Comparing peacekeeping operations in the Middle East: the cases of MFO and UNIFIL II

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Introduction

This thesis analyses and compares the current mandate, structure and daily activities as well as possible future developments of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping operation in the Sinai Peninsula with those of the second United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL II) in Lebanon. This research wants to highlight that, contrarily to general expectations, both the missions represent two cases of similar peacekeeping experiments in the Middle East sharing many common features and having similar prospects of existence.

Some of the questions that might immediately arise are: why have I tackled the subject of peacekeeping? Why have I decided to compare, not only analyse, two operations? Why, among all the others in the same region, have I chosen MFO and UNIFIL II?

First of all, peacekeeping is a very actual and important field of research and of operations on-the-ground which characterises many states’ activities while intervening in some regions of the world where conflicts and hostilities have been taking place. Although conflict represents a very ancient and primordial feature of human life, the study of peacekeeping is a rather recent one and its origins go back to the period of the Cold War, hence the bipolar context. In this period, the Middle East, together with the Caucasus, the Balkans and African states, was one of the main theatres of confrontation and of hostilities specifically between the new born Jewish State and its Arab neighbours. Here, since 1948, several peacekeeping operations, among which some of them were led by the United Nations (UN) and some others were independent from the UN, started to take place. Some of them lapsed at the end of their mandate and were not renewed, others, by contrast, continued throughout the years and still represent in their respective regions an important, sometimes fundamental, source of peace and stability. Hence, in a world that is currently characterised by the presence of new international threats that menace the stability within and between states – for instance the upsurge of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the issue of nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, regional illegal smuggling of arms, drugs and weapons – instruments of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and eventually of peacekeeping, in case where hostilities have already blown up, seem to represent very important tools and instruments at the
disposal of the International Community that, through the use of soft power means such as dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy, may solve an ongoing conflict, prevent its escalation and, eventually, maintain a permanent ceasefire.

Secondly, at the end of the thesis we will acknowledge the power of comparison as a fundamental tool of analysis. In fact, comparing a limited number of units sharpens our perception of the cases analysed in detail, shapes our conception and gives us a new and interesting framework of analysis by bringing into focus similarities and contrasts among different cases.

Finally, the reason why I have considered the independent MFO mission and the UN-led UNIFIL II operation lies on the efficacy, the continuity and the stability that, eventually, characterise both the missions classifying them amongst the most successful, still existing, peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. As we will see, the fact of being a UN-led or a non-UN led peacekeeping operation does not really and necessarily imply a difference in each mission’s effectiveness and results; it might imply different structuring elements and organisational assets within their operational structure but does not represent an influential and a fundamental element of comparison between the missions. Therefore, while analysing in detail the differences among MFO and UNFIL II, I will not address this feature since it is not a determinant factor for the peculiarities of both the missions.

In order to provide us with a more critic and a deeper evaluation of MFO nad UNIFIL II, I have divided the thesis into four chapters that gradually introduce us to the topic of the research.

Chapter I (What is peacekeeping?) consists on a general introduction to the study of peacekeeping operations, its novelty, its misconceptions and its characteristics. It will start by describing how the academic study and practice of security studies and conflict resolution is inserted in a context of new wars and regional complex theories characterising the post-Cold War era. It will proceed by explaining how peacekeeping is related to, but at the same time differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Three other paragraphs will be devoted to the United Nations’ peacekeeping, the development of a multidimensional peacekeeping model and to the issue of efficacy of UN and non-UN led operations.
The Chapter ends with an explanation of the method used for comparing both MFO and UNIFIL II.

Chapter II (The Multinational Force and Observers - MFO) analyses in more detail the first peacekeeping operation: the MFO. It will examines its evolution from its roots until its establishment. It will describe the organization in terms of mandate, structure, troops’ disposition, treaty geography and financings. Finally, the last paragraph will be devoted to an analysis of the current geopolitical environment and of the new challenges charactering the Sinai Peninsula, where MFO is stationed.

Chapter III (The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon II – UNIFIL II) examines in detail UNIFIL II mission: in parallel with the previous Chapter, it will tackle the historic evolution of the operation ending up with an analysis of the current mandate, structure and daily activities of the force. This Chapter will also focus on the Italian contribution to the Force and will also address the ongoing challenges charactering the Lebanese territory and menacing the working of the mission itself.

Chapter IV (Lessons learnt) resumes the scope of the research: it will draw the differences and the analogies among MFO and UNIFIL II. At the end of this chapter, some further conclusions will be assessed. In particular, this final paragraph will provide us with a generic frame and consideration of each operation focusing on the efficacy and possible future developments of both MFO and UNIFIL II.
CHAPTER I

WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING?

1.1 The study of peacekeeping

Although there is no formal doctrine or definition of peacekeeping, it is a common conception and shared view that peacekeeping refers to the deployment of national or multinational forces in order to control and prevent an escalation of an ongoing armed conflict between or within states\(^1\). Surprisingly, the field of study of peacekeeping is a rather recent one albeit conflicts and wars are features that are deeply rooted in human history. In fact, conflict is a universal feature of human society\(^2\). It has always characterised international politics representing one the most influential components of interstate and intrastate dynamics. Conflict may derive from social disparities in terms of economic differentiation, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization\(^3\). Yet, conflicts are dynamics, as they escalate and de-escalate, where third parties are likely to be involved in the course of their progress and may become parties in the conflict itself\(^4\).

The history of conflict goes even further than the establishment of the first civilizations and the first communities of individuals recognising themselves within a social structure and organization. Conflict has always been part of human beings; its first apparition is not datable and many theories developed in the course of the centuries, such as those remarkably of Plato, Hobbes and Rousseau, have tried to explain its causes and features.

Notwithstanding the fact that conflicts and wars have been, for a long time, the subjects of research and study in fields as diplomacy, international relations, history, political science, sociology and law, only during the second half of the twentieth century a science of peace started to be developed. In fact, at the height of the Cold War, when the development of nuclear weapons and conflict between the

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3. *Ibidem*
superpowers seemed to threaten again human survival, there was an urgent need to find, once for all, a method of conflict resolution that could prevent the escalation of war and, eventually, resolve it. Hence, since the second half of the twentieth century, Conflict Resolution (CR) has become a defined specialist field studying the phenomenon of war and analysing ways to bring it under control while fostering better relations between parties involved in the dispute.

Yet, since its advent as a field of study and research, Conflict Resolution had to face immediately another important change in international politics. With the end of colonial politics, the end of the Cold War, the increased level of international activism fostered by the UN and the regime of global legal norms proscribing the use of military force, there was a decline in the number of interstate conflicts and an increasing number of intrastate ones that pushed the scholar community to shift the attention from great power rivalry to new wars and civil conflicts. These theorists started to claim about the atrociousness of new wars identifying several empirical trends of the post-Cold War period:

- increase in the number of civil wars and intra-state conflicts;
- increase in the intensity of battle;
- increase in the number of civilians displaced in civil wars,
- increase in the number of civilians killed in civil wars;
- increase in the ratio of civilians to military personnel killed in civil wars.

Eventually, these theories of new wars led to the development of new security studies. In fact the post-Cold War period, while marking the end of bipolar rivalry at the global level, was characterised by a large wave of democratization and, above all, by an upsurge in new and atrocious civil and regional conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and among several African states that led to power vacuums in their respective regions. These environments led to new security formations. In this frame, Barry Buzan in 1991 developed a theory of regional security, namely the “Regional Security Complex Theory” (RSCT), that gave a

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5 The “New Wars” debate revisited: an empirical evaluation of the atrociousness of “New Wars”, Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, Jonathan Hall, Uppsala Peace Research Papers n° 9, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2006, p.3.

6 Ibidem
regional dimension to international security and that was mainly based on the argument that after the post-Cold War era international interactions were essentially regionalized. He defined a Regional Complex as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. In the following years, Buzan and Wæver modified the RSCT taking into consideration the changing regional and global security threats. Buzan and Wæver in 2003 defined the so-called “securitization model” that is the security interconnectedness according to which within a security complex security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or solved apart from the one another. That is to say, countries within regions are interdepend in terms of security and one’s domestic sphere is strictly related to the regional one.

*(The Middle Eastern RSC) is a clear example of a conflict formation, if one that is unusually large and complicated, and that also possesses some distinctive cultural features. [...] The insecurity of ruling elites within their domestic sphere plays a significant role in shaping the dynamics of (in)security overall.*

Their study further evolved taking into account the interplay between global powers (super or great powers) and Regional Complexes where those could penetrate changing the security dynamics within a defined region.

The academic study and practice of conflict resolution is inserted in this new context of theories and studies. Yet, CR came to have many features in common with the concept of Peace Operations in the field of international conflict management and security purposes. While the study of Conflict Resolution was emerging at the height of the Cold War, thus during the ‘50s, Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester B. Pearson were defining the basic principles of *peacekeeping*. They did so when leading one of the first peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), namely the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), created in response to the

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Suez Canal crisis occurred in the Middle East in 1956. Conflict Resolution encompasses the role played by peacekeeping in a more general way. CR broadly deals with the study of the phenomenon of conflict, analysing ways to bring it under control and, eventually, to resolve it. On the other hand, peacekeeping is a branch of the wider theory of CR and refers to the deployment of either national or multinational forces in a territory during a ceasefire in order to curb an ongoing conflict or to prevent the escalation of future hostilities between or within states.

In general, the United Nations (UN) has always represented the main actor undertaking peacekeeping operations; yet, the surge in global peacekeeping activity has not been limited to the United Nations but also regional organizations and, in some cases, single states have conducted such operations unilaterally. For instance, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the NATO, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were some of the actors involved in major peacekeeping operations throughout the post-Cold War period\textsuperscript{10}.

\begin{itemize}
\item Symbols of the main actors involved in peacekeeping operations.
\end{itemize}
Since its creation on 24 October 1945, the UN was charged with the task to prevent conflicts and their escalation by means of soft power, persuading opposing parties to use dialogue rather than violence and bringing a peaceful solution to conflict. In order to fulfil its commitments, during the last sixty years, the UN has operated through peacekeeping operations playing a key role in containing or ending many conflicts. The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and the UN General Assembly President Lester Pearson defined in 1956 the three basic principles of peacekeeping:

- the consent of the conflicting parties;
- the non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate;
- political neutrality (not taking sides), impartiality, (commitment to the mandate) and legitimacy (sanctioned and accountable to the Security Council advised by the Secretary-General).

Therefore, peacekeeping forces are usually unarmed or only lightly armed in order to use the minimum of force exceptionally when required (in self-defence or when there is an impediment to the fulfilment of its mandate).

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the nature of wars and conflicts has changed drastically and, in adapting themselves to the ongoing events and geopolitical transformations, peacekeeping operations have represented a crucial instrument at the disposal of the international community to advance international peace and security through the deployment of national or multinational forces. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires to include military, police and civilian personnel working together to monitor an ongoing truce and solve a potential escalation of the hostilities through means of soft power such as diplomacy, negotiations, dialogue and agreement.

Peacekeeping is related to, but at the same time differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. According to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO):

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conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary General’s “good offices,” preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his her own initiative, may exercise his or her “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary
conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.\textsuperscript{14}

As seen from the figure above, each operation is usually not limited to one type of activity. For instance, peacekeeping operations often play an active role in

\textsuperscript{14} Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 2008, p. 17-18.

peacemaking efforts and peacebuilding activities. Eventually, when a ceasefire has failed and the parties involved in the conflict show their unwillingness to reach a peaceful compromise, peacekeeping operations can also intervene through peace enforcement and the use of military force.

1.2 The UN peacekeeping

International peacekeeping is at the top of the agenda of the United Nations. The establishment of the UN Organizations in 1945 was aimed at preserving international peace and security in the aftermath of the Second World War throughout the war-torn environment. Although there is no a unique and recognised definition of peacekeeping, many scholars and the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali have made attempts to define it. For instance, in its review of peacekeeping, the UN defined it as:

*an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntarily and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force or arms, thus contrasting them with the “enforcement action” of the United Nations under art 42.*

The UN Charter does not provide a concrete legal base for peacekeeping within the frame of the United Nations. In fact, there are no explicit provisions for peacekeeping in the UN Charter. Peacekeeping operations can be located in the so-called grey zone, a halfway between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, respectively those dedicated to the pacific settlement of disputes and to peace enforcement. This is why the UN assigned peacekeeping operations to chapter six and a-half placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and enforcement action as authorized under Chapter

VII. The UN Security Council, under the same Chapters, was and still represents the organ charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of collective security and stability through peaceful measures of settlement of disputes and, whether necessary, through peace enforcement actions. Peacekeeping operations began under the UN auspices in 1948 with the unarmed United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) deployed as a military observation team in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires and to supervise armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab countries. Since then, the UN has intervened in many conflicts through peacekeeping operations playing an important role in preventing disputes from escalating into war and exhorting opposing parties to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict. The UN specialised Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, is devoted to assisting the Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. The DPKO plans, prepares, manages and directs UN peacekeeping operations ensuring the fulfilment of their respective mandates under the authority of the Security Council and General Assembly and under the command vested in the Secretary General.

Generally referring to the organizing structure of the UN missions, the Secretary General (SG), backed by the approval of the Security Council, appoints the Head of Mission (HoM) of a peacekeeping operation who exercises the UN authority on behalf of the Secretary General. Moreover, the Secretary General appoints the Head of the military component of the peacekeeping operation, that can be either a Force Commander (FC) or a Chief Military Observer. In some situations the FC might coincide with the Head of Mission but, usually, the Head of Mission is a civilian who is appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and who exercises the UN authority on behalf of the SG in the specific operation.

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18 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. www.un.org
19 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. www.uncosa.unvienna.org
20 The future of UNIFIL. Thesis given from Prof. P. Ferrara following his consent.
21 Ibidem
1.3 From traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping

Before and during the Cold War period the main objective of the UN was to ensure and verify the resilience of a ceasefire while conducting peacekeeping operations; the major part of the United Nations longstanding peacekeeping missions maintain this traditional character. Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed. Traditional peacekeeping operations are characterised by:

- observation, monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, over-flights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties;
- supervision of ceasefire and support to verification mechanisms;
- interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.

Through these means of dialogue and soft power, traditional peacekeeping operations ensure that both the parties in conflict respect the ceasefire, enabling each one of them to be aware and reassured that one is not going to take military advantage over the other bypassing the truce. Generally, traditional peacekeeping operations do not directly make political efforts to solve the conflict: they have rather a logistic and military character that may not lead to a political settlement between the parties. The role of traditional peacekeeping operation is not to resolve territorial or political disputes within a country but rather to buy time for enabling the government itself to do so, while contributing to the maintenance of regional peace and security and creating the preconditions for these achievements.

Contrarily to the Cold War period, since the late 1980s peacekeeping operations have largely passed from being traditional, classical operations to become a new type of force. In fact, during the bipolar context, the UN acted merely as an interim measure and force of interposition aiming at separating adversarial parties.

On the contrary, in the aftermath of the USSR’s dissolution, the transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new type of peacekeeping, namely the

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multidimensional operations\textsuperscript{23}. Since new wars and intrastate conflicts have become more complex, involving civil society and third countries, and hostilities have become more intense and violent, a new multidimensional approach providing a broader range of solutions had to be found. In fact, today’s international security environment is far more complex than the way it was in the era of bipolarity. Intrastate conflicts, undermining security and stability at the domestic and regional level, have replaced the threat of a world war among superpowers; moreover, the presence of new challenges such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, rogue and failed states incapable to manage their internal situation and sovereignty has pushed the UN to adopt a different approach in order to contain and to end hostilities within these regions. In fact, today’s peacekeeping operations are likely to occur in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments that are characterised by:

- fragile cease-fire and peace agreements;
- numerous parties to a conflict;
- undisciplined factions who are not responsive to their own controlling authorities;
- a breakdown of the rule of law and an absence of law and order;
- presence of local armed groups or spoilers to the peace process;
- instances of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV);
- systematic and endemic violations of human rights;
- involvement of large numbers of civilians affected by conflict, including as refugees and displaced persons; and

\textsuperscript{23} The shift to multidimensional peacekeeping operations can be traced to the publication of An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General formulated by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in June 1992. In his Report, Mr. Boutros-Ghali argued that the UN had to emphasize human security since the states themselves were often not a source of protection but a source of harm. http://www.unrol.org/files/a_47_277.pdf
Multidimensional operations can be characterised by the involvement of military personnel, police and civilians capable to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. The aftermath of an internal conflict might be generally characterised by a difficult and challenging environment where violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. For instance, the State coming out from the war usually lacks of capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order; moreover, in many cases, in war torn countries basic infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed leading to a dramatic displacement of the population and waves of refugees towards other countries. Another factor that might characterise the State’s internal situation are societal clashes and tensions with individuals divided along ethnic, sectarian, religious and political belongings. Usually, these divisions are even more profound if, during the conflict, human rights abuses have been committed, further complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation. Therefore, multidimensional peacekeeping operations represent an important international effort that leads countries affected by the consequences of war toward a sustainable peace, restoring their internal situation and providing them with the basic needs to regain their internal sovereignty and territorial legitimacy.

In order to achieve these purposes, multidimensional peacekeeping forces not only monitor and observe ceasefires but they also:

- create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;

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26 Perspectives on peacekeeping and atrocities prevention: expanding stakeholders and regional arrangements, David Curran, Trudy Fraser, Larry Roeder, Robert Zuber, Springer, 2015, p.3.
provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Moreover, multidimensional peacekeeping operations play a critical role in securing the peace process by filling the security and public order vacuum that generally characterises war torn environments. In fact, in contrast to traditional UN peacekeeping operations, multidimensional operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict through the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation. In general, multidimensional peacekeeping operations require more efforts and participation from the international community and sometimes can take too long timings to obtain an effective result. They tend to have large numbers of troops, local and international civilians recruited for various tasks, and police. Hence, at first stage traditional peacekeeping operations are more frequently deployed in war-torn territories in order to provide basic observing, supervising and inter-positioning functions.

1.4 Does peacekeeping work?

Over the past years since 1948, more than seventy UN peacekeeping operations and more than forty non-UN led peacekeeping operations have been deployed in countries coming out from violent civil wars.

As the table below shows, despite the number of forces involved in peacekeeping operations has augmented, the UN remains the dominant actor in the field. In any case, since the end of the Cold War the whole international community and the UN have become much more involved in internal civil conflicts monitoring and sometimes even managing the transition to peace within war torn states. Although the number of peacekeeping operations has increased sharply in the aftermath of the Cold War and interventions have been characterised by a transformation and an extension of their goals and purposes, scholars and practitioners of the matter have debated and questioned the efficacy and the merits of the operations.

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Their studies and researches on the field have tried to address the question of peacekeeping effectiveness. In general, one of the common findings is that peacekeeping has a large and statistically significant effect on the duration of peace after civil wars\textsuperscript{30}. Yet, further studies have debated whether peacekeeping is best conducted by the United Nations or by other organizations or regional actors or whether peacekeeping is more effective in presence of some independent variables instead of others. In general, opponents of peacekeeping often tend to focus on the political interests and strategic concerns that lie beyond the assessment and deployment of the operations led by the UN or independent organizations. According to them, the major part of peacekeeping operations is inefficient because the real purposes of the mission itself lie beyond those that are manifested and publicly stated. They affirm that peacekeeping forces are dispatched within certain areas and territories of greater interest while neglecting others that are inconsistent with personal scopes. Yet, they might eventually intervene in order to obtain a good press.


boosting their legitimacy and role as peace leaders and guarantees. The political
debate on the effectiveness of peacekeeping is wide and it extends to many different
types of criticism. The assumption of my elaborate is that, independently from the
reasons driving the operation and independently from their results, either successful
or not, peacekeeping does always represent a valid attempt and instrument at the
disposal of the international community for resolving conflicts and advancing
peaceful relations between the parties involved in the dispute. As the table below
shows, peacekeeping operations not only have registered many successful campaigns
in various territories and war-torn countries but they have always represented an
important effort of the international community to maintain peace and security in
those areas. At least, we do have independent organizations and the UN that provide
enough resources along with peacekeeping personnel, equipment, expertise, and
funding to countries and territories dismantled by civil wars.

Table 1 Mandate implementation: potential causes of success and failure

<table>
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<th>Country (Dates)</th>
<th>Situational difficulty of civil war (10 easy, 1 difficult)</th>
<th>Security Council interest consensus</th>
<th>Security Council interest intensity</th>
<th>Peacekeeping rules followed (limited force, impartiality, consent)</th>
<th>Organizational learning (first level)</th>
<th>Outcome (of mandate implementation)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia (4/89–5/90)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador (7/91–4/95)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (2/92–9/93)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (12/92–12/94)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Slavonia (1/98–1/97)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor (10/99–5/02)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (2/95–6/97)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low/Moderate*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (5/93–5/95)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Usually/No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (2/92–5/95–12/95)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Usually/No</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (10/93–5/96)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Usually/No</td>
<td>Moderate*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of past and current
peacekeeping missions, we can maintain that “on average” peacekeeping strongly
works to reduce the risk of conflict escalation. For instance, in 2000, Professor
Michael Doyle from Columbia University and Professor Nicholas Sambanis from

Yale University demonstrated that the presence of a large peacekeeping operation in a country emerging from civil war significantly reduced the chances of that society slipping back into violence32. In order to reach this conclusion, Doyle and Sambanis analysed those war-torn countries where peace missions had taken place while considering proxy variables such as the type of conflict, the intensity of hostility by observing the number of deaths and displacements, the number of hostile factions, the level of ethnic division and the outcomes of the war33.

From Doyle and Sambanis’ analysis it is evident that, on balance, peacekeeping works reasonably well at preventing conflicts from escalating.

The answer from the statistical studies is: absolutely, (peacekeeping operations) they work massively. A country is much less likely to fall back in civil war if they have got armed peacekeepers. And the better financed and armed the peacekeeping force, the more effective they are...

The United Nations does a number of things badly, but it does a number of things well, and one of them is peacekeeping – on average, not 100 percent of the time. The headlines would never tell you that. Only a statistical study would34.

Eventually, peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool, dramatically reducing the risk that war will resume35. Yet, in cases such as in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda where peacekeeping operations have failed in reaching their purposes of long-lasting peace and collective security, these operations have represented, anyway, an important effort and precious source of aid to the internal situation, minimizing the risks of a war outbreak and bringing a further contribute to end the conflict.

1.5 Comparing peacekeeping operations

Different features, different scopes and outcomes characterising each mission represent some of the useful elements needed for comparing peacekeeping operations and acknowledging their strengths and weaknesses. Comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis. It sharpens our power of description and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus similarities and contrasts among cases\(^36\). In order to engage in a comparative analysis we need a method for comparing. This method is necessary for testing empirical hypotheses about relations between variables in different cases\(^37\). The comparative method requires, firstly, a defined object to be compared, secondly, it requires identified units to compare and the time period to which the comparison refers; lastly, it requires detailed properties of those units\(^38\). The comparative method is generally applied to a limited number of cases that might be very similar (most similar cases research) or might be very dissimilar (the most dissimilar cases research)\(^39\). Whereas the first strategy allows for more detailed comparisons, the second leads to broader comparisons\(^40\). Notwithstanding the fact that the comparative method does not provide a clear answer to one’s research, it permits to broaden the perspectives on the matter and to better acknowledge the content of the analysis.

In this case, comparing the MFO and the UNIFIL II means comparing two peacekeeping operations that only apparently are very different one to the other. On the contrary, they share more features than general expectations highlight. Hence, it is a comparison of most similar cases that, following a method based on a historical analysis and a Regional Security Complex analysis, supports the argument of this thesis: although the differences among MFO and UNIFIL II operations are several, both the missions are characterised by many common elements that provide us with a very interesting frame and different perspective on the subject of the research.


\(^{39}\) *Ibidem*

CHAPTER II

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)

Since 25 April 1982, for the third time in history, an international peacekeeping mission has been operative in the Sinai Peninsula. Contrarily to the previous United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF) I and UNEF II, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) supervises the correct implementation of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel without operating under the auspices of the United Nations. In fact, without the obtainment of the Security Council unanimity for the dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai, the parties negotiated a Protocol in 1981 establishing the MFO as an alternative to the envisioned UN force. At present, twelve contributing countries (Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, the Republic of the Fiji Islands, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay) provide personnel to make up the MFO's Force in different military elements.

2.1 The United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF I)

In order to understand and acknowledge the role and the mandate of MFO it is necessary to analyse its roots and previous analogue experiments in the region. UNEF I and UNEF II were the first two UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the territories besides the Suez Canal and on the Sinai Peninsula. Since its establishment, the UNEF was fundamental to solve the crisis broke out with the military action of the Israeli and Anglo-French forces against Egypt during the Second Arab-Israeli conflict of 1956 also known as Suez crisis. This force represented a useful source for securing the ceasefire and a pre-condition for calling on an effective withdrawal of the Israeli invading forces from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. At the request of the United States, the Security Council held a meeting on 30 October

41 MFO: peacekeeping in the Middle East, Major Hofman Cornelis, Military Review, vol. 63, n° 9, 1983, p. 3.
42 Ibidem
43 MFO website, contingents, troop contributing countries. www.mfo.org
44 In July 1956 President Nasser had nationalized the Suez canal in order to finance the construction of the massive Aswan dam on the Nile River. In response, Israel invaded in late October, and British and French troops landed in early November, occupying the canal zone.
1956, during which it submitted a draft resolution calling upon an immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces behind the established armistice lines. Since the resolution was promptly blocked by British and French vetoes, the issue was transmitted to the General Assembly in compliance with the General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, namely Uniting for peace. Through this referral, the General Assembly granted to itself the power to deal with threats to the peace bypassing, doing so, the UN Security Council vetoes. On 1st November 1956 was held the first emergency special session of the General Assembly and, on the following day, it adopted Resolution 997 (ES-I), calling for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines and the reopening of the Canal. Moreover, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 999 (ES-I), authorizing the Secretary General to implement the ceasefire and demanding a cessation of the movement of military forces and arms into the area. Therefore, on the same day, the Secretary-General submitted his first report calling for the establishment of an emergency international United Nations Force. On 5 November 1956 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1000 (ES-I) by which it:

Established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956;

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45 Middle East – UNEF I, background. [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)
The 1949 Armistice Lines were set after a series of armistice agreements, concluded under the auspices of and supervised by the United Nations, signed during 1949 between Israel and neighbouring countries after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. On 24 February 1949 an Israel–Egypt Armistice Agreement was signed in Rhodes. It provided for large demilitarized zones in the Nitzana-AbuAgayla sector and left to Egypt the control over the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it did not specify the rights of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran causing several controversies in the following years. The 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel collapsed when Israel and the Anglo-French troops in 1956 occupied large portions of the Egyptian territory. [http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/egyptian-israel-1949.pdf](http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/egyptian-israel-1949.pdf)

46 Ibidem


49 Ibidem

Appointed, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) E.L.M. Burns, as Chief of the Command;

Authorized the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the observer corps of UNTSO, a limited number of officers who were to be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorized him, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, of the additional number of officers needed.

Invited the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as might be necessary for prompt execution of the actions envisaged. Therefore, a priority objective of the Secretary General, after the adoption of the enabling resolutions 997-1003 (ES-I) from 1 to 10 November 1956, was to assemble a usable Force and land it in Egypt as rapidly as possible.

On 7 November the General Assembly adopted resolution 1001 (ES-I) that formed the basis for the establishment of one of the first peacekeeping Force in United Nations’ history, second to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), from which a selected a group of observers began planning the organization of the new Force. On the same day, with the adoption of Resolution 1002 (ES-I), the Anglo-French forces and the Israeli ones were respectively asked to withdraw from Egyptian territory and to retire behind the armistice lines. After the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, that took place in December 1956, UNEF first task was to supervise the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel and the withdrawal of this latter from the Egyptian territory.

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52 Middle East – UNEF I, background. www.un.org
The withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula took place between 3 December 1956 and 22 January 1957, whereas the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh areas were left at the beginning of March. In adopting Resolution 1001 (ES-I) on 7 November 1956, the General Assembly stated that a principle governing the stationing and functioning of UNEF, and later of all other peacekeeping forces, was the consent of the hosting Government\textsuperscript{55}. In fact, in compliance with the UN peacekeeping principles and since it was not an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNEF could enter and operate officially in the country on 12 November 1956 once the Egyptian Government had given its consent to host the Force in its territory. From this on, the Force Commander and the group of military observers of UNTSO established a temporary headquarter in Cairo\textsuperscript{56}. The operation of the Force took place into four different phases: the first one, from mid-November to late December 1956, was characterised by the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Port Said area. The second, from that time to early March 1957, by the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula, except the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area that were left during the third phase in March. Finally, the fourth and last phase began with the deployment of UNEF along the borders between Egypt and Israel; the Force was operative from March 1957 until May 1967\textsuperscript{57}.

Once the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Egyptian territory was completed, the main objective of UNEF was to ensure the ceasefire between the two countries acting as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) and the international boundary\textsuperscript{58}. UNEF task was to avoid incidents, to prevent illegal crossings of the Line by civilians of either side for whatever purposes and to observe and report on all violations of the Line whether on land, sea or in the air\textsuperscript{59}. The strength of the Force remained at the authorized level of about 6,000 units until the end of 1957 while, in the following years, it was gradually reduced because the situation in the area of operation remained rather quiet and because of financial

\textsuperscript{55} Middle East – UNEF I, background, www.un.org
\textsuperscript{56} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{57} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{58} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{59} Ibidem
difficulties. Overall, during this period, the Force could manage effectively to maintain peace in those sensitive areas until 18 May 1967, date in which, at the request of the Egyptian Government, UNEF I was withdrawn since it had not anymore the host government’s permission to remain in the country.

This map shows UNEF I area of deployment. [http://texantales.com/](http://texantales.com/)


61 This map shows UNEF I area of deployment. [http://texantales.com/](http://texantales.com/)
2.2 UNEF II

Between summer 1967 and autumn 1973 the relations among Egypt and Israel worsened again. At the request of President Nasser, Egypt withdrew its permission for the stationing of UNEF I expelling it from Sinai Peninsula; moreover, he decided to close the Strait of Tiran and, doing so, he created the preconditions for the outbreak of of the Third Arab-Israeli War\(^{62}\) occurred in June 1967, when Israel seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. At the end of August 1967 the Arab League met in Khartoum to discuss about the Arab position against the Jewish State. The final Resolution issued on 1 September called for a continued state of belligerency with Israel stating that there had to be no recognition, no peace, and no negotiations with the Jewish State (the so called *three no’s*)\(^{63}\). Yet, in March 1969 Egypt initiated renewed attacks against Israel, marking the beginning of the *War of Attrition* with the scope of retaking the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israel during the Six Days War. Until the death of Nasser in 1970 fighting between Egypt and the Jewish State continued in a static and limited way since no territory was conquered or relinquished.

Hostilities picked again on 6 October 1973 during the holy Jewish day of Yom Kippur, *when Egyptian forces in the Suez Canal sector and, in a coordinated move, Syrian troops on the Golan Heights attacked Israeli positions*\(^{64}\). The Security Council convened between 8 and 12 October to consider the conflict and the overall situation, but, because of the opposing positions of the major Powers, that is to say the US and the Soviet Union, it could not reach a decision and adopt a resolution\(^{65}\). Meanwhile war escalated and, by 21 October, the situation became worse. Following the Soviet Union and the United States’ request of an urgent meeting of the Security Council, on 22 October, on a proposal submitted jointly by the two major Powers, the UNSC adopted Resolution 338 (1973) calling for a ceasefire that was latterly

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\(^{62}\) The *Six Days War* was fought between the 5\(^{th}\) and the 10\(^{th}\) of June 1967 after the Israeli attack against the Arab state. It ended with a decisive Israeli victory that captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria.

\(^{63}\) *Global Liberalism, Local Popularism: Peace And Conflict in Israel/Palestine And Northern Ireland*, Guy Ben-Porat, Syracuse University Press, 2006.

\(^{64}\) *International Law on peacekeeping: a study of Article 40 of the UN Charter*, Hitoshi Nasu, Brill, 2009, p. 91.

\(^{65}\) *Middle East – UNEF II, background.* [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)
confirmed in Resolution 339 (1973) of 23 October\textsuperscript{66}. Because of the critical situation, the UN Secretary General requested to deploy immediately United Nations observers in the territory in order to restore peace among the parties.

President Anwar Sadat, who took over the government of Egypt after Nasser’s death in 1970, asked to the Soviet Union and the United States to send their troops in the area in order to end the fighting over the region and to enforce the ceasefire. The Security Council met again on 24 October and worked out a resolution calling for an increase in UNTSO observers in the area and the establishment of a new United Nations peacekeeping force: the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)\textsuperscript{67}. Thus, on 25 October 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 340 (1973), by which it demanded an immediate and complete ceasefire and a retirement of the countries’ militia to the positions occupied by them before 22 October 1973\textsuperscript{68}. The mandate of UNEF II, that originally had to last for six months, until 24 April 1974, was subsequently renewed eight times. Each time, the Secretary General submitted a report to the Security Council on the activities carried out by the Force during its mandate expressing the importance of UNEF II presence in the area and demanding its renewal\textsuperscript{69}. October 1978 represented the last time in which the mandate of UNEF II was extended for nine extra months, until 24 July 1979. During the last phase of UNEF II activities, a Peace Treaty was concluded in March 1979 between Egypt and Israel, entering into force on 25 April. Apparently, the Treaty of Peace had to provide a UN mission of observers replacing UNEF II, that lapsed in July 1979, accordingly to the UNSC’s decision.

Article IV of the Treaty stated that\textsuperscript{70}:

\begin{quote}
In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{66} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{67} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{68} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{69} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{70} Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, 26 March 1979 http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/InterDocs/images/284.pdf
United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

The United Nations forces and observers would have operated in checkpoints, meanwhile patrolling the boundaries and observing posts along the international boundary; moreover, it would have ensured freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace. This UN force had to be stationed:

in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members

Meanwhile, in compliance with the Treaty, the Israeli forces withdrew from the north of Sinai whose area was returned to Egypt. However, because of a strong opposition to the Treaty coming from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), from Arab States, and from the Soviet Union within the Security Council, the UNSC decided to

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71 Forty Years in Search of Arab-Israeli Peace, William B. Quandt, Macalester International Volume n° 23, the Israeli-Palestinian impasse: dialogic transformations, University of Virginia, 2009, p. 56.
allow the UNEF II mandate to lapse. Once it happened on 24 July 1979, on the base of the UNSC’s decision, the various contingents rapidly retired to their countries and the region remained without an international force monitoring the ceasefire. However and in this eventuality, in an annex to the treaty, the United States stated they would have organized a multinational force of equivalent strength if the United Nations showed its incapability to provide a force as envisaged by the Treaty.

2.3 MFO

The MFO was born in the wake of these conjunctions as an “alternative” to the prior UNEF peacekeeping force whose mandate ended in July 1979. Its history goes back to the 1973 war occurred during the holy Jewish Yom Kippur day when Egypt, in a surprise move, crossed the Suez Canal and inflicted serious losses to the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). The following agreements negotiated between 1974 and 1977 pursuing an Arab-Israeli ceasefire did not reach any effective solution to the stalemate and, it was not until 17 September 1978 that a definite peace accord was signed between Egypt and Israel. The Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the US President Jimmy Carter signed the Peace Accords at Camp David, Maryland, putting the bases for the reconciliation between the two historic enemies. These accords became renowned as the centrepiece of American policy towards the Middle East. However, this event represented a pivotal moment not only for the U.S. diplomacy, acting as a mediator of the dispute, but also for the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, this episode pushed the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Peace Prize for 1978 to President Sadat and Menachem Begin for their contribution to ensure peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel, formalized with the signing of the Peace Treaty.

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73 Peacekeeping in the Middle East as an International Regime, Kenneth Dombrowski, Routledge, 2007, p.79.
75 The crossing of the Suez Canal, October 6, 1973 (the Ramadan war), Bg Hamdy Sobhy Abouseada, Egyptian Army, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2000.
76 The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, William B. Quandt and John C. Campbell, 1988, p.1.
concluded on 26 March 1979. With this event, for the first time an Arab country came to terms with Israel and recognised its sovereignty through a peace agreement. Following the Camp David accords, Arab nations felt betrayed and the perception of Egypt within the Arab world changed abruptly. Anwar Sadat’s peaceful initiative towards Israel and its disregard in demanding greater concessions for the recognition of Palestinians' right to self-determination cost his life. Yet, after the President’s assassination on 6 October 1981, Egypt was suspended from the Arab League from 1979 until 1989.

2.4 Camp David Accords

After twelve days of secret meetings mediated by President Carter and lasted from 5 to 17 September 1978, both Egypt and Israel concluded an agreement in the White House. The accords had their base in the UN Resolutions 242 and 338, with the purpose of establishing provisions and principles that would have led to a solution of the conflict. In Camp David two accords were signed: the first was a framework for peace in the Middle East whereas the second a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The first accord was divided in three parts: the first was devoted to the issue of Palestine and included a framework laying down the method of negotiations to settle West Bank and Gaza as Palestinian territories. The second part clearly aimed at normalizing the relations between Egypt and Israel through full diplomatic, economic, and cultural exchange. Finally, the third part, of the so called “associated principles”, provided a just, comprehensive, and durable solution of the Middle East conflict for any other neighbouring Arab state seeking to come to terms with Israel. The second accord consisted of a provision regarding the stationing forces, declaring that:

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77 Award Ceremony Speech, Presentation Speech delivered by Aase Lionaes, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1978, Oslo, December 10, 1978. [www.nobelprize.org](http://www.nobelprize.org)

78 1978 Camp David Peace Accords, Palestine facts. [www.palestinefacts.org](http://www.palestinefacts.org)

79 The Camp David Accords, documents pertaining to the conclusion of peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel) [http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/InterDocs/images/284.pdf](http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/InterDocs/images/284.pdf)
no more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces would have been stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

A second provision, on the interim withdrawal, stated that:

between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces had to withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad.

This provision implicated an Israeli return of the Sinai control to Egypt through the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) from the Peninsula. Eventually, the Jewish State agreed to vacate Sinai and dismantle its air bases in a period of three years whereas Egypt agreed to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and to allow its safe passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal.

The 1979 Treaty provided for the complete withdrawal of all the IDF forces and of Israeli civilians from Sinai within three years. Yet, in order to provide maximum security for both the parties, two measures had to be established: military restriction in the Sinai and the border area of Israel, and the stationing of a UN peacekeeping force and observers in the area. The establishment of a UN peacekeeping force required the approval of all the permanent members within the UN Security Council. However, the URSS, that had previously opposed the Camp David Accords, also opposed the final Peace Treaty and did not support the continuation of the UNEF II mandate whose operations were ceased in June 1979.

Still on 18 May 1981 the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation was far from being actualized because of an unreached unanimity within the UN Security Council. The lack of peacekeeping forces, for the areas to be vacated by the IDF, was a serious problem for the maintenance of peace and security in the Sinai Peninsula. The Security Council offered to charge the UNTSO with the task of supervising the withdrawal. However, Israel rejected this offer considering it as insufficient and, instead, it turned to the US, which under the 1979 Treaty had committed itself to

80 Ibidem
form an alternative peacekeeping force, if the UN would have not provided one. In fact, *in a letter attached to the Peace Treaty from Carter to Begin and Sadat, a provision was made for this eventuality stating that*\(^{83}\):

> if the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable multinational force\(^{84}\).

The US, Egypt and Israel undertook negotiations from 17 July 1981 that formally ended on 3 August 1981 with the signature of a Protocol. This Protocol established the MFO as an alternative to a UN peacekeeping operation and, combined with the Treaty of Peace, it provided the legal basis for MFO operations. On 25 April 1982, after fifteen years of Israeli occupation, the rest of the Sinai was returned to Egypt and the MFO started to be operative.

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\(^{83}\) *Ibidem*

\(^{84}\) *Letters from President Carter to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, MFO Treaty of Peace.*

www.mfo.org
This map and the following ones are taken from *The history of peacekeeping in the Sinai desert, 1956-2002*, Robert R. Kiser Maj, thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2003.
2.5 Organization

The MFO Protocol of 3 August 1981 defined the structure, tasks, rights, obligations and responsibilities which stemmed from the Camp David agreements of 26 March 1979. Broadly speaking, the MFO’s mission is to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Treaty of Peace and to employ best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. The MFO deployed its troops between 10 and 20 March 1982 into its North base camp at El Gorah and was operational by 25 April 1982, the day in which Israel withdrew its last troops from the Sinai returning it to the Egyptian sovereignty. The force was organized with a diplomatic and administrative arm headquartered in Rome, Italy, led by a Director General (DG) whereas the Force and the Observers were located on the Sinai Peninsula and were led by a Force Commander (FC). The MFO still consists of a personnel coming from twelve different nations: Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, the Republic of the Fiji Islands, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.

In organizing the composition of the MFO, Israel desired the US involvement in the peacekeeping force since this would have brought more efficiency to the mission whereas Egypt was initially opposed. This latter eventually agreed that the US would have contributed with one (the largest) infantry battalion and a logistic unit along with a civilian observer unit (COU).

The size of the MFO was another contentious issue since Egypt wanted it rather small and Israel wanted a greater presence of troops. Finally, it was dictated by art. 19 of the Protocol, limiting the MFO to:

three infantry battalions totalling not more than 2000 troops, a coastal patrol unit and an Observer unit, an aviation element and logistics and signal units.

87 Ibidem
The first nations to envoy troops to the MFO were Uruguay, Columbia and Fiji. These latter two provided light infantry battalions to the Force. Italy became the first of the European nations to engage itself within the Force, supplying a naval component with patrol vessels monitoring the Straits of Tiran (Coastal Patrol Unit, ITCON)\textsuperscript{92}. Then, France supplied a light aircraft detachment while the UK supplied a headquarters unit. The major part of European countries did not commit themselves to participate in the mission since they were dived on and opposed to the Camp David framework for peace. In fact, competing European proposals such as the 1980 Venice Declaration placed more emphasis on the problem of Israeli occupation\textsuperscript{93} of the Palestinian territories, such as West Bank and Gaza. On 25 April 1982, the MFO

\[90\text{http://mfo.org/assets/docs/protocol.pdf}\]
\[91\text{Source of the figure: The fat lady has sung: the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Spoehr, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2000, p.6.}\]
\[92\text{The history of peacekeeping in the Sinai desert, 1956-2002, Robert R. Kiser Maj, thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003, p. 79.}\]
\[93\text{The history of peacekeeping in the Sinai desert, 1956-2002, Robert R. Kiser Maj, thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003, p. 79-80.}\]
officially assumed its mission. The MFO ended up consisting of almost 2.700 troops among which the largest contingents were those of the US, Colombia and Fiji.

2.6 Treaty geography and troops’ disposition

The Treaty of Peace divides Sinai into four security Zones three of which are in Sinai and one in Israel along the international border:\n
- Zone A – bounded on the east by line A and on the west by Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez;
- Zone B – bounded by line B on the east and by line A on the west;
- Zone C – bounded by line B on the west and by the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east;
- Zone D – bounded by line D on the east and the international boundary on the west.

In these Zones the MFO has the task of observing and reporting that Egypt and Israel effectively comply with the provisions of the Treaty respecting their borders and peace. Although the mandate of MFO is to “observe and report”, it is further assigned with four essential tasks on the basis of the Protocol of 3 August 1981:\n
- operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C;
- periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of the Annex to the Treaty of Peace, to be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
- additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party;
- ensure the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran.

Moreover:

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94 MFO website. www.mfo.org
• Under Agreed Arrangements signed on 1 September 2005, the MFO took on the additional responsibility of monitoring the deployment of Border Guards along the Egyptian side of the border between Egypt and Gaza, in the northermost part of Zone C. The MFO monitors the Border Guard Force by verifying that the deployment is consistent with the terms agreed between Egypt and Israel (as amended on 11 July 2007), including the stipulated number, characteristics and location of personnel, weapons, equipment and infrastructure.

Task one refers to “buffer zone” operations in Zone C. Task two refers to verification missions executed by the COU that include inspections of Egyptian and Israeli installations and supply points. Task three provides a mechanism by which the parties can request additional verification, if they suspect a violation of the provisions of the Protocol. Task four refers to MFO Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU) operations in the Red Sea and Straits of Tiran.

Moreover, in each Zone the Treaty establishes a limitation of force: Egypt was restricted in zone A to 22,000 troops (including mechanised infantry division and its military installations) and in Zone B to 4,000 troops. Finally, in Zone C Egypt could only deploy lightly armed civil police. In Zone D, Israel was restricted to 4,000 troops. Zone C, an area approximately 375 km long and 20 km wide near the border with Israel, is the focus of MFO attention. Only the Multinational Force and Observers and Egyptian police are stationed in Zone C except for an area in the north along the 14 kilometres long Philadelphia Corridor, separating Egypt from the Gaza Strip, where a designated force of Egyptian Guards is present since the agreement between Egypt and Israel was signed in 2005.

96 MFO – Mission. www.mfo.org
100 The Philadelphia Accord between Egypt and Israel was concluded on 1 September 2005. It authorized Egypt to deploy 750 border guards along the Philadelphia Corridor to patrol the border on Egypt’s side enabling Israel to evacuate the Rafah area. The deployment of Egyptian patrol forces to the Egyptian side of the border aimed at preventing smuggling into Gaza.
The MFO, that as of September 2015 numbers a personnel of 1682 men – 78 of which are provided by our government – monitors all traffic in, out, and within Zone C through a system of mobile patrols and aerial reconnaissance\textsuperscript{101}. Observers

\textsuperscript{101} The history of peacekeeping in the Sinai desert, 1956-2002, Robert R. Kiser Maj, thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
carefully verify if the presence of Israeli and Egyptian forces in the territory complies with the restrictions of the Treaty; with the same purpose, since 1982 the Italian Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU - ITCON), based at the Egyptian port of Sharm el Sheikh, controls naval traffic patrolling the Mediterranean and monitors the freedom of navigation, accordingly to Article V of the Treaty of Peace, through the Strait of Tiran and the southern entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. In Zone C, three MFO infantry battalions are deployed in order to conduct military observation from predetermined points: a northern, a central and a southern sector. The Fijian Battalion (FIJIBATT) operates in the northern sector whereas the Colombian Battalion (COLBATT) in the central one. Finally, the United States Battalion (USBATT) is responsible for the MFO's operations within the southern Sector of Zone C. Moreover, the US Civilian Observer Unit (COU), operating out of the MFO base camps at El Gorah and Sharm el Sheikh, executes periodic aerial and ground verification missions in Zones A, B, C and D. At present, the French contingent provides the MFO with its Fixed Wing Aviation Unit (FWAU) and officers serving among the staff of the Force Commander. The FWAU provides transportation between North and South Camp, support to the COU as well as generic administrative support. The Canadian Contingent's mission is to provide personnel to perform functions in support of the MFO. Members of the Canadian Contingent are charged with a wide variety of offices across all branches of the MFO and are based at both MFO camps in the Sinai (El Gorah and Sharm el Sheikh). The New Zealand Contingent provides a Training and Advisory Team (TAT) to the Force along with engineering personnel. Moreover, New Zealand and Australia contributed the Force's Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (RWAU), a combined Air Force helicopter squadron, from March 1982 until April 1986. Australia renewed its commitment to the MFO in January 1993, with an Army contingent of twenty-six personnel serving in a variety of engineering, security, administrative and medical support roles at the Force Headquarters. The Czech Contingent (CZECHCON) is the newest troop-contributing nation of the MFO. The country expanded its mission by deploying an Air Force Contingent with transport aircraft on 4 November 2013. The Norwegian Contingent (NORCON) consists of

2003, p. 82.

102 All these information are taken from MFO website. www.mfo.org

three staff officers who hold the following key positions: Chief of Operations (Colonel) and two Force Field Liaison Officers (Majors). The United Kingdom initially served within the MFO from 1982 to 1992 providing a headquarters company and officers amounting to approximately 35 personnel. The United Kingdom returned to the MFO supporting nations as a donor state in August 2012 and as of June 2014 is providing the MFO with an Engineer Officer of the rank of Major to serve on the Force Commander's Staff. Finally, Uruguay, which has provided a contingent to the MFO since 1982, currently provides a Transport and Engineering Unit (TREU) in support of the MFO mission and authorized strength is 58 personnel.\footnote{All these information and those at p. 23 are taken from MFO website. www.mfo.org}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{top_military_police_contributors.png}
\caption{Top Military and Police Contributors}
\end{figure}

\footnote{MFO troop contributing countries as of 2014. http://peaceoperationsreview.org/non-un-military-missions/}
The Force Commander’s headquarter is stationed in the North Camp at El Gorah in northern Sinai, approximately 20 km south of the Mediterranean coastline. The FC, appointed by the Director General (DG) for a term of three years, is responsible for the general and daily command of the force and supervises the MFO activities in the area of operation.\textsuperscript{106} Besides the North and South Camp, respectively located at El Gorah and near Sharm el Sheikh, Zone C is characterised by the presence of several Observation Posts (Op’s) and Check Points (CP’s) where the MFO soldiers perform their generic functions of “observing and reporting” that the provisions envisioned in the Treaty are fully respected.

While the FC directly supervises the activities of the Force, the Director General, whose Headquarter is located in Rome, exercises policy and manages the overall direction of the MFO overseeing all its functions including legal and financial matters, contracts, procurement, facilities management, personnel and recruitment, welfare programs, troop rotation arrangements and program evaluation.\textsuperscript{107} His role could be linked to that of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL); he is appointed by both the parties for a mandate of four years. Through the liaison offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv, the DG also mediates diplomatic contacts and political matters between Egypt and Israel and among Troop Contributing and Donor States.

With Law n° 967 of 29 December 1982, ratifying the agreement signed on 16 March 1982 between the Republic of Italy and the Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) for the participation in the mission and the subsequent renewal of the agreement, Italy committed itself within the Force and provided Costal Patrol Units and personnel. With the establishment of MFO Director General’s headquarters in Rome on 12 August 1982 and with the appointment of Major General Roberto Martinelli as MFO Force Commander between 2004 and 2007, Italy gained a prestigious mark of recognition to its Armed Forces in confirmation of its great commitment in Sinai.

\textit{In data 5 marzo 1982 il Direttore generale della MFO (Forza multinazionale e di osservatori del Sinai, che, per statuto, non può

\textsuperscript{106} MFO: the multinational force and observers website. www.mfo.org

\textsuperscript{107} Ibidem
aver sede né in Egitto né in Israele), Leamon Hunt, si è rivolto al nostro Ministero degli affari esteri per conoscere se l'Italia sarebbe stata disposta ad accogliere a Roma il Quartier generale della MFO. Al riguardo, è stato comunicato al signor Hunt che il Governo italiano accettava in linea di principio la richiesta in questione ed avrebbe altresì esaminato la possibilità di concedere alla MFO i privilegi e le immunità normalmente accordati ad un'Organizzazione internazionale. Tale decisione si ricollega al nostro convincimento che la scelta di Roma come sede della MFO vale a sottolineare il ruolo mediterraneo e mediorientale dell'Italia, con riflessi positivi sia nel quadro europeo che in quello occidentale più in generale. A tale ruolo corrispondono del resto precise responsabilità politiche che il nostro Paese ha ritenuto doveroso assumersì già al momento della decisione di aderire con un proprio contributo alla MFO. Il Governo non poteva, inoltre, non tenere nella dovuta considerazione il fatto che gli Stati Uniti avevano auspicato, in qualità di firmatari nonché garanti del Trattato istitutivo della MFO, una nostra disponibilità in materia, sottolineando al tempo stesso il positivo orientamento nello stesso senso delle due parti direttamente interessate, Egitto ed Israele. In conseguenza delle suesposte valutazioni politiche si è proceduto il 12 giugno 1982 alla firma dell'Accordo che viene sottoposto alla ratifica con il presente disegno di legge. L'Accordo, dopo avere previsto lo stabilimento a Roma della sede della Forza multinazionale e osservatori del Sinai, la quale si assume tutti gli oneri finanziari per il reperimento dei locali e le spese di manutenzione, sancisce una serie di clausole contenenti privilegi, immunità ed esenzioni consuete agli accordi di sede. In particolare si prevede: l'inviolabilità della sede e l'obbligo del Governo italiano di garantirne la sicurezza; la garanzia della continuità e della segretezza delle comunicazioni della Forza multinazionale e osservatori del Sinai; la libertà delle riunioni nella sede;
l'immunità dalla giurisdizione per l'Organizzazione e i beni destinati all'esercizio delle sue funzioni istituzionali, così come l'esenzione della Forza multinazionale e osservatori del Sinai da ogni imposta diretta statale o locale, dall'IVA per gli acquisti di importo non inferiore alla somma da concordarsi, dall'imposta di registro e similari per gli atti stipulati, dai dazi doganali per gli oggetti importati od esportati per i suoi scopi ufficiali; la libertà dell'Organizzazione di tenere e trasferire fondi in qualsiasi valuta. Inoltre l'Accordo riconosce ai funzionari della Forza multinazionale e osservatori del Sinai, nonché ai rappresentanti dei Governi membri e partecipanti alle riunioni dell'Organizzazione taluni privilegi e immunità in materia giurisdizionale, fiscale e valutaria, accordando al Direttore generale, al suo vice e al funzionario che lo sostituisce in caso di assenza gli stessi privilegi e immunità dei diplomatici accreditati

At present, Italy represents the fourth contributor country in terms of troops following USA, Colombia and Fiji Islands. The Italian Navy provides support with 78 men making up the Coastal Patrol Unit of the MFO, the only naval component of the force whose task is to ensure freedom of navigation and transit in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, in compliance with the provisions of Article V of the 1979 Treaty of Peace. The Italian Coastal Patrol Unit consists of three Naval Units class Explorer (Explorer, Sentinel and Lookout - ITCON) moored at the Italian naval base in the port of Sharm el Sheikh; their task is to ensure that the mission assigned to Italy by the MFO is effectively accomplished.

2.7 Financings

At present, the MFO is financed by the three signatory nations, Egypt, Israel and USA that contribute one third each one of the MFO's annual budget. The directly interested Parties, Egypt and Israel, fund most of the costs of the MFO. In addition, there are Donor States such as Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom that contributed approximately to 6% of the MFO's operating revenue. Australia and the United States provide funding for Force Protection purposes. As the graphic below shows, the MFO budget requirements generally fall into the following categories:

As of 30 September 2015, the total support to the Force has been of USD 91.261 million\textsuperscript{111}. The MFO exhorts outsider donors to contribute through a substantial financial aid in order to provide relief for Egypt and Israel who meet most of the costs of the MFO; after a series of recent terrorist attacks that have changed drastically the security environment in Sinai, now more than ever operational

\textsuperscript{110} MFO website, Servants of Peace. www.mfo.org
\textsuperscript{111} Independent auditors' report, MFO website. www.mfo.org
measures to promote the safety of MFO personnel are urgently required. Hence, donor funds are indispensable to finance these security strategies and to guarantee a strong commitment to the peace between the Parties and to regional stability, while ensuring that the MFO can continue to accomplish efficiently its mission.

2.8 New challenges

After more than three decades from the establishment of the MFO that became officially operative on 25 April 1982, Sinai is currently experiencing a troublesome fighting against groups of Islamist extremists stationed over the Peninsula clashing with Egyptian military troops and security forces. Notwithstanding the fact that Egypt has fought for years against jihadist menaces in northern Sinai, a pick in the hostilities between the extremists and the government’s forces and police was reached in July 2013 when a jihadist group that in 2014 became known as “Wilayat Sinai” or “Sinai Province” claimed responsibility for the launch of several attacks against army posts in north Sinai. In fact, the situation had become even more critical after former President Mohamed Morsi was ousted in 2013; following this event Sinai became the battlefield of local extremist/militant groups and security forces. The Egyptian armed forces and the police became the militants’ targets, with most attacks carried out by the Sinai Province. At present, this militant group represents the most active insurgent group in Egypt. It has been the cause of a number of deadly attacks, mostly in North Sinai, but also in the capital, Cairo, and other provinces.\textsuperscript{112} Wilayat Sinai, initially known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), has been active on the Sinai Peninsula since 2011 and joined ISIS in November 2014, changing its name to the current one. Although the group passed from attacking Israel with rockets to fight against Egypt's security services, since the oust of President Mohammed Morsi in 2013 the targets of the extremist group have been extended. More recently, the Sinai Province claimed responsibility for having fired a rocket at the MFO's air base at El Gorah on 3 September 2015 injuring four Americans and two Fijian peacekeepers. Notwithstanding the fact that the MFO has always been extremely exposed to the menace represented by the Sinai Province, this event, coupled with the general deteriorating security situation in Sinai, has alarmed

the US and has led its administration to reconsider various ways to protect troops increasing their number, equip them more heavily and withdrawing from MFO altogether, thus questioning the existence of the Force itself. Although the Camp David Accords, which put the basis for the following 1979 Treaty of Peace among Egypt and Israel, envisioned the presence of two American military units, the US can temporarily remove them in case of an imminent danger. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said that:

> The US is concerned over deteriorating security conditions in an area of north eastern Sinai where Egyptian security forces as well as civilian and military elements of the MFO, including the US military forces stationed at the MFO North Camp, are exposed to potential risk.

Throughout the last years, Sinai Province has increased in numbers, capabilities and sophistication, significantly endangering the MFO operation that, due to its mandate as peacekeeping force, is just lightly armed and cannot afford such a pressing menace. As David Satterfield, Director General of the MFO, stated recently:

> the security situation in the Sinai brings the parties and the MFO together to face conditions beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the Treaty of Peace and the 1981 Protocol establishing the MFO. The security circumstances in the Sinai today were unimaginable when the treaty and its protocol were drafted.

In the light of Sinai’s insurgencies, the MFO has enhanced and mediated a stronger bilateral cooperation between Israel and Egypt. Moreover it has played a role in securing an Israeli consent for the deployment of Egyptian troops and heavy

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113 *US may pull out Sinai force that helps keep Israel-Egypt peace*, Bradley Klapper and Julie Pace, The Times of Israel, 19 August 2015.

114 *Ibidem*


weaponry in Sinai to fight the militants.\textsuperscript{117} In fact, although the 1979 Treaty imposed troop limitations in each of the four zones dividing the Peninsula, it allows for mutual agreement among the Parties upon exceptions.\textsuperscript{118} In fact, over time, the two governments have developed a functional, cooperative relationship mediated and assisted by the MFO and, currently, they share a deep concern about the threat posed by the extremist militants of the Sinai Province among the region.

However, since \textit{Egypt and Israel will continue to need international military assistance and diplomatic engagement to address regional security threats over Sinai},\textsuperscript{119} MFO stability and effectiveness remain fundamental elements in order to counter the menace. \textit{In the immediate term, Washington and the MFO have responded by hardening the MFO's positions and focusing on force protection. Improved sensors and barriers as well as additional guard towers have been erected around MFO outposts over the past two years, and peacekeepers have received weapons upgrades in recent weeks}.\textsuperscript{120} Yet, among the American options there is still the possibility to withdraw US contingents from MFO for security reasons. This very unlikely decision would have a huge political consequence within MFO itself destabilising an operation that owes its creation and deployment to the massive US engagement and mediation.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{119} Ibidem
CHAPTER III
THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON: UNIFIL II

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) II is a multinational force of interposition redefined and inaugurated by the United Nations in August 2006, during the course of the second Lebanese-Israeli conflict. The UN created UNIFIL, for the first time, in 1978 with the Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426; its mandate was to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and help the Lebanese government in reestablishing its effective authority in the area. With Resolution n° 1701 of 11 August 2006, the UNIFIL II became operative; the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the Mission until 31 August 2007, and enlarged significantly the troop strength from an average of 2,000 units up to a maximum of 15,000. In addition, the mandate of the UNIFIL II was expanded; UNIFIL II peacekeeping mission still aims:

- to support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the actualization of the provisions contained within the Resolution;
- to facilitate the deployment of the LAF in South Lebanon until the Blue Line while verifying Israeli troops retirement from the region;
- to monitor the end of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel;
- to create proper conditions for the restore of peace and security;
- to assist the LAF in the deployment throughout the South until the border with Israel, consenting the complete retirement of the Israeli forces from the territories of Southern Lebanon;
- to assure the freedom of movement and of action to the UN personal and to humanitarian convoy;

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• to establish the necessary conditions for a permanent cease-fire and for its implementation;
• to assist the Lebanese government in the control of the borders in order to prevent the illegal entrance of arms.

The mandate given to the UNIFIL II is the most robust mandate given to a force operating in the Israeli-Arab theater\(^{124}\). It lies in a grey zone, also called “Chapter VI and a half”, between the peaceful settlement of disputes envisioned in Chapter VI and the military enforcement envisioned in Chapter VII of the UN Charter which gives the Security Council broader powers to take action against threats or breaches of peace\(^{125}\). In fact, the new Resolution states that UNIFIL can:

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\begin{align*}
take \text{ all the necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces,} \\
\text{and as it deems with its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind}\^{126}. \\
\end{align*}
\]

There is a mandate to use force only in case of self-defense and for resisting of attempts by forceful means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties\(^{127}\).

UNIFIL II operation is the result of a prolonged series of regional controversies characterising Lebanon and the neighbouring Jewish State. Since the end of the French mandate in 1946 over its territory, Lebanon has witnessed the occurrence of several conflicts along its borders. In 1948, it participated in the first Arab-Israeli war flanking Egypt, Jordan and Syria against Israel. Since then, relations with this latter have always been critical: the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat installed in the southern part of the country, the context of the Lebanese civil war that broke out in 1975 and, later, the presence of Hezbollah were all factors that increased drastically tensions along the border with Israel causing an incessant exchange of fire between Lebanon and the Jewish State.

\(^{124}\) Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community, Efrat Elron, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol.13 No.4 2007.


\(^{127}\) Israel, UNIFIL II, the UN and the International Community, Efrat Elron, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol.13 No.4 2007.
Map showing Lebanon and the First UNIFIL (UNIFIL I) Area of Responsibility. 
http://www.nationsonline.org/
3.1 History: from UNIFIL I to UNIFIL II

The history of UNIFIL II peacekeeping operation goes back to the UN Security Council’s Resolutions 425 and 426 of 1978 that, for the first time, established the force (UNIFIL I) in the wake of the Lebanese-Israeli war blown up few days before. In fact, during the 1970s, the relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to South Lebanon, after the Jordanian civil war, intensified the tensions along the border with Israel\(^\text{129}\). This crisis reached a peak when, on 11 March 1978, the PLO, that controlled the greatest part of southern Lebanon, launched a raid in north Israel, causing many victims among the Israeli population\(^\text{130}\). The Israel Defense Force (IDF) responded to the attack invading a vast portion of southern Lebanon on the night of 15 March in order to destroy PLO’s bases. The Lebanese government, which had no affiliation with the Palestinian forces protested to the UNSC against the Israeli invasion and called for an intervention of the United Nations. Hence, on 19 March 1978, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 425 and 426 in which it called upon Israel to cease its military action immediately and withdraw its forces from the Lebanese territory\(^\text{131}\). With these Resolutions, the UNSC established also the first UNIFIL mission, charging it with three defined purposes: confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area\(^\text{132}\). The first UNIFIL troops to monitor Israeli withdrawal and restore peace stationed in the area on 23 March 1978. By 1982, the PLO presence in South Lebanon had become increasingly powerful, with a large provision of arms and supported by the Syrian presence\(^\text{133}\). Over the following decades, UNIFIL continued to monitor the maintenance of the ceasefire. However, two major periods of escalated violence limited UNIFIL’s action in the territory. In 1982, because of a sharp increase of violence along the border, Israel invaded Lebanon and acted as an active belligerent in the Lebanese Civil War: with "Operation Peace for Galilee",

\(^{129}\) Israel-Palestine conflict from 1968 to 1988. www.grondamorin.com

\(^{130}\) UNIFIL background. www.un.org

\(^{131}\) Ibidem

\(^{132}\) Resolution 425 (1978) adopted by the Security Council at its 2074\(^\text{th}\) meeting, on 19 March 1978.

launched on 6th June 1982, Israel’s air force attacked PLO bases near Beirut. In response, the PLO bombarded several Israeli posts in Northern Galilee. Once the IDF had crossed the Lebanese border, after several guerrillas against the PLO, Arafat agreed that the PLO militia would have left Lebanon giving a truce to the hostilities and pushing the Israeli forces to withdraw to a 10 kilometer security zone in south Lebanon.

After Israel’s partial withdrawal, that took place in 1985, a new Shi’ite militant group and political movement, known as Hezbollah, which still maintains a large paramilitary force and a number of democratically-elected seats in the Lebanese parliament, became a new player in the war scene. In fact, on July 12, 2006, a frontier dispute between the Israeli Army and the armed wing of Hezbollah rapidly developed into a full-scale armed conflict, killing hundreds of civilians. The distinctive characteristic of the 2006 conflict relies in the confrontation between a state and a non-state entity, namely Israel and Hezbollah, a political organization that fights against the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon since 1968. The recent conflict broke out on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah started Operation True Promise with the launch of Katyusha rockets against the Israeli village of Zar’it, killing eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two of them, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. Israel responded immediately to the attack: on the same day, it launched the Operation Change of Direction characterized by a naval and air blockade of Lebanon, air strikes throughout the country and a major ground incursion into southern Lebanon along the so-called Blue Line.

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134 Ibidem
135 Ibidem
136 UN Peacekeeping: enhancing American interests. The UN interim Force in Lebanon.
141 The Blue Line is the Line of Withdrawal that was identified in 2000 by the United Nations in cooperation with Lebanese and Israeli officials for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) troops from Lebanese territory in conformity with Security Council
resolution 425. In fact, it was the line of deployment of the IDF before March 14, 1978, when Israel invaded Lebanon.

Map showing the Area of Responsibility of UNIFIL I. UN source: www.un.org.
Fighting between Israel and the Shi’ite group continued throughout summer 2006 inflicting a series of victims among civilians. The Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to allow a UN team to come to the area and mediate a cease-fire creating a buffer zone in the border with Lebanon and in order to contain Hezbollah’s rockets and raids while guaranteeing security for the Jewish population along the border with Lebanon\(^{143}\). He affirmed that Israel would have suspended its military actions only at three conditions: with the liberation of the two kidnapped soldiers, the suspension of rocket launch from Hezbollah and its total disarmament\(^ {144}\).

With the escalation of the hostilities, throughout the G8 of Petersburg of 16 July and the International Conference for Lebanon in Rome of 26 July, the International Community tried to find a solution to the Lebanese-Israeli crisis. Representatives of Italy and the United States, the United Nations, Canada, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the European Union (High Representative, Finnish Presidency, Commission), and the World Bank asked for the deployment of an International Force in Lebanon that would have been *urgently authorized under a UN mandate to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in providing a secure environment*\(^ {145}\). Hence, on 17 July, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, decided to deploy a multilateral force along the border between Lebanon and Israel for mediating the dispute. During the International Conference for Lebanon the Lebanese Prime Minister, Fuad Siniora, introduced a “seven points” plan through which he reminded the necessity of reaffirming the entire Lebanese sovereignty and through which he exhorted Israel to withdraw its contingent from Southern Lebanon in respect of the Blue Line and the Shebaa Farms area controlled by the UN\(^ {146}\) and which Lebanon claimed under its sovereignty. In the final declaration of the Conference, all the participants recognized

\(^{143}\) *Olmert: Operation will stop when Hizbullah disarms*, Israel News, 14 July 2006. 
\(^{144}\) *Ibidem* 
\(^{146}\) *The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: Understanding the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, Henrietta Wilkins, Routledge, 2013, p. 112. Israel occupied the Shebaa Farms during the Six Days War in 1967. At present, it still controls this region and manifests its will to come to terms and negotiate only with Syria but not with Lebanon.
the importance of a lasting, permanent and sustainable cease-fire of the hostilities.\textsuperscript{147} The participant countries stated that, in order to gain an effective Lebanese security, the government had to regain its authority and sovereignty all over the territory. They supported the efforts of the Lebanese government in achieving this purpose; at the same time, Lebanese population had to be protected and assisted and, with this aim, the participants admitted the Israeli proposal of creating a humanitarian corridor towards Lebanon that would have permitted flights to the international airport of Beirut. Hence, in the final declaration, the International Community agreed for the deployment of an international force under the UN that could accomplish these tasks. Throughout the course of the International Conference in Rome, hostilities picked again causing a bloodshed of civilians that led to a popular rebellion against the same UN quarter in Beirut. On 5 August, the US and France proposed a UNSC draft resolution and presented it on the following day to the Lebanese authorities. The draft resolution stated the following:\textsuperscript{148}:

- Full “cessation of hostilities, based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations”;
- Extension of the “control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory”;
- Full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1559, including the disarming of all armed groups in Lebanon;
- Unconditional release of Israeli prisoners, while “encouraging the efforts aimed at resolving the issue of Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel”;
- Re-opening of Lebanon’s airport and ports only for “verifiably and purely civilian purposes,” as opposed to an immediate lifting of the blockade;
- Deployment of an “international force” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to help implement a “long term solution”;

\textsuperscript{147} International Conference for Lebanon, Rome, July 26, Co-Chairmen Statement, \url{http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98981.pdf}

\textsuperscript{148} UNIFIL II: emerging and evolving European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East, Karim Makdisi & Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, EuroMesco Paper, 2009, p. 22.
- UNIFIL is to monitor the implementation of this resolution and to extend its assistance “to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons”.

The declaration made reference to some crucial points among which there was territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, on the basis of the international borders recognized with the general Treaty of the Israeli-Lebanese armistice of 1949, and the respect of the Blue Line. Moreover, under the terms of this draft resolution, UNIFIL was thus to be confined to solely a monitoring and humanitarian role, while a NATO-supported “international force” would have dealt with the task of disarming Hezbollah, implementing UNSC Resolution 1559, and guaranteeing security for Israel along the Blue Line\(^\text{149}\). Finally, the participants in the International Conference decided unanimously the establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government\(^\text{150}\). However, the final draft encountered the dissent of both the parties: on one hand, Lebanon complained the absence of an explicit provision demanding for a full and immediate Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon since its presence in the territory was considered illegitimate. On the other hand, Israel complained the lack of a reference giving to Hezbollah responsibility for the origin of the conflict. Eventually, on 11 August, the UN Security Council adopted with unanimity of vote Resolution n° 1701 through which it claimed a full cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and the support by Israel and Lebanon of a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to be based, inter alia, on full respect for the Blue Line by both parties and on security arrangements aimed at maintaining southern Lebanon free of military activities and weaponry (other than those of the Lebanese government and UNIFIL) and at the cessation of the sale and supply of arms to Lebanon, except as authorized by the Lebanese government\(^\text{151}\).

Moreover, in Article XI of the Resolution, the Security Council extended UNIFIL’s force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, hence, it was

\(^{149}\) Ibidem
\(^{150}\) Draft UN Lebanon resolution. www.bbc.com/news
increased to a maximum of 15,000 troops and its original mandate was extended to provide, inter alia, the following tasks\textsuperscript{152}:

- monitoring of the cessation of hostilities;
- accompaniment and support of the Lebanese army in its deployment throughout southern Lebanon; and
- assistance in ensuring humanitarian access to civilian populations and the return of displaced persons.

On 12 August the Lebanese cabinet approved unanimously the Resolution; the same did Israel on 13 August; on the following day, the hostilities ended and, from 16 August, the Israeli Defence Force started its withdrawal. At the same time, four brigades of the Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) were deployed in the South of Litani river. In this frame, UNIFIL II assumed its role of interposition force operating between IDF and LAF in the buffer zone bordered by the Blue Line and Litani river.

### 3.2 Hezbollah

Hezbollah, whose name literally means \textit{Party of God}, consists of a Shi’ite political group provided with a military wing that has been capable to affirm itself in the Lebanese political arena from the mid-1980s. In fact, it emerged during the Lebanese civil war lasted between 1975 and 1990 in the aftermath of Israel's invasion and occupation of 1982\textsuperscript{153}. Hezbollah issued its founding Manifesto in 1985 through which it affirmed its loyalty to Iran's supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It urged the establishment of an Islamic regime and called for the expulsion of external forces from Lebanese territory, as well as for the destruction of the neighbouring Jewish State\textsuperscript{154}. As the Manifesto says\textsuperscript{155}:

\begin{quote}
our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Who Will Keep the Peace? The Role of Peacekeeping in a Future Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accord}, Justus Reid Weiner, Avinoam Sharon, Michelle Morrison, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2010, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{154} ibidem

wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore, our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease-fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated.

By the 1990s, Hezbollah became the best-organized political phenomenon enjoying the largest base of popular support\(^\text{156}\). The growing consensus of the Shi’ite faction, which accounts for forty per cent of Lebanon’s total population, permitted Hezbollah to enter the Lebanese government as a political party in 1992 for the first time. In southern Lebanon Hezbollah controls about ten per cent of all Lebanese territory\(^\text{157}\), a portion of land where most Shi’a are concentrated. The organizational structure of the party is shaped as a hierarchical pyramid where the governing authority of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), which includes also a number of Iranian representatives, detains the whole decision-making power and directs several subordinate functional councils. The secretary-general Sheikh Hassan Sayyid Nasrallah, presides over the Majlis al-Shura since 1992 and functions as the group’s leader under the authority of the “jurist theologian” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader\(^\text{158}\). Five administrative bodies, namely the Executive Council, the Judicial Council, the Political Council, the Political Advisor, and the Jihad/Military Council, are organized around thematic responsibilities\(^\text{159}\); moreover, each functional council is in charge of several operational desks, each responsible for specific topics\(^\text{160}\). Nasrallah confirms that Hezbollah has four organizational levels, the top levels being more visible to the public, and the last level represented by the mujahidin or guerrilla fighters\(^\text{161}\).


\(^{159}\) *Ibidem*

\(^{160}\) *Hezbollah: Profile of the Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria*, Intelligence and Terrorist Information Center, Center for Special Studies, Special In-formation Bulletin (Intelligence and Terrorist Information Center, Center for Special Studies, 2003). www.terrorism-info.org.il

On the base of its statements and declarations, Hezbollah has always represented, since its birth, a proclaimed enemy and menace for the Jewish State. In this frame, the role of the UNIFIL remains only apparently a marginal one: even if in its mandate it is not explicitly mentioned, the force operates as a bulwark against Hezbollah protecting and ensuring Israeli security creating a buffer zone on Israel's northern border free of Hezbollah’s fighters. Surprisingly, only with the consent of Hezbollah, that is also politically represented within the Lebanese government, the UNIFIL deployment of forces could effectively take place\textsuperscript{162}. The \textit{Party of God} agreed on three conditions\textsuperscript{163}:

- the UN forces should have come only in support of the Lebanese army and never as an independent player;
- UNIFIL and the Lebanese army would not have directly confiscated Hezbollah’s weapons but only those illegally coming across the borders;
- UNIFIL’s mandate would have been limited to the area south of the Litani River and the force would have not expanded its operations to any other part of Lebanon.

Immediately, among the primary goals of the mission, the peacekeepers had to learn how to deal with the Shi’ite community and Hezbollah. In fact, realizing that Hezbollah was still a dominating force and ideology in South Lebanon, some UNIFIL contingents\textsuperscript{164} established their own discreet channels with the party, by-passing the UNIFIL headquarters\textsuperscript{165}. When Hezbollah was consolidating its presence in South Lebanon in the early 1980s pursuing an initially hostile attitude towards UNIFIL, contacts were established between the UN peacekeepers and the party to reduce misunderstandings and tensions. That commitment became permanent and even more effective when Hassan Nasrallah became Hezbollah’s leader in 1992\textsuperscript{166}. Contrarily to the Israeli public attitude that denounces such contacts established by

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{UNIFIL - Peacekeepers in the Line of Fire}, Timur Göksel, Published by Heinrich Boell Foundation, Beirut, 2007, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibidem}

\textsuperscript{164} The new, expanded UNIFIL was initially reluctant to come to terms with Hezbollah because important UN member states, such as the US and some other European countries, saw Hezbollah as a terrorist organization serving the interests of countries such as Iran and Syria.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{UNIFIL - Peacekeepers in the Line of Fire}, Timur Göksel, Published by Heinrich Boell Foundation, Beirut, 2007, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibidem}
UNIFIL with Hezbollah, the Israeli Defense Forces has encouraged the UN personnel to maintain these kind of contacts with the Party of God as the only way to avoid misunderstandings and further hostilities\textsuperscript{167}.

After the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon, in the aftermath of the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, one of the still open issues was the disarmament of Hezbollah, which was clearly stated by Article III of the UNSC Resolution 1559\textsuperscript{168}:

\textit{The Security Council}

... 

2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon;

3. Calls for disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;

...

The new UNSC Resolution 1701 does not explicitly reaffirm the necessity to disarm Hezbollah. In fact, UNIFIL’s purpose is to support the LAF in doing so through assistance on the ground and by training personnel. During an interview with the Italian journal \textit{La Repubblica} on 24 August 2006, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora clearly stated that he did not expect the multinational UNIFIL force to take part in disarming Hezbollah\textsuperscript{169}.

\textit{It is clear that the Lebanese army will carry out this mission. The multinational force is not supposed to do that and should not bother itself with it. Hezbollah is a political party represented in the government and it agreed to the seven-point plan presented to the UN by the Lebanese government. (...) I hope the (Lebanese) army will be the only military entity to be recognized by all residents of southern Lebanon.}

\textsuperscript{167} Ibidem
On 12 September, in a report on the implementation of Resolution 1701, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said\textsuperscript{170}:

\begin{quote}
I remain convinced that the disarming of Hezbollah and other militia should take place through a political process that will lead to the full restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon so that there will be no weapons or authority other than its own. The national dialogue has not managed so far to achieve a consensus on a political process and timeline for the full disarming of Hezbollah in the sense of an integration of its armed capacity into the Lebanese Armed Forces. I expect that the Government of Lebanon, pursuant to its decision of 27 July 2006, will define such a political process.
\end{quote}

Yet, the first Force Commander of UNIFIL II, the French Major-General Alain Pellegrini, stated on Monday 18 September 2006 that his force would have not been responsible for the dismantling of Hezbollah. Their main task, he said, was to ensure the neutralization of southern Lebanon that had not to be used as a base for attacks on Israel\textsuperscript{171}.

\begin{quote}
The disarmament of Hezbollah is not the business of UNIFIL. This is a strictly Lebanese affair, which should be resolved at a national level (…) Our mission is to have a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani (River) where there is no illegal army and from which you cannot launch hostile acts.
\end{quote}

Pellegrini said, referring to the UNIFIL II Area of Responsibility (AoR) between the UN-demarcated border with Israel and the Litani river. Notwithstanding the UNIFIL public abstention in disarming directly Hezbollah, the multilateral force has represented and still continues to be an important player operating as a bulwark

\textsuperscript{171} UNIFIL head restates: Group won't disarm Hezbollah, The Jerusalem Post, 18 September 2006 \url{www.jpost.com}
against the Party of God; its presence in south Lebanon remains a firm guarantee of protection and security to Israel against this enemy.

3.3 A new UNIFIL

Through Resolution 1701/2006, UNIFIL underwent a substantial transformation. Its deployment increased numerically with the possibility to engage from 4,500 blue helmets until 15,000 men and its mandate was extended\textsuperscript{172}. Today, the UNIFIL comprises over 10,000 military personnel from 40 countries and around 900 civilian national and international staff\textsuperscript{173}. Moreover, whereas UNIFIL I was a traditional peacekeeping operation observing, monitoring, reporting, maintaining the ceasefire and the withdrawal of forces, establishing buffer zones and operating as interposing force between two enemies, the UNIFIL II has increasingly evolved from a primarily military model of observing the cease-fire and the separation of forces to incorporate a complex model of many elements including military branch, international and local civilians working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace in the region\textsuperscript{174}. Hence, UNIFIL II is the perfect example of what we call today multidimensional peacekeeping\textsuperscript{175}. The implementation of UNSC Resolution n° 1701 has empowered the military strength of UNIFIL through the provision of heavy armoured vehicles, antitank weapons and antiaircraft radars. Moreover, the UNIFIL Area of Responsibility (AoR) was further extended up to the Litani river.

(…) notre zone d’opérations occupe maintenant l’entièrre entendue entre le Litani et la Ligne bleu…Notre nouveau domaine n’est finalement pas surdimensionné puisque nos effectifs, précédemment de 2,000, peuvent maintenant s’accroître jusqu’à un plafond autorisé de 15.000 militaires\textsuperscript{176}.  

\textsuperscript{172} UNIFIL background. www.un.org
\textsuperscript{173} UNIFIL HoM/FC meets Troop Contributing Countries, UN Security Council P5 and EU representative, 3 December 2015.
\textsuperscript{174} Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 2008.
\textsuperscript{175} Analysis on UNIFIL II: Three years after. UNIFIL II: how and until when will the “interim” continue?, Karin Kneissl, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009, p.5.
\textsuperscript{176} Un été del feu au Liban, Pellegrini A., Economica, 2010, p.127

This map shows the new operational boundary of UNIFIL II extended to the north-west Tyre region.
The AoR was divided into two land UNIFIL sectors, sector west under the Italian military leadership whose headquarters are located in Shama and the eastern one led by a Spanish brigadier general with headquarters in Camp Cervantes in Marjayoun. UNIFIL operation and Force Commander’s headquarters remained in Naqoura that serves as its strategic as well as the administrative HQ for both local and international staff\textsuperscript{178}. Meanwhile, the territorial waters of Lebanon went under the joint control of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) and the LAF Navy. The new UNIFIL mandate gives to the International Community a greater role to play in the diplomatic and political effort in order to push the Lebanese authorities to undertake their responsibilities more autonomously and effectively.

\textsuperscript{178} EU and Multilateral Peace Operations. Assessing options and limits, Brigadier General Santi Bonfanti, Center for High Defence Studies (CASD), 8 March 2012.

We have to forget the previous UNIFIL. The previous UNIFIL is dead and the new one is very different, UNIFIL Major General Alain Pellegrini told reporters. It is strengthened with stronger rules of engagement. We will have more people, more equipment. We have the possibility to use force to implement our mission.\footnote{IDF Prepares to Leave Lebanon in 10-14 Days, Amos Harel, Haaretz News, 3 September 2006. http://www.haaretz.com/}

One of the most important features of the new UNIFIL is the presence of strong European contingents whose infantry troops are self-sufficient, well trained and well equipped\footnote{UNIFIL- Peacekeepers in the Line of Fire, Goksel T., 2007, p. 3.}. Most important, the participation of these European nations, among which notably there are France, Italy and Spain in varying capacities and numbers, has given to the UNIFIL a strong political influence in the region too. In political as well as military terms, European nations were the driving force behind this UNIFIL “enhancement”\footnote{Europe rediscovers peacekeeping? Political and military logics in the 2006. UNIFIL enhancement. Alexander Mattelaer, Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009, p. 5.}. European troop contributors were interested in redefining the organisational set-up for the operation, introducing their own approach to plan operations while enhancing their leadership role in deciding on the deployment of their forces under the UN command\footnote{Europe rediscovers peacekeeping? Political and military logics in the 2006. UNIFIL enhancement. Alexander Mattelaer, Royal Institute for International Relations, 2009.}. Generally speaking, the importance of a European engagement in peacekeeping operations has always been stressed by the US administration and the UN itself.

\textit{Obviously it is not the job of the United States - or any government - to tell European countries how to maintain peace and security. But it is essential that each of us does our fair share (…)}\footnote{U.S. urges Europe to commit more troops to U.N. peacekeeping, Michelle Nichols, Reuters News, 9 March 2015. http://www.reuters.com/}

With these words, in March 2015 the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, publically called for a greater participation of European troops in peacekeeping operations. The EU engagement in regions such as the Middle East not only provides key logistical assets, intelligence capability and modern standards to the missions but also it boosts a political process and development in those areas.
affected by war. With respect to UNIFIL II, the significant presence of EU troops (in 2006, European countries provided more than sixty per cent of UNIFIL contingents) emphasises the overall status of neutrality of the Force since European countries are interested in maintaining good relations both with Israel and with the Arab world, thus promoting dialogue between the parties. It is very unlikely that this dialogue will definitely end the conflict, but, still, it represents a key element of stability in circumstances where communication between the parties is very limited. Still, *there is a common understanding among the UN Secretariat, Israel and Lebanon that the credibility of UNIFIL relies primarily on European political and military commitment*.

This coincidence between the military and the political is further emphasised through the (military) role of the Force Commander (FC) that corresponds with the (political) one represented by the Head of Mission (HoM). The FC/HoM of the UNIFIL is the operational commandant of the Force whose headquarters are located in Naqoura, southern Lebanon; he is normally responsible to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG, simply known as “UN Special Representative”) and has the task of exerting an operational control on the contingents of the contributing countries. The FC/HoM in the UNIFIL is submitted to the coordinating authority of the SRSG appointed in the country, that is to say the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL). The UNIFIL FC/HoM exerts his tasks through an enlarged military staff which is under the responsibility of his Chief of Staff (CoS). Moreover, the FC/HoM is flanked by a Department for Mission Support (DMS) that deals with logistic issues. Finally, the Department for Political and Civil Affairs (DPCA) liaises the FC/HoM with the governmental institutions of Lebanon and Israel. This Department has the important task of dealing with national dynamics working as an open channel of communication with the institutional and governmental leaders of both the countries. Hence, the DPCA is the office that maintains socioeconomic and cultural relationships with administrative entities, local organizations and associations involved in humanitarian assistance in southern

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187 *Ibidem*
Lebanon. Through the DPCA peacekeepers may conduct daily relations with the local population, institutions and political entities\textsuperscript{188}. Yet, the balance between politics and military is better emphasized by the periodic \textit{tripartite meetings} entertained between UNIFIL, LAF, and IDF officials\textsuperscript{189}. These moments, taking place in small neutral areas currently under the control of the Italian peacekeepers, provide a forum of discussion and a fundamental instrument of \textit{confidence building} among the parties that come together in order to take action for stabilizing the situation in southern Lebanon\textsuperscript{190}. Moreover, a set of UNIFIL liaison officers mediate everyday confrontations between both parties along the Blue Line in order to enhance confidence building and to prevent the escalation of small incidents into potential hostilities\textsuperscript{191}. Tripartite meetings take place in the UNIFIL's site at Ras Al Naqoura crossing; they are chaired by the FC/HoM and are attended by senior officers from LAF and IDF. Participants meet in a room empty of journalists, third parties or reporters; each Party sits giving his back to the other country and does not speak directly to this latter's representative but only through the FC/HoM of UNIFIL who refers the content of the speech to the other. Usually this forum is intended to discuss about the implementation of relevant provisions of Resolution 1701, the Blue Line demarcation, air and ground violations along with ongoing issues in order to minimize the scope for misunderstandings and facilitate a relation of reciprocal trust between the parties to the conflict.

3.4 Maritime Task Force (MTF)

In order to implement its mandate as defined by Resolution 1701, UNIFIL carries out a range of activities across its Area of Responsibility, between the Litani river in the north and the Blue Line in the south; among these activities there are day and night-

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{The future of UNIFIL.} Thesis given from Prof. P. Ferrara following his consent.


\textsuperscript{190} One of the most relevant outcomes of the tripartite meetings, which underlines the political, military and civil joint effort of the mission, is the Blue Line demarcation process. At present, the official border between the two rival countries does not exist. The blue line is not the international boundary line but it represents the Israeli line of withdrawal from Lebanon that took place in 2000.

time patrols\textsuperscript{192}. Since 15 October 2006, a naval component started to support the Lebanese Navy in monitoring the country’s territorial waters, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing the unauthorized entry of arms or related material by sea into Lebanon\textsuperscript{193}. This force, whose establishment provoked the removal the Israeli naval blockade\textsuperscript{194}, became known as the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF), that still represents the only naval force in UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, in September 2006, Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora had requested the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to provide a Naval Task Force in order to prevent the unauthorized entry of arms or related material by sea into Lebanon\textsuperscript{195}. He demanded that the force patrolled the outer six miles of the territorial waters in close cooperation with the Lebanese Navy and LAF until the Lebanese Naval and Security Forces would have been able to fulfil these tasks on their own\textsuperscript{196}. In fact, in his letter, the Prime Minister underlined the limits of Lebanon’s current naval capabilities for patrolling the country’s 200 kilometres of coastline to secure maritime borders. Therefore, MTF was created as \textit{Commander Task Force 448} representing the first Naval Task Force ever to take part in a United Nations peacekeeping mission\textsuperscript{197}. Since 29 February 2008, the command of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force was transferred to the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) that, led by Italy, since that time operated under a United Nations’ mandate\textsuperscript{198}. In order to accomplish its tasks, the MTF operates in the Area of Maritime Operations (AMO) along the entire coastline of Lebanon that stretches westward up to forty-three nautical miles into the Mediterranean Sea\textsuperscript{199}. \textit{The first 12 nautical miles from the Lebanese coastline constitute Lebanese territorial waters, beyond which are international}

\textsuperscript{192} UNIFIL Operations. \url{www.unifil.unmissions.org/}
\textsuperscript{193} UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. \url{www.unifil.unmissions.org/}
\textsuperscript{194} On 13 July 2006, Israeli warships blocked Lebanese ports in order to hinder the transfer of "terrorists and weapons to the terror organisations operating in Lebanon". \textit{Israel imposes Lebanon blockade}, BBC news, 13 July 2006.
\textsuperscript{195} The interception of vessels on the high seas: contemporary challenges to the legal order of the oceans, Efthymios Papastavridis, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{196} Maritime security operations and an convention on the law of the sea requirements and capabilities the un view, presentation of Rear Admiral Joese Leandro MaritimeTask Force Commander, \url{http://eu2013.ie/media/eupresidency/content/documents/maritimeseminarpresentations/REAR-ADMIRAL-LEANDRO-Session-IV-b.pdf}
\textsuperscript{197} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{198} UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. \url{www.unifil.unmissions.org}
\textsuperscript{199} Maritime Task Force’s role in UNIFIL. \url{www.unifil.unmissions.org}
waters. MTF Units conduct continuous surveillance of merchant traffic, particularly along the approach corridors to the three main harbours of Lebanon: Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon\(^{200}\). The MTF has two main tasks. First, to establish a naval presence and surveillance over the Area of Maritime Operations patrolling the international and territorial waters offshore the Lebanese coast, with priority to the Lebanese territorial waters, in support of the Lebanese Navy, in order to detect any illegal traffic outward and toward the country\(^{201}\). Second, to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), including identification and, within the Lebanese territorial waters, stopping/diverting or referring suspect Merchant Vessels for inspection by Lebanese authorities\(^{202}\). Moreover, the LAF Navy might charge the MTF with the task of inspection of a suspect vessel. Substantially, the long term objective of MTF is to provide the LAF Navy with enough capabilities in order to assume, by itself, maritime security responsibilities. Since its establishment in October 2006, a total of fifteen countries have contributed to the MTF: Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey and, at present, UNIFIL-MTF comprises naval units from Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, Greece, Indonesia and Turkey\(^{203}\).

3.5 Mine Action Coordination Centre for South Lebanon (MACC-SL)

Years and years of wars have left Southern Lebanon full of dangerous unexploded mines that present a very high concern for the local population\(^{204}\). Therefore, once the Israel Defence Forces withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it left a huge number of uncleared landmines in the abandoned area of south Lebanon. Hence, the Mine Action Coordination Centre for South Lebanon (MACC-SL) was established within UNIFIL in July 2000 and, cooperating closely with the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC), it started clearing hundreds of thousands of mines and unexploded ordnance left behind by wars and occupation\(^{205}\). In 2009, MACC handed over the responsibility of the program to the LMAC and in 2011 the United Nations Mine

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\(^{200}\) Ibidem
\(^{201}\) Ibidem
\(^{202}\) Ibidem
\(^{203}\) UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. www. unifil.unmissions.org
\(^{204}\) The future of UNIFIL. Thesis given from Prof. P. Ferrara following his consent.
\(^{205}\) Mine and cluster clearance. www. unifil.unmissions.org
Action Support Team (UNMAST) was created in order to support and enable UNIFIL in implementing its mandate and to provide assistance to the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) in the form of resource mobilization for humanitarian mine action activities. UNMAST is responsible for supporting and enabling UNIFIL demining on the Blue Line and ensuring these activities are conducted in accordance to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)\textsuperscript{206}. Up to now, UNIFIL troops have been able to demine an area of 86.268 square meters and a battle area cleared of 4.677.529 square meters\textsuperscript{207}.

\textbf{3.6 Monitor, support and assist}

With the implementation of Resolution 1701 the mandate of UNIFIL II has been extended; the core mission of UNIFIL II is characterised by three major tasks: monitoring the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, assisting the Lebanese population as well as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stationed in the south of Lebanon in order to enhance their development and their gradual capability to control autonomously the AoR in which the blue helmets are deployed.

The first task is achieved through the monitoring activity within the whole Area of Responsibility (AoR) which extends for about 1026 km\textsuperscript{2}; here, UNIFIL monitors the crossing points on the Litani river, along the northern border, and ensures the respect of the demarcation line (the Blue Line) defined by the UN in 2000 along the southern border with Israel.

Furthermore, in order to avoid the exploitation of the Lebanese southern territories from where rockets are launched towards the Israeli northern region of Galilee, special Counter Rocket Launching Operations (CRLO) are conducted by UNIFIL together with LAF, \textit{during which troops jointly patrol a selected area by vehicle and on foot and establish temporary observation posts and checkpoints to stop and check vehicles and persons moving in the area, besides conducting searches of specific areas assessed as potential sites for launching rockets}\textsuperscript{208}.

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Ibidem}
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Ibidem}
\textsuperscript{208} UNIFIL ground operations. www.unifil.unmissions.org
All these activities aim at avoiding any possible smuggling of weapons within the Area of Responsibility and, at the same time, at preserving the south of Lebanon from any illegal armed presence.

The Maritime Task Force is another instrument at the disposal of UNIFIL through which the force has the possibility to monitor Lebanese territorial waters and secure its borders by permanently patrolling the country’s 200 kilometres of coastline along with the Lebanese Navy. The MTF operates within the Area of Maritime Operations (AMO), which comprises also an undefined portion of sea over the two territorial waters of Lebanon and Israel, to support the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing the unauthorized entry of arms or related material by sea into Lebanon\(^{209}\).

Moreover, in the light of the tragic and deadly exchange of fire between the LAF and the IDF, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary General underlined the need for UNIFIL to engage with both parties to further develop liaison and coordination arrangements for times of crisis, when there are breaches of the cessation of hostilities\(^{210}\). In this respect, the tripartite mechanism represents the primary tool for strategic liaison and coordination between UNIFIL and the parties. In fact, it is a credit to the parties that they have utilized the tripartite mechanism to de-escalate tensions and resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner\(^{211}\).

The second major task of UNIFIL is to support and assist the local Lebanese population. Although UNIFIL II, by its nature, is not a kind of humanitarian mission, the military and civilian personnel is strongly engaged in the development of many projects of civil-military cooperation\(^{212}\). This engagement is further enhanced through the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that, in the short and medium term, provide poor inhabitants with goods, services and infrastructure of first necessity fostering the economic and social growth of south Lebanon. In fact, the improving economic conditions create a safer environment,

\(^{209}\) Maritime Task Force’s role in UNIFIL. www.unifil.unmissions.org
\(^{210}\) Letter dated 12 March 2012 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Security Council, 12 March 2012. www.unifil.unmissions.org
\(^{211}\) Ibidem
\(^{212}\) Intervista al Comandante di UNIFIL, Generale Luciano Portolano, Salvatore Pappalardo, Difesa Online, 19 April 2015. www.difesaonline.it
lower social tensions and allow UNIFIL to work effectively in partnership and support of LAF in full respect of Resolution 1701\textsuperscript{213}. In this frame, the Civil Affairs branch (DPCA) has the important task of dealing with national dynamics working as an open channel of communication with the institutional and governmental leaders of both the countries. Hence, the DPCA is the office that maintains socioeconomic and cultural relationships with administrative entities, local organizations and associations involved in humanitarian assistance in southern Lebanon. Through the DPCA peacekeepers may conduct daily relations with the local population, institutions and political entities.

The third fundamental task of the Mission is to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL carries out this task by gradually transferring responsibilities to the LAF so that it assumes full and effective security control over UNIFIL’s area of operations in line with the UN Security Council resolution 1701\textsuperscript{214}. To this end, UNIFIL has been conducting regular joint training and exercises with LAF, such as joint exercises in artillery live firing, medical evacuation, natural disaster response and so on. At the same time, UNIFIL continues to urge the international community to further intensify its material and technical assistance to the LAF\textsuperscript{215}. It is important to gradually establish the autonomy of the Lebanese Armed Forces not only for their full control of the AoR and of the Lebanese territorial waters, but also in order to move the country towards a permanent ceasefire. In this regard, the instrument of the Strategic Dialogue between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces acts as a means to strengthen not only the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume greater security responsibilities in southern Lebanon and Lebanese territorial waters but also as a means to enable the Lebanese Armed Forces to move towards a permanent ceasefire\textsuperscript{216}.

Hence, as we have seen, the coordinated work of UNIFIL and LAF, along with the surveillance of the AoR and territorial waters, the mechanism of tripartite meetings, the demarcation process, the strategic dialogue and all those activities enhancing the process of confidence building well represent the efforts of the whole Force, thus, of

\textsuperscript{213} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{214} UNIFIL ground operations. www.unifil.unmissions.org
\textsuperscript{215} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{216} Letter dated 12 March 2012 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Security Council, 12 March 2012. www.unifil.unmissions.org
the International Community, to make local institutions and authorities capable and autonomous enough to regain the internal sovereignty and unity of Lebanon in spite of the numerous divisions among clans, sects and political affinities characterising the country.

3.7 Italian contribution

Although Italian contribution to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon began with UNIFIL I in 1979, with the implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006) the participation of Italy within the mission increased significantly. Our country flanked from the outset the process of negotiations and the following adoption of the Resolution on 12 August establishing the new UNIFIL II Force. Specifically, the left-centrist Government of Romano Prodi took the important political and diplomatic initiative of hosting the International Conference for Lebanon held in Rome on 26 July 2006. In this occasion, Italy co-chaired the Conference with the US\textsuperscript{217}. Another important political initiative was undertaken on 7 September of the same year, when the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Massimo D’Alema, met Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Tel Aviv. In fact, in early September, Israel had manifested its uncertainty in lifting air and sea blockade in Lebanon\textsuperscript{218}; during this meeting, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs succeeded in managing the lifting offering an Italian Navy vessel to patrol Lebanese waters until a German-led Maritime Task Force would be deployed. The operation concretely started when Israel accepted the offer, and Italian vessels Garibaldi, San Giorgio, San Marco, San Giusto and Fenice constituted the Interim Maritime Task Force in support of the Lebanese Navy\textsuperscript{219}. Israel definitely lifted the air and naval blockade on 2 October 2006.

As regards the Maritime Task Force, Italy assumed the responsibility of patrolling the Lebanese coast on 29 February 2008, when Germany handed over the command

\textsuperscript{217} The UNIFIL II Mission in Lebanon: Italy’s Contribution, Lucia Marta, Real Instituto Elcano, 4 September 2008. \url{http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/}

\textsuperscript{218} Israel had imposed the air, land and sea blockade shortly after the 34-day war against the Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah erupted on July 12. Israel lifting blockade of Lebanon, USA Today, 9 June 2006. \url{http://www.usatoday.com/}

\textsuperscript{219} National prerogatives in multilateral peacekeeping: Italy in Lebanese perception and Rome’s role within UNIFIL II, Marina Calculli, p. 201-214. \url{http://cdlm.revues.org/7565}
of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force to the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) led by Italy (which assumed for three times the command of the MTF).

Italy participates in UNIFIL II as part of Operation Leonte. On 14 October 2015 the Army Brigadier General Franco Federici took the command of the Western Sector of UNIFIL and of the Italian Joint Task Force in Lebanon. This latter is composed of:

- the Command of Sector West of UNIFIL allocated in Millevoi base in Shama; this sector comprises units of France, Armenia, Brunei, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Tanzania, Serbia and Estonia.
- the Administrative Center of Superintendency (CAI) stationed at the base of Shama;
- ITALBATT task force that contributes with other nations’ battle groups to control the Blue Line and the territory of southern Lebanon in assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces;
- ITALAIR task force;
- a Combat Service Support Battalion (Shama) that provides logistical support to the western sector;
- a Combat Support Battalion (Shama) providing direct support to the sector west through the technical unit;
- a Sector Mobile Reserve (Shama).

As of today, Italy provides 1,070 peacekeepers to the Force and it is the second contributing country with the second largest contingent of the UN peacekeeping mission only second to the Indonesian one. The command of the entire mission from February 2007 was in the hands of the Italian Major General Claudio Graziano who took the leadership of the mission after the French General Alain Pellegrini. Except for the short command of the Spanish General Asarta, lasted from 28 January 2010 to January 2012, the UNIFIL II mission has always been in Italian hands, first with General Paolo Serra and then, from 24 July 2014, with General Luciano Portolano, the standing FC/HoM of UNIFIL II. Through its leadership, Italy has been maintaining its role and prestigious mandate within the Force. Thanks to its long

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lasting commitment within the peacekeeping operation, Italy has received several times the UN Secretary General’s honours and the International Community’s recognition of its excellent work in the field.

3.8 New challenges

The security environment in south Lebanon has always been a very complex and difficult theatre of contrasts and hostilities that UNIFIL is intended to address and to constantly mitigate through soft-power means of dialogue and negotiations. Challenges to the stability and to the resilience of a ceasefire in south Lebanon are several; violations of Resolution 1701, the internal situation of Lebanon, the presence of Hezbollah and, more recently, the menace represented by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are some of the elements compromising the stability of the country. Indeed, instability within the country would mean for UNIFIL II countering a huge impediment to the accomplishment of its mandate, causing a probable collapse of the Force itself. Generally referring to Blue line violations, land crossings and missile attacks from one region to the other still characterise south Lebanon everyday life. Serious firing incidents along the Blue Line have caused several victims among civilians, LAF and IDF soldiers and, eventually, among UNIFIL peacekeepers.

For instance, on 28 January 2015, Lance Corporal Francisco Javier Soria Toledo of Spain was killed while deployed at a UN position near Ghajar during a serious fighting incident along the Blue Line. In fact, six rockets launched towards Israel from the vicinity of Wazzani north of Maysat in the UNIFIL II AoR caused an IDF’s response returning artillery fire in the same general area and cost the Spanish peacekeeper’s life.

When strikes from one side to the other cross the Blue Line, UNIFIL is in charge of mediating the exchange of fire between the Parties through dialogue with the respective authorities in order to avoid an escalation of the hostilities and restoring the truce. Even more recently, on 4 January 2016, two IDF vehicles were attacked south of the Blue Line in the area of Sheeba Farms. Hezbollah, who still fights

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221 UNIFIL Press Statement on today’s incident along the Blue Line, 4 January 2016. www.unifil.unmissions.org
against the Israeli occupation of this zone\textsuperscript{222}, has claimed responsibility for the attacks leading to the IDF armed response, shelling across the Blue Line towards the Area of Responsibility.

As usual in these cases, Major General Luciano Portolano immediately took contact with both Lebanese authorities and IDF officials \textit{urging both sides to exercise utmost restraint in order to prevent any escalation of the situation}\textsuperscript{224}.

\textsuperscript{222} Since Israel withdrew from South Lebanon on May 25, 2000, the Shebaa farms - on the southwest ridge of the Hermon mountain range, an area occupied by Israel in June 1967 as part of the Golan Heights - have become a new territorial bone of contention between Israel and Lebanon. The area, which is 14 kilometres in length and one to two kilometres in width and consists of some 14 agricultural properties, has become the major battlefield between Hezbollah and Israel. According to the official Israeli stance, the area is an integral part of the Golan Heights and should be negotiated with Syria, if and when peace talks are resumed. Lebanon, however, supported by Syria, claims the area is an integral part of South Lebanon, and should have been included when Israel withdrew from Lebanon. \textit{Understanding the Shebaa Farms Dispute: Roots of the Anomaly and Prospects for Resolution}, Palestine-Israel Journal, \url{http://www.pij.org/}

\textsuperscript{223} Major General Luciano Portolano, Commander of UNIFIL Mission in southern Lebanon, renders the military honours to the Spanish Peacekeeper Francisco Javier Soria Toledo killed in January 2015. UN website

\textsuperscript{224} UNIFIL. Press Statement on today’s incident along the Blue Line, 4 January 2016. \url{www.unifil.unmissions.org}
The Syrian crisis, which is protracting since 2011 in the wake of the Arab Spring, is another element that is having a huge impact on the internal situation of Lebanon and that indirectly influences the working of the Force. Although the Baabda Declaration issued by the National Dialogue Committee on 11 June 2012 aimed at maintaining Lebanon's neutrality and dissociation from regional conflicts, especially the Syrian crisis, the influx of Syrian refugees coming into Lebanon remains a threat to the country’s stability. This flux, coupled with the political vacuum characterising Lebanon, has further complicated the internal situation of the country and has indirectly threatened the working of UNIFIL in the southern part of Lebanon. In fact, although the Force remains territorially quite detached from the central government, its activities are eventually influenced by the overall situation that the country is witnessing.

Moreover, in addition to the continuous violations of Resolution 1701, the incidents along the Blue Line and the consequences of the Syrian crisis, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS – represents a new threat in the region grav ing on Lebanon and on UNIFIL’s responsibility to maintain the ceasefire and stability. As Major General Luciano Portolano said during an interview, ISIS represents a menace at the entire global level, thus even south Lebanon cannot avoid this danger\textsuperscript{225}.

Hence, in order to deal effectively with any menace, UNIFIL has enhanced its measure of control of the territory and of Lebanese territorial waters in order to hinder any kind of jihadist infiltration in the AoR. All these activities are conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces that along with the government, are primarily responsible for the security and stability of the area. On the base of the Security Council’s decision that extends the mandate of UNIFIL II for one more year, until 31 August 2016, the mission has been renewed on the basis of the new geopolitical situation in the region, the level and the type of the ongoing threat\textsuperscript{226}.

\textsuperscript{225} Intervista al Comandante di UNIFIL, Generale Luciano Portolano, Salvatore Pappalardo, Difesa Online, 19 April 2015

\textsuperscript{226} Intervista al Comandante di UNIFIL, Generale Luciano Portolano, Salvatore Pappalardo, Difesa Online, 19 April 2015.
Lebanon today is a hope. If this country enters into war, the whole region would lose that hope\textsuperscript{227}.

With these words, the ex UNIFIL Major General Paolo Serra has underlined the importance of Lebanon’s stability within the region and the necessity for UNIFIL to enhance or at least maintain its strong capability of deterrence against threats to peace that might menace the internal situation of the country and the overall regional security.

\textsuperscript{227} Il generale Paolo Serra: i caschi blu dell’UNIFIL il più forte deterrent ad un attacco del Califfato in Libano, Stefano Vaccara, La Voce di New York, 5 February 2015. http://www.lavocedinewyork.com/
CHAPTER IV

LESSONS LEARNT

The historical and strategic analysis of the MFO and the UNIFIL II provides us with some clear characteristics and features for comparing the missions. While apparently differences between MFO and UNIFIL II seem to exceed the analogies, it is important to highlight which are the similarities between them and the analogies that provide us with an interesting framework of analysis and a deeper evaluation of each peacekeeping operation.

4.1 Differences

One of the most evident differences that distinguishes MFO from UNIFIL II are the numbers in terms of deployment, financing and troop contributing countries that characterise each mission and that prove a smaller “dimension” of the MFO compared to the one of UNIFIL II.

As far as the former mission is concerned, at present the MFO consists of a military personnel of nearly 1700 men belonging to twelve contributing nations (Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, the Republic of the Fiji Islands, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay). The US, Colombia, and Fiji provide the greatest amounts of personnel, followed by Italy and Canada. The MFO budget in the last year (from 2014 to 2015) totalled USD 91 million, a part of which is evenly shared among the US, Egypt and Israel; the rest derives from Norway plus other external donors not contributing with personnel. After UNIFIL II underwent a series of changes within its structure and deployment, it became the most longstanding and the largest UN peacekeeping operation accounting for a total strength of 11.352 peacekeepers including uniformed/troop personnel (10.483), civilian personnel (869), international civilians (279) and local civilians (590) from 40 troop-contributing countries.²²⁸

With an approved budget of USD 506,346,400 million for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016\textsuperscript{230}, UNIFIL operation represents by far one of the most expensive UN peacekeeping operations stationed in the Middle East. Whereas the MFO mission can be considered a traditional peacekeeping operation that operates as observation, interposition force and transition assistance, UNIFIL II has increasingly evolved from a primarily military model of observing the cease-fire and the separation of forces to incorporate a complex model of many elements including, along with troops and military personnel, international and local civilians working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace in the region, hence becoming a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation.

Another difference between MFO and UNIFIL II is due to the different nature of the parties to the dispute in each case. More precisely, MFO represents a force of interposition between two state-actors, Egypt and Israel, whereas UNIFIL II interposes itself between Israel and a non-state actor, namely Hezbollah. This latter might create greater obstacles to UNIFIL II in the assessment of strategies and

\textsuperscript{229} Source: MFO website. \url{http://mfo.org/en/mfo-in-numbers}

\textsuperscript{230} UN General Assembly. Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016, Sixty-ninth session, Fifth Committee Agenda item 148, Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. \url{http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/69/24}
measure for carrying on its own mandate. In fact, Hezbollah proves to be a rather “difficult” subject to deal and dialogue with because it is built on ideologies and creeds that go far beyond the peaceful purposes of the Force itself. One of the main contentious that still characterises the relation with Hezbollah is whether UNIFIL II has the mandate to disarm the group. Notwithstanding the fact that the UN has more than once stated that is not the UNFIL task to disarm directly the group but rather a Lebanese government matter, Israel on the other side continues to protest against the UN accusing it of failing to implement the Resolution 1701 and of not reporting on the smuggling of weapons into southern Lebanon\textsuperscript{231}. Hezbollah, its relations with Syria and Iran strongly continue to menace Israel and to represent one of the main factors of antagonism between this country and Lebanon.

Another element that distinguishes MFO from UNIFIL II is the presence of European contingents within each respective Force. Whereas at the onset of MFO only four western European countries, Britain, France, Italy and The Netherlands, announced in November 1981 that they would have provided units for the Multinational Force, EU Member States started immediately to play a leading role in contributing troops and personnel to the more robust peacekeeping force of UNIFIL II born in 2006\textsuperscript{232}.

As regards to the MFO, the European Foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict (European Political Cooperation - EPC) has had to cope from the outset with three structural weaknesses\textsuperscript{233}: 1) the EPC provided for a loose coordination of national foreign policies; 2) the ten members of the European Economic Community did not possess enough political and military instrument to conduct multilaterally or unilaterally infield interventions; 3) the Middle East conflict around the late ‘70s and the beginning of the ‘80s was still conceived as a superpower context\textsuperscript{234}. Above all, the EEC countries were divided on the issue of participating within a multinational operation and intervening in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In that period, some governments, most notably the French one, agreed to maintain better alliances with


\textsuperscript{232} UNIFIL II: emerging and evolving European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East, Karim Makdisi & Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, EuroMesco Paper, 2009, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{234} Ibidem
Arab countries and to support the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) instead of becoming guarantees of an Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement. Hence, most of them did not take part in the MFO mission. On the other hand, there is no doubt that UNIFIL II has become a European-led UN operation\textsuperscript{235}. During the following years, the European Union has increasingly intervened in conflict and post-conflict situations throughout the Middle East committing itself in supporting the various efforts in the peace process and pushing for a just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine through means of soft power to conflict resolution and peace-building\textsuperscript{236}. UNIFIL II was thus seen by many in the EU as both an opportunity to demonstrate its increased commitment to the region and as a potential test case for intervention in other parts of the Middle East, including Palestine\textsuperscript{237}. This strong European participation in UNIFIL II implies an evident political influence within the region; from the onset of UNIFIL II operation, European troop contributors were interested in redefining the organisational set-up for the mission, introducing their own approach to plan operations while enhancing their leadership role in deciding on the deployment of their forces under the UN command\textsuperscript{238}. Moreover, EU commitment within the Force emphasised the neutrality and impartiality of UNIFIL II towards the parties to the conflict, since European participants were neither on the side of the Arab world nor on the side of Israel; on the contrary, they were more interested in maintaining an equidistance from Lebanon and Israel and good relations with both the countries.

4.2 Analogies

MFO and UNIFIL II were both stationed in the Middle East, a region that has always undergone a series of extensive international peacekeeping efforts throughout the past six decades: in 1948, the UN dispatched its first ever peacekeeping mission in the Middle East, namely the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Thereon and still today, the Middle East has constantly been theatre of

\textsuperscript{235} UNIFIL II: emerging and evolving European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East, Karim Makdisi & Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, EuroMesco Paper, 2009, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{237} Ibidem
UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, *the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict meant that there was an invariable need for impartial observers to monitor cease-fire lines and border transgressions as well as to physically separate between the warring sides*\(^{239}\). This implies a common scope in the mandate of both the operations that similarly aim at maintaining peaceful relations among the parties to the dispute and that, specifically and indirectly, aim at providing security for the newborn Jewish State as well as international security within the region.

Although there are contrasting views, from a general perspective we can maintain that both MFO and UNIFIL II represent two cases of important and successful peacekeeping operations in this region. My assumption derives from the consideration of four main features that distinguish successful operations from unsuccessful ones. Basically, MFO and UNIFIL II are succeeding in their scope because of the following existing conditions\(^ {240}\):

- cooperation and support of the parties to the dispute;
- political support of a portion of the international community, including the two superpowers or, at least, the support of the United States;
- a clear, defined and realistic mandate and
- sufficient freedom of movement for the force and the observers in order to carry out their responsibilities.

As long as all these features persist, missions are likely to succeed in their working. Although incidents and violations to the Treaty and of Resolution 1701 have occurred, both the missions still represent a fundamental source of stability in the respective regions. For instance, in a letter dated 31 July 2014 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, it is stated that\(^{241}\):

\[\text{UNIFIL continues to play a crucial role in ensuring peace and stability in southern Lebanon, as well as full respect for the Blue}\]

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\(^{240}\) Multinational peacekeeping in the Middle East, Robert B. Houghton & Frank G. Trinka, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1985, p. 3.

\(^{241}\) Letter dated 31 July 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1 August 2014. 
Line by both Lebanon and Israel. Recent incidents of rockets fired from southern Lebanon towards Israel and of retaliation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) across the Blue Line are cause for concern. Between 11 and 16 July 2014, at least 11 rockets were launched from the UNIFIL area of operations towards Israel in five separate incidents. Five of the rockets hit Israel. IDF retaliated on all occasions with several rounds of artillery or illumination fire across the Blue Line towards the launching areas. In addition, on 11 July 2014, the Lebanese armed forces found and dismantled two rockets set to launch towards Israel. No casualties or significant damage were reported from either side. In each instance, UNIFIL immediately engaged with IDF and the Lebanese armed forces to urge them to exercise maximum restraint and cooperate with UNIFIL in order to prevent a further escalation of tension and to restore the cessation of hostilities.

That is why the mandate of both MFO and UNIFIL II have been constantly protracted and renewed. Another factor that can contribute to improve the quality of an operation might be the existence of relevant passed experiences in the same region that have prepared the ground for the most recent ones. In both cases, the peacekeeping missions had been preceded by previous operations and did not start ex novo: MFO was backed by UNEF I and UNEF II whereas UNIFIL II followed the first Interim Force in Lebanon coming to a substantial transformation from 2006. Hence, passed experiences greatly contributed to launch the following missions allowing them to be ameliorated and better reformed on the basis of past lessons.

Both MFO and UNFIL II are characterised by a defined and realistic mandate that is clearly stated, respectively, within the Protocol and the UNSC Resolution. The origins of the MFO lie in Annex I to the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel\(^2^4^2\), in which the parties called for a UN force of observers in order to supervise the implementation of the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Because of an unreached unanimity within the Security Council and, thus, without the possibility to deploy a UN force, the parties negotiated a Protocol in 1981 that established the

\(^{242}\) MFO website: About the MFO
MFO as an alternative mission defining its mission, its mandate and drawing its structure. Similarly, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1701 on 11 August, which came into effect on 14 August. Resolution 1701 led to the creation of a more “robust” UNIFIL in order to allow it to implement its new mandate of supervising the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, while also ensuring the deployment of the Lebanese army and return of effective state authority in southern Lebanon at the expense of non-state militias. As, stated above, the presence of a “legal” basis in both cases ensures a greater efficacy that is a consequence of a clear definition of the scope, the mandate and the structure of each mission.

The geopolitical environments in which both the missions operate is another interesting feature that is similar in MFO and UNIFIL II. Notwithstanding the fact that the MFO is facilitated by the geography and demography of Sinai since there is considerable space with which to separate the former combatants, the area is not free from third parties and other actors that undermine the working of the mission in Sinai. In fact, the Peninsula has become theatre of recent insurgencies due above all to the terroristic activities and the smuggling of weapons and militants to and from the Gaza Strip. Tensions started around October 2004 when the militant Jihadist group Tawhid wal Jihad (that means Monotheism and Jihad) launched a new era of insurgency inside Sinai. Other groups such as Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, Jund al Islam, Al-Takfir wa l-Hijra, Ansar al-Sharia and the Mujahideen Shura Council still represent Salafi jihadist menaces in the area of Sinai and Gaza compromising the security of the region and putting pressure on Egypt, Israel and the MFO peacekeeping force. In particular, since 2011 the salafist group of the Sinai Peninsula, initially known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem), operates on the Peninsula and joined ISIS becoming its affiliate in November 2014. Since 2011, and above all in 2014 and 2015, this armed group has claimed responsibility for several attacks to governmental posts in Northern Sinai; it has been

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243 UNIFIL II: emerging and evolving European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East, Karim Makdisi & Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, EuroMesco Paper, 2009, p.5.

involved in suicide bombings, drive-by shootings, assassinations and beheadings245 throughout the last three years. From its onset, UNIFIL II had to face a complex situation in southern Lebanon, not only because its zone of deployment amounted to about ten per cent of the country’s total territory246, but, above all, because of the difficult political situation afflicting Lebanon. This country continues to face numerous domestic challenges as well as increasing external threats. The presidential vacuum does not permit to address security and socio-economic challenges facing the country247. In a statement by the President of the Security Council of 19 March 2015, the SC:

expresses its concern at the ten-month stalemate in the election of the President of the Republic, which has undermined Lebanon’s ability to address the security, economic and social challenges it faces and has jeopardized the normal functioning of Lebanese institutions. The Council urges Lebanese leaders to adhere to Lebanon’s Constitution and National Pact and calls on all parties to act responsibly and put Lebanon’s stability and national interests ahead of partisan politics and to show the necessary flexibility and sense of urgency to apply mechanisms provided for by the Lebanese Constitution with regard to the election. It calls on the members of Parliament to uphold Lebanon’s long-standing democratic tradition and to convene to elect a President without further delay. (…)248

The unstable regional environment caused by the Syrian crisis, which is another factor bending Lebanon and putting further strains on the country, conflicts along Lebanon’s border with Syria and tensions in the border with Israel continue to undermine the overall stability of the country. The Syrian crisis affects the political, security and humanitarian situations in Lebanon; it has led to the intensification of

245 Sinai Province: Egypt's most dangerous group, BBC monitoring. www.bbc.com


248 Ibidem
political polarization in Lebanon\textsuperscript{249}. \textit{There are an estimated 1.2 million registered refugees in Lebanon, which represents close to one-quarter of the total population of the country. This is putting an enormous burden on Lebanon’s ability to secure the country and maintain its stability}\textsuperscript{250}. Hence, we can maintain that, in both cases, the environment in which MFO and UNIFIL II take place are very challenging and put several strains on the working of the missions.

If we look at MFO and UNIFIL II we would observe that both the forces share a rather similar organisational structure. First of all, the office of the MFO Director General resembles in its general functions that of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) whereas the MFO Force Commander can be linked to the military role (that is also political) of the UNIFIL HoM/FC. Secondly, MFO and UNIFIL II operations are also constituted by the same units: infantry troops, a naval patrolling unit and an air unit. As regards to the MFO, three infantry battalions (FIIBATT, COLBATT and USBATT), whose personnel is respectively provided by Fiji, Colombia and United States, are stationed in Zone C of the Sinai Peninsula and have the task of conducting military observation from the three different sectors assigned to each unit. Moreover, the Italian Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU - ITCON), based at the Egyptian port of Sharm el Sheikh, that monitors freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the southern entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba since 1982. Finally, a Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (AVCO) – that replace the previous Fixed Wing Aviation Unit (FWAU) – provides direct support to one of the three infantry battalions as well as liaison and reconnaissance flights for the FC; in addition to these tasks it also provides for search and rescue, casualty evacuation, transportation between North and South Camp and support to the CoU\textsuperscript{251}.

In parallel, after the UNSC Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006, the AoR of UNIFIL II has been enlarged (including the area of Tyre) and divided into two sections (Brigades): Sector East and Sector West. The command of this latter was assigned to

\textsuperscript{249} Il Libano e la crisi siriana: le lezioni di UNIFIL per l’Italia e la Comunità internazionale, Gianni Rufini, Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale, 2013.


\textsuperscript{251} Scarcely Heard Amid the Guns: An Inside Look at Canadian Peacekeeping, John Conrad, Dundurn, 2011, pp. 222-223.
the Italian contingent and composed of five units (Battle Group\textsuperscript{252}), known as: ITALBATT1 (infantry), ITALBATT2 (cavalry), FRENCHBATT (contingent of France), GHANABATT (contingent of Ghana) and ROKBATT (contingent of South Korea). The command of Sector East went under the Spanish contingent and was composed of four units: INDOBATT (contingent of Indonesia), INDBATT (Indian contingent), NEPBATT (Nepali contingent) and SPAINBATT (Spanish contingent)\textsuperscript{253}. Today, the UNIFIL comprises over 10,000 military personnel from 40 countries and around 900 civilian national and international staff\textsuperscript{254}. Moreover, since 15 October 2006, the naval component of the Maritime Task Force (MTF) started to support the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the country’s coastline and preventing arms smuggling through sea to Lebanon. This force still represents the only naval force in UN peacekeeping operations. Finally ITALAIR, established in 1979 as an aerial support unit for UNIFIL’s operations in south Lebanon, represents one of the oldest units in UNIFIL. After the July 2006 war in South Lebanon and the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701, ITALAIR became a task force operating directly under the UNIFIL Force Commander and is comprised of crew from three branches of the Italian Armed Forces: the army, the air force and the navy\textsuperscript{255}. Although violations of the Treaty and of Resolution 1701 to different extent have been numerous, the success of the MFO and UNIFIL II is in part due to the capacity of both the forces to maintain friendly relations between Egypt and Israel or between the Lebanese authorities and the Jewish State. For instance, through the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2236/2015 the UNSC:

\textit{commends the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon (...).}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{252} Battle Group: designation of an infantry unit at the level of battalion when deployed on operations. Under the command of such units there can be different units of combat support.

\textsuperscript{253} UNIFIL II – Libano. Le operazioni a livello tattico, Francesco Matarrese, Informazioni della difesa n. 1, 2009.

\textsuperscript{254} UNIFIL HoM/FC meets Troop Contributing Countries, UN Security Council P5 and EU representative, 3 December 2015.

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In concrete, it is through the presence of two liaison offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv that the MFO guarantees a good contact and coordination between the parties to the dispute whereas UNIFIL II can rely on the efficacy of monthly tripartite meetings with both the parties to the dispute and on the strategic dialogue with LAF officials. In the 2003 Annual Report of the Director General Arthur H. Hughes, the DG stated that:

"our successful mission execution reflects the determination of Israel and Egypt to insulate their mutual security commitments under the Treaty of Peace and the positive work of the liaison system from the political uncertainties of the region. This model liaison system linking the Parties and the MFO continues to do its job well. I cannot acknowledge often enough my great respect for the dedicated work and professionalism of both liaison organizations: the Egyptian Liaison Agency With International Organizations (LAWIO) headed by Brig. Hussein Ghobashi; and the Israel Defense Forces Liaison and Foreign Relations Division (IDFLFRD) headed by BG Ehud Dekel. Both began their tours as Chief of their respective liaison organizations this past spring. I want to give a special welcome to them on the occasion of their first Trilateral meeting.

Hence, this liaison system provides a mechanism for bilateral consultation between Egypt and Israel that, along with MFO mediation, has been fundamental for implementing the provisions of the Treaty and for ensuring that tensions along the border between the countries have remained contained.

On the other hand, with tripartite meetings, UNIFIL II can provide a forum of discussion, to address military-strategic issues, with Lebanese and Israeli foreign ministers as well as a fundamental instrument of confidence building among the parties coming together for stabilizing the situation in southern Lebanon. The tripartite meetings prove to be a vital mechanism for demonstrating the continued

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commitment to the existing security regime. During the tripartite meeting held on 25 November 2015 the Head of the Mission and Force Commander Major-General Luciano Portolano stressed that:

in the recent Security Council discussion, there was a positive recognition of the constructive role played by the tripartite forum in facilitating discussions and preserving stability in UNIFIL’s area of operations. (...) The Secretary-General underlined that UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements are a key element in preventing and defusing tensions along the Blue Line, and praised the parties for continuing to make use of them.

Therefore, we can maintain that in both cases the parties to the dispute are committed to a certain degree of cooperation that is better emphasised through the mediation activities of MFO and UNIFIL II, that provide a channel for consultation and pacific discussion of the parties in order to preserve stability in the regions while minimizing the likelihood of a conflict outbreak.

One last but not least important element that both MFO and UNIFIL II have in common is the active and relevant role of Italy in both the missions.

As far as the MFO is concerned, Italy represents the fourth largest contributor country of the force (whose headquarters are in Rome), in terms of personnel. Moreover, with the appointment of Major General Roberto Martinelli as MFO Force Commander between 2004 and 2007, Italy gained a prestigious mark of recognition to its national force in confirmation of its great commitment in Sinai. The Italian Navy provides support with three Naval Units Class Explorer that make up the Coastal Patrol Unit of the MFO, the only naval component of the force whose task is to ensure freedom of navigation and transit in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, in compliance with the provisions of Article V of the 1979 Treaty of Peace. The Italian engagement with MFO is based on a specific agreement (exchange of

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notes) repeatedly renovated after the first ratification with Law n° 967 of 29 December 1982. In Annex II of this agreement was stated that:

il Governo italiano fornirà alla MFO un Contingente navale che avrà una responsabilità primaria nell’effettuare pattugliamenti navali nello Stretto di Tiran e nelle sue vicinanze, come parte della missione della MFO per assicurare la libertà di navigazione attraverso tale Stretto, conformemente all’articolo V del Trattato di Pace. Tale compito sarà svolto effettuando pattugliamenti navali intermittenti attraverso tale via d’acqua internazionale e nelle immediate vicinanze, osservando e riferendo palesi interferenze nella navigazione.

Our country participates in this force since its establishment (1982) with personnel and equipment of the Italian Navy. The Coastal Patrol Unit of the MFO has its headquarters at the port of Sharm El Sheikh and consists of three Naval Units coastal patrol and a total of 78 men, who constitute the Tenth Naval Coastal Group (COMGRUPNAVCOAST 10). This Group consists of: a group with tasks on the ground providing logistical/administrative support to the naval component; three Naval Units class Explorer (Explorer, Sentinel and Lookout - ITCON) moored at the Italian naval base (Coastal Patrol Unit) in the port of Sharm El Sheikh and ensuring the mission assigned to Italy by the MFO. This consists on patrolling the area of responsibility, observing and reporting maritime, naval and military aircraft traffic and warning of any violation of the conduct. Units also provide support to local authorities in sea-search and rescue activities and operate in order to protect the marine environment.


Recently and more than once, the participation of Italy within MFO has been prized officially with some honours from the standing FC of the force. The individual and collective effort of the personnel of the Tenth Naval Coastal Group has been formally recognised through ceremonies during which it has been vested with eulogies and decorations in confirmation of its great commitment in patrolling Sinai waters.

Today, the leadership of the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon represents the most advanced experiment of Italian international military intervention. Italy took a leading role since the International Conference for Lebanon (on 26 July, 2006) that led to the establishment of UNIFIL II, then within the same UNIFIL II and finally in terms of development cooperation, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Lebanon. Following the approval of Resolution 1701 in 2006, our government led several times the MTF and, immediately, declared its availability to provide the mission with a contingent of at least 2,500 troops and to take responsibility for the command. Italy was assigned with an area of responsibility bounded by the coastal

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262 Il Libano e la crisi siriana: le lezioni di UNIFIL per l’Italia e la Comunità internazionale, Gianni Rufini, Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale, 2013.
263 Ibidem
belt in its western side and by the Litani river in its northern part, a very sensitive region since it has always been the traditional stronghold of Hezbollah. At present, with its national operation, namely *Operation Leonte*, Italy provides a contingent of about 1,100 soldiers to the international mission. From 14 October 2015, the army Brigadier General Franco Federici commands the Western Sector of UNIFIL and the Italian Joint Task Force in Lebanon. This latter is composed by:

- the Command of Sector West of UNIFIL allocated in *Millevoi* base in Shama; this sector comprises units of France, Armenia, Brunei, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Tanzania, Serbia and Estonia.
- the Administrative Center of Superintendency (CAI) stationed at the base of Shama;
- ITALBATT task force that contributes with other nations’ battle groups to control the Blue Line and the territory of southern Lebanon in assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces;
- ITALAIR task force;
- a Combat Service Support Battalion (base in Shama) that provides logistical support to the western sector;
- a Combat Support Battalion (based in Shama) providing direct support to the sector west through the technical unit;
- a Sector Mobile Reserve (based in Shama).

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The command of the entire mission until February 2007 was in the hands of the French General Alain Pellegrini who had already led UNIFIL I. Since then, it passed to the Italian General Claudio Graziano. Until 28 January 2010, the day he left his office at the Spanish General Alberto Asarta, Graziano managed to achieve many positive results to UNIFIL II, recognized by both the Israelis and the Lebanese, in terms of maintenance of the truce, support for the deployment of Lebanese forces and humanitarian support to the population. Except for the short experience of the Spanish General Asarta, ended in January 2012, the UNIFIL II command’s mission has always been in Italian hands, first with General Paolo Serra and then, from 24 July 2014, with General Luciano Portolano who represents the standing Force Commander and Head of Mission of UNIFIL II.

266 UNIFIL II, il contributo italiano, Alessandra Frusciante, Osservatorio sul Mediterraneo, Istituto di Studi Politici S. Pio V, 26 ottobre, 2015.
Therefore, in 2014 Italy renewed its prestigious mandate within UNIFIL II maintaining its leadership of the mission and awarding the UN Secretary General’s honours and the International Community recognition and acknowledgement of its excellent work in the field.

To sum up, Italy is highly represented within MFO and UNIFIL II: in both cases, it has been priced for its great contribute to the missions and its admirable performance and attitude, acting as a collective force enhancing the peace process and the stabilisation within the regions.

4.3 Conclusions

We have seen how, apparently, two different peacekeeping operations in the Middle East come out sharing more common features than what general expectations highlight. Moreover, thanks to the historical and strategic analysis drawn for each mission, we can come to conclusions and, possibly, we might better assert the efficacy and the future developments of MFO and UNIFIL II in their respective regions.

\[267\] UNIFIL II, Major-General Serra hands over the UN flag to Major-General Portolano. unifil.unmissions.org
Up to date, MFO has proved to be a non-UN successful peacekeeping operation, capable to maintain the truce between two historical enemies, Egypt and Israel. As we have seen in Chapters II and IV, the success of MFO rests above all on the underlying commitment of the Parties to the peace and support of the mission itself through the systems of equal funding and the annual trilateral meeting with liaison officers of both the parties\textsuperscript{268}. However, MFO's future is undermined by the deteriorating security situation in Sinai. In recent months, Wilayat Sinai, the jihadist faction that was known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis until it declared itself as a province of the so-called ISIS in November 2014, has increasingly threatened peacekeeping forces stationed in the Peninsula\textsuperscript{269}. The apex of the tensions occurred on 9 June of the following year, when the group fired a rocket at the MFO's El Gorah air base. On one hand, these ongoing circumstances might influence negatively the working of the MFO and its internal balance with contributing countries deciding somehow to defect from the force for security concerns. Recently, the US has also questioned the possibility to leave temporarily the Force due to peacekeepers’ high exposure to daily and potential risks; at present, nothing seems to have changed within the structure and the contingents of MFO and the defection of countries from the Force seem to be very unlikely. Positive relations among Egypt and Israel incentive most of the states to believe they are doing well in order to reach a permanent ceasefire within the region. With respect to the US, given America’s close relationships with both Egypt and Israel, it is very hard to foresee an unilateral change in US posture in Sinai but, at most, Obama’s administration might opt for finding ways to reinforce and sustain its peacekeepers providing them with additional equipment to better secure positions. Although, since its establishment, MFO has been facing many threats, throughout the years the Force has shown its capability to maintain the truce between Egypt and Israel albeit new challenges have occurred along their border. Both the parties recognise the key role played by MFO and deem any drawdown of its foreign troops as a possibility more for terroristic activities on the Peninsula to step forward. Troop contributing countries acknowledge the effectiveness of the

\textsuperscript{268} Improving the prospects for future international peace operations: workshop proceedings, DIANE Publishing, 1995, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{269} Securing the Sinai MFO without a US drawdown, Eric Trager, Policywatch 2478, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 August 2015.
Force and the important role it represents for the maintenance of peace between Egypt and Israel. Hence, although tensions now, more than ever, are representing a serious menace for the working of the force and the stability of the region, such new occurrences might push even further the cooperation between MFO, Egypt and Israel in order to address regional security threats, thus, preserving MFO’s fundamental role of peacekeeper within Sinai.

When it comes to UNIFIL II we should have in mind a successful model of peacekeeping operation that has produced a longstanding period of relative calm and stability in southern Lebanon, enjoyed by this latter country and Israel, after thirty long years of conflict. At present, the ISIS and the infiltration of terroristic cells represent a problem also for Lebanon and not only for the Sinai Peninsula. Therefore, on 21 August 2015, at the request of the parties, The Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon until 31 August 2016 without changes in deployment. The mission is renewed with objectives and instruments whose validity and effectiveness is evaluated on the base of the results achieved and on the evolution of the new geopolitical situation in the region, the level and the type of the ongoing threat. Hence, UNIFIL’s mission has been extended and its activities of territorial control have been strongly incremented in order to face the menace and the possibility of jihadist infiltration in the territory. Although the force is experiencing one of the most hard period since its establishment, UNIFIL II can rely on its strong capabilities and on the great consensus gained among the local authorities and the local community. Through the systems of demarcation of the Blue Line and the monthly tripartite meetings with LAF and IDF authorities the force enhances the process of confidence building within the region. Moreover, although the internal situation of Lebanon is characterised by social tensions and political instability, UNIFIL’s area of responsibility benefits of the positive impacts of the coordination and the strategic dialogue among the peacekeepers and the LAF. Yet, the provision of humanitarian assistance to the population through Quick Impact Projects puts UNIFIL II in direct contact with the local communities and contributes to increase its consensus among the country. Therefore, on the light of all its features, activities and characteristics,

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270 *Intervista al Comandante di UNIFIL, Generale Luciano Portolano*, Salvatore Pappalardo, Difesa Online, 19 April 2015.
UNIFIL II, supported on the ground by the contribution of forty national troops, empowered by the unanimous consent of the UN General Assembly as well as the consent of both Lebanese local authorities and of Israel, represents the essential backbone of a permanent ceasefire and a future independent Lebanon.
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Comparing peacekeeping operations in the Middle East: the cases of MFO and UNIFIL II

This thesis analyses and compares the current mandate, structure and daily activities as well as possible future developments of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping operation in the Sinai Peninsula with those of the second United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL II) in Lebanon. This research wants to highlight that, contrarily to general expectations, both the missions represent two cases of similar peacekeeping experiments in the Middle East sharing many common features and having similar prospects of existence. Why have I tackled the subject of peacekeeping? Why have I decided to compare, not only analyse, two operations? Why, among all the others in the same region, have I chosen MFO and UNIFIL II? These are some of the questions that immediately arise while dealing with this research. Firstly, peacekeeping is a very important field of research and of operations on-the-ground which characterises many states’ activities while intervening in some regions of the world where conflicts and hostilities have been taking place. In a world that is currently characterised by the presence of new international threats that menace the stability within and between states or regions – for instance the upsurge of terrorism, the issue of nuclear proliferation, regional illegal smuggling of arms, drugs and weapons – instruments of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and eventually of peacekeeping, in case where hostilities have already blown up, seem to represent very important tools and instruments at the disposal of the International Community that, through the use of soft power means such as dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy, can solve an ongoing conflict, preventing its escalation and, eventually, maintaining a permanent ceasefire.

Secondly, at the end of the thesis we will acknowledge the power of comparison as a fundamental tool of analysis. Comparing a limited number of units sharpens our perception of the cases analysed in detail and gives us a new and interesting framework of analysis by bringing into focus similarities and contrasts among different cases.

Finally, the reason why I have considered the independent MFO mission and the UN-led UNIFIL II mission lies on the efficacy, the continuity and the stability that, eventually, characterise both the mission classifying them amongst the most successful, still existing, peacekeeping operations in the Middle East.

In order to provide us with a more critic and a deeper evaluation of both the missions, I have divided the thesis into four chapters that gradually introduce us to the topic of the research.
Chapter I (What is peacekeeping?) consists on a general introduction to the study of peacekeeping operations, its novelty, its misconceptions and its characteristics. It will start by describing how the academic study and practice of security studies and conflict resolution is inserted in a context of new wars and regional complex theories characterising the post-Cold War era. It will proceed by explaining how peacekeeping is related to, but at the same time differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Successively, three other paragraphs will be devoted to the United Nations’ peacekeeping, the development of a multidimensional peacekeeping model and to the issue of efficacy of UN and non-UN led operations.

Chapter II (The Multinational Force and Observers - MFO) analyses in more detail the first peacekeeping operation: the MFO. It will examines its evolution from its roots until its establishment. It will describe the organization in terms of mandate, structure, troops’ disposition, treaty geography and financings. Finally, the last paragraph will be devoted to an analysis of the current geopolitical environment and of the new challenges charactering the Sinai Peninsula, where MFO is stationed.

Chapter III (The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon II – UNIFIL II) examines in detail UNIFIL II mission: in parallel with the previous Chapter, it will tackle the historic evolution of the operation ending up with an analysis of the current mandate, structure and daily activities of the force. This Chapter will also focus on the Italian contribution to the Force and will also address the ongoing challenges charactering the Lebanese territory and menacing the working of the mission itself.

Chapter IV (Lessons learnt) resumes the scope of the research: it will draw the differences and the analogies among MFO and UNIFIL II. At the end of this chapter, some further conclusions will be assessed. In particular, this final paragraph will provide us with a generic frame and consideration of each operation focusing on the efficacy and possible future developments of both MFO and UNIFIL II.

What is peacekeeping?
Although there is no formal doctrine or definition of peacekeeping, it is a common conception and shared view that peacekeeping refers to the deployment of national or multinational forces in order to control and prevent an escalation of an ongoing armed conflict between or within states. Even the UN Charter does not provide a concrete legal basis for peacekeeping since there is no explicit provision devoted to peace operations in the UN Charter. Thus, peacekeeping operations can be

located in the so-called grey zone, a halfway between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, respectively those dedicated to the pacific settlement of disputes and to peace enforcement. In fact, peacekeeping forces are only lightly armed and operate through means of soft power except in self-defence or when there is an impediment to the fulfilment of their mandate. Surprisingly, although conflicts and wars are features that are deeply rooted in human history (they are universal feature of human society\textsuperscript{272}), the field of study of peacekeeping is a rather recent one. In fact, only during the second half of the twentieth century a science of peace started to be developed. At the height of the Cold War, with the bipolar rivalry, there was an urgent need to find, once for all, a method of Conflict Resolution that could prevent the escalation of war and, eventually, resolve it. Hence, since then, Conflict Resolution (CR) has become a defined specialist field studying the phenomenon of war and analysing ways to bring it under control while fostering better relations between parties involved in the dispute. With the end of the Cold War, CR had to face the rise of new wars (civil wars and intrastate conflicts) and regional ones in areas such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, among African states and in the Middle East.

The study of new intrastate and regional conflicts throughout the post-Cold War period led to the development of new security studies such as the “Regional Security Complex Theory” (RSCT) developed by Barry Buzan in 1991. This latter gave a regional dimension to international security arguing that after the post-Cold War era international interactions were essentially regionalized and that there was a security interdependence characterising states’ relations. Conflict resolution is inserted in this new context of theories and studies; it broadly deals with the study of the phenomenon of conflict, analysing ways to bring it under control and, eventually, to resolve it. On the other hand, peacekeeping is a branch of the wider theory of CR and refers to the deployment of either national or multinational forces in a territory during a ceasefire in order to curb an ongoing conflict or to prevent the escalation of future hostilities between or within states. The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and the UN General Assembly President Lester Pearson defined in 1956 the three basic principles of peacekeeping\textsuperscript{273}:

- the consent of the conflicting parties;
- the non-use of force, except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate;

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}, Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, Tom Woodhouse, Polity, 2011, p.7.  
political neutrality (not taking sides), impartiality, (commitment to the mandate) and legitimacy (sanctioned and accountable to the Security Council advised by the Secretary-General).

Since its creation on 24 October 1945, the UN was charged with the task to prevent conflicts and their escalation by means of soft power; international peacekeeping still remains at the top of the agenda of the United Nations that has always represented the main actor undertaking peacekeeping operations. Contrarily to the Cold War period, since the ‘80s peacekeeping operations passed from being mostly traditional missions of interposition to become multidimensional operations taking place in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments\(^\text{274}\) and characterised by the involvement of military personnel, police and civilians capable to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, to enhance the political process and to create a secure and stable environment. Although the number of peacekeeping operations has increased sharply in the aftermath of the Cold War and interventions have been characterised by a transformation and an extension of their goals and purposes, scholars and practitioners of the matter have debated and questioned the results of these missions and have tried to address the issue of peacekeeping effectiveness. My argument is that, in most of the cases, peacekeeping has a large and statistically significant effect on the duration of peace after civil wars\(^\text{275}\). When peacekeeping operations have failed in reaching their purposes of long-lasting peace and collective security, these operations have represented, anyway, an important effort and precious source of aid to the internal situation, minimizing the risks of a war outbreak and bringing a further contribute to end the conflict.

**The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)**

The MFO has been representing since 1982 the third peacekeeping mission operative in the Sinai Peninsula. It supervises the correct implementation of the 1979 Peace Treaty concluded between Egypt and Israel through the mediation of the US without operating under the auspices of the United Nations\(^\text{276}\). Two previous experiments in the region took place through the deployment of UNEF I and UNEF II, two UN-led peacekeeping operations that were dispatched in Sinai between 1956 and 1979 respectively through the General Assembly Resolution n° 1001 (ES-I) in 1956 and the Security Council Resolution n° 340 of 1973. The MFO was born as an alternative to the UN force envisioned in the Peace Treaty; the UN force could not be established and deployed since it

\(^{274}\) *Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D., Peace Operations Training Institute, 2010, p. 31.


\(^{276}\) *MFO: peacekeeping in the Middle East*, Major Hofman Cornelis, Military Review, vol. 63, n° 9, 1983, p. 3.
did not reach the approval of all the permanent members within the UN Security Council. In a Letter addressed to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin annexed to the Treaty, the US stated it would have committed itself to form an alternative peacekeeping force, if the UN had not been able to do so. Hence, on 3 August 1981 Egypt, Israel and the US signed a Protocol establishing the MFO that became operative on 25 April 1982 (day in which Israel withdrew its last troops from the Sinai returning it to the Egyptian sovereignty). The Force mandate is to supervise the correct implementation of the 1979 Treaty of Peace and to prevent any violation of its terms. The MFO is further charged with four main tasks:\(^{277}\):

- operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B (within Zone C);
- periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of the Annex to the Treaty of Peace, to be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
- additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party;
- ensure the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran in compliance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.

The general and daily command of MFO is led by the Force Commander (FC) whose headquarter is stationed in the North Camp at El Gorah in northern Sinai and who supervises the MFO activities in the Area of Operation\(^ {278}\). The FC, whose mandate lasts for three years and can be renewed with the consent of the Parties, is appointed by the Director General (DG), whose Headquarter is located in Rome. Throughout a mandate of four years, the DG exercises policy and management direction over the functions of the MFO and supervises all its operations including legal and financial matters, contracts, procurement, facilities management, personnel and recruitment, welfare programs, troop rotation arrangements and program evaluation\(^ {279}\). The DG reports to the Parties on the developments relating to the functioning of the Force and, through the liaison offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv, the DG also mediates diplomatic contacts and political matters between Egypt and Israel and among Troop Contributing and Donor States. At present, the MFO is financed by the three signatory nations, Egypt, Israel and USA that contribute evenly, one third each one, to the MFO's annual budget. In addition, there are Donor States that contribute approximately to 6% of the MFO's operating revenue.


\(^{278}\) MFO: the multinational force and observers website. www.mfo.org

\(^{279}\) Ibidem
In order to provide maximum security for both the Parties after the final Israeli withdrawal behind the international boundary and in order to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, this latter divides Sinai into four security Zones:

- Zone A – bounded on the east by line A and on the west by Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez;
- Zone B – bounded by line B on the east and by line A on the west;
- Zone C – bounded by line B on the west and by the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east;
- Zone D – bounded by line D on the east and the international boundary on the west.

In these Zones the MFO has the task of observing and reporting that Egypt and Israel effectively comply with the provisions of the Treaty respecting their borders, the limitation of forces within each zone and peace. Zone C is the focus of MFO attention. Only the Multinational Force and Observers and Egyptian police are stationed in Zone C. The MFO monitors all traffic in, out, and within Zone C through a system of mobile patrols and aerial reconnaissance. Here, three MFO infantry battalions (FUJIBATT, COLBATT and USBATT) are deployed in order to conduct military observation from predetermined points. At present, twelve contributing countries (Australia, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, the Republic of the Fiji Islands, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay) provide personnel to make up the MFO's Force in different military elements. As far as the participation of Italy within the Force is concerned, since 1982 the Italian Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU - ITCON), based at the Egyptian port of Sharm el Sheikh, controls naval traffic patrolling the Mediterranean and monitors the freedom of navigation, accordingly to Article V of the Treaty of Peace, through the Strait of Tiran and the southern entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

As far as the geopolitical environment and challenges on the Peninsula are concerned, Sinai is currently experiencing a troublesome fighting against groups of Islamist extremists stationed over the region clashing with Egyptian military troops and security forces. Since 2011 and, above all, after the events of June 2013, the jihadist group of Wilayat Sinai (or Sinai Province), an affiliate of ISIS since November 2014, represents the most active insurgent group in Egypt causing a number of problems.

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280 MFO website. [www.mfo.org](http://www.mfo.org)
282 MFO website, contingents, troop contributing countries. [www.mfo.org](http://www.mfo.org)
of deadly attacks, mostly in North Sinai, but also in the capital, Cairo, and other provinces\textsuperscript{283}. In this frame, not only MFO has always been extremely exposed to the menace represented by the Sinai Province, but this threat, coupled with the general deteriorating security situation in Sinai, has also alarmed the US and has led its administration to reconsider its commitment within the Force thus questioning the existence of MFO itself. In the light of Sinai’s insurgencies, the MFO has enhanced and mediated a stronger bilateral cooperation between Israel and Egypt since both the Parties share a deep concern about the threat posed by the extremist militants of the Sinai Province and other groups among the region. Hence, MFO, more than ever, is experiencing a very tough situation which exceeds its power and capability of maintaining the ceasefire and ensuring peace on the Peninsula.

**The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon II (UNIFIL II)**

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) II is a multinational force of interposition redefined and inaugurated by the United Nations in August 2006, during the course of the second Lebanese-Israeli conflict. The UN created UNIFIL, for the first time, in 1978 with the Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426; its mandate was to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and help the Lebanese government in reestablishing its effective authority in the area\textsuperscript{284}. With Resolution n° 1701 of 11 August 2006\textsuperscript{285}, the UNIFIL II became operative; the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the mission until 31 August 2007, and enlarged significantly the troop strength from an average of 2,000 units to a maximum of 15,000. The core tasks of the new UNIFIL, *inter alia*, are: 1) monitoring the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, 2) assisting the Lebanese population and 3) assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stationed in the south of Lebanon in order to enhance their development and their gradual capability to control autonomously the Area of Responsibility (AoR) in which the blue helmets are deployed. With the implementation of Resolution 1701, the AoR was divided into two land UNIFIL sectors: sector west under the Italian military leadership and the eastern one led by a Spanish brigadier general. Meanwhile, the territorial waters of Lebanon went under the joint control of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and the LAF Navy. In the case of UNIFIL II, the role of the Force Commander (FC) corresponds with the one of the Head of Mission (HoM). The FC/HoM of

\textsuperscript{283} Sinai Province: Egypt's most dangerous group, BBC monitoring. \url{www.bbc.com} \url{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25882504}


the UNIFIL is the operational commandant of the Force, whose Headquarters is located in Naqoura, southern Lebanon; he is normally responsible to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (that is to say the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon – “UNSCOL”) and has the task of exerting an operational control on the contingents of the contributing countries. In order to implement its mandate as defined by Resolution 1701, UNIFIL carries out a range of activities across its Area of Responsibility (between the Litani river in the north and the Blue Line in the south); these activities include day and night-time patrols, establishment of observation points, monitoring of the Blue Line, and carrying out clearance of unexploded ordnance and cluster munitions.\textsuperscript{286} Since 15 October 2006, the naval component of the Maritime Task Force (MTF), that still represents the only naval force in UN peacekeeping operations, started to support the Lebanese Navy in monitoring the country’s territorial waters, securing the Lebanese coastline and preventing the unauthorized entry of arms or related material by sea into Lebanon.\textsuperscript{287} Once the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 leaving a huge number of unexploded mines, the Mine Action Coordination Centre for South Lebanon (MACC-SL) was established and it started clearing hundreds of thousands of mines and unexploded ordnance left by Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{288} Finally, the Force supports the civil population through \textit{Quick Impact Projects} (QIPs) and assists the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stationed in the south of Lebanon through the \textit{Strategic Dialogue} and through joint exercises and training activities enhancing their development and their autonomy to control the buffer zone\textsuperscript{289} where the mission takes place. Concerning the Italian contribution to UNIFIL II, today’s leadership of the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon represents the most advanced experiment of Italian international military intervention. Italy took a leading role since the International Conference for Lebanon (on 26 July, 2006) that led to the establishment of UNIFIL II, then within the same UNIFIL II and finally in terms of development cooperation, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Lebanon. Following the approval of Resolution 1701, our government led several times the MTF and, immediately, declared its availability to provide the mission with a contingent of at least 2,500 troops and to take responsibility for the command. Italy was assigned with a sector area bounded by the coastal belt in its western side and by the Litani river in its northern part, a very sensitive region since it has always been the traditional stronghold of Hezbollah. At present, with its national operation, namely \textit{Operation Leonte}, Italy provides a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{286} UNIFIL Operations. www.unifil.unmissions.org/
\item \textsuperscript{287} UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. www.unifil.unmissions.org/
\item \textsuperscript{288} Mine and cluster clearance. www.unifil.unmissions.org
\item \textsuperscript{289} It refers to the Area of Responsibility which is located between the Litani river and the Blue Line.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
contingent of about 1,100 soldiers to the international mission. Since February 2007, and with a very short Spanish leadership from January 2012 until January 2012, UNIFIL II command’s mission has always been in Italian hands, first with Major General Claudio Graziano followed by General Paolo Serra and finally, from 24 July 2014, with General Luciano Portolano who represents the standing Force Commander and Head of Mission of UNIFIL II.

When it comes to the security environment in south Lebanon, this country has always been characterised by several contrasts and hostilities that UNIFIL is intended to address and to constantly mitigate through soft-power means of dialogue and negotiations. Challenges to the stability and to the resilience of a ceasefire in south Lebanon are, above all, due to: violations of Resolution 1701, the internal instability of the country, the presence of Hezbollah and, more recently, the menace represented by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) compromising the stability of the region. Generally referring to Blue line violations, land crossings and missile attacks from one region to the other have always represented south Lebanon everyday life. Serious firing incidents along the Blue Line have caused several victims among civilians, LAF and IDF soldiers and, eventually, among UNIFIL peacekeepers. When strikes from one side to the other cross the Blue Line, UNIFIL is in charge of mediating the exchange of fire between the Parties through dialogue with the respective authorities in order to avoid an escalation of the hostilities and restoring the truce. The Syrian crisis, which is protracting since 2011 in the wake of the Arab Spring, is another element that is having a huge impact on the internal situation of Lebanon and that indirectly influences the working of the Force. Although the Baabda Declaration issued by the National Dialogue Committee on 11 June 2012 was intended to maintain Lebanon’s neutrality and dissociation from regional conflicts, especially the Syrian crisis, the influx of Syrian refugees coming into Lebanon remains a threat to the country’s stability. This flux, coupled with the political vacuum characterising Lebanon, has further complicated the internal situation of the country and has indirectly threatened the working of UNIFIL in the southern part of Lebanon. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS – represents a new threat in the region gravning on Lebanon and on UNIFIL’s responsibility to maintain the ceasefire and stability. As Major General Luciano Portolano said during an interview, *ISIS represents a menace at the entire global level, thus even south Lebanon cannot avoid this danger*\(^{290}\). Hence, in order to deal effectively with any menace, UNIFIL has enhanced its measure of control of the territory and of Lebanese territorial waters in order to hinder any kind of jihadist infiltration in the AoR. All these activities are conducted in

\(^{290}\) *Intervista al Comandante di UNIFIL, Generale Luciano Portolano*, Salvatore Pappalardo, Difesa Online, 19 April 2015
close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces that along with the government, are primarily responsible for the security and stability of the area.\textsuperscript{291}

\textit{Lessons learnt}

While apparently differences between MFO and UNIFIL II seem to exceed the analogies, it is important to highlight which are the similarities between them that provide us with an interesting framework of analysis and a deeper evaluation of each peacekeeping operation.

On one hand, among the most evident differences that distinguishes MFO from UNIFIL II there are the numbers in terms of deployment, financing and troop contributing countries that characterise each mission and that prove a smaller “dimension” of the MFO compared to the one of UNIFIL II. Moreover, whereas the MFO mission can be considered a traditional peacekeeping mission operating through observation, interposition and transition assistance, UNIFIL II has increasingly evolved towards a complex model of multidimensional peacekeeping operation including military branch, international and local civilians working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace in the region.\textsuperscript{292} Another difference between MFO and UNFIL II is the different nature of the parties to the dispute. MFO represents a force of interposition between two state-actors, Egypt and Israel, whereas UNIFIL II interposes itself between Israel and a non-state actor, namely Hezbollah. Moreover, whereas at the onset of MFO only four western European countries (Britain, France, Italy and The Netherlands) announced in November 1981 that they would have provided units for the Multinational Force, EU Member States started immediately to play a leading role in UNIFIL II since 2006\textsuperscript{293} bringing a strong political influence within the region and emphasising the neutrality of the mission, due to their interest in maintaining good relations with both Israel and Arab countries. Whereas in the case of MFO, EEC countries were divided on the issue of participating within a multinational operation and intervening in the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the other hand, \textit{there is no doubt that UNIFIL II has become a European-led UN operation}.\textsuperscript{294} On the other hand, MFO and UNIFIL II were both stationed in the Middle East, a region that has witnessed the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948. These events, and specifically those occurred along the Egyptian-Israeli border and those along the Lebanese-Israeli one, have led to the

\textsuperscript{291} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{292} Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 2008.
\textsuperscript{293} UNIFIL II: emerging and evolving European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East, Karim Makdisi & Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, EuroMesco Paper, 2009, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{294} UNIFIL II: emerging and evolving European engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East, Karim Makdisi & Timur Göksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth, EuroMesco Paper, 2009, p. 7.
stationing of impartial observers to monitor ceasefires within the respective regions. This has implied a common scope in the mandate of both the operations that similarly aim at maintaining peaceful relations among the parties to the dispute and that, specifically, aim at providing security for the new born Jewish State as well as international security within the region. In addition, although there are contrasting views, we can maintain that both MFO and UNIFIL II represent two cases of important and successful peacekeeping operations in this region. My assumption derives from the consideration of four main features that distinguish successful operations from unsuccessful ones. Basically, MFO and UNIFIL II are succeeding in their scope because they are characterised by: 1) cooperation and support of the parties to the dispute; 2) political support of a portion of the international community, including the two superpowers or, at least, the support of the United States; 3) a clear, defined and realistic mandate and 4) sufficient freedom of movement for the force and the observers in order to carry out their responsibilities\textsuperscript{295}. As long as all these features persist, missions are likely to succeed in their working. That is why both MFO and UNIFIL II operations have been constantly protracted and renewed throughout the years and still represent crucial instruments in ensuring peace and stability among the region.

Another interesting feature that is similar between MFO and UNIFIL II is the geopolitical environment in which both the missions operate: notwithstanding the fact that the MFO is facilitated by the geography and demography of Sinai since there is considerable space with which to separate the former combatants\textsuperscript{296}, the area is not free from third parties and other actors that undermine the working of the mission in Sinai. In fact, the Peninsula has become theatre of recent insurgencies due above all to the terroristic activities and the smuggling of weapons and militants to and from the Gaza Strip; similarly, UNIFIL II had to face from its onset a complex situation in Lebanon due to the continues and numerous domestic challenges as well as increasing external threats. Not only Hezbollah and the political vacuum are critical elements somehow destabilising Lebanon but also the consequences of the Syrian crisis are graving on the country. As regard with the missions’ structure, if we look at MFO and UNIFIL II we would observe that both the forces are constituted by the same units: infantry troops, a naval patrolling unit and an air unit. Moreover, the office of the MFO Director General resembles in its general functions that of the United Nations

\textsuperscript{295} \textit{Multinational peacekeeping in the Middle East}, Robert B. Houghton & Frank G. Trinka, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Dept. of State, 1985, p. 3.

Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) whereas the MFO Force Commander can be linked to the military role (that is also political) of the UNIFIL HoM/FC.

The success of the MFO and UNIFIL II is in part due to the capacity of both the forces to maintain diplomatic relations with the respective Parties. It is through the presence of two liaison offices in Cairo and Tel Aviv that the MFO guarantees a good coordination between the parties to the dispute whereas UNIFIL II can rely on the efficacy of monthly tripartite meetings with both the parties through which it provides a forum of discussion, to address military-strategic issues, with Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers as well as a fundamental instrument of confidence building. Hence, both MFO and UNIFIL II work as channels for consultation and dialogue for the parties in order to preserve stability in the regions while minimizing the likelihood of a conflict outbreak.

One last but not least important element that both MFO and UNIFIL II have in common is the active and relevant role of Italy in both the missions. As far as the MFO is concerned, Italy represents the fourth largest contributor country of the force (whose headquarters are in Rome), in terms of personnel. Moreover, with the appointment of Major General Roberto Martinelli as MFO Force Commander between 2004 and 2007, Italy gained a prestigious mark of recognition to its Armed Forces in confirmation of its great commitment in Sinai. The Italian Navy provides support with three Naval Units Class Explorer that make up the Coastal Patrol Unit of the MFO headquartered in the port of Sharm El Sheikh, the only naval component of the force whose task is to ensure freedom of navigation and transit in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqabah, in compliance with the provisions of Article V of the Treaty. Recently the participation of Italy within MFO has been prized officially with some honours from the standing FC. The individual and collective effort of the personnel of the Tenth Naval Coastal Group has been formally recognised and vested with eulogies and decorations in confirmation of its great commitment and results in patrolling Sinai waters.

Today, the leadership of UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon represents the most advanced experiment of Italian international military intervention. Italy took a leading role since the International Conference for Lebanon (26 July 2006) that led to the establishment of UNIFIL II. Following the approval of Resolution 1701 in 2006, our government led several times the MTF and declared its availability to provide the mission with a contingent of at least 2,500 troops. At present, with its national operation, namely Operation Leonte, Italy provides a contingent of about 1,100 soldiers to the mission. Since February 2007, and with the exception of a short period from January 2010 to

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January 2012, the UNIFIL II command’s mission has always been in Italian hands, first with General Claudio Graziano followed by Major General Paolo Serra and then, from 24 July 2014, with General Luciano Portolano. Therefore, in 2014 Italy renewed its prestigious mandate within UNIFIL II maintaining its leadership of the mission, awarding the UN Secretary General’s honours and the International Community recognition of its excellent work in the field.

We have seen how two apparently different peacekeeping operations in the Middle East come out sharing more common features than what general expectations highlight. Thanks to the historical and strategic analysis drawn for each mission, we might better assert the possible future developments of MFO and UNIFIL II. Currently, MFO’s future is undermined by the deteriorating security situation in Sinai. In recent months the Sinai Province has increasingly threatened peacekeeping forces stationed in the Peninsula. The apex of the tensions occurred on 9 June 2015, when the group fired a rocket at the MFO’s El Gorah air base. On one hand, these ongoing circumstances might influence negatively the working of the MFO and its internal balance with contributing countries deciding somehow to defect from the force for security concerns. In this regard, recently Obama’s administration, after the incidents of 9 June and those of 3 September 2015 where four American peacekeepers were injured, has questioned the possibility to leave temporarily the Force due to peacekeepers’ high exposure to daily and potential risks. However, given America’s close relationships with both Egypt and Israel, it is very hard to foresee an unilateral change in US posture in Sinai but, at most, Obama’s administration might opt for finding ways to reinforce and sustain its peacekeepers providing them with additional equipment to better secure positions. As far as other troop contributing countries are concerned, positive relations among Egypt and Israel push most of the states to believe they are doing well in order to reach a permanent ceasefire within the region; therefore, they recognise the effectiveness of the Force and the important role it represents for the maintenance of peace between Egypt and Israel. In fact, throughout the years MFO has shown its capability to maintain effectively the truce between Egypt and Israel notwithstanding the occurrence of new challenges along their border. Both the parties recognise this key role played by MFO and deem any drawdown of its foreign troops as a possibility for terroristic activities on the Peninsula to step forward. Hence, although tensions now, more than ever, are representing a serious menace for the working of the force and the stability of the region, paradoxically these new occurrences might push even further the cooperation between

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MFO, Egypt and Israel in order to address regional security threats, thus, preserving MFO’s fundamental role of peacekeeper within Sinai.

When it comes to UNIFIL II we should have in mind a successful model of peacekeeping operation that has produced a period of calm and stability in southern Lebanon, enjoyed by this latter country and Israel, after thirty long years of conflict. At present, the ISIS and the infiltration of terroristic cells represent a problem also for Lebanon and not only for the Sinai Peninsula. Therefore, on 21 August 2015, at the request of the parties, The Security Council extended UNIFIL mandate of one year with objectives and instruments based on the evolution of the new geopolitical situation in the region, the level and the type of the ongoing threat in order to face the menace and the possibility of jihadist infiltration in the territory. Although the force is experiencing one of the most hard period since its establishment, UNIFIL II can rely on its strong capabilities and on the great consensus gained among the Lebanese population and local authorities through the Strategic Dialogue entertained with the LAF and through QIPs for humanitarian assistance. Therefore, in the light of all its features and activities, UNIFIL II, supported on the ground by the contribution of forty national troops, empowered by the unanimous consent of the UN General Assembly as well as the consent of both Lebanon and Israel, represents the essential backbone of a permanent ceasefire and a future independent Lebanon.

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