



**FACULTY: POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**Chair: Security Studies**

**THE “POSITIVE PEACE” CONCEPT WITHIN  
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING  
A GALTUNIAN ASSESMENT OF UNITED NATIONS  
OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE, ONUMOZ (1992 – 1994)**

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*A mio nonno Pietro, che mi ha protetto e accompagnato in questi  
anni, dandomi la forza di reagire quando la soluzione sembrava  
mollare.*

*Da lassù, questo traguardo è nostro.*

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## Introduction

The idea which lies at the basis of my research question is that United Nations Peacekeeping could represent, nowadays, from my humble interpretation, one of the most effective instrument to solve national and international conflicts. This statement doesn't want to "carry the burden" of the absolute infallibility of the UN system. Conversely, it would like to demonstrate that, through the implementation of determined "*positive*" elements, the goal of a constructive conflict resolution could be easier to reach.

Since 1948, year when the Peacekeeping officially started its activities<sup>1</sup>, to the present days, the UN system for conflict resolution and peacebuilding has faced several missions, intervening in more or less complicated conflict situations. Year after year, the Peacekeeping could not escape the natural process of evolution. Pursuing the goal of adapting itself to the international conflictual conditions, Peacekeeping has undergone constant changes, not only from the point of view of intervention dynamics, but also in relation to the objectives to be pursued.

Our attention will be focused on a particular moment of Peacekeeping evolutionary process: the end of Cold War and Bipolarism. This historical moment represented a corner stone, not only for the international environment, but also for the transformation of UN structure and missions. The transition from Peacekeeping of 1<sup>st</sup> generation to the Peacekeeping of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation – re-adapted to better tackle new international conflicts – was, in fact, deeply inspired by the theories on conflict transformation elaborated by the Norwegian sociologist and political scientist, Johan Galtung. In the same way, should not be underestimated the bibliographic resources relative to the precursors of the author: sociologists and thinkers such as Sorokin, Richardson, Wright and Boulding will be analysed through their works and their thoughts, to better understand in which direction they have influenced the Galtunian Peace Research.

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<sup>1</sup> In 1948, the Security Council authorized the deployment of military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors – an operation which became known as the *United Nations Truce Supervision Organization* (UNTSO).

The Norwegian author will introduce the second key element of the thesis: the “*positive peace*” concept. This theory represented an astonishing innovation transforming years and years of peace research theory in implementable operational provisions (a crucial shift from theoretical to practical/military field).<sup>2</sup> This futuristic concept, which embodies the elements for the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace, was adopted by the UN Peacekeeping Department for the elaboration of missions’ mandates.

Following the Galtunian doctrine, I will try to detect the positive correlation between the theoretical innovation of *positive peace* and the UN Peacekeeping system.

Throughout the pages I will answer the core research question of my thesis: is it possible to demonstrate that the implementation of *positive peace* elements, through the UN Peacekeeping system, could contribute to build a stable and long-lasting peace conditions for countries coming out from conflictual situations?

Many other hypotheses will be examined following our path: is it possible to establish an effective relation among Peacekeeping and “*nonviolent conflict resolution*”, according to Galtung’s expression? If so, how and where does this correlation manifest itself? What is the philosophical foundation of “*positive peace*” and why does it represent such an innovation for peace research? But especially, could we consider *positive peace* as a realistic goal of the UN peacekeeping strategies?

With regard to the methodology I used to deal with the research questions, the duality of the subjects - *positive peace* and UN Peacekeeping - must be taken into account. For this reason, the thesis is primarily based, on the one hand, on texts and essays written by Johan Galtung. To build the theoretical structure of the research, in fact, I relied on Norwegian author’s works that deepen the concepts of peace research, positive peace, violence and conflict transformation, and that represent, *inter alia*, the pillars of his doctrine. In the same way,

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<sup>2</sup> Behind the *Positive Peace* concept lies a philosophical reflection that developed through centuries. “*De Civitate Dei*” by St. Augustine (written by 413 – 426), “*Perpetual Peace*” (1795), by Immanuel Kant, the papal encyclical “*Pacem in Terris*”, issued by Pope John XXIII on 11 April 1963, on nuclear non-proliferation. Several were the theories that approached the concept of a more complex peace, “positive” according Galtung.



should not be underestimated the bibliographic resources relative to the precursors of the author: sociologists and thinkers such as Sorokin, Richardson, Wright and Boulding will be analysed through their works and their thoughts, to better understand in which direction they have influenced the Galtunian Peace Research. The empirical section of the thesis, conversely, concerning the analysis of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, will make use of explicative graphic resources, data and statistics, and bibliographical references. Of crucial importance, then, will be the official documents, reports and provisions elaborated by the United Nations. To these resources, in addition, there will be several other references of contemporary authors and experts, that will help to render more clear the examination of the case study.

The thesis is, therefore, divided into four distinct, but interconnected, sections.

The first section, of historical nature, will introduce the main protagonist of the research: the United Nations Peacekeeping. Through the analysis of its history and structure, I will focus on the most important steps of evolution, such as the transition from Peacekeeping of 1<sup>st</sup> generation to Peacekeeping of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation, just after the end of the Cold War, or the Brahimi Report, in 2000, which institutionalized all previous provisions designed to improve the system's effectiveness. A closer look to the working mechanisms of this massive Organization will explain how it organizes and structures its missions' mandates. In the final paragraph, reminding the reader the existing possibility of failure, it will be synthetically analyzed the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), that went down in history as one of the worst failure of UN Peacekeeping. The UNMIBH's failure, whose fate was partially doomed by the lack of *positive peace* elements' implementation, will introduce the second core element of the research: the Johan Galtung's *positive peace* concept.

The second chapter, therefore, focuses on Johan Galtung<sup>3</sup> - sociologist, political scientist and "father" of peace research doctrine – and his innovative theoretical elaboration: the *positive*

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<sup>3</sup> Is really important, for me, to stress that the choice of the Norwegian author is not casual: his theories on nonviolent conflict resolution have been deeply influenced by his friendship with Danilo Dolci, sociologist and activist of non-violence. Dolci, known as the *Gandhi of Sicily*, promoted non-violent

*peace* concept. After the overview on Galtung's precursors and those theories which influenced him, this section will go deeper in the framework of peace research. The elements that give shape to the concept will be analyzed a) *theoretically*, focusing on content and using tables to facilitate the comprehension of the subject; b) *empirically*, linking the theoretical content to the practical implementation through the mandate of the UN mission.

The third part of the discussion represents the theoretical backbone of the thesis. Without this step it would be impossible to close the theoretical circle, exactly as it would be impossible to introduce the case study, which allows to give shape to the research question. The thesis will focus on the Galtunian concept of *violence* - considered by the author "the root cause of all tensions and conflicts" and the opposite of peace<sup>4</sup> - and *conflict transformation*. Violence, divided into *direct* (personal) and *structural* (social), represents the main cause of tensions and conflicts. This social status can be only transformed through a positive process. A process that must be driven by an approach that does not seek to eliminate conflict (inbuilt in human nature), but rather aims to transform it, leading society to evolution. *Positive peace* sets itself the goal of *conflict transformation* in order to eliminate violence from culture, often rebuilding societies and institutions that previously fueled conflicts.

Exactly as the theoretical part, also the practical one will be essential to understand the application of Galtung's theory, but also to achieve our final goal. In order not to let the words to remain just ink on white paper, I will try to demonstrate, through the analysis of a case study, that the UN Missions could be able to envisage the construction of a stable and safe reconstruction, if mandates are inspired to the *positive peace* provisions.

The last chapter of the research will be dedicated to the analysis of the United Nations Mozambique Operation (ONUMOZ), 1992 – 1994. The choice of this international mission is not casual, but has been driven by many reasons. 1) ONUMOZ was one of those operations

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struggles against Mafia and underdevelopment of the island. The choice is, then, related to a commonality of "origins" between the activity of Dolci and the place where I come from.

<sup>4</sup> The representation of violence as opposite concept of peace (not war then) is one of the greatest innovations introduced by Galtung. This idea shifts the focus from the conflictual framework to the social one.

implemented after the end of Cold War, in a country where the conflictual scenario mirrored the Bipolar division USA – USSR. 2) The Mozambican case was different because resulted in a civil war and not an international conflict; the goal of rebuilding and reuniting a country, fractured by internal contrasts, highlights the importance of implementation of *positive peace* in the event of a civil war. 3) ONUMOZ represented an innovation under the diplomatic point of view too, due to the fact that, for the first time, peace agreements were conducted, prepared and ratified in front of a third catholic entity, with a strong tradition in the country: the Community of Sant'Egidio (with the collaboration of the United Nations Secretary General). Finally, 4) I believe this case study could support my general idea according which, if the UN Peacekeeping has the possibility to intervene with appropriate means, taking inspiration and implementing the elements of *positive peace*, then it could be able to create the conditions of a solid and long-lasting peace. After that, the responsibility of building on these conditions “seeded” by the Organization belongs to the actor helped.

To conclude, I will carefully evaluate if the theoretical construction, built so far, is solid enough to stand by itself, and perhaps to be a starting point for future research hypotheses; I will be wondering if the case study is able to justify the framework developed in previous chapters. In a nutshell, I will be wondering if the general goal of the thesis has been reached.

In front of several challenges that the United Nations is going to face nowadays, increasingly large and even more complex to be addressed, I'll ask myself if, and how, Johan Galtung's theories, and methodologies, can fit in a modern implementation of Peacekeeping.

*“The UN wasn’t created to take  
mankind into paradise, but rather,  
to save humanity from hell.”*

Dag Hammarskjöld

# CHAPTER 1

## The United Nations Peace Keeping operations

In a world that changes every day, in which conflicts overcome national boundaries, becoming “international”, it is unthinkable to find the solution at the national level. Exactly due to this reason, in the post-Cold War era, International Organizations have increased their importance, taking over on states. International problems, on the other hand, require international solutions. The United Nations, who were founded (according to the UN Charter) to “*save future generations from the scourge of war*”<sup>5</sup>, faces, nowadays, this challenge as its most important function.

Focusing on the field of conflict resolution and peace research will be crucial not to lose sight of the goal of our research, but also not to get lost in the maze of the United Nations. For this reason, to be called into question will be the *UN Peace Keeping operations*, that in the last decades have represented the organization's operational arm.

The missions of the United Nations, thus, can be divided in three main activities:

- *Peacemaking*: prevention of conflicts and reconciliation (pre-conflict intervention phase);
- *Peacekeeping*: maintenance of peace (conflict phase and short term solutions);
- *Peacebuilding*: construction of peace (post-conflict phase and long term solutions);

Short term and long term conflict prevention find their principal duty in facing and avoiding, respectively, direct and structural violence (main causes of conflicts), with the aim to rebuild tougher bases for peace. On the other side, reconciliation and pacification operation are addressed to ongoing conflicts, trying to stop them in time, using tools such as diplomacy and mediation.

The term *peacebuilding* is more recent, and it defines those UN activities aimed at re-creating foundations for peace, and providing instruments to build on these foundations. Emblematic

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<sup>5</sup> Charter of the United Nations, Preamble. May 8, 1945, San Francisco.

examples of peacebuilding are: reinforcement of rule of law, a greater respect of Human Rights, technical assistance for democratic development and conflict resolution promotion.

In operational and financial terms, the biggest effort of the UN is focused on *Peacekeeping* operations. Until today the UN implemented 54 peacekeeping operations (all over the world) and 16 of these are still ongoing operations<sup>6</sup>. Obviously, models have changed during the years: while in its first stage peacekeeping followed a military model characterized by cease-fire and opponents' separations (nation-state era), in the current stage it has evolved into an integrated multi-shaped system (army, police, and civilian personnel) with the aim of peace construction, and consolidation.

In this chapter we will deepen the knowledge of UN Peacekeeping *apparatus*, putting it in relation with the themes we are going to analyse in the next chapters (violence and conflict transformation), but also with the idea of positive peace implementation.

### **1.1. Essence and Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations**

The peacekeeping operations represent, today, one of the most effective way to help countries destroyed by internal or external conflicts, creating conditions for a sustainable peace. From the headquarters, and from the field, the UN peace operators daily monitor and study the dynamics emerging from post-conflict situations, and assist all the parties with the implementation of peace agreement they have subscribed.

In this process, the UN Security Council receives, officially from the United Nations Charter, the power and the responsibility to undertake collective action aiming at the protection of peace. This is the reason why the international community ask the Security Council to authorize peace operations. Most of these operations are planned and led by the UN, using troops under the UN operational command. In complementary cases, when a UN direct involvement it's considered not appropriate nor excessive, the Council authorizes other

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<sup>6</sup> Data from United Nations Peacekeeping website, Past and Current peacekeeping operations.

Regional or International Organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the Africa Union (AU), the NATO or simply “coalition of volunteer countries”, to implement several maintenance functions or peace protection.

Inadequate political structures that fail to guarantee democratic and correct power shifting; increasing dissatisfaction or vulnerable populations manipulated and exploited; competition for scarce resources that increases anger and frustration among people; these are just few of the situations in which the risk of an armed conflict is rooted. All these elements ignite interstate or intra-state violence (whose boundaries are blurred), and a huge number of weapons of any calibre, available worldwide, pour flammable substance on this violence. An incredible human suffering is the result of this terrible fire, really often on a large scale, to which is added the threat to international peace and security, and destruction of economic and social life for whole populations involved.

Many conflicts today appear distant to those who don't “stand in the immediate line of fire”, so to push the idea that inaction could be better than intervention. But nations all over the world must always consider carefully the risks of the action compared to those of inaction. The failure of the international community attempting to solve conflicts peacefully, sometimes could transform these in even bigger conflicts that can destabilize neighbouring countries and spread to entire regions. In the last 30 years, but especially nowadays, due to flowing globalization, very few conflicts can be defined as “local”. More and more often, these conflicts generate a multitude of problems, such as illegal traffic of weapons, drug or human beings; terrorism; refugees' flows; environmental damages. The spill over effect is often perceived really far from the epicentre of the conflict.

The United Nations system, built on a 60-years' experience on the ground, constitutes one of the main tools to face these issues. Its legitimacy and universality are directly linked to the interaction of 191 Member States.

The UN peacekeeping operations are, furthermore, very effective also in relation to their cost, if only compared to both the huge expenditures related to conflict and to the price paid in

human lives. According to study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffle<sup>7</sup>, in terms of investments, UN peace operations cost much less than other forms of international intervention and their costs are shared more equitably among UN Member States.

Two further studies, carried out by UBC's Human Security Centre<sup>8</sup> and by the Rand Corporation<sup>9</sup>, demonstrated there is an inverse correlation between the implementation of peace operations and the number of war victims, both on short and long term. In particular, the Rand Corporation reported that the UN system provide the most appropriate institutional framework. The UN operations represent a highly effective tool to direct societies, emerging from conflicts, to the way of a stable peace, a democratic government and a solid rule of law. Alternative solutions do exist, obviously, but are far more expensive or far less effective.

## **1.2. Evolution of Peacekeeping: From the end of Cold War to our day**

Peacekeeping operations have never stopped evolving, since the first UN mission. Learning from success, as well from failure, they have been adapting to the changes that international environments have opposed them over years, increasing both the effectiveness, and the credibility of the UN system.

The traditional peacekeeping system was firstly developed during the period of Cold War, as a tool to ease tensions between parties and supporting conflict resolution between States. Operations were carried out by unarmed or lightly armed military personnel, belonging to a certain numbers of countries under the UN command, interposed between the conflicting parties. Peace operators were supposed not to fight war with war. As a general rule, they were deployed by the UN when the cease-fire had entered into force, and all the parties involved

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<sup>7</sup> Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffle, *"The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War"*, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 26 March 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Human Security report 2005 *"War and Peace in 21st Century"*, Human Security Centre, University of the British Columbia, Canada, 2005.

<sup>9</sup> James Dobbins, *"The UN's role in Nation-Building: from the Congo to Iraq"*, Rand Publications, 2005.



in the conflict had agreed with it. The UN troops duties were very basic if compared to the responsibilities of today: monitoring activities on the ground and draw impartial reports on the compliance of parties with the cease-fire, troops withdrawal and respect of peace agreement. These moves gave more time and larger negotiating space to diplomatic efforts facing causes of conflict.

It was at the end of the Cold War that the international situation fell in the total chaos. The requests for UN peacekeeping activities reported a huge increase due to civil wars, the crumbling of the USSR with its internal conflicts and related independence request of those states that lay under the Russian grasp. The Security Council, away from the Bipolarism, started implementing increasingly larger, and more complex operations, trying to realize peace agreements among actors of inter-state conflicts. Furthermore, peacekeeping ended out involving more and more non-military components to ensure sustainability. In 1992 the Department for PeaceKeeping Operation (DPKO) was established to answer the requests coming from all over the world.

Overall, the new missions have been characterized both by success, like in Mozambique<sup>10</sup>, (that will be analysed in Ch. 4) where the UN Peacekeeping activities helped, during the transition period, to build a solid peace, and by failure, such as in the Bosnia - Herzegovina case, often because of the underestimation of the situation. The most emblematic examples were reported at the end of the millennium: contemporarily to the missions in Cambodia and Mozambique, the Council agreed to intervene in Somalia and Bosnia Herzegovina, where no cease-fire nor a simple peace agreement were reached between the parties. The result was that many mandates, assigned to those missions, revealed unachievable with specific resources and the available human potential. In some other cases, Member States were unable to raise their voice and see their decisions implemented: it was the case of the *Srebrenica Massacre* (Bosnia Herzegovina, 1995) and of *genocide of Ruanda* (1994). These failures forced the UN to a self-examination period.

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<sup>10</sup> Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), *United Nations Operation in Mozambique*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumoz.htm>

After the two tragic events mentioned, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, required investigation to identify the underlying causes. The evaluations that came out highlighted the increasing necessity, of the UN, to improve its tools in conducting peacekeeping operations, both during and in the aftermath of the conflict. In particular, the increasing necessity to improve the rapidity in deploying troops, as well sustainable mandates that could reflect the necessities of the ground. The UN peacekeeping operations needed now to be disciplined by new rules of engagement, both for UN operators' security and for rescued civilians. This internal revolution had to provide a better planning and deployment of peace operations. In conclusion, changing international conditions required the United Nations to reinforce its program for civilians' protection and a greater respect for Human Rights.

The moment comes with the Brahimi Report.

### 1.2.1. *The Brahimi Report*

The revolution came at the beginning of the new century, after the publishing of two reports which highlighted the failure of the UN, in preventing the genocide in Rwanda, and in protecting the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina); following these reports, the former Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the *Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. The main objective of the panel was to assess shortcomings, deficits and weaknesses of the existing peace operations system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change. The Panel was composed by experts who had already worked in the field of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The Panel stresses the need for strategy, and support, in case of *preventive action* and *peacebuilding*:

*"(...) the Security Council and the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, conscious that the United Nations will continue to face the prospect of having to assist communities and nations in making the transition*

*from war to peace, have each recognized and acknowledged the key role of peace-building in complex peace operations.”<sup>11</sup>*

And so continues:

*“(...) the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) present to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.”<sup>12</sup>*

Further elements supported by the Panel were: a) stronger implementation of rule of law instruments; b) respect for human rights and national reconciliation as ultimate result for communities coming out from a conflict; c) consolidation of disarmament; d) “*quick impact projects*” that make a real difference in the lives of people; e) integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.

Coming to the *peacekeeping*, the attention of the Panel was focused on the need of a robust but, at the same time, elastic doctrine:

*“(...) impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. (...)”<sup>13</sup>*

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<sup>11</sup> UN report n. A/55/305-S/2000/809, “*Brahimi Report*” - Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), Pag 6, 21 August 2000.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> UN report n. A/55/305-S/2000/809, “*Brahimi Report*” - Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), Pag. 8, 21 August 2000.

The Panel highlighted the concept that the UN peacekeepers must be able to defend themselves, the mission components and the mission's mandate. Changing the engagement rules allows contingents not to cede the initiative. At the same time, UN operators who witness violence against civilians, should be authorized to stop it, respecting the UN Charter and principles.

One of the most important point the Panel focused on was that of the *reality* of the missions' mandates. In the past, the UN has often found itself unable to respond effectively to challenges because of "planning best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have exhibited worst-case behaviour.", the Report says. It means that in these cases, the mandates must clearly specify the authorization to use force, translated in bigger forces, better equipped to be a credible deterrent. This is the main reason why:

*"The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation. Security Council mandates, in turn, should reflect the clarity that peacekeeping operations require for unity of effort when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations."*<sup>14</sup>

Following the Report, the UN and its MS introduced several measures to improve peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. The Department of PeaceKeeping Operations (DPKO) obtained the authorization to enlarge the staff at its headquarters to bear operations on the ground. The DPKO reinforced the offices of Military Advisers and police.

The process of study and analysis of missions, reported in Panel, came alive in the form of a Unit of Case Studies whose aim was to analyse lessons learnt, both on the ground and in tactic, and advising missions on many issues such: a) the presence of women in various context; b) improving the conduct of peacekeepers, to increase their and rescued safety; c) planning disarmament programs together with demobilization of military installations and

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<sup>14</sup> UN report n. A/55/305-S/2000/809, "Brahimi Report" - Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), Pag. 10, 21 August 2000.

reintegration; d) developing tools and finding ways to implement the rule of law and all the related elements as the introduction of an institutional apparatus, police force for safety and respect of human rights<sup>15</sup>. The non-stop training has been strengthened to provide a significantly improved rapid response capabilities.

The DPKO re-organized the systems of agreements for the provision of troops to the UN (UNSAS), a list of the specific resources of the member states, including military personnel and specialized civilian personnel, the material and the equipment available for the UN peacekeeping. The UNPCRS (United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System) which replaced the old UNSAS (United Nations Standby Arrangement System) in July 2015, has been able to provide armed troops within 30 and 90 days, from the start of a new operation. Many advances have been made, finally, under the point of view of mandates, elaborated in a clearer manner, but above all, in a more realistic and adaptable perspective, more suitable to various international environments.

The DPKO has continued to work on one of the most significant and characteristic aspects of "*positive peace*": the development of concept of **permanent police force**, closely connected to integrated training programs on site, which will allow the peacekeepers to perpetuate a coherent and comprehensive training for all military, police and civilian personnel on the ground.

Since 2000, many of the reforms proposed by the Brahimi report, and supported by the states, have been implemented, significantly improving the method of planning, implementing and carrying on the peacekeeping operations. The long-term efforts that were initially undertaken, are bearing fruit now in places that seemed very far from being able to find a stable peace and a certain situation. Reforms continue with a special emphasis, concentrating particularly on so-called "integrated missions", based on the most important components in the field of peace-building (human rights, rule of law, humanitarian assistance). Also on the heels

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<sup>15</sup> All these elements, pillars of the concept of *positive peace*, can be clearly linked to the main aspects theorized by Galtung, in its principle of conflict transformation. It is no coincidence, then, that in the drawing up of the Brahimi report, there it is a Galtunian explicit influence.

incidence of sexual exploitation and abuse discovered in recent years, DPKO has initiated comprehensive reforms in the field of conduct, discipline and accountability of this problem.

### **1.3. “Orders from Above”**

71 operations accomplished from 1948 to this day, plus 16 current mission all over the world; more than 123 countries involved in peacekeeping missions; 106.506 troops deployed, only in 2016, among military personnel, military experts and police; 16.471 civilian personnel (international and local); 1.799 volunteers; total budget about \$8.27 billion plus outstanding contributions about \$1.6 billion, for almost \$10 billion.<sup>16</sup> Data and statistics speak clear: the United Nations are a massive international organization, which has the obligation to combine efficiency and promptness of action to save life, with the main objective to put an end to conflicts, or to create lasting peace conditions in those situations where it seems impossible. It is precisely because of his unmatched magnitude that anarchy must not lead an organization of this size. To prevent such a situation to be created, affecting the structure and efficiency of the United Nations, and more specifically of peacekeeping operations, the Security Council has been given the role of leader in the organization of peacekeeping, acting in cooperation with the General Assembly and Member States.

#### *1.3.1. The Security Council and the General Assembly*

Since the first day it was created, the Security Council has had the important responsibility, in reference to the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and common security. It is the Security Council which determine when and where a UN Peacekeeping mission should be deployed.

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<sup>16</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Fact Sheet*, [Http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml), 2015/2016.

Facing numerous challenges from all over the world, the Council responds using a case-by-case system (not one size fits all), and employing a large range of options and tools at its disposal. In the establishment of a new peacekeeping operation, the S.C. must take into account the relevance of many factors that influence the mission:

- The presence of a cease-fire in place according to which the parties have committed themselves to build a peace process with the aim to reach a political settlement;
- Whether a political goal exists and it may be reflected in the mandate;
- The possibility to formulate a real mandate for a UN operation;
- Whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the main parties or factions regarding the safety and security of UN personnel.

The Council creates and establishes peacekeeping operations by adopting resolutions, and gives them a mandate (a description of the mission tasks). To initiate a new mission, or to modify the mandate, 9 out of 15 Council's Member States must vote in favour. If, however, one of the five permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia) votes against the proposal, this automatically falls.

Under Article 25 of the Charter "*The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.*"<sup>17</sup> The Council has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated to implement.

### **General Assembly**

On the other side we find the General Assembly, which is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. It comprises all the 193 MS of the UN, and provides states with a multilateral forum where to discuss international issues, including

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<sup>17</sup> Charter of the United Nations, *Chapter V - The Security Council, voting and powers*, Article 25, Pag.7, San Francisco, 1945.

peace and security. In relation to peacekeeping missions, the General Assembly plays a key role because it deals with funding from MS:

*“1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.*

*2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly*

*3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.”<sup>18</sup>*

Due to the fact that all the UN MS share the costs of peacekeeping, the Assembly apportions these expenses on a special scale of assessments, taking into account the relative economic wealth of Member States, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, through its Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary), it approves and oversees the peacekeeping budget. This includes how specific field operations are funded and equipped, based on detailed submissions provided to it by the UN Secretary-General.

In the end, there is the DPKO that directs and manages the missions on behalf of the Secretary General, who is competent to report to the Council about the progress of these latter. Most of the missions are led by a Special Representative of the Secretary General. DPKO assists the latter in policies development and procedures for peacekeeping activities, drawing up recommendations to start new missions and manage those underway.

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<sup>18</sup> Charter of the United Nations, *Chapter IV -The General Assembly, functions and powers*, Article 17, Pagg. 5-6, San Francisco 1945.



1.3.2. *How much does peacekeeping cost? Who provides for “peacekeepers”?*

UN Peacekeeping operations are based on the cost-effectiveness ratio: the budget allocated annually, by the UN, for the missions of maintaining and building peace in the world, cost less than the amount spent by the city of New York for its police department, in one year.

The approved budget for UN Peacekeeping operations for the year 2015/2016 is about \$8.27 billion, that by way of comparison, is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures (estimated at \$1,747 billion in 2013). The top 10 providers of assessed contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations in 2013-2015 are:

1. United States (28.38%)
2. Japan (10.83%)
3. France (7.22%)
4. Germany (7.14%)
5. United Kingdom (6.68%)
6. China (6.64%)
7. Italy (4.45%)
8. Russian Federation (3.15%)
9. Canada (2.98%)
10. Spain (2.97%)

Many countries have also voluntarily made additional resources available to support UN Peacekeeping efforts on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs. Although the payment of peacekeeping assessments is mandatory, as of 30 June 2015, Member States owed approximately \$1.6 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues.

The Charter of the United Nations declares that, to provide assistance to the UN peacekeeping missions all over the world, all the Member States should make available, to the Security

Council, armed forces, police and logistic facilities, so as to make better implementation of the missions. From 1948 until today, more than 130 nations have contributed to peace operations with military personnel, police and civil experts. More than one million soldiers, police officers and civilians have served under the UN flag since it was established the first mission. Referring to the data of the month of August 2015, the UN deployed more than 90000 troops, in addition to 1800 and 13500 experts police corps.

But, despite the large and growing number of contributors, there is a tendency that characterizes the system of supply of troops and that cannot be positive definite: always with reference to the data of the month of August 2015, we can see that the 10 largest suppliers of "blue helmets" are developing countries: 1. Bangladesh 9,432 - 2. Ethiopia 8,309 - 3. India 7,794 - 4. Pakistan 7,533 - 5. Rwanda 5,685 - 6. Nepal 5,346 - 7. Senegal 3,628 - 8. Ghana 3,242 - 9. China 3,079 - 10. Nigeria 2,968. Italy is the 26<sup>th</sup> country with 1,103, France is 31<sup>st</sup> with 909, while the United States are 74<sup>th</sup> with 82 peacekeepers.<sup>19</sup> From these data can be guessed that the major contributors, in terms of money and resources, are, at the same time, the minor contributors in terms of troops deployed. Wanting to make a comparison with the economy, is like the biggest powers of the UN provides Capital to mechanism, and developing countries make it works with Labour. This tendency, despite numerous appeals to a more equitable distribution of the burden of peacekeeping, continues to be widespread within the UN peacekeeping mechanisms.

#### **1.4. Challenges and priorities for UN Peacekeeping**

*“United Nations peacekeeping is a collective effort. And, as the world around us changes, it is essential that the diverse stakeholders who authorize, finance and contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations collectively reflect on the role of peacekeeping in a changing global landscape. The Secretary-General has called*

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<sup>19</sup> United Nations PeaceKeeping, *UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> , August 2015.

*for a major review of UN peacekeeping and we are currently embarking on this important and timely process. Today, I will highlight some of the issues which I feel need to be at the centre of this exercise, drawing on three years as the head of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”<sup>20</sup>*

This is what Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations,<sup>21</sup> wrote in the introduction of his report on the challenges and priorities of the United Nations. In the last decades, since the Peacekeeping has been formed, the number and the extent of the conflict is greatly diminished reaching the lowest levels ever, globally. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding missions have played a crucial role, since the end of the Cold War, monitoring, building and supporting the introduction of peace agreements sometimes facing very prohibitive conditions (illustrated by the example of Cambodia or Mozambique). As the Under-Secretary-General himself reiterated in his report:

*“There are no guarantees, and peacekeeping is a high risk endeavour, but it remains true that a country has a better chance of emerging from conflict and maintaining that peace when a peace operation has been deployed.”*

Unfortunately, today, even if fewer in numbers, conflicts are becoming uncontrollable. Some of them who had previously intrastate characteristics, now have turned into regional or even international scale, with catastrophic results: they are prolonged in time and have a very high mortality rate. The recent conflicts, such as in Democratic Republic of Congo, in Kosovo or in South Sudan, are driven by a complex mix of factors including failing or incapable states, flare-ups of ethnic strife, transnational criminal and terrorist threats, and serious humanitarian and public health crises. While the peace missions seek to give concrete answers to very complicated dynamic situations, the UN Security Council has intensified its request to the DPKO about the possibility of intervening earlier, where there might be an opening in the

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<sup>20</sup> United Nations Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsou, *New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping*, The Brookings Institution, Pag. 1, 17 June 2014.

<sup>21</sup> Hervé Ladsous (born 1950) is the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. He was appointed to this position by the United Nations Secretary-General *Ban Ki-moon* on 2 September 2011, following Alain Le Roy.

middle of a conflict, in order to seek even a temporary fragile peace and the protection of civilians.

Today, despite the peacekeeping missions have evolved to better adapt to the continuous changes in the international environment, despite new technologies have been introduced to allow peacekeepers to act safely and to protect those who should be protected referring to the mandates, although most of the missions had a positive outcome and even today we continue to reap the benefits of the intervention of the UN troops, soldiers, volunteers and police continue to operate in a very dangerous environment. More than two thirds of all civilian, police and military personnel in UN missions are operating in contexts with significant levels of ongoing violence, and this greatly impact the ability to start up new missions and to operate effectively and safely once they are deployed.

There is another aspect on which the Under-Secretary-General report focused: several current peacekeeping operations are mandated to advance national reconciliation and dialogue in the absence of a peace agreement or even clear identification of the parties to the conflict. This may be driven by the very understandable desire of the Security Council not to stand by while civilians are killed in the midst of conflict. In some cases, the Security Council has chosen to deploy a peacekeeping operation in order to buttress an opening, however incomplete, effectively using peacekeeping operations as a “wedge” to progressively build momentum, as in Mali and CAR. Often, when this situation is implemented, conflicts tend to re-emerge even during into the operation and, as a result, the revised mandate for the mission focuses heavily on protection of civilians while acknowledging the urgent need for a political solution.

One of the greatest challenge, or better threat, the UN is facing today is terrorism. Obviously the word “terrorism” could have a straight and automatic reference to what has been happening for the last three years with the Islamic State, but this phenomenon includes all those attacks designed and implemented to sow death and terror among the civilian population. Is exactly what is happening every day in countries like Mali, South Sudan or DR of Congo, or what happened during the 16-years civil war in Mozambique (1976 – 1992). To face that sort of transnational threat, the UN needs a stronger organization, a greater

involvement of the Member States in terms of resources, troops and weapons. The mission of peacekeepers is to operate safely in every environment, and to make this happen, a strong participation of experts in international organized crime is needed. Facing these transnational actors presents also political challenges: they often have little stake in the countries where they operate and cannot easily be brought into a political process. The Security Council may also have less leverage to bring to bear on them, compared to armed groups dependent upon external support.

In facing these challenges, the Security Council began to approve more robust mandates in relation to some missions. For example, the S.C. Resolution 2098 authorized Force Intervention Brigade for MONUSCO, with a mandate that allows the deployment of offensive military operations against military and terrorist groups that terrorize the population. More robust and realistic mandates must be matched with a corresponding deployment of forces (military, police, civilian experts and volunteers), which may allow the Security Council to carry out the mission.

There is a very important detail that most of today's conflicts, the UN is forced to confront, has in common:

*“(...) as we look across our missions today, we see that some of the biggest challenges we face are political in nature. As I noted, many of the environments into which we have recently deployed lack a clear political framework to guide the government and other parties to the conflict towards an inclusive, non-violent post conflict political order.”<sup>22</sup>*

The lack of political framework, in countries emerging from conflict, is often cause of riots and renewed fighting because the fragility of post-conflict situation is not capable of withstanding the tension between the parties involved. When it is difficult to draw up an agreed development method, an agreed roadmap, the key political role of the mission can be questioned and challenged by all actors; sometimes, the one who has the greatest interest to

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<sup>22</sup> United Nations Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsou, *New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping*, The Brookings Institution, Pag. 7, 17 June 2014.

make the mission lose its "balance" and effectiveness, is the government (the one on site or temporary) itself. For the mission, being able to find the perfect balance between the two principles, that of consent and that of impartiality<sup>23</sup>, is one of the major challenges to envisage.

In situations like these, it is critical for United Nations peacekeeping to focus its early efforts on assisting the parties to establish a basic and achievable roadmap for peace. It is strictly necessary to insist on inclusive policies measures regarding policy making, even in the early days of a post-conflict situation, so to establish a degree of legitimacy in the interim political structure, and build confidence among a divided population: make them understand that they will have some voice in how they are governed going forward. And in the moment a political opening is coming true, the mandate must give precise instructions to intervene with appropriate and targeted action plans, and with expertise, to support the strengthening of the elements that shape the "positive peace": rule of law, DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration), democratic processes and core government functions to begin to progressively consolidate peace.

Together with the objective of creating provisional but stable political structures, another important responsibility is the protection and safety of civilians. This responsibility is one of the key principles of peacekeeping missions, and enters in place from the first moment in which troops are deployed. Today, though, in these increasingly dangerous environments, protecting civilians demands a willingness to be proactive and decisive in high-risk environments:

*"(...) in the face of evolving threats to civilians in our operating environments, a static posture can no longer be the default approach to protection threats. It is no longer enough to protect by our mere presence. Peacekeeping must move to an*

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<sup>23</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, *Chapter 5 - Guiding principles for civil affairs work*, Chapter V, Paragraph 5.1. Impartiality and consent, Pagg. 60 – 61.

*ethos of “proactive protection” whereby peacekeeping missions respond directly and decisively to threats at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.”<sup>24</sup>*

Be able to achieve the result of proactive protection through the peacekeeping requires the ability to act and react quickly even on extended geographic areas. Greater mobility, skills, and ability to act in turn will require new types of capabilities, suitable and modern equipment, and above all new technologies. Multipliers of force and resources and capabilities developers will be required to give the mission the necessary mobility, the necessary rapid response, and robustness you need to complete mandates, even those more difficult to realize.

More in general, if we would like to resume what should be the main priority for the improvement of Peacekeeping, an expert and clear analysis is given, again, the Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsou. His vision is really coherent and entails many points that, if realized, could help the peacekeeping system to switch to a higher and more efficient level.

What follows are the elements analysed by the Under-Secretary-General:

### **1) Expanding and deepening the engagement of contributors**

On the one hand, it's strict necessary to deepen the involvement of those contributors who are already part of peacekeeping system; on the other hand, there is the need to increase the number of contributors in order to broaden the basis and have access to more resources. This will be the only way to “exploit” the full array of capabilities of MS and other partners. Without this full participation, we see a growing gap between the capabilities required and the capabilities provided. The UN system works only thanks to member states who provide troops, resources and financial funds; unfortunately, however, the peacekeeping mechanism will never reach its full potential if its main contributors choose to participate partially, or not to participate. Putting the UN boots on the ground has a double importance, the first on the military side (the real action *per se*), and the second on the political one, because it contributes to send a strong signal to the conflicting parties and to the international communities.

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<sup>24</sup> United Nations Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsou, *New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping*, The Brookings Institution, Pagg. 8-9, 17 June 2014.

## **2) Cooperation with regional actors**

Nowadays, as reiterated by the Egyptian President of the Security Council in his speech of May 24 of this year,<sup>25</sup> peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions play on increasingly crowded fields, where regional actors interweave their parallel missions playing an active role in crisis response. To this myriad of actors present on the ground is required coherence in acting, cooperation, and above all inter-operability. The UN Peacekeeping is trying to strengthen cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, NATO and the Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO)<sup>26</sup>, because these actors are developing the potential to respond rapidly to threats and they can provide, as well, resources and expertise. The challenge is to build strategic partnerships with key stakeholders and translating partnerships into political and operational results.

## **3) Deployment rapidity**

When a crisis erupts, the DPKO finds itself in a race against time implying a rapid mobilization and deployment of the troops, with the aim of stabilizing the situation in the area, before it becomes irretrievable and it falls in a spiral of continuous violence. Intervening, then, in conflicts that are already ongoing, is many times more complicated but, at the same time, it implies a greater urgency and necessity, because a day of conflict without intervention is always intended to turn into a day of violence, destruction and suffering, as we said before. How a mission is deployed is of utmost importance: first of all, how the mission is perceived by the local population; secondly, what is the degree of confidence that mission enjoys with the local government, because the latter should perceive the former as a hope, rather than a threat:

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<sup>25</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2016/8*, pag.2, 24 May 2016.

<sup>26</sup> The *Collective Security Treaty Organization* (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military alliance that was signed on 15 May 1992. In 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States - Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan - signed the Collective Security Treaty.



*“We continue to struggle to deploy peacekeepers in a timely manner. The solution must come collectively from the Secretariat and Member States and cut across force generation, logistics planning and military planning, legal negotiations, strategic sea- and airlift, and global supply chain management. Enabling capacities such as engineering, air and ground transport and medical support remain critical chokepoints. While we are working to shorten this process as much as possible, a hard limitation is the willingness of Member States to prepare troops to peacekeeping missions in advance of a Security Council resolution, and ensure that they can meet UN standards. (...)”<sup>27</sup>*

#### **4) Capabilities modernization**

Peacekeepers need a modernization in capabilities to stand strong in the new transforming environments, in which they operate; peace operators must be able to ensure appropriate duty of care, and capacities of military and police must be enhanced to confront new threats. Once troops are in action, there will be the necessity for a robust, highly mobile capabilities and a need for reserve capabilities to enable rapid adjustment of the dynamics of conflict and intervention. The ability to operate safely in an environment of asymmetric threat will require improved training, detection capabilities, proper equipment, better access to information, and improved contingency planning.

#### **5) Performance**

Since the beginning of the new millennium, especially after the Brahimi report (2000) and the numerous reforms applied to the peacekeeping system, the United Nations have had an increasing demand to deploy the mission with higher and higher standards of performance. Member States and people around the world expect to see constant success among the ranks of the United Nations. A step that certainly helped the DPKO, is the creation of the *Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership* (OPSP)<sup>28</sup>, that already supports the peacekeeping

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<sup>27</sup> United Nations Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsou, *New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping*, The Brookings Institution, Pagg. 14, 17 June 2014.

<sup>28</sup> The *Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership* (OPSP) operates under the direction of the Under-Secretaries-General (USGs) for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO-DFS), to assist,

department with numerous benefits, not only towards the Member States, but also to troops- and police-contributing countries, and to the Secretariat. The main role played by the OPSP is the one to identify what could be the "strong" elements (the most influential) of a mandate, and what are the weaknesses of this. The Office analyses the missions already carried out, the lessons learned on the field, and the best adoptable practices; after that it transfers relevant information to the DPKO that encompasses them in the mandate. Under the item *performance* is it possible to find also the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy on misconduct and sexual abuse by civilian, military and police peacekeepers.

## **1.5. Limits of Peacekeeping: the failure of United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

I find it appropriate to analyse, for greater completeness of research, not only the Organization's successes, but also the fallibility of UN missions, often because of problems of underestimation we have mentioned before. Although this is not the place to go deeper in the details of limits' problem, is necessary to report an example of failure to be able to make a comparison with the examples of success. This will allow us to understand why sometimes the Organization has been able to achieve great successes (e.g. Cambodia or Mozambique), and while in other cases it has fell in the abyss of failure.

The case in question relates to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), with a more specific focus on the "massacre of Srebrenica". In 1995, during the final phases of the controversial war in Bosnia, Bosnian Serb forces entered eastern Srebrenica slaughtering 8.000 Muslim men and children and collecting their bodies into pits. The act, which lasted five days, was the most brutal massacre since the end of World War II, and, at

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among other functions, in identifying gaps that have an impact on the delivery of mandates by uniformed personnel by making recommendations on systemic issues relating United Nations peacekeeping operations.

the same time, it represented also one of the most tremendous failure of the UN Peacekeeping.

The UN, in fact, had declared the city as safe areas, free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. Due to this, 600 infantry soldiers were patrolling the area where thousands of people had taken refuge. When the Serb soldiers began the massacre, Muslim fighters (rival faction of Bosnian Serb) asked the UN troops to have back their weapons in order to fight, but the requested was refused, following the mandate's provision. The 600 UN soldiers found themselves observing powerlessly a highly preventable massacre.

The fall of Srebrenica represented a damaging symbol of the United Nations Peacekeeping system in a new era of civil war, and it demonstrated the fallacy of a system which allowed state interests within the scope the UN was acting.<sup>29</sup> The Secretary General himself, Kofi Annan, states in his report of 15 November 1999:

*"The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever."<sup>30</sup>*

It is not my intention to go deeply into the problems of the mission in Bosnia, but I would like to analyse two key elements that characterized the failure of the mission, elements that cannot be found in other successful operations.

The first element, stressed by Kofi Annan, was the lack of consent among the parties in conflict. It was planned and implemented a mission to protect a peace where there was no peace, and where conflictual actors did want to reach a common ground. So, it would be wrong to attribute the entire blame to UN troops, or to the orders of headquarters. The biggest mistake was to underestimate the situation, applying automatically the impartiality philosophy of the troops.

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<sup>29</sup> Barbara Crosette, "U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre", The New York Times, 16 November 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html?_r=0)

<sup>30</sup> United Nations Report A/54/549, "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55", 15 November 1999.

The intervention in Bosnia should have provided a military force to stop ethnic cleansing, massacres and terrorist acts, to prevent an entire population to be deported and killed. This should have been the primary goal of the mission, Annan reiterated, to be reached by all means and with the political will to go all the way.

But this was the most problematic aspect of UN Mission in question. The will of the powers at the basis of the Organization was really contrasting. In the case of the massacre, harsh accusations were addressed to the role of the United Kingdom, France and the United States which, despite being aware of the intentions of the Serbs towards the Bosnians, let the latter to have the protected enclave of Srebrenica, in order to end the war.

The intervention in Bosnia may be included in the category of first generation peacekeeping, and for this reason, it was not backed by a strong and complete mandate, obviously unable to complete the mission.

Nowadays the limits remain, and the challenges multiply and get bigger. This, however, does not reduce, from my point of view, the trust in the activities of the United Nations. This, in fact, if organized according to constructive principles and through mandates aiming at the achievement of *positive peace*, can represent the most effective method of resolution and transformation of conflict.

What do we mean with the term "*positive peace*"? What does it mean that UN Peacekeeping Missions' mandates have to aim to this concept? Of what consists this theoretical structure, and how is it possible to put it into practice? What is its origin in the context of peace research? Hereafter in this research, already in the second chapter, we will be able to go deeper into this key concept, and into its origins.

*“By peace we mean the capacity  
to transform conflicts with empathy,  
without violence, and creatively  
- a never- ending process”*

Johan Galtung

## Chapter 2

### Johan Galtung: the “father” of Peace Research

To the question: “Which is the most important advice you could give to young students of international relations, at the beginning of their careers, that would like to specialize in peace and conflicts resolution studies?”, Johan Galtung answered:

*“Just stop studying international relations on books and texts. Travel everywhere, talk with people, asking what was the best and the worst thing that occurred to their nation or their country, what are the conflicts and which the solutions. Study history to find new ways. Try to understand the deepest side of collective subconscious. Pay greater attention to culture and nation, less to threats and states. Orient yourself to the common solution, not to victory, even in everyday life.”<sup>31</sup>*

This was the answer that the Norwegian author gave to Al McKay, director of *Sereno Regis* Center Study, during its interview on 2 July, 2014. In a forty-year academic career, Johan Galtung has been visiting professor in more than 30 universities, all over the five continents. He wrote more than 100 books and more than 1000 articles about peace research, conflict resolution, ecology, health, global governance and sustainable development. He was the main founder of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)<sup>32</sup> in 1959, and served as its first director until 1970. In 1969 he was appointed to the world's first chair in peace and conflict studies, at the University of Oslo. In 1993 co-founded TRASCEND INTERNATIONAL – A Peace Development Environment Network<sup>33</sup>, that today counts members in more than 60 countries.

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<sup>31</sup> Al McKay, “Un’intervista a Johan Galtung”, Centro Studi Sereno Regis, 13 giugno 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Founded in 1959 by Johan Galtung, the *Peace Research Institute Oslo* (PRIO) is an independent research institution known for its effective synergy of basic and policy-relevant research. PRIO also conducts graduate training and is engaged in the promotion of peace through conflict resolution, dialogue and reconciliation, public information and policymaking activities.

<sup>33</sup> TRASCEND INTERNATIONAL was founded in August 1993 by Johan Galtung and Fumiko Nishimura as a conflict mediation organization. By now, TRASCEND has more than 400 scholars-practitioners from more than 60 countries as members.

Galtung is known for contributions to sociology in the 1950s, political science in the 1960s, economics and history in the 1970s, macro-history, anthropology, and theology in the 1980s. He has developed several influential theories, such as the distinction between positive and negative peace, structural violence, theories on conflict and conflict transformation, the concept of peacebuilding, the structural theory of imperialism, and the theory of the United States as simultaneously a republic and an empire. He has often been critical of western countries in their attitude to the Global South. In 1987 he was awarded with the *Right Livelihood Award* for his systematic and multidisciplinary study on the conditions that could lead to peace.

But, who is Johan Galtung? Who is behind the mask of this extraordinary character who has devoted his life to the study of peace? Which are the experiences that lead to his theories and what are the experts from which he drew inspiration? Why his ideas have influenced so much the Peacekeeping system of the United Nations? What is certain is that he has drawn, from his life, lessons that allowed him to elaborate theories that still remain in the history of humanity.

### **Biographic clues**

In 1954, one of the cells of the Oslo prison hosted for six months the young man of noble birth Johan Vincent Galtung. His cellmates did not easily accept that he was there because he refused the six months of military service. From this experience, Galtung drew lessons for his studies and new inner strength, as often happened in his life. Galtung life, indeed, is dotted with numerous and diverse experiences that influenced his theories.

Fifth of five brothers, he inherited from his father, August Andreas Galtung, a great human depth and a strong sense of responsibility. That of Galtung was one of the oldest aristocratic families in Norway, even if the value of aristocratic titles were abolished from 1821. Furthermore, the profession of his father, who was a doctor, forwarded to him the idea that most of the problems and conflicts can be solved

Johan Galtung was born in Oslo, 24 October 1930, and spent his childhood in the Norway invaded and occupied by the Nazi army. Already in 1944 he lived a sense of injustice of the

war in a direct way: his father one night was taken at home by Nazi agents, and was forced to spend 14 months in a concentration camp. This was one of the event that influenced his life and his future philosophical perspective. Once the war ended, the philosopher, still traumatized by the loss of his father, began to wonder how tragedies of that calibre could be averted.

It was during college that he began to develop decisive life choices. Contemporarily math and sociology student, he began to direct its interests towards the themes of Peace Research, acquiring interdisciplinary approach that characterized the birth of the Peace Research, through his ideas. Following his university studies, Johan refused to take part in military service, and for this reason was forced to serve six months in prison. Just like Gramsci and Gandhi, the months spent in prison represented an opportunity to study and writing. Under the wise guide of Arne Naess<sup>34</sup>, he began to develop a deep interest in the in the study of Satyagraha<sup>35</sup>, the Gandhian fighting method that establishes a link between means and purposes of political action. While Arne Naess was, therefore, his first and unforgettable mentor, Galtung structured its knowledge as scientist in the field research, analysing sociological issues like non-violence, poverty, peace and the means to get to it.

Between 1956 and 1957 Galtung travelled to Sicily to study the situation of a land so beautiful but at the same time so mangled by the growing phenomenon of Mafia. Although the years spent in Sicily represented a milestone for the thought of Galtung, historians and scholars initially ignored this stage because it was considered too "distant" from the theories developed later. The time spent on the island gave him the opportunity, not only to come into contact with Danilo Dolci<sup>36</sup>, famous as the "Gandhi of Sicily", but also created a sincere and

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<sup>34</sup> *Arne Dekke Eide Naess* (Oslo, 27 January 1912 – Oslo, 14 January 2009), was a Norwegian philosopher. He studied philosophy, math and astronomy. Philosophy professor until 1969, was expert in history of philosophy, philosophy of science, ethics; he developed great interest in Spinoza's thought, but especially in Gandhi's theories, for his idea of non-violent revolution.

<sup>35</sup> *Satyagraha*, better known as "passive resistance", is an ethic and political theory elaborated and enacted by Gandhi, in the early '900. The same theory was adopted by other politicians and activists such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela e Aung San Suu Kyi.

<sup>36</sup> *Danilo Dolci* (June 28, 1924 – December 30, 1997) was an Italian social activist, sociologist, popular educator and poet. He is best known for his opposition to poverty, social exclusion and the Mafia on



constructive friendship, crucial to understand how concepts evolved in Galtung's mind. Models of development such as meeting basic human needs and self-reliance, found their roots in the Sicilian years.

Meeting Danilo Dolci marked a profound differentiation with the then hegemonic American school of conflict resolution, which seems to fall in *behavioralism*<sup>37</sup>, or rather the illusion that every problem can be solved by addressing individual behaviours, ignoring structural changes necessary to fight exploitation, one of the greatest violence that Gandhi fought during the British colonialism. One of the highest contribution offered by Galtung to peace studies, is the idea that "*opposite of peace, is not war, but violence*"<sup>38</sup>, and the main task of non-violence is building just societies.

Galtung spent a lot of time in other countries, for longer or shorter periods. He perceived the journey as an existential element, a behaviour, lot more than a mere shift from one point to another. It was an occasion for reflection, to change, immersing himself in very different situations and to confront different points of view. One of the most typical travel was in USSR and its satellites countries. Between 1953 and 1989 he visited the Soviet Union for 25 times. In its constant search for constructive approaches and third ways, he believed that was essential to analyse deeply, under a sociological point of view, the situation in Eastern Europe, so as to have an overall global framework set.

Over years, Galtung showed himself through an eclectic path that led him to teach in many universities, to receive several academic assignments, to be active in conferences, training or mediation interventions and consulting in numerous countries. Furthermore, he was adviser and trainer in global economy for companies like Ibm and Shell, for more than ten years, and

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Sicily, and is considered to be one of the protagonists of the non-violence movement in Italy. He became known as the "Gandhi of Sicily".

<sup>37</sup> *Behaviouralism* (or behavioralism in the United States) is an approach in political science, which emerged in the 1930s in the United States. It represents a sharp break from previous political science. This is because it emphasized an objective, quantified approach to explain and predict political behaviour. It is associated with the rise of the behavioural sciences, modelled after the natural sciences. This means that behavioralism claims it can explain political behaviour from an unbiased, neutral point of view.

<sup>38</sup> Johan Galtung, *Palestina-Israele. Una soluzione non-violenta?* Torino, Sonda, 1989.

this gave him the possibility to understand better and in a more direct way the mechanisms of global economy. It is still one of the most important figures at UN level, for his research and its results, which have inspired the peacekeeping and peace building system.

Galtung also reflected and wrote a lot about his spiritual life and his own inner dimension. In many texts and operas, we can find analysis of western and eastern religions together with their interpretation of key concepts such as peace, conflicts, gender issue and so on. He sees the life as a prospective.

### **Interpretations on the author**

*“There are some people like Picasso, with a so vast and varied production that it is hard to believe it comes from one person. Johan Galtung falls into this category”<sup>39</sup>.*

This is how Kenneth Boulding opens one of his article introducing Johan Galtung as a complex author to read and to interpret for many reason.

Founder of the Peace Research, Galtung has a background primarily as a sociologist and mathematician, but it has formed and has worked also on several disciplines which lead him to range greatly, to abandon traditional schemes and classic paradigms. Moreover, he moves not only within the conceptualism of the Western tradition, but he blends it with cultural references far away from its main western key concept. He draws inspiration from Japanese doctrines, such as Indian and Chinese one, mixing concepts and thoughts.

In a perspective of changing sociological paradigm, Galtung has offered his concept of “*non-violence*” as the experimental method of the new science of conflicts. The non-violent method indicates, according to the etymology of the Greek word, the 'way' (*Hodos*) that leads over (*metà*) the conflict, namely, that "transcends" it. Focusing on the relationship between means and ends becomes a new need for scientific rationality. Starting from the consciousness that, sometimes, the conflict couldn't be destructive, but could be an opportunity to challenge and

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<sup>39</sup> Kenneth Boulding, “*Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung*”, in *Journal of Peace research*, n. 1, vol. 14, 1977, p. 75.

change, the non-violent method is crucial to affect and transform the current structural realities that produce injustice and war.

Johan Galtung described the physiognomy of social studies for Peace, using the medical image of diagnosis - prognosis - therapy<sup>40</sup>. Conflict is investigated as to the symptoms of a disease: identifying the causes (Diagnosis), studying the clinical course (Prognosis), and finding a cure (Therapy). Being son of a doctor leads him to become the undisputed doctor/mediator of the many social and international conflicts. The work of conflict mediator is essentially cultural and educational; his medicine is non-violent type. It acts in the deepest layers of people and society, healing the culture of the actors of the conflict through a maieutic process, following the path indicated by Danilo Dolci, because a destructive conflict can become generator of new, more constructive reality. The goal of the mediator will be, therefore, to help the parties to find possible alternatives to violence and war, enabling dynamics and constructive social processes, not non-destructive ones.

The distinction between direct violence and structural violence, the investigation of the causes of violence rooted in the cultures of peoples, the dissertation on alternative development models (so called "*third ways*"), the links between conflict and development, between security and disarmament, between non-offensive weapons and forms of civil defense on nonviolent bases, the inseparable link between peace and justice, are many of the acquisitions that, between the '70s and '80s, characterized the international scene for the first time, and whose father was Johan Galtung.

A conflict, Galtung teaches, cannot be definitively resolved, but only processed or, better said, transcended. This consciousness led to the creation in 1998, forty years after the first studies of Charlottesville, of TRANSCEND project<sup>41</sup>, which aims to support and defend the non-violent approach in conflict transformation. "*Transcending*" means to re-define the situation so that, what seemed incompatible and locked, it can open to a new perspective. Creativity is the key to transform the conflict. The creative act does not necessarily mean the inclusion of new

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<sup>40</sup> Johan Galtung, *Pace con mezzi pacifici*, Milano, Esperia, 2000.

<sup>41</sup> Johan Galtung, *La trasformazione nonviolenta dei conflitti. Il metodo Transcend*, Torino, EGA, 2000.

elements, but may also consist of different combinations of the existing ones. Over the years and especially in the last decades, TRANSCEND has become the most reliable international network of scholars-mediators who is professionally involved in social conflicts between states, nations, civilizations.

Overall, if we were to describe the Galtung methodological framework with an adjective, perhaps the most appropriate would be *holistic*<sup>42</sup>. A flexible and inclusive model, which uses several models, weaving and comparing them. An approach which takes shape from the multiple approaches experienced during his sociological career.

The relevance of Galtunism was certainly decisive for the entire peace research, but his impact, must not be circumscribed only to this discipline. Of crucial importance is to understand both the scientific and epistemological impact of Galtunism within individual disciplines to which he has dedicated himself. For many years, especially after 1964 (year in which the *Journal of Peace Research*<sup>43</sup> began to be published) Johan Galtung was one of the most mentioned scientists, and it was with him that the peace research began to scientifically consolidate.

## 2.1. Origins of Peace Research

Peace studies, as an academic subject, were born after the Second World War, exactly like the International Relations (IR) were established after the First World War, in part for the same reasons.

After WWI, however, pioneers of the future peace research had already stand out intellectually, working systematically on causes and models of war. The First World War, indeed, began in an atmosphere of traditional thinking that considered violence inevitable, and declaring war as second actor was the first step towards defeat. Every nation was

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<sup>42</sup> Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Development, Vol. III*, Christian Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1988, pp. 233-237.

<sup>43</sup> Peter Nils Gleditsch, "*The Structure of Galtunism*", cit. p. 75.

convinced to be able to keep events under control, and to win a war in short time, thanks to the massive support of its own people. All these beliefs proved more than contradictory when the disastrous results of the First World War came to light.

It must be said that the initiatives which emerged during the interwar period were neither numerous nor coordinates, to represent a real peace research movement.<sup>44</sup> What got a great boost in this period was the “*education to peace*”, which was linked to the “*scientific pacifism*”. These initial visions, even if not generally shared, helped developing the so-called peace research.

So, due to the lack of real effective theories, an effective reevaluation of peace research was initiated and carried forward only in post-World War II era. During this time, the focus was on disarmament and control of scientific research for military purposes; of great interest was also the question of integration between states. Later in history, due to the bipolarization of powers, the focus moved onto the Games’ Theory, but also to the *conflict theory* and *conflict analysis*<sup>45</sup>. Furthermore, new developments in the peace research were partly a reaction to the simplistic analysis on deterrence: scholars feared that decision-makers and public opinion were trapped in the dynamics of the conflict so that deterrence would have led to an escalation of violence and not to its containment. For this reason, deterrence and disarmament experts worked closely with policymakers trying to influence their policies.

It was in this active and varied international context that two main opposing ideas greatly contributed to give shape to peace research:

- 1) *Realpolitik*: inspired by authors such as Thucydides and Machiavelli; a critical and constructive analysis of "violence" and "war", developed from Greek and Roman authors until realist schools. The bond between realism and war was considered a “self-fulfilling prophecy”.

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<sup>44</sup> Peter Dungen, “*Initiatives for the Pursuit and Institutionalisation of Peace Research in Europe During the Inter-War Period (1919-1939)*”, in Broadhead, Lee-Anne, *Issues in Peace Research 1995-96*, University of Bradford, 1996, pp. 5-32.

<sup>45</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Peace: Research, Education, Action: Essays in Peace Research Volume I*”, Christian Ejlertsen, Copenhagen, 1975.

2) *Utopianism*: the idea that is, not only wondering how the real world appear and if it moves in the direction that some claim, but stating that reality must always be improving.

These two aspects were not in contradiction between each other, but complementary<sup>46</sup>: realism requires empirical confirmations, even on long term, and utopianism recognises the same need.

The peace research thus focused, in this first phase, on the problem of violence<sup>47</sup>, especially the organized violence, creating a research context by itself. Obviously views and opinions differed among themselves, with scholars believing that structural violence and deterrence were not part of the same typological family.

The peace research was also considered one of the social sciences. Starting from the positivist behavioural approaches based on quantitative studies, simple models and statistics, it proceeded to a wide variety of research methods with increasing complexity and theoretical innovations. This was favoured by an interdisciplinary basis that characterizes peace studies, and more generally, all of the social sciences.

## 2.2. Galtung's precursors

Including some definitions in the preparation of a research helps to clarify the terms of the discourse. Reporting here some authors rather than others is not related to their greater or lesser importance, but mainly to their implicit or explicit link with Galtung. The choice of Pitirim Sorokin, Lewis Richardson and Quincy Wright as "precursors of Peace Research" is justified by the fact that they first understood the need to develop and apply a scientific method to peace studies. These authors realized that progresses can be achieved only through the use of careful and controlled observations, evidences collection and the belief that the

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<sup>46</sup> Peter Wallensteen, *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges*, Westview Press, London, 1988.

<sup>47</sup> Galtung identifies three typologies of violence: direct, structural and cultural. Each of them are subject of study of Peace Research

assumptions should always be checked before being accepted. This same kind of rigor and commitment to research is considered necessary even before even before acquiring any knowledge about war and peace.

Even without using the expression "*peace research*"<sup>48</sup>, Sorokin, Richardson and Wright are considered the most important precursors and the most influential authors of the next movement of the peace research<sup>49</sup>. Since the thirties, with their parallel but independent studies, they were the first to develop quantitative analysis on war<sup>50</sup>. Following different path, they reach to the conclusion that it is necessary, as well as crucial, to increase the basic knowledge about the war, to relate to this topic. Furthermore, these authors were able to overcome the tradition that saw the discipline of international relations moving together with the diplomatic history in full idiosyncrasy, starting right from identifying the causes of the war and, especially, the two world wars<sup>51</sup>.

### 2.2.1. Sorokin, Richardson & Wright (1945 – 1959)

#### **Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin**

Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin (1889 – 1968), born in a small country in the Northern Russia from a family of farmers, was one of the first sociological professor of Tsarist Russia, regime with which it came into conflict several times<sup>52</sup>, as well as with the Soviet government. During the October Revolution was personal secretary of Alexander Kerenky, who was placed at the head of the Provisional Government. Furthermore, he founded the department of sociology at the University of St. Petersburg, after being himself student of the Institute. After the

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<sup>48</sup> Peter Dungen, "*Initiatives for the Pursuit and Institutionalisation of Peace Research in Europe During the Inter-War Period (1919-1939)*", *cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>49</sup> Before these three, shall be mentioned Frederick Adams Woods and Alexander Baltzly, which operated in the quantitative field.

<sup>50</sup> Ron P Smith, "Quantitative Methods in Peace Research", in *Peace Research*, n. 4, vol. 35, 1988, pp. 419-427.

<sup>51</sup> Paul Francis Diehl, "*The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem*", University of Michigan Press, 2004, pp. IX-XI.

<sup>52</sup> Sorokin was imprisoned several times by the regime for political reasons.

October Revolution, however, he started undertaking anti-Bolshevik activities and due to this, was imprisoned and sentenced to death, sentence later commuted to exile; because of his situation, Sorokin was forced to leave the country with his wife, and after one year spent in Praha, they reached the United States (1924) which recognised them the citizenship, in 1930<sup>53</sup>.

Among the early works related to his study on peace and war, a writing in particular should be mentioned whose name is "*The influence of war on human behaviour and social organization*", published in 1922 and destroyed by the order of Russian entourage. In the same year, he published on the magazine *Ekonomist* a text named "*The influence of war*", that was attacked directly by Lenin himself.

In 1930, Abbot Lawrence Lowell, head of Harvard University, posed Sorokin at the head of the first department of sociology of this University. This success is to be credited in particular to his first six years in the US, who had spent working at the University of Minnesota<sup>54</sup>. In this period, Sorokin wrote six books that contribute to create him a strong reputation and greatly influenced the sociology in the following years: *Social Mobility* (1927), *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (1929) with Carle. C. Zimmerman and the first of three volumes of *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology* (1929) with Zimmerman and Charles Galpin.

In 1930, obtained the chair in Harvard, he began to work on his most important work, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, which was published in four volumes at the end of the thirties. With this opera, Sorokin – attacking traditional sociological studies oriented toward an increasing specialization – sought a way towards a universal or "integral" theory of man, society and history<sup>55</sup>. The years at Harvard, thus, marked a transition from empiricism to "fundamentalism" as the foundation of knowledge. His work wanted to combine empirical, rational and super sensory aspects of knowledge, within an epistemology that penetrated every aspect of human life and civilization<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>53</sup> Barry V. Johnston, "*Pitirim A. Sorokin: An Intellectual Biography*", University Press of Kansas, 1995.

<sup>54</sup> Lewis A. Coser, "*Masters of Sociological Thought*", Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1977.

<sup>55</sup> Carlo Gambescia, *Invito alla lettura di Sorokin*, Edizioni Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 2002.

<sup>56</sup> Barry V Johnston, "*Sorokin Lives! Centennial Observations*", in *Footnotes*, n. 1, vol. 17, 1989, pp. 1-5.



Growing up intellectually in the climate of the October Revolution, he rejected Paretian elitism, considering the mass movement in its spontaneity and autonomy as the protagonist of social life. Partly, Sorokin can thus be considered a continuer of the studies on the Crowd Psychology, because it analysed war, and contemporary revolution, the same way as the crowd behaviours. Conversely to the first studies on mass behaviours, he highlighted the unpredictability and spontaneity of these movements and of the social movement in Western society.

Sorokin believed that sociologists spend too much time studying the destructive aspects of human behaviour, while his interest is to study the positive aspects to improve the human condition itself. All this pushed Sorokin to dedicate himself to the study of altruism and following this tendency, he created the "*Harvard Center for Creative Altruism*". Some scholars believed that this research centre also belonged to the nonviolent tradition<sup>57</sup>. The interest to create the center, in a pragmatic way, was born by the contrast with Talcott Parsons for control of the sociology department. Parsons, indeed, took the place of Sorokin and renamed the department "*Department of Social Relations Department*". Sorokin decided to remain anyway at Harvard, and exactly for this reason he founded the Center starting from his strong interest on altruism. The traditional sociologists tended to be sceptical about the research of Pitirim Sorokin and even at the center he worked mainly in the shadows.

In the sixties, however, the trend began to mutate and Sorokin was more esteemed by American sociologists<sup>58</sup>. In 1962 the publishing company Bedminster Press published again *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. Sorokin put his commitment in this abridged version in 1956, so condensing the four volumes work into one, cutting the whole apparatus of notes and bibliographic, and omitting some parts, in his opinion of minor importance. In this new version he quoted Quincy Wright (who was his great supporter), and the data appeared in *A Study of War*, published five years later the first edition of *Dynamics*, "confirmed essentially the trends of the curves of the indexes reported here", Sorokin said.

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<sup>57</sup> Håkan Wiberg, "*The Peace Research Movement*", in Wallensteen, 1988, pp. 30-56.

<sup>58</sup> Barry V. Johnston, "*Pitirim A. Sorokin: An Intellectual Biography*", University Press of Kansas, 1995

In 1963, the Sorokin opinion was adopted again by Philip J. Allen<sup>59</sup> and Edward A. Tiryakian<sup>60</sup> works. Moreover, in April 1963, some sociologists supported the candidacy of Sorokin as president of the *American Sociological Association*, election that was realized in the same year<sup>61</sup>.

With regards to the specific quantitative studies on war, the third volume of *Dynamics* is focused right on the theme of war. This important part of the work contains statistics on wars and battles from the sixth century BC until the twenties. Sorokin's attention was concentrated in researching how the story creates multiple empirical indicators. Among these, one of the most important results of the research was to test how no culture is, internally or externally, more belligerent than another one. In the text, almost a thousand wars are analysed, comparing data and quantitative aspects: the force of armies, the number of losses and the duration of each war are studied in their complexity. The different historical periods are compared with each other, and wars are weighted in their effects in relation to the number of inhabitants of the communities involved. In this way, Sorokin found out that the the most intense periods of war were those of transition from one culture to another dominion, while he doesn't notice any constant trend related to the disappearance or diminution of the phenomenon of war<sup>62</sup>.

Sorokin was, therefore, a relevant author for subsequent peace studies. In this area, one of the problems that emerged in the following years, was the of lack operational definitions of war<sup>63</sup>, element to which authors like David Singer or Petter Gleditsch will work at the *University of Michigan* and the *International Peace Research Institute, Oslo* (PRIO). The contribution of Sorokin, however, should be remembered not only for quantitative studies on

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<sup>59</sup> Philip J. Allen, "*Pitirim A. Sorokin in Review*", Duke University Press, Durham, 1963

<sup>60</sup> Edward A. Tiryakian, "*Sociological Theory, Values and Sociocultural Change: Essays in Honour of Pitirim A. Sorokin*", Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

<sup>61</sup> Pitirim A. Sorokin, "*A Long Journey: The Autobiography of Pitirim A. Sorokin*", Rowman & Littlefield, 1963.

<sup>62</sup> Pitirim Sorokin, "*Social and Cultural Dynamics*", Vol. 3, American Book Company, New York, 1937.

<sup>63</sup> Daniel S. Geller, "Toward a Scientific Theory of War", in Diehl, Paul Francis, *The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004.

wars and revolutions, but also for the overall role played by the author in sociology and in the construction of the “positive peace” concept.

### **Lewis Fry Richardson**

Lewis Fry Richardson (1881-1953), born from a Quaker family, graduated in physics and psychology, was one of the most famous meteorologists of his time. He worked at the *Meteorological Office* in Newcastle, but from 1916 until the end of World War I, he moved with the *Friend's Ambulance Unit* in France<sup>64</sup>. The Quaker environment in which Richardson grew, instilled in him a deep pacifism, also acquired in personal choices, as conscientious objection during the WWI, decision which will create him problems in the academic field. Furthermore, the combination of relevant factors such as the subjective experience of war, the mathematical knowledge and the growing interest in the new field of psychology, guided him in his eclectic journey in search of the causes of war<sup>65</sup>. In the twenties he took his second degree in psychology, then PhD student in 1929, and in the thirties he spread his model on arms proliferation. Previously, in 1919, he had written his first important work on war, *The Mathematical Psychology of War*, printed in three hundred copies<sup>66</sup>, but it is just from the thirties that he devoted most of his studies to conflicts.

During World War II, Richardson decided to retire from charge of principal of the *Paisley Technical College*, to commit full time to the conflict analysis, also publishing a series of articles in various scientific journals. His two main works in this field are *Arms and Insecurity*<sup>67</sup> and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*<sup>68</sup>, preceded, in 1939, by the important supplement monograph *Generalized Foreign Politics*. These works were presented at the “*Invisible College*”, group grew around Kenneth Boulding and his wife Elise, where they became important reference texts. In 1960 both works were published.

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<sup>64</sup> Oliver M Ashford, “*Prophet or Professor? The Life and Work of Lewis Fry Richardson*”, A. Hilger, 1985.

<sup>65</sup> William Eckhardt, “*Pioneers of Peace Research*”, Taylor & Francis, London, 1983.

<sup>66</sup> Lewis Fry Richardson, “*Mathematical Psychology of War*”, W. Hunt, 1919.

<sup>67</sup> Lewis Fry Richardson, “*Arms and Insecurity*”, Boxwood Press, Pittsburgh, 1960.

<sup>68</sup> Lewis Fry Richardson, “*Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*”, Atlantic Books, Steven & Sons Limited, 1950.

The direct result, and probably the most important, of these two works, was to demonstrate the possibility to seek the causes of wars and the armaments proliferation using scientific methods, limiting as much as possible the influence of the personal beliefs of the researcher. Richardson understands that there were many opinions on war, about the causes and the ways to prevent it, but there were just a few ways to verify that these opinions had been rectified. So it worked to collect statistics for hundreds of "deadly quarrels" between 1820 and 1949. This work was used as a database for evaluating many of the most common clichés and groped to translate them into statistical hypotheses. Most of them turned out to be unfounded, and subsequent quantitative studies gave him confirmation. Among the correlations found, three were the main features:

- 1) Great powers are more involved in wars than others;
- 2) There is a direct relationship between the number of boundaries of a state and the number of wars;
- 3) The more a state possesses armaments, in proportion to its size, the higher the number of conflicts in which is involved.

This last point therefore confirms the thesis of Woodrow Wilson that the excessive increase of armaments in a defensive key, would lead to the ruin of the same States<sup>69</sup>. Afterwards – analysing the characteristics of states – observed that the homogeneity in culture, language and religion is not sufficient to avoid conflicts between them. The influence of certain cultural aspects within a civilization, instead, may be relevant to lead to a decline in violent conflicts. This can be seen, for example, in Richardson analysis on the cycle of war, when he finds out that in China, in the "Chinese New Year" (220-618 A.D.), during which the teachings of Confucius were abandoned, wars increased. With the same methodological approach that he used in *Arms and Insecurity*, Richardson elaborated varying assumptions about weapons proliferation based on differential equations and on probability theories, trying to verify in

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<sup>69</sup> Steven Greffenius, *The Logic of Conflict: Making War and Peace in the Middle East*, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1993.

comparison with some case studies. In this he was a true "pioneer" and in subsequent years had been followed by many scholars.

More in general, Richardson was a positivist, even if more sophisticated than many of the social scientists of his time<sup>70</sup>. In fact, he worked hard to not let his beliefs influence the results, considering this as the greatest weakness of pacifism of his time.

The research procedure was then defined as "negative", as it did not go beyond the empirical analysis, ignoring the critical side and the framework of evaluation and design. This was also connected to his absence from the scientific community of international relations or other political studies and, for this reason, many years needed before his work was studied by historians and political scientists. The enhancement of Richardson eclectic studies was conducted thanks to the rising American research community on peace and conflict<sup>71</sup>.

### **Philip Quincy Wright**

Philip Quincy Wright (1890-1970) was professor of international law and political science at the University of Chicago from 1923 to 1956. It is recognized as a pioneer, not only of peace research, but also of international relations and international law. He was, in fact, one of the founders in 1928, together with Hans Morgenthau, of the first graduation program in international relations of the United States<sup>72</sup>.

His main contribution to the early development of peace research, and its most important work was "*A study of War*"<sup>73</sup>, published in 1942 after sixteen years of his and other researchers' studies (updated in 1965). Although the collection of data was carried out in part in parallel with that of Richardson, this work has some unique features. The work contains, indeed, a vast compendium with contributions of scholars from various disciplines, from

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<sup>70</sup> Michael Nicolson, "Review Article: Lewis Fry Richardson and the Study of the Causes of War", in *British Journal of Political Science*, n. 3, vol. 29, 1999, pp. 541-563.

<sup>71</sup> William Eckhardt, "*Pioneers of Peace Research*", Taylor & Francis, London, 1983; and Peter Lawler, "*A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research*", Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1995, note 21, p. 14.

<sup>72</sup> Reference is to *Committee on International Relations* of Chicago University

<sup>73</sup> Quincy Wright, "*A Study of War*", The University of Chicago Press, 1942.

biology to law, who has long helped in trying to understand the various aspects of the war and the peacekeeping.

Wright's work is a comprehensive plan of research linking different levels of conflict between them, even joining with several other factors placed in the background. Its inductive analysis and collection of statistics – for example on modern wars from 1480 to 1940, on primitive cultures, on civilizations in history – have been used by many authors have been a valuable database for future researchers. In this way, Wright was one of the pioneers in quantitative analysis of discipline<sup>74</sup>.

All major concepts developed by Wright can be identified in "*A Study of War*". This is divided in four parts. In the first part the concepts and definitions of "war" are analysed, and changes are tracked through the history of time from the Renaissance. In the broadest sense possible, Wright defines the war as:

*"Violent contact of separate but similar entities"*<sup>75</sup>.

The war itself is considered as a "natural" event, but not impossible to control by the human race. With regard to peace, is defined as a state of order and justice:

*"The positive aspect of peace, justice, cannot be separated from the negative, the elimination of violence"*<sup>76</sup>

Furthermore, the works of Sorokin and Richardson are mentioned several times, appreciated for the way they "see" the intensity of the war through multiple parameters.

In the second part, the most extended, are analysed causes of the war, the *balance of power*, the various aspects of the relationship between law and war, nationalism and war and, finally, between population and war. In the analysis of the causes of war, Wright observes how each of the six major conflicts over more twenty centuries, they show a combination of idealistic,

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<sup>74</sup> Karl Deutsch, "Quincy Wright's Contribution to the Study of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* n. 14, vol. 4, 1970.

<sup>75</sup> Quincy Wright, "*A Study of War*", The University of Chicago Press, 1942. p. 5.

<sup>76</sup> Quincy Wright, "*A Study of War*", 1942, p. 8.

psychologic, political and juridical causes<sup>77</sup>, from which, however, it is difficult to derive some constants. For what concern the *balance of power*, he studies how it can be overcome and replaced by supranational integration, starting with an analysis of how this system does not lead to an increasing stability. In this context, the Wright's work has influenced many researchers, among the others Kenneth Boulding.<sup>78</sup>

In the third part, the focus is on the prediction of the war and the conditions for peace. Talking about these, Wright is one of the most exposed to the influence of international law and the establishment of the League of Nations as a possible path for peace. In this regard, he supported the idea that an international organization, and the international law itself, would have contributed to reduce sovereignty and independence of States, but in the interest of peace<sup>79</sup>.

Under the point of view of the ideation of a new international organization of all people, deeply present in the works of Quincy Wright, it should also be remembered the work done at the end of the thirties by the *Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (Csop)*<sup>80</sup>. For many authors there was no question that this Commission played an important role in the birth of United Nations<sup>81</sup>. The commission, composed of 47 members, enjoyed the support from the highest US charges such as the President Roosevelt, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. Wright puts his competences as an expert of international law, and his studies on wars, at the Commission's service and works primarily on developing regional systems.

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<sup>77</sup> Carolyn Stephenson, *Peace Studies: The Evolution of Peace Research and Peace Education*, University of Hawaii, 1990.

<sup>78</sup> Hakan Wiberg, *The Peace Research Movement*, in Wallensteen P. 1988, pp. 30-56.

<sup>79</sup> Peter Wallensteen, *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges*, Westview Press, London, 1988.

<sup>80</sup> Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (Csop), *Building Peace: Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace*, vol. 2, *A Statement of American Proposals for a New World Order June 6, 1941*, The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J., 1973.

<sup>81</sup> Robert Hillmann, "Quincy Wright and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace", in *Global Governance: A review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, n. 4, vol. 4, 1998.

In the fourth part of *A Study of War*, at last, is analysed the prevention and control of the war. Focusing on *prevention*, Wright goes far beyond the quantitative analysis, and thus it introduces an element that will become rooted in the same discipline of peace research.

We can say that the logical thread of Wright, aims to move this subject of study away from political and legal field into the empirical and quantitative one. Starting from that, an increasing number of scholars and authors studied the international relations as a subject which could be analysed by empirical processes. The Wright's work, of character nearly encyclopaedic, has the merit to show to the discipline of international relations that complex social phenomena, like war and revolution, should be subject to very sophisticated technical studies<sup>82</sup>. Within this methodological formulation, a critic addressed to Wright was to have use a too legalistic method in the identification of wars.

On the contrary of Sorokin and Richardson, Wright is member of the first peace research community. For this reason, he had published since the first number of *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, in 1957<sup>83</sup>. Philip Quincy Wright represented the connection between the first generation of founding fathers and the first generation of peace research.

### 2.2.2. *The Conflict resolution by Kenneth Boulding (1959 – 1968)*

Kenneth Boulding was one of the first and most important peace researcher, with particular attention to the theme of conflict resolution. Personally motivated as Quaker and professionally as a professor of economics, Boulding formed, with his wife Elise, a partnership that gave a great contribution to research on peace and conflict. As a member of the *Society of Friends*, it drew deep motivations in Quaker values linked to reconciliation and in their centuries-old tradition of activity for peace. Since the first years of study, indeed, Boulding considered war as the biggest problem of his time, and he strongly believed that:

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<sup>82</sup> John A Vasquez, Marie T Henehan, "*The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*", Lexington Books, 1999, pp. 376-77.

<sup>83</sup> Quincy Wright, "The Value for Conflict Resolution of a General Discipline of International Relations" and "Project for a World Intelligence Center", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, n. 1, vol. 1, 1957.



“[...] for the first time in the history of humanity, a world without poverty and without war is technically possible.”<sup>84</sup>

In 1957, at the University of Michigan, Boulding and a small group of academics, among which there was the mathematician-biologist Anatol Rapoport and social psychologist Herbert Kelman, they began publication of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, that in the following years would have become one of the leading magazines for the discipline. Moreover, in 1959, they created the *Center for Research on Conflict Resolution*<sup>85</sup>.

In general, the publications of Boulding had been focusing mainly on the prevention of war, in part to the limited results of the discipline of International Relations. His text *Conflict and Defence* advances the thesis of the decline of the nation state, while *Perspective on the Economics of Peace* argues that the discipline of international relations is not able to recognize this decline, but only to analyse it. For Boulding, if war is the result of intrinsic characteristics to the sovereign state, it can only be prevented by a reform of international organization and the development of capacity and information research. In fact, the collection of data and their processing could allow an advancement of scientific knowledge on conflict training, to replace the perception that is necessary to go through traditional diplomacy. For example, the first thematic of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, in March 1957, included an article by Quincy Wright containing the proposal for a world center for conflict prevention, certainly a pioneering idea<sup>86</sup>. For Boulding, in these years of formation of his thought, conflict resolution meant the development of a basic knowledge that allows the formation of "social data stations", developing a similar system to the network of meteorological stations. These centers can join together a chain of social, political and economic data, or can produce indicators of "temperature" and "social pressure" and prevent "hot fronts" in social and international relations.

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<sup>84</sup> Kenneth Boulding, *The Economics of Peace*, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1944.

<sup>85</sup> Hakan Wiberg, "The Peace Research Movement", in Wallensteen, P., 1988, pp. 30-56.

<sup>86</sup> Quincy Wright, "Project for a World Intelligence Center", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, n. 1, vol. 1, 1957, pp. 83-92.

Moreover, Boulding dealt with the phenomenon of the conflict as a social process that operates in many different contexts<sup>87</sup>. Considers it as an important part of specialized studies in international relations or other types of relationships, given that there are general theories for the conflict in every field, with similar elements and differences in them. He completed a work that defines the "pure theory", a complex theorization of general phenomenon of the conflict. The primary objective pursued was to show how most of the conflictual processes are neither random nor incomprehensible, nor without solution<sup>88</sup>. In fact, the conflict is seen as an activity seen everywhere. So, even Boulding, as theorized in parallel by John Burton, reserved to the concept of conflict a neutral value, and no negative one, as it was conceived by most sociologists and politicians of his time. The consequence of this last concept is the attempt to eliminate the conflictuality, and not the acceptance of its social function, connected to the study to understand the techniques of resolution and transformation. For Boulding, in fact, as a neutral phenomenon, conflict is socially necessary and desirable; what is despicable are its degenerations. It is therefore necessary to extend peaceful conflicts and reduce others, because peaceful conflicts can be vehicles of progress through ideas and knowledge.

In *Conflict and Defence*, Boulding identifies and builds theoretical models of a series of social processes related to conflict. The elaborate theory that results is neutral from the point of view of values, except in the last part where it analyses the implications of the theories developed in the light of its values. The observation of the conflict takes place on all levels: the conflicts between individuals, between groups and between organizations are carefully analysed and compared with each other. Moreover, he believed that the theoretical is divided into static and dynamic, in every system. The static equilibrium doesn't need properly to understand the conflict, but provides the framework within which the dynamic process moves. Dynamic systems are not stable, but change often and unpredictably.

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<sup>87</sup> Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defence, A General Theory*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1962.

<sup>88</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "Organization and Conflict", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, n. 2, vol. 1, 1957.

In his analysis on the conflict, Boulding makes extensive use of the Game Theory. This theory is largely linked to the decision-making, and, in this sense, it works in an abstraction layer that is not immediately usable for practical conclusions. What is interesting, is that according to the author, not everything can be explained by the Game Theory:

*“The real world, however, is much more complicated (or may be even simpler in some respects) than the Hobbesian universe of the game theorist. For a true understanding of conflict, we also have to examine love, affection, empathy, and community of feeling. These are concepts aliens to the theory of games.”<sup>89</sup>*

History, then, for Boulding is a "model" immensely more complex than mathematical models illustrated in his work.

In this perspective, Boulding also moved starting from mathematical and statistical studies of Richardson, applying and elaborating them on the basis of economic models, but recognizing the entailed limitations and simplifications if contextualized with the historical reality of international conflicts. For Boulding, Richardson was the most acute observer of "reaction processes" within the framework of proliferation of weapons and for that named these processes as "*Richardson processes*" in his honour.

One of Boulding concepts that most influenced the thinking of his contemporaries was that of "power." The author noted that the term "power" is ambiguous. On the one hand it means the power to command, order, coercion (hard power). On the other side it means the power to cooperate, to legitimize, to inspire, to persuade (soft power). The hard power has always been important in violent conflicts, but the soft power may be more important in the conflicts managed peacefully. Boulding called the hard power as a "*threat power*" ("do what I want or I'll do what you don't want"). He distinguished between two forms of soft power: *exchange power*, associated with an agreement or compromise approach ("do what I want and I'll do what you want"), and *integrative power*, combined with the transformation and solution of long-term problem ("together we can do something that is best for both"). Resolvers of

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<sup>89</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "Organization and Conflict", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, n. 2, vol. 1, 1957.

conflict try to shift the emphasis from the use of "threat" power to the use of "swap" power and "integration". Third parties, such as politicians and governments, can use all these forms of power<sup>90</sup>.

Finally, should be recalled that Kenneth Boulding was deeply evolutionary. This can be understood by many of his analysis also outside of the peace research, such as economy, where he worked for a fusion of economics and biology in evolutionary economic perspective which combine human values and technical features. Furthermore, he worked in a system of analysis to unify the social and natural sciences, never handling an idea of science that is non-regulatory. These two aspects, the evolutionist and the anti-regulatory, are clearly present in the *Friendly Quarrels* that Boulding addressed to Johan Galtung in 1977<sup>91</sup>: he opposed the dynamism of its evolutionism to the static nature of Galtung structuralism, and reported the regulatory risks of the Galtunian methodology.

### **International conflicts**

As regards the possibility of building a world government, for Boulding this may occur by conquest, or, as it is hoped, by agreement, but he is cautious determining whether it will be possible and if independent states will continue to exist in the same way they are organized now. Certainly, he considered necessary to develop institutions for control of conflicts. Boulding recognized the difficulties of arms control and international conflicts, but also he considered that would be a suicide for humankind to think these problems without solutions. This thought came from the fact that an international conflict can get out of hand and destroy the entire human race.

Talking about a world government, the author underlined the importance of this, but the problem, he stated, is how to build it concretely, no longer considering it a far utopian prospect. The problem lies in the absence of international responsibility that would bring together the contending parties. Furthermore, he believed was necessary to separate the love

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<sup>90</sup> Kenneth Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, Sage Publications, London, 1989

<sup>91</sup> Kenneth Boulding, *Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung*, in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 14, 1977.

for his own country, which is admirable, from the desire to complete independence, which could lead to destruction. This could mean joining a federal system, even though, overall, feels very difficult to build effective United Nations, even though international organizations, on certain and precise issues, already work.

Regarding the political sphere as a whole, Boulding affirmed that the State must resolve the problem of diversity: allowing a large number of specialized institutions within a single interdependent structure. Within a State, institutional representatives are not, *per se*, a guarantee of order, but they help government to take responsibility. The biggest danger for democracy occurs when it's not able to nominate a responsible government.

Finally, it is interesting to note that Boulding traced the history of peace movements in the United States and Western Europe, where, he believed, pacifism has its origin in the Christian churches of the early days. In general, he noticed how pacifism has always been sectoral and expression of a small number of people. In this analysis, he distinguished between *peace studies* and *peace movements* and adds:

*“Just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so peace is too important to leave to the pacifists”<sup>92</sup>*

Pacifist movements don't accept the institution “war”, but they don't do much to develop peace institutions. According to Boulding, therefore, condemning violence is not anymore enough, but create organizations to control it is crucial. Is necessary to go along the road of a strong global organization, and not of the world disarmament, as often supported by the pacifists.

### 2.2.3. *New Peace Research Institute (1968 – 1978)*

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<sup>92</sup> Kenneth Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 14, 1977.

International events of early and late sixties, such as the Cuban crises or the invasion of Czechoslovakia, raised a number of new questions in the peace research, concerning, among other things, the dangers of the Cold War, the mechanisms of domination and exploitation and the role of discipline in certain conflicts.

The seventies were the period of greatest growth of research institutions on peace. In these years, the differentiation within the discipline significantly increases. In particular, a series of “interdisciplinary” networks developed; within these networks there were prospects, visions and guidelines common to the most of the scholars belonging the peace research considered as a whole<sup>93</sup>.

This process of differentiation was normal in ordinary subjects, but was not the same for peace research because of its regulatory and transdisciplinary nature; both of these features have helped to broaden out the intellectual boundaries of the discipline, up to losing them. It seemed, in fact, that there was no social problem that cannot find a legitimate place in the peace research, and therefore constantly redefines the area of that discipline<sup>94</sup>. This such rapid spreading also created some problems: many scholars who define themselves as *peace researcher* failed to have an overall view of the field of study, and a research institute had only a few aspects represented within itself. This was physiological for a research field in expansion, but it could also be a strong limit, especially when you consider the transdisciplinary nature of peace research<sup>95</sup>.

Since 1968, in conjunction with the continuation of the war in Vietnam, a major dispute began within the peace research community, which ended only in the mid-seventies. In particular, the initial attack against what could be defined as the "first wave of peace research", was launched in 1968, in the *Journal of Peace Research* by Herman Schmid<sup>96</sup>, Swedish sociologist

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<sup>93</sup> Hakan Wiberg, “The Peace Research Movement”, in Wallensteen, P., 1988, pp. 30-56.

<sup>94</sup> Hylke Tromp, “Introduction”, in Unesco, *Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies*, Unesco, Paris, 1980.

<sup>95</sup> Hakan Wiberg, “The Peace Research Movement”, in Wallensteen, P., 1988.

<sup>96</sup> Herman Schmid was an eclectic intellectual, in his youth. Expelled from the Swedish high school at the age of sixteen, in the fifties he moved to Germany where he attended for a period the Berliner Ensemble, founded by Brecht in 1949. He was activist against nuclear in 1959. After being leader of

from the University of Lund. Schmid argued that peace research endorses naïve liberal assumptions on common interests, where, in his opinion, there wasn't anyone. For this reason, most of these peace researches, could be considered often valid only in a nuclear challenge between superpowers, but never in other situations. Moreover, the problem was not only of universal validity, but such theories were also deemed counterproductive regarding the achievement of peace and justice. Processes such as mediation, conciliation or compromise may be inappropriate in some contexts, such as, for example, when justice is totally on one side and the injustice totally on the opposite side. According to Schmid, many conflicts between powerful and weak states, national and international, they show asymmetries we have seen<sup>97</sup>. In other words, in some cases it may be more important to win a war than trying to stop it through techniques such as conciliation and mediation. In addition, Schmid argued that peace research gives too much importance to East-West relations and too little to the North-South relations.

To understand this debate, it is necessary to point out that the first researchers on peace were influenced by the historical context in which they operated, as clearly happened for the idealists and the realists, respectively, after the first and second World War. First generation, indeed, was affected by the political climate, in which the nuclear threat was the main issue. Since the early sixties, however, there were fewer concerns about the danger of nuclear war, and for the young European researchers of the North-South issues, Vietnam in particular, represented a more relevant issue than nuclear and totalitarianism.

In the second half of the seventies, it was possible to see three new significant trends. First of all, the division into different schools reduced the most radical debates within the peace research community, beginning to adopt the attitude of *laissez faire*. Then, some of more radical scholars ceased their activities relating to peace research, gradually taking off from this field of research. Finally, there was an adjustment path of the remaining radical thinkers from the enlargement of research topics, point that led to new growth in the eighties.

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the student party at the University of Lund, he moved definitely to Denmark where he founded, with other colleagues, the *Roskilde University Centre*, where he works now.

<sup>97</sup> Andrew Mack, "*Peace Research in the 1980s*", Australian Studies University Press, 1988

In the seventies, important new centers of study and research on peace were created, even outside of Western Europe and the US, with a new focus not only for post-graduate studies, but also for degree courses themselves. It was also realized the institutionalization of teaching of peace studies in universities. The first chair was established in 1971 at Colgate, in the US, while in Britain, in 1973, was established the Department of Peace Studies at the Bradford University, with Adam Curle<sup>98</sup> as first director of the first chair of peace studies of a British universities.

From 1968 to 1978, the *Missouri Peace Studies* Institute participated and created several training and research programs, but this activity ran out at the end of the seventies and mainly demonstrating a response to the situation in US foreign policy. This was an example of how some courses or research programs created in recent years, not rooted in a solid foundation of studies like the University of Michigan, were no lasting.

In the former West Germany, the peace research started later than other Western countries. At the end of the sixties, it was formed the academic association (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Frieden und Konfliktforschung*) to support peace studies and their institutionalization. In 1970 and 1971 two research institutes were founded, one in Frankfurt and the other in Hamburg, with five and ten research seats<sup>99</sup>.

Always in the seventies research institutions were founded in neutral countries such as Finland or Switzerland. For example, in Finland, the *Tampere Peace Research* Institute was established in 1970, and the following year launched the publication *Current Research on Peace and Violence*. In Switzerland, in 1972, the *Forschungsstelle für Politische Wissenschaft* was established in Zurich, under the direction of Daniel Frei, greatly busy in peace research field.

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<sup>98</sup> Charles Thomas William Curley (1916-1996), universally recognized as Adam Curle, was not only a professor of international fame, but also he had direct field experience in peace processes, on multiple levels. After the experience of the war, it became a Lecturer in *Social Psychology* at Oxford University where he was trained in historical and anthropological context. Later, he taught in several universities in India, Papista, Nigeria and Ghana, countries where he experimented *Peacemaking* techniques (mediation, problem solving, negotiation and political analysis). Before landing to Bradford, he moved to the Unites States as director of the *Harvard Centre for Studies in Education and Development*.

<sup>99</sup> Adams Robert, "New Peace Studies, Old International Relations", in Nobel, Jaap, "*The Coming of Age of Peace: Studies in the Development of a Discipline*", Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 1-24.



In 1975, outside of Europe, at Hiroshima, to be exact, the *Institute for Science of Peace* was based at the University of Hiroshima.

### 2.3. The Northern Context

The Northern region<sup>100</sup> in Europe has always offered alternative approaches and models to overcome the dilemma between security and prosperity. In this region, for various reasons, integration and fragmentation were balanced starting from the diversity. Concepts such as “security community” and “democratic peace” came to life and grew in this “cold” context of the European region.

The starting point was the observation that in this region (from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but more in general, is it possible to include also the 19<sup>th</sup> century) international conflicts (as well as internal) have been resolved without using armed confrontation. In these decades, wars have been brought only by invading super powers such as USSR invading Finland, in 1939, and Germany invading Denmark, in 1940.

Definitely, these countries share some common social and cultural elements, and this is one reason that most affected their peaceful coexistence. Integration and security have always interweaved exactly like the *Nordic Nexus* and the *Nordic Balance* did<sup>101</sup>. The former concept refers to regional aspects of *integration* among the northern countries. The latter doesn’t refer to an equilibrium among these countries, but to the *position* obtained under the point of view of strategic balancing between the USA and the USSR: combining many security method, these countries were able to maintain peace in their regions.

Alongside these elements in common, internal, historical and social diversities are numerous between the Nordic countries, exactly like their international politics. Before 1945, for example, their behaviours were differentiated, while the Cold War was perceived as unique.

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<sup>100</sup> For “Northern Region” here we mean countries as Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

<sup>101</sup> Bruce Olav Solheim, *The Nordic Nexus – A Lesson in Peaceful Security*, Westport, CT & London, Praeger, 1994

At the level of the United Nations, and other international organizations, these five countries were, and still are, considered as a group. This link has been gathering since 1989 with ever tighter processes of European and international cooperation. Overall, throughout the Cold War we can identify a constant and even transverse work for the creation of a "low-tension area".

Clive Archer shows us how these countries, geographically close, started from a system of States among which reigned the "*absence of war*", to a pluralistic community based on "*positive safety*"<sup>102</sup> with strong ties and interdependencies, through an intermediate stage in which the intra- and inter-state conflicts were resolved without recourse to violence.

Archer also outlines five elements that can qualify a "zone of peace":

- There should be no war among the states of the region;
- There should be no wars to other states;
- There should be no civil wars or armed insurrections among states of the region;
- There should be few or no intervention of the armed forces of states in the region or in other parts of the world (except in the case of international sanctions);
- There must be no, or almost none, expectation of war between states in the region.

This is what Archer calls a "*low-tension*" area.

The ideas of "positive security" and stable peace, introduced by Archer, can be found in the work of Karl Wolfgang Deutsch. The author analyses how the expectations that there will be no conflicts in the region, based on trust, have led, along with the creation of common institutions and a high level of interdependence, to a "*pluralistic security community*"<sup>103</sup>. Indeed, taking up the threads of commonalities and differences of the region, the definition of "pluralistic security community" would fit well into the area in account.

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<sup>102</sup> Is possible to observe a Galtunian reference in this expression deriving from "positive peace". The inclusion of the term "security" next "positive", to be understood as constructive and not just as the absence of threats, can be identified as a sign of the importance that this concept plays in the nineties in the tradition of peace research alongside, sometimes replacing the same concept of peace.

<sup>103</sup> Karl Deutsch, "*Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*", Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957.

### 2.3.1. *The theoretical impulse of Karl Wolfgang Deutsch*<sup>104</sup>

Karl Deutsch was a key philosopher for the definition of "Security Community". The added value, compared to other reflections on the strategic context, is to have highlighted the importance of relations between States in terms of interactions between their companies and the nature of their policies. The concept of sovereignty is therefore seen as an overcoming of a rigid distinction between domestic and foreign policy.

Within the pluralistic security community, a real and mutual guarantee develops, that its members do not fight each other, but they will find other ways to manage conflicts, thus creating a long period of peaceful changes. In this environment, public institutions, as well as social stratifications, have a crucial role. Next to these two elements, Deutsch also posed the compatibility of the higher values and the ability to respond to the needs of other actors. The basic value refers primarily to solidarity, the rule of law and consensus building. For Clive Archer the values identified by Deutsch were the foundations that pushed this region from a stable zone of peace, at the beginning of the twentieth century, to a safe community after the Second World War<sup>105</sup>.

That kind of relationships that is necessary to reach the construction of a security community can also be defined as "*stable peace*". Stable peace is defined as the previous step necessary

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<sup>104</sup> Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1912 - 1992), American social and political scientist of Czech origin, is known for its innovative use of quantitative methods, models of thought and analysis of formal systems in social and political sciences, and, in particular, in studies on war and peace, communication, political integration and cooperation. Deutsch dedicated his will and ability to what he called "*security communities*", and studied political integration processes to develop new concepts that led to fundamental insights about socio-political issues. He also worked to link theories with systematic evidences, and preferably quantitative ones. Deutsch was elected president of the *American Political Science Association* in 1969, of the *Political Science Association of Science* in 1976 and the *Society for General Systems Research* in 1983. From 1977 to 1988 he was director of the *Institute of Comparative Social Research* at the Science Center Berlin. Besides all this, Karl W. Deutsch is remembered for his strong political commitment, his studies and his strong moral passion.

<sup>105</sup> Pertti Joenniemi, Clive Archer, pp. 8-18; "*The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'*".

to get to a security community<sup>106</sup>. The concept of stable peace, actually, was introduced by Kenneth Boulding<sup>107</sup>, which was, as we have seen, one of the founders of peace research.

Another concept used was that of "*peaceful security*", which presents the region as a security system that emphasizes nonviolence, cooperation through the differences, and less violent approaches to international politics. This vision wanted to include both the model of regional integration of *Nordic Nexus*, and the model of regional security of *Nordic Balance* (previously seen). The objective was to hold together peace, security, prosperity and freedom.

A further element to be introduced in this arena, is democracy: what role does it play in the key of peacekeeping? Is it a decisive factor, or just is not enough, marginal, an element to take for granted? In Deutsch it was not addressed directly as a possible variable, and was taken for granted that obtaining the shared democracy can facilitate the formation of public institutions. In Kacowicz, conversely, democracy is considered, even if this author was as a pivotal point the expectations of peaceful change which occurred, over time within the region.

To give a concrete example, consider the case of relations between two great Scandinavian democracies, Sweden and Norway. Democracy, in these countries, has been, sometimes a source of conflict, sometimes a source of cooperation. With the introduction, by the Storting (parliament), of the principle of "*parliamentarism*", and many consequent limitations to the monarchy, some conflict were created in the union with the growing Norwegian part. Since 1905, with the independence of Norway, the Swedish democratization process has had a positive influence on the relationship between the two States.

### 2.3.2. *Prio, cradle and forge of Peace Research*

Within the Northern environment we must nominate the *International Peace Research Institute, Oslo*, (PRIO), especially because the Northern context was where the peace research developed more. PRIO is the research institute that more than any other contributed by the

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<sup>106</sup> Magnus Ericson, "*The Case of Norway and Sweden*", in Joenniemi, P., Archer, C. p. 24.

<sup>107</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "*Stable Peace*", University of Texas Press, Austin & London, 1978.

late fifties to this growth. There were born some of the most authoritative scientific journals of the peace field<sup>108</sup>, and among its founders and supporters there were scholars who gave life to peace research itself<sup>109</sup>. The path of reasoning must arrive to Johan Galtung, symbolic scholar of peace research, which we will discuss later.

The objective of peace research in the Scandinavian context, more in general, was that of developing a new perspective of international politics, primarily directed to the construction of an imagination that allows to overcome problems such as the nuclear weapons, so to ensure the survival of the human race. Hence here arose the key idea of peace research not only as a description, but also as an explanation and prescription of phenomena. Another analogous perspective was that the ultimate purpose of peace research was to create social justice for the advancement of mankind. Starting from these assumptions, the peace research emerged in the fifties and sixties in opposition, as in part already seen above, to realism and behaviourism.

### **Initiation and growth of Prio**

The figure of Johan Galtung was crucial in this context. Founder and director of the Prio in the first decade, he was initially formed as a mathematician, but after he obtained a second title in sociology, the subject he had taught at Columbia University and with which he was widely identified in the fifties, although he had worked from the beginning to the construction of a cross-disciplinary environment.

In his reconstruction of the first steps of Prio, Galtung explains how in 1959, to Norwegian Ministry of Education, the "peace research" expression sounds like "communist", "subversive"<sup>110</sup>, ingenuous, without scientific footing and politically subversive; because of this they proposed to define it as "conflict research". From the university came only the support of individual teachers, and the Research Council was in favour of funding individual aspects and not the total approach of peace research. The first economic support, in the end,

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<sup>108</sup> Reference to the *Journal of Peace Research*, the *Bulletin of Peace Proposal and Security Dialogue*.

<sup>109</sup> Suffice it to think about Johan Galtung or Nils Petter Gleditsch.

<sup>110</sup> Johan Galtung, *"Johan Uten Land. På Fredsveien Gjennom Verden, Aschehoug"*, Oslo, 2000, Eng. trad. Johan Lackland. *On the Peace Path through the World*.

did not come from the Ministry, but from *Sigurd* and *Erik Rinde*, father and son, respectively directors of a private institution and a private company. The Rinde covered the first costs with a grant of \$ 5,000 for the *Institute for Social Research in Oslo* (first headquarters of peace research), and \$ 500 for the American professor Otto Klineberg<sup>111</sup> as a consultant<sup>112</sup>.

The adventure of Prio officially began the 1<sup>st</sup> of June, 1959 with five researchers working on four lines of research, and its head office outside Oslo. The four lines of research were: 1) a review of the theories of conflict through various disciplines; 2) duels in medieval France as a way to resolve conflicts; 3) Khrushchev's visit to Norway in the media and in public opinion; 4) a comparative study on the public's behaviour with respect to nuclear energy. Among the research of the early years it was also included peace education (including an empirical and maieutic study that let the children to draw of peace and war until an educational program).

Cold War was not present. This is justified by Galtung, explaining that he preferred starting from a limited analysis for which it would be possible to reach realistic goals, instead of analyse a very wide topic without reaching clear goals. Another reason could be avoiding a topic that could bring divisions into Norwegian field.

At the same time, should be kept in mind that, in the late fifties and early sixties, the Galtung classes, at college, were filmed by the media, and this create a movement around him and the new idea of peace research. A television program was thus realized, dedicated to studies of Galtung and his four colleagues. Already in these movies, the thirty-year-old Galtung demonstrated a strong personality, great rhetorical skills and ability to make himself understood.

According to Galtung, the start of peace research led to break the vicious circle that awards scholarships in one area, only to those who had shown ability, but without a scholarship was

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<sup>111</sup> Otto Klineberg, from the Columbia University, is best known for having worked on the drafting of the US Supreme Court sentence that, in May 17, 1954, declared that segregation between whites and blacks in the Federal school system was not in accordance with the law. Galtung, also dedicated the second volume of *Essays in Peace Research* to Otto Klineberg, recalling the great contribution of content and support given by social psychologist to peace research of the early years

<sup>112</sup> Johan Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses", in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 2, vol. 22, 1985, pp. 141-158.

almost impossible to do so. Secondly, starting from 1963, both the Ministry of Education and the Norwegian Research Council started providing their financial support, either for specific projects, either for administrative and management costs. In 1963 the debate on the institutionalization of a research center for peace also came to the Norwegian Parliament where many parties supported the birth of Prio.

In the background, the Norwegian social context of the fifties was characterized by peace movements, strongly pushed forward by feminist movement and the middle class, supporter of social sciences because the developments linked to science could have fostered peace processes; whereas, in parallel, the foreign policy of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev gave, initially, hopes for détente.

Since the early years (1959-1963), so, the specific work of peace research, which was based on complex studies, such as, for example, the mathematical background of the quantitative studies, led to a separation from the general public, and this was the original objectives of peace research itself. Therefore, this brought to a more academic fold, while the peace movement in the sixties and seventies become even more radical. The peace research failed his attempt to work doing research "with people".

Another aspect linked to international politics, that should be considered, was the opposition of many peace researchers to the European Union membership, in that time European Economic Community (EEC). This because it was perceived as a union of rich countries opposed to poor countries, more as a "regional" and not a global agreement, unlike the UN<sup>113</sup>. In this context, an important role was played by a Norwegian socio-political peculiarity: being in favour to major agreements, but remaining strongly linked to its regional roots; this was the element which was perceived in contrast with the EEC.

In the meantime, while in 1964 the *Peace Research Journal* was launched, contemporarily the progressive growth of institute led to its full independence in 1966, strongly supported by Galtung. Later, after many internal discussions, even the University of Oslo joined it, creating

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<sup>113</sup> Johan Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses", *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 2, vol. 22, 1985, pp. 141-158.

a chair in peace research. The chair was assigned to Galtung in 1969 and, for a year, he divided his work and expertise between Prio and the university. The Norwegian researcher, gradually, started spending more and more time engaged in research and conferences abroad, and devoted smaller and smaller energies to form a group of new researchers for peace within the faculty. Also the ties with Prio become milder, and in 1976 Galtung decides to leave the co-direction of the *Journal of Peace Research*.

At the end of the sixties, when Galtung had entered the university as professor, declared that he would not have covered that seat for more than ten years and, so, ten years later, in 1977, he sent his letter of resignation. Inside the Prio, initially developed the idea, supported by Galtung, to apply for a "*collective chair*" divided between several researchers; the proposal didn't receive successful feedback from the University, and even among the usual supporters of the institute there was no positive opinion. The proposal to forward a single candidate from the Prio was not accepted and, in the end, three researchers of the Prio apply for the position.

In the eighties, a conservative government was set up and some researchers were afraid that Prio would have faced severe restrictions, or even be incorporated into other centers. The government constituted a commission to analyse the organizations that deal with international relations and peace research. The relationship that resulted was balanced and well-structured and had no direct impact on the Prio; the government did not hinder the center because he noticed the high quality of researches. Furthermore, in this decade, some moderate researchers opposed to specific researches in the military field such as those led by Gleditsch, from the mid-sixties, which now appear to undermine the very existence of the institution. This was because the Norwegian population was in favour of NATO, and it was not easy to find consensus on this researches.

In the late eighties and early nineties, the peace research developed a strong consideration from other disciplines, and cultivates relationships with political sciences.

### **Further developments**

Both universities and political institutions gradually recognized the Prio as an institute of excellence in research, and this can be seen from the funding received by the Ministry of



Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The center played a leading role as a *think tank*. The financing, however, ended up influencing the agenda of the center, giving life to the fear of Gleditsch. Overall, it should be noted that the Prio hardly wanted

to directly influence politics, because, to put it as Gleditsch, the peace researcher often advises and indicate the paths, but often advancing their proposals with modesty and discretion.

More generally, Norway stood in foreign policy as a "humanitarian power" and was engaged in various conflicts as a mediator and in different actions of Peacemaking, although with controversial results. The humanitarian force setting, and in particular mediation, was born thanks to high-profile research and recommendations from the peace research<sup>114</sup>.

As well as in the relationship with the government and with the movements, the Prio interacted with the military, also exerting a certain influence of content and setting. Until the sixties, actually, cooperating with the Defence was extremely complex, in particular because the generals who had supported the war, and were in command, reasoned strictly in terms of arms and military force; the focus was on the "main enemy", the USSR. In the seventies and eighties, a new generation of generals took over, more open to recommendations and to work on researches. In these years, new innovative works with alternative concepts were elaborated by Galtung, concepts such as the "*defensive defense*"<sup>115</sup>, that inevitably involved the military<sup>116</sup>.

From a point of view of the topics covered, currently the Prio is divided into three research programs: 1) *Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding*, 2) *Ethics*, 3) *Norms and Identities*, 4) *Security Programme*<sup>117</sup>. They, actually, are accompanied by a fourth area of research that is

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<sup>114</sup> Yiannis Papadakis, "*History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks*" on the "*History of Cyprus*", Prio Cyprus Centre Report 2/2008.

<sup>115</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Trans-armament: from Offensive to Defensive Defense*", *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 21, 1984

<sup>116</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research Volume II*", Christian Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1976.

<sup>117</sup> <https://www.prio.org/About/>

officially as an independent center, the *Centre for Study on Civil War*. At this center also must be added the detached Cyprus Centre.

First of all, it should be noted that the introduction of the research program *Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, Ethics, Norms and Identities* is a visible sign of how, in the nineties, the concept of "political identity" becomes increasingly important<sup>118</sup>. Secondly, the *Security Programme* took this name in 2004, instead of *Foreign and Security Policy Programme*, since Peter Burgess, philosophical background professor, took the role of Program Director. This area of research of the Prio is extremely close to the so-called "*school of Copenhagen*"; its philosophical background is mainly European, while other studies of the center are more on the Anglo-American trend.

The research methods include the game theories, economic theories, comparative case studies, historical sources and statistical quantitative analysis<sup>119</sup>. Quantitative analyses on war and conflict, in fact, still occupy a very important place within the Prio, and they are among the most used and cited researches by universities and institutions. Since the early years, Prio widely used the quantitative analysis, while in the seventies, with the prevalence of behaviourism, these had declined. From the eighties there has been a return of the attention towards quantitative studies that touched a peak of relevance in the context of studies on democratic peace. Overall, within the Prio, quantitative studies, the most cited internationally, coexist along with qualitative analysis within the different areas of research.

## **2.4. Peace Research by Johan Galtung**

The Galtunian peace research process developed obviously in that context that gave him life (the Northern context), and then was influenced, with the foundation of *International Peace*

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<sup>118</sup> J. Peter Burgess, Ola Tunder, "*European Security Identities: Contested Understandings of EU and NATO*", Prio Report, n. 2/2000, Oslo, 2000.

<sup>119</sup> PRIO, The Peace Research Institute Oslo, <http://www.prio.no/cscw>.

*Research Institute, Oslo (Prio)* - one of the European hubs of peace research. We will consider now some characteristics of Galtunian peace research.

Galtung defines peace research as the "research within the conditions – past, present and future – for realization of peace"<sup>120</sup>. In a broader definition, a discipline focused or *oriented*, with its point of gravity in the human sciences. His task is to explore the conditions that prevent, or facilitate, peace, either in the negative sense of the word (absence of war), either in its positive sense (integration, cooperation)<sup>121</sup>. *Oriented* science must not be confused, according to Galtung, with the *applied* sciences, who find in their functioning some applications in the promotion of values, a setting non necessarily desired. The uniqueness of the oriented science, instead, consists precisely in a prior justification of the value on which research is conducted, aspect for which a consensus of society would be required.

The Galtunian peace research is, by definition, contaminated by various disciplines, pure disciplines that are crossed and transcended in the search for methodologies, theories and practices for peace. The Galtung sociological background comes into play only to a limited extent, while an important role is played by international relations. One can also talk about the Galtung application of sociology to the international environment – even if in this perspective it seems forced the reference to Saint-Simon.

As evidenced by his bibliography, the peace research comes from an idea of Johan Galtung, that builds an interdisciplinary field on peace research. The peace research set by the author wants to go beyond those philosophical researches or those moral settings without any scientific foundations. In his mind, methodological researches have to provide a basis to identify dissonances between the value of peace and social and political action on a global scale. The first years of Galtung work on the peace research focused on two large scopes: the definition of the peace concept, and the application of structural-functionalism to the analysis of international system<sup>122</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*", in *Essay in Peace Research Vol. I*, p. 131.

<sup>121</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Peace Research*", in *Essay in Peace Research Vol. I*, p. 150.

<sup>122</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Peace Research*", in *Essay in Peace Research Vol. I*, p. 150.

The peace research, in Galtunian conception, remains a discipline partially action-oriented (research and action or research and intervention). Certainly, not all peace research is, or has been, characterized by this approach. As a common denominator, the peace research aims to provide, through its studies, accurate technical tools to help policy makers. Indeed, with regard to studies on peace and conflict, only the fundamental decisions are strictly ideological<sup>123</sup>.

Galtung, under the aspect of *action*, describes four main phases that peace research had to pass through until the seventies<sup>124</sup>. At the beginning, the idea was just to do propaganda among other intellectuals; afterwards, there emerged the classical idea of peace research that attempts to support researchers also in acting, starting from the implicit assumption that international politics was in the hands of a small elite. Then, in the subsequent phase, there was the idea of working on public opinion, on the masses as opposition to the elite in power. Finally, the fourth idea was to launch the international peace research in its specificity of *peace* and not just as *research*. Furthermore, he mentions the useful comparison with other professions:

*“Engineers know what is wrong with a bridge and how a proper bridge must be, but the actions necessary to achieve it, is a task left to the “workmen”, while in medicine a surgeon with a scalpel also does the action. The engineering has a high level of knowledge and a low level of capacity, so there is need workmen, that have a low level of knowledge and a high level of capacity. The medical profession has rather a high level of both, which obviously does not exclude the presence of nurses and the internal division of labor.”*<sup>125</sup>

Sometimes, just pursuing pure knowledge, you can come to results that give rise to accidental practical results.

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<sup>123</sup> Johan Galtung, “Peace Research”, in *Essay in Peace Research Vol. I*, pp. 150-166.

<sup>124</sup> Johan Galtung, “Structural and Direct Violence a Note on Operation”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 8, 1971.

<sup>125</sup> Johan Galtung, *Pace con mezzi pacifici*, Milano, Esperia, p. 63.

In general, the setting provided by Galtung to his peace research shows some critical issues; one of which regards the relationship between social consensus on core values and the risk of conditioning that funding can trigger on research. One of the main aspects of the problem, for the Norwegian author, regards the research topics that are promoted as they have a strong social consensus, and this triggers a conservative mechanism of maintaining the status quo. At the same time, however, Galtung believes that, for a discipline such as the peace research, is necessary to have a wide social consensus around one, at least, specific topics. Nevertheless, this come into contradiction with the need to avoid manipulation.

A further problem that occurs is that of the definition of the value of peace. Galtung argues that getting lost in the definition becomes a task too abstract and postpones scientific research. At the same time, though, Galtung tries several times to express this definition. In this perspective, the peace research of Galtung, prioritizing key conditions to obtain peace compared to the re-definition of idea of peace, could reflect the philosophical pragmatism which led the growth of the American sociology in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Kenneth Boulding criticizes Galtung both for the risks and for the normativistic setting. The Norwegian author answer sharing this concern, that he saw coming true in some project of the *United Nations University*. He believes that new strategies are needed to limit the *structural violence*, a theory of strategies, which means “theory of purposeful action”<sup>126</sup>.

In this way, within Galtunian works, a contradiction and a methodological problematic remain alive. The contradiction is that one between the critique to philosophical settings of definition of values and the wide presence of these. The methodological problematic, on the contrary, refers to the tension between normativism and scientific empiricism, which Galtung tries answer, leaving anyway gaps in knowledge.

#### 2.4.1. *Peace Research relationship with International Relations*

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<sup>126</sup> Kenneth Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 14, 1977

The discipline of international relations, for its part, offered many resources for peace researchers. Overall, though, in the early years, Peace Research had a revenge and detachment attitude towards the international relations, because these were identified as the status quo in international politics, and for the almost complete monopoly of discipline by the realist theories. In the past the opposition of these theories was one of the engines for the development of research for peace, and over the last twenty years there has been a strong rapprochement between the two disciplines. In addition to this, it should be noted that, in many countries, peace research originated mainly from a general trust that the social sciences could successfully face any problem, rather than by a clear and well-articulated critique of realism or any other approach to international relations<sup>127</sup>. Trust in social sciences that we can find in the Galtunian framework for scientific rigor in peace studies and in the above mentioned setting of Enlightenment origin.

First authors of peace research hardly referred to the "old" framework of international relations. Only a few of them analyse this discipline and its main exponents. Overall, this discipline was considered to be out of fashion, or not sufficiently engaged in rethinking global politics. It continued to be seen with suspicion because it was dominated by the emphasis on power politics, although, the schools of thought of international relations were different<sup>128</sup>, and they influenced the whole sphere of political science. Furthermore, in particular from the early sixties the development and the inclusion of strategic studies in international relations seems to confirm the idea that this discipline was closely linked to political power, to proliferation of weapons and the idea of deterrence. Many peace researchers remain reasonably suspicious of Strategic Studies, which were essentially based on conservative assumptions, such as the acceptance of hostility in international politics.

In any case, peace researchers took some resources from the discipline of International Relations, trying to use, in their analysis, methods and assumptions different from the practice of international relations. And while many just formed on political science or IR, others, who

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<sup>127</sup> Robert Adams, "New Peace Studies, Old International Relations", in Nobel, Jaap, *The Coming of Age of Peace*, pp. 1-24.

<sup>128</sup> Just think about the *behaviourism*, which developed in the US during the fifties.

came from different disciplines, believed that the integration of these domains had been able to bring great results<sup>129</sup>.

Another difference in the approach method, is that the peace research doesn't deal only with international conflicts, but with every form of violence, starting from inter-individual relations and between groups<sup>130</sup>. Galtung himself believes that the comprehension of violence, even at lower and smaller levels, can be crucial to understand the one at higher levels, and that solutions and transformations of conflicts must be sought starting with the individual. The author adds that the State-centric setting, which often dominates international relations, is limited; a better and valid approach for peace researchers could be starting from small peripheral problems and then gradually enlarge the focus.<sup>131</sup>

In this process, some researchers focus, for example, on civil wars and their role in I.R. civil wars, indeed, especially after the Cold War, led to the involvement of other countries, becoming conflicts that overcome the boundaries of a single state. The dedication of many peace researchers regarding low-intensity conflicts found that the traditional methods of fighting, and not only nuclear threat, continue to be relevant to the global politics.

Finally, Galtung criticises the name *international relations*. What it usually intended is "relations among states", or "relations among countries". "International relations" gives the idea that all countries are *uninational*. It would have been more correct to use the term "*world sciences*", similarly to "social sciences" and "human sciences"<sup>132</sup>.

#### 2.4.2. *Negative and Positive Peace*

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<sup>129</sup> Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", in *Essay in Peace Research Vol. I.*

<sup>130</sup> Simona Sharoni, "*La logica della pace: la trasformazione dei conflitti dal basso*", Edizioni Gruppo Abele, Torino, 1997.

<sup>131</sup> Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", in *Essay in Peace Research Vol. I.*

<sup>132</sup> Johan Galtung, *Pace con mezzi pacifici*, p. 43.

Within this international environment of peace research, the Norwegian author brings to life one of his most revolutionary concepts, considering the time when it was drawn up: the *positive peace* concept.

As regards the concept of peace, the Galtung's work moves to overcome, on the one side the philosophical framework of cosmopolitanism, and on the other side the classical structure of the Anglo-American ambit, with the aim of achieving peace. The definitions of peace clearly represent the basis of peace research and are a point of reference for scholars of the subject. Galtung, meanwhile, elaborates numerous peace definitions, that matures and changes over time, following the influence of the events.

The two most important and well-known definitions of peace are those of *negative* and *positive* peace, which are, apparently, two sides of the same coin.

### **Negative peace**

According to the author's definition, negative peace is the absence of any type of organized violence: when, for example, a ceasefire is enacted, a negative peace will ensue. We define it as "negative" because something undesirable stops happening (e.g. the violence stopped, the oppression ended), but it's not complete, nor long-lasting. This state of affairs is often not enough to implement a stable or complete reconstruction. If consensus on ceasefire is not followed by a re-approaching process between conflicting parties, nor by a gradual elimination of hatred, then the *structural violence* continues to fuel an implicit tension destined to explode again.

One of the most emblematic example of negative peace was the Treaty of Versailles<sup>133</sup>, which officially ended the First World War. The armistice took six months of negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the treaty.

Among all the provisions elaborated in the six months of Conference, probably, the most controversial point was represented by Article 231, also known as the *War Guilt Clause*. This

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<sup>133</sup> The Treaty of Versailles was one of the peace treaties at the end of World War I. It ended the state of war between Germany and the Allied Powers. It took six months of negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to conclude the peace treaty.



statement accused Germany of being responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. The text reported as follows:

*"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."<sup>134</sup>*

The biggest mistake was that the winning nations, out of revenge, dictated mandatory conditions without regarding the reasons of losing sides.

Thus, the clause forced Germany to disarm, imposed the loss of colonies but, above all, the country was ordered to pay to the states of the Entente a war compensation of 132 billion gold marks, an unimaginable amount. Already at that time, the economist John Maynard Keynes was in complete disagreement with the amount, considering it excessive and counterproductive.

The imposition of such war debt represented the main cause of an incredible inflation that put the German society on its knees, after the war destructions. The humiliation of a terrible defeat was aggravated by social and economic conditions unable to meet the basic needs. Everything was awfully aggravated by the economic crisis of 1929 that affected the entire world.

These assumptions inherited by Germany from the Paris Peace Conference, paved the way for the political extremism professed by Adolf Hitler, which was proclaimed Chancellor of the Reich in 1933.

The description of historical facts, sadly famous, stops here. The goal was to describe what could be the consequences of an incomplete peace, where parties continue to feel hatred between each other.

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<sup>134</sup> Marks Sally, *"The Illusion of Peace, International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933"*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1976, p.13.

## Positive Peace

This solution, analysed in the next paragraph, is made of integration, cooperation and social justice development<sup>135</sup>. It is filled with positive content such as restoration of relationships, creation of social systems which serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict. Peace is seen with a continuum that could reach the utopic maximum of good relations between all.

Kenneth Boulding criticized this division between positive and negative peace, considering it weak and too generalist. He considers that the negative peace would be more properly defined as a negative war, while positive peace seems to have little to do with the concept of peace<sup>136</sup>. Galtung replies that, in its construction, the two terms are not one the opposite of the other, but "*are two dimensions of the problematic of peace*"<sup>137</sup>. Reaching negative peace is therefore an indispensable step, but not necessarily long-lasting, since is not structural.

Galtung himself recognizes that the concept of positive peace can be very large, and due to this, he tries to overcome this limit following two theoretical paths: on one hand the concept of *integration*, and on the other hand the concept of *violence*<sup>138</sup>. While the first concept, albeit widely used, does not lead far, the concept of violence, instead, must be used as opposed of peace. The creation of peace seems directly related to the reduction and transformation of violence. The theory of violence in Galtung can be summed up in the triangle: direct violence - structural violence - cultural violence<sup>139</sup>. *Negative* peace is defined as lack of direct violence, whereas *positive* peace is the lack of structural violence<sup>140</sup>.

More deeply, however, Galtung aspires to a positive peace model on which he calibrates its theoretical and practical work; a model that could be taken as an example in the approach to

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<sup>135</sup> Johan Galtung, "An Editorial: What is Peace Research?", in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 1, pp. 1-4.

<sup>136</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung", in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 1, vol. 14, 1977

<sup>137</sup> Johan Galtung, "Introduction", in *Essay in Peace Research Volume V, cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>138</sup> Hans-Henrik Holm, "Johan Galtung and the Science of Human Fulfilment: from Petal-Picking to Mega Research", *cit.*, p. 29-30.

<sup>139</sup> We will analyse the concept of Galtunian violence in the Chapter n. 3

<sup>140</sup> Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", p. 130.

conflict resolution, leaving freedom of implementation to those are going to use it. Due to this, at the same time, he does not adhere, strictly, to any definition crystallized in time. This probably for two reasons. On the one hand, to favour its inclusive vision of many theories, and on the other, because an excessively rigid definition of peace, in the end, it might be an imposition or a hindrance:

*“For this to happen a very fluid, very flexible approach to peace will have to be taken; no rigid uni-dimensional architectonics based on the predilection for one single type of building unit; nor the imposition of one civilization over the other, trying to reproduce itself through concept imperialism and structural expansionism”<sup>141</sup>.*

## **2.5. Positive Peace elements and UN Peacekeeping**

The theoretical innovation introduced by the Norwegian sociologist consisted in transforming a multitude of pre-existing concepts, related to peace tradition or peace research, in operational elements regrouped under the concept of *positive peace*. This multitude of elements had the duty to guide the military intervention, or the post-conflict reconstruction, to a long term stable situation.

Exactly due to this prospect of shift from theory to the “field”, the UN Peacekeeping adopted the concept as a cornerstone for the missions’ mandates construction.

In the development of this paragraph, we will analyse in deep the elements of *positive peace*, thanks to the support of four tables: 1) Military and Security elements; 2) Political and Constitutional elements; 3) Economic, Social and Psycho-Social elements; 4) International Integration elements.

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<sup>141</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace*”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, n. 2, vol. 18, 1981, p. 23.

These graphic representations, furthermore, will be reported again in the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter, when the United Nations Operation in Mozambique will be analysed through the *positive peace* perspective.

## Positive Peace Elements

### 1) Military and Security

| Short term  | Middle term   | Long term  |
|---|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separation of factions</li> <li>• Security zones</li> <li>• Disarmament</li> <li>• Demobilization</li> <li>• Separation army police</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of the new national army</li> <li>• Integration the national police</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demilitarization of politics</li> <li>• Transformation of <i>cultural violence</i></li> </ul> |

The peacekeeping system provides troops to promote stability and security, and to protect personnel and property.

The Blue Helmets first action is addressed to the separation of conflicting parties, in order to avoid further violence, allowing the creation of humanitarian corridors to aid people.

Today, the principal tasks are:

- *Monitor a disputed border*: this activity of monitoring is widespread mainly in the Middle East, Norther and Central Africa and South East Asia;
- *Monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas*: this practice has proved crucial because brings parties to respect the ceasefire or peace agreement signed.

Troops deployed on the ground discourage many attempts of violence, especially *direct violence*, referring to Galtung's definition.

- *Provide security across a conflict zone*: this is one most difficult element to implement. Provide security means covering large areas of the state, cities, villages trying to reach and protect people who are threatened by conflicts, terrorist groups, famine and hunger. Security is almost always related to the feeling of trust, both among people rescued, and in respect of the troops on the ground.
- *Protect civilians*: this activity, which falls into "general security", is implemented, not only in cases conflicts, but also in circumstances of natural disasters (e.g. the tragic tsunami that struck Thailand and Indonesia in 2004), massive migratory phenomena (the support of UNHCR revealed crucial in monitoring and helping refugees) and terrorist attacks. This practice is addressed to all those events who can endanger population and innocents people.
- *Assist in-country military personnel with training and support*: the in-country military assistance represents the medium/long term provision provided by mandates. The assistance and training of local troops, police and specialists has the duty to help and teach the country to "walk on its own feet again ", replacing the UN troops once withdrawn.

### **United Nations Police:**

United Nations Police reinforces and re-establishes security by patrolling communities, advising domestic police services, ensuring compliance with international human rights standards, restoring and promoting public safety and the rule of law.

The police corps are called to play a key role in security stabilization because they mainly act at local level, providing expert assistance and training for the police of host-state. Furthermore, the UN police officers cooperate to assist domestic police services with strategic planning and providing technical support.

**Disarmament:**

*“[is the] collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population.”*

What DDR process does is contributing to make the social and political environment safer so that the recovery can begin. Furthermore, it helps ex-combatants to adjust their life once the conflict is finished, and support them to become active participants in peace processes.

**Demobilization:**

*“[is the] formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants.”*

Demobilization phase is, formally, the step before the reintegration (as we will see in “economic and social” table) of combatants within the social system.

**National Army**

A parallel activity to that of the demobilization is the constitution of a new National Army. This procedure is often reported in the mandates and provides for a conversion of combat troops into national soldiers.

In the Mozambican case, the creation of the national army was hindered by the fact that soldiers belonged to enemy factions (FRELIMO and RENAMO). Due to this it was really hard to build mutual trust between them.

More in general, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of military sphere is the first step towards the elimination of *structural violence*.

## 2) Political and Constitutional

| Short term  | Middle term  | Long term  |
|---|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of government transition problems</li> <li>• Constitutional reform</li> <li>• Preparation of elections</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overcoming the problems related to the second round of elections</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of <i>good governance</i></li> <li>• Respect of Human Rights</li> <li>• <i>Rule of law</i></li> <li>• Development of civil society</li> </ul> |

Under the political and constitutional framework are regrouped those processes for construction, or reconstruction, of stable political and institutional structures. States with fragile institutions, in fact, have more difficulties managing contrasts and internal conflicts that could explode again. It can also happen that authoritarian political forces take control of power, repressing any claim from minority ethnic or national groups, whose rights cannot be guaranteed because of the absence of democratic principles. The more the political system is fragile, the more probable is that it fuels *structural violence*, and then tensions.

Even if the role played by the UN is crucial, the problems, however, arise again once the assistance finishes, often causing dependence of local institutions from the international organizations, without being able to establish an effective "*consolidated democracy*"<sup>142</sup>.

The keystone elements of democratization processes represent the instruments for the realization both of the institutional dimension of democracy and legislation itself.

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<sup>142</sup> J.J. Linz & A. Stepan, "*Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, Southern America and Post-Communist Europe.*" Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1996.

- *Multiparty system and free political competition*: this system plays a dual function: on the one hand that of being the necessary channel for the expression of the needs and will of the citizens, while on the other one that to represent the most appropriate means for peaceful resolutions and conflict mediation.<sup>143</sup> The importance of this dynamic between parties is even greater if we are in front of multi-ethnic and divided society. Respect for democratic methods of political competition can in fact contribute significantly to the degree of integration of communities and institutions.
- *Electoral Processes*: elections represent an important step for the creation of public institutions and legitimate governments; are a method of division of power according to pre-established criteria and democratic rules.

In most cases, the support of the international community in the electoral process is, initially, almost total. It consists in financing, technical assistance and training, preparation and conduct of elections. After a number of years, this support should be reduced to a simple monitoring.

But are elections, for their own sake, symptom of consolidated democracy? They are not, if in the aftermath of peace agreements, the only active parties are those nationalists, which do not guarantee a representation of the entire population. It is necessary, therefore, to focus on the creation of political parties with a wider base, supported by national political platforms and plans of action that pursue the interests of all citizens.

- *Constitutional Elaboration*: this is another fundamental element of positive peace on long term. Peace agreements are often enacted by the UN, with small cooperation of local actors. Through these agreements, the future rules and behaviours between citizens and institutions are established, together with mutual trust between political groups and individual.

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<sup>143</sup> Sumantra Bose, *"Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist partition and international intervention"*, London, Hurst&Company 2002.



The process of constitutional elaboration is directly linked to the one of preparation of peace agreements, and the new Constitution will represent the set of rules and reference principles, for the foundation of the new state. Exactly like elections, this process must not occur hastily, because it would end up being fragile and incomplete. Due to this, the UN has to follow a boom-up path of education of people and institutions, as well. All this is necessary so that the citizens consider the Constitution as a democratic instrument to defend the new institutions from possible attacks.

This process should be used to develop new rules and legitimize the creation of a new political center for a stable and lasting peace; the new Constitution defines the shape of Government, creates the foundation of the relationship between citizens and the State and defines the social contract that regulates the operation of every organized society.

### **Rule of Law**

When the process of adoption of the main legislative acts is completed, the political forces agree on the rule of law and on the interests of citizens. Literally:

*“Derived from internationally accepted standards, the World Justice Project’s definition of the rule of law is a system in which the following four universal principles are upheld:*

1. *The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under the law.*
2. *The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property and certain core human rights.*
3. *The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.*

4. *Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.*<sup>144</sup>

Rule of Law is the legal and political framework under which all persons and institutions, including the State itself, are accountable. Upholding the rule of law is essential to successful implementation of peacekeeping. It requires strengthening confidence in police, justice systems and correctional services. Establishing respect for the rule of law is fundamental to achieving a durable peace in the aftermath of a conflict. Laws need to be publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated and be consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Peacekeeping works to strengthen police, justice and corrections institutions, as well as the institutions that can hold them accountable.

In a post-conflict situation, very often, the police stations, courthouses and prisons are destroyed or razed. Key legal records and other necessary materials are often missing. Typically, the independence of the judiciary is weak, their salaries low and often unpaid, providing a fertile ground for corruption. Prisons suffer from extreme overcrowding, lack of food, absence of adequate medical care and poor sanitation. Political interference is often rampant and oversight mechanisms non-existent or biased.

What the DPKO aims to do when faces the situation above, is to address these three institutions at the same time, using its own police corps, re-establishing the judicial system, albeit momentary, and also using corrections officers. On short and medium term, the Department aims to stabilize the local security, and for this reason he works to reconstitute, and rebuild, the criminal justice system. During these processes, peacekeeping operations work together with the authorities and local institutions to develop comprehensive plans that include rebuilding or constructing new police stations, court houses and prisons. At the same time, the missions seek to find cooperation in the Government that houses them, to develop

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<sup>144</sup> World Justice Project, “What is the Rule of Law?”, <http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law>, 2009.

and train local capacity, and look for the human resources required to make these institutions work.

The assistance to the rule of law reconstruction is based, obviously, on United Nations standards that reflect:

- International human rights law;
- International humanitarian law;
- International criminal law;
- International refugee law.

Restoring the rule of law is a long-term process, and the UN, together with the DPKO, are developing the expertise that can quickly deploy peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions around the world.

### **Electoral assistance**

One of the most important steps for a society that emerges from conflict are elections. Once the parties to the conflict agree to cease fire, often the elections processes are provided in the peace treaty itself, and represent an important step towards the legitimation of a new state. UN Peacekeeping mandate are supposed to play a central role in these processes.

In recent years, DPKO has assisted election in many countries (DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Liberia and the Sudan) providing several kinds of assistance:

- Technical assistance: it consists of many aspects like the deployment of troops and police who have the duty to patrol and monitor if voters can exercise their voting right without fear of violence; experts working on the reform of electoral laws ascertaining of make it equitable; logistical support in the form of distribution of ballot material.

- Organization and monitoring of elections: in some cases, which have become quite rare in the last decade, the United Nations is called upon to assess the integrity of the electoral process.<sup>145</sup>

### 3) Economic, Social and Psycho-social

| Short term  | Middle term  | Long term   |
|---|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Essential services</li> <li>• Communications</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rehabilitation of the re-settled population</li> <li>• Demobilization of soldiers</li> <li>• Reconstruction of infrastructures</li> <li>• Demining</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long term macroeconomic policies</li> <li>• Local sustainable development</li> <li>• Equal distribution</li> </ul> |

The country's reconstruction steps through the recovery of economic framework, the reconstruction of the social fabric and of mutual trust. Therefore, while on the one side a more equal distribution of resources permits to fill the gap of economic diversity, on the other side a social reintegration leads the country to progressive elimination of *structural violence*.

#### Humanitarian Assistance

Nowadays, the DPKO always reports, as main objective, the "POC", Protection of Civilian. Together with the Department of Field Support (DFS), they work to improve performances in this area, trying to create comprehensive action plans and conceptual frameworks. Important role is played by training courses in protection of civilians, addressed to those experts who are going to be deployed on the fields, such as police and troops.

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<sup>145</sup> On November 2010, the Head of the Peacekeeping operation in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI), was asked to certify the election of President Alassane Ouattara, after the arrest of the incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo.

Implementation of *POC* is becoming harder and harder because of innumerable challenges:

- Prohibitive rescue and protection conditions, insufficient resources, or partners who lack will or capacity to act properly;
- Troops and experts are often deployed within an unrealistic expectation that they will be able to protect everyone, everywhere and every when;
- The dynamism of conflicting environments tends to change constantly, like the dunes in the desert, requiring great ability to adapt itself to changing conditions.

### **Communications and Infrastructures**

Every post-conflict situation reports a widespread destruction of communication routes and infrastructure. From this derives an almost total impossibility of communication between the various areas, not only between the center and periphery, but also between the most important hubs of the country.

The reconstruction process of interconnections requires the efforts both of civil engineering and the army experts. Main goal is to render usable again the main ways of communication and telecommunication.

### **Reintegration:**

*“[is the] process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level.”<sup>146</sup>*

Reintegration is the third phase of DDR, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The psychological purpose of this provision is fundamental: allowing society to regain the strands lost during the war – more important in case of civil war.

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<sup>146</sup> United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, “*What is DDR?*” Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005.

## Human Rights Protection

The HR Protection represents, today, a core pillar within the UN ethic, and the Peacekeeping Department. All staff involved in peace operations must ensure the protection and promotion of human rights through their actions. To ensure that protection can be implemented at 360 degrees, some missions (e.g. DR Congo, Afghanistan, Darfur) include specialized teams in HR Protection that focus exclusively in this field.

The DPKO missions always follow human rights-related mandates, trying to implement HR across all the activities. Main goals are, therefore, the protection and promotion of HR (short and long term), empowering the population to assert and claim their human rights and enabling State and all the other national/international institutions to respect their human rights obligations and uphold the rule of law.

A really close cooperation is implemented with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which provides for expertise, guidance and support to the missions.

Typically, activities of DPKO, in the field of Human Rights, include:

- Human rights monitoring, investigations and analysis;
- Preventing human rights violations, including through mission-wide early warning mechanisms;
- Responding to violations of human rights, including support for accountability;
- Advocacy, intervention and reporting;
- Human rights advice, support for institutional reform and capacity building, working closely with host governments, national institutions and civil society.<sup>147</sup>

When we proceed in the description of various aspects - such as those of the positive peace - it is important to keep in mind that between the enumeration and the implementation exists an enormous difference. Where, in fact, on paper, boundaries are clearly visible and precise,

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<sup>147</sup>United Nations Peacekeeping, *Human Rights Protection*, 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/humanrights.shtml>,

and details allow to place an action in a section or in another, when we shift our focus on the field activities, only then we are able to realize how the reality mixes elements. Boundaries of factors become blurred, and detach themselves from the representation on paper. This is the main reason why the United Nations combine analysis of previous missions, so to have retroactive perspective, and training of troops and police, implemented by experts on the field, so to prepare soldiers and specialists to the environment that awaits them.

**Mine Clearance**

This process was largely implemented during the ONUMOZ mission (1992-1994), as we will see. Pursuing safety of people, special army units spend their experiences in land mine clearance. This procedure, very expensive and often prolonged in time, proves crucial in order not to cause more dead and wounded in the aftermath of the conflict.

**4) International Integration**

| <b>Short term</b>  | <b>Middle term</b>   | <b>Long term</b>   |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to peace process</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfer of power to local control, avoiding interferences</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integration in regional and international networks</li> </ul> |

The international integration process could take place through several channels, such as the political, diplomatic than up to the economic one.

Politically speaking, the deployment of experts for the monitoring of electoral process, or experts in constitutional field who advise the host-government institutions on what might be the best constitutional structure applicable.

Foreign investments represent another possibility, for the helped country, to be involved (or re-introduced) within the international economic networks. If the government is able to make

good use of FDI (foreign direct investments)<sup>148</sup>, these can help support the reconstruction, firstly, and then the economic growth. Clear example of international economic integration was the case of loans requested by the Mozambican government, between 1990 and 1994, to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, trying to give new life to a kneeling economy.

Diplomatic relations, finally, can be used to strengthen the international bonds, pursuing the trust of foreign countries.

The elements presented above descriptively synthesize what give shape to *positive peace*. The parallelism between theoretical and practical field proves to be crucial to better understand how these provisions are implemented by the UN Peacekeeping. In the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter I will prove it.

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<sup>148</sup> The *Foreign Direct Investments*, FDI, are the most common macroeconomic method for foreign financing.



*“The worst sin towards our fellow  
creatures is not to hate them,  
but to be indifferent to them.  
That's the essence of humanity.”*

George Bernard Shaw

## CHAPTER 3

### Approaches to conflict resolution by Johan Galtung

In the second chapter we have analysed the evolution of peace research, the fields that this word covered in the past, and the fields it covers now. We have seen how this concept has become, over time, a very popular field of study, involving more and more scholars, international institutions and research centers. We should not forget, however, what Norberto Bobbio says about peace:

*"Man has begun to reflect about peace starting from the state of war, from what threatened his life, and his properties, what made precarious his existence conditions"*<sup>149</sup>

And he continued:

*"He began to aspire to the benefits of peace, starting from the horrors of war."*<sup>150</sup>

Then again we must emphasize the importance of the analogy peace-war, because we can discuss about the former only in relation to the latter. What I will try to do in this part of my research is to investigate the concept of conflict and its main causes (for example violence); the last part aims to go deeper in the Galtunian conflict transformation, or Trascend Method, so to build a bridge to introduce us to chapter four. Obviously, once again, my *"Virgilian guide"*, along this path, will be represented by Johan Galtung<sup>151</sup>.

### 3.1. The definition of conflict

Starting from the observation that between the two terms of the analogy peace-war, the former is the weak one, and the latter is the strong one, the state of peace can be defined

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<sup>149</sup> Norberto Bobbio & Sergio Romano, *"PACE, Concetti, problemi e ideali"*, Enciclopedia Treccani, 1989.

<sup>150</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>151</sup> The reference is to the Dante's masterpiece: The Divine Comedy. In the work, the Roman poet *Publio Virgilio Marone* guides Dante through the Hell and Purgatory.

only preliminarily defining the state of war. Hence, it can be stated that a state of war exists when two or more political groups (individuals, factions or states) find each other in a conflictual relationship, whose solution is left to the use of force. The definition “*political groups*”, adopted here, is used in “Weberian” sense<sup>152</sup>, that includes independent groups, equipped with their own strength, that cannot be classified in the technical-legal concept of State. A conflict situation occurs then, whenever the needs or interests of an individual or of a group are incompatible with those of another individual or another group, and, therefore, cannot be satisfied unless one actor, or the other, is damaged. The most typical case of conflict is that of competition among several individuals or groups for possession of a scarce good, that is in the other’s territory. This source of conflict has been analysed so many times that it has become a phenomenon whose name is “territorialism”<sup>153</sup>. Another reason for conflict, which can degenerate into riots or war, according to the gravity of the case and the quantity of the individuals involved, is the defense of rank or hierarchy, which allows those who occupy the highest levels to enjoy certain privileges. Naturally, not all conflicts are destined to be solved with the use of force. The war, as resolution of a conflict among political groups *via* use of force, is one of the way to solve a conflict, generally used when the peaceful ways haven’t worked.

The distinction between situations in which conflicts are usually solved with agreements, and situations in which conflicts are solved with the use of force, it corresponds to the distinction between “*agonistic state*” (which provides substantive and procedural rules concerning the conduct of the conflict), and “*polemical state*” (which provides rules for peaceful settlement of disputes)<sup>154</sup>. The boundaries of these two states become blurred at international level; in fact, while at internal level the use of force is monopolised by state institutions, within the international framework the rules for a peaceful settlement are less effective because it

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<sup>152</sup> Max Weber, “*Economy and Society. An outline of interpretive sociology*”, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1978. According to the German sociologist the birth of political power takes place with the transition from closed social groups to political communities, until the Modern State.

<sup>153</sup> Paola Viganò, “*Territorialism*”, Studio Report, Harvard University Graduate School of Design, 2014.

<sup>154</sup> Norberto Bobbio, “*Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace*”, p. 35, Il Mulino, 2009.

doesn't exist a coercive power (higher than the actors), that can obtain compliance of the agreement by force.

Furthermore, conflict' situations can be characterized by a significant presence of high levels of violence, which can manifest in different ways and modalities. Violent conflicts take military nature when violence is organized and collective<sup>155</sup>.

Once defined the state of war, we can derive from it the state of peace (that we have seen previously).

### 3.1.1. *Background of conflict resolution*

During the last decades of the last century the concept of *conflict resolution* has undergone many changes in meaning, sometimes even substantial<sup>156</sup>, that have altered the meaning. I will try, in this paragraph, to summarize and explain the areas now covered by this concept.

#### **Conflict resolution**

Known also as *reconciliation*, this was the original term, introduced in the sixties, to specify the process by which it was possible to achieve the objective of ending, or stopping, a conflict situation.

In this process, an important role is played by committed group members who try to solve the conflict by communicating information (in a constructive way) about their ideologies and the motives that brought them to conflict; they also engage in collective negotiations<sup>157</sup>.

The dimension of conflict, moreover, is always paralleled by different perceptions of resolution dimension: *cognitive resolution* is the way that actors involved "understand" and view the conflict (perspectives, understandings and attitudes); *emotional resolution*, on the

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<sup>155</sup> Johan Galtung, *"Solving Conflicts. A Peace Research Perspective."*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, Institute for Peace, 1989, 62 pp.

<sup>156</sup> For example, is normal nowadays to use the expression "*conflict resolution*" referring, also in a generic sense, to the act of interacting with a conflict, in order to reduce, control and sedate.

<sup>157</sup> Donelson R. Forsyth, *"Group Dynamics"*, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2009.

other side, is how the actor feel the conflict; *behavioural resolution* consists in trying to understand what the opponent is going to do.

In the last years, numerous procedures of conflict resolution have developed, that go beyond the classic negotiation; these are mediation, mediation-arbitration, diplomacy, and creative peacebuilding<sup>158</sup>.

### **Conflict management**

This expression was introduced in the seventies, and it recognised the conflict as a natural element of the social context, both national and international, which needs to be optimally managed by highly qualified personnel. This new conflict concept recognized that the idea according which conflicts can be definitively resolved is illusory and misleading. Interpersonal relationships tend to be, because of their implicit nature, conflictual; what changes is the level and the violence of the conflict<sup>159</sup>.

Today conflict management represents the process which aims at limiting the negative aspects of conflict, increasing, on the other hand, all the positive ones. The main goal is, therefore, improving communication and cooperation between groups, and setting a functional organization that can create the condition to enact the process of conflict resolution<sup>160</sup>.

### **Conflict settlement**

During the last phases of the Cold War, while the fall of the Soviet Union was perceived as imminent, and several local and regional actors were beginning to emerge again or asking for independence (actors curbed by the two super powers during the Cold War), within the international system it was possible to witness a substantial intensification of tensions. In front

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<sup>158</sup> Bernard Mayer, *"The Dynamics of Conflict: A Guide to Engagement and Intervention"*, ed. by Jossey Bass, San Francisco, California, 2012.

<sup>159</sup> M.K. Kozan, *"Culture and conflict management: A theoretical framework"*, art. In the *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 1997, 8, 338 – 360.

<sup>160</sup> Kristin J. Behfar, Randall S. Peterson, William Trochim, *"The critical role of conflict resolution in teams: A close look at the links between conflict type, conflict management strategies, and team outcomes"*, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 2008, p. 170–188.

of this emergency created by the proliferation of so many micro-conflicts – for whom management could ever be well prepared nor equipped, and no one had the possibility to plan the resolution on a short term – a new approach makes its way through those already existing. This new conflict approach was aimed at the “settlement” of the conflict, implemented through the strenuous research for compromises, where the main goal was neither the satisfaction of the parties, nor the achievement of a stable conflict situation, but it was the achievement of a result that avoids phenomena with high risk of escalation (concept that comes close to practice of *crisis management*)<sup>161</sup>.

In the conflict settlement practice, the parties consciously pursue a low-profile objective, the compromise indeed, and this leads them to be satisfied with relatively stable results. The positive aspect of this approach to the conflict consists in the fact that, even because of the lack of temporal resource, begins to emerge the idea that is necessary (for both parts) to concentrate on the real and objective reasons that lie at the roots of the conflict; along this path, there is no time nor space for all idiosyncratic factors, as well as for all the other collateral issues that have done nothing but foment the conflict<sup>162</sup>. What is positive of this type of approach is that compromise solutions don't undermine the fundamental interests of parts and, at the same time, enable them to obtain ceasefires in exchange for reciprocal concessions, substantially not very significant both from an objective point of view and an image point of view.

The management of conflict settlement process, often prolonged in time to avoid further clashes or conflicts (as we have seen), becomes a crucial aspect of confrontation, often with the necessity to entrust it to a third party. This acts as a guarantor and, sometimes, interposes himself between the parties (even physically), ensuring the respect for compromises' agreement, or avoiding physical interactions that, given the persistence of tensions, would

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<sup>161</sup> Mary E. King, Cristopher A. Miller, “*Teaching Model: Non-Violent Transformation of Conflict*”, University for Peace, 2006.

<sup>162</sup> Marc Weller, Katherine Nobbs, “*Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts*”, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.

risk to bring out the problem again. From this point of view, the UN Peacekeeping Operations constitute the operational instrument of conflict settlement.

### 3.1.2. *Argumentative strategies*

Affirming that international crisis (and conflicts) are, today, the main object of study for the discipline of conflict resolution, and all related activities, is definitely not something new. One of the first scholars to provide an accurate definition of the concept of international crises was certainly Michael Brecher<sup>163</sup>. In 1997, in one of his most famous work, "*A comprehensive study of the causes and consequences of war in the twentieth century*", to which he worked with Jonathan Wilkenfeld, he observes that an international crisis can be generally defined by two conditions:

- A. Interactions between two or more States change in the typology, presenting an increase of the disrupting charge, with a relative (and natural) increase of the possibility of military hostilities;
- B. This type of eventualities can destabilize relations between States (a sort of chain reaction), endangering the structure and the organization of the international system as whole<sup>164</sup>.

This being said, a State may be considered protagonist, or in any case involved, in an international crisis, when its leaders perceive three additional general conditions:

- 1. A threat to fundamental national values;
- 2. The need to take decisions within limited periods of time;
- 3. A significant increase in the possibilities of being involved in military hostilities.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Michael Brecher (14 march 1925) is a political scientist and professor of Quebec. He obtained a doctorate in international relations from Yale University in 1953. He is professor since 1954 and holds the Angus Chair of Political Science at McGill University.

<sup>164</sup> Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "*A Study of Crisis*", University of Michigan Press, 1997.

<sup>165</sup> After 11 September 2001, it is clear how among the actors which can promote hostility, violence and terror at international level, causing international crisis, there are also non-state actors, such as the international terroristic organizations (for example the IS), and the international criminal organization.

In the context of the international political events and of conflict resolution, great importance is attributed to those factors that could cause conflicts, factors, which in their turn, could be defined by many social and cultural aspects. Culture is the common shared vision on which the organizational structure of society is based; a cultural fact is represented by the set of rules, preconceived roles and habits, before becoming, eventually, also legal element; there exists, finally, a culture of communicating and interacting. Although the attention given to the cultural component has never been in the background, in the studies on the conflict, it was concluded that this important component represents a particularly difficult element to influence, especially at the collective level. Attempting to change beliefs, ideas, values and perspectives becomes increasingly difficult as we move from a small context up to entire communities<sup>166</sup>.

Taking these considerations and bringing them in the conflict resolution context, it is clear that, nowadays, we have a quite sophisticated knowledge in communicative-cultural environment as regards the conditioning, for both individuals and entire communities. The problem is that the practical results of this knowledge are unstable and have a relatively weak impact.

The schematic representation that follow aims to illustrate, on one side, the correlation between the evolution of the conflict and its evolution during time; on the other side, it analyses the way in which the actors communicate with each other defending the reciprocal positions. So, what will be possible to deduce from scheme will be the correlations between communication methods and quality of conflict.

**Argumentative strategies in competitive communication context<sup>167</sup>**

| Typology      | Definition   |
|---------------|--|
| <i>Ad rem</i> | When we refer only to the object of argumentation (this is the most honest and correct form of confrontation). |

<sup>166</sup> Carlo Simon Belli, *“Teorie delle relazioni internazionali”*, Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2003.

<sup>167</sup> Carlo Simon Belli (2005), *“La risoluzione dei conflitti internazionali”*, Perugia, Guerra Edizioni.



|                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| <i>Ad hominem</i>   | When contradictions in the interlocutor's statements are emphasized. Highlight the inconsistency of interlocutor's assertions is used to prove him unable to argue rationally.   |
| <i>Ad auditores</i> | When, once interpreted opinions, preferences and interests of a hypothetical third actor (or public opinion), one tries to gain support putting in good or bad light the interlocutor, convinced that such support can substantially weaken the opponent's position. |
| <i>Ad personam</i>  | When, without any bond or linkage with the topics discussed, the interlocutor is accused of infamy and reprehensible behaviours. The aim is to radically discredit him.  |

As it possible to notice from the above scheme, the main typologies of argumentative strategies follow a path *in crescendo*; every step of it (from *ad rem* to *ad personam*) reveals itself directly proportional to the possibility of creating tensions which often result in clashes and conflicts.

The first typology, the *ad rem* one, has the lowest percentage of possibilities to generate tensions between the actors involved; it focuses on the object of discord and seeks common solutions without leaving gaps of substance. The other three typologies, conversely, have rooted in their nature the seed of conflict. Therefore, during these kind of confrontations, positions of the actors turn away, with a real radicalization. The last and the worst step is the *ad personam* strategy, characterized by the fact that object of the conflict is not even taken into account. This strategy is capable to create the deepest communicative furrows, often unbridgeable<sup>168</sup>.

These four argumentative strategies may be related with many types of conflicts:

1. *Divergent*: is present the will to use the same resources for different objectives;
2. *Competing*: the subject of the dispute is the same for both actors;
3. *Reciprocal hindering*: it consists of strategic actions aimed to change the actions of the other party;

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<sup>168</sup> Carlo Simon Belli, *ibidem*.

4. *Aggressive*: the action is directed against the other party rather than against the problem, or the action of the other actor.

From the intersection of argumentative strategies with four potential types of conflict, we are able to create hypothetical conflictual situations characterized by determined and specific variables, or rather, more or less difficult to manage from the point of view of negotiation. For example, exactly like for the argumentative strategies, there are some typologies of conflicts which, irreversibly, lead to violence: is this the case of those situations where the parties involved have, as principal objective, to hinder each other. As a result, this conflict will be more prone to escalation phenomena. The same situation arises when one, or more parties, they decide to involve in the conflict, using appropriate argumentative strategies, third parties; again, in this case, an escalation can be expected<sup>169</sup>.

Although starting from the concept that is difficult to define or influence the typologies of conflict that the actors are going to face, it is clear that is possible, instead, to intervene on the argumentative strategies that they plan to use, suggesting them the most reasonable way to go to (which is always the *ad rem* one), in such a way as to encourage a rapid dimensioning of the conflict itself.

Intervene on the parties to the conflict, suggesting them which argumentative strategies to enact, means preventing their positions to become radicalized up to creating a gap impossible to fill, where one perceives the other, irremediably, as an enemy. For this reason, the good mediator must know how to "drive" the parties towards the use of *ad rem* argumentative strategies, assuming himself an attitude that inspires the parties, and that is inspired to the oriental strategy of *wei wu wei*<sup>170</sup>, also known as "*action without action*" or "*reverse effort*"<sup>171</sup>.

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<sup>169</sup> Carlo Simon Belli, "*Teorie delle relazioni internazionali*", Guerra Edizioni, Perugia, 2003.

<sup>170</sup> Wu Wei is an important concept in Taoism that literally means *non-action* or *non-doing*. In the Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu explains that beings (or phenomena) that are wholly in harmony with the Tao behave in a completely natural, uncontrived way. The goal of spiritual practice for the human being is, according to Lao Tzu, the attainment of this purely natural way of behaving, as when the planets revolve around the sun. The planets effortlessly do this revolving without any sort of control, force, or attempt to revolve themselves, instead engaging in effortless and spontaneous movement.


<sup>171</sup> David Loy, "*Wei-wu-wei: Nondual action*", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 1985, pp. 73–87.

In concrete terms, it is a matter of knowing how to manage the relationship between the parties, following two basic elements:

- A. Ignore all the argumentative strategies based on non-objective considerations (potentially dangerous), both in order not to get emotionally involved – with the risk of not controlling the situation –, and in order to set an example for the interested parties on the attitude to adopt towards provocative approaches or generally aggressive;
- B. Intervene clearly in the communicative dynamics of the parties, pushing away from strategies which are not *ad rem*, and forcing them, at the same time, to face the various problematics in a strict objective way.

If we wanted to schematically summarize what a conflict consists in, what are the possible causes, or the strategies which can avert it, then we can follow what Carlo Simon Belli says in his work “*La risoluzione dei conflitti internazionali*”:

### Three levels of conflict<sup>172</sup>



<sup>172</sup> Carlo Simon Belli (2005), “*La risoluzione dei conflitti internazionali*”, Perugia, Guerra Edizioni.

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <p><b>3A. Induced or reactive behaviours</b>, that depend on:</p> <p>a) Subjective <i>reactivity to the environment</i> (more or less aggressive feedback: 1) confrontation, 2) compromise, 3) cooperation, 4) procrastination.</p> <p>b) <i>Characteristic of negotiation's environment.</i></p> <p>c) <i>Values, cultural and customary constraints;</i></p> <p>d) <i>Legal and regulatory constraints.</i></p> | <p><b>3B. Induced or voluntary behaviours</b>, that depend on these argumentative strategies:</p> <p>1) <i>Ad rem;</i></p> <p>2) <i>Ad hominem;</i></p> <p>3) <i>Ad auditores;</i></p> <p>4) <i>Ad personam.</i></p> <p>This category stands in the middle between 3A and 3C, because adopting these strategies often depends both on instinctive reactions and on voluntary behaviours.</p> | <p><b>3C. Voluntary and rational behaviours</b>, that depend on decisional processes of involved actors; in this case it is necessary to be able to predict the subjective moves of the parties, considering:</p> <p>a) power relationships;</p> <p>b) objectives;</p> <p>c) strategies;</p> <p>d) relation between <i>benefits – costs – risks – opportunities.</i></p> |
|---|--|--|

Once analysed the argumentative strategies and the ways in which they relate to the conflicting situations, to understand, and coherently describe any confrontation situation (conflictual or cooperative), we need to analyse, following the teachings of Galtung, the cause of conflicts. These are, according to the Norwegian author, strictly related to the manifestation of violence used on that occasion. This is what we will see in the next paragraph.

### 3.2. Different aspects of the same Galtunian concept: Violence

Talking about the relationships between peace and violence, Galtung says:

*“The statement ‘peace is absence of violence’ shall be retained as valid. [...] What we intend is only that the terms ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ be linked to each other such that ‘peace’ can be regarded as ‘absence of violence’.”<sup>173</sup>*

This statement is still one of the most important contributions of the Norwegian author, because it has helped to shift the focus from conflict (as the antagonist of peace) to violence,

<sup>173</sup> Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, Sage Publications Ltd, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167-191

and the main goal of non-violence activities (and peace research too) is not to eliminate conflicts, which are rooted in human nature, and, for this reason, are ineradicable. The main objective of non-violence is to create just society, based on culture, education, rule of law and safety. More in general, these are the same principles upon which Galtung's "*positive peace*" lies, and that has been adopted by the United Nations in its Peacekeeping Missions.

In this sense, studying violence, and the way it is enacted in a determined context, it helps to understand the nature and the causes of conflict; consequently, knowing the nature, can lead to find eventual forms of intervention in the conflict. Therefore, it is studying the forms in which violence occurs during a conflict, which allows to penetrate its very essence.

The starting point from which Galtung guides us to explain what violence is and how it occurs, is a first very general definition (even if he is not looking for *the* definition of violence, because this takes you away from specific study):

*"violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations."*<sup>174</sup>

As we have said, this is a general definition, and it is clear that stopping at this point would be the worst mistake ever. Galtung says that violence is characterized by at least six dimensions. To discuss them, it can be useful to conceive violence in terms of *influence* and assume the existence of a *subject*, an *object* and *action*.

### *3.2.1. Personal and Structural violence: six dimensions of violence*

#### **1) Physical and psychological violence**

The first distinction, often overshadowed for excessive superficiality, is between *physical* and *psychological*. This differentiation is very important, because, most of time, the narrow concept of violence focuses only on physical violence. Then, while physical violence "works on the body", psychological violence (entails lies, brainwashing, indoctrination and threats) works on the soul, and has the aim to decrease mental potentialities.

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<sup>174</sup> Johan Galtung, *ibidem*, p. 168.

Moreover, Galtung reflects on the possibility to adapt the terms "hurt" and "hit" both to the field of physical and psychological violence:

*"Incidentally, it is interesting that such English words as 'hurt' and 'hit' can be used to express psychological as well as physical violence: this doubleness is already built into the language."<sup>175</sup>*

## **2) Negative and positive approach to influence**

What Galtung states is that a person can be influenced not only under the threat of the punishment, but also by rewarding him when he does what the influencer considers right. So instead of imposing constraints on action, these are decreased and action is extended. This process, even if seems pretty far from that of violence, Galtung says, is closer than one might think. The result, indeed, may still be that human beings are effectively prevented from realizing their potentialities<sup>176</sup>.

Even if this idea has not always been shared by experts and sociologists, what must be highlighted is that the concept of violence can be extended in this direction, since it produces a much wider basis for discussion.

## **3) Presence or absence of an object that is hurt**

Are we in presence of violence if no physical or biological object is hurt? It might be considered that when a person, a group or a nation, implement acts of physical violence (from throwing stones to testing nuclear arms), there may be not violence, in the sense that no one is hit or hurt. But, behind the absence of physical violence, there could be the *threat* (the intention) of physical violence or the indirect threat of psychological violence. The famous *balance of power* doctrine is based on efforts to obtain precisely this effect.

Can the destruction of things be considered violence? Of course it is, especially when falls into two main areas, related to psychological violence: 1) the destruction of things as a foreboding

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<sup>175</sup> Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", p. 168.

<sup>176</sup> Herbert Marcuse, "One-dimensional Man", Boston Press, 1968.

or threat of possible destruction of persons<sup>177</sup>; 2) the destruction of things as destruction of something very cherished by persons, referred to as consumers or owners<sup>178</sup>.

#### **4) Presence or absence of a subject (person) who acts**

This is probably the most important distinction. Again it may be asked: can we talk about violence when nobody is committing direct violence? In this case, the distinction follows another path: on one side, we consider as *personal* or *direct* the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence; on the other side we consider as *structural* or *indirect* the type of violence where there is no actor. In both cases, people could be killed or damaged (hit or hurt), but, whereas in the first case it is possible to trace back to the perpetrator of these crimes, in the second case it is not possible, and often, is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person. In *structural*, violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as un-equal life chances<sup>179</sup>.

Galtung talks about contexts in which resources are unevenly distributed, income distributions are skewed, literacy and education are not for everyone and medical services are affordable only for few people. More in general, is about “*power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed*”<sup>180</sup>. The situation is even worse if those people low on income are the same being low in education and low on health, and consequently low on power - as is frequently the case.

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<sup>177</sup> This is a recurrent theme in much of the analysis of violence in the US. Violence against property is seen as training, the first window-pane crushed to pieces is also a blow against the bourgeois in oneself, a liberation from former constraints, an act of communication signalling to either camp a new belongingness and above all a rejection of tacit rules of the game. 'If they can do that to property, what can they do to persons -'

<sup>178</sup> It was pointed out by Herman Kahn (at a seminar at PRIO, May 1969) that middle class students and lower class police may have highly different relations to property: as something highly replaceable for the middle class student in an affluent society, as something difficult to attain for a lower class Irish cop. What to one is a relatively unproblematic act of communication may to the other be sacrilegious, particularly since students probably aspire to mobility and freedom unfettered by property ties.

<sup>179</sup> Carmichael Stokeley, “*Black Power*”, *The Dialectics of Liberation*, David Cooper ed., London Penguin, p. 151, 1968.

<sup>180</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Violence, Peace and Peace Research*”, p. 171.

The most crucial aspect, reached this point, is that, if people (low on income, education and power) are starving although there is plenty of resources to satisfy everyone, then *structural violence* is present, and it is committed against these people. There is no clear subject – object – action relation, Galtung says, but we are absolutely in presence of violence. The step that follows, perfectly, explains the distinction between *personal/direct* and *structural/indirect* violence:

*“Violence with a clear subject-object relation is manifest because it is visible as action. It corresponds to our ideas of what drama is, and it is personal because there are persons committing the violence. [...] Violence without this relation is structural, built into structure. Thus, when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another.”<sup>181</sup>*

The term that may be used to describe this context is *social injustice*.

### **5) Intended or unintended violence**

This distinction is very important in those cases which the guilty must be processed. In fact, being guilty, according to the old Roman legal tradition is often related to the intention rather than the consequence of the act. This spontaneous link *intention-guilt* puts the spotlight on a fallacious point: ethical and legal systems can be effective in finding intended violence, but fail to capture structural violence.

When Galtung affirms that peace is the opposite of violence, this point of view entails also structural violence and not only the personal/direct one. This is what many scholars, and people, don't take in account.

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<sup>181</sup> Johan Galtung, *Ibidem*.



### **6) *Manifest or latent violence***

As suggested by the terms themselves, while manifest violence is observable (whether is personal or structural), latent violence is something which is not there, yet might easily come about. So, latent violence in personal context means a situation where a little challenge presupposes fight and killing, as it is for racial fights. In these cases, Galtung argues, violence is rooted there since the first day, hour and minute, prior any clash or violence; we cannot see it, maybe could be perceived, but not touched.

More in general, personal violence could be described as a threat, a demonstration even when nobody is hit, or killed. Structural violence could be figured out as a “blueprint”, an abstract form without social life, with the goal of threaten people into subordination.

Tradition has been thinking about the concept of violence, mainly, as *personal* violence, and not as *structural* one, and this is not strange. Important sub-divisions have been made like violence vs. threat of violence, physical vs. psychological, intended vs. unintended, but each of these did not entail the structural context. The main reason is that the object of *personal* violence perceives the violence, usually, and may complain, whereas the object of *structural* violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all. Personal violence “represents change and dynamism; structural violence is silent, essentially static”<sup>182</sup>. In a static society, personal violence would be noticed and prosecuted, whereas structural violence may be perceived as natural. The opposite occurs in a dynamic society: personal violence is seen as wrong (so prosecuted), but somehow congruent with the social framework; structural violence, instead, may come visible because too different from the normal social frameworks.

There is another dimension of violence that, together with *personal* and *structural*, closes the circle of the Galtunian violence concept: the *cultural* violence.

### **3.2.2. *The Cultural violence***

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<sup>182</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Violence, Peace and Peace Research*”, p. 173.

With the definition *cultural violence* Galtung refers those aspects of culture which are symbolically linked to our existence - religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science – and that can be used to justify acts of direct or structural violence<sup>183</sup>:

*“Stars, crosses and crescents; flags, anthems and military parades; the ubiquitous portrait of the Leader; inflammatory speeches and posters - all these come to mind.”*<sup>184</sup>

Obviously, these reported here are just some aspects of culture and not an entire one. Then, before talking about cultural violence, we must always remember that is almost impossible that an entire culture is violent. For this reason, we shall always prefer the expression “*Aspect A of culture C is an example of cultural violence*” to cultural stereotypes like “*culture C is violent*”<sup>185</sup>. It is, nevertheless, very difficult to define which are the elements of a culture that could be defined “violent”.

One good place where to start is looking for the negation (the opposite) of *cultural violence*. Following the path, we have done so far, the opposite should be *cultural peace*. Now, Galtung argues that the role played by *cultural violence* is very important for one main reason: during years, a major task of peace research, and the peace movement in general, has been the search for a culture of peace that could be institutionalized and internationalized. But, if this does occur, it would be direct violence, because it would fall in imposing a culture.

What *cultural violence* does, is making *direct* and *structural* violence look right, or at least not wrong:

*“One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral colour of an act from red/wrong to green/right, or at least to yellow/acceptable; an example [...]*

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<sup>183</sup> 'Cultural violence' follows in the footsteps of the concept of 'structural violence'.


<sup>184</sup> Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3., College of Social Sciences, University of Hawaii, Manoa, pp. 291-305.

<sup>185</sup> Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence”, p. 291.

*'murder on behalf of the country as right, on behalf of oneself wrong. Another way is by making reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least (we see it) not as violent.'*<sup>186</sup>

The following scheme, which refers directly to the "Violence Triangle" by Galtung<sup>187</sup>, explains the relations and interactions between the three "super-types" of violence introduced by the author.

### The Violence triangle



As it is possible to notice, the three "super-types" are related between each other: if we consider the basis composed by structural and direct violence, it seems that cultural violence is the legitimizer of both; conversely, focusing on direct violence, it happens that structural and cultural violence become sources of direct violence.

Despite the interactions among these concepts, there is a radical difference in the time relation between them: 1) direct violence is an *event*; 2) structural violence is a *process*; 3) cultural violence is an *invariant element*, remaining essentially the same for long periods, given

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<sup>186</sup> Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence", p. 292.

<sup>187</sup> Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence", p. 294.

the slow transformations of basic culture. Furthermore, these three elements rarely act together, but they enter time differently.

The process, according to the Norwegian author, is often the same:

*“The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage, and counter-violence to keep the cage intact.”<sup>188</sup>*

Direct and structural violence create needs-deficits. When this occurs, we are in front of a *trauma*. If this happens to a collectivity, there are two reactions that may occur: 1) needs-deficits pushes people to fight to have their needs respected, leading to direct violence; 2) on the other side, needs-deficits can lead to a feeling of demoralization, hopelessness and apathy; this feeling expands within society, sowing the seed of cultural violence. Leaders who impose cultural violence, indeed, they prefer collectivity surrendered to submission, accusing those who want to get out of the "cage" as "aggressors", because they threaten the culture created, made of submission.

In the moment the violent culture is able to spread within society, affecting the structural system, then direct violence (or personal) will become normal and ritualistic, but, above all, institutionalized. Galtung argues that the *violence triangle* could be and, must be, fought with a virtuous triangle, also named as the *peace triangle*, shaped by peace, friendliness and love<sup>189</sup>.

### 3.2.3. *From the concept of Violence to Peace*

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<sup>188</sup> Ibidem, p. 295.

<sup>189</sup> Ibidem, p. 301

Following the distinction between *personal* and *structural* violence (we put *cultural violence* in the latter typology), and knowing that the analogy is composed by the terms violence-peace, then, in the same way, the concept of peace will be two-sided:

*“Absence of personal violence, and absence of structural violence. [...] (We shall refer to them as) negative peace and positive peace”<sup>190</sup>.*

The reason why Galtung uses the terms negative and positive is clearly explained: the absence of *personal violence* doesn't lead to positive social conditions, considering that “social injustice” may continue to exist; on the other side, the absence of *structural violence* leads to what we have called “social justice”, which is a positive social condition (equal distribution of resources and power).

Thus, peace theory is strictly connected with conflict theory and equally with development theory. Peace research, at the same way, is seriously related to conflict research and conflict research. This sort of general synthesis reminds us the analogy between war and peace that we have seen in Chapter 1: two concepts which cannot be split.

The justification why we should approach both sides of the research on violence, personal and structural, is easily explicable, and allow us to understand why peace research must go deeper than the surface in too it, Galtung says. A research focused only on *personal violence*, disregarding any factor that links it to the structural one, means accepting, and leaving there, at the roots, all the violence built within the systems, and not outside (or in evidence):

*“Personal violence is built into the system as work is built into a compressed spring in a mattress: it only shows when the mattress is disintegrating.”<sup>191</sup>*

Being able to identify and prevent personal violence, however, pays less if a situation with constant structural violence continues to be present.

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<sup>190</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Violence, Peace and Peace Research*”, in *Journal of Peace Research*, Sage Publications Ltd, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), p 183.

<sup>191</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Violence, Peace and Peace Research*”, *ibidem*, p. 184

It could be said that, putting too much emphasis on one aspect than on the other, could lead to a superficial rationalization of the two extremes (like right and left extremism). And these two types are of course not only formally, but also socially related, in a dialectic manner: one is often a reaction to the other. They could develop within a social order where no peace aspects are realized: *social injustice* can be maintained using manifest *personal violence*. For peace, unfortunately, the solution lies not even in passing in the middle of these two extremisms, without causing the implementation. Efforts to avoid both personal and structural violence may easily lead to accept one of them, or even both.

So, where to find out a solution? Where to look for a path to follow in order to address these two extremisms, so to prevent them from societies, and help peace to restore the intrinsic social order? The answer, obviously, is not easy to pick out. Many approaches have developed, following peace research and peace concept, but most of them, according Galtung, are doomed to failure for one reason: they believe that, not being able to act effectively on both evils, is necessary to focus on a single extremism and fight it. It is clear the superficiality of these theories, that do not take into account the close link mentioned above.

There is an approach, which Galtung describes as preferable in this context, and that the author describe as follows:

*“Both values, both goals are significant, and it is probably a disservice to man to try, in any abstract way, to say that one is more important than the other. [...] Moreover, they seem often to be coupled in such a way that it is very difficult to get rid of both evils; more likely the Devil is driven out with Beelzebub.”<sup>192</sup>*

Getting closer to this approach, however, we must not forget that even the achievement of one of the two results, is better than nothing, even considering those social regimes and structures which didn't achieve neither.

By the way, there are many forms of social action, today, that try to address both violence in an effective way. One can think about the growth in the field of non-violent action, either on

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<sup>192</sup> Ibidem, p. 186

the side of *dissociative* non-violence, that has the aim to separate parties so that the weaker one can its autonomy during the truce period, either on the side of *associative* non-violence, whose goal is to bring hostile parties together again, creating a new basis for equal partnership. Another widely developed area is that of theories about vertical development, participation, decentralization and co-decision. Furthermore, no less importance shall be given to approaches related to disarmament issues and arms control.

More in general, according to Galtung, once peace research will be able to address both evils (personal and structural), there is no reason to believe that in the future we will develop various forms of social action that combine absence of *personal violence* with fight against *social injustice*. There are more than enough people willing to sacrifice one for the other - it is by aiming for both that peace research can make a real contribution.<sup>193</sup>

### **3.3. Galtung approach to conflict transformation**

The analysis carried out by Galtung on the concept of violence is of crucial importance for peace research because allows to identify causes, situations and environments in which conflict could explode.

The aim of this paragraph will be to go deeper in the Galtunian approach of *conflict transformation*, the theory that has most influenced the peace research and conflict resolution, for systematic innovation that has introduced. To be able to understand the Galtung's point of view, however, we shall analyse the doctrine of one of the philosophers and pacifists who most influenced Galtung approach to conflict: The Mahatma Gandhi<sup>194</sup>. Only

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<sup>193</sup> Ibidem p. 186.

<sup>194</sup> Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (2 October 1869 – 30 January 1948) was the preeminent leader of the Indian independence movement in British-ruled India. Employing nonviolent civil disobedience, Gandhi led India to independence and inspired movements for civil rights and freedom across the world. The honorific Mahatma — applied to him first in 1914 in South Africa — is now used worldwide. He is unofficially called the *Father of the Nation*.

going through the theories and approaches of Gandhi we will be able to understand how the point of view of the Norwegian author changed during years.

### 3.3.1. *Gandhi's conflict resolution*

To better understand the whole doctrine developed by the Mahatma, is necessary, firstly, to deepen its idea of conflict, realize the value of his radical relativism, as well as his idea of *non-violence*<sup>195</sup>. From these three concepts we can derive the authentic Gandhian method of Satyagraha.

#### **The concept of conflict**

According to Gandhi, the conflict shall be interpreted more as an opportunity, than as a threat or a problematic phenomenon; problems start arise when the protagonists of the conflict begin to adopt, actively or passively, negative behaviours. These attitudes, thus, take the upper hand also for the mutual conviction of the parties that the conflict is source of extreme danger; due to this, it must be faced rapidly, with drastic and radical tools, primarily violent. We are in front of a vicious circle, where the rooted fear of the conflict induces actors to use practices which lead to conflict, and often with extremely terrible modalities and consequences.

On the other side, Gandhi supports the idea that conflicts are, first of all, an opportunity for the social apparatus to evolve and change for the better; conflicts, indeed, naturally arise when the available resources of community are not properly used, nor equally shared. The "legitimization" of the conflicts derives from the real and concrete inefficiencies that people have in their relations with social environment. Real problems arise when actors start fighting each other thinking the other one is the problem.

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<sup>195</sup> The expression *non-violence* corresponds to the literal translation of the Sanskrit Term *Ahimsa*, which means "lack of desire to harm or kill". Non-violence is the personal practice of being harmless to self and others under every condition. It comes from the belief that hurting people, animals or the environment is unnecessary to achieve an outcome and refers to a general philosophy of abstention from violence based on moral, religious or spiritual principles.



The conflict shall be considered therefore, Gandhi suggests, as an unavoidable opportunity for growth, so it is necessary to learn to coexist with it positively. In those rare cases in which the conflict does not occur, it means a substantial alarming lack of relationship between social subjects, dangerous sign of stasis which must be anyway avoided. In order that a constructive way to see the conflict prevails, it is necessary that, in its various aspects, it is managed in a conscious and aware manner, never allowing negative subjective factors, or structural situations, to get the upper hands. Fundamental elements in this recognition process are 1) the *relativism*, and 2) *non-violence*.<sup>196</sup>

### **The Relativism**

With reference to the first concept, we can remember how, for Gandhi, there are no absolute truths, because human comprehension is imperfect, and this inevitably determines limits and fallibility of human action. Following the reasoning that no absolute truth exists, then it follows that a multiplicity of truth exists, and each of them has its own "*raison d'être*". Is more than probable that one of these truths may turn out as a font of inspiration for the improvement of social relations.

Ironically, the value added of each truth comes from the fact of being the product of a subjective perspective: men, not being able to know anyway the truth in an objective and absolute manner, can hope to approach it only putting in relation many more subjective perspectives possible. Conflict is, then, a confrontation of truths that can, and must, have as a goal the identification of more and more wide perspectives, increasingly useful for the evolution of human society to get away from violence. The confrontation between truths that takes place in the occasion of a conflict constitutes, precisely, the opportunity for the emergence all what is useful in each truth, by means a process of selection and refinement of each of them.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Thomas Weber, "*Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor*", ed. by La Trobe University, Cambridge University Press, January 2007.

<sup>197</sup> Christine Jordis, "*GANDHI*", Edition Gallimard, Paris 2006.

This objective, however, cannot be achieved if the confrontation is violent, mutually exclusive, aiming at the destruction rather than the integration of truths and of the other perspectives. Gandhi also notes that the recognition of the value of relativism also determines another positive effect: the gradual renunciation of violence. The use of violence, indeed, is justified exactly in relation to the desire to want to defend so-called absolute truth; *vice versa*, in the name of a truth that is only partial, in the name of one of many possible truths, the use of violence becomes automatically unlawful and unconceivable, unjustifiable in every sense, both legally, politically and socio-cultural, but also at the level of individual choice, which means within every single individual. Ultimately, relativism teaches, at the same time, to read the role of conflict in a new constructive perspective, and to move away from inconsiderate use of violence.

From this statements derive the third concept of Gandhi's doctrine.

### **The principle of "Non-violence"**

*"Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon. Indeed, it is a weapon unique in history, which cuts without wounding and ennobles the man who wields it."<sup>198</sup>*

This concept (probably the most famous and the most adopted at global level by activists and pacifists) too often simplified as the unconditioned rejection of violence, is much more articulated, and it goes far beyond this superficial definition; the aspects related to the non-violence concept are, indeed, numerous and interconnected.

First of all, non-violence could be adopted as choice of individual, which comes, and strengthens, from the constant personal exercise of relating both with others individuals, and with the problems that must be faced every day. In the same way, it can also represent a collective choice, valuable achievement of dominant sociocultural conditionings of a society; this has been able to achieve such a high level of evolution, so to recognize the objective usefulness of eliminating violence in intersubjective relations. This situation has allowed the

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<sup>198</sup> Martin Luther King, Jr., *"The Quest for Peace and Justice"*, Martin Luther King's Nobel Lecture, delivered in the Auditorium of the University of Oslo at December 11, 1964.

creation of a number of constructions and social behaviours that facilitate nonviolent social dynamics.

On the other hand, this could be seen as a strategic choice, enacted in order to optimize the relationship between means and purposes, but also to influence the quality of the these latter, to the extent that operating on the reality ends up influencing the reality itself. In this case, it is deeply spread the idea that there are valid alternatives to violence, to the point that there is also a moral and ethical rejection of violence.

Finally, it may simply be a tactical choice, to which one could be forced in relation to its actual capacities, and, in this case, we are in front of the simplest form of non-violence, the passive resistance; it is also defined as the "*non-violence of the weak*"<sup>199</sup>, of those who are forced, for just tactics reasons, to renounce to violence, even if not necessarily motivated by a moral rejection of violence itself.

The non-violence doctrine is deeply antagonistic to all forms of violence, in a conscious and active way, up to stand in constant conflict to all its manifestations, even at the expense of, paradoxically, generating conflicts. To the extent that there is no difference between killing and let killing, it could be a moral imperative also to trigger a conflict aimed at the reduction of violence itself, as long as the management of this conflict is then implemented by following in fact the principles of nonviolent action. These principles, of course, deny the utility of violence even when it comes to obstruct the violence itself, even if they admit the use of force as *extreme ratio*.<sup>200</sup>

Although this theorization could be exposed to many criticism, especially if interpreted from a western point of view – this seeks, in fact, an exclusive definition of the opposite elements, rather than their integration –, the golden rule of interpretation to follow is purely Oriental: in practice, it is acting always renouncing to the temptation to use violence, almost as if this does not exist as a strategic feasible option; but, when it's not possible to evade neither the

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<sup>199</sup> The "*Non-violence of the weak*" refers to the non-violence concept of those people who don't have the possibility to oppose with weapons; this does not mean they are not eager to do that.

<sup>200</sup> Thomas Weber, "*Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor*", ed. by La Trobe University, Cambridge University Press, January 2007, p. 201.

use of force, nor the involvement in violent dynamics, it will be necessary to act avoiding the identification with violence, using the logic of non-violence, so constantly limiting themselves, trying not to be overwhelmed by the instincts, the pulses and the logic of violence. In these cases, is strictly necessary to remain attached to non-violent principles. For this purpose, it is essential to keep the situation constantly “*under control*” (as westerners say), concept that is expressed in a better way by the Orientals: they called it “awareness” or, using a more philosophical expression, the “*ability to hearkens*”<sup>201</sup>.

In the case of fundamentalist pacifism, it may happen that we leave unconsciously dragging into the dynamics of violent conflicts, driven by the prevalence of substantial intolerance and aggressive feelings; in the case of non-violence the primary purpose is to hinder the conflict, also entering in the mechanisms that govern it, but always maintaining a conscious detachment from violent methods and logics, thus denying any form of hostility and intolerance. In the former case there is the risk of becoming involuntarily passive part of the violent conflict; in the latter one, is it possible to act as a variable able to influence and alter the nature itself of the conflict.

From a western perspective, similar reasoning may seem vague and poorly defined, but it is no coincidence that the reflections on non-violence were born in eastern cultural environments, where nothing is really definite and definable, and goodness of a choice is ensured by the sensitivity and intuition of the decision maker, and it is evaluated in relation to its utility for the entire community. More in general, Gandhi refuses the violence for at least four different reasons, undoubtedly more rational:

1. Violence, even more when it’s organized, cannot determine stable and long lasting conflicts’ solutions, but at most compresses them, leaving unresolved, but also generating reasons of future tensions and frictions;

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<sup>201</sup> Ellen W. Gorsevski, “*Peaceful Persuasion: The Geopolitics of Non-violent Rhetoric*”, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2004, p. 186.

2. The use of violence makes man brutal, it leads him to become accustomed, to justify it, to consider it as a useful interactive modality to rapidly solve problems and disputes;
3. Violence tends to bring out more violence, both placing at the forefront aggressive and authoritarian men, both facilitating the proliferation of institutions and organizational structures which promote and favour the exercise of violence itself;
4. Violence causes irreparable consequences on the effective exercise and fruition of the fundamental values of democracy and human rights, as being incompatible with the principles of equality, dignity and freedom of men, to the extent that who is stronger is invariably in the position to impose itself on the weaker.<sup>202</sup>

### **The Satyagraha**

All these elements can be identified as the keystone of the Satyagraha, term whose translation is "*insistence on truth*" (*satya* "truth"; *agraha* "insistence" or "holding firmly to") or "*holding onto truth*":

*"Truth (satya) implies love, and firmness (agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force. I thus began to call the Indian movement Satyagraha, that is to say, the Force which is born of Truth and Love or nonviolence, and gave up the use of the phrase "passive resistance", in connection with it, so much so that even in English writing we often avoided it and used instead the word "satyagraha" itself or some other equivalent English phrase."*<sup>203</sup>

The term, apart from making a clear distinction between active and passive non-violence, explicates the attitude of non-violent individual who, on the occasion of any competition, proves to be highly motivated to defend, with calm and firmness, its own reasons, without ever prevaricate others. The doctrine states also that, the individual who defends his positions with violent and aggressive methods reveals the weakness of its truth, losing the opportunity

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<sup>202</sup> Thomas Weber, "*Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor*", ed. by La Trobe University, Cambridge University Press, January 2007, p. 208.

<sup>203</sup> Mahatma Gandhi, "*Gandhi and Satyagraha*", Gandhi Research Foundation, <http://www.gandhifoundation.net/about%20gandhi6.htm>

to improve it. Moreover, as well as violence shows an intrinsic weakness, the firmness of non-violence positively impresses, making authoritative the truth and also its holder.

In the Satyagraha Gandhi suggests various forms of struggle - primarily designed for an internal political context, but which may also be extended to the international one, inspiring forms of non-violent conflict rather than warlike strategies - as well as non-violent principles that have been inherited by diplomats, peacemakers and peacekeepers, and they are still implemented. These non-conflictual forms are based on the fundamental rules and principles within the Gandhian doctrine, and are the same that influenced Galtung in the elaboration of his theory of peace research and *conflict transformation*.

Among the main principles that constitute the pillars of the Satyagraha, in relation to the scope of our research, there are some which find implementation in our day, at national and international level:

- **The second principle**, the coherence of forms of fight in relation to the purpose: who enacts the Satyagraha must be proportionate and balanced with respect to the problem, while action should be aimed at building a solution rather than to destroy or eliminate the other party.
- **The fifth principle**: it is always necessary to avoid the development of deep differences between the parties distinguishing between the evil on the one hand, and individuals that enact it, on the other; distinguishing between people and roles they play, and being able to empathize with the opponent's purposes and with the reasons that move or condition him, avoiding rigid and inflexible attitudes towards him: the opponent must always be given the opportunity to change position, avoiding he become a trap of our own prejudices.
- **The sixth principle** reminds us that is necessary to ensure that the conflict, as far as possible, is maintained at the lowest tension level, so to avoid dangerous escalation.

Starting, then, from the concept of Gandhian active non-violence, and from the idea that the conflict is an unavoidable phenomenon - within any society - since it is rooted in the nature of human beings, Galtung allowed the Peace Research, and consequently the doctrine of conflict


resolution, to take a huge step forward thanks to its development of *conflict transformation* theory (not any more the elimination or the eradication of the conflict). This methodology, that over years over time has had more and more success, today stands as the dominant theory in the field of Peace Research, globally.

### 3.3.2. The Conflict Transformation by Johan Galtung

During this chapter we have often mentioned the Galtunian concept of *conflict transformation*, but always in a superficial way, without ever going in the specific. Now is the time to focus our attention on this conflict transformation method, since it represents, probably, one of the most important result. This section of the research will be, thus, focused on the creator of this innovative approach - that is spreading significantly also thanks to the strong support of major international organizations such as the United Nations - and on its operative system.

The graph below shows analytically the levels of transformation that can occur, according to Galtung. It will be our starting point to go deeper into the concept.

#### Possible transformations of international conflicts



The graph on levels of transformation<sup>204</sup> we have just seen, explains very clearly what are the factors who may be affected by changes, at the international level. Starting from a context (or systemic) level, which entails all the deep and inner elements that influence a conflict, to a structural level, characterized by the organization of relationships among international actors; and to conclude, an inter-personal level, that is about the evolution of decisional processes enacted by those individuals which represent Nations, or social collectivity, to defend and pursue their interests. We analyse now these five levels within which the transformation of the conflict may occur.

1. **Context, or Systemic transformation:** belong to this macro level all the elements, factors and changes which concern the "*supra-structure*" of society; exogenous factors with respect to the dynamics of conflict. Every alteration of the superstructure's equilibrium, ends up substantially conditioning all the elements that are included in it (for example, changes that determine modifications in the nature of the actors, and the consequential emergence of new types of interlocutors; the discovery of new technologies, new energy sources or new weapons; the evolution, or modification, of one or more regulating principles of the international system).
2. **Structural transformation:** a step below of the supra-structure transformations, we find those changes related to the structure of the conflict: the way in which it is organized, all the possible relationships between objectives and related means that the actors use to get them, the military capacity and available technologies of the parties. Not of minor importance, obviously, the influence of the upper level (for example, changes regarding the symmetries of power between the parties involved, the organization of alliances, global changes as it was the end of the Cold War, constitutive or independence wars).

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<sup>204</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Conflict Transformation with Peaceful Means (Transcend Method)*", United Nations Disaster Management Training Program, 2000.



3. **Actors transformation:** changes concerning the number and types of actors involved; but also changes in the balance of power and resulting in the shifting of leadership from one actor to another. As we can notice from the graph, this level, who plays on the same floor of the fourth and fifth variable, influences and is strongly influenced by the other two (for example the change of decision makers, and their replacement).
4. **Individuals and Groups transformation:** changes within individuals or within groups, whereby the way they see, perceive or deal with conflict changes; these sort of changes can be induced by relative changes in the determinants of the third level (actors), and it may, in turn, induce changes in the determinants of fifth level (goals). A simple example could be the leader of a group who understands that is necessary to change approach to the conflict.
5. **Goals transformation:** when actors change, or overturn their priorities or their objectives, they place the main emphasis on targets previously considered unreachable or irrelevant, or introduce new goals to replace the old ones. This determinant can mutate due to variations, directly or indirectly, induced by all the above levels.

Theoretically, it is on these five levels that it would be necessary to intervene to build peace. But clearly, as explained before, on the first two levels it is not possible to intervene, or better to say, changes and transformations are possible, but are not reachable by individuals; rather, they are the result of social evolution of the international system. On the third, fourth and fifth level, conversely, it would be possible to design and build common solutions to common problems; this would give initiation, to a bottom-up process of transformation of each conflict that, over time, can be hypothesized to end impacting positively, firstly on the structural context, and then on the systemic one. This structural arrangement, designed by the Norwegian author, is evidently based on the approach of problem solving and on all those combinations of conciliatory strategies - deriving more from the constructivist tradition than

from the Realist movement - aimed at reciprocal understandings and problems sharing, as we have seen in the previous pages<sup>205</sup>.

The approach to conflict transformation developed by Galtung is more commonly known, among the experts or within the international organizations, with the name of Transcend Method<sup>206</sup>. Transcend because the last step of the conflict transformation consists in the ability to completely transcend it, or to create positive opportunities (as Gandhi taught). At the basis of this method underlie two key antagonist approaches: on the one side the *conflict formation* cycle, while on the other one the antithetical cycle of *conflict transformation*. Both elaborations are really complex and articulated, witnessing a high degree of complexity of the dynamics established in the presence of conflicting competitions. The Norwegian political scientist is particularly careful about acknowledging and defining the various elements involved in the processes that determine the occurrence of a conflict, in the belief that conflicts are the "enemies" that must be properly known to be tackled successfully<sup>207</sup>.

It is no coincidence that, if we compare the two cycles of conflicts, formation and transformation, is possible to observe how the latter, under many points of view, literally overlays on the former one, almost as to underline that the possibility to build positive peace depends on ability to transform, into their opposite complementary, those individual elements that normally contribute to the emergence of a conflict. More in general, at the base of the model of Galtung, remains the conviction that those same functions that ensure a cooperative relation, if they manifest in a distorted way, or in a hostile social environment, they may determine forms of conflictual competition.

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<sup>205</sup> Johan Galtung, "*Conflict Transformation with Peaceful Means (Transcend Method)*", United Nations Disaster Management Training Program, 2000, p. 47.

<sup>206</sup> The TRANSCEND method is expressed in three word-triples. First, there are the three phases of the method: mapping the conflict, legitimizing, and bridging incompatibilities. Second, there are the three aspects of the process: one-on-one, dialogue, and transcendence. Third, there are the three capacities demanded of the mediator: empathy, nonviolence, and creativity.

<sup>207</sup> In this case, the reference is to Sun Tzu, in *The Art of War*: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."

## The Conflict Cycle

The constant number in Galtung is the three. The elements that feed the conflict cycle, indeed, are nine, and can be divided into three groups of three, known as 1) the *triangle of violence*, 2) the *triangle of conflict* and 3) the *triangle of wrong perspectives*. The three triangles are analysed below:

1. **Triangle of Violence:** we have already analysed this triangle in the paragraph related to the concept of violence. It is composed by three types of violence:

- *Direct (or personal) violence:* enacted by violent actors, it aims to hit and hurt in a way, both visible and invisible, against people, societies, environments and cultures;
- *Structural violence:* it involves the social structure, and, for this reason, can also be defined unintentional. It can be political (repressive) or economic (expropriation). It negates the need for freedom, well-being and identity;
- *Cultural violence:* the most dangerous one, because, through this, the other two types of violence are justified and, at the same time, considered good, legitimate and unavoidable.

2. **Triangle of Conflict:** with regard to this triangle, the factors which determine the permanence of the actors within the conflict are:

- *Contradictions:* wrong interior attitudes (which determine negative feelings). For example, an apparent incompatibility of objectives can be considered irreparable, if positions are irremovable;
- *Wrong attitudes:* as the lack of will or inability to face and solve the contradictions, caused primarily by the perception that the positions are irreconcilable;
- *Wrong behaviours:* easily translatable into wrong exterior attitudes that prefer the use of direct forms of violence (physical but also verbal);

Within this group, each of the three factors negatively affects the other: the idea that the positions are irreconcilable induces to adopt internal and exterior wrong

attitudes; the latter, in turn, make contradictions deeper and reinforce negative internal feelings; and these also confirm the belief that the contradictions are actually irreconcilable and that it is right to prefer the use of violence in interpersonal interactions. The triangle of the conflict feeds and is fed both by the triangle of the violence from the triangle of wrong perspective.

3. **Triangle of Wrong Perspectives:** it shows that there are three negative ways of thinking about social interactions that, inevitably, push to the emergence of the conflict:

- *Military:* it prefers to theorize forced and violent solutions of the problems (Kshatriya solutions, or violent and imposed);
- *Commercial:* It conceives relations exclusively from a commercial perspective, according to which the solutions can be barter (Vaishya solutions);
- *Political:* It considers possible to find reasonable solutions only in the highest circles, detached from the real dynamics of conflict, that choose to impose their own solutions from above;

These three perspectives do not necessarily influence each other as in the previous case, but each is present, to varying degrees, each time a conflict arises.

So, as well as these three groups determine the maintenance of conflictual tension, inside, the three elements that define them tend to reinforce each other, ensuring propulsive force to the whole cycle, and threatening, consequently, the four basic needs of communities and individuals: 1) the desire for survival, 2) the preservation of identities, 3) the need for freedom, and finally, 4) the desire of well-being.

### **The conflict transformation cycle**

On the other side of the chessboard we find the conflict transformation process. When operating to transform conflicts in peaceful way, is necessary to intervene in order to overturn the value of the three triangles of the conflict, pushing the violence to *trascend* in its opposite:

the non-violence. This process changes the perspectives, and radically transforms the conflict, the relations between actors and with the surrounding environment.

In this case, we find a multiple of three, twelve, which are the elements that come into contrast with conflictual ones; these elements are divided in four triangles: 1) *triangle of conflict transformation*, 2) *triangle of non-violence*, 3) *triangle of pianification*, 3) *triangle of correct perspectives*.

1. **Triangle of non-violence:** with regard to this triangle, direct violence will be replaced by softer approaches and tools, so to positively influence the interlocutors:

- *Thinking:* it represents the interior preparation through meditation, silence and reflection to eradicate negative and destructive pulses.
- *Word:* during the confrontation, scolding expressions, apportioning blame should be avoided, leaving space for constructive expressions.
- *Action:* it manifests through non-violent political tools, such as the use of mass media, demonstrations and meetings. If necessary, firmness in the use of extreme forms of non-violence (as taught by Gandhi).

The widespread dissemination of positive and constructive ideas, that eliminate from individuals the destructive pulses, can contribute to the eradication of structural violence, to the extent that the organization of the social system can be positively redefined by the multiplicity ideas and perspectives. At last, the constructive use of the word is able to define best cultural models.

2. **Triangle of correct perspectives:** here, the point of view changes, so it's not top-down anymore, but is bottom-up perspective:

- *Sowing:* new ideas and solutions are necessary and have to be invented, through the widest participation possible.
- *Cultivating:* once founded, the new solutions must be handled and monitored by the democratic participation.
- *Collecting:* peace requires time, so it is necessary to be able to seize the moment to win peace.

In this triangle it is no longer present the idea that social and interpersonal interactions should preferably be guided from above, but instead, it consolidates the belief that the prospects that are truly capable of ensuring peaceful coexistence, between the parties, are those formed within the social context. The political perspective from the top is then replaced by the representative perspective, democratic and more equal. The wrong military perspective, obsessed by the need to prevaricate others, is replaced by the ability to wait for the favourable moment to act.

It is at this point that possibilities of transforming the conflict begin to materialize, because the actors understand the importance of adopting correct nonviolent behaviours; they develop feelings of empathy instead of negative interior attitudes; they will be able to conceive creative approaches to problems, learning that the contradictions seem irreconcilable only for those who accept to suffer them. But, there is one element missing in order to close the transformation cycle. This element, according to Galtung, is the...

3. **Triangle of pianification**: shaped by three factors that are linked to the professional activity of the mediator, this is considered by the author as an *exogenous* factor, and it must be surgically grafted into the conflict cycle:

- *Diagnosis*: to know and understand the causes that led to the conflict;
- *Prognosis*: to predict "*rebus sic stantibus*" the general direction of the situation;
- *Therapy*: to re-design the future relying on the elements of the non-violence triangle, of the correct perspectives and of conflict transformation.

Finally, once all the necessary steps have been met, then, we are able to reach the last triangle elaborated by Galtung, which is the real **conflict transformation triangle**. Exactly like the previous three, this one is composed of three sub-elements that allow to transform and transcend the conflict, so to put the basis for the establishment of positive peace:

- *Creativity*: is the ability to overcome mental limitations that lock litigants, developing new strategies of social interaction.

- *Empathy*: undoubtedly one of the most important concept, because it consists in put himself in the shoes of the other part, trying to understand the objectives and the states of mind, on the cognitive and emotional level.
- *Non-violence*: is the set of those exterior attitudes that allows to resist to the temptation of using violence, or proposing it as solution.

Exactly as in the cycle of conflict formation, here are, again, the four basic needs of individuals (survival, preservation of identity, freedom and well-being); this time, the four needs are respected and promoted. This means also an implementation of crucial elements that allow the peacekeepers (focus of our research) to put the basis for the institution of positive peace, as elaborated by the Norwegian author.

In the next paragraph we will focus on how the conflict resolution has evolved from the beginning of the post-Cold War era, right up to the present day. Following this path, we will see how the actors and the international venues have changed, but above all, it will be introduced the concept of UN PeaceKeeping Missions, and its importance.

### **3.4. Conflict Transformation today**

The world has transformed rapidly since the end of the Cold War. An old system broke down, whereas it's difficult to identify the new one that can replace the previous. New paths are coming to light, but they are still too blurred to be clearly seen. A new wave of democratization, a wider globalization, more technical information about politics and economics, international coordination and common security are just few of the factors which are changing shape after the end of Bipolarism. Alongside with them, new enemies have transformed too, such as the organized violence, terrorism, dangerous non-state actors or governments who, thanks to new technologies, weapons and online systems, now try to re-set their boundaries, often entering into conflict with other actors. When this occurs, we are in front of an "international conflict". International conflict still includes the old-fashioned war, a violent confrontation between nation states acting through their own armed forces outside their borders. But now some conflicts are treated as threats to international peace

and security even if two states are not fighting (ex. Internal/civil conflict that threatens universal norms, human rights or democratic governance).

Conflict resolution methods have evolved during time, following the direction of the conflicts, without losing sight of the Galtunian ideas related to conflict transformation. The traditional diplomatic strategies<sup>208</sup>, elaborated since the very first moment, have continued to be important, even if they have been implemented in different ways. In deploying and using force to address and resolve conflicts, there has been increased emphasis (in the post-Cold War period) on multilateral actors, like the NATO, the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU). States have asked for the help of regional or international organizations to advance possible resolution goals, especially in situation of unilateral state threat.

Military organization have been used for new purposes in conflict resolution. Armed forces are increasingly less used in direct interventions, field in which regional organizations are taking the leadership. The UN Peacekeeping Missions are the most emblematic example of this process. The UN troops still maintain the goal to physically separate the actors in conflict to prevent further violence or clashes, but, first of all, they are deployed to provide humanitarian relief, resettle refugees, rebuild infrastructures and the rule of law (in case of state actor).

The current conflict resolution is characterized, differently from the pre Cold War era, by two main strategies. It is no longer about zero-sum game strategies nor conflict of interests. One of these is the *conflict transformation* (that we have previously seen), which entails those strategies based on the logic that 1) interests and conflicts of interest are to some degree socially constructed and malleable, and 2) that it is possible for groups to redefine their interests to reduce intergroup tension and suspicion and to make peaceful settlements more possible. Certain types of conflicts have showed having some aspects which could be

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<sup>208</sup> Strategies of so-called *integrative negotiation* or *integrative bargaining* departed from zero-sum thinking with the notion that there may be ways to accommodate both parties' interests in a negotiation. In practice, integrative negotiation often involves adding inducements to bring one or both parties to recalculate interests enough to support an agreement. Thus, although integrative negotiation allows for nonzero-sum outcomes, in many applications it follows the logic of stable interests.



transformed to path the way for an easier reconciliation. Anyway, even if these strategies are widely used today, it doesn't always mean that are used effectively.

**Strategies and tools for Conflict resolution**

| Strategy  | Tools for C.R.  |
|---|---|
| <b>Power Politics (traditional)</b>                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Threats of force</li> <li>- Defensive alliances</li> <li>- Economic sanctions</li> <li>- Bargaining as a trade-off of interests</li> <li>- Power mediation</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Conflict transformation</b>                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Problem-solving workshops</li> <li>- Alternative dispute resolution</li> <li>- Reconciliation by truth commissions</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Structural prevention (UN PeaceKeeping Missions)</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Electoral system design</li> <li>- Autonomy</li> <li>- Legal guarantees of free speech and association</li> <li>- Civilian control of military organizations</li> <li>- Normative change</li> <li>- Human rights protection</li> </ul> |

These strategies are often used in combination to achieve faster and more effective results. Due to this, boundaries of these approaches are often blurred<sup>209</sup>.

Theorized by Galtung during the seventies and eighties, *conflict transformation* is, today, the most common theoretical construction of conflict resolution. This approach consists in facilitating the reconciliation of conflicting parties through meetings, during which actors seek to understand their positions, and constructively discuss about that. This procedure tends to take place in a non-conflictual atmosphere more conducive to peaceful resolution. The intent is to push the actors to reinterpret and the re-elaborate their positions so to build new relationship. In recent years, conflict transformation strategies have been adopted by many

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<sup>209</sup> Paul C. Stern, Daniel Druckman, “*International conflict resolution after the Cold War*”, ed. Committee on International Conflict Resolution & Commission on Behavioural and Social Sciences and Education, Washington DC, 2000, p. 5.

international, regional or Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), that spread ideas such as alternative disputes resolution to those countries which are witnessing new emerging democracies.

The second strategy, often used by the United Nations, is the *structural prevention*<sup>210</sup>. This approach is addressed to those critical situations which are either coming out from a conflict, either living an initial crisis that has all the preconditions to culminate into a dangerous conflict. Main goal of *structural prevention* is creating organized systems of laws and rules to establish and strengthen non-violent channels to a) solve disputes and conflicts, b) erode conflict of interests, c) transform conflict on a common, shared, ground.

*Structural prevention* mainly focuses on the problems of culturally divided states, especially those with weak democratic apparatus or weak democratic traditions, dangerous ethnic divisions, and civilian violence, often perpetrated by one group to another one (ex. civil wars), or by the government to population (ex. dictatorships, military governments). Tools that can be used by the organizations are numerous: institutional for transitional justice, truth telling and reconciliation; new rule of law (new electoral and constitutional design); autonomy arrangements within federal governance structures; laws and policies to accommodate and satisfy linguistic and religious differences; training for law enforcement officials in following the rule of law; civilian control of military organization assured by national institutions; development and support of civil society<sup>211</sup>. Part of structural prevention is *normative change*. This procedure has the objective to develop and institutionalize formal and informal principles of the new preventing conflict context who is going to develop. States and Organizations that operate in this field can, not only modify previous rules and norms (enacted during the Cold War), but they can also establish new ones in line with international law.

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<sup>210</sup> *Structural prevention* shall be distinguished from *operational prevention*. The former strategy includes all the strategies that can avoid the use of the latter one. The definition could have even more narrow meaning, referring to the efforts to modify structural conditions within states so as to improve opportunities for nonviolent conflict resolution (what we are interested on in this research).

<sup>211</sup> Paul C. Stern, Daniel Druckman, "*International conflict resolution after the Cold War*", p. 6.

Today, the idea that these strategies are more and more adopted and implemented, allow scholars to think that we are in front of new enduring features of conflict resolution. What pushes experts to admit this, is that those forces which have made these new strategies more suitable and attractive, are becoming themselves enduring. If international conflicts continue to have their customary extent, if terrorism keep conquering space on the international chessboard, and interests of non-state actors become more and more important, then, it means that all the conditions to make these new conflict resolution strategies are playing. This does not mean that nation states are going to lose importance, but they are going to be “just actors of a much larger cast”. Interstate conflicts will remain as important as dangerous, but the trends in international arena are changing.

Under such conditions, the role played by the United Nations, mainly with Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding missions, is going to be crucial, and must be effective. Furthermore, the UN, as a third actor, is better positioned to facilitate negotiations between parties, because of numerous interests at stake. The UN is exclusively able to deploy soldiers and volunteers with the goal to implement both tools for conflict resolutions and for humanitarian intervention. It promotes, thanks to its mandates, training in informal disputes resolution techniques, and provide for institutions of civil society which participate in democratic processes. The UN experts, once on the field, contribute to the so called *structural prevention*, by advising on electoral and constitutional design, running and monitoring democratic elections and comparing the process with previous ones already completed. Moreover, through Peacekeeping missions, the UN has helped countries coming out from conflicts, developing and enforcing new laws and norms on human rights protection, treatment of minorities, and democratic governance<sup>212</sup>.

To conclude, we can say that everything is changing. The conflicts have been increasingly shifting, during years, from a national level to an international one. Actors have evolved and multiplied: not only nation-states but also non-state actors, criminal and terroristic organizations. Conflictual arenas have spread far where they did not exist before, involving

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<sup>212</sup> Paul C. Stern, Daniel Druckman, “*International conflict resolution after the Cold War*”, pp. 8-9.

more and more often innocent civilians. In the same way, on the other side of the analogy, conflict resolution and peace research have followed the parallel path of conflict, trying to adapt to the international situations which have arisen, step by step, over years. Starting from the concept of traditional diplomacy among nation-states actors, and the classical conflict resolution, until the theory of *conflict transformation* by Johan Galtung, that represented a turning point. This introduced the idea that the conflict (read as concept) is rooted in human nature, and due to this, cannot be eliminated, but only transformed in a new constructive relationship. The theories of Norwegian author still play a crucial role within the United Nations, and especially within the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), giving a clear theoretical and practical addressing to the missions' mandates. Today, Galtung is one of the most important experts and co-operator of the United Nations in the field of peace research and peace building.

*“The U.N. acts as the world's conscience,  
and over eighty-five percent of the work that  
is done by the United Nations is in the social,  
economic, educational and cultural fields.”*

Shirley Temple

## CHAPTER 4

### **The UN Operation in Mozambique (1992 - 1994): from war to *positive peace* implementation**

The *United Nations Operations in Mozambique* (UNOMOZ) was a UN peace mission to Mozambique established on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December, 1992, under *Security Council Resolution 797*<sup>213</sup> with the assignment to monitor the implementation of the *Rome General Peace Accords* agreed upon by the Mozambican president *Joaquim Chissano* (FRELIMO) and *Afonso Dhlakama* of RENAMO. Its mandate formally came to an end at midnight on 9 December. However, ONUMOZ continued to carry out residual functions until the Mission was fully liquidated at the end of January 1995.

The United Nations' operation in Mozambique was unprecedented in scope, and the results have been almost completely positive. The transformation the country lived between 1992 and 1994, must give credit to the work implemented by the Organization. The elements that allow us to define the outcome as "positive" are numerous, and, although accompanied by negative ones, formers represent clearly the majority: from the draft of positive Peace Agreement to the deployment of more than 90.000 soldiers and experts for safety and monitoring reasons; from the reconstruction of the national army, torn to pieces by years of civil war, to the rehabilitation of soldiers, administrative institutions and demilitarization of political oppositions (RENAMO in this case). All these factors allowed Mozambique to discover, for the first time after centuries of colonization and war, the normality of a stable and free elections, which influenced the economic and social growth rates. Nowadays, natural resources and tourism lead the country as one of the first African developing economies,

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<sup>213</sup> The Council requested the Secretary-General in planning and executing the deployment of the Operation to seek economies through phased deployment, with an initial mandate ending on 31 October 1993. It also demanded the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and ONUMOZ, respecting the ceasefire and guaranteeing their safety.

trying to harmonise political imbalances risen again in recent years, waking the ghosts of the past.

Another crucial element to stress is the diplomatic innovation ONUMOZ represented: for the first time ever, the ground for Peace Agreement signed in Rome, in 1992, was sown by an international independent catholic (third) actor: the community of Sant'Egidio. This community, of religious origins, was already committed, in the 80s, in humanitarian and rescue missions to help Mozambican population threatened by the civil war. Its effort consisted in a) filling the social gap created by the conflict; b) addressing the Galtunian *direct violence* with humanitarian and rescue work; c) reconciling the conflicting parties for the sake of the people. The Community's intervention - reason why Rome was the city chosen to sign the peace agreements -, always backed by the UN Secretary General, must not be underestimated, but considered as one of the key element that shaped the ONUMOZ Mission.

Using the words of Jeremy Weinstein<sup>214</sup>:

*"It is no wonder, then, that Mozambique finds itself highlighted as a success story for the United Nations in conflict-ridden Africa."*<sup>215</sup>

Starting, therefore, from the historical path, we will go deeper, step by step, in the description and Galtunian evaluation of the mission. We will use, as reference, the *positive peace* tables reported at the end of Chapter 2, e proposed again in paragraph 4.3. The main goal, up to this point, is to empirically demonstrate that a UN Mission, backed by *positive peace* elements, is able to create conditions for a stable and safe environment.

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<sup>215</sup> Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Mozambique, a Fading U.N. Success Story", *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 13, Number 1, January 2002, p. 141

## 4.1. Historical events

### 4.1.1. *The Mozambique independence declaration*

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of June, 1975, Mozambique proclaimed itself independent from Portugal, after 11 years of war against the colonizer empire. The main actor in anti-Portuguese key was the communist Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)<sup>216</sup>, led by Eduardo Mondlane until his death in 1969. Portuguese colonization didn't bring any positive development, or industrialization, within the country; it was used only as instrument to exploit Mozambique's resources and low-cost workers. Furthermore, following the regime of *apartheid*, the biggest part of population was reduced to slavery.

On the 25<sup>th</sup> April of 1974, in correspondence with the *Carnation Revolution*<sup>217</sup>, and the will of the new government to abandon the colonial missions overseas, the FRELIMO (supported by Cuba and USSR) was able to take, in a short time, the capital Maputo, and forced the Portuguese to leave the country. One year later, on the 25<sup>th</sup> of June, Mozambique self-proclaimed itself independent, establishing a presidential republic with President, Samora Machel, and the FRELIMO government party.

The enthusiasm for the independence ended very soon, when it was clear that the road to modernization of the country, was not going to be free of obstacles, as one might imagine. Problems began to arise already at the eve of independence, when FRELIMO, evoking the victory against the Portuguese, embarked on its revolutionary program without bothering to obtain popular consent.

Now, before moving on to describe the causes of the Civil War, its actors, and the destruction that resulted from, it is strictly necessary to stop for a while and focus on the historical

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<sup>216</sup> The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), from the Portuguese "*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*", was founded in 1962 as a liberation movement against the Portuguese colonization. After the independence, achieved in 1975, the party (communist) has ruled until present days, overcoming the terrible civil war against the opposition faction of Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), from 1992 to 1994.

<sup>217</sup> The *Carnation Revolution*, that in Portuguese is *Revolução dos Cravos*, refers to the 25 April military coup in Lisbon, Portugal, on 25 April 1974, which overthrew the regime of the Estado Novo.



background. I leave thus pending the thread of civil war<sup>218</sup>, to go back in time to the years before the Portuguese colonization.

#### 4.1.2. *Historical Background*

Thanks to its geographical position and the abundance of rivers and natural harbours, Mozambique has represented a strategic outpost since the first centuries. Suffice it to say that when colonialism comes to an end, the Cold War strengthened its importance, as the Soviet Union and the United States battled to maintain their spheres of influence in the region.

Geographically, the country conformation is influenced by three major rivers – the Zambesi in the north, the Save in the center, the Limpopo in the south – which have had profound effects on the social and cultural landscapes, because they contribute to divide the country into three, respective, “*broad cultural and linguistic bands*”<sup>219</sup>. In the northern provinces, the *Macua-Lowme* groups, which represented the largest part of population (47%); in the center the *Teve* and *Ndau* group; in the south, below the Save river, the *Tsonga* group (23%). Even if the northern group of Macua-Lowme counted for almost half of population, it never dominated politics. This because, the ethnic groups were highly fragmented with the aggregate numbers obscuring important distinctions that subdivided these larger categories.

#### **The Portuguese colonization**

From the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the differences between the three bands had become more and more intense and incisive (on a cultural and social level); and, although the Portuguese were able to push their way inland, the southern Mozambique surrendered only at the beginning of 1900.

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<sup>218</sup> The Civil War between FRELIMO and the opposition RENAMO will find its development in paragraph 4.1.3., when all the elements will be known.

<sup>219</sup> Margaret Hall & Tom Young, “*Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*”, Ohio University Press, 1997.

The foreign domination brought no improvement in the countries, nor in the cleavages among the geographic zones, but rather, it contributed to make them even deeper, adding, to cultural and linguistic distinctions, also disparities in levels of economic development and prosperity. The southern provinces, in fact, were administered directly by the state, who invested significantly in development and infrastructure. Conversely, central and northern areas were divided among private Portuguese companies, that receive concessions to develop agricultural export industries. The former area, thus, became the largest source of income for the Portuguese empire in Mozambique: they exported labor to south Africa in exchange for gold. The latter one (north and center), in the hands of private concessions, faced the total failure: forced cultivations were imposed and slavery, although banned between 1929 and 1941, was considered a customary practice<sup>220</sup>.

What we have just treated is one of the key points that justified and gave shape to the civil war that destroyed the country: a vast diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups whose importance has been underestimated for centuries.

### **The struggle for independence**

During all the period, political dissidents who dared to oppose to the Portuguese regime were forced into exile, resulting in a weak and disorganized opposition.

The *Mozambique Front of Liberation* (FRELIMO) came to life in 1962, in Tanzania, created by exiled political figures<sup>221</sup>, merging the various nationalist groups that were attempting to emerge silently. One year later, in 1963, the sociologist and politician, Eduardo Mondlane<sup>222</sup> took the leadership of the movement and called for independence from Portugal. Supported by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, Mondlane began, in 1964, a campaign

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<sup>220</sup> Slavery in Mozambique continued to exist (also because of the influence of the *apartheid* phenomenon in South Africa) until 1975, year in which the country declared the independence from Portuguese.

<sup>221</sup> Malyn Newitt, "*A History of Mozambique*", Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995, p. 541

<sup>222</sup> *Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane* (20 June 1920 – 3 February 1969) served as the founding President of the *Mozambican Liberation Front* (FRELIMO) from 1962, the year that FRELIMO was founded in Tanzania, until his assassination in 1969. He was an anthropologist by profession but worked as a history and sociology professor at Syracuse University

of guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese enemy, destined to last ten years. The leader of FRELIMO, unfortunately, didn't see the complete independence: Mondlane was killed by a parcel bomb in 1969. The power, thus, shifted to a *Presidential Council* composed by Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos, and Samora Machel. The union of the various nationalist groups, however, was dead with the Mozambican leader. Accused of collaboration in the killing of Eduardo Mondlane, Simango was expelled by the Council, giving the opportunity to Samora Machel to strengthen its position.

In the following six years, FRELIMO accelerated the war alongside with its pro-communist policies, under the influence of Southern intellectuals (former Gaza). This clean cut did nothing but aggravate the discontent, and the gaps, among members, especially those coming from the center and the north, to the point that, by the time that Frelimo came to power in 1975, key leaders of these areas went over to opposition movements. Without any more obstacles coming from different points of view, the party was free to implement their own socialist policies, even more when the independence was reached.

In June 1975 (as we have seen before), after 10 years of war, and 50.000 victims, FRELIMO declared Mozambique independent from the Portuguese colonizers, and Samora Machel became Mozambique's first president. The situation, however, was doomed to degenerate, exactly because of those geographical and social divisions rooted in Mozambican culture, and exacerbated during the independence war itself.

The anti-socialist discontent, therefore, was about to transform in a civil conflict<sup>223</sup>.

#### 4.1.3. *The rise of Civil War*

Once the country had been washed out by the Portuguese "ashes", and the guerrillas had enjoyed the triumph, the FRELIMO began its transformation of the social, political and economic life of Mozambique. Following the Soviet example of other major countries, the

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<sup>223</sup> Mark D. Tooley, "Praying for Marxism in Africa", FrontPageMagazine.com, Friday, March 13, 2009.

changes were radical and dramatic, unexpected and often violent. These were mainly addressed to the rural areas: traditional leaders of those areas were replaced by pro-communist "*party secretaries*"<sup>224</sup>, directly connected to the government; collective farming instead of subsistence agriculture and state-mandated communal villages instead of traditional settlement patterns. The result was a "*Marxist-Leninist agenda*", obviously, mandatory, which nullified the concept of political freedom and banned the oppositions. With a huge northern and central representation in the oppositions' groups, and the government in the south (in Maputo), the repression could only lead to civil war.

### **The Mozambican National Resistance - RENAMO**<sup>225</sup>

While the country was split between the independence and the imposition of the new communist system by the FRELIMO, the opposition started organize themselves outside the borders.

In Rhodesia, thanks also to the support of the *Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation* (CIO), the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) group was born. It was structured as an anti-communist actor, opposed to the Samora Machel party, and it was led by André Matsangaissa, former senior official in FRELIMO's armed wing. The goal of the Group was to gather anyone who had been forced to exile by the FRELIMO party: politicians, soldiers, or ordinary civilians. In Mozambique, RENAMO focuses on those areas where discontent was higher; its troops raided re-education camps and prisons, releasing unjustly imprisoned Mozambicans and offering them "*a chance to revenge*"<sup>226</sup>.

Once the northern and central military and strategic bases were carefully secured, and the opposition clustered around RENAMO, South Africa intervened in favour of the group as the primary financial supporter. In addition, European right-wings, and the United States, assisted

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<sup>224</sup> This definition had direct reference to the title given to the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the case of Mozambique, the term referred to the representatives of the party spread all over the country

<sup>225</sup> Portuguese name was *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*

<sup>226</sup> Stephen A. Emerson, "*The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo\_Renamo Struggle, 1977\_1992*", Helion and Company, February 2014, pp. 74-110.

RENAMO in developing a clear political agenda, advocating a capitalist approach to development and a transition to multiparty democracy.

The civil war officially started in 1977, and, after few years, it was clear how the Cold War re-proposed here: on one side the communist FRELIMO, supported by USSR and People's Republic of China; on the other the anti-communist RENAMO, firstly support by the Rhodesia and South Africa, and then by the USA. The tactics used by both parties, were those of guerrilla, terror (mainly addressed to the population) and raids against infrastructures and strategic centers.

In 1979, Matsangaissa died in RENAMO's unsuccessful attack, and he was succeeded by the ruthless *Afonso Dhlakama*, sadly famous for the crimes committed against innocent people. At his bidding, the entire population under RENAMO was forced to work by mass abduction, while the children were trained and recruited as soldiers: it was estimated that one third of RENAMO forces were child soldiers<sup>227</sup>. Mass abduction consisted in fulfilling three main task: 1) produce food for RENAMO, 2) Transport goods and ammunition, 3) sex slaves for women. The use of mines become customary, especially by the resistance, which used them to terrify the population, damage the economy and destroy civil services (hospital, schools).

Although the FRELIMO forces were greater in number and heavily equipped, until 1984 none of the two groups managed to prevail. The only number to grow was that of civilian casualties because of guerrilla attacks, landmines, mass killings and famine, attributable to both the policies of RENAMO and FRELIMO. In 1986, Samora Machel, the Mozambique's first president, died in a controversial aircraft crash. His successor, *Joaquim Alberto Chissano*<sup>228</sup>, spent himself to create several international bonds with western powers, and to put an end to the civil war.

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<sup>227</sup> Tom Hartley, "*RENAMO and the LRA: The History and Futures of African Child Soldiers*", ed. by Liz Goodwin, *New Histories* magazine, <http://newhistories.group.shef.ac.uk/wordpress/wordpress/renamo-and-the-lra-the-history-and-futures-of-african-child-soldiers/>

<sup>228</sup> Joaquim Alberto Chissano (born 22 October 1939), was the second president of Mozambique. He is credited with transforming the war-torn country of Mozambique into one of the most successful African democracies. After his presidency, Chissano became an elder statesman, envoy and diplomat for both his home country and the United Nations.

### **War crimes and crimes against humanity**

The conflict, that in less than 16 years caused one million deaths, went down in history for the atrocities committed against the civilian population, especially women and children.

On the one hand, the Resistance faction, the RENAMO, headed by Afonso Dhlakama, whose destabilization tactics require the constant use of atrocious crimes, precisely in order to destabilize. These actions included: 1) mass killing, 2) rapes, 3) mutilation of non-combatants individuals during terrorist raids in villages or in cities, 4) the recruitment of child soldiers (as mentioned above), 5) the use of Gandira system<sup>229</sup> based on forced labor and sexual violence. Following the rules of this brutal system, women were used as slaves and raped to improve the spirit of soldiers, while the population starved, because forced to produce for RENAMO, without being able to produce for itself. Needless to say that, refusing to follow the rules imposed by Gandira, or any attempt to escape, meant execution by soldiers. Another tremendous practice used by the soldiers was the “*mutilation and killing of children left behind by escaped parents*”<sup>230</sup>.

The war crimes committed by RENAMO gained worldwide media attention when the faction soldiers, during one of its terroristic raid, butchered 424 civilians, including the patients of a hospital, with machetes, in the town of Homoine. The scandal that arose from the incident, prompted the United States, initially supporters of RENAMO in the battle against communism of FRELIMO, to investigate the methods used by the faction during the attacks: The *Gersony Report*, named after Robert Gersony (Consultant to Bureau for Refugee Programs Department of State in 1988), demonstrated, to the international community, that the modalities through which the massacre was perpetrated in Homoine, were nothing more than standard modalities. Apparently, the only difference between the Homoine massacre and RENAMO's

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<sup>229</sup> Victor Igreja, “*The Monkey's Sworn Oath. Cultures of Engagement for Reconciliation and Healing in the Aftermath of the Civil War in Mozambique*”, Leiden University Medical Center (LUMC), Faculty of Medicine, and Research School CNWS, School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, Leiden University, June, 2007.

<sup>230</sup> Robert Gersony, “*Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique*”, also known as “*Gersony Report*”, submitted to Ambassador Jonathan Moore, Director of Bureau for Refugee Programs, April 1988, pp. 24-27.

usual methods was the size of the operation. The Gersony Report, moreover, wanted to show how much this violence were systematic: making direct reference to interviews with refugees, described in the report, it seemed that 94% of the murders, 94% of the abductions and 93% of the lootings to RENAMO<sup>231</sup>.

The report strongly persuaded the US Government to stop supporting such a ruthless conflictual actor.

Thinking that the other side of the chessboard could be presumed innocent, however, would be a really huge mistake. The government faction, even though on a smaller scale, was guilty of the same crimes<sup>232</sup>.

Forced labor became reality very early, and communal villages were required. A large amount of population preferred to live in the countryside, despite the risk of attacks by RENAMO. Rape was a practice diffused among FRELIMO soldiers too; the difference was that, in this case, it was not institutionalised by a system, the so called "Gandira". Another practice that was put in place, especially after independence (since 1975), was that of "re-education centers", where, political dissidents, soldiers, criminals and prostitutes were imprisoned without a trial; the centers were no more than "*infamous centers of torture and death*"<sup>233</sup>. It is estimated that 30.000 people died in these camps<sup>234</sup>, and the same number, if not more, died because of executions to extend control in the country.

From a total of 1 million dead, which we mentioned at the beginning of the section, nearly 400,000 were victims of crimes against humanity or war crimes: the data report, around 125,000 brutal killings by the hand of RENAMO (between 1977 and 1987), and around 250.000 by the hand of Government party FRELIMO since the independence eve (1975 to 1987)<sup>235</sup>.

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<sup>231</sup> Robert Gersony, "*The Gersony Report*", p. 34-36. 1988.

<sup>232</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 1990, Africa watch overview section, Focus on Mozambique. [https://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AFRICA.BOU-07.htm#P403\\_90345](https://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AFRICA.BOU-07.htm#P403_90345)

<sup>233</sup> Peter Worthington, "*Machel Through Rose-Tinted Specs*," Financial Post (Canada), November 1, 1986.

<sup>234</sup> Geoff Hill, "*A Crying Field to Remember*," The Star (South Africa), November 13, 2007.

<sup>235</sup> Rudolph Rummel, "*Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900*", Hardcover - International Edition, November 1998.

### **Final years of the war**

Sixteen years drained out every resource the country had; the population was on his knees, exhausted by hunger and violence; FRELIMO and RENAMO armies were crumbling. Sixteen years were too much both for those in command, and for those submitted.

1989 was a crucial year, worldwide, and in Mozambique: in November, the fall of Berlin Wall brought an end to a war that lasted 30 years, fought with threats in Europe, but with weapons in other parts of the world. Few months later, the South African President, F.W. de Klerk, freed Nelson Mandela, launching a clear message: South Africa was no longer willing to tolerate the phenomenon of apartheid. The leader of RENAMO realized the message had a further meaning: South African military support for RENAMO was coming to an end.

On the other hand, after the election of the forward-looking 2<sup>nd</sup> President Joaquim Alberto Chissano, in 1986, FRELIMO started to increase, and strengthen bonds with western powers and international organizations. In 1987, preliminary talks had begun with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to obtain a loan to revitalize economy. Three years later, in 1990, a new constitution was adopted, which allows political opposition and the multi-party system. The civil war was losing credibility and energy, but was struggling to reach a conclusion.

The situation of the country was, to put it mildly, disastrous. About a hundred thousand soldiers continue to take up their guns, without taking into account the number of child soldiers still on the field; the economic situation was kneeling, mainly because of the nationalization and collectivism policies imposed by the President Machel, but also because the country had no hope to attract foreign investments. Until then, it was not clear to RENAMO what it would have obtained laying down weapons, and this motivates them to keep on fighting. Furthermore, in the last phases of the war, the group obtained important victories closer and closer to the capital Maputo, in the south, and this pushed them to fight, believing in an imminent victory.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> Stathis N. Kalyvas, *“New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?*, from *World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Oct., 2001), pp. 99-118.



Efforts to bring the two factions to the collaboration had begun in 1980, under the responsibility of the Catholic Church, deeply rooted in Mozambique. With RENAMO and FRELIMO reluctant to look for any rapprochement, or any contact point from which to build a new governmental structure, the role of the Church was that of a mediator between the parties. For ten years, the church struggled to improve the informal contacts, while the formal contacts were not taken into account.

In 1990, with the south African regime of apartheid now faltering, and the consent on the new constitution (as seen before), FRELIMO and RENAMO decided to approach negotiations. The warring parties agreed to initiate conversations mediated by the Community of Saint Egidio, an independent Catholic organization with a long history of work in Mozambique.

#### 4.1.4. *The General Peace Agreement (1992)*

After a 27-month mediation, and 11 working sessions, continuously supported by the United Nations, step by step, the protagonists came to the signing of the peace agreements, in Rome, October 4, 1992. The Italian government was represented by the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, *Mario Raffaelli*<sup>237</sup>; the delegation of FRELIMO was present with *Armando Guebuza*<sup>238</sup>, while the RENAMO group with *Raul Domingos*, former fighter of the faction. The Community of Sant'Egidio, that hosted the conversations, was represented by *Andrea Riccardi*<sup>239</sup>, *Matteo*

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<sup>237</sup> *Mario Raffaelli* (15 May, 1946) is an Italian politician, member of the Italian Socialist Party from 1979 to 1994, and elected Under Secretary several times. Between 1990 and 1992, he represented the Italian government in the negotiations that led to the peace agreement in Rome between the government of Mozambique and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. From 2003 to 2008 he was the special envoy of the government for the Horn of Africa. Since 2010 he is president of AMREF Italy (African Medical and Research Foundation).

<sup>238</sup> *Armando Emilio Guebuza* (January 1943), is a Mozambican politician. He was President of Mozambique for two terms: from 2005 to 2015, after winning the 2004 and 2009 elections. He represented FRELIMO during the General Peace Agreement of 1992, and, during the transitional phase towards the first general elections in 1994, he represented the Government of Mozambique in the joint Supervision and Monitoring Commission, the highest implementing body of the General Peace Accords.

<sup>239</sup> *Andrea Riccardi* (January 1950), is an Italian historian, academic, activist and politician, founder, in 1968, of the Community of Sant'Egidio. Was the mediator in the negotiations for the resolution of the conflict in Mozambique, and this earned him the honorary citizenship of Mozambique.

Zuppi<sup>240</sup>, and by the bishop *Jaime Gonçalves*. Agreements were officially signed by the then President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the head of the opposing faction, RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama. Furthermore, the Agreement endorses the participation of the UN: 1) to monitor the respect in the implementation; 2) to provide expertise and technical assistance for the implementations and monitoring of general elections. Agreements became operative on the 15<sup>th</sup> of October, 1992.

The Agreement, followed by seven specific protocols, stated that, once implemented the ceasefire, it was necessary to move rapidly to the separation of the two fighting forces, and group these in certain areas of the country. The only armed force allowed by the Agreement was the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM); consequently, all the troops that did not belong to this, would have been demobilized. The process would have lasted six months starting from the operative entry into force of the Agreement. In the meantime, with a look at the new elections, which were scheduled to take place not later than October 15, 1993, new parties would have been formed (to participate in these new elections). On 16 July 1992, both parties (Government and RENAMO) agreed to the Declaration on Fundamental principles of humanitarian assistance, activities that would have been implemented by the United Nations.

Given that the United Nations would have had a key role in the implementation of the Agreement, then a *Supervisory and Monitoring Commission*, headed by the UN, was created. On 9 October, moreover, the Secretary General sent to the Security Council a report in which he recommended an immediate action plan for Mozambique, and expressed its intention to elect an interim Special Representative, to evaluate the organization's work.

Four days later, on 13 October, following the Resolution 782<sup>241</sup> (1992) of the Security Council, the government of Mozambique and RENAMO signed the General Peace Agreement; at the same time, they approved the Italian Aldo Ajello as interim *Special Representative*, and a team of 25 military observers. Ajello, appointed by the Secretary-General, was asked to immediately

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<sup>240</sup> Matteo Zuppi (October 1955), is an Italian Catholic archbishop. Following the resolution of the Mozambican Civil War, he also obtained the honorary citizenship

<sup>241</sup> Ali M. Taisier & Robert O. Matthews, *"Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution"*. McGill-Queen's Press. 1999, p. 145.

start the process of democratization, demobilization of the armies and to initiate all those practices of a peace process.

On 15 October, the day in which the Agreement entered into force, the experts and military observers arrived in Mozambique, with the objective of verifying the deployment of international troops on the territory. The Agreement, in fact, implied that Malawi and Zimbabwe deployed troops to support government forces to keep open the transport corridors along the country.

The situation, however, was not prospecting of easy solution. Both Mozambican actors, in fact, although they had committed themselves to implement the principles of the Agreement immediately after the entry into force of the latter, when Ajello arrived in Mozambique, had not initiated none of the planned actions. So, further discussions began concerning the deployment of the agreement practices. Meanwhile, even if the ceasefire had been agreed, it was violated repeatedly, in many parts of the country, and the Special Representative was forced to invite parties not solve disputes via conflict, but with negotiation.

Once the parties were brought to the discussion table again, in the form of informal meeting, one month after the entry into force of the Agreement, on 4 November, the Special Representative appointed the *Supervisory and Monitoring Commission* (CSC). The Commission had the main objective:

*“to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that might arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions.”<sup>242</sup>*

It was chaired by the UN, and was composed by the Government and RENAMO, plus the Italian, French, Portuguese, British, American and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) representatives.

CSC on the same day appointed its main subsidiary commissions:

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<sup>242</sup> UN PeaceKeeping Mission, “Mozambique – ONUMOZ”, Setting up of monitoring mechanism, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm#General>.

*“the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM).”<sup>243</sup>*

With these efforts having laid the groundwork, the United Nations was able to step in and make a critical difference.

## **4.2. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)**

In early December 1992, the Secretary General Submitted to the Security Council the details of the *United Nations Operation in Mozambique* (ONUMOZ). The projection of the country, in the report, was not positive:

*“Describing the difficulties of the operation, he referred to the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the General Peace Agreement and the complexity of the processes envisaged in the Agreement.”<sup>244</sup>*

The two key problems underlined by the Secretary General, which would have prevented the creation of the conditions for democratic elections, were:

- *The military situation*: until all the troops of both factions were not put under control, the situation would have remained ungovernable;
- *The commitment of the parties*: without the effort of the parties involved, any attempt to restore normalcy in the country would have been futile.

In his recommendation to the Security Council on the implementation of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, the Secretary General stated:

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<sup>243</sup> Richard Synge, “Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94”, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

<sup>244</sup> UN Security Council, Resolution 797 (1992). “Adopted by the Security Council at its 3149th meeting, on 16 December 1992”.

*"in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists."*<sup>245</sup>

With Resolution 797 of December 16, 1992, the Security Council approved, as a result of the report, the deployment of UNOMOZ, with a first deadline by 31 October 1993. The main principles followed by the Council were the ones reported by the Sec. General: military control and cooperation between the government and FRELIMO, on a long term democratic and electoral perspective.

### **ONUMOZ Mandate**

In the realization of an elastic, applicable and efficient mandate, the Security Council, after having emphasized the importance of full involvement of the interim Special Representative, focused on main four points that would have formed the backbone of a reborn country: 1) political, 2) military, 3) electoral and 4) humanitarian. The approach to these elements had to be complete, leaving no gaps in the activity of UN peacekeepers:

*"Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country might deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, required prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections."*<sup>246</sup>

The role of Aldo Ajello would have been very delicate, because he was responsible for the deployment of troops and use of expertise:

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<sup>245</sup> United Nations, *"The Blue helmets: a review of United Nations peace-keeping"*, Dept. of Public Information, 1996.

<sup>246</sup> UN Security Council, Resolution 797 (1992). "Adopted by the Security Council at its 3149th meeting, on 16 December 1992".

- *Political aspects:* the Office of Special Representative had the task of guiding the UN intervention, and was responsible for the political leadership of the peace process; this entailed facilitating the implementation of the General Agreement, through the leadership of the *Supervisory and Monitoring Commission*.
- *Military aspects:* probably the most important, delicate and difficult aspect to solve. ONUMOZ was responsible for: 1) monitoring the compliance with the ceasefire; 2) implement the separation and concentration of troops; 3) demobilization of these latter; 4) collection and destruction of weapons; 5) management of international troops; 6) securing of transport corridors; 7) re-launch infrastructures; 8) provide for the security of UN peacekeeping troops and all the experts involved. All this on an area of 800 thousand square kilometres.<sup>247</sup>

The military aspect was managed by the UN troops, together with the military observers and 49 assembly areas (divided into three military regions); UN troops were further deployed in airports, ports and access areas, including RENAMO headquarters. In assembly areas, about 100 thousand soldiers would have had to be grouped and demobilized to be sent back into civil society. Civil technical units worked closely with the *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance* (UNOCHA), to implement humanitarian aspects.

Key element was the protection of the four corridors within the countries: protection of humanitarian convoys and the transport of resources were the main responsibilities. For this reason, ONUMOZ implied the deployment of infantry battalions along the corridors.

- *Electoral process:* General Agreement stipulated that, one year after the entry into force, legislative and presidential elections should have been held simultaneously; the period could vary due of the actual circumstances and the difficulties encountered.

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<sup>247</sup> In order to give a clear idea of the extension of Mozambique, Italy's surface is 300 thousand square kilometres, Germany is 357 thousand square kilometres, France is 643 thousand.

In this case the responsibility was on the Electoral Division to monitor and verify the implementation of every element and stages of electoral process, which were organized by the National Elections Commission.

Moreover, the Special Representative had the authority to coordinate the whole general electoral process of Mozambique, which would have been enacted through the *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP).

- *Humanitarian aspects:* closely related to the military aspect, this one represented a considerable effort for the mission. The Agreement of 1992 established two key objectives to be pursued, for international humanitarian assistance: on the one hand helping reconciliation between the two parties; on the other hand, assisting the return of people displaced by war and hunger, fled to the neighbouring country. The *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs* (UNOCHA)<sup>248</sup> headquarter was established in the capital Maputo, with many sub offices at regional and provincial level, and was headed by the Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid community were asked to provide representatives to work within UNOHAC.

#### 4.2.1. *Facing the Reality*

From the very first moment of the ONUMOZ mission, it was clear that the estimated timetable in the General Agreement was absolutely unrealistic: because of various delays, and political, administrative and logistical obstacles, in early April 1993, the situation was still deadlocked. The deep mistrust between the Government and RENAMO turned into reluctance to gather and demobilize troops, and this caused a serious delay of the mission. As it was not enough, RENAMO insisted that 65% of ONUMOZ troops should have been deployed before the

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<sup>248</sup> United Nations General Assembly, Session 46 Resolution 182. “*Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations*”, A/RES/46/182, 19 December 1991.

assembly process began; there were administrative problems in deploying troops and many other logistical and legal problems related to the absence of a status-of-force agreement.

Considered that the conditions did not allow it, the election date, initially scheduled for October 1993, was postponed, and the discussions between the two factions and the Special Representative started again to determine a new date.

On 14 April, with the Resolution 818 (1993), the Security Council stressed that the Mission was living a stalemate in its proceeding; it further urged the Government and RENAMO to fulfil the promises elaborated in the General Peace Agreement, especially for what concerned the grouping and demobilization of the troops. It was clear that the military field represented the cornerstone of the ONUMOZ mission: once this aspect was brought under control, the UN Peacekeepers could have started their job. Furthermore, the Resolution strongly invited both parties to cooperate with the Special Representative in the implementation of the points of mandate.<sup>249</sup>

The resolution gave an impressive boost to the UN, so that, in less than three weeks, it was able to solve part of the problems, and in early May ONUMOZ was fully deployed with its military infrastructures. In the following months (30 June) the Secretary General reported about the successes of peace process such as the establishment of the voluntary trust fund to assist RENAMO, international effort in humanitarian field, large return of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, the Zimbabwean and Malawian troops were successfully withdrawn, and a status-of-forces agreement was signed between the Government and the United Nations.

Even though steps forward were made in terms of the deployment of mission and safety of the country, under the electoral point of view the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State Administration was not complete; the demobilization of the troops, on the other side, had not yet begun. The Secretary General stated it was a crucial point for the stability of the country: the process had to be completed

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<sup>249</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 818 (1993), *“Reaffirming its resolution 782 (1992) of October 1992 and 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992”*.



at the beginning of 1994, and it had to be accompanied by the creation of a national army of Mozambique. To succeed in this process:

*"[...] the Secretary-General was willing to grant the request that ONUMOZ, with the consent of the Security Council, assume chairmanship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force on the understanding that it would not entail any obligation on the part of the United Nations for training or establishing new armed forces."*<sup>250</sup>

The timetable was then modified, considering a 16-month period before the parliamentary and presidential elections (October 1994). The ONUMOZ foresaw for the regrouping and demobilization of troops, both governmental and RENAMO's, about nine months from June 1993: the 50% of the soldiers by January 1994 and the rest by May. The UN Military Observers estimated that 30.000 soldiers would have been absorbed by the new national army, while the rest re-inserted within society; the process would have lasted one year.

July 9, through resolution 850 (1993), the Security Council acknowledged of the progress made so far, but stressed how the delay in the context of the demobilization of the army was postponing the creation of the national army and the election itself. For this, the two Mozambican parties were invited, once again, to comply with the obligations undertaken in Rome, a year and a half before.

### **The two major agreements**

The summer of 1993 was very significant from a diplomatic point of view; the government and FRELIMO, thanks to the mediation of the Special Representative, started having direct contacts. The presidents themselves decided meet each other: the President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the President of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama.

The talks started on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August, in Maputo. During this event, the Special Representative emphasized, in front of the two main protagonists, the importance of

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<sup>250</sup> UN PeaceKeeping Mission, "Mozambique – ONUMOZ", New Timetable, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm#General>

respecting the new timetable. The talks had to result, hence, in something concrete and constructive. Any further delay wouldn't have been accepted. The meeting witnessed both Mozambican parties accepting the expiring date of October 1994 for the elections, even if the consent was implicit by the RENAMO.

This round of meetings (3 – 10 September) also led to the signing of two key agreements, the first since the General Peace Agreement (October 1992):

- 1) The Government and RENAMO *“agreed to integrate into the state administration all areas that had been under RENAMO control”*<sup>251</sup>; this point, according to the Secretary General would have helped the stabilisation of the country and national reunification.
- 2) With reference to the field of national police, parties reached the agreement to entrust the United Nations the monitoring of police activities (public or private) in the country, checking compliance with the freedoms and rights of citizens, and to provide with technical support to the police on the field.

Once apportioned the responsibility, the Secretary General decided to deploy survey team of experts that could provide constructive recommendations.<sup>252</sup>

With resolution 863 of 13 September<sup>253</sup>, the Security Council firmly imposed the timetable to the two factions. Talks had to continue, while demobilization had to start without further hesitation.

From the political point of view, on the contrary, considered that progress had been very few, The Special Representative urged the opposition RENAMO, and other political parties,<sup>254</sup> to join the government of Joaquim Chissano to draft a new electoral law, that deals to proceed

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<sup>251</sup> UN PeaceKeeping Mission, “Mozambique – ONUMOZ”, Two Major Agreements signed, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm#General>

<sup>252</sup> The deployment of police observers had already been authorized by resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992. In this case, 128 ONUMOZ police observers were deployed.

<sup>253</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 863 (1993), 13 September 1993. The Security Council reiterated the importance of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique and their timely implementation.

<sup>254</sup> It should be remembered that the new constitution signed in 1990 decreed the creation of a multi-party democracy.

to the establishments of a National Election Commission. The Security Council, for its part, agreed to UN monitoring on the national police and welcomed his intention to send a survey team of experts in that connection.

### **Secretary General's visit**

Between 17 and 20 October, in an effort to accelerate the development process of the peace agreements, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, visited Mozambique to bring the parties together and analyse the mission.

The visit was positive because it enabled significant progress. The main results were, undoubtedly, 1) the agreements on the mobilization and grouping of troops and irregular militias, 2) the disarmament, 3) the constitution of National Election Commission and a 4) completion program of electoral law. For what concerned the police apparatus, the visit paved the way for the creation of National Police Affairs Commission, in charge of controlling the activities of the National Police.

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of November, given the steps forward, the Security Council considered sufficient, but still necessary, to renew the mandate of ONUMOZ for six months, looking forward to a report from the Special Representative on 31 January 1994, and every three months from that date.

Though many problems remained, the last months of 1993 gave the impression, to the international community, that the conditions for reaching the end of the mission were in place.

#### *4.2.2. Last year of ONUMOZ (1994)*

The year 1994 opened with three basic problems highlighted in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on January 28: one was the daily problem of military demobilisation of troops and paramilitary forces together with the transfer of the weapons; the second was related to the financial support for the transformation of RENAMO from a military movement into a political opposition; the last one was the necessity of a national defense force.

In the same report, the Secretary General stated that, given the previous political developments, there were all the conditions for a shift of focus from a mere implementation of the cease-fire regulations to a more detailed application of police activities and respect for civil rights. It was established, therefore, that 1114 ONUMOZ civilian police experts would have been sent on the field (in addition to the 128 already authorized). The goal was to establish a large number of police in the country, taking into account that, by the end of May, the complete demobilization of troops was planned.

Between March and April 1994, for the first time, there were no military activities that could put endangered or delay the implementation of the ceasefire, and for this reason, these were two months full of successes: the demobilization of troops began on the 10<sup>th</sup> of March, while the 49 areas to collect soldiers before sending them back to society were open and operational by 21 February. The General Peace Agreement was, finally, entering effectively into force.

By mid-April, 55% of Government and 81% of RENAMO soldiers were cantoned. A total of 12.756 troops, was demobilized and transported to the districts of their choice, by 18<sup>th</sup> of April. In the meantime, the training programme for the new Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM)<sup>255</sup> had begun, provided training for some 2,000 soldiers. For the command of the new armed force, two generals were chosen: Lagos Lidimo of the Government and Mateus Ngonhamo of RENAMO.

It was April 11 when Joaquim Chissano announced that general elections would take place between 27 and 28 October. Indeed, all the necessary conditions for these to occur were taking shape: the *Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration* was already operating since February of that year.

Unfortunately, there were still some obstacles that slow down the mission. For example, the delay in assembling government troops, together with the demobilization of RENAMO forces; as if not enough, the National Elections Commission was going to encounter difficulties in the

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<sup>255</sup> The Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (Portuguese: *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique*, or *FADM*), were definitely formed in mid-August 1994, by the integration of the People's Forces of Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM) with the military wing of RENAMO, following the end of the civil war.

process of voter registration. Numerous continue to be the logistics, administrative and financial problems, without considering that political representatives were having huge problems to manifest their ideas, for the reasons above. Considering these problems on the one hand, and the fact that ONUMOZ was playing a key role in the peace and democratization process on the other, the Secretary General convinced the Security Council to extend the mandate of the mission, at least until the end of elections, with the final end of the mission set for January 31, 1995.

Following the report of the Secretary General, on 5 May, the Security Council adopted Resolution 916, by which it renewed the mandate ONUMOZ until November 15, 1994, but referring to the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General.

June and July saw the Mission, together with the Government and RENAMO, engaged in the last step towards demobilization of troops. Also it proceeded with the formation of the FADM, the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces, that, after reducing the number of selected soldiers from 30,000 to 15,000 (due to logistical and financial reasons), was about to enter in service. From the political and electoral point of view, then, there were no more critical problems, so that, when the nine members of the Security Council visited the country in mid-August, they concluded that all the conditions outlined in the Agreement had been respected and implemented.

By the end of August, the demobilization was finally concluded, and the national army, monitored by the ONUMOZ military observers, was taking place all over the country. In the same way, the police were ready and established in major cities and towns and in 44 field posts. Humanitarian programs played a key role in reconciliation of the country, being able to resettle, in two years, the 75% of refugees.

The electoral processes were the one to present less problems. Voter registration started on 1 June and was extended to mid-September to allow a greater selection. The beginning of the electoral campaign was predetermined for September 22, and ONUMOZ was ready to support all parties in an active participation:

*"As the peace process approaches its final leg, it will be incumbent upon all concerned in Mozambique to double their efforts to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and that the transitional period promotes national reconciliation and stability"*<sup>256</sup>

A month before the elections, the Security Council was confident for the progress made by Mozambique in the peace process, democracy. It declared the elections were going to be free and fair, and encouraged the parties in the good efforts they were doing.

### 4.2.3. *The General Elections*

As scheduled, the election polls opened on 27 October. The international community deployed approximately 2,300 electoral observers, 900 of them from the United Nations. Other organizations sent their observers, such as the European Union, the Organization of African Unity.

Apart from the threat by the President of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, to boycott the elections for suspected irregularities in the voting procedures - problem solved the following day, thanks to the intervention of the President of the Security Council - the elections were conducted in a general atmosphere of peace, which allowed precise organization without problems or accidents. The voting period was extended by one day to 29 October to allow a greater number of people to express the vote. When the poll closed, the data did record a very high percentage of participation, with 90% in some provinces. The Special Representative, on the eve of counting of ballots, expressed to the Security Council his satisfaction over the role played by the UN Mission.

#### **The electoral results**

With the ONUMOZ still on Mozambican soil for residual tasks of monitoring and safety, the Electoral Law required that the election results would have been announced 15 days after the

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<sup>256</sup> Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines, *"The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective"*, Published by Conciliation Resources, London, 1998.

end of elections. This time interval had to ensure the utmost transparency and accuracy of the scrutiny, especially in front of the UN political observers.

November 19, 1994 the results were announced: Joaquim Chissano, of FRELIMO party, won the Presidential Elections with 53.3%, while the leader of opposition RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, reached the 33.7%. The electoral participation was of 87%. The Legislative Elections witnessed the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) receiving the 44.3%, followed by the RENAMO with 37.8%, and the Uniao Democratica (UD) with 5.2%. Those three parties had the following share of the new Parliament's 250 seats: FRELIMO - 129, RENAMO - 109 and UD - 12.

The Special Representative stated that the process had been carried out without serious problems, and that the UN experts would have analysed any irregularities. However, more in general, the elections took place in an atmosphere of organization professionalism and democratic participation. It was the same Representative to report to the Security Council that the elections had been "*free and fair*"<sup>257</sup>.

With the Resolution 960 (1994), the Security Council:

*"endorsed the results of the Mozambican elections, and called on all parties to stand by their obligation to accept and fully abide by the results. It also called on them to continue the process of national reconciliation based on a system of multi-party democracy and the observance of democratic principles."*<sup>258</sup>

The new Parliament was installed in Maputo in 8 December 1994, and Joaquim Chissano was officially appointed president the following day. On the 9<sup>th</sup> of December, therefore, the mandate of ONUMOZ Mission came to the end, even though continued to perform residual functions until the end of January 1995, date on which the mission was fully liquidated.

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<sup>257</sup> David J. Francis, "*Dangers of Co-deployment: UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa*", Ashgate Publishing, 2005, p. 92.

<sup>258</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolutions 960 (1994), of 21 November 1994, endorsed the recent elections on 27–29 October 1994 in accordance with the Rome General Peace Accords.

### **4.3. United Nations Operation in Mozambique: A Galtunian analysis of a “positive” mission**

Before moving on to the detailed analysis of the mission, I would like to briefly contextualize the mission at international level, to justify reasons and methods of intervention.

The ONUMOZ Mission (1992-1994) is part of a series of missions implemented after the end of the Cold War, and later institutionalized with the Brahimi Report (2000). During these years, requests for intervention, to the United Nations, grew exponentially for several reasons:

- The end of the bipolar division, lasted 40 years, which gave birth to new state and inter-state conflicts;
- The collapse of the Soviet Union, which left behind waves of regional tensions and fights for independence;
- The emergence of new non-state actors which put at risk the security of the international community (e.g. terrorist groups);
- New technologies and new weapons;
- The internationalization of the conflicts and the dramatic escalation of tensions.

The complexity of the environment, shaping in front of the UN, forced the Organization to implement changes in strategies and instruments, in order not to lose effectiveness in front of the myriad of assistance requests.

The answer to international evolution manifested in the form of transition from peacekeeping of 1<sup>st</sup> generation to peacekeeping of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation. This latter, characterized by more robust mandates, involved a greater number of fields: a) humanitarian, b) military, c) police apparatus, d) political and administrative system, e) democratic and electoral mechanism, f) assistance of displaced persons and refugees, g) reconstruction and culture.



This multidimensionality of mandates was largely inspired by the Galtung's theory of conflict transformation and, especially, *positive peace*.

The next table, already seen in the last paragraph of Chapter 2, synthetically exposes the elements of *positive peace* which are adopted by the peacekeeping of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation; following the construction of this graphic representation, I will analyse in deep the ONUMOZ Mission to evaluate if the UN intervention in Mozambique could be defined as positive as the international community has defined.

## ***Positive Peace Elements***

| Field<br>Term                       | Short term  | Middle term  | Long term  |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| <b>Military and Security</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separation of factions</li> <li>• Security zones</li> <li>• Disarmament</li> <li>• Demobilization</li> <li>• Separation army police</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of the new national army</li> <li>• Integration the national police</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demilitarization of politics</li> <li>• Transformation of the culture of violence</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Political and Constitutional</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of government transition problems</li> <li>• Constitutional reform</li> <li>• Preparation of elections</li> </ul>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overcoming the problems related to the second round of elections</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of <i>good governance</i></li> <li>• Respect of Human Rights</li> <li>• <i>Rule of law</i></li> <li>• Development of civil society</li> </ul> |
| <b>Economic and Social</b>          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Essential services</li> <li>• Communications</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rehabilitation of re-settled population</li> <li>• Demobilization of soldiers</li> <li>• Reconstruction of infrastructures</li> <li>• Demining</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long term macroeconomic policies</li> <li>• Local sustainable development</li> <li>• Equal distribution</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Psycho-social</b>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overcoming mistrust and mutual distrust</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of peace and justice priorities</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Treatment of psychological trauma</li> <li>• Reconciliation policies</li> </ul>   |

|                      |  |  |  |
|----------------------|--|--|--|
| <b>International</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to peace process</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfer of power to local control, avoiding interferences</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integration in regional and international networks</li> </ul> |
|----------------------|--|--|--|

#### 4.3.1. *ONUMOZ Evaluation*

Despite the numerous difficulties faced by the Organization during the implementation of the mission, see the constant delay in the demobilization of factions' soldiers, the slowness of electoral preparation and the hatred between Government and RENAMO which affected almost every decision of the Special Representative and the UN Secretary General, the mission managed, not only to stop the so called *direct* violence, but also to heal society through humanitarian and constitutional interventions. In simple terms, two years of ONUMOZ were able to address, with its provision, the *structural violence* fuelled by the country's previous history.

The assessment of the mission will take account of both positive and negative elements, observing the effects in the aftermath of the intervention.

### **The General Peace Agreement**

The first element to be put under the spotlight is the General Peace Agreement, signed in Rome, on 4 October 1992. Representing the backbone of the mission, it is strictly necessary to evaluate whether the GPA contains, in itself, the seeds of positive peace.

The process, that lasted more than one year, resulted in a rapprochement between the two conflicting parties:

*“Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of RENAMO, meeting at Rome, under the chairmanship of the Italian Government, in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, Emilio Colombo, and in the presence of [...], at the conclusion of the negotiating process in Rome for the establishment of a*

*lasting peace and effective democracy in Mozambique, **accept as binding** the following documents which constitute the General Peace Agreement [...].”<sup>259</sup>*

The *consent of the parties* to accept “as binding” all the provisions and attached Protocols, represented the first core pillar for the implementation of *Positive Peace*. Galtung itself stated that:

*“Peacebuilding efforts require consent by the parties concerned”<sup>260</sup>.*

In the unfortunate event that the two sides had refused to get closer, avoiding the possibility to enact the consent of the parties, ONUMOZ could have transformed in a failure, probably similar to the Bosnia – Herzegovina Mission we have seen in Chapter 1.

The separation of conflicting parties that followed the GPA resulted in a second crucial Galtunian element: the stop of perpetration of *direct violence*, allowing the implementation of *negative peace* (in the form of ceasefire).

Unfortunately, the separation between parties never erased the hatred between RENAMO and the FRELIMO. This mutual non-acceptance deeply influenced the political development of the country, giving FRELIMO, in the years that followed, an authoritarian power opposed to a non-existent political opposition.

## **1) Military and Security field**

The core element (previously seen), entailed in this scope, is the separation of conflicting parties, implemented as a direct consequence of the General Peace Agreement. The next steps will go deeper in military and security field.

ONUMOZ was able to implement a military intervention at the highest level: the creation of security zones and humanitarian and refuelling corridors, as well as the reconstruction of infrastructure was guaranteed by constant patrols, both by land (infantry) and by air (air

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<sup>259</sup> United Nations Security Council, “General Peace Agreement for Mozambique”, S/24635, 8 October 1992.

<sup>260</sup> Corneliu Bjola, Markus Kornprobst, “*Understanding International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics*”, Routledge, 2013.

force); major hubs of the country, such as airports, ports, oil pumping stations, UN warehouses and headquarters, temporary and permanent arms deposits of parties' troops, were subjected to a 24-hour surveillance.

ONUMOZ military component supported the humanitarian assistance, protecting corridors, but also cooperated in activities such as logistical support for experts and volunteers, medical assistance and civil engineering expertise.

### **The Ceasefire**

Military observers, deployed by the Security Council with Resolution 782 (1992), had the duty to monitor the compliance of parties with the conditions of the ceasefire. The ceasefire, enforced by troops, prospected to separate and:

*“control the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others and themselves”<sup>261</sup>.*

The general Peace Agreement, in addition, arranged that was duty of *Cease-fire Commission* (CCF) to deal with any violation of the ceasefire, with the active participation of ONUMOZ experts. The Commission was composed by

*“representatives of the Government, RENAMO, the invited countries and the United Nations. CCF was presided over by the United Nations;”<sup>262</sup>.*

In general, despite the Commission divided the breaches of ceasefire in three main categories, such as a) illegal detention of individuals, b) alleged movement of troops and c) occupation of new positions, the notified violations were not numerous and did not represent a serious threat to the peace process.

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<sup>261</sup> Niels van Willigen, *Peacebuilding and International Administration: The Cases of Bosnia and Kosovo*, Routledge.

<sup>262</sup> Peace Accord Matrix, *“Cease Fire: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique. Protocol IV.VI(i)”*, ed. by University of Notre dame. <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/cease-fire-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

The ceasefire, albeit it falls in the category of *negative peace*, if effectively enforced, represents the very first step towards the conditions for a stable peace.

### **Disarmament and Demobilization of troops**

The General Peace Agreement, in order to avoid further violence and risks of escalation between FRELIMO and RENAMO, predisposed the implementation of *Disarmament* and *Demobilization* processes. These two elements are always paralleled by a third one: *Reintegration* (we will see it later talking about social reconstruction). The *DDR* has become an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation.

The two military dynamics, established in 1992 by the GPA, only began in October/November 1993, because of multiple difficulties and delays. These, in fact, proved to be the most complicated steps of military field.

Troops cantonment was actually slow because it depended on the negotiations between the Government and RENAMO, which did not trust each other and struggled to find a common ground to satisfy both voices. At the beginning, of the 49 areas predefined by the Agreement, only 21 opened (12 for the Government and 8 for RENAMO), and the grouping of troops started. One month later, the Mission had opened 15 more areas (36 in total). While the initial stages were more focused on the Government troops cantonment, in a second phase (Late December / early January 1994) this trend changed shifting on the troops of RENAMO.

Huge problems were also encountered in the demobilization of paramilitary and illegal militia. The dismantling of these troops, which was planned to begin alongside with the regular forces, started, on the contrary, at the end of January 1994, after several attempts to determine the expiring date of this demobilization.

Why does a constructive disarmament and demobilization was, in this case, crucial? In a country internally devastated by 15 years of civil war, centuries of colonization and the independence war against Portugal, being able to render harmless the military factions (first cause of brutal violence and bloodshed) which had been threatening innocents people, represented the necessary condition for Mozambican stability.

### **The national police apparatus**

During the two years of ONUMOZ mission, the Security Council, following the reports of the Secretary General, authorized the deployment of more than 1.200 police experts on Mozambican soil, to merge and train the locale police corps.

Following the demobilization of conflicting parties' troops, the national police apparatus would have replaced militias, enforcing constant patrolling to ensure the respect of population security and rights, defending the law, maintaining public order and preventing or suppressing crimes.<sup>263</sup>

All the efforts of police reform resulted in the institution of CIVPOL, the Civilian Police component, which was mandated to:

*“monitor all police activities in the country and verify that their actions were consistent with the General Peace Agreement; monitor respect of citizens' rights and civil liberties; provide technical support to the National Police Commission; verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies did not violate the General Peace Agreement; verify the strength and location of the government police forces and their materiel; and monitor and verify the process of reorganization and retraining of the quick reaction police, including its activities, weapons and equipment.”<sup>264</sup>*

CIVPOL worked closely with ONUMOZ checking and monitoring the conduct of electoral campaign, and ensuring that the political rights of citizens, groups and political organizations were respected. CIVPOL, despite the cooperation with ONUMOZ, was not part of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique. It was a separate component under the command of a Chief Police Observer who was directly related to the UN Special Representative.

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<sup>263</sup> Mark Malan, *“Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police Reform in Mozambique and South Africa,”* International Peacekeeping 6, no. 4 (1999)

<sup>264</sup> Alice H. Henkin, *“Honouring Human Rights”*, Aspen Institute. Justice and Society Program, Aspen, 2000, pp. 133-134.

During the years of the mission, CIVPOL established itself at any strategic collocations within the country, without any unrestricted access to the general public, conducting its own investigations and recommending corrective actions.

In a *positive peace* perspective, the construction and deployment of police apparatus was one of the hardest aspect. In fact, when the intervention concluded, and troops were withdrawn, the burden of security and safety was put on the police shoulders. CIVPOL, under this aspect, was a 70% success: in January 1994, Mozambican police counted more than 18.000 policemen, 11 headquarters and over 200 stations in all the districts. During the two years of mission, human rights abuses and crimes decreased.

The UN efforts contributed separating, firstly, troops from police, and then creating some new institutional corps.

Following the course of events, problems started, in March 1994, once the UN surveillance retired from the country; crimes increased again, showing a non-indifferent degree of independence to the UN Institutions. That's the main reason why it's not possible to define the reform of police apparatus as a complete success.

### **The national army: Mozambican Defence Force**

In July 1993, the *Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force*<sup>265</sup>, composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of France, Portugal and the United Kingdom, under the United Nations chairmanship, signed the Lisbon Declaration. According to the principles set out in the Declaration, the Joint Commission established an assistance program for the creation of a new unified army.

The process consisted of training experts for the new Mozambican army: 540 officers, from the Government and from RENAMO, were sent to Nyanga (Zimbabwe) to start training. Once the training was completed, the officers were transported back to Mozambique by ONUMOZ

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<sup>265</sup> Portuguese definition: *Comissão Conjunta para a Formação das Forças Armadas de Defesa e Segurança de Moçambique* (CCFADM).



forces. Their main purpose became that of helping in training the infantry soldiers at the three Mozambican Defence Force training centres.

At the same time, the Commission was working at nineteen documents concerning the organization, structure, operational procedures, uniforms and ranks' symbols of the new Mozambican Defence Force.

Exactly like the police apparatus, the new national army, the FADM, Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique, flanked the UN troops during the two years' mission. In the years that followed, then, the new Armed Forces had the duty to take the place left empty by the ONUMOZ soldiers. The replacement process, however, was not so easy. Problems were mainly related to the historical division between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and the lack of trust between the parties' soldiers. Problems manifested from lower to higher rank of the Army.

It is possible, therefore, to say that, on a long term, the lack of cohesion within the armed forces didn't allow ONUMOZ to build up and reinforce the structure of the army, but not to spread the sense of belonging.

### **Transformation of culture of Violence**

Through the perspective of *positive* peace, the restructuring and reformation of military and police apparatus represented the hardest step to take. The main difficulty to overcome had been rooted within the country since the Portuguese colonization: the culture of violence.

The colonization, that started in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, did not bring to the country any incisive modernization, nor improvements. The sole purpose was to exploit the resources and manpower. This condition of, physical, psychological, as well as racial submission did nothing but feeding hatred and contempt that did sediment in social roots, spreading it.

Following the Galtung's theory we have seen in the Chapter 3, the process of social transformation contributed to give shape, year after year, century after century, to the so called *structural violence*: a political and social environment which considered violence as a normal state of affairs. This kind of violence was the main reason why the Mozambican history was thus characterized by conflicts, terrorist attack and pure violence.

The partial transformation of *structural violence* through the reform of military and security field, was one of the biggest achievement of ONUMOZ. Result obtained also thanks to the demilitarization of politics and transformation of two military factions, FRELIMO and RENAMO, in two representative political parties.

## **2) Political and Constitutional**

The political and constitutional transformation planned by the General Peace Agreement, and then implemented by ONUMOZ experts, represented, for Mozambique, a crucial step. After centuries of absence of democracy, in 29 October 1994, the country witnessed, for the first time, “free and fair” democratic elections. The fact that in the subsequent years, the political situation did not evolve positively, should not make us forget the starting point Mozambique and United Nations Operation, in 1992. The political and constitutional goals reached during the UN intervention, were absolutely positive considering the internal political situation.

### **The Government transition**

The transition from armed factions to political parties, probably, was the most emblematic element from a Galtungian perspective of “*transformation of conflict*”: given the impossibility of eliminating the conflict, experts concentrated on the transformation of main structural causes: FRELIMO and RENAMO.

On the basis, therefore, of the Galtung’s idea, political reform pivoted on the conflict between the two parties, moving it from the battlefield to the National Assembly, giving life to the Government party and its political opposition. This dynamic contributed to create a new institutional framework of a multi-party democracy.

In 1994, moreover, the GPA modified the Constitution, introducing the “principles of Electoral Law” in Article 107:

*“Paragraph 3 of article 107 was revised and changed from majority vote to proportional vote according to the protocol of the GPA. The new Constitution and the GPA had thus established the foundations for the creation of the planning,*

*executing, directing, and supervising organs of the electoral processes for the multi-party elections—the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat of the Electoral Administration (STAE)”<sup>266</sup>.*

The political reform, unfortunately, didn't eliminate the hatred between the two actors. The shift to the National Assembly represented for RENAMO the first step away from the possibility to gain the majority, replacing FRELIMO. The leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, never accepted to continually represent the opposition of the chessboard, without having the chance to win the power. In the years following the mission, sadly, this tension and hatred has been accumulating, up to these days, when this situation is leading to a tightening of relations and more and more often is pushing RENAMO to take up arms,

More in general, political problems started after the 1994 elections, when mission was over, and Mozambique was the only responsible for its choices. Conversely, if we focus the analysis on the revolution process enacted by ONUMOZ, so 1992 – 1994, I would say that say that the result reached by the mission was meaningful given the political and democratic inexperience of the country.

### **Constitutional Reform**

The Mozambican Constitution was introduced in 1990, under the FRELIMO president Joaquim Chissano. This new text provided, for the first time ever, for a multi-party political system, market based economy and free elections (held with the support of ONUMOZ in 1994).

The Constitution provides that the President of Republic has the role of head of state, head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Moreover, he is directly elected for a five-year term via run-off voting. The Prime Minister, for his part, is appointed by the President, and his functions include convening and chairing the Council of Ministers (cabinet), advising the President, assisting the President in governing the country, and coordinating the functions of the other Ministers.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> Irae Baptista Lundin, "Towards Stable Electoral Laws in Mozambique," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2 (2004): 97-118.

<sup>267</sup> *Constitution of Mozambique*, Articles 150, 154 and 155.

## The electoral process

The electoral process struggled to begin, mainly because of heavier priorities such as the demobilization and cantonment of troops. In March 1993, the Government of Mozambique, monitored by the UN experts in the elaboration, prepared a draft electoral law which was brought to the attention of RENAMO and other smaller political parties. The conference to discuss the project, that was held a month later, was not a success. RENAMO refused to join it because of lack of time to read the text; the other parties, even if they attended the conference, withdrew after having presented a declaration which called for both financial and material support. As RENAMO, moreover, they asserted that the time to analyse the text was too short. The meeting broke up in a stalemate.

The conference met again on August 2, 1993, about 4 months later. All political parties were present, including RENAMO, but also this session was destined to reach a deadlock. Parties, in fact, got stuck over an article related to the composition of the *National Electoral Commission*<sup>268</sup>, that was planned to be the impartial and representative institution responsible for organizing the parliamentary and presidential elections. Again, the conference ended and the discussions were postponed.

The stalemate was finally overcome during the visit of the UN Secretary General (17 October 1993). Thanks to the intervention of Boutros Boutros-Ghali<sup>269</sup>, with the collaboration of Special Representative, the government and RENAMO managed to untie, firstly, the knot related to the composition of the National Electoral Commission, and after, the chairmanship of the Commission. Despite the important goal reached, however, the following discussions stopped for an impasse over four issues:

- Voting rights of expatriates Mozambican citizens;
- Composition of provincial and district election commissions;

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<sup>268</sup> The National Electoral Commission (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, CNE) is established by Law 6/2013 (Articles 1 - 3). The CNE is an independent body subordinate only to the constitution (and therefore the Constitutional Council)

<sup>269</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali (14 November 1922 – 16 February 2016) was an Egyptian politician and diplomat who was the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) from January 1992 to December 1996.

- Composition of the *Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration*<sup>270</sup>;
- Establishment and composition of an electoral tribunal.

After two months and several meetings between President Chissano and RENAMO's representative, Dhlakama, together in consultation with the Special Representative of the UN, the parties succeeded in reaching consensus on the issues mentioned above. This paved the way for the conduct of the electoral process.

December 9, 1993 the new Electoral Law was finally approved by the Mozambican National Assembly:

*“It was promulgated a few days later by President Chissano and entered into force January 12, 1994. The members of the National Elections Commission were appointed on 21 January 1994.”<sup>271</sup>*

The electoral process was monitored, step by step, by the United Nations experts which suggested the direction to be taken in the medium / long-term perspective. The mission's ability to bring a country to its knees to hold elections was considerable. Furthermore, once initiated, in March 1993, the process was carried on without too many problems or obstacles, controlled not only by the political experts, but also by CIVPOL.

As we will see in the next paragraphs, the political field did not evolve positively because of tensions between parties we have already told. The years following the mission were characterized by a masked authoritarian regime that limited the RENAMO opposition (already in trouble). Thus, while on the one hand it is possible to affirm that on the short and medium term ONUMOZ was able to reconstruct the political backbone, on the other hand,

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<sup>270</sup> The Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections (*Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*, STAE), represents the executive arm of the National Electoral Commission. The STAE is responsible for the organisation and logistics of voter registration and the conduct of elections and referenda. In the execution of its mission it is answerable only to the CNE and is explicitly subordinated to it.

<sup>271</sup>Yusuf, *“African Yearbook of International Law. Annuaire Africain de Droit International”*, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, Volume3, p. 310. 1995.

Mozambique grew with many structural problems deriving from hatred. A *structural violence* never completely eliminated.

### **3) Economic, Social and Psycho-social**

Although the economic aspect was partially controversial, producing consequences that deeply influenced the economic development of the country and its society, under the social and psychological point of view the Mozambican recovery was partially complete, and implemented with goal of elimination of *direct* and *structural violence* shaped with centuries of hate.

In the next section, we will be heading some elements whose development aimed at social rehabilitation, but they were not of easy acceptance; among these the prisoner release and the amnesty.

#### **Humanitarian Assistance**

Humanitarian programmes implemented by ONUMOZ was certainly one of the major goal of the mission, but at the same time, one of the most difficult tasks given the breadth of the country and the social cleavages. The program was able to respond effectively to the reintegration needs of Mozambicans and lay the foundations for a stable situation and growth prospects. Unfortunately for the country, conditions created from the social renewal, political and military were not backed by economic development, and consequently, did not allow an increase of the country's welfare.

The short term humanitarian efforts were focused on the creation of common communication ways which could facilitate the implementation of the General Peace Agreement provisions. In the same way, the commissions for humanitarian assistance, grouped under the UNOHAC, with the support of the military engineering, developed corridors both to foster the first aid spreading and to develop contacts between the distant areas and concerned provinces. The infrastructure reconstruction framework, conversely, faced major problems related to the economic instability. Only since the end of '90s, the FRELIMO government started allocating

huge amounts of investments in infrastructure reconstruction, especially following the economic needs, and demands, of foreign investors.

Although the Demobilization could fall in this sphere, I decided to include it in the military and security for the reasons given above

### **Reintegration**

The reintegration of soldiers, on the one hand, and refugees, on the other, was one of the social provisions fully provided by the GPA.

The process, that found no implementation during the first year of mission because of serious delays in demobilization and cantonment of troops and armed militias, officially started in the first months of 1993, when the Government requested the assistance of international community. The goal was to allow ex-combatants to receive higher financial assistance once reintegrated within society, thus achieving a better integration in productive and civic life.<sup>272</sup>

The Reintegration and Support Scheme (RSS), together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), provided for a financial subsidy to all ex-combatants. In addition:

*"[...] one of the key underlying assumptions of the reintegration programme was the strongly held belief that the average soldier was of peasant origins and, first and foremost, would want to return to the land. In view of this, the decision was taken to provide each former soldier with a 'kit' consisting of a hoe, a bucket and seeds. It was hoped that this would encourage former combatants to return to rural agricultural communities, where there were greater employment opportunities for less skilled ex-soldiers than in the urban and semi-urban areas."*<sup>273</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> "Mozambique – ONUMOZ Background," United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed September 13, 2010. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm>.

<sup>273</sup> Chris Alden, "Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," Security Dialogue 33 no. 3, September 2002.

Financial support was also flanked by the possibility to participate in training courses aimed at producing skilled and semi-skilled graduates.

In 1997, the project cycle and funding came to an end: data reported that 85–90% (200.000 former combatants) of demobilized soldiers had been successfully reintegrated into society.<sup>274</sup>

### **Refugees and Internally Displaced Person**

*“A major goal of the ONUMOZ humanitarian assistance programme was to respond effectively to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans, particularly those returning to resettle in their original communities. It had been projected that approximately 6 million Mozambicans would resettle during the following two years, including about 4.0 to 4.5 million internally displaced persons”.*<sup>275</sup>

The repatriation and resettlement programs carried out by the UNOHAC was absolutely monumental: it costed to the donor countries \$536 million and allowed 6 million Mozambicans to return their communities or villages.

The difference between refugees and IDPs must be stressed: data related to the number of Mozambicans fled outside the borders were 1.5 million while those who remained within the country (IDPs) were 4.5 million, to which had to added 350.000 soldiers, and their dependants.<sup>276</sup> The most important element to be stressed, through a *positive peace* perspective, was the ability of the several humanitarian organizations (deployed under the UN umbrella), operating on the field, to allow refugees and IDPs to return home, reintegrating within the social fabric, giving them new possibilities and new hopes. The last eight months of the program had the goal of building a bridge between the emergency phase and the post-war reconstruction phase (long-term).

### **Mine Clearance**

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<sup>274</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>275</sup> "Mozambique - ONUMOZ Background," United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), accessed June 4, 2010. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozFT.htm>.

<sup>276</sup> Sam Barnes, "Humanitarian Aid Coordination during War and Peace in Mozambique, 1985-1995", STUDIES ON EMERGENCIES AND DISASTER RELIEF, Report No.7.



Another issue of crucial importance was the mine clearance of the country. The use of anti-personnel bombs was sadly used for terrorist attacks by RENAMO, and sometimes even by FRELIMO. The demining responsibility was entrusted to the *National Mine Clearance Plan*<sup>277</sup>. The plan, which struggled in the beginning for logistical reasons, in its first phase dealt with: 1) the demining of main roads (about 4000 km), 2) developing of mine awareness programmes and 3) training the Mozambican forces in demining process and use of technology related to this. Once the first phase concluded (May 1994), UNOHAC reported that the mandate for mine clearance had been achieved. The second phase, conversely, focused on the creation of a national capacity for mine clearance. Data reported that, by the end of 1994, Mozambique could count on about 450 technicians and experts in demining.<sup>278</sup>

### **Amnesty and Prisoner Release**

These two provisions represented the most innovative, but at the same time, the most delicate element provided by the General Peace Agreement. During the Civil War, indeed, both factions, RENAMO and FRELIMO, had been accused by the international community to use terrorist attacks, and unprecedented violence, in order to terrorize and kill innocent people. Armed militias were accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>279</sup>

The General Peace Agreement ruled that all prisoners, especially POWs, except those accused of ordinary crimes, would have been released from the starting date of the mission. Equally, the GPA officially provided for the implementation of general political amnesty: FRELIMO and RENAMO soldiers would have not been prosecuted for crimes committed.

Why does the General Peace Agreement provided for the implementation of such amnesty when crimes committed by soldiers (regardless of military rank) were so serious, and so hardly condemned by the International Community?

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<sup>277</sup> Hildegard Scheu, *"Humanitarian Mine Action in Mozambique"*, Pub. By Landmines in Africa. <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/6.2/focus/hildegardscheu/hildegardscheu.htm>

<sup>278</sup> Human Rights Watch Arms Project, *"Landmines in Mozambique"*, Human Rights Watch, March 1994.

<sup>279</sup> See paragraph 4.1.4.

The question is what makes the topic controversial, but in the answer lies the innovation of *positive peace*. In the Mozambican case, the United Nations made an important choice: to reconstitute the social fabric, reintegrating soldiers who were often children or young people forced to take up arms, part of communities and villages.

It was a medium/long term choice, with the aim of reconciling society and overcoming mutual mistrust. It was a necessary, brave, choice.

#### **4) International Integration**

The General Peace Agreement opened the doors to international donors. Italy, as host-country, took the leadership already in the first day of donor's conference. On the 16 December 1992, in Rome, it was agreed the amount of 320 million dollars to be addressed to emergency programs, reintegration of refugees and demobilization of soldiers. The countries that decided to participate to the fund for Mozambique were the following: Italy, the European Community, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland and the USA.<sup>280</sup>

The international openness represented a crucial step for Mozambique. In fact, this increased its bonds with the international community and its economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It was thanks to the loans of these two institutions that the country, in the years that followed the elections in 1994, began investing in reconstruction of infrastructures and then schools, hospitals and several facilities, previously ignored.

On 9 June 1993, additional \$70 million were pledged by donor countries to support, but also foster the peace process.

The Mozambican case is one of the most emblematic example of a strong international support. The main role was played by the UNOHAC, that led a massive campaign in favour of

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<sup>280</sup> "Mozambique Peace Accord donor countries named," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 23, 1992.

the peace process, and it represented Organizations such as the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the International Organization for Migration. Several international agencies, together with NGOs and other donor countries cooperated effectively. Between 1992 and 1994, the number of NGOs present in Mozambique rose from 150 to 250. The large international support for the peace process in Mozambique proved instrumental in securing peace and relative stability in the country.<sup>281</sup>

The international integration has been deepening mostly in the last decade, due to economic reasons. Mozambique, in fact, has started attracting huge amount of FDIs thanks to its natural resources (natural gas, oil, diamonds) and incredible tourism potential.

### **The situation of the economy**

During two years of Mission, the UN was able to reconstruct the political system, its mechanisms and its actors; it was able to give the society its dignity, thanks to humanitarian effort, through delicate steps such as the amnesty and repatriation of refugees. But what was the effect of the intervention on the economy of the country? How this influenced the development of Mozambique?

Already in 1987, with the help of the IMF and the World Bank, the Government had drawn up a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), trying to respond to the economic collapse, to create better conditions for populations, to reduce domestic imbalances and to create the foundations for economic growth.

Although the SAP caused the acceleration of inflation, and the tightening of economic conditions, the program proved to be partially positive because halted the economic stagnation. On the other hand, however, in the years following the civil war, Mozambique was deeply dependent on international financial aid (the USA were the first donors), which shifted from humanitarian emergency aid to long term development policies. The country became a

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<sup>281</sup> Marc de Tollenaere, "Fostering Multiparty Politics in Mozambique," in *Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies*, ed. Jeronen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 75-96.

“donor darling”<sup>282</sup> in 1994, when managed to make the crucial step of the democratic elections. The international community, in fact, hoped to use the case of Mozambique as a positive example of development for African countries:

*“In the 1990-1994 period, Mozambique was the largest aid recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for more than 1.1 billion US dollars per year: 200 million in debt relief; 100 million in food and emergency aid; and 800 million for other kinds of assistance. The consequence of the proliferation of aid was that donors and international NGOs became powerful, often bypassing the Mozambican government in policy making and implementation”.*<sup>283</sup>

It must be stressed that economic growth in Mozambique was strongly influenced by foreign investments, during the years of the mission and especially after. The main players became multinationals, and the mega trade groups interested in this resource-rich country with an economic base. The international community and investors interest, unfortunately, did not bring any benefit to the population, at least in the first decade after the General Peace Agreement, for two main reasons: 1) this savage capitalism was mainly channelled by the FRELIMO, who was in control of every state institutions and had not any political opposition; 2) corruption was spread among the government party, and this did not allow an optimal exploitation of the investments and financial aids.

For these reasons, Mozambique remained, despite an economic structure built with the help of the IFM and the World Bank, one of the poorest countries in Africa, with more than 60% of the population below the poverty line. Infrastructures were rebuilt very slowly, schools were left out from the investments, while the main centers for farming, such as collection centers and food markets, were placed in the last position in the field of reconstruction.

If observed following a *positive peace* interpretation, the economic performance of the country, at least in the 90s, including the ONUMOZ mission, cannot be considered fully

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<sup>282</sup> Katharina Hofmann, “*Economic Transformation in Mozambique. Implications for Human Security*”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013.

<sup>283</sup> Joseph Hanlon, “Mozambique's elite -- finding its way in a globalised world and returning to old development models”, Crisis States Research Centre seminar 7 October 2009.

positive. Although the intervention was able to give a new structure to the political and social field, it was not able to boost the economy so to push the welfare state to grow fairly. Obviously, the political corrupt leadership of FRELIMO was not helpful for the reasons we have seen before. International openness that was given to the country caused a heavy dependence on foreign funds, addiction that lasted about ten years (until 2002).<sup>284</sup>

#### **4.4. Post-intervention years**

ONUMOZ left Mozambique at the end of January 1995, after having allowed the country to face “free and fair” general elections, for the first time. The Parliament was installed in Maputo (8 December 1994) and Joaquim Chissano was elected President of Mozambique the following day.

Political and economic situation remained pretty fragile in the years following the first elections in 1994. Although the result of the election had been accepted by both sides, RENAMO hardly swallowed the bitter pill, and constantly demonstrated it as the first opposition party. The new Government, for its part, inherited a country exhausted by 30 years of anti-colonial and civil war. Infrastructures were largely destroyed, millions of refugees and displaced persons were on their way home, the countryside was infested with mines. The economy was unable to recover, despite the International Monetary fund and the World Bank loans, and remained bound to the mere subsistence, forcing huge parts of the population to live in absolute poverty.<sup>285</sup> Mozambique was one of the poorest countries in the world, and the recovery was not around the corner.

##### **Political Aspect**

Whereas the democratic transition was monopolized by the two biggest parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO - respectively as Majority and Opposition party - excluding other smaller political

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<sup>284</sup> Joseph Hanlon, Milton Keynes, “Mozambique: ‘The war ended 17 years ago, but we are still poor’”, LINKS – international journal of socialist renewal, March 2010. <http://links.org.au/node/1541>

<sup>285</sup> Simone Pelizza, “Mozambico: Quarant’anni di Indipendenza”, Il Caffè Geopolitico, 15 luglio 2015. <http://www.ilcaffegeopolitico.org/30760/mozambico-quarantanni-indipendenza>

parties, once the Government entered into power, it acted to remove RENAMO's power, which had reached more than 50% of the votes in 61 of 142 districts. The majority, therefore, aimed to amend the 1990 Constitution, referring to the decentralization policy, thus reducing the districts from 142 to 33. Despite the opposition of RENAMO, the law was approved and the ruling party managed to thwart the danger of seeing the opposing faction dominant in the administrative districts.

In the years following the first multiparty elections, the country lived in a relative political calm, during which the FRELIMO ruled against a controlled opposition, using the absolute control of the state apparatus. The maintenance of power was guaranteed by the constitutional conditions previously established.

In 1999, Chissano won the elections with 52.3% beating Dhlakama for 4.6% of votes (47.7%); in the same way, FRELIMO obtained the 53.2% of the vote (133 seats), against 46.8% of the RENAMO (117 seats). The tight gap of Chissano victory in 1999 was the reason for its withdrawal; when the President asked its supporters if he had to run for a third mandate, these impeded him, accusing him of being too permissive towards the opposition and not very incisive in relation to the dynamics of power.

The end of millennium elections were not only the last elections for Chissano, but also represented the rupture of the political "calm" of the country, as we shall see in the next paragraph.

### **Economic Sector**

Economically the country was exhausted by years of war. The two years of United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) had focused on the military, humanitarian and political factor, due to the urgency.

The government's choice was, therefore, to rely on loans from the IMF and World Bank, to begin the reconstruction and structural reform. Macroeconomic results were, generally, positive: inflation dropped from 57% in 1992 to 17% in 1996; the legislative framework was modified to open up to foreign investment; privatizations in strategical sectors were favoured

to relieve the load on the government (ports, banks, energy sector, air and rail transports). The government agreed that it would be more convenient to adopt liberal capitalism, abandoning those Communist principles that characterized the economic structure in earlier decades.

The operation of customs was entrusted to a British company (Crown Agents), huge portions of fertile land, as well as extensive mineral concessions, were ceded to Lonrho, the corporation created by the British to protect their interests in Africa after decolonization, particularly rooted in southern Africa.<sup>286</sup> Foreign investors were competing for gas and oil resources of the country, while others hypothesized substantial investments in tourism. Meanwhile, with the collaboration of South Africa, the work for reconstruction of the highway Maputo-Johannesburg started.

Overall, Mozambique was the recipient of \$ 6 billion in foreign investments by multinationals and donors. This was possible also thanks to the international opening initiated by the government during the ONUMOZ Mission, and intensified in the following years.

Was it a real economic success? Was the country striving to better conditions? Unfortunately, Mozambicans were paying the price of macroeconomic doctrine. The investments were not addressed to reconstruction nor to fix devastated infrastructure, in order not to increase the public debt. Similarly, in the first phase, education and healthcare were neglected, entrusting the recovery to the future economic growth.

The Mozambican population remained one of the poorest of the world, with dramatic cleavages in the distribution of wealth: the regions of the South were helped by a) the closeness of South Africa, which meant infrastructures, investments, services and trade, and by the fact that b) in Maputo there was the biggest concentration of international institutions and diplomatic representations, fuelling the growth of the capital. The regions of the centers and North, even if favoured by a good weather for agriculture, were cut off from the new

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<sup>286</sup> M. Anne Pitcher, *“Transforming Mozambique. The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000”*, Colgate University, New York, February 2008.

development method. The prime Minister himself, Pascoal Mocumbi, stated that the growth of the country would have resulted in social inequalities and asymmetries.<sup>287</sup>

At the beginning of the new millennium, the situation of the country was still in stalemate because of its economic situation and the differences within the country.

#### 4.4.1. *The New Millennium*

The 2000 was not certainly a positive year for the country: in the first months the cyclone Eline devastated the country, causing hundreds of deaths and millions of displaced persons, putting on his knees the economic fate of the country. A few months later a “political earthquake” struck the Government. In fact, in relation to controversies concerning the possible illegal movement of international funds by corrupt officials of FRELIMO, the journalist Carlos Cardoso, who was investigating in this affair, was murdered under mysterious circumstances. The country sank back into political chaos, despite the first decade of balance. Corruption charges against the government party were heavy, and led to new attempts of guerrilla with the RENAMO faction.

Two years later, in 2002 precisely, the incredible transformation of the country began. Joaquim Chissano, until that moment President of Mozambique, re-elected with the majority in the 1999 elections, accused of corruption and weakness towards the RENAMO opposition, lost all supporters and was forced to resign, without reaching a third term in office. Chissano was replaced by *Armando Guebuza*<sup>288</sup>, one of the leader of FRELIMO, the man of change.

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<sup>287</sup> Paul Fauvet, “*Mozambique: growth with poverty. A difficult transition from prolonged war to peace and development*”, Africa Recovery, Department of Public Information, United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/vol14no3/mozamb1.htm>

<sup>288</sup> Armando Emílio Guebuza (20 January 1943) is a Mozambican politician who was President of Mozambique from 2005 to 2015. Guebuza, who joined the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) at the age of 20, represented FRELIMO at the peace negotiations with the RENAMO guerrilla group that led to the Rome General Peace Accords, 1992. During the transitional phase towards the first general elections in 1994, he represented the Government of Mozambique in the joint Supervision and Monitoring Commission, the highest implementing body of the General Peace Accords.



For the 2004 presidential elections, FRELIMO then presents the new government candidate, known for his composure and organizational skills. Guebuza started immediately a travel campaign in all districts of the country to revitalize the basic institutions of the Party, launching a real democratic electoral reflux, declined in previous elections. In addition to the strengthening of the party, the new Secretary began a new pro-Western policy that assured him the sympathies of the donor states and international institutions. Thanks to these strategic moves, Guebuza won a sweeping victory in both the presidential and legislative elections: 63% in Presidential and 62% in Legislative. For RENAMO, which stops at 32% and 30%, began a progressive fall away from the Mozambican politics.

The 2004 elections took place in a very safe and stable atmosphere, marking a turning point in relation with the two previous elections of 1994 and 1999. Furthermore, the abandonment of federalist-like Mozambican state, and a greater decision-making autonomy of provincial and municipal authorities, contributed to decentralize the economic and financial issues.<sup>289</sup>

From an economic point of view, encouraging recovery signals had been registered since 2002, but it was from 2004 that the dynamics changed completely, and the pro-Western political opening contributed: Guebuza saw his country changing face in an astonishing way. The gross domestic product started growing at a rate of 7% per year, with peaks of 7.4% in 2014. The strengthening of State's fiscal action allowed the reconstruction of production and transport infrastructures destroyed during the civil war, together with a sharp reduction in external public debt. At the same time, the discovery and exploitation of large mineral deposits (primarily aluminium, iron, gold and coal) in the central provinces of the country attracted massive investments of multinational companies and East Asian emerging economies. The discovery of major oil reserves off the coast of the country translated in as many opportunities of growth, attracting the attention of many countries of the world.

While the agricultural economy continued to occupy most of the production areas (70% of Mozambican were employed in this sector), the rest started moving towards the industrial

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<sup>289</sup> ANAMM & World Bank, *"Municipal Development in Mozambique: Lessons from the First Decade"*. World Bank/ National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique (ANAMM), Maputo, 2009.

and tertiary sector.<sup>290</sup> An incredible boom was also experienced in the tourism sector, mainly due to the opening of the country to the western world.

Although economic development was unable to fully resolve the difference in growth problems, intervention policies such as the regulation of water flow of major rivers<sup>291</sup>, or energy investments, provided clear evidences that Mozambique was becoming, from country with lowest income of all Africa, to one of the driving forces of the economy of the continent.

When in 2009 the Mozambican citizens were called to the polls for the third independent and democratic elections, the result was written even before starting the counting of votes: Guebuza won the presidential elections with an overwhelming 75%, while the historic leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama collapsed to 16%; the legislative elections recited the same script, with the winning FRELIMO (75% and 191 seats), and RENAMO down to 17% and 51 seats in the National Assembly.

For Guebuza, a relevant boost came, not only from the economic sector, but also from the NGOs present at that time in Mozambique. These Organizations played a really important role because often they contributed to the electoral campaign for FRELIMO, which sponsored their activities through funds.

#### 4.4.2. *Mozambique today*

After 2009 elections, the growth trends of the country have continued at an impressive pace, turning the country into one of the greatest protagonists of the recent “African economic miracle”<sup>292</sup>. The principal cities of the country, Maputo included, have experienced, over the

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<sup>290</sup> M. Anne Pitcher, *“Transforming Mozambique. The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000”*, Colgate University, New York, February 2008

<sup>291</sup> Nilgün Gökgür & Leroy Jones, *“PRIVATIZATION OF MOZAMBIQUE WATER SECTOR”*, One of Eight Papers from a Project Entitled: *Assessing the Impact of Privatization in Africa*, Boston Institute for Developing Economies (BIDE), October, 2006.

<sup>292</sup> Norbert Dörr, Susan Lund, Charles Roxburgh, *“The African Miracle. How the world's charity case became its best investment opportunity.”*, Foreign Policy, 28 November 2010. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/28/the-african-miracle/>

last 14 years, a huge industrial and technological development, leading Mozambique to know the world (thanks to internet and technology), and the world to know Mozambique.

The economy seems to resist in its growth, with the mining sector “leading horse”, and thanks to new significant discoveries of natural gas deposits in the Rovuma River basin, near the border with Tanzania, that promises to transform the country into a major world gas producer. Large international companies such as ENI and *Anadarko Petroleum Corporation* have already launched exploration missions, planning the construction of implants for the extraction and transport. The agricultural sector has continued to expand, attracting huge amounts of investment, while tourism is facing a real unexpected boom.

Politically speaking, stability has begun to waver. FRELIMO, backed by the positive economic situation, and the organizational politics by Guebuza, kept ruling the country, after the 2009 elections. In 2014, then, on the occasion of presidential elections, Guebuza, who had already served two terms (a third was unconstitutional), abdicated in favour of Filipe Nyusi<sup>293</sup>. The new candidate, unknown to many, was the most closely identified with President Guebuza. The choice was strategic because it would have allowed Guebuza to maintain a major power within the party.

The elections saw Nyusi winning with 57% of the votes against the historic rival Dhlakama with 36%. FRELIMO maintained a majority in AN with 55%, losing more than 50 seats in the interests of the RENAMO (32% with 89 seats). This time, the leader of RENAMO claimed that the results were fraudulent and called for national unity government, threatening to create a parallel government away from FRELIMO.<sup>294</sup> Although the protest was soon abandoned, this political confrontation has had serious repercussions in the social sphere.

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<sup>293</sup> Filipe Jacinto Nyusi is the fourth President of Mozambique, in office since 2015. Was Minister of Defense in 2008. On 1 March 2014, the Frelimo Central Committee elected Nyusi as the party's candidate for the 2014 presidential election, winning on the candidate Luisa Diogo.

<sup>294</sup> “*Mozambique: Dhlakama Threatens to Set Up His Own Government*”. Mozambique News Agency. 26 November 2014. Retrieved 7 January 2015. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201411261601.html>

In the last two years, in fact, the fighting between the government army and the RENAMO's militias have reappeared, albeit on a small scale, but obviously awakening the horrors of 16 years of civil war and terrorist attacks.

#### **4.5. Final Observation**

It would be naive not to admit that Mozambique is facing heavy problems today, and it would be even more serious claiming that the country didn't face any issues in the years that followed the ONUMOZ Mission.

The foundations of the new economic prosperity are very fragile, partly because of the tensions nested in the regions of the country, that feed these days' clashes between the Government and RENAMO. Politically, there is no doubt that the country is going through a tough time, after years of relative (political) calm. The protests and the continued questioning of the election results by Afonso Dhlakama, have soured relations between the parties, reaching the point for which both have taken up weapons again. The current president Nyusi, conscious of the history of the country, and the incumbent danger, has launched new rounds of official negotiations, monitored by the EU and the United Nations, with the aim of finding a permanent solution to the problematic reintegration of RENAMO in political and also social life of the country.

The president also committed himself to undertake a battle against government corruption, greatly criticized, and to reform the internal structure of FRELIMO party, getting rid of para-authoritarian and nepotistic tendencies, that have been created over years, but which have given political stability to the country.

All the developments the country is leaving today, clearly represents a beginning of a new era. If this President will be able to find the support of its party, and if his different style of dialogue with the opposition will lead to satisfactory results, then the conditions to push Mozambique to a new growth (both political and economic) will come back into play.

Following the discovery of huge natural gas resources, Mozambique was put in front of international attention, which obviously has expressed its interest in investing in this resource (e.g. ENI and the mega corporations Anadarko Petroleum). Due to this, the long term prospect is really positive and encouraging.

To a greater or lesser extent, however, these developments are going to affect, creating serious challenges, the interests of the local communities. The investment figure reached until today is not in a position to enable the country to pay taxes or give jobs. In addition, the infrastructures:

*"[...] of roads, telecommunications, railways and electricity is inadequate to keep up with the demands of investors, let alone population growth."*<sup>295</sup>

The road to stability is still long and full of obstacles. The government will have to worry not only to solve the internal political situation, but will also have to work with international investors so as to give life to a constructive growth for the country. It will have to implement short and medium term measures focusing on competitive industries, but balancing with social needs, constitutional rights and expectations of citizens.

#### *4.5.1. Comprehensive assessment of ONUMOZ Mission*

Why, when it comes to talk about the ONUMOZ Mission, the international community unequivocally admits the positivity of intervention, considering the results achieved? I firmly support the idea that this mission can be considered one of the success of UN Peacekeeping activities, for many reasons.

Aware of the problems the country faced after the mission, and it is still experiencing, we must think about what was the situation before the implementation of the mission and how serious were the conditions of Mozambique in the previous years to 1992.

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<sup>295</sup> Alex Vines, Soren Kirk Jensen & Henry Thompson, "Mozambique to 2018: Managers, Mediators and Magnates", Chatham House, The royal Institute of International Affairs, June 2015. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/mozambique-2018#>

The war of independence that lasted 11 years (1964-1975) fought against Portugal, and won after years of suffering; the outbreak of civil war, few months after independence, between FRELIMO and RENAMO, which ended in 1992, thanks to the intervention of the United Nations, with the above mission. Mozambique experienced 28 years of continuous conflicts (the most terrible were those of the civil war) that didn't bring any profits nor to those who gave orders, nor to those who implemented them, and even to Mozambican citizens, innocent victims of ruthless terrorist attacks.

When the war ended in 1992, thanks to the General Peace Accords signed in Rome, and the Mission approached for the first time the Mozambican soil, not much was left of the country:

- 1 million people had been killed, murdered, slaughtered ruthlessly by the actions of both factions;
- 1.5 million sought refuge outside the borders of the country, in neighbouring Tanzania, Rhodesia and South Africa,
- 4.5 million falls under the definition of "*internally displaced person*"<sup>296</sup>;
- 28% of the field soldiers (25,500) were younger than 18 years old, so called "child soldiers";
- 80% of the infrastructure was destroyed;
- 500,000 was the number of landmines around the country.

The country was basically divided between the two factions, RENAMO in the north and center, FRELIMO in the south, and no one of them had the desire to give way to the other, nor to seek an agreement or a discussion.

The main positive element, then, was the desire to bring the conflicting parties together again, and this goal was pursued by the Community of Sant'Egidio, first, and then by the Special Representative Aldo Ajello, with the support of the Secretary General.

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<sup>296</sup> Internally displaced people (IDPs) have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike refugees, they are on the run at home. While they may have fled for similar reasons, IDPs stay within their own country and remain under the protection of its government, even if that government is the reason for their displacement. As a result, these people are among the most vulnerable in the world.

In two years, the mission brought on the soil of Mozambique 6,500 troops, 350 military observers, 1,144 civilian police, used 500 local staff.

However, the main goal that ONUMOZ was able to achieve, in my opinion, beyond numbers, data and statistics, was to “lift” Mozambique, devastated by war, to a new level of humanity, which was missing in the country for almost 30 years. ONUMOZ gave Mozambique its dignity back, through the demobilization of army, the creation of national police force to maintain security, through humanitarian assistance that enabled those who had fled to return home and restart their life, even with all the difficulties of the case.

Interpreting the main goal of the mission, according to a Galtungian interpretation, I would say the United Nations aspired to build a stable and long-lasting peace: a peace that the Norwegian author would define “*positive peace*”.

*“To succeed, jump as quickly  
at opportunities as you  
do at conclusions.”*

Benjamin Franklin



## Conclusions

At the beginning of this work, when I had not dealt yet with Galtung's precursors and, and theories on conflict transformation were totally unknown to any reader, unless he had prior knowledge of them – I expressed an idea, which is also the main idea underlying this research. It is the idea that when the UN Peacekeeping system commits itself to the implementation of Galtung's Positive Peace principles, it is able to build the conditions for a stable and long-lasting peace: the positive peace. The main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate this opinion of mine. This represented the research question of this work.

Now, at the end of it, I ask myself: Did I manage to reach my goal? Did I convincingly prove that my theory is solid enough to stand by itself? Did I use coherently theoretical and practical tools, or are they superficial and not appropriate?

The first step was to introduce the UN Peacekeeping system: from the history and evolution of the Organization to the structures and the mechanisms that move the apparatus and the institutions that rule it. After having analysed the challenges the UN are going to face in the near future, I have considered closely one of the worst failures of Peacekeeping: the Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (focusing on the Massacre of Srebrenica). The analysis of this event has proved to be fundamental: it shows, in fact, that the UN Peacekeeping system is fallible by its nature, but it is more fallible if it doesn't pursue the goal of *positive peace*.

In the second chapter the attention shifted on Johan Galtung and the context of peace research, of which Galtung is considered "the father". The theoretical exposition of this part helps to understand the origins and the ideas behind the *Positive Peace* concept developed by the Norwegian author. For this reason, I have analysed Galtung's precursors and their studies on peace research. In the last part of the chapter I explained the positive relationship between the elements of positive peace and their adoption by the UN Peacekeeping.

Once the importance of this relationship has been stressed, I moved to the analysis of the causes of the conflicts, focusing on the Galtunian concept of Violence. Violence, according to the Norwegian author, is the is the main cause of conflict, having careful to distinguish

between *direct violence* (personal violence) and *structural violence* (social violence). The latter, deeply rooted in society, is bound to create tensions and conflicts that can be tackled with and resolved only through their transformation. In this process, we have seen how positive peace represented the opposite of structural violence. This allows to explain the relations between violence and positive peace concept within the framework of conflict transformation.

The last step consisted in the empirical demonstration that, when the UN Peacekeeping Missions are inspired by the *Positive Peace* elements, the possibility to build solid and long-lasting peace conditions is higher. The case study analysed is the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992 - 1994, which was a positive mission according to the International Community.

The in-depth analysis of the Mission allowed me to give an answer to the central research question of the thesis. ONUMOZ represents the practical demonstration that if the United Nations Peacekeeping follows the *positive peace* elements, it is able to create solid growth conditions for those countries recovering from very serious conflicts.

In fact, this Mission proved able to give back to Mozambique its dignity of country, which had been trampled for centuries by conditions of exploitation, colonization and civil war. It proved able to create, in two years, conditions for free, fair, but above all, democratic elections, representative of the popular will.

This new structure undoubtedly influenced the development of the country: firstly, it enabled the implementation of a democratic political system, previously unknown; secondly, it allowed to reintegrate the country within the international framework, giving it the opportunity to have diplomatic and economic growth prospects; finally, it reconstructed the social tissue by means of daring and innovative reconciling policies, which aimed at filling the gap of social differences.

The problems that arose after the withdrawal of the Mission, in January 1995, and which are still present, were part of the development process that characterizes each "young" state; a state, moreover, completely ignorant of forms of democratic government, or of a liberal pro-

Western economic approach. I would say that, today, Mozambique is facing problems that it wouldn't have been able to face if the ONUMOZ Mission had not intervened to create the basis of a state.

In the evaluation of the Mission, on a short, medium and long term, positive and negative sides must be carefully taken into account, weighing the effects and consequences. The experts of the International Community affirm, today, that on the whole the positive aspects have been more numerous than the negative ones, and I agree with this point of view.

The project of the UN Peacekeeping was an ambitious one, which was not simply limited to a temporary ceasefire, but aimed to build the conditions to enable the country to "stand on its own legs", without depending on the international community.

In conclusion, I would like to shortly focus on the innovative character, in terms of diplomacy and international mediation, of the peacekeeping operation carried out by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, in order to introduce my final reflection about *positive peace* and good mediation.

As already pointed out at the beginning of Chapter 4, the path to the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome, in 1992, was paved by the constant efforts and humanitarian work of the community of Sant'Egidio. The role played by the Community as international mediator and independent third party, backed by the UN Secretary General, was one of the most significant developments of this Operation. Furthermore, the importance acquired by Italy both during the GPA and the mission, was a source of pride for our country.

I would like to focus, now, on the role played by the mediator and the peacemaker. The definition of this actor, i.e. of its professional, human, intuitive and empathetic features, represents the culmination of my research.

Starting from the assumption that conflict and tension represent constant elements in man's daily life, without necessarily having to get to the level of international conflicts or tensions between states, I would like to stress the concept of "good mediator". This practical and

psychological attitude could allow to adopt, in a future perspective, behaviours as mature as possible and aware of responsibilities.

This idea found inspiration in the Transcend Method, which is the core elaboration of Galtung's theoretical apparatus. It is as a way to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. The premises of this method, which have been borrowed from the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Taoist, Islamic, Jewish religions, aim to transform the philosophical and ethical teachings into operational principles shaping the activity and skills of the peacemaker.

The method consists in three main lines of action:

1. Interaction with parties exploring objectives, analysing fears and gaining trust;
2. Distinction between legitimate objectives, genuinely related to the needs, and illegitimate objectives;
3. Reduction of the gap between objectives through solutions that include creativity, empathy and non-violence, in order to build a new reality.

The attitude of the parties becomes the most relevant element because of the importance of their consent to pursue the benefits of a common solution.

After having deepened the methods of approaching negotiations - 1) *negative or distributive bargaining*: parties entrench behind their positions at the cost of not reaching an agreement; 2) *integrative or integrative bargaining*: parties are willing to sacrifice something for the mutual benefit; 3) *constructive or problem solving*: parties make the cultural effort to share the perspective that the "enemy" is not the counterpart, but is the problem in itself; - the focus shifts on the keystone of conflict transformation: the good mediator.

This actor plays a crucial role in the dynamics of conflict resolution, showing his skill and abilities to intervene between conflicting parties. A skill set which becomes art if the mediator is able to find or create solution out of nowhere. This is probably the main feature of Galtung's mediator concept. The author reports, step by step, the most fundamental attitudes to assume during negotiations in order to obtain the trust of the parties, and strive for a positive construction of the discussion.

What results from this analysis is, indeed, the importance of the role, but also the commitment of the mediator: professional preparation, knowledge of historical and political facts, geopolitical dynamics on the one side; on the other one, the soul qualities such as sensitivity, intuition, empathy and creativity, to enter the heart of the conflict and transform it, due to the impossibility to eliminate it.

The possibility to perform the role of good mediator is given to everyone, in relation to the various degrees of conflict development: from daily “conflict” to international level. However, in order that everyone could find this passion and desire, the role of mediator must not remain just a role, but it has to become a “mission” - it is no coincidence that the UN operations are called missions.

Getting fond of what one does, putting oneself at the service of an infinite and timeless value: peace.

*“By peace we mean the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy, without violence, and creatively- a never-ending process.”*

***Johan Galtung***



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**FACULTY: POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**Chair: Security Studies**

*Abstract*

**THE “POSITIVE PEACE” CONCEPT WITHIN  
THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING  
A GALTUNIAN ASSESMENT OF UNITED NATIONS  
OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (1992 – 1994)**

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## *The choice of the subject*

This research project has been deeply influenced by my degree course in security studies. The underlying idea of this work is that nations and states, today, are no longer enough in the field of conflict resolution. In a world that changes every day, where conflict and tensions overcome limits and boundaries, national actors are no longer able, from my humble perspective, to stem and fight international phenomena.

Due to this reason, the first main subject of this research will be one of the most important International Organization within the supranational context: The United Nations. The focus will be centred, specifically, on the UN Peacekeeping Missions, that represent the “operative arm” of the Organization. This apparatus, engaged in dealing with conflicts and tensions at the international level, proved to be a more effective means than the state conception, so popular before the Cold War.

This idea doesn't want to “carry the burden” of the absolute infallibility of the UN system. Conversely, it aims to demonstrate that, if the UN Peacekeeping takes inspiration from the elements of *Positive Peace*, the goal of a constructive, and positive indeed, conflict resolution could be easier to reach.

The history of the United Nations Peacekeeping started, officially in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors – an operation which became known as the *United Nations Truce Supervision Organization* (UNTSO). Since that moment, the Organization had struggled to “*save humanity from hell*”, as Dag Hammarskjöld said. In more than 60 missions faced over its history, the UN Peacekeeping has undergone a natural evolutionary process, adapting to the international conflictual conditions.

The most remarkable step of this process, probably, was the USSR collapse and the end of Bipolar division; in a nutshell, it was emblemized by the end of Cold War. This famous historical moment represented a corner stone for the United Nations structure and missions

too. In fact, the so famous state-centric concept was abandoned, and the Organization started gaining importance, again, in international conflict resolution. The evolutionary change experienced by the organization can be synthesized by the transition from Peacekeeping of 1<sup>st</sup> Generation to Peacekeeping of 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation. While the former was characterized by the achievement of separation between conflicting parties (ceasefire) and the monitoring of compliance with it, the latter was much more complex and complete: it entailed many aspects, from military to political field, from social to international scope. The goal of second generation was not just the separation of parties, but the reconstruction of the state, trying to build the basis for a solid and long-lasting peace: the *positive peace* indeed.

We must not forget that a practical implementation is always backed by a theoretical elaboration from which the former draws inspiration. Therefore, what was the theoretical elaboration which inspired the United Nations to change its methods of intervention, but also its ultimate goals? The answer will introduce the second main subject of the research: the *positive peace* concept, elaborated by the Norwegian author, Johan Galtung.

The UN transition was deeply influenced by the Galtung's theories on conflict transformation, and peace research. The *positive peace* concept, in fact, represented an astonishing innovation: it transformed years and years of theoretical peace theories in implementable operational provisions. It then went from the theoretical / literary field to the practical / military sphere. It was exactly this futuristic concept which deeply influenced the construction of UN Missions' mandates, making them more complete and safe, but at the same time more complex to implement.

From the interpretation, but especially, from the relation between our two subjects, I have built the core research question of the thesis: is it possible to demonstrate that the implementation of *positive peace* elements, through the UN Peacekeeping system, could contribute to build a stable and long-lasting peace conditions for countries coming out from conflictual situations?

Throughout the pages of this work, numerous other hypothesis will be examined such as is it possible to establish an effective relation among Peacekeeping and "*nonviolent conflict*

*resolution*”, according to Galtung’s expression? If so, how and where does this correlation manifest itself? What is the philosophical foundation of “*positive peace*” and why does it represent such an innovation for peace research? But especially, could we consider *positive peace* as a realistic goal of the UN peacekeeping strategies?

With regard to the methodology used to deal with the research, it will be, obviously, related to the duality of subject. For the interpretation of *positive peace*, then, I will rely on Galtung’s works on peace research, violence and conflict transformation, as well as on bibliographic resources relative to his precursors: the sociologist Pitirim Aleksandrovič Sorokin, the psychologist and pacifist Lewis Fry Richardson and the American political scientist Philip Quincy Wright will be part of the authors mentioned. In the same way, not to let words to remain just ink on paper and theoretical abstractions, in the analysis of case study relative to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, I will make use of explicative graphic resources, data and statistics, and bibliographical references. Of crucial importance, in this last section, will be the official documents, reports and provisions elaborated by the United Nations.

### *The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*

The research moves its first steps from the United Nations analysis. In May 8, 1945, when the world was still counting the victims of World War II, members of the executive committee of the United Nations conference meet in the Opera House in San Francisco to consider conference procedure. The leaders of 50 war-weary countries gathered to create an international order that “*would save future generations from the scourge of war.*” With that, the United Nations were created.

In order not to get lost within the UN maze, we must not lose of sight our main objective: the conflict resolution. For this reason, the focus will move on the Peacekeeping system, so to analyse the Organization’s operational arm. After a brief introduction on the methods of intervention, among which we find *Peacemaking*, *PeaceKeeping* and *Peacebuilding*, the research leaves the surface and heads towards the core of the subject.

Since 1948, Peacekeeping missions have never stopped evolving, learning its potential from successes and its limits from failures. Year after year, the system has tried to mirror the international environment shaped by the rise and disappearance of the actors. an evolutionary path that never stopped, with times of greater and lesser success. During the Cold War, for example, the space for the UN intervention was seriously reduce by the Bipolarism between the USA and the USSR. The traditional peacekeeping system, also known as Peacekeeping of 1<sup>st</sup> Generation, was carried out by unarmed or lightly armed military personnel, belonging to a certain numbers of countries under the UN command, interposed between the conflicting parties. Peace operators were supposed not to fight war with war. Troops and experts were deployed by the UN when the cease-fire had entered into force, and all the parties involved in the conflict had agreed with it.

It was at the end of the Cold War that the international situation fell in the total chaos. The requests for UN peacekeeping activities reported a huge increase due to civil wars, the crumbling of the USSR with its internal conflicts and related independence request of those states that lay under the Russian grasp. The post-Cold War missions, characterized both by success, as for the Mozambique, and failure, such as in the Bosnia - Herzegovina case, witnessed the most important evolutionary step: the shift from the Peacekeeping of 1<sup>st</sup> Generation to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation. This generation, as reported above, distinguished from the 1<sup>st</sup> for more robust, more resilient and more complete mandates, but at the same time more complex to implement.

In 2000, after the two most tragic failures of the United Nations, the genocide in Rwanda (1994), and the massacre of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the former Secretary General, Kofi Annan, appointed the *Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* to investigate shortcomings, deficits and weaknesses of the peace operations system. The result, known as the "*Brahimi Report*", from the Chair of the Panel, Lakhdar Brahimi, called for renewed political commitment of Member States, significant institutional changes and increased financial support. Following the Report, the UN and its MS introduced several measures to improve peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. The Department of PeaceKeeping

Operations (DPKO) obtained the authorization to enlarge the staff at its headquarters to bear operations on the ground. The DPKO reinforced the offices of Military Advisers and police.

The "*Brahimi Report*", essentially, institutionalized all the necessary elements to make the Peacekeeping the most effective possible, giving to the UN missions the construction that marks them today.

Therefore, after having observed the mechanisms that move this massive Organization, and having analysed those that will be challenges and future priorities of the UN Peacekeeping, the research brings us back to a fundamental concept: the fallibility of the system. The case study reported is United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) went down in history as one of the worst failure of the UN Peacekeeping. In 1995, in fact, during the final phases of the controversial war in Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb forces entered eastern Srebrenica (a small city located in eastern Bosnia) slaughtering 8.000 Muslim men and children and collecting their bodies into pits. The act, which lasted five days, was the most brutal massacre since the end of World War II.

The failure and shame derived from the fact that the UN had previously declared the city as "safe areas", free from any armed attack or any other hostile acts. Due to this, 600 infantry soldiers were patrolling the area where thousands of people had taken refuge. When the Serb soldiers began the massacre, Muslim fighters (rival faction of Bosnian Serb) asked the UN troops to have back their weapons in order to fight, but the requested was refused, because of mandate's provision. The UN soldiers found themselves observing powerlessly a highly preventable massacre.

What was the main reason that transformed a peace mission in a "death mission"? Did the United Nations really aim to construction of peace, or international political interests diverted the Operation? We will not go deeper in the Bosnia failure, but the answers to these questions will lift us to the second floor of our research construction.

Beyond the political problems that deadlocked the Security Council decisions and the logistical ones in the elaboration of the mandate of the mission - the mission was indeed designed as a 1<sup>st</sup> Generation mission - the core element that completely lacked in the implementation of UNMIBH, strongly stressed by Kofi Annan himself, was the consent of the parties to find a common agreement. It was planned and implemented a mission to protect peace where there were no conditions for peace, and where conflictual actors did not want to reach a common ground of discussion. The consent of parties always represents the first crucial step in order to effectively implement the *positive peace* provisions. Lacking this, the building becomes a "house of cards".

Reached this point, is more than spontaneous wondering what *positive peace* is. What are the origins of this concept, and what does it mean? What does it mean that UN Peacekeeping Missions' mandates have to aim to this concept? Of what consists this theoretical structure, and how is it possible to put it into practice? What is its origin in the context of peace research?

### *Johan Galtung: the "father" of Positive Peace*

The *positive peace* concept was elaborated by the Norwegian sociologist, mathematician and principal founder of the discipline of peace and conflict studies, Johan Galtung. In a forty-year academic career, the author has been visiting professor in more than 30 universities, all over the five continents. He wrote more than 100 books and more than 1000 articles about peace research, conflict resolution, ecology, health, global governance and sustainable development. His theoretical contribution boasts, today, several influential theories, such as the distinction between positive and negative peace, structural and direct violence, theories on conflict and conflict transformation, the concept of peacebuilding, the structural theory of imperialism, and the theory of the United States as simultaneously a republic and an empire. It is no coincidence if Galtung has been defined the "father of peace research".

In order to better understand the main features of the Galtunian concept, the research will take a historical / analytical aspect. Our focus will be, therefore, addressed, firstly towards the life and the interpretations referred to the author. In a second time, then, the Galtung's precursors will be subjected to a careful analysis to verify how much, and in which directions,

exogenous theories have influenced the author's thought. The construction of our theoretical framework will be complex because of the multiplicity of historical and literary impulses.

This path will lead us to the theoretical core of the thesis: the innovative *positive peace* concept and the elements that shape it. With the support of the following graphic representations, I will analyse the provisions elaborated by Galtung within his theory. This won't be the last time we see this representation. In fact, it will be re-proposed to analyse, through a Galtunian perspective, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique case study.

**Positive Peace Elements**

| Field / Term                        | Short term  | Middle term  | Long term  |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|
| <b>Military and Security</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Separation of factions</li> <li>• Security zones</li> <li>• Disarmament</li> <li>• Demobilization</li> <li>• Separation army police</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of the new national army</li> <li>• Integration the national police</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demilitarization of politics</li> <li>• Transformation of the culture of violence</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Political and Constitutional</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of government transition problems</li> <li>• Constitutional reform</li> <li>• Preparation of elections</li> </ul>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overcoming the problems related to the second round of elections</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidation of <i>good governance</i></li> <li>• Respect of Human Rights</li> <li>• <i>Rule of law</i></li> <li>• Development of civil society</li> </ul> |
| <b>Economic and Social</b>          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Essential services</li> <li>• Communications</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rehabilitation of re-settled population</li> <li>• Demobilization of soldiers</li> <li>• Reconstruction of infrastructures</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long term macroeconomic policies</li> <li>• Local sustainable development</li> <li>• Equal distribution</li> </ul>  |



|                      |   |  |  |
|----------------------|---|--|--|
|                      |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demining</li> </ul>   |  |
| <b>Psycho-social</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overcoming mistrust and mutual distrust</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of peace and justice priorities</li> </ul>                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Treatment of psychological trauma</li> <li>• Reconciliation policies</li> </ul> |
| <b>International</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to peace process</li> </ul>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfer of power to local control, avoiding interferences</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integration in regional and international networks</li> </ul>                   |

*The concept of Violence and Conflict Transformation*

Among the most important and innovative Galtungian theoretical elaboration, in strong relation with the *positive peace* concept, lies the idea that peace plays, on the conceptual chessboard, the role of antagonist of *violence*, and not of war, as the tradition of peace research had always handed down. This alternative elaboration revolutionized the field of conflict resolution.


In his work “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, Galtung stated: “*The statement ‘peace is absence of violence’ shall be retained as valid. [...] What we intend is only that the terms ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ be linked to each other such that ‘peace’ can be regarded as ‘absence of violence’.*”. This statement shifted the focus from conflict to violence (as said), and transformed the main goal of peace research and non-violence activities: the main objective was no longer the elimination of the conflict, because deeply rooted in the customs and habits of mankind; the goal, conversely, was the constructive *transformation* of the conflict, through non-violent elements such as just society, culture, education, rule of law and safety.

The deep study of violence, enacted by Galtung, helps to identify the nature and the causes of conflict; consequently, from the moment when the causes are no longer unknown, the peace researcher is able to elaborate innovative forms to positively transform the conflict. Therefore, studying the various forms of violence allows to penetrate its very essence.

The general differentiation Galtung elaborated, in relation to the concept of *violence*, was: a) *Direct* (or personal) violence, b) *Structural* violence, c) *Cultural* violence. The first usually occurs at the interpersonal level, and it is structured as an *event*; the structural violence is deeply more grievous because is a *process*: it is fuelled by culture, customs, ideas and institutions; the last type, the *cultural* violence is an *invariant element* and carries the unfortunate role of tying direct to structural violence. The feeding process of violence is perfectly represented by Galtung in his statement from his article "*Cultural Violence*": "*The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage, and counter-violence to keep the cage intact.*"

Following the distinction between *personal* and *structural* violence, Galtung can introduce the concept of *negative* and *positive* peace, as we have seen. While the former, in fact, arises as the absence of *direct violence*, the latter arises as the opposite of *structural* violence. The reason why the author uses the terms *negative* and *positive* is easily explained: the absence of *personal* violence doesn't lead to positive social conditions, considering that "social injustice" may continue to exist; conversely, the absence of *structural* violence leads to "social justice", which is a positive social condition (equal distribution of resources and power). The graph in the following page facilitates the understanding of the mechanism:

**Scheme of Violence and Peace concept**



It is exactly at this point that the Galtunian theoretical elaboration appears clearly: the analysis of violence allows peace researcher to identify causes, situations and environments in which conflict could explode; violence, and together with it, the conflict, however, they cannot be eliminated. How to act then? Let the tensions explode, forcing parties to count their dead? Wait until the end of a conflict to implement a new balance?

The solution elaborated by Galtung is innovative as the concept of *positive peace*: the peace maker must not aim, therefore, to the elimination of the conflict; he must aim to its *transformation*. This theoretical and practical construction, inspired by the Gandhian thinking and acting (more precisely by the Satyagraha), represented one of the most important results achieved in the context of the negotiation and mediation techniques.

The mechanism starts from the analysis of possible formations and evolutions of international conflicts, focusing on the five levels in which changes could occur: 1) Context transformation, 2) Structural transformation, 3) Actors transformation, 4) Individuals and Groups

transformation, 5) Goals transformation. Once these levels have been studied, reporting the conflict's probabilities in each one, the following step represents the pillar of *Conflict transformation*. In fact, Galtung deploys on a theoretical chessboard, two crucial opponents:

- The *conflict cycle*: The elements that feed the conflict cycle are nine, and can be divided into three groups of three, known as 1) the *triangle of violence*, 2) the *triangle of conflict* and 3) the *triangle of wrong perspectives*. As we shall see, these three triangles are composed, in their turn, by three elements which fuel the conflict because of their interactions.
- The *transformation cycle*: In this case, we find a multiple of three, twelve, which are the elements that come into contrast with conflictual ones; these elements are divided in four triangles: 1) *triangle of conflict transformation*, 2) *triangle of non-violence*, 3) *triangle of pianification*, 4) *triangle of correct perspectives*.

Today, *conflict transformation* is the most common theoretical construction of conflict resolution. The approach consists in the reconciliation of the parties through the analysis of problems, elaboration of solutions and the capacity to understand that the “enemy” is not the counterpart, but a third external element which damages both actors. A crucial role, moreover, is played by the mediator: thanks to his skills, in fact, he shall be able to create a non-conflictual atmosphere, more conducive to peaceful resolution, but also to push parties together using existing solutions, or creatively elaborates new ones.

### *The UN Operation in Mozambique (1992 – 1994): from war to positive peace implementation*

In order to empirically demonstrate that the implementation of *positive peace* elements can contribute to create conditions for a stable and long-lasting peace, the last step of the research will lead us to the analysis of the chosen case study: The United Nations Operations in Mozambique, ONUMOZ (1992 - 1994).

The *United Nations Operations in Mozambique* (UNOMOZ) was a UN peace mission to Mozambique established on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December, 1992, under *Security Council Resolution 797* with the assignment to monitor the implementation of the *Rome General Peace Accords*

agreed upon by the Mozambican president *Joaquim Chissano* (FRELIMO) and *Afonso Dhlakama* of RENAMO.

The Operation in Mozambique was unprecedented in scope, and the results have been almost completely positive. The transformation the country lived between 1992 and 1994, must give credit to the work implemented by the Organization. The positive elements exceeded the negative ones in the accomplishment of the final goal: the reconstruction of the country. From the draft of positive Peace Agreement to the deployment of more than 90.000 soldiers and experts for safety and monitoring reasons; from the reconstruction of the national army, torn to pieces by years of civil war, to the rehabilitation of soldiers, administrative institutions and demilitarization of political oppositions (RENAMO in this case). All these factors allowed Mozambique to discover, for the first time after centuries of colonization and war, the normality of a stable and free elections, which influenced the economic and social growth rates. Nowadays, natural resources and tourism lead the country as one of the first African developing economies, trying to harmonise political imbalances risen again in recent years, waking the ghosts of the past.

Another crucial element to stress is the diplomatic innovation ONUMOZ represented: for the first time ever, the ground for Peace Agreement signed in Rome, in 1992, was sown by an international independent catholic (third) actor: the community of Sant'Egidio. This community, of religious origins, was already committed, in the 80s, in humanitarian and rescue missions to help Mozambican population threatened by the civil war. Its effort consisted in a) filling the social gap created by the conflict; b) addressing the Galtunian *direct violence* with humanitarian and rescue work; c) reconciling the conflicting parties for the sake of the people. The Community's intervention - reason why Rome was the city chosen to sign the peace agreements -, always backed by the UN Secretary General, must not be underestimated, but considered as one of the key element that shaped the ONUMOZ Mission.

Starting from the historical development, the thesis goes deeper within the UN mission, subjecting it to a Galtunian analysis. As reference, it will be possible to use the *positive peace* tables reported few pages ago.

Do I manage to reach my goal? Do I convincingly prove that my theory is solid enough to stand by itself? Do I use coherently theoretical and practical tools, or are they superficial and not appropriate?

The in-depth analysis of the Mission allows me to answer the core research question of the thesis. ONUMOZ represents the practical demonstration that, if the United Nations Peacekeeping follows the *positive peace* elements, it is able to create solid growth conditions for those countries recovering from very serious conflicts. The mission proved able to give back to Mozambique its dignity of country, which had been trampled for centuries by conditions of exploitation, colonization and civil war. It proved able to create, in two years, conditions for free, fair, but above all, democratic elections, representative of the popular will.

In the evaluation of ONUMOZ, on a short, medium and long term, positive and negative sides must be carefully taken into account, weighing the effects and consequences. The experts of the International Community affirm, today, that on the whole the positive aspects have been more numerous than the negative ones, and I agree with this point of view.

The project of the UN Peacekeeping was an ambitious one, which was not simply limited to a temporary ceasefire, but aimed to build the conditions to enable the country to "stand on its own legs", without depending on the international community.

To conclude, the research focuses on the on the concept and role of "good mediator", idea which is inspired to the Transcend Method, the core elaboration of Galtung's theoretical apparatus, and a way to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. The method wants to stress the importance, but also the commitment, of the mediator: professional preparation, knowledge of historical and political facts, geopolitical dynamics on the one side; on the other one, the soul qualities such as sensitivity, intuition, empathy and creativity, to enter the heart of the conflict and transform it.

The possibility to perform the role of good mediator is given to everyone. However, in order to find these passion and desire, the role of mediator must not remain just a role, but it has to become a "mission" - it is no coincidence that the UN operations are called missions.

Getting fond of what one does, putting oneself at the service of an infinite and timeless value: peace.

*“By peace we mean the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy, without violence, and creatively- a never-ending process.”*

Johan Galtung