egidio et pas….

R : En vérité, c'est Sant Egidio qui s'est proposé à Rugova et Milosevic. La première version était perplexe parce que Milosevic nous a dit, la première fois que nous avons proposé ca : voyez la Bosnie c'est Disney Land par rapport à ce que pourrait se passer au Kosovo. Et Rugova de son coté, les premières deux et trois années, il espérait

beaucoup des américains mais la chose qui a décidé Rugova à nous confier la médiation c'est le fait que à Dayton on n'a pas parlé du Kosovo. C'était grande délusion pour les albanais. Alors à ce moment la Rugova a dit les jeux c'est vous.

M : Et Milosevic dans tout ça , il pensait quoi de Sant Egidio à l'époque ?

R : Milosevic après Dayton avait résolu la question de Bosnie et restait avec la seule question du Kosovo. Et je ne sais pas ce qu'il y avait dans la dans la tête de Milosevic mais après Dayton lui-même a dit on peut commencer les pourparlers avec les albanais.

M : Si je comprends bien, le contexte du Kosovo est radicalement différent du contexte algérien ou Mozambique parce que il y avait la communauté internationale qui était extrêmement présente. Et est ce que nous pourrions aussi imaginer que la pression internationale, donc de l'extérieure, a aussi permis à Milosevic de céder et d'accepter la médiation de Saint Egidio ?

R : Oui la communauté internationale qui n'avait pas jusque là des initiatives sur le Kosovo, s'était occupé seulement de la Bosnie et de Croatie et ignorait le Kosovo te la macédoine et substantiellement il y avait des diplomates sans des efforts des gouvernements, et parut content qu'il y avait Saint Egidio à ce moment. Et l'UE nous a toujours appuyé avec des communiqués et même les américains ont collaboré avec Gelbhart et après Holbrook à notre médiation. Et ça c'était important pour Milosevic et Rugova. Rugova tenait beaucoup au fait que les américains étaient d'accord et soutenaient la médiation. Et Milosevic désirait probablement une réintégration dans la communauté internationale et peut-être pour lui-même c'était important qu'il y avait, comment dire, un appui international à la médiation. Et je dois dire toute fois que l'appui international était surtout avec des communiqués, des positions politiques, mais pas très concrets. A un certain moment nous avons ressentis la nécessité de bâtir de nouvelles écoles et surtout des facultés universitaires et nous avons paré avec l'UE et nous avons vu un grand problème de lenteur, de bureaucratie. Peut-être on aurait pu recevoir des aides matérielles pour bâtir ou directement des constructions, le montage, mais ca nécessitait des années ; des missions d'experts, des études préparatoires,… Cela voulait dire beaucoup de temps

et le problème c'était demain pas trois ans après. Parce qu'il y avait la guerre qui montait, la guerilla, les gens tués, ce n'était pas possible d'attendre toute la bureaucratie.

M : Ok, intéressant, merci beaucoup. Pouvez-vous juste me rappeler brièvement quelles étaient les caractéristiques principales des deux parties qui étaient assises aux tables de la médiation. Donc d'un coté les albanais de l'autre les serbes. En deux ou trois mots comment caractérisez vous l'ambiance ? Est ce que vous avez noté une amélioration des relations entre les deux parties, est ce qu'elles ont changé ?

R : Au plan personnel oui, mais pas au plan objectif des points à l'ordre du jour… Toujours les délégations, je pense trois et trois, toujours ils essayaient de concéder le moins possible, ils hésitaient tous les deux. Seulement on faisait des pas quand Rugova et Milosevic intervenaient directement et personnellement sur la délégation. Il était toujours nécessaire.

M : Milosevic et Rugova n'étaient jamais présent ?

R : Ils étaient en contact au téléphone. Quand on les rencontrait, très souvent on venait chez eux, on devait les voir et parler pour débloquer la négociation.

M : Et est ce que les représentants de Milosevic et de Rugova appliquaient à la lettre les recommandations des deux chefs ? On sentait clairement que par exemple…

R : Les serbes je pense oui. Les albanais,   il y avait un problème supplémentaire c'était que les trois albanais étaient menacés de mort, d'être assassinés par l'UCK si ils avaient fait des progrès dans la négociation.

M : UCK rappelez-moi

R : UCK c'est la guerrillia albanaise qui après la guerre a pris le pouvoir au Kosovo. La guerrillia albanaise avait dit aux trois qu'ils ne devaient rien faire sinon ils étaient tués. Cela a été quelque chose supplémentaire, ce n'était pas seulement les directives de Rugova qui étaient importantes pour ces trois hommes. Je ne sais pas… Le niveau

de la menace et la perception personnel mais ils m'ont dit , après, … Nous ne savions pas cette chose mais peu avant la guerre en 99, peu avant la guerre qui débutait en Avril, j'étais en janvier au Kosovo et deux des membres de la délégation albanaise nous ont dit qu'il y avait des menaces de mort à eux t que cela avait pesé lourdement sur les négociations.

M : alors j'ai plutôt envie de me concentrer sur l'identité religieuse de Saint Egidio. Est ce que selon vous le statut religieux de Sant Egidio a-t-il facilité la médiation entre les deux vous m'avez parlé au début…

R : Oui parce qu'on doit être quelque chose. Si on n'est pas une entité religieuse on est une entité politique, économique, financière, militaire. Et pour une médiation c'était mieux d'être une entité religieuse parce que l'entité religieuse n'a pas d'intérêt matériel directe.

M : et son statut par exemple, parce que souvent on parle de faith-based mediation où on prend en compte tous les instruments religieux, la prière, le coté spirituel, le coté de la foi, de l'écoute de l'autre, de la confiance, du dialogue. Ce sont des valeurs importantes.

R : Oui il y a des valeurs d'écoute, qui sont importantes, des relations humaines , d'amitié , parce que quand on est avec des hommes, ca va pour produire des amitiés alors c'était ca mais naturellement la médiation en soi c'était laïque, c'était la politique. L'aspect religieux était un aspect de conscience de la personne, pas un aspect… on a jamais prié à la table des négociations même parce que les trois Albanais étaient des musulmans et trois les serbes étaient des orthodoxes. C'est pas pour, il n'y avait rien n'a quoi faire (inaudible). Les gens sous le plan de la négociation laïque, politique mais c'était une arrière de conscience.

M : c'est pour ca que je me concentre sur votre attitude lors de la médiation, comme vous dites si on compare la diplomatie traditionnelle c'est une diplomatie plutôt protocolaire avec des règles et comme vous dites la relation humaine le coté humain, le côté du dialogue, pour moi, c'est quelque chose d'important, de fondamental quand on est en pleine médiation. C'est ca qui est important.

R : Oui je n'ai pas dit jusque là maintenant mais les relations avec Rugova ,avec les hommes de Rugova ; les relations avec les serbes et Milosevic, ce n'était pas quelque chose de technique, c'était une question humaine. On essayait de comprendre la personne, de se faire comprendre de se dévoiler comment on est, de montrer une attention psychologique. Et tout le monde disait que Milosevic (pas Rugova) était un nationaliste, mais nous avons compris en parlant avec lui que ce n'était pas un nationaliste mais un homme de pouvoir, c'était différent par exemple. Si tu ne comprends pas ça, c'était difficile de traiter avec Milosevic. Et Rugova avait des aspects de compatriote du 19ième siècle. Il avait une culture française, ce sont… il était passionnée par la minéralogie alors on parlait de la minéralogie… Ce sont des choses qui, quand on entre dans une relation avec un homme, après on fait une entreprise avec lui, il faut se connaitre sinon on peut penser qu'on va abandonner, si on n'a pas une connaissance. Il faut être franc et ouvert sinon sans le rapport humain c'est difficile je pense que la bonne politique c'est ca ce n'est pas ut des que pense le petit peuple. C'est beaucoup de questions de relations personnelles.

M : Ok, oui c'est ca

R : Quand Angela Merkel traite avec Poutine, et après téléphone à Obama ca cela arrive sur la base de rapports personnels qu'elle a avec Poutine et Obama ; ce n'est pas une question technique pure.

M : Et donc ca aurait clairement contribué à soutenir une certaine confiance entre donc les parties, la méthode de Sant Egidio…

R : C'est la recherche des relations personnelles qui est toujours différente selon les hommes.

M : C'est évident, ok. Selon vous, quel était le style de la médiation au Kosovo, le style de la médiation, une diplomatie secrète, ouverte.

R : La diplomatie est secrète jusqu'au moment où on signe l'accord et après ca devient publique car il y a l'accord avec la signature.

M : Par exemple au Mozambique elle était secrète du début jusqu'à la fin si je me rappel bien ?

R : Jusqu'à la première rencontre ici. Oui le secret est utile pour éviter des interférences mais quand on débute ca devient publique. Puis le secret n'empêche pas qu'on parle avec beaucoup d'instituions et des diplomaties ; les institutions et la diplomatie, par définition, ne sont pas des journalistes. On parle dans les couloirs, dans les sièges des ministères mais on demande discrétion.

M : ca c'est important c'est une de mes hypothèses lors de la médiation. Est ce qu'il y avait une présence d'acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques lors de la médiation. Est ce que par exemple, on dit souvent que quand on fait appel à une diplomatie informelle il faut qu'il y ait la présence des Etats tiers des USA, l'UE ; l'ONU…

R : A la table des négociations pas, il y avait des soutiens extérieur à la table par exemple ; Goldhart parlait avec Rugova pour soutenir la médiation, c'était l'envoyé de Clinton pour les Balkans. Après il y avait Halbrooke qui avait même montré l'intérêt pour la chose. (synergie)

M : Donc il y avait les USA et il y avait quel autre acteur qui était présent ?

R : il y avait l'Union Européenne, les européeens, je me rappelle qu'il y avait un ambassadeur du Royaume Unis, un anglais qui était très favorable à la médiation et qui avait réussi à créer un rapport personnel avec Milosevic et il a aidé et après quand Major a cédé le guide du gouvernement anglais britannique à Blair, la Grande-Bretagne a totalement changé de politique et est devenue très anti-Milosevic. Et l'ambassadeur a changé et ça dépend souvent de l'hasard et la politique. Donc je dirais ces choses… Peut-être vous pouvez trouver cela curieux mais on a tissé un lien avec la femme de Milosevic On disait à Belgrade que deux personnes pouvaient influencer Milosevic : sa femme Mirianna Markevich, il me semble, j'ai un peu oublié, et l'autre c'était le chef du service secret serbe sasinich. Mais c'était

impossible de le rejoindre mais la femme de Milosevic était favorable à la médiation je suppose qu'elle a dit à son mari quelque chose dans ce sens.

M : Ok, Ok et donc vous avez parlé des USA qui était plutôt du coté albanais qui soutenait plutôt la cause albanaise, les USA.

R : Oui les USA avait une position défavorable à la Serbie et favorable aux albanais, et les albanais cherchaient beaucoup la relation avec les USA on comprend ca.

M : Et l'Italie et le Vatican ont-ils apporté un soutien à la médiation de Sant Egidio via des communiqués, … via Jean Paul II n'ai pas fait de.

R : Le vatican pas, je…

M : Jean Paul II n'ai pas fait de…

R : Il parlait de la paix en générale, je ne me rappel pas que … Le Vatican, était très soucieux de rester au dessus de la mêlé. Je me rappelle que….L'Italie vous disiez ?

M : oui le Gouverment italien.

R : le gouvernement italien était très favorable à l'initiative. Je me rappel beaucoup de permanences dans la chambre à l'ambassade d'Italie à Belgrade. Les différents ambassadeurs qui étaient là durant la période étaient touts très collaboratifs. Ils aidaient au point de vue des contacts politiques, ils donnaient des informations, parce qu'ils voulaient la paix au Kosovo. Je me rappelle avec plaisir la collaboration des ambassadeurs. Avant il y avait un chargé d'affaires, puis un ambassadeur.

M : Donc, les trois acteurs clés étaient les USA la G-B et l'Italie qui ont clairement joué un rôle indirecte pour la médiation.

R : on peut dire ca mais, c'es un soutien mais pas un rôle décisif. Nous étions seuls à la table de la négociation même dans les rencontres avec Rugova ou avec Milosevic nous étions seules.

M : la société civile n'était pas du tout présente ? j'ai bien compris que lors de la table des négociations, vous n'étiez que six, mais la société civile, par exemple il y avait des ONG qui soutenaient aussi votre cause ?

R : non pas du tout, il y avait des ONG mais non….

M : Et l'ONU aucune présence de l'ONU

R : Mais l'ONU était loin à cette époque là parce qu' ils auraient été appelé après certaines conclusion du step mais non non . Je ne me rappelle rien de l'ONU, peu être que j'ai oublié…

M : Non, non, pas de soucis. Comment selon vous les parties lors la médiation ont-elles pu se laisser pénétrer par la paix ? Quels ont été les éléments déclencheurs ? Vous m'avez peut être déjà répondu mais est ce qu'on peut… vous avez parler des relations personnelles, du dialogue, de la confiance et de la pression internationale, qui sont des facteurs qui ont contribué à faire comprendre que la paix devait, on ne parle même pas de paix mais d'un accord sur le volet éducatif, mais je voudrais essayer de comprendre comment les attitudes des médiateurs ont-elles changés ? Si vous vous rappelez de moments, de…

R : Il me semble que les serbes étaient plutôt des exécuteurs de la volonté de Milosevic et que Milosevic éait un homme qui faisait beaucoup dans la tactique alors il donnait quelque chose, après il s'arrêtait, puis il faisait piétiner les négociations, puis recommençait à donner quelque chose. Il était sensible à tous ces mouvements de la politique international. Mais il était très tactique. Il voyait la nécessité de composer avec les albanais mais il avait peur de perdre consensus à l'intérieur de la société serbe et puisque il y avait continuellement élection en Serbie, Milosevic utilisait le Kosovo toujours pour dire aux serbes : je suis ferme je ne concède presque rien au albanais. Alors, après chaque élection il était plus ouvert, alors quand il s'approchait de l'élection il était tactique. Les albanais ont changé sous le plan personnel, la confiance en nous a grandit mais sur le plan objectif il y avait toujours

cette méfiance envers les serbes. Puis il y avait cette pression de la Guerrillia qui était importante.

M : Donc, pour récapituler, donc ce que j'avais envie vraiment de souligner, c'était selon vous quels étaient les instruments utilisés par Sant Egidio qui ont permis d'établir un état de confiance et de voir évoluer la médiation des relations personnelle mais il n'y a pas d'autres instruments qui vous viennent à l'esprit ? Par exemple,….

R : Naturellement, si des diplomates parlaient bien de Sant Egidio à Milosevic et à Rugova c'était des choses qui aidaient la confiance ; qui montrait que Sant Egidio n'était pas un groupe d'aventuriers, seuls de Don Quichotte. (téléphone sonne). Il y avait des précédents, le cas du Mozambique, c' était un témoignage de l'efficacité du travail de Sant Egidio. Le cas du Mozambique et d'autres médiations mineures comme au Guatemala qui étaient déjà la ; alors Rugova connaissait que le Mozambique avait eu la paix à travers la médiation de Sant Egidio. C'était une chose qui naturellement compte. Quand on fait une demande pour obtenir un travail, on vous montre un Curriculum Vitae.

M : Donc, selon vous l'identité à proprement parlé religieuse de Sant Egidio n'a pas eu d'impact lors de la médiation, un impact positif ?

R : Oui dans le sens qu'on était pas des gens intéressés par les intérêts matériel. Rugova avait été communiste et était très laïque. Bien qu'à la fin de sa vie il s'est rapproché de la religion mais à cette étape là il était laïque. Milosevic était un homme très communiste, partageant les vues idéologiques. Il n'était pas d'un milieu religieux. Tous les deux étaient… Mais le fait que l'église orthodoxe serbe nous avait présenté à Milosevic auquel l'évêque catholique du Kosovo, Marco Soppi, était notre ami et parlait librement avec Rugova , était une bonne chose.

M : Parce que je pense que entre l'église orthodoxe et l'archevêque et Sant Egidio il y avait des valeurs communes que vous vous partagiez.

R : oui on avait des valeurs communes

M : et ça c'est important.

R : une croyance commune, comme tout chétien…. Oui.
M : Ok parfait. Merci beaucoup , c'est très très bien.

Interview with Don Angelo Romano (02/09/2015)

M = Martin Balbachewski
D.A.R = Don Angelo Romano

D.A.R : membre du bureau des relations internationales de la communauté de San'Egidio, professeur de stratégie de l'église à l'université Urbana.

M : ok. Vous avez donc fait parti du processus de médiation… ?

D.A.R : J'ai fait parti du processus de médiation pour la paix en Algérie, au Burundi, et après maintenant je m'occupe du cas de la Lybie.

M : Ok parfait, alors juste deux questions qui sont hors sujet de l'Algérie, elles concernent San'Egidio. Alors, première question très simple, comment décririez vous la communauté ?

D.A.R : C'est une communauté chrétienne, qui est née à Rome en 1968, par l'initiative d'une jeune à l'époque, Paula(o) Ricardi qui dès le début s'est engagé dans la vie chrétienne, dans la vie communautaire, avec d'autres, ils faisaient des prières pour les pauvres, de l'évangélisation, l'ouverture et aussi je dirais, depuis le début, action pour la paix. Quand le pape françois est venu nous visiter l'année passée, il nous a donné une tres belle définition, il a dit sant'egidio c'est les 3 « P » :

« La Prière, les Pauvres et la Paix » donc c'est ca qu'on trouve depuis le début à Sant'egidio même si au début c'était encore en phase germinale disons mais avec le temps tous ces éléments de la vie de sant'egidio ont grandi, ont donné des fleurs, des fruits et donc aujourd'hui Sant'egidio est présent dans plus de 70 pays dans le monde avec des commaunatés qui aident les pauvres en tant que bénévole donc disons que ce n'est pas un travail payé, ils aident les pauvres comme leur propre famille, ils prient et ils font une action qui est une action de prévention de conflit mais aussi de résolution de conflit.

M : Ok, alors deuxième question, comment qualifieriez vous la diplomatie de Sant'egidio si on peut parler de diplomatie ?

D.A.R : oui je pense que… Oui, nous on n'a pas les instruments classiques de la diplomatie, la diplomatie a ses instruments, ses protocoles, ses règles et c'est très important l'existence de la diplomatie, ses protocoles, ses règles et ses lois je dirais, il y des lois. Nous avons des avantages et des désavantages de n'être pas une diplomatie donc nous on n'a pas de règles à respecter dans le sens qu'on n'a pas de limitations bien sur nous avons notre propre conscience, notre éthique et notre inspiration chrétienne, mais disons on n'a pas de limitations que la diplomatie ordinaire normalement a. Je donne un exemple, il y a des personnes que normalement un diplomate ne peut pas rencontrer parce que rencontrer dans le langage diplomatique aussi inter-reconnaître. Donc si il y a mouvement rebelle, d'opposition, armé par exemple il y a des gens qu'on ne peut pas rencontrer si vous êtes un diplomate. Alors bien sur nous on n'a pas cette limitation, on a un peu plus de liberté, pour se proposer comme un chemin, un canal de dialogue et sur ça bien sur à chaque fois qu'on commence de se proposer comme médiateur, nous mettons au centre notre action les intérêts de la paix. C'est ca notre règle.

M : Ok parfait. Alors concernant l'Algérie, quelles étaient les principales causes et raisons qui ont fatalement causé et influencé le conflit en Algérie ?

D.A.R : en Algérie il y avait eu une longue période de régime unique, il y avait l'ouverture de la démocatie vous savez que les années 90 François Mitterand a fait son fameux discours de la Baule, et il a dit « bon les amis, le mur de Berlin vient de

tomber, donc il faut la démocratie, donc on ne peut pas continuer à justifier des régimes non démocratiques avec la justification de la guerre froide, donc, dans ce discours c'est là que la France qui était un petit peu le centre, l'articulation de la guerre froide, dans une certaine partie de l'Afrique et surtout l'Afrique de nord et donc a encouragé une certaine évolution démocratique pour sa part. L'Algérie a commencé son chemin démocratique qui a vu la croissance de ce parti islamique qui était les front islamiste du salut et au premier tour des élections était un tour avec lequel on avait vu la victoire du front islamique du salut avant le deuxième tour les militaires ont fait un coup d'état et ils ont fermé le processus démocratique. Et c'est là que ca a commencé.

M : et les militaires ne provenaient d'aucun parti politique ?

D.A.R : Alors là c'est une bonne question (rires)

M : parce qu'on en parle dans… excusez-moi, donc il y avait beaucoup de radicaux mais je pense qu'une certaine frange des militaires faisait parti du FLN ou c'est faux ?

D.A.R : vous savez le FLN c'était le parti Etat, donc et à l'intérieur du FLN qu' il y avait beaucoup de tendances différentes etc le FLN c'était le parti « tout » disons. Les militaires algériens représentaient le pouvoir algérien, le véritable pouvoir algérien car depuis l'indépendance l'armée était la vraie source du pouvoir. Boumediene il avait fait, disons si on regarde l'histoire d'un pays qui a été géré en fait par des militaires depuis l'indépendance vous voyez, Boumediene a fait son coup d'état mais c'était un chef militaire, donc une longue histoire disons un peu semblable à celle de l'Egypte pour certaines choses et d'autres pays arabes, cétait l'armée comme source de pouvoir et aussi un état avec une certaine direction idéologique, l'Algérie était proche avec le front socialiste, il ne faut pas oublier que l'Algérie était en première ligne pour gérer le mouvement de libération africain, tous les pays qui ont du lutté pour acquérir leur indépendance ont trouvé soutien en l'Algérie, toute l'Afrique lusophone le Mozambique, la Guinée-Bissau, mais aussi l'Afrique du sud a reçu de l'aide, disons c'était un pays très important dans l'histoire africaine et son armée a joué un rôle très important c'était un poids énorme que les militaires avaient dans cette situation et

surtout car les militaires étaient les vainqueurs de cette guerre d'indépendance contre la France donc c'était…

M : une symbolique…

D.A.R : une symbolique oui absolument vous les comparez un petit peu, c'était un peu le même rôle qu'avait joué l'armée en Turquie ou même en Egypte donc l'armée était la véritable âme de l'état. Et donc ce coup d'etat a été fait officiellement pour éviter le pire, pour éviter que le pays puisse plonger dans une crise, il y a eu beaucoup qui a disons cru à ça, en bonne foi peut être dans le sens de dire on empêche la conquête démocratique d'un parti qui n'est pas véritablement démocratique comme l'était le FIS (front islamique du salut) parce que il ont des idées islamistes qui n'étaient pas véritablement démocratique.

M : ok. Donc vous avez mis en avant le facteur politique, le facteur militaire, et par exemple dans le livre on sent bien qu'il n'a pas une Algérie mais deux Algérie, il y l'Algérie des villes, industrielle on va dire, industrialisée et on va dire l'Algérie campagne on va dire et selon vous…

D.A.R : oui ça c'est déjà, je veux dire c'est un peu une simplification car il y aussi tout le problème des berbères, il y a aussi tout le problème de la division de la société entre ce qui fait partie de cette ou ce qui est lié à cette âme de l'état, tout ce qui est lié à cette structure fondamentale de l'Etat, qui est l'armée et les autres. Vous savez en Algérie ce n'est pas la même chose si vous avez un cousin, un oncle, militaire votre perspective de vie change radicalement, c'est tout à fait autre chose.

M : Ok, ok

D.A.R : vous savez vous rentrez dans une autre…

M : dimension

D.A.R : oui tout à fait

M : encore maintenant ?

D.A.R oui je pense, mais à l'époque c'était vraiment une différence énorme, vous ne viviez pas dans les mêmes maisons, vous n'aviez pas les mêmes opportunités, pas le même niveau de vie, pas le même niveau de sécurité, c'est totalement autre chose

M : ok. Et donc après ce coup militaire, une question mais juste pour avoir une petite clarification, les partis politiques se sont retirés de la scène politique ou comment cela s'est passé ?

D.A.R : alors ça s'est passé comme ça, il y a eu beaucoup disons de turbulences dans le sens que il y a eu une longue descente aux enfers de la situation.

M : une dégradation

D.A.R : une longue dégradation qui a signifié l'assassinat de Mohammed Boudiaf. C'était un des crimes… Les partis politiques étaient en tout, il faut distinguer, il y avait trois partis politiques qui avaient presque ensemble 64 % des voix qui étaient : les FIS, le FLN, et le FFS (le front de force socialiste). Apres il y avait plusieurs petits partis, meme un parti trotskyste, plusieurs petits partis qu'il ne faut pas mépriser car ils avaient des leaders qui avaient des opinions, des fois respectables, très respectables sur la situation. Et alors, disons quand on a vu le début de la descente aux enfers du pays comme je vous ai dit nous on avait beaucoup de liens d'amitié avec des gens qu'on connaissait en Algérie. Alors depuis le début de la crise on avait reçu beaucoup d'appels pour dire « mais comment, le mur de Berlin est tombé, vous etes content que la démocratie est venue en Europe de l'est mais nous on cherche de construire notre démocratie, il y a un coup d'état qui est là et vous ne faites rien alors là on s'est dit que c'était quelque chose pour lequel il fallait faire quelque chose. Surtout car il nous semblait significatif de la part d'un pays musulman comme l'Algérie qu'il fallait aider à faire la démocratie dans un pays à 98% musulman, ça on s'est dit qu'il fallait aider à la démocratie. Donc c'est comme ca qu'on a commencé et donc on a parlé de colloques sur l'Algérie, des médiations au début, de faire des colloques sur l'Algérie, venez parler de l'Algérie librement comme ca, qu'est ce que vous pensez de la situation. Et on a invité tout le monde.

M : quand vous dites tout le monde c'est la classe politique, c'est la société civile, c'est…

D.A.R : on a essayé de faire les invitations les plus larges possibles, vous allez voir qu'on a même invité des gens qui ont décidé de ne pas venir qui nous ont même attaqué en disant « pourquoi vous fait ça » donc on avait invité le plus large disons, ils étaient présents ici comme le parti libéral, les partis trotskyste étaient ici, plusieurs petits partis étaient présents ici qui représentaient 2,3% et surtout il y avait les 3 secrétaires générales, pardon les 2 secrétaires générales du FLN (Mehdi), de la FFS (Ahi Ahmed) et le représentant mandaté par le leader en cavale du FIS. Nous on a essayé de les inviter pour parler. On voulait ouvrir un espace au dialogue sans agenda on ne voulait pas laisser les choses se dérouler comme ca sans rien faire, laisser la solution aux armes parce que bien sur de la part du FIS (du leader en cavale) il disait « on refuse la démocratie, on nous attaque donc l'unique réponse c'était les armes, ils avaient créé l'armée islamique du salut, l'AIS, leur branche armée.

M : terroriste ?

D.A.R : quand vous rentrez dans une logique de guerre civile, la définition de ce qui est terroriste et ce qui n'est pas terroriste c'est comme les fantomes, vous essayer de les prendre et vous ne les prendrez jamais. Parce que vous parlez avec des gens qui… je vais vous mentionner du film de Pontecorvo alors à un certain moment il y a une scène très intéressante, les français qui est vrai et surtout l'argument est très correct, vient de prendre le chef de la FLN à Alger, il est prisonnier et pour montrer ce succès ils portent ce monsieur devant la presse, donc il y a des questions dans la presse et la presse pose la question « vous n'avez pas honte d'emmener des bombes dans des petits, chez les gens,… » vous savez quelle était la réponse du monsieur ? il a dit « nous on n'a pas d'avions, on n'a pas de char, l'armée française nous attaque avec les avions, les chars, le napalm, ils tuent les enfants, des femmes. Donnez moi des avions et je vous donnerai mes bourses de femmes. (silence)… C'est ca la logique, c'est atroce mais c'est ca la logique, je ne justifie pas mais c'est ca la logique. Donc c'était le début d'une guerre civile, car au début d'une guerre civile, chacun pense être justifié et utilise tous les moyens pour vaincre. Donc une guerre civile c'est une

guerre qui est malheureusement qui engage la population civile, c'est ca la tragédie d'une guerre civile, ce n'est pas une guerre entre deux armées, qui peuvent se reconnaitre, avec les quartiers généraux, les officiers, ici c'est une guerre en cachette, donc avec les représailles, avec les violences, avec les vengeances, avec les atroces amplifications de la guerre civile. Parce que la guerre civile c'est une guerre encore plus amplifiée. Je dis en Italie on a vécu un peu ca pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, je vous le dis encore maintenant il y a encore des blessures ouvertes. Ce n'est pas encore tout à fait résolu. (téléphone sonne)

M : vous pouvez répondre si vous voulez

D.A.R : (conversation téléphonique) donc, quelle était la question ?

M : vous avez répondu à la question. On parlait donc de, on a un peu dévié, on a parlé des causes et des principales raisons qui ont déclenché le conflit.

D.A.R : alors les causes étaient la peur, disons il faut dire, il y a eu l'interruption du processus de paix et la peur de la part de la société algérienne qui avait que une victoire du FIS déclenche la construction d'un Etat islamique non démocratique. Ca il faut considérer comme une raison du conflit. Il faut être clair sur ce point. Il y avait cette polarisation, disons ces deux partis, d'un coté l'enthousiasme du parti islamique qui se sentait proche de la victoire et disons les militaires qui ont profité de ce climat de peur d'une partie de la société algérienne, là il faut compendre, une chose, l'Algérie pour beaucoup de temps a parlé le langage du pays socialiste, socialiste arabe mais socialiste. Alors 89 (claque ses deux mains), c'est fini. Nous on doit faire, je ne sais pas vous avez quel âge ?

M : j'ai 24 ans. Je suis né en 91 donc juste après la guerre froide.

D.A.R : alors pour vous il faut faire un effort. Disons que la comparaison c'est un peu comme imaginer un pape qui sort de la fenêtre et qui dit « je m'excuse on s'est trompé, on ferme l'église catholique (rire) » C'est un petit peu le choc. Disons le système socialiste était intelligent. C'était une idéologie qui était devenue une culture, une organisation de l'Etat, une économie, un monde. C'était surtout un langage, une

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explication de la vérité, tout était bien expliqué avec les catégories socialistes. Alors la victoire du Front Islamique du Salut, c'était aussi l'idée qui disait devant tous les problèmes que nous avons il y a une solution simple : c'est l'islam. Alors là il faut dire notre stratégie, notre vision. Le fait de faire référence à une religion ne signifie pas forcément avoir une attitude non démocratique. Regardons par exemple quelle a été le rôle des dirigeants chrétiens en Europe après la deuxième guerre mondiale. Disons la naissance de l'Europe a été grâce à l'association de leader comme Schuman,… qui avaient une identité chrétienne évidente. C'était une situation disons exceptionnelle, la religion a été une source d'inspiration. Donc pourquoi ne pas imaginer une chose pareille dans un pays comme l'Algérie qui sortait d'une situation exceptionnelle parce que un monde était fini, n'était plus là. Alors c'était nécessaire de rebâtir la société dans laquelle je ne veux pas me prolonger sur ca mais il y avait des injustices incroyables, la société était divisée entre ceux qui étaient membres d'une certaine élite et le reste du monde qui ne vivait de rien, avec le rêve de migrer en France. C'était un pays jeune, plein de jeunes, c'était encore plus à l'époque un pays très très jeune avec des jeunes qui n'avaient pas de perspectives, qui cherchaient qui voulaient… Bon alors dans tout ce cadre là on a cherché, il fallait trouver la manière, disons car c'était clair le danger qui existait avec la radicalisation du FIS mais c'était clair aussi la présence d'autres gens que le FIS qui n'étaient pas des radicaux qui seulement voulaient porter une inspiration musulmane pour la gestion du pouvoir et de la société. Alors pourquoi ne pas penser à un rôle démocratique pour des gens comme ça, des idées comme ça. Ca a été notre idée, notre espoir. Nous on a pensé : si nous on fait le choix, de la guerre et de la guerre civile, après une élection avortée cela va radicaliser les esprits. Et ca a été le choix. Donc disons pour faire une photographie tres grossière de la situation que nous on rencontré au début.

Quand nous on a reçu l'adhésion de la FLN, de la FFS et des gens du FIS, on a vu qu'il y avait des disponibilités et alors nous on s'est dit on avance. Sant'Egidio devait seulement etre un espace, nous on n'a pas les solutions, on ne veut pas imposer de plan. Disons nous on donne notre espace aux algériens pour parler. « Qu'est ce que vous voulez, qu'est ce que vous pensez ? » Ils sont venus et ils ont parlé, des personnalités comme … sont venus et il a discuté. Et c'est clair que quand ils ont, il y a tout au début ue réaction qui voulait nier totalement les valeurs, on a parlé d'ingérence, on a parlé d'autres choses et c'est clair qu'ils ont… Je me rappelle Ben Bella qui riait en disant « je ne pense pas qu'il y ait personne qui puisse m'apprendre

comment etre patriote algérien ». C'est clair que c'était un peu ridicule disons. Mais, la réaction des gens qui ne voulaient pas, ils ne voulaient meme pas l'attention internationale sur l'Algérie.

M : ok. Important ça, important.

D.A.R : Ils ne voulaient meme pas l'attention internationale sur l'algérie. Ils auraient aimé le soutien oui pour une guerre qui commençait, oui mais l'attention internationale non. Pas du tout.

M : et donc selon vous, vous avez peut être déjà signalé les motivations, enfin, les raisons qui ont motivées Sant'egidio à intervenir en Algérie c'est cet état de guerre,…

D.A.R : c'était le début, le tout début. On voulait, on voyait bien l'abîme où le pays était proche de se plonger. On a essayé de l'éviter parce qu'on voyait bien le chemin, on voyait un peu le même chemin, parce qu'il faut comprendre que beaucoup de membres du FIS c'était des anciens de la FLN. C'était même des anciens de la guerre d'indépendance. Al Mathani c'était le commandant de l'indépendance. Si vous regardez la déclaration avec la quelle la FLN a fait la déclaration du début de la guerre d'indépendance vous trouverez même le principe pour la constitution d'un Etat sur les principes de la religion islamique. Donc du début il y avait cette présence dans la lutte pour l'indépendance, après les choses ont évolué dans une certaine autre direction. Donc ces gens étaient de plus en plus marginalisés mais ils n 'étaient pas plongés du ciel mais je veux dire ils étaient là depuis toujours. Il faut comprendre ça sinon on pense que les islamistes viennent de je ne sais pas où. Disons c'est clair qu'il y a toujours eu une présence au sein du cadre politique algérien, qui n'était peut être pas une présence structurée après il avait une influence en Egypte sur les frères musulmans. Je dirais surtout je pense l'identité algérienne qui était une identité très liée à l'islam, on essayé aussi de la lier un petit peu à cette idée laïque, socialiste, disons modèle Bahat. Disons que le FLN s'inspirait un peu de modèle de parti socialiste arabe laique. Meme s'il ne l'était pas, il avait certains point communs. Et quand tout ça à commencer à tomber par terre donc l'autre racine tres importante de l'identité algérienne a commencé à pousser immédiatement.

M : ok. Alors c'est une double question mais ce ne sont pas les mêmes mais elles sont proches. Comment était perçue l'église catholique en Algérie ?

D.A.R : l'église catholique a survécu en Algérie après l'indépendance grace à des figures prophétiques. Je veux mentionner le cardinal Duval. Le cardinal Duval a été une figure fondamentale parce que pendant la guerre d'indépendance il a clairement dit que le pays devait trouver son chemin indépendant. Ca bien sur ca ne signifiait pas l'expulsion de tous les français du territoire algérien mais parce qu'à l'époque on pensait beaucoup à la possible cohabitation. Donc le cardinal Duval a pris position. Et cette position ouvertement favorable à l'indépendance algérienne a permis la continuation de l'église catholique parce que sinon on aurait pu expulser tous les prêtres, fermer toutes les églises en l'espace d'une semaine. Par contre l'église était perçue comme une force véritablement pas identifiée à l'avance. Ça c'est tres important. Et l'histoire des moines des Tibérine est tres significative. Un des moines qui a été enlevé et tué c'était un médecin. Lui il était là depuis la guerre civile et il avait soigné les blessés de l'armée de la libération nationale pendant la guerre d'indépendance. Donc les moines c'était intouchable. Les monastères c'est considéré comme un lieu de Dieu. Totalement disons un lieu de paix pas comme un forteresse dans un territoire ennemi. Non. Ce n'était pas ça. Toutes les femmes, tous les malades qui voulaient être soignés ils allaient faire les visites gratuitement au monastère. Pour vous dire c'était une routine traditionnelle dans ce sens. L'église Catholique a Angeli au début de la crise était une église tres petite. Composée seulement des européens d'origine, tres petite qui malheureusement tout de suite est devenue une des cibles pour des actes terroristes fait pour avoir de l'écho sur les médias. Là malheureusement la logique du terrorisme est terrible et je pense qu'il y a encore… Mais la logique du terrorisme c'est une logique barbare et des fois j'ai l'impression que les médias n'ont pas cette compréhension. Par exemple quand on voit la manière dont les médias traitent le matériel audiovisuel de Daech on a la perception d'une faiblesse de compréhension du phénomène. On devient des haut-parleur de daech.

M : c'est vrai vous avez raison. C'est ce qu'il veulent.

D.A.R : oui voilà c'est exactement ce qu'ils veulent. Et donc les terroristes qui faisaient des attaques sur l'église catholique voulaient exactement que la presse

occidentale soit leur haut parleur. Pour dire on fait ca parce qu'il y a ca, ca et ca. Une logique barbare parce qu'il fallait tué, des pauvres sœurs qui vivaient dans la cashba dans les villages avec les pauvres, on a tué des vieux prêtres, on a tué des vieux français à la retraite, on a tué monseigneur Claverie et après on a tué les moines de Tibérine.

M : Ok. Alors dans la même perspective, pour Sant'egidio c'était important donc quand vous avez parlé donc de ce colloque et puis de la médiation d'entretenir un contact important avec la communauté musulmane, enfin je parle en terme du dialogue inter-religieux.

D.A.R : on avait eu des contacts au niveau du dialogue inter-religieux oui avant le début de la crise où il y avait des personnalités du monde musulman. Et tout de suite c'est devenu un contact politique.

M : donc les rendez-vous qu'il y a maintenant ce dimanche c'est de cela que vous parlez ?

D.A.R : les rendez-vous qu'il y a ce dimanche ca c'est religieux oui bien sur.

M : donc vous avez déjà rencontré la classe politique, les personnes importantes de l'Algérie ? Il y a déjà eu un contact avant que la crise démarre ?

Et il faut dire que la réponse nous a surpris, il y avait un climat d'enthousiasme ici et de douleur aussi pour la situation que vivait l'Algérie. Mais aussi un climat de réaction positif par rapport à l'humiliation nationale que le pays venait de vivre c'était une humiliation nationale. Pensez ca quand il y a une guerre civile, les premieres cibles sont les personnalités qui disent. Vous ne trouverez jamais dans une guerre civile que les premières victimes sont des extremistes, vous trouverez toujours des personnalités qui disent « non arrêtez qu'est ce que vous faites ? » ca ce sont les premieres cibles. Et c'est ca que l'algérie a eu, il y a eu beacoup de journalistes, intellectuels, c'était un massacre.

M : ok. Donc vous aviez parlé quand on n'avait pas encore commencé l'interview que Sant'Egidio était déjà implantée en Algérie via des voyages de jeunes mais c'est important, quelque part vous n'étiez pas nouveau sur le terrain, quelque part vous aviez déjà un…

D.A.R : absolument c'est important. Meme si c'était une connaissance faite par des jeunes, mais c'était une connaissance faite du terrain, mais on avait percu que le pays il y avait cette tension, cet espoir democratique, la présence en algérie de l'islam, la présence en algérie d'anciens combattants qui avaient fait la guerre en afghanistan, il y avait cette mosquée dite des « afghans » à Alger qui était une mosquée seulement d'anciens combattants mujahidin de la guerre d'afghanistan. On avait eu cette perception. Mais bien sur l'algérie que j'ai connu c'était un pays comme je vous l'ai dit c'était un pays où l'étranger était intouchable. Donc regarder ce pays là devenir un pays où chaque étranger est devenu une cible c'était vraiment une chose horrible.

M : et donc pour bien comprendre, vous avez pu rentrer en contact avec les dirigeants et les personnes importantes des partis politiques grace à votre travail de terrain qui a été effectué…

D.A.R : oui le travail de terrain a été effectué pour faire le reste oui bien sur.

M : mais c'est un travail de terrain d'observateur ou un travail humanitaire ? ca c'est une autre question parce que…

D.A.R : non non pas de travail humanitaire parce que à l'époque on n'a pas fait ca. Mais c'était surtout un travail de connaissance, du respect, un travail de rencontre.

M : inter-religieux ou ?...

D.A.R : inter-religieux, oui c'est comme ca qu'on a commencé, des rencontres avec l'imam tel, avec les telles personnalités, avec l'ancien maire, le groupe de jeunes qui faisait des choses.

M : donc une dimension anthropologique…

D.A.R : oui sur le terrain, à la base. Et certaines personnalités algérienne ont été des personnes clefs pour apres élargir un petit peu ce réseau de connaissance.

M : vous pouvez me dire si ces personnalités étaient des politiciens, des imams…

D.A.R : surtout des gens de la société civile qui étaient un peu disons pas loin du monde islamiste mais en même temps sans un role ouvertement politique. Avec un ouverture. Apres vous savez l'Algérie c'est un pays dans lequel disons dans la classe dirigeante algérienne tout le monde connaît tout le monde. Donc c'est pas un grand monde. C'est pas tellement difficile d'arriver à tout le monde disons.

M : ok. Donc quand le conflit a démarré et qu'il a commencé à y avoir des attentats, je suppose qu'il y avait la guerre, est ce que Sant'Egidio a mis en place des missions humanitaires comme on le voit au Mozambique par exemple, a-t-elle organisé des aides particulières pour venir en aide aux personnes ?

D.A.R : alors vous devez penser ca. Depuis que nous avons fait le premier colloque, nous avons fait un deuxième colloque et nous avons proposé cette plateforme de Rome, qui était une offre de paix. C'était une plateforme de paix, vous pouvez le lire dans le livre. Disons sur laquelle on mettait de points, sur la démocratie, sur les droits de l'homme, sur la guerre… Et la position du pouvoir militaire algérien a été disons clôture totale. D'attaque tout azimut. Donc il n'y a pas eu disons, il n'y a pas eu d'attitude, ce n'est pas comme si on se disait c'est innaceptable mais peut etre on peut se rencontrer pour discuter. Non. C'était la cloture totale. C'était « vous êtes en train de faire de l'ingérence dans les affaires internes ».

M : donc le gouvernement algérien n'a pas permis par exemple d'organiser des missions pour pouvoir venir en aide ?

D.A.R : c'était impensable.

M : impensable ok.

D.A.R : impensable. Quand je vous dis c'est une guerre sale, je vous suggère de voir cette vidéo de canal+ sur l'histoire de l'Algérie. Parce que disons, sur la base de plusieurs témoignages de plusieurs anciens membres des services de sécurité algériens on dit ouvertement que … a été assassiné par les services de sécurité algériens. C'est clair qu'il y a eu double violence. Il y a eu la violence des islamistes et la violence de l'état. C'est clair. Et les services de sécurité c'est clair. Mais si vous prenez les victimes identifier qui a fait quoi c'est presque impossible.

M : donc c'était vraiment un chantier, c'était vraiment tres tres difficile…

D.A.R : oui là c'est vraiment une chose tres tres sale. Il n'y avait pas les conditions disons pour une intervention sur le terrain au pays pendant le conflit.

M : ok. Alors par rapport à la médiation même si on en peut pas nommer les colloques qui ont été mis en place par Sant'egidio comme des processus de médiation, mais si on prend les 3, les deux colloques plus la plateforme de Rome, quelles étaient les principales caractéristiques des parties qui étaient assises à la table.

D.A.R : alors je pense que pour ce que j'ai percu à l'époque, moi j'avais la perception à l'époque que tous les participants à l'époque ils étaient disons ils se sentaient pris par une mission sacrée. Comme quelque chose qui était là devant la plus horrible humiliation du pays car le pays était en train, parce que la guerre d'indépendance était une page, bien sur pour les algériens c'était une page de gloire disons mais là il n'y avait pas de gloire, c'était une guerre horrible. Et donc tout le monde ils avaient l'esprit comme s'il participaient à quelque chose d'important et avec meme un certain, disons entre eux ils voulaient montrer le respect de toutes les opinions.

M : même les FIS ?

D.A.R : oui surtout les FIS. Disons les trois représentants des trois partis les plus important, ils n'ont jamais donné l'impression de mépriser les autres, en disant oui vous etes le parti libéral on ne peut pas vous écouter, non ils s'écoutaient. Tout le monde cherchait de montrer disons son attitude démocratique.

M : et ce changement est ce que c'est grâce à sant'egidio ?

D.A.R : je pense plus que c'était un climat général. Surtout… Ceux qui ont critiqué les colloques pour la démocratie ils disaient « vous ne comprenez pas, les islamistes ils disent qu'ils sont pour la démocratie et après ils font des coups d'état et c'est fini. Si vous pensez les choses comme ca, bien sur ce n'est pas possible de faire quelque chose. Bien sur si je ne aucune confiance sur le fait qu'une personne puisse être sincèrement attachée à des valeurs démocratiques alors on nie à la racine de la possibilité du dialogue. Et moi ca je ne suis pas d'accord. Cela me semble être une position idéologique et un peu discriminatoire. Je dois dire en principe si on commence à pense de manière idéologique, on pourrait penser la même chose des chrétiens en disant oui les chrétiens ont fait des guerres de religions donc ils ne sont pas démocratiques, on pourrait trouver des justifications pour dire que les discussions avec les chrétiens sont impossible. Mais bien sur aujourd'hui avec tout ce qui se passe on pourrait croire que cette version puisse être proche de la vérité. Selon moi non. C'est exactement le contraire. Nous sommes entrains de vivre une radicalisation parce qu'il y a eu un manque de développement démocratique de cette partie du monde islamique. Et les causes du manque d'évolution démocratique sont plusieurs. Par exemple je ne peux éviter de mentionner que quand il y a eu le début de la révolte en Syrie, il y a eu des syriens qui allaient dans les manifestations avec des enfants, il n'y avait pas de volonté de guerre civile. Il y a eu des choix, quand ils ont tiré sur les enfants. Il y a eu un choix de radicaliser les choses quand ils tiraient sur les gens qui passaient dans la rue. Et ca a produit ce qu'ils voulaient produire. Pour dire regardez le choix est entre moi ou celui qui est pire que moi.

M : donc ma question était : pour vous Sant'Egidio n'a pas contribué réellement, on parle souvent d'une méthode de dialogue, d'échange personnelles, interpersonelles
 entre les hommes, essayer de s'écouter, elle n'a pas réussi à changer les attitudes des partis politiques ?

D.A.R : non non, nous avons changé dans le sens que nous avons créé un environnement qui a aidé à cette évolution, c'est à dire, un environnement de gens qui se sont trouvés. Des algériens, des grands messieurs. Quand vous parlez , Ben Bella, d'Haid Akhmed, vous parlez d'un personnage légendaire, Ben Bella aussi, c'est lui

qui aurait fait le premier enlèvement d'avion. C'était un grand moment, tout le monde a perçu ça comme un moment solennel, donc ça change un peu, vous devez nécessairement trouver une plateforme commune avec les autres. On avait créé une plateforme commune, il n'y avait pas seulement les FIS, ils oublient de mentionner qu'il y avait le FFS et le FLN, on oublie toujours de mentionner ca. Pourquoi on ne mentionne pas ça ? Est ce que le FLN ce n'est pas suffisamment fiable, pas suffisamment laïque, mais tout le monde a signé, même le FLN, Merih, le chef, c'était un Monsieur, un grand Monsieur qui était le plus loin possible des idées des islamistes vraiment un monsieur tres laïque, un vrai politicien qui comprenait clairement que le chemin qu'était en train de prendre le pays était un chemin de l'enfer. Donc Merih voulait éviter ca. Akhmed voulait éviter ça. Mais c'était des gens qui avaient écrit l'histoire de leur pays. Il y avait comme disons comme un modérateur, maître Ali Yayah, un monsieur encore vivant, il a je pense 98 ans , qui était un défenseur des droits de l'homme respecté par tout le monde, un monsieur hors de la…

M : donc ceux qui étaient réellement autour de la table c'étaient des personnes qui voulaient trouve des bonnes solutions pour leur pays.

D.A.R : oui. Avec toutes leurs limites bien sûr. Chacun avait sa vision de la réalité. Ahid Ahmed, c'était un homme laïque, démocratique. Les gens du FIS avaient leur vision des choses, comme quelqu'un qui est entrain de vaincre et on lui vole la victoire au dernier 10 mètres de la course disons, ils avaient leur propre vision. Ils disaient c'est l'état qui fait le terrorisme contre nous, nous c'est de la résistance. Donc tout ca crée, il y'avait aussi Louise Anoun qui était du parti trotskyste, une femme remarquable, qui avec ce petit parti était très intéressant à écouter, elle aussi avait ses choses à dire, même le parti libéral, une grande représentation du monde politique algérien. Apres on peut dire qu'il y avait quelqu'un qui manquait, oui c'est vrai mais on n'avait pas la prétention de faire une assemblée constituante ici, mais on a donné un espace pour dire qu'il y avait un espace pour sortir de la crise.

M : même sans les militaires ?

D.A.R : On le faisait pour les militaires, pour dire regardez…

M : il n'y a pas eu de porte parole ou de représentant ?

D.A.R : non bien sur qu'il n'y en a pas eu, l'offre a été lancée comme un message public. Normalement Sant'Egidio, quand il y a un travail de médiation, il y a un conflit et des parties, et on travail dans la discrétion parce que c'est important de donner aux deux partis le calme, de ne pas être perturbé par les réactions de la presse et de dire à tout le monde qu'on a fait ce pas ensemble. Il faut établir ensemble la communication, la conférence de presse… donc on utilise la discrétion. Mais pouquoi sur les colloques sur l'Algérie on fait tout ca ouvertement ? C'était l'unique manière pour la transparence. Même en faisant comme ca le gouvernement algérien nous accusait de faire de l'ingérence. Imaginez si on avait fait ca dans la discrétion, on aurait pu dire je ne sais pas quoi qu'on aurait fait les réunions sous la présidence du Vatican ou je ne sais pas quoi. Non nous on a présenté en disant il y aura ce monsieur, ce monsieur, il faut rendre hommage au courage des gens qui ont participé, ils ont eu un courage extraordinaire. Ils se sont exposés. Ils ont accepté de s'exposer. C'était clair que la publicité c'était l'unique manière pour éviter les légendes, en plus tout le système médiatique algérien est un peu compliqué, il y avait certaines voix un peu plus libres mais…

M : et selon vous pourquoi est ce que les partis ont fait appel à Sant'egidio ?

D.A.R : les partis ont répondu à l'invitation de Sant'egidio. L'appel venait surtout de la société civile algérienne de nos amis disons et les partis ont répondu à l'appel de Sant'egidio avec enthousiasme.

M : pour quelles raisons ?

D.A.R : alors ils ont dit parce que, quand ils sont venus à Rome, le gouvernement a dit mais pourquoi vous êtes allés chez les chrétiens, chez les infidèles pour parler de l'Algérie ?(rires) parce qu'en Algérie ce n'était pas possible. C'était un climat de peur et terreur, ce n'était pas possible. On disait « tous ces gens qui sont allés à Rome c'est absurde ils pouvaient trouver tout l'espace de dialogue en Algérie ». Mais ce n'était pas vrai.

M : mais pourquoi à Rome ? Pourquoi pas justement la France ou…

D.A.R : parce que personne l'a fait. C'est tres simple. A part nous personne l'a fait. Il n'y avait pas d'autre invitation possible. Personne n'avait envie de se mêler du conflit, de ce coup d'état. Personne ne voulait se mêler de ca.

M : selon vous le statut, il y a encore deux, trois questions, le statut moral de Sant'Egidio a aussi permis d'attirer les partis politiques ?

D.A.R : La transparence, on n'avait rien à gagner avec ca, nous on était des croyants des chrétiens, qui devant un pays ami, qu'on connaissait bien, qui a souffert énormément pour acquérir son indépendance, un pays qui a connu un histoire comme ca, qui est proche de se plonger dans un abyme d'horreur, et qui fait quelque chose. Cela nous nous a donné une crédibilité. Ce n'est pas la Vatican, le gouvernement Italien, c'est Sant'Egidio. Donc c'est pas un gouvernement qui essaye de manipuler le cadre politique algérien. Non pas du tout.

M : et l'identité religieuse de votre communauté ?

D.A.R : l'identité religieuse est très intéressante car dans la polémique disons alimentée par le pouvoir algérien pour critiquer les participants aux colloques d'Alger a été une sorte de critique : ils sont allés chez les chrétiens pour chercher ça. Et là les participants aux colloques ont donné un réponse sympathique en disant « pour une fois qu'on reçoit une proposition bonne des chrétiens il faut l'utiliser ». Si du monde chrétien vient quelque chose de bien qui peut nous aider il faut l'utiliser.

M : mais quelque part vous partagez les même valeurs ? Ca c'est important aussi, c'est de là que vient le dialogue interreligieux.

D.A.R : bien sur et surtout disons cet esprit de gratuité. On faisait ca gratuitement, on faisait un geste comme si vous voyez une personne tomber dans un trou, on a dit « arrête je vais t'aider pour sortir ».

M : un geste envers des personnes en difficulté.

D.A.R : voilà. Et tout le monde savait qui était là, ils savaient qu'on faisait des choses pour les pauvres, ils savaient qu'on priait, ils nous voyait prier, ils nous voyaient comme des croyants. C'est très important pour le respect, pour dialoguer avec les autres, pour rencontrer les autres. C'est très important d'avoir une identité claire. Ceux qui ont peur de rencontrer l'autre, normalement ils ont une identité fragile. On n'a jamais caché que nous étions des chrétiens, catholiques tres engagés. Par contre quand ils venaient, quand il y avait des prières, on montrait aux algériens tous les gens dans l'église de Santa Maria, l'église pleine. Ils étaient absolument éblouis. Parce que Vous savez il y a des préjugés que nous avons sur les musulmans et il y a aussi des préjugés des musulmans sur nous. Il y a des obstacles de tous les côtés. Par exemple pour les musulmans l'Europe c'est la terre de la sécularisation, de perte de la foi, de la corruption etc. Regarder des jeunes qui prient par exemple pour eux c'était synonyme de grand respect.

M : ok. Parce que par exemple je demandais à Roberto Morrozo, au Kosovo l'aspect religieux n'était pas important. Nettement moins important. Parce que moi c'est une de mes hypothèses, c'est de savoir si l'identité religieuse de la communauté Sant'egidio a-t-elle contribué oui ou non à la paix en Algérie etc.. Donc toutes ces valeurs humaines, tout ce coté humain…

D.A.R : oui évidemment. C'est impossible de faire une scission entre notre identité et ce que nous faisons. C'est clair que toute notre action pour la paix est enracinée dans notre identité chrétienne. Et les algériens savaient tres bien ca, que nous on était des chrétiens, qu'on priait.

M : que vous étiez dévoué à aider les autres.

D.A.R : oui voilà. On était là pas pour avoir des contrats du pétrole.

M : oui voilà c'est ca que j'ai bien compris, c'est qu'il y a votre identité et votre impartialité. Il n'y a pas d'intérêts, pas de dollars…

D.A.R : Oui voilà. Quand ils sont venus ici, on a pas dit vous êtes ici pour faire ça, ça et ça. On a dit qu'est ce que vous proposez comme solution, qu'est vous voulez pour l'Algérie ? Selon vous, quel résultat doit venir de cette rencontre ? Et c'est à partir de Là qu'on a produit un appel de l'homme, une plateforme pour l'Algérie. Mais c'est à partir de leur requête, idée, rêve que nous avons fait la plateforme de Rome. Nous on n'a pas imposé les choses, c'est absurde de pense cela.

M : donc cette identité a facilité la médiation.

D.A.R : oui a facilité à construire un environnement qui a produit une offre de paix. Et donc cet environnement à aider les algériens à construire avec nous.

M : ok. C'est juste avec les partis politiques ou vous avez aussi travaillé avec la société civile ?

D.A.R : oui je vous ai dit il y avait des personnes de la société civile, il y avait maître Aliyaya, c'était une personnalité de la société civile, c'était lui un peu le doyen de la réunion et si je ne me trompe pas il y avait aussi des représentants des syndicats qui ont participé aux colloques. Il y avait aussi des algériens qui avaient aussi un peu d'autorité mais qui n'avaient pas de rôle religieux ou politique, qui étaient un peu comme des hommes sages.

M : Dernière question, question fondamentale, lors des colloques et de la plateforme pour l'Algérie, donc on a déjà parlé des acteurs en Algérie mais est ce que vous avez eu besoin d'appuis extérieurs, c'est à dire d'acteurs étatiques, officiels ?

D.A.R : bien sur. On a bien sur eu besoin que l'Italie laisse rentrer les invités aux rencontres, que le gouvernement italien laisse passer ces monsieurs, cesmonsieurs… qu'ils donnent des visas. Ca c'est une forme de collaboration. On a eu des contacts, on a essayé de passer le message à toute la diplomatie européenne.

M : pour quelles raisons ?

D.A.R : pour dire écoutez il y a cette offre de paix,

M : ils vous ont soutenu ? ils vous ont envoyé des experts, des médiateurs ?

D.A.R : il y a eu un grand engouement par rapport au résultat suite au Colloque de Rome. Il y a eu une tentative bien expliquée dans le livre, de la présidence française pour dire que c'était une bonne chose mais tout ca disons mais cela n'a pas eu d'effets sur le processus.

M : donc il n'y a pas eu de soutien externe on va dire ?

D.A.R : soutien oui, dans le sens oui bravo. Soutien dans le sens de dire on parle avec le gouvernement algérien et on propose des solutions et conditions non. D'arriver à une sorte de pression diplomatique majeur sur le gouvernement algérien pour accepter l'offre de paix, non. Il y a eu une tentative française qui a été de suite arrêtée.

M : et la table ne voulait pas parler avec des Etats ?

D.A.R : les partis à la table voulaient parler avec tout le monde. La diplomatie était rès disposée à écouter les gens ici. Et surtout ils étaient intéressés de parler avec Sant'egidio. Mais cette attitude favorable de la part de la diplomatie n'est pas devenue une véritable pression sur le gouvernement algérien pour lui faire changer d'avis.

M : non, non mais je pare plus en terme de médiation

D.A.R : disons que pour la médiation, en général il y a eu beaucoup d'attention, bien sur en Europe il y a eu plusieurs mouvements politiques qui étaient des souteneurs au coup d'état en Algérie du gouvernement militaire. Donc ces mouvements politiques nous ont critiqué en disant que vous donnez de l'espace…

M : vous avez des noms ou ?

D.A.R : En Italie je dis qu'il y a eu un petit mouvement politique, surtout à gauche, vous savez l'Algérie c'était surtout un mythe, pour la gauche européenne, le mythe de la révolution algérienne, vous savez quand un mythe tombe c'est toujours pas facile de l'accepter.

M : ok. Parce que vous savez si on prend l'exemple du Mozambique avec l'expert Cameron Hume qui a été présent, c'est pour ca j'aimerais savoir s'il y a eu présence officielle lors des colloques

D.A.R : il y a eu des diplomates qui sont venus qui ont observé mais aucun n'a eu un rôle comparable à celui de Cameron Hume.

M : ok et un soutien logistique ?

D.A.R : c'est quelque chose de pratique donc dans ce sens oui.

M : et des mises en contact avec des personnes importantes.

D.A.R : pas tellement. En général à la fin des colloques on a fait le tour des diplomaties pour expliquer ce qu'on faisait etc…

M : la France ne vous a pas aidé ?

D.A.R la France était très intéressée, ils ont meme essayé un petit peu de dire au gouvernement algérien de considérer cette initiative. Les relations avec la France   et l'Algérie c'est une chose qui est tellement compliquée qui pour les êtres humains ordinaires est quelque chose de difficile à comprendre.

M : et le Vatican, le saint-siège ?

D.AR : le Saint-Siège était très préoccupé de la situation, pour les conséquences sur l 'église locale. Nous on les a averti de ce qu'on était en train de faire. Elle n'a jamais un rôle.

M : et la raison pour laquelle la diplomatie officielle n'a pas voulu jouer un rôle était parce qu'il voyaient que ca allait être très compliqué ? Ou qu'ils avaient confiance en vous et qu'ils ne pouvaient rien apporter de plus ?

D.A.R : C'était un monde différent, l'Algérie était loin, c'était le début du changement, Gorbatchev était tombé, c'était le début de la présidence de Yeltsin, le monde était distrait par autre chose. Il y avait d'autres préoccupations. Toute l'attention des gouvernements européens était sur l'Europe de l'Est et les Balkans.

M : c'est très étrange, donc vous n'aviez même pas un représentant du gouvernement italien assis à la table des négociations.

D.A.R : alors vous devez penser une chose, quand le colloque de l'Algérie a commencé, l'Italie venait de vivre une véritable révolution politique, c'était la fin de la sois-disante première république et le début de la deuxième. C'est à dire que tous les partis politiques qui avaient bâti la démocratie italienne allaient disparaître. Tous. Le parti républicain, le parti libéral, même le parti communiste venait de disparaître et prendre un autre nom. Alors il y avait du ciel, tombé le nouveau parti de Berlusconi qui venait de vaincre les élections. Donc, il y avait le massacre d'une classe politique. Je veux dire massacre pour dire disons, tout le monde avec des enquêtes, le juge, la corruption. C'était une période très difficile pour l'Italie. Au point de vue de la politqiue étrangère, une situation comme celle-là, c'est un court circuit, donc le pays est plus préoccupé de ce qui se passe à l'intérieur que de ce qui se passe à l'extérieur. Meme la capacité d'un pays de faire une politique étrangère, c'est une réelle crise. Les grands protaganistes de l'Italie venaient tous de fuir le pays.

M : non mais comme vous l'avez dit les diplomaties étaient occupées par autre chose.

D.A.R : Absolument.

M : Ok, merci beaucoup. Je pense qu'on va arrêter là.

D.A.R : De rien.

Interview with Jan De Volder (03/09/2015) – the interview for the first 5 minutes has not been record. Therefore I had to re-ask him the first two and half questions at the end of the interview. The interview was made by phonecall.

M = Martin Balbachewski
J = Jan De Volder

M: Pouvez-vous vous présenter ?

J: Jan de Volder, historien romaniste, journaliste spécialisé dans le monde religieux, surtout dans le dialogue inter-religieux pour Sant'Egidio. Je suis engagé depuis ma jeunesse et aujourd'hui je m'occupe surtout de l'accueil des étrangers, des primo-arrivants en Belgique et puis des projets de dialogue inter-religieux en Belgique et aussi au Nigéria.

M: Ok, parfait. Alors, la première question c'était : « comment décriez-vous la communauté de Sant'Egidio ?

J: Je dirais que c'est un acteur assez « sui generis », c'est assez unique, qui est difficilement comparable à d'autres associations. Donc un peu complexe aussi, pas facile à comprendre je pense mais, disons que c'est vraiment ce que l'on a envie d'être, c'est à dire un mouvement ou une communauté d'Homme, de laïques, hommes et femmes qui cherchent à vivre l'évangile dans le service aux plus démunis et dans l'amour et dans la construction de la paix. Et c'est un fruit des intuitions du Concile Vatican II même si c'est une expérience tout à fait originale et pour ma part belle.

M: Ok, parfait. La deuxième question c'était : « comment qualifieriez-vous la diplomatie de Sant'Egidio ? »

J: Là aussi c'est une diplomatie originale, une approche originale qui est très axée sur la rencontre humaine, sur l'écoute, sur la sympathie aussi sur une certaine sensibilité des relations humaines. Voilà, mais aussi bien sûr une analyse, une capacité d'analyse politique des problème. Mais, je pense qu'à la base il y a vraiment la foi que tout est

possible et que la paix est toujours possible.

M: J'ai une petite question en fait par rapport à ça : « est-ce que tous les membres de Sant'Egidio sont des croyants finalement ou pas du tout ? »

J: Oui, normalement oui.

M: Je veux dire est-ce que c'est une des conditions pour être membre ?

J: Ben oui parce que bon,il faut quand même se dire chrétien, il faut quand même vouloir écouter l'évangile. Maintenant, qu'est-ce qu'un croyant ? Donc si on se dit vraiment membre de Sant'Egidio, oui il faut être chrétien. Mais bon évidemment il y a beaucoup d'amis de toutes sortes, des musulmans, des athées, des juifs, des bouddhistes. Donc oui, pour être membre il faut quand même être chrétien et croyant. Maintenant pour être ami, non.

M: Ok, parfait. Quelles étaient les principales causes et raisons qui ont déclenché le conflit au Mozambique et en Algérie ?

J: Guerre froide. Contexte de la décolonisation. Il y a aussi un aspect idéologique bien sûr avec le gouvernement marxiste d'un côté. Mais il y avait un côté éthnique aussi et puis un côté social parce que c'est un pays extrêmement pauvre. Le banditisme des uns et des autres ça a joué aussi, ou la corruption des autres donc tout ça ça jouait.

M: Et l'aspect religieux n'était pas du tout présent par rapport au conflit ?

J: Je ne pense pas trop, un peu oui mais non pas trop parce que le gouvernement était vraiment anti-religieux au début dans les années 80 ou la liberté religieuse était une question mais finalement Sant'Egidio a pu construire une relation avec le gouvernement du FRELIMO notamment en travaillant sur la question de la liberté religieuse et c'est là que la confiance s'est installée avec Jean-Paul II et avec « **Beningueros ?** ».

M: Et ça, ça a permis en fait de rentrer en contact avec le gouvernement pour ensuite

régler la question du RENAMO si je ne m'abuse ?

J: Oui, mai là on ne savait pas, on ne savait pas du tout. Au début c'était pas une stratégie. Ca c'est venu avec l'Histoire donc nous on a voulu comme on était devenu ami de cet évêque, de Peyra, qui nous disait : « Nous on ne peut même pas sonner des cloches », voilà on a dit c'est quand même un peu exagéré donc on a parlé avec des gens communists, des amis en Italie qui étaient vraiment des communistes mais qui disaient oui c'est bien d'être communiste mais là c'est quand même un peu exagéré donc voilà c'est comme ça que ça c'est fait de fil en aiguille.

J: Pour l'Algérie évidemment c'est un contexte différent. C'était dans le contexte de la démocratisation à partir de 1989 parce qu'évidemment l'Algérie avait eu un contexte de parti unique et puis l'ouverture du centre démocratique qui suscitait beaucoup d'espoir à l'époque. C'était aussi une peu la fin de la Guerre Froide. Quand on a vu que les islasmistes qui avaient été longtemps supprimés en Algérie prenaient tellement de voix, il y a eu la réaction de l'armée qu'on connaît et donc du coup la lutte armée qui a commencé donc dès qu'on a voulu éviter que les islamistes, notamment le FIS, pouvaient s'exprimer comme un acteur politique. Mais là aussi un contexte social vraiment difficile avec une pauvreté énorme en Algérie, avec une jeunesse sans espoir et donc au chômage.

M: Ok, parfait. Selon vous quelles étaient les principales motivations qui ont amené Sant'Egidio à intervenir au Mozambique et en Algérie ?

J: Je pense que c'est l'amitié avec les deux pays. C'était peut-être les pays en Afrique à cette époque là qu'on connaissait le mieux. Le Mozambique, moi je me rappelle, au début que j'ai rencontré la Communauté de Sant'Egidio c'est à dire en 1984 mes premiers contacts. J'avais 17 ans, mais je me rappelle que par exemple il y avait des collectes pour le Mozambique, des collectes dans les magasins de Rome. On envoyait des vivres et des bateaux avec des lettres. C'était un pays tellement pauvre on était devenu bon vous connaissez l'histoire avec Gonzalvez donc l'amitié avec un évêque… Mais c'était vraiment l'amitié pour un peuple ou l'amour pour un pays qui souffrait. Et en fait c'était un peu de même en Algérie parce que l'Algérie c'était quand même un pays qui était visité beaucoup par des jeunes de la communauté au début des années

80. Moi même j'ai fait un voyage encore en 92 en Algérie. Il y avait beaucoup d'amis notamment dans le monde chrétien mais aussi dans le monde musulman et donc il y avait beaucoup de « liens» et donc il y avait aussi des demandes de l'aide. Après le Mozambique, qu'est-ce que vous faîtes pour l'Algérie ?

M: Ok, parfait. Comment était perçue l'Eglise catholique au Mozambique et en Algérie selon vous ? La place, la position ?

J: Ca dépend un peu de par qui. Percu par qui, c'est un peu une question tellement générale. C'est claire que l'Eglise au Mozambique c'était pas facile parce que le régime c'était quand même marxiste. C'était la partie dure. Et en effet comme vous avez pu lire aussi, la première chose que Sant'Egidio a fait c'est se mettre un peu en contact avec des communistes italiens à l'époque d'Enrico Berlinguer d'essayer d'avoir un peu plus de liberté religieuse donc le fait qu'on pouvait sonner les cloches qui était l'exemple le plus connu. Aussi la visite du pape au Mozambique. Oui, l'Eglise catholique était mal vue par le FRELIMO au début mais puis ça a changé petit à petit. Il y a eu une ouverture plus grande au sein des années 80.

En Algérie c'était une situation différente. Pays musulman évidemment, avec une Eglise très très minoritaire. Là peut-être notre grand ami c'était Monseigneur Duvale, Le vieux cardinal français sur lequel d'ailleurs Mario Impargliazo, qui est le président actuel de Sant'Egidio, a fait aussi sa thèse je pense. C'était un peu son intuition : « comment être chrétien au milieu des musulmans ? », c'est pas évident mais : « comment être un témoignage ? ». Et donc il y avait des témoins tout à fait remarquable. Evidemment il y avait Monseigneur Thessier qui était le successeur de Monseigneur Duvale. Il y avait les trappistes de Thibérines, qui ont connu le sort tragique que l'on connaît, dans des circonstances que l'on ne connaît pas toujours, toujours pas. Il y avait aussi le père Blanc de Thizioul, il y avait vraiment des acteurs très très impressionants, d'acteurs du dialogue inter-religieux. Je dirais que à cette époque là l'Algérie était quand même un pays intéressant. Je pense que si on avait pu trouver une autre voie pour l'Algérie, on ne sait jamais on n'écrit pas l'Histoire avec des "si mais", l'Histoire aurait pu être différente.

M: Ok, parfait. Par rapport à cette question , Sant'Egidio a essayé d'entretenir de très

très bonnes relations avec l'Eglise catholique au Mozambique et l'Eglise catholique en Algérie ainsi que la communauté musulmane en Algérie, c'était très important d'avoir de telles relations ?

J: Oui c'était très crucial je pense mais bon il faut aussi comprendre que l'Eglise catholique n'est pas monolythe. Je ne sais pas si vous connaissez un peu le monde catholique ?

M: Pas très bien non.

J: Si je parle avec des amis de l'ULB, ils ont l'impression qu'elle est monolythe mais il y a beaucoup de tendances au sein de l'Eglise. Beaucoup de sensibilités différentes, de positions différentes donc oui il y a une grande unité sur certaines choses mais après il y a beaucoup de différences aussi. On cherche à avoir les meilleures relations avec tout le monde. Maintenant il peut y avoir des opinions et des sensibilités différentes ça c'est claire.

M: Alors une question qui est pour moi essentielle : « Est-ce que avant et pendant le conflit, pendant la médiation, est-ce que Sant'Egidio s'est elle implantée localement afin d'apporter une aide humanitaire ou une aide spirituelle aux locaux au Mozambique et en Algérie ?

J: Oui, donc ça c'est la question sur l'implantation des communautés ?

M: Oui, exactement.

J: Je pense que pour le Mozambique ça a été très important parce que le Mozambique a été le premier pays où il y avait des communauté de Sant'Egidio en Afrique sub-Saharienne. Et aussi le fait que des frères et des soeurs vivaient dans la guerre et aussi sont morts dans la guerre. Vous avez entendu ces histoires sans doute, Madora une soeur et aussi un garçon, dont le nom m'échappe en ce moment, qui sont morts par balle. Ce n'était pas des combattants, c'était des innocents. Tout ça a vraiment nourri une réflexion au sein de la communauté qui a aidé Sant'Egidio a joué un rôle qu'elle n'avait jamais pensé au début de jouer. Donc c'est à dire si personne ne fait la paix,

essayons de faire la paix. Essayons nous de faire la paix. Ca c'était très important, c'est l'expérience qu'il y avait des communautés et leur témoignage sur le terrain de gens que l'on connaissait qui vivaient dans cette guerre.

M: Donc vous dîtes par là que quelque part ce contact a permis aussi de mettre en avant et de mettre en valeur la crédibilité de Sant'Egidio ?

J: Je ne sais pas si j'ai dit ça non. Oui, ça peut aider évidemment. La présence des communautés sur le terrain c'est toujours un peu une épée à double tranchant. C'est à dire qu'il y a des avantages. Les avantages c'est une connaissance du terrain, c'est avoir des informations de première main. C'est très différent des diplomates qui souvent sont loin, qui lisent des rapports mais qui n'ont pas ce contact du vécu des gens. Ca c'est un énorme avantage. Le désavantage si vous voulez c'est qu'on est un peu moins libre de faire ce qu'on veut parce que les communautés sur place qui sont des frères et des soeurs doivent aussi être protégés donc on ne peut pas les exposer comme ça. Parfois ce n'est pas facile. Maintenant ça n'a pas joué tellement dans le conflit au Mozambique je pense, ni en Algérie où on n'a pas de communauté. Mais ça peut jouer dans d'autres conflits.

M: Je ne me souviens plus si en Algérie il y avait déjà des contacts qui ont été mis en place sur le terrain avant ou pendant que le conflit éclate ?
(10:23) contact

J: Oui tout à fait, dans les années 80 il y a eu beaucoup de contacts avec l'Algérie.

M: Des échanges interculturels si je me souviens bien ?

J: Oui, des échanges mais surtout des jeunes qui allaient en été puis après qui continuaient à écrire des lettres, ce genre d'échange.

M: Est-ce qu'on pourrait parler d'établissement de lien, de « network » comme on dit avec la société civile par exemple au Mozambique et en Algérie ? Est-ce qu'il y avait une réelle coopération, une entente avec la société civile ?
(10 :58)

J: c'est un plus difficile. La société civile dans ces pays, cela ne veut pas dire grand chose. L'église c'est l'acteur principale de la société civile , je dirais, parce que le reste, ce sont des états encombrants, c'est dictature. Mozambique et en quelque sort l'Algérie aussi. Il y a peu d'espace, surtout pour les européeens, pour uen société civile. Je ne sais pas si vous avez un peu d'expérience pour ces pays là, pour ce genre de pays…

M: Non pas trop, mais on imagine bien pour ces pays en guerre

J: ou bien ce sont des parties politique, tout de suite,… ou bien, mais.... L'église ….Ou bien les religions… Il y a quelques associations de droits de l'homme qui étaient actives en Algérie mais c'était très vite lié au monde politique quand même. Donc vous avez une société civile libre d'agire comme nous on l'entend, ça c'est très … oui un peu les femmes, **Bikao ? (inaudible)** avec lesquelles nous avons noué des relations. Et quelques associations de droits de l'homme. Mais quelques uns étaient très trés pro-pouvoir. Donc c'était très instrumentalisé.

M: on m'a parlé aussi, on m'a évoqué aussi de relations avec des personnes influentes de la société civile, des imams ,…

J : oui, Aylaria. Oui c'était un intellectuel, un juriste, je pense, influent et c'est avec qui on a partagé d'analyse. Oui ça c'est clair, ça c'est important. Je connais moins bien, il y a sans doute des gens qui connaissent mieux les détails de ça.

M : Alors, peut-être vous avez déjà répondu à cette question mais est ce que selon vous Sant'Egidio était active à un niveau bas, pas à un niveau formel, officiel, c'est à dire active avec les personnes lambda, cela a permis à légitimer Sant'Egidio à devenir le médiateur ou pas du conflit ?

J : oui sans doute. On voit toujours une dynamique, enfin toujours souvent dans les conflits, mais c'était surement le cas au Mozambique et l'Algérie. La question de l'internationalisation. En général, les pouvoirs en place, ils veulent considérer leurs conflits comme un conflit local, qui dépend de la souveraineté de l'état et donc ils ne veulent pas des gens, des états, des organisations, qui se mêlent de ça. Parce qu'ils

disent que c'est une affaire à nous et nous on va… . Comme l'Espagne avec l'ETA par exemple, c'est une affaire à nous et nous on régler cela. Soit par les armes, soit par la négociation. C'est une affaire à nous. Alors que les rebelles, évidement, en général ils ont une tendance inverse, ils veulent l'internationalisation, ils cherchent l'internationalisation. Ça c'est toujours quelque chose dans la médiation de conflits qui jouent. Alors, donc, un avantage que Sant'Egidio peut avoir en tant qu'acteur non-institutionnel c'est que bon c'est en quelque sorte les rebelles, en parlant avec Sant'Egido en tant que médiateur, voilà c'est l'internationalisation, c'est l'Italie ,c'est Rome, c'est le Sant Siège, c'est l'église catholique. Alors un état non, c'est pas l'internationalisation, ce n'est pas un état, ce n'est pas un acteur reconnu, vous voyez ? C'est dans ce sens là, cela a été un peu un avantage dans les deux médiations. Mais évidemment, il y aussi une faiblesse. Parce qu'on peut massacrer l'effort de Sant'Egidio. Comme elle l'a fait en Algérie notamment.

M : c'est ça… Pour moi enfaite, c'est une de mes hypothèses, c'est que l'implantation locale et le fait de rentrer en contact, donc pas simplement dans une perspective top down, qui permet aussi de quelque part projeter une image positive de Sant'Egidio comme quelque part une entité avec qui on peut faire confiance, avec qui on sait son statut, c'est une entité impartiale, qui met les deux parties sur un même pied d'estal. (identité+ (16 :00)

J : Ca c'est clair, donc je pense que ca c'est vrai. Mais il faudrait vérifier un peu avec les autres acteurs. Qui connaît Sant'Egidio sur place, bon ou à Rome ou ailleurs, va voir que ce sont des gens bien intentionnés qui sont les amis des pauvres, qui travaillent gratuitement dans la majorité des cas, qui … bon voilà qui cherche la paix quoi et qui va augmneter la confiance. En général je pense que ce sont des choses qui augmentent la confiance. Evidement on invente toujours ces choses, des gens du Vatican, de la CIA, des français, de … Donc, on va inventer mais je pense que les gens qui connaissent vraiment Sant'Egidio, ils vont être convaincu de notre bonne foi.

M : C'est ca, ok. Alors, simplement j'aimerais … je ne sais pas si vous pourriez répondre à cette question, parce quelle est un peu plus précise. C'est que…

J : Excusez-moi, restez en ligne, j'ai un appel urgent là donc. (téléphone)

M : J'avais juste une petite question est ce que vous vous souvenez des principales caractéristique des parties belligérantes au Mozambique et en Algérie ?

J : C'est compliqué hein… Donc… les caractéristiques ?

M : oui donc comment on pourrait définir le FRELIMO, le RENAMO, ; les parties en Algérie qui étaient assise à la table des négociations et le gouvernement Algérien. Quels étaient leur particularité ?

J : oui… donc bon le FRELIMO était un parti qui avait une réelle idée socialiste, étatique, de parti-unique. C'était vraiment des idéologues. Ce n'était pas évidnet au départ de les attirer à la table des négociations. Le RENAMO, bon c'était vraiment considéré comme une bande de bandits, ce qui était un peu exagéré comme on l'a découvert. On a vu quand même une vision politique. Mais c'est vrai qu'il manquait d'expérience plus politique donc cela leur a pris du temps de devenir un acteur politique capable de faire les négociations. Je dirais voilà que c'était vraiment des rebelles un peu bandits avec une idée politique où ils ont du apprendre à faire de la politique. Donc ça c'est pour le Mozambique. Pour l'Algérie, c'est beaucoup plus compliqué.

M : Non mais pour l'Algérie, il y a un peu trop d'acteurs….

J : oui il y avait beaucoup d'acteurs…

M : non non mais les grandes tendances. Donc il y avait évidemment le FIS qui était un parti islamiste,…

J : Oui le FIS était le parti islamiste mais le FIS évidemment c'était aussi des gens avec peu d'expérience politique, qui avait souffert dans les prisons, qui était dur mais qui avait un peu l'appui du peuple. Il savait que le gouvernement était hait par beaucoup de gens, et donc ils ont quand même eu la subtilité, mais on a jamais pu savoir si c'était juste des manœuvres, mais la subtilité quand même de vouloir un dialogue avec tous les autres partis quoi, et donc d'êtres prêt à signer cette plateforme

de Rome qui reste une référence la plus démocratique de l'histoire du pays. Donc il y avait quand même une intelligence, il y avait des têtes qui pensaient. Puis il y avait aussi des fous évidemment. Alors il y avait les berbères, le SF… comment ils s'appelaient ?

M : le parti socialiste ?

J : non, le FFS, donc le parti des berbères. Ahmed Aid, c'était l'opposant de tout monde. Mais il était un politique, donc, u homme doué. Il y avait Ben Bella. Je me rappelle que Ben Bella avait rencontré à Sant'Egidio Aid Ahmed, celui qui avait condamné à mort 20 ans auparavant. Puis il y avait Louise Anoun, qui était du parti Trokiste. Alors la je les connais mieux, je les accueillais à Rome, je les recevais à Rome, c'était très étonnant. C'est une Trotkiste pure et dur mais elle était charmante et elle était très apprécié à la communauté, c'était la première fois de sa vie à Rome, peut-être la première fois de sa vie dans une église catholique à Saint Pierre. Tout ça c'était extrêmement amusant mais c'était aussi une femme qui voulait l'accord avec les islamistes.

M : Ok, c'est ça. Donc, plus spécifiquement, comment on pourrait analyser l'évolution de la relation entre les parties ? Parce qu'au départ, on parlait de relations extrêmement tendues parce qu'ils se font la guerre et comment on pourrait analyser, comprendre cette évolution, ce processus qui s'est mis en place ?

J : Au Mozambique ?

M : oui, d'abord au Mozambique.

J : c'est un travail de confiance, de confidence building, qui prend du temps. Il y a eu beaucoup de … cela a duré le processus, deux ans et demi. A un certain moment, je me rappel que Sant'Egidio était devenue la visée des diplomates mais aussi qui était critiquée par des missionnaires qui disaient mais nous : ici nous on souffre et vous qu'est ce que vous faites, vous mangez de bonnes pizzas à Rome… Donc Tout ça était critiqué et cela a pris du temps mais cela a eu son sens de prendre du temps.

C'était vraiment nécessaire pour gagner la résistance des uns et des autres. Donc mais je pense que là, le travail du médiateur a été très important.

M : vous parlez de Sant'Egidio ?

J : oui je parle de Sant'Egido mais de l'équipe en générale. Il y avait Raffaelli, il y avait l'évêque, donc une équipe. Le travail de Matteo Zuppi, d'Andrea Riccardi ont été remarquable dans le sens de …. Mais aussi de bien écouter leurs peurs, leurs résistances, leurs idées, de l'autre. Mais je pense que se retrouver comme une famille mozambicaine a été fondamentale. Un amour pour le pays des deux côtés. Et ça aussi, le type de négociation pour l'Algérie était très différente. C'était là… c'était plutôt des <u>facilitateurs</u> et c'était eux qui signaient l'accord. ; c'était vraiment les partis politique algériens qui voulaient se rencontrer, qui voulaient faire quelque chose de commun. Là aussi les divergences étaient très grande mais il y avait un amour pour leur pays, les algériens étaient aussi des nationalistes. Et aussi la peur que la guerre n'éclate. Une réelle volonté de démocratie, de pluralisme et tout. Donc ça c'était vraiment quelque chose de commun.

M : Oui parce que quand même, à la table, il y avait le FLN et le FIS qui étaient quand même les deux parties opposées et qui se détestaient… Donc c'est…

J : Exacte mais ils avaient … Bon oui il faut quand même voir l'esprit du temps. Tout d'abord, il y avait beaucoup d'expérience de démocratisation en Algérie, après le parti unique, même au sein de FLN , il y avait des gens , des tendances, qui pour dire voilà c'est bien la démocratisation parce que nous comme parti-unique. Ce n'était pas que tout le monde... (inaudible) que le FLN voulait rester le parti unique. C'est vrai qu'ils se détestaient , qu 'on parlait avec l'ennemi, mais quand même il y avait des points de convergences, surtout la grande volonté de rétablir la paix et la paix dans la démocratie et trouver un avenir dans le pays. C'était vraiment tout ce qui réunissait. Dès le début je pense, c'était plus naturel, par le contexte quoi. Euhhmmm voilà.

M : c'est très très bien. Alors, l'autre question que j'aimerais savoir, elle est assez courte je pense. Pourquoi les partis opposés, rivaux, ont-ils fait appel à Sant'Egidio ? Peut-être qu'ils n'ont pas fait appel, dans certain cas je pense que c'est Sant'Egidio

qui s'est proposée. Mais pourquoi Sant'Egidio et pas un autre, pourquoi pas un état ou une organisation régionale voir internationale ?

J : Mais, dans le cas du Mozambique, on a tenté de tout hein. Donc, on a vraiment tenté de tout., donc, il ya eu des médiations, de l'Union Africaine, du Zimbabwe, qui n'ont pas fonctionné.

M : Elles n'ont pas fonctionné ca je sais.

J : Elles n'ont pas fonctionné, c'est écrit dans l'histoire, parce que souvent ce sont des états qui n'étaient pas vraiment neutre. Ils avaient leurs intérêts, leurs amis, ils avaient… et donc voilà donc… Et c'est là que bon pour nous Sant'Egidio au Mozambique, cela a été aussi un peu une expérience incroyable dans le sens qu'on a vu que finalement ils faisaient confiance à nous. C'était un peu une révélation quoi Ce n'était pas quelque chose qu'on attendait dès le début.

M : Et l'Algérie c'était….

J : l'Algérie c'était vraiment un peu dans la foulée du succès Mozambicain et ils étaient désespérés et ils voyaient que leur pays, ils avaient la peur de l'occident, des américains, de l'Europe, de la France. Donc voilà c'était vraiment… Un peu l'amitié réel avec des acteurs en Algérie qui a fait que voilà ils ont accepté cette invitation un peu drôle, étrange, de venir dans un couvent. Ce n'était pas vraiment un couvent mais à Sant'Egidio, un acteur catholique, à Rome, discuter de l'avenir de leur pays. Mais c'est la Méditerrané et là je pense que la méditerrané a joué beaucoup. C'était le sens Méditerranéen qui était grand, avec une ouverture des frontières, avec un sentiment d'unité. Donc je pense que les acteurs ont compris ça comme, comme ils ne pouvaient pas se rencontrer dans le pays même, comme le gouvernement, le pouvoir militaire faisait tout pour qu'ils n'interagissaient pas, et trouvaient un espace libre.

M : Oui parce qu'apparemment, en Algérie, contrairement au Mozambique, le gouvernment ne voulait même pas que Sant'Egidio organise des convois humanitaires ou venir aider le peuple par exemple, il y avait vraiment une barrière infranchissable.

J : Oui, voilà. Ils voulaient aucunement un accord avec le FIS. Eux, ils voulaient l'option militaire qui a prévalut. Donc, ils voulaient donc faire front envers le FIS et voilà et donc comment dire, combattre l'ennemi. Avec l'appui politique, sécuritaire, appuyé par des peurs en France. C'était le début de l'islamisme. (inaudible).

M : Alors, par rapport à ca, selon vous le statut religieux et humaniste de Sant'Egidio a facilité la médiation au Mozambique ?

J : Oui bien sûr. Dans les deux cas. Même si les acteurs n'étaient pas particulièrement religieux, ni catholique. Les mozambicains étaient vraiment des marxistes au gouvernement. Il y avait quand même cette confiance envers l'église catholique. Rome était une grande…Le Mozambique était à l'époque le pays le plus pauvre du monde. Ils étaient assez humbles, être à Rome, c'était quand même quelque chose d'incroyable. Oui le statut de la communauté, comme un acteur religieux, le fait qu'on priait, le fait qu'ils entendaient les prières le soir, ils savaient qu'on priait pour la paix au Mozambique. Oui, cela a crée un certain climat serin qui a favorisé le processus. Je dirais la même chose pour l'Algérie parce que la il y av ait des acteurs plus religieux, même si c'était des musulmans, mais avec un grand respect pour l'église catholique ainsi qu'envers la communauté de Sant'Egidio.je pense que ce statu moral a un peu aidé.

M : ok c'est ça le statu de moral. Oui parce que dans le cas de l'Algérie, on le sait que chaque année il y a la prière, les trois jours pour la prière pour la paix. Donc ce dialogue interreligieux a réellement fonctionné même si la plateforme de l'Algérie ne s'est pas mise en place.

J : Ah oui, oui. C'était vraiment un dialogue politique mais aussi interreligieux. Même si les dimensions nettement religieuses,… oui jouent un peu. Oui comme on discutait du code de la famille et de toutes ces choses là… Mais quand même c'était une approche, l'approche était quand même laïque. Une approche laïque, une dynamique politique. Mais je dirais que le fait d'être un acteur religieux était fort apprécié, notamment par les musulmans. Ils voyaient des gens qui priaient, qui aimaient les pauvres, qui faisaient…(inaudible). Mais évidemment, cela a joué négativement pour

la propagande du gouvernement, qui a tout fait pour discrédité et rendre moins crédible Sant'Egidio. Donc, voilà le sous marin du Vatican, des congressistes de Sant'Egidio, des catholiques, une secte. Donc cela a joué négativement pour la propagande… (inaudible) . Mais avec les acteurs je pense que c'était quelque chose de positif. Même avec Louise Anoun, je me rappel, parce que je l'ai connue un peu mieux, elle était vraiment intéressée, elle posait des tas de questions sur notre vie. C'était une gauchiste de première classe mais elle appréciait la communauté pour la justice sociale.

M : Ok mais, il faut remettre dans le contexte, dans le sens où vous venez de signer l'accord au Mozambique. Donc vous avez déjà un certain prestige international.

J : Oui exact, oui oui. Donc ça a commencé, je me rappel au début, enfin ce n'était pas tellement connu le rôle de Sant'Egidio, c'est un peu venu avec les années. Les Algériens, ils avaient bien compris que Sant'Egido avait fait ça… et donc… ils ont fait appel à Sant'Egido. Moi je me rappel en 1992, donc on avait la prière pour la paix comme vous dites, la rencontre international pour la paix, pendant trois jours à Bruxelles. Et au mois de Septembre, c'était juste avant la signature de l'accord. On a parlé du Mozambique à Bruxelles mais aussi de l'Algérie, il y avait aussi des interlocuteurs Algériens. Notamment un des pères, le père Christian de Chergé qui était là, donc …. Les pères de Tibhirine qui ont été assassiné plus tard.

M : Ok, c'est ça. Et donc , il y a eu un réel climat de confiance qui s'est mis en place entre les parties, comme vous l'avez dit, ce statu, cette identité religieuse, impartiale, neutre, de Sant'Egidio a vraiment contribué, selon vous ?

J : Oui

M : Ok, ça c'est important.

M : Alors c'est une question qui est plutôt par rapport à la médiation, c'est une de mes hypothèses. Je ne sais pas si vous connaissez, si vous êtes familier avec le concept de Multi-track diplomacy. Parce qu'ici j'aimerais savoir si pendant le processus de

médiation, il y avait la présence de d'autres acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques pendant la table des négociations qui auraient…

J : Oui donc, ça c'est clair, au Mozambique, euh… oui bon, dès qu'on a compris que la chose pouvait fonctionner, qu'une confiance entre les parties commençaient à se mettre en place, on a cherché aussi un peu se cadre institutionnel, notamment avec le gouvernement italien, représenté par Raffaeli et avec l'église catholique avec Gonzalves (inaudible) mais quand même avec toute liberté, c'est seulement à la fin, les observateurs, si je me rappel bien, que les états, comme d'autres états africains ainsi que le Portugal ont été invité pour soutenir notre processus ; l'ONU évidemment devait faire tout le désarmement,…

M : le peacebuilding oui…

J : Oui je pense vraiment qu'au début, c'était vraiment Track II puis c'est devenu un Multitrack assez rapidement.

M : et le rôle de Cameron Hume, était très important selon vous ?

J : Je ne sais pas trop bien, moi je ne l'ai jamais rencontré…

M : Mais j'ai son livre, je verrai bien si il est important…

J : Cameron Hume, c'était l'américain non ?

M : Oui le diplomate américain qui a participé exactement…

J : ça il faudrait demandé à un niveau…

M : Oui mais ils m'ont répondu mais c'est juste aussi pour avoir votre opinion. Et dans le cas de l'Algérie.

J : Dans le cas de l'Algérie, au début c'était vraiment une démarche de nous, qui était un peu dans la perplexité mais aussi dans l'impuissance du monde international qui

faisiat absolument rien pour l'Algérie. Et donc, je pense vraiment que c'était oui, un soutien de tous les partis politiques, sauf l'armée, une partie. Mais internationalement, au début, non c'était pas beaucoup, c'est allé vite, il y a eu deux rencontres : novembre 94 puis début janvier 95 puis c'était déjà signé. Puis après, on a essayé de trouver des appuis pour ce texte, mais là bon cela n'a pas été très facile parce qu'il y avait beaucoup de propagande contre. Mais il y avait des états qui étaient quand même intéressés, mais aussi les états qui bon… Je ne me rappel plus l'histoire parfaitement… l'histoire est écrite dans le livre de Impagliazzo et Giro… Mais on a cherché quand même les appuis, je sais par exemple que les Etats Unis étaient intéressés à la démarche ainsi qu'une partie du gouvernement français aussi mais finalement, donc Mitterand à l'époque oui puis ils ont eu peur, puis il y avait l'influence de Pasqua qui était complètement contre. Donc, vous voyez, c'était vraiment des discussions au sein des gouvernements. Finalement, la majorité que ca soit en Europe, ils ont eu peur ; ils se sont dits : non, non va appuyer le gouvernment (inaudible).

M : Ok, ok. C'est ça. Mais donc, …

J : Mais ça dépend enfin. Si je peux me permettre, c'est quand même une chance de perdue…

M : Pardon ?

J : Je dis, ça reste une occasion de perdue.

M : Ah oui.

J : je veux dire, je pense que ce texte méritait vraiment un appui majeure et cela aurait fait une autre histoire en Algérie.

M : Ah oui. Donc selon vous, il fallait plutôt un appui des diplomaties officielles pour pouvoir mettre en place, pour pouvoir convaincre…

J : C'était nécessaire, bien sûr. Pour contraindre, pour obliger l'armée ou le pouvoir en place d'accepter le texte ou au moins de s'engager dans une négociation. Ca ils auraient pu faire, mais ils ne l'ont pas fait.

M : Alors j'ai une dernière question après je vais vous parler d'un petit soucis que j'ai eu mais c'est pas grave… Alors, comment les parties opposées peuvent-elles se laisser pénétrer par la paix, selon vous ? Je sais, c'est une question très générale mais ce que j'aimerais comprendre, c'est la méthodologie de Sant'Egidio, comme va-t-elle transformer les attitudes, quels sont les instruments, par le dialogue, par la confiance, ou c'est par un langage/ vocabulaire commun, par la prière par exemple ? Donc, quels sont tous les outils selon vous ?

J : Ben tout ce que vous dites c'est vrai. Moi je pense que la démarche dans les deux cas était politique, politique et humaine. Donc politique dans le sens, quand les parties comprennent qu'un accord vaut mieux que la lutte armée, ça c'est, je pense que c'est crucial. Pour les Mozambicians, ils se sont battus pendant 15 ans donc 20 ans. Mais ils ont compris qu'ils ne gagneraient pas par les armes. Donc, il y avait aussi la fatigue de la guerre qui a fait qu'il voulaient, qu'ils avaient compris, et nous avons aussi aidé à comprendre, qu'il valait mieux se parler que se combattre quoi. Et, en Algérie, c'est un peu la même chose parce que, enfin la même chose non, parce que c'était avant que la guerre n'éclate, mais la guerre était entrain d'éclater. On a vu des choses extrêmement dur avec la naissance de la GIA par exemple. Mais les gens autour de la table, c'était des politiques responsables, qui avaient un énorme amour pour leur pays, et qui pour cela, ils étaient aussi prêt aussi d'engager dans un dialogue avec l'adversaire. Evidemment ils n'étaient pas d'accords avec le FIS. Mais ils avaient compris que peut être qu'il y avait moyen de les conditionner dans un contexte pluraliste.

M : Parce que, comme vous le dites, ce qui est assez intéressant, en Algérie, c'était une médiation beaucoup plus compliqué, l'intéressé ou celui qui devait mettre en place ou en vigueur l'accord n 'était même pas à la table des négociations. Donc, pour vous c'était extrêmement compliqué quelque part ?

J : oui oui. Mais encore c'était pas, nous avions invité toute le monde. L'armée n'était pas venue, elle n'avait pas voulu. Mais c'était leur démarche, ce n'était pas notre démarche. Nous avons vraiment offert une possibilité, nous avons fait un peu monsieur de bon offices mais c'est eux qui ont signé l'accord, c'est eux qui l'ont négocié en grande partie donc… Le rôle de monsieur Aliaria qui avait déjà un âge respectable en ce temps la, il était crucial, puis ils discutaient en Arabe entre eux, c'était vraiment leurs démarches. Evidemment, nous avons appuyé, nous avons donné des idées, nous avons crée l'espace et tout ce que vous voulez mais c'était vraiment leur démarche. Donc, parce que eux, le FIS était en grande partie des nationalistes qui ne voulaient pas vraiment d'étrangers qui se mêlaient de leurs affaires. Mais ils étaient content de trouver un espace libre et agréable, pacifique où ils pouvaient ou moins se parler ; ce qui n'était pas possible dans leur pays. Donc, voilà, je pense que c'est un peu ça qui a joué.

Interview with Leone Gianturco, Rome, (02/09/2015)

L.G = Leone Gianturco

M = Martin Balbachewski

L.G: The peace negotiation since the outset, I was always with father matteo during the preliminary context we had with RENAMO since 1986 and during the negotiations I was in charge of paper. You may know that paper and discussion papers were confidential during the negotiation so the parties had to trust somebody and they chose to trust Sant'Egidio and I was the person who could work on the Portuguese text at the time so in a way we found ourselves involved in the process. Not as professional of conflict resolution or people who do this as a profession. I was quite young when we started I was 28 years old.

M: Ok, so you work for Sant'Egidio since more or less 20 years?

L.G: Yes I'm a member of Sant'Egidio since I was a 15 years old guy. As you know we are interested for Africa, for conflict because of our choice to be close to the outcasts and to start from the periphery to understand better about the world. That's how we start with the poor people in the roman outskirt, with the young people, with the adolescent people. And then listening to those who come and give an appeal, so the capability to listening to others. So Mozambique started by listening with some Mozambicans and their case.

M: Ok. First I'd like to ask two questions about Sant'egidio without taking about Mozambique, after we will deepend the subject.
How would you describe the community of Sant'Egidio? In a few line.

L.G: Yes, Sant'Egidio is a group of people who have the ambition to change the world starting from the gospel and find the inspiration into the gospel, transforming their personal life in the contact with those who are the least and working for peace at the grassroots level. It's very easy to define Sant'Egidio as a life as a choice not as a volunteer or as a non-profit organization.

M: ok, but which is devoted for the others… ?

L.G: yes. I think our main strength is to be people who are not professional but who have an ideal and this is one of our ideals.

M: ok thank you. How would you qualify the diplomacy of Sant'Egidio in a few line?

L.G: Yes, I think the diplomacy of Sant'Egidio is always starting with the personal encounter which becomes a collective encounter with the situation of human distress in which we try to play our comparative advantage inasmuch we are not a government or a structure of organization and this may help us to gain the trust of others because we do not have vested interests.

M: Yes Roberto Morozzo told me that it is very important that you cultivate your impartial identity.

L.G: yes in which you are partial for the peace and for the poor. Of course you listen to others and you study, it is important to have an understanding towards the situations in which we get involved. You are a good catholic, a good person but you have to understand whom you're speaking with, if you speak with a "guerilla" or a politician you are not zelig,

M: so you agree to focus on the humanistic approach of the diplomacy of the community of SantEegidio

L.G: yes but as I said humanistic approach does not mean that you are in a way foolish or that you don't understand the other person. Humanistic approach means that we believe that much can be done by personal transformation.

M: and that people can change…
L.G: yes for Mozambique's approach was the anthropological transformation of the guerrillas and also of the government and also of the Mozambique on the field. At some stage they made a choice for peace. And they didn't go backwards, they didn't backtrack. If they backtrack now it's a new issue it's not an old issue. This is real this really can happen sometimes it can happen and you can sometimes believe that there are some economic factors or diamonds but the fact is that you can not do much about

it which is not the case when it comes to people, you have entire population who are held by few dictators or people who have psychiatric problems but the real problem is the issue of people who hate each other and sometimes, it is not easy explanations given by books about economy, resources, diamonds. Of course, they are part of the equation but they can not solve the equation without the human characteristic factors.

M: Ok. More about the Mozambique, what were the main causes of the conflict because there wasn't just only one.

L.G: Of course there was not just only one. You have to go back to colonialism of the country. After the decolonization, there were still 97 % of illiterate people and the economy was completely jeopardized. Of course I would say that the main factor that brought independency to Mozambique was the change in Portugal more than the guerrillas which was of course importnant. Then you had this group of people who educated themselves in these diferent circles. But Marxsim-Leninism was kind of grammar, an easy framework, it was really important…(interruption). Marxismo era la grammatica della FRELIMO…

M: Scusa in englese.

L.G: oh sorry. So Marxism, Leninism was the grammar of FRELIMO, it was useful for them in order to run the country, to manage a country were there wasn't any resources, no human resources so the single paradigm of marxsim-leninism was actually the only way they had to run the country. But then this created resentment.
They resettled people, for example villagers, they put people who weren't use to live in the countryside in the villages and created community of workers. People were used to listen to traditional leaders but the power said "no, these are obscurantist leaders, throw them out". People used to go to church and FRELIMO closed the church. So, people, Mozambicans very poor started having this resentment against FRELIMO. But in the meanwhile, the regional power, especially the right wing apartheid based party in South African and Rhodesia, supported a counter-insurgency in Mozambique and created artificially RENAMO. There was a group of people who were trained by Rhodesians. The problem is that RENAMO started to become, indigenous and built on FRELIMO mistakes. This is what the international committee

did not understand, for years and years people said that RENAMO was created by external powers and still in 1984, 8 years after the creation of RENAMO the Mozambican government made an agreement with the south African government who was supporting Renamo and the idea was that the solution was to cut the thread of the puppet so Renamo will not continue. But the fact that Renamo building on people's resentment especially in way using the machinery (guns), they become indigenous and started not to need the puppetry. Renamo grew on Frelimo's mistakes. And so they kidnapped people, they were very rude and harsh, the only way to change was to destroy that was FRELIMO like bridges, villages,… it was their strategy to exist. The world and international community who backed for time FRELIMO continue to say that the problem was a cancer that from outside. But it was a problem that need to abrupt from the inside. This was our perception, I think we were ahead of time respect to others who were outside. The cause of Mozambique was complex and you're right to say it comes with several factors. An on other factor is regional factor. FRELIMO was mostly from the south, RENAMO mostly from the center, but then RENAMO spread everywhere, towards the south and the north, also where FRELIMO was strong, why, because they built on the resentment of the people against FRELIMO the local disorganization was also an other factor. So the reason was that the danger came from outside but grew as if it was from the inside, endogenous, that made the war very difficult to solve. It is easier when you have identified enemies like in the cold war and the case of Angola which received support from the Soviet union. Here with FRELIMO, even the west was involved so we had to go and understand on the field, we went to the bushes to understand.

M: ok. Were there any religious causes in the conflict in Mozambique?

L.G: no, not at all. There were consequences on religion. It is a very large country with a lot of different ethnic groups, there were 15 different groups who are very different from each other, you have several religions, you have catholics, protestants, muslims in the north, hindou in the south, the religion is not the cause of the war here.

M: I'd like to know the reasons that pushed Sant'Egidio to intervene in Mozambique. In Morozo's book, the main reaon he says was that two religious people were killed.

L.G: the reason was that we had the attitude to be open and so we had this Mozambican priest who became bishop and asked for help and told us that they had a problem with the church because they close the church, that they couldn't ring the bell anymore, so we thought that we should do something for this people and so we tried to understand more, we talked to the Italian communist party and asked them if they could help us to understand their communist party. It was a very naïve way to process but then our priest came back and told us that there were famines, so we went there, with ship loads and planes, because at that time the Italian government had a lot of money for this. And then we went there speaking with the Mozambicans to understand. And then slowly we understood that peace was the point.

We went to Maputo, which was full of workers from all around the world, and people didn't use the word RENAMO, they said that there were, bandidos, puppets from south Africa. So nobody addressed this issue but slowly we understood that if u don't address the issue of peace, you will never had development. So we understood that we should do something. But then, a boy died, Laurindo, from the grassroots group; poor young student who helped poor children in slums in Maputo without asking for money and based on the gospel. And then he went back to vacation to see his family but he was killed in a ambush by Renamo's people. So when he died, we asked ourselves if we were doing as much as we could to help this country, should we do more? Why do we think that we do enough with what we did? So we boosted the search to speak with RENAMO people. But of course it was the friendship with Mozambicans, this bishop, other Mozambicans we knew, it was this personal engagement that pushed us to intervene in Mozambique; this broad us to engage in the peace process. In a way, we tried to do something that was beyond our responsibility, but actually it was not.

M: how was perceived the catholic church in Mozambique ?

L.G: in Mozambique, everybody knows that after the independence in 1975 the roman catholic church was considered as a rudiment of Portugal colonialism. The president called the bishops monkeys, they couldn't move, the churches were closing down; there were nationalized and there was the rumor that nouns were to be forced into marriages with combatants. So religious people had a hard time. An other unfair

fact is that most bishops were blacks, who had strive for the independence, they were Mozambicans, not Portuguese. So that's the first issue that we tried to address, we had a meeting with Cardinal… who was at the head of the Vatican diplomacy and … ? on of the minister of Mozambique to try to free some priests who were put in jail. But the real step change was when we brought the president of Mozambique to meet the pope in 1985 so he looked into his eyes and say that, Jean-Paul II said that "I know that you are not a real Marxist, I know that you are a nationalist. Im polish, I know the Marxists, you are more nationalists than Marxists. And the president of Mozambique was very impressed and changed his mind about catholic church. And so the change of this relation brought also to the possibility of the church to be part of this biiger mediation with Sant'Egidio for peace.

M: so it is the impact of Sant'Egidio itself no?

L.G: for us it is the same, we want to help others, we are a small community, not very known by everybody but we are based in Rome, our bishop is the pope. So we always used to meet him.

M: ok but I mean that if the Mozambique government didn't recognize the catholic church, it could have impacted on Sant'Egidio's activies?

LG: no because at that time there were not Sant'Egidio communities in Mozambique. Only Grass groups started in 1989. So we did that later. So there were no links between our peace work and our grassroots activities. The linkage was that our people was being killed in ambushes and were praying for peace; but our people were mainly in towns where it was safer. But otherwise we didn't have any properties, anything that was affected by the war, if not the people themselves.

M: I need to know something because…

L.G: it is important because vested interests is not just a nice word, but in practice, Sant'Egidio started activities knowing that it will not receive anything in return. There is this small group of ten people who are there and pray. Sorry, but when we choose to speak with the muslim world we don't have communities there, so for us it is

important to say this because we feel this as the gospel; the gospel is to and not asks for it in return. So it is a practical way to put into practice the gospel. We don't want a return, we may have a return, but it comes later one, there is no relationship. Sorry for interrupt you.

M: no no it's okay. But I need to know something, because sometimes we think that it is better for the mediator to be perceived as credible and legitimate around the table of mediation that before and during the mediation process, it is involved for instance
In humanitarian aid or bringing or giving some relieves, services to people in order to be perceived as and entity which is devoted to the other, ready to help. So I want to know if Sant'Egdio before the mediation process started, was involved….

L.G: yes Sant'Egidio sent the first plan of aid in 1984 and before that Sant'Egidio founded the comity of "friends of Mozambique" to rally aid material and financial support from Italy and other European countries to Mozambique. So it was perceived as a church group who was doing something for the people.

M: at the grassroots level.

L.G: at the grassroots level but when you send a thousand tons of food, everybody knows about it, the newspapers speak about it.

M: you had the agreement from Mozambique government ?

L.G: yes at the beginning they wanted all the aid to be sent to their military people, we said no, but we understood that we were giving 20% of the food to the soldiers. We were also perceived as Rome, which has some appeal you see? It is the center of the catholic world and also Italy, has some appeal because Italy was not a colonial power and had some links with FRELIMO sides, members had studied in Italy as Pascuale Montero… and also some Italian was involved in the liberation struggle themselves. So Italy was perceived as a friendly country especially the government, for the development of aid. So Italy, Rome the Vatican, the community of Sant'Egidio's aid. But then the choice of Sant'Egidio to become a mediator had other reasons which go then into the mediations themselves.

M: ok during the humanitarian delivery, did you manage to build some network activity with some civil society, organization?

L.G: there were no civil organizations. The only one was caritas Mozambique but in general there were no civil society organization.

M: ok because we say that for the mediation process to be a success, we should have the support from the people.

LG: the support from the people can come later on. But people in Mozambique and in Italy started to understand that something was happening in Mozambique. And then you have the lobbying, we organized the delivery of hundred of thousands postcards to the table of the negotiation from the people in the villages asking for them to accelerate the process. And then the big support came after the peace agreement to organize a reconciliation ceremony.

The first speech that we did gave the people some hope, so it was a little bit top-down at the first stage. I must say because we cannot say that it came from the grassroots because from the grassroots you have, initiatives, people praying and asking to stop war but nobody had any idea of what to do and what had to be done.

M: we can say that the first step of Sant'Egidio actions really enhanced Sant'Egidio legitimacy and credibility in FRELIMO's opinion?

L.G: Yes, in the eyes of FRELIMO. In the eyes of RENAMO, it was a separate process, organizing the travel of the Bishop Gonzalves in 1988… and also with the leader of RENAMO in ROME, trying to listen and speaking to them, understand them and also giving to them the credibility vis-à-vis government delegations. And slowly, slowly gaining their trust. And also the composition of the mediation, there was an Italian MP who was perceived as a friend to FRELIMO, Government to government, one of the bishop was a friend of RENAMO and Zuppi and Riccardi in the middle. (26:35) Friends of peace but FRELIMO recognized them as smart peole, they liked Riccardi as an historian who was capable to understand the Mozambical culture. He

spoke at the FRELIMO congress as a member of the delegation, between Bulgaria, North Korea, Soviet union and Sant'Egidio.

M: ok. Now I'd like to ask some precisions about the mediation because we have talked about the previous stage of the mediation and that previous stage in Mozambique helped to prove that sant'egidio might have been the entity to find a solution. I don't know if you agree with or not?

L.G: yes but that was not so much a deliberate process, on the contrary we wanted that the parties came find us, that they chose us, that the government chose us and also RENAMO. We got the hind from a dinner in a terrace in ROME, a man who was in the Italian fascist party and who was a friend of Renamo, and he proved us as some days later when they freed a nun that they had kidnapped. It was the proof that had the real contact. So we called the right person. RENAMO has many contact, people in United States and other countries but this men, coming from Germany, proved he had the right contact from the bush in Mozambique. And then we started having contact with them. The idea was to bring them to Rome but we didn't know what to do, we let them meet each other and then they chose us as mediators. They also wanted observers and other government who never showed up, Kenya, Zimbabwe becaue they were perceived as : Kenya friend of RENAMO, Zimbabwe friend of FRELIMO (28:55). And then the bishop cam to met them, but they did not trust. The trust came up as a divine coincidence when both sent a letter saying ok: lets meet this people. Who are in the room stay in the room. No contact with people, journalists and then 2 years of negotiation without any journalists involved. But that was a confidential process: so they only trusted the four mediators. So nobody except for 4 negotiators, who were the observers and became formal mediators during the process. We had an observer who was part of the Italian government, Raffaelli, and then the Italian wanted to come in the negotiation. But Raffaelli responded: sorry Im there… to give you the perception that it was really a kind of amateur diplomacy, in a way. And the first paper that came out was not a draft presented by the mediators but the result of the merging of the two previous negotiation papers, only one line. It was only one line on a piece of paper, it was the starting point. But those lines were saying: FRELIMO are murderers, unjust, robbers,… And RENAMO must do amnesty, com back and give up your weapons.   The only sentence that we kept was that we beloved

Mozambican people. So it was the starting point. So nothing like proposing ourselves, they chose us.

M: ok ok, what were the main features that characterized RENAMO and FRELIMO?

L.G: at the beginning they came and didn't know really what to do. RENAMO came to point at the mistakes from the past. FRELIMO sustained a swift process, left them back in, give them amnesty and let's have a cease-fire now and then we discuss the details. RENAMO knew that if they gave up now, they would not have anything else. The only way they could have something was with weapons so if they dropped them they wouldn't be able to have something. It was very political at the end. And some people said   that RENAMO had guerrillas, you are creating a political group by giving them formal space to discuss. But we understood that they were in a way political. All they wanted to do was to destroy everything that was FRELIMO.

This is a guideline, you know, RENAMO wanted to destroy everything that FRELIMO had built so the project was to destroy FRILIMO. By destroying schools, bridges etc… And so they came with two different worlds, with two ideas. So we took the phrase from John 23rd "look for what unites and give up what divides. And to not look back. The proposal that became the weaknes became the strength of the mediation.

M: ok. Some authors say that the concept of forgiveness is it really important in the process in Mozambique?

L.G: I think that to Mozambique was really different, not like South Africa or countries where you have this kind of problem with the legacy and the sentiment of justice. In Mozambique, during the peace process people continued to kill each other but then the people forgave, so they took this anthropological decision to change, to engage in this process and to risk something they did forgive but when the peace was signed the people forgave so the one who had killed his mother and who became a guerrilla came to the village and said I'm sorry, that I killed and people made him ceremony. It was incredible people in Mozambique they didn't forgive, they wanted to start a new page. They said "ok war was governing us, now peace is governing us, those were the old rules now let's make new rules". And some people say that the

Mozambicans are not human, they say "how can they undergo like this?". But we can ask "weren't they wise? And the war is over now so that's the greatness of the people who decided to turn the page. We were wondering how would they reconciliate? They just say, ok the war is over. It looks very primordial but that the solution they found, and there were no justice and commission at all involved. There was nobody who told them to do it. And also the South Africans they said ok let's go forward. They were passionate.

M: what do you mean by anthropological ?

L.G: well because in a negotiation, if you come with instructions and the negotiations fail, you go nowhere. But if you come up with instructions to be cautious and that you understand that you speak with an other person, you see for years and years, RENAMO people were considered by FRILIMO people as animals, as bandits, as butchers. But they started to understand that RENAMO people were people and they had a story, a people's story. And also RENAMO started to change, they started to understand that the military solution will bring them nowhere and also that the political solution must replace their military solution and so they started to give up weapons, and they became politicians. And then FRILIMO started to be afraid because RENAMO were improving negotiation techniques, at the beginning they were irrational. In 1982, RENAMO people were great chess players and FRILIMO people were sweating with panic.

M: so the attitude changed

L.G: so the attitude changed. Guerillas started to think that they could become a member of the parliament and they became members of the parliament, they had a salary, a car, they entered in the town with a car not anymore in the bush. That was a big change. And FRILIMO people started to accept that RENAMO could exist. Until 1991, you couldn't say the word RENAMO, only Bandidos arrmanos, unless you were arrested or considered as a RENAMO person. FRILIMO people said that the word was invented by South Africa. So the change of FRILIMO people was to say, okay, they are there, they exist. It was an overwhelming step change to see the acceptance of the existence of RENAMO people. It was incredible, unthinkable.

M: Sometimes, you talked about the fact that Mozambique is like a family. I think that you told me that we can notice the evolution of the process and the RENAMO understood and became kind of politicized, and maybe they could also imagine to live together, and I think that in the book written by Morozzo, we talk about that all Mozambicans are brothers, you know what I mean, we can really notice that in two years we went from fighting or hating each other and after step by step they became close…

L.G: yes but two things are important before answering. First, that the recognition of brothers from the same family has started from the beginning. Because they knew that hatred between brothers is more difficult to solve you know.
And the second point is that it was never an easy way to become friends, to shake hands, they never stayed in the same hotel and so at the end they eventually became members of the parliament and they met each other at the parliament and so on the political level they started to share something and it started to enter in their mindset the fact they were maybe relatives.

M: thanks to sant'egidio?

L.G: also thanks to themselves. What Sant'Egidio did was to facilitate the process, it was never imposed, we had the idea that they would achieve it because they had the resources.

M: and with which instruments Sant'Egidio did persuade them to enter in a peaceful process?

L.G: : first of all, there was the recognition that they were going nowhere, they knew that at some stage they won't achieve anything beyond conflict so the recognition that they to come to the negotiation table. And then of course, the moral suasion, the knowledge of the people, the understanding of the psychology, the human factor. We were everywhere, we were drivers, we drove them to the cinema, to the football stadium, we translated their text, we brought them suits, we tried to do everything to get them together, when they were drunk we called the meeting of, informing the

other party that they were undisposed. So we tried to do all we could from a human point of view. Also we were advocate of the voiceless. I mean the Mozambican people couldn't say anything a part from the postcards. We took the time. You can't just shout at people. I remember once in Burundi's prison, Nelson Mandela started screaming and saying " this is a scandal " and screaming against (inaudible). But it was Nelson Mandela, he could do that. He could do that. You can not go preach to somebody else, it was (inaudible), we want peace, it is not my fault, it is his fault. So you enter in an endless debate. You have to make people know that the others are suffering but you have to tell them in another way. So look them in the eyes and try to understand, to listen to them and I think that moral suasion, the firm convincing that peace was the only outcome. Prayers also helped us a lot. Every evening, there were prayers in Sant'Egidio. Since we started at Sant'egidio in 1968 we do a prayer in the evening for an half an hour, it's not a mass. So for all those times people were going to the meeting room on the left and on the right there was the praying room, with other people praying for peace in Mozambique. Everyday, all of group of Europe, of poor people, everybody know Mozambique and Sant'Egidio because they pray for peace in Mozambique. This gave us the strength. The moral suasion is imperative for peace. And also the trust, that Matteo and Andrea built on them. It was enormous. And also the fact that we didn't link anything to journalists, the rules were very good. And it was terrible, the journalists in front of Sant'Egidio could not say anything: today, there is some traffic here, the RENAMO delegation is entering the room, I think we saw four of them, of the door is closed. That was the only thing they could say. But it was a good rule to avoid parallel negotiation violated by the press. So a mix of these factors. But I think also that the Mozambicans themselves they engaged this anthropological transformation. We had also to ask for help on military issues, we asked some experts from some Europeans and western countries, also African countries, we got some military expert to negotiate military problems. We could not do that.

M: for which reasons did you need military experts?

L.G: for the demobilization of the army, you see, the peace accord is a book, the Angola peace accord was a paper that said "we don't cease fire, we will discuss it later" and it was the beginning of the end for Angola. But Mozambique's peace

accord was written with blood and sweat, every line, it's an enormous piece of paper and so every word was discussed, negotiated and in the end we were all ownership of the agreement, so they couldn't violate it. It was a book, I mean lot and lot of documents. And one of this document was " how do we demobilize the army? " "what should the UN do?"

M: I mean that Sant'Egidio is not active in peace building, yes or no?

L.G: yes of course but it was our first experience that we had to demobilize soldiers and so we asked for some military experts how to do it I mean we weren't use to do that. The conditioning of armaments…

M: I have three or four questions left. I just want to know if the religious status did facilitate the mediation between the two parties, I mean the religious status of Sant'Egidio? If it was important or not to take on the fact that the community of Sant'Egidio was believing in god and…

L.G: yes Mozambique knew that there was a Rome catholic church in the Vatican,… I think they disregarded the religious for a lot of times. FRELIMO by saying that religious people are monkeys and RENAMO kidnapping and killing priests a lot of nuns were killed by RENAMO. So in some way, for an anti-clerical Portugal legacy, you do not have the respect for the catholics but I think that we were most seen as people without any vested interest and also we were catholics but we didn't have churches, buildings, big communities in the country. So we were seen as outsiders, see we were also not Africans, which is one problem because peace must come from the region, and regional powers must be involved. Yes of course but maybe not as mediators. We weren't part of the problem but part of the solution. They trusted us more than anyone.

M: so you mean that the religious attributes of Sant'Egidio didn't play any role in the mediation process?

L.G: it played a role when you are part of a mosaic of respect, or values for example. Moral values, the prayers were very important. But I don't think that it was enough. It was a condition but not enough to become as we became negotiators to achieve peace. It's not enough especially in those situations dealing governments, armies, guerrillas. Ok, Ok priests go to the church… I have my business to do. So in a way you have to gain you legitimacy day by day and of course your church background helps you, it is an asset you have; which others don't have like universities, professionals, or loose-peace mediators, they don't have this background. And especially the fact that we weren't paid. They knew we have that job. None of us was paid to do that by Sant'Egidio, they knew that. And also we never gave money out which is very important in this kind of situation. We only bought some whiskies sometimes.

M: How San'Egidio built trust beween the two parties during the mediation process. Can you just highlight some instruments or process that you used, or the mediator used to open the eyes of the disputing parties to understand that we have to move forwards and to get peace as soon as possible?

L.g: Matteo wrote something about this. He tried to upgrade story telling to analysis. In the book it is the last part, if you don't have that you're lost.

M: I have three books which were written by Andrea Riccardi, and I don't know, but I need it ?

L.G: yes you need to read it. It's calling "making peace" it's in English now. And in my article about Mozambique in that book, matteo tries to summarize several factors (scratches, rumor of a pen writing on papers). But can you repeat the question maybe I can explain better.

M: the question: which process or instrument that Sant'Egidio used to build trust between the disputing parties?

L.G: first of all there has to be, they have to trust us so then you could ask them to trust each other in a naïve way. They have to trust us that we are listening to them

and understand their opposite points of view. But they both have the merit because it is their point of view. So, we didn't see so bad faith in those view points, even if your viewpoint is in bad faith, you convince yourself that you're right and then you start believing it and you know inside that you're not saying the truth but you have to defend it. The real in Mozambique was the lack of democracy. Then, the same thing could say by FRELIMO, the problem is violence,… both issues are rights. (53:07) So the fact that we were listening to them, giving them the right to express, we were giving them some kind of guaranty. I think that we gave them guarantees that we would not cheat them, guarantees that we would listen to them and that we would take seriously their points and that we would never write a compromise text without showing them that we took their points or explaining : we didn't take you points here because it could backfire later. So being taken seriously was also very important, especially for RENAMO. To be taken seriously at an equal footing with the others. Which is not recognizing them or giving them the legitimacy because of the confidential of the negotiation. But because it was giving the idea that they were at parts with the others.

And with FRILIMO at the end we were trying to build their capacity to be magnanimous, and so we said that we recognized what FRILIMO did for this country and that we recognize that it is very painful for you but we are confident that in the interest of Mozambique, Mozambican people you will give up a little bit of your face to build peace. And so helping them to re-elaborate their understanding, giving them a perspective, giving them a vision which they didn't have, they were blocked. Another point on building trust is that we never cheated on them, we try to make them meet others who could help them and to understand the other one. You see people came from the bush, they didn't trust anyone and hey were scared. They were afraid of the helicopters here in Rome because it reminded them of home, of war. They were scared that we gonna cheat them. And so patience was another big fact. (time: 56:00) Wait a lot of time and people criticized; the negotiations are dragging, in Rome, the negotiations "piétinnent le monde", a famous title. Les negotiations piétinnent, of course there was an alternative. We tried to say them to accelerate, we asked them for a truce. But RENAMO never gave up weapons. So in the end, it took time, but that was the time, the history will judge, a time necessary to understand for them to swallow it and own it. And the Angola negotiation was tragic, little time, small piece of paper: falling to war again for 10 years in a much more bloody wars than the first

one. That is typical example when you rush things. Another example is how the American did in Burundi where they forced people to sit at the table, they were wrong it didn't work at all. We paid the hotel and we gave a deadline, of course we were flexible. One day for example in August 1990 they came in Rome and we asked to them : where is your chief? He is not coming. We had to wait for 15 days for a member to come so we entertained the delegation for 15 days instead of calling of negotiation and say "oh we can't count on them" we said "let's wait" and then they all came. I remember all our holidays were lost because it started on the 15th of august (laughing). Two months of just waiting.

M: I need to know something because it's one of my hypothesis. I don't know if you know the concept of multi-track diplomacy, because I want to know if during the mediation process if they were the presences of other actors, state actors, official actors and non-official actors because sometimes it is said that for the unofficial process to succeed it needs the involvement of the US or Great-Britain, the UN, France…

LG: I think it was the best way because the official track was the parallel track. It was like compounding something. But the parties did not want any governments to be involved except for the Italian government. So Cameron Hume came, and he was happy to be there, and we organized meeting with the US, trying to understand their point; he tried to make the point of the USA. But then RENAMO declared war to him. They officially declared war to the US during one of this meeting. So we could not push this people inasmuch and on the contrary, Portugal wanted to take the negotiation in Lisbon. What is this people? This community? Negotiations should be done by governments, not by this people. But the party wanted us. Of course we didn't have the power to impose, to direct the United States to be out of the process but the parties didn't want the United States. But we knew that at some stage we had to bring them in as observers.

M: so the US?

L.G: the US? France, UK, Portugal, there is the list in the book and the UN. The UN delegate especially in the last part because we had to engage the UN to do something as military experts but that was in 92, so before that for two years we only used informal contacts. But of course we knew that official diplomacy can become part of the problem if we don't involve them. So for example with Portugal, we tried to convince them, we talked a lot with Portuguese delagates and we explain them that it was very important not to jeopardize Sant'Egidio negotiation and that if they brought them to Lisbon they would never achieve that, FRELIMO would never agree because they were formal colonial power but we said that they could bring support. We became friends after some many drinks. The British guy for example was more concerned about training RENAMO people in their camp in Malawi. Everyone had their own agendas but it was very useful to bring them in but more as a support factor, it was not a parallel diplomacy in that way. You have this two track diplomacy in other situations. For example in Burundi, perhaps in Kosovo Im not sure. Guatemala, with several tracks but in Mozambique it was one track, our track. Track 2 was to involve other diplomacies so in a way you're right, there is always a track two. But on the formal settings you can choose which is the best one.

M: so we agree that for the Mozambique peace agreement there were not the involvement of official diplomacy but the they gave their support to Sant'Egidio

L.G: they gave their support and then they were formally involved as observers in 1992

M: when was the day of general peace agreement for Mozambique?

L.G: 4 october 1992.

M: ok so they were observers before the peace agreement was reached?

L.G: yes and then we gave the dossier to the UN.

M: to the implementation.

L.G: yes and the UN was very happy that what all of them said all the time. They said: they gave me a book, they gave me everything, I have to run this. It was good because they extended the time from one to two years. That was the right time. it was good to put the peace accord in one year after the election but it was also god afterwards to delay that to two years. Our choice were good. They were not in contradiction.

M: so we could consider that the observers gave advices how to run the mediation process or they were just like observers that wanted to be there. It may be to simple to use "advices" ?

L.G: no no, we listened to the observers, we took what was good from them, we took some of their informations but our impression was that the international community was late, very late. It was typical in Mozambique; they had a misunderstanding of the situation. La lecture de la situation n'était pas au niveau de la situation.

M: that they didn't have the expertise that you had?

L.G: not the expertise, they didn't know what was really going on in Mozambique. They didn't know a lot about RENAMO, nobody knew that the real people were in the bush, so people didn't know the real actors. Only when they came out people saw them so the governments they didn't know about Renamo, it was really a black hole.

M: Ok but for instance the role of Cameron Young was important, for example he wrote a famous book about Mozambique peace process.

L.G: Yes, Cameron Hume gave us a very important supporting role especially in helping the RENAMO to understand that there was a world around them, starting to educate them about the international community, international organizations, they didn't know anything about international organization, the UN, you know. They only knew about Germany because Schtrauss of the CDU used to support them and gave them some financing, they knew about the Portuguese parties. So Hume was like a reality check for them. He was collaborating and helping us and many times he was there as a person, the time he tried to be the big US guy he lost.

M: who was Cameron Hume?

L.G: He was a diplomat from the Holy see. He said that Sant'Egidio was adrenaline, sexy, we were happy to have this guy because we managed to speak with to him and to have a good relationship with him. But the contribution of the US only came later, much late.

M: ok but you mentioned France, G-B, this is only the observers that wanted to join… ?

L.G: yes the US came earlier with Cameron Hume. For example, with the US, we tried to have a Christmas truce in 1990. So I went with Cameron to met some people and RENAMO said: no way, we can not give a truce.

M : and FRILIMO wanted to receive some help, but wanted that the US join the table of the negotiations?

L.G: Well, no. FRILIMO, at the beginning in 1989, president Chissano said ok I don't want this church people like the bishops that never achieved anything meeting RENAMO and FRELIMO in Nairobi. So, ok. Now, lets entrust governments, lets entrust Kenyan and Zimbabwe. He made a public announcement.

M: And it didn't work…

L.G: no because it was unilateral. RENAMO said who? How can you decide without us? I can tell you the story about the constitution. They introduce FRELIMO a multi party constitution   after years of one party ruling the country. It was RENAMO request? And Chissano thought that it would make them happy. No. they were wild. You know why? Because it was decided without consulting them. So he was giving them about what they asked for many years. They were very angry : no, this is what you want, you want to dictate us in a multi party system. The multi party system has to be the result of our negotiations. It cannot come from you, it comes from us. He saved the country. So two worlds apart.

M: But finally RENAMO became a political movement?

L.G: yes. But the problem was that they still had some formal soldiers, bodyguard. That typical way of not solving issues that come up again. The ancient combatants were still there. Their still looming. But most of them left and demobilized. They were everywhere.

M: One last question. You mentioned that there were regional actors that wanted to intervene in the process but it didn't work because?

L.G. Yes. You know, one was Malawi, they tried but FRILIMO didn't trust Malawi. The other one was Zimbabwe but they were perceived as FRILIMO. For example, Mugabe spoke with them in English but the president of RENAMO didn't understand anything , he wanted to speak in Portuguese. The negotiations in Sant'Egidio were always in Portuguese.

M: ok so you speak Portuguese ?

L.G: Of course and Matteo speaks Portuguese, Andrea mid-translating in Portuguese, Raffaelli learnt Portuguese. So every documents were in Portuguese and nobody spoke anything else than Portuguese so when Mugabe spoke in english with RENAMO they asked themselves: who is this guy? We don't understand, we don't care. So here, we understand the mistrust. An other one who tried to speak was Mazire of Botswana and he organized a last meeting in September In 1990 in a African way. But then when he came to Rome, RENAMO said no, the solutionswith mazire is not a solution, he denied that. You are cheating me, you are all friend of FRELIMO. This regional guy is a friend of FRELIMO. The only friend of RENAMO was Kenya.

M: Last thing, how the disputing parties were transcended by the peace, you know how they started to understand that they could reach peace? You already said to me that their attitude changed if we analyze the evolution of the process. You said that the humanistic approach is very important. I want to understand how they, you know

before they were like killing each other and after they start to talk each other and to sit…

L.G: yes but they continue killing each other at home. How did they realize that they could achieve peace? it was a very slow process. I think time was important for them to realize. Of course the factor that there was no other ways. For example in 1992 there was a big drought in Mozambique and people in the international community and the UN thought that it could bring peace because they had no food and it didn't bring peace the drought. I mean sometimes there are some mechanicals factors or many people tried to buy RENAMO or give money to RENAMO. No it was useless. Time and this anthropological change. I Think that the key of the success was to transfer the existing conflict from a military dimension to a political dimension. So there is still conflict there even now. But you bring it from the military arena to the political arena. At the end they didn't understand that they were brothers or sisters, but they understood that they could fight in an other way. So the transposition of the conflict from a military to a political dimension, that was the real key, the real outcome and the guarantee for 22 years of peace in the future.

M: Thank you very much