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**Comparison of Structuralism and Reductionism under
Counterfactual Interference:
Case Study of Appeasement in 1919-1938**

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research background

In the field of international relations, the theory of balance of power has always been an important tool to analyze concrete case and give explanations in global affairs. Especially in the school of realism, balance of power enjoys prominent status for long due to its simple and neat logic chain, as well as its strong explanatory power. Before the modern international relations theory was introduced, balance of power has already been mentioned in many other disciplines, such as history. The earliest record in western history about the using of balance of power can be traced back to Thucydides' History of Peloponnesian War. The balance of power, both as a descriptive power structure and a diplomatic strategy, was discussed and praised by Thucydides. Also in the East, the theory of balance of power are abundant in history records. Dating back to 2 BC, the famous Chinese national style history recordation Zhan Guo Ce, translated as Intrigues of the Warring States, clearly cited the applications of balance of power amongst small states to survive. Though as a centuries diplomacy, cases about balance of power never shriveled. From ancient Greek city states to duchies of Holy Roman Empire, from Bismarck's continental alliances to the confronted blocs in Cold War, balance of power from time to time occupied the center stage of international arena. And this makes the balance of power an inexhaustible resources to unveil the truth, if any, of international relations.

There have been innumerable researches on the topic of balance of power, some are concerning about the pure theoretical evaluation, some focus on the fluctuation of the applications of this specific diplomacy, and some put the balance of power under the context of realism spectrum to assess its universality. With so many previous research achievements and theory findings, this dissertation will particularly focus on a tiny spot of the history of international relations between two world wars. Taking the history of appeasement during 1919-1938 as the background, look closely at the elaborative attempts that European countries sought to maintain the balanced power structure

shaped in Paris Peace Conference after World War I. Hence, what is the historical background in that period?

In June 28th 1919, the signing of Versailles Treaty marks the formation of a new European system. As the core of the “Versailles-Washington System”, the essence of the peace treaty reflected the consistent demands for the balance of power among postwar European countries.¹ The powers were trying to make the system run by a series of diplomatic adjustments, interest compromises and even intriguing local conflicts, henceforth devoted to form a balanced and flexible system. Although the reconstruction of the balance of power was bound to hurt some actors with vested interests, Europe enjoyed a long history of pursuing balance of power as guiding diplomacy.

Since Metternich established the principle of balance of power and territorial compensation in Vienna Conference in 1815, seeking the balance of power has always been the important rule in European foreign policy practices.² Due to the great changes of balance of power after World War I and together with that Versailles peace treaty failed to achieve its balancing goal, there rose a great deal of diplomatic actions aiming to reshape the balance of power after the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Amongst those endeavors, the Locarno conference held in 1925 was of node significance: after this conference “the consensus of anti-Soviet Union in Europe” began to replace the “containment policy towards Germany” as European diplomatic consensus. From then on, the new consensus had become the criterion in dealing with postwar international relations.³ And afterwards, along with the gradual ease of containing Germany, appeasement was eventually introduced and fermented as the catalyst of World War II.

¹ See Frederick Brown, “Reflections on Versailles”, *The Hudson Review*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 335-349; Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “The History of a Lesson: Versailles, Munich and the Social Construction of the Past”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 499-519.

² See Catherine Lu, “Justice and Moral Regeneration: Lessons from the Treaty of Versailles”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 3-25.

³ See Frederick Brown, “Reflections on Versailles”, *The Hudson Review*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 336.

1.2 Research problem statement: A puzzle of balance of power

The history of the interwar period showed obviously that the pursuit of balance of power for peace with the method of appeasement had proved a total failure. As a highly contested diplomacy, appeasement, in a way, can be regarded as a special way to pursue a specific power structure. Either this is out of cowardly concession or sensible strategic compromise. Nevertheless, the debates about whether appeasement is a true diplomacy seem not to end right away.

When scholars talk about appeasement, few of them would not knit their brows. In the modern context, appeasement has long been infamously and unjustly labeled as a futureless foreign policy. This is largely due to the deceptive Munich scheme and its war-leading consequences. However, in the practice, appeasement was adopted as an effective means of foreign policy in order to shape the balance of power before World War II, and even continued to militate after the war. Contrast to the detestable attitude among academia, there is no obvious moral prejudice in the decision-making level. The prevailing misunderstanding of appeasement requires a more objective evaluation, which should in a way exclude the overwhelming despise, but go with rational assessment by recalling the historic moment before the conspiracy of Munich incubated.

In a sense, the appeasement policy pursued by Britain and United States after World War I towards Germany is, by some means, the continuation of the historic principle in foreign policy acquiesced by major nations in Europe, namely the balance of power. In view that under the guidance of such principle, the Westphalia and Vienna peace conferences had sequentially and successfully realized peace after Thirty-year War and Napoleon's hegemonic war. Therefore the envisaged balancing system provided in Locarno conference at that time were of high expectations among European countries. However, not only did the construction of the wishful system fail to ensure the peace of Europe, but also unable to prevent Germany from embarking on a vicious expansion. Until up to the Germany's invasion of Poland, the efforts for peace under balance of power principle completely bankrupted, and consequently resulted in the outbreak of World War II.

Appeasement is far away from the essence of balance of power, but it is indeed a subtle lens to closely observe the feature of this diplomacy. Traditionally, the notion of balance of power means major powers in a certain international structure seek to achieve peace via terrible but solid balance of capability, especially the balance of military forces. We can recall the night before World War I, when Britain and Germany accelerated the military competition in navy, and Germany attempted to counterbalance British dominance on maritime power. Also it's not difficult for us to remember the Cold War era, while United States and Soviet Union competitively increased their long range nuclear missiles for fear that any bloc would gain relative advantages henceforth broke the balance of terror. In any case, however, when talk about balance of power, we all agree that the ultimate goal for such diplomacy is to reach an equilibrium between or amongst states, which will automatically result in peace, regardless of how horrible it might be.

But our stereotype to balance of power remains strong. Since the diplomatic objective is to achieve peace under the arrangement of a balanced power structure, we took it for granted that only by gaining power would the balance of power be implemented appropriately. However, we have to admit that appeasement also fall into the claim of the goal of a balanced peace. Though the mechanism of how power shifts in the structure differs from what we presume, it is undeniable that by giving power to others can also lead to equilibrium, of course it will only function when the power offering state owns favorable power. In a way we can say appeasement aims at the same end the balance of power has long been pursuing, but only in a different, maybe opposite, approach. Just as what Joseph Nye argued "appeasement itself is not a bad thing, rather one traditional diplomacy".

Moreover, before the appeasement diplomacy was stigmatized by Munich scheme, there are many cases that proved the effectiveness of offering power to realize peace. As mentioned previously the consensus made in Vienna Peace Conference, the attitude towards vanquished France was a good example to understand the relations between balance of power and appeasement. Also we can resort to the experience in the East, have a look at what happened in China during the bipolar system between Han Dynasty

and the Huns. This also presents us with a different example to go deep into how balance of power could function. By all means, the balance of power can be implemented in many ways, at least we have to say military competition is not the only annotation. And appeasement in theory should be listed in our remarks, just as Paul Kennedy argued “appeasement is the policy of setting international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly dangerous.”

Considered that what United States and Britain did to Germany during interwar period can be regarded as an attempt of power balancing, so unlike what happened after the conferences in Munster and Vienna, why was the new balancing arrangement unable to maintain the peace and even bolstered another crucial war? Was it the flawed design of the balancing system *per se* or the faults in the practical operation that should be to blame? To be more specific, was the appeasement policy, at bottom, motivating Germany to provoke the war? If that is the truth, to what extent should we put blame on appeasement? And essentially, what kind of perspective should we adopt to explain the false promise of appeasement in this time under the notion of balance of power?

With so many doubts to the failed diplomacy, here comes the puzzle that the balance of power does not always work as envisaged. The theoretical gap between normative descriptions and empirical cases is huge. We have to detangle the puzzle by focusing on the diplomacy of balance of power itself. Again, go back to the instant case of appeasement in 1919-1938, if appeasement is a false promise for peace and never a just approach to pursue the balance of power, so, what would be the right approach to implement the diplomacy of balance of power? To put it in other words, and also the research problem this dissertation would like to solve:

Under what conditions is the balance of power a true diplomacy?

Based on the background we discussed, the conditions for a true diplomacy can be various. Given the multiple approaches to implementing balance of power, some conditions might lie in a certain mechanism that power should be shifted accordingly. And also we may think beyond the power logic, and try to find some inspiring factors

that are hidden behind the veil of power. Furthermore, we could just jump out of the field of IR, where there might be some helpful enlightenments that contribute to our work, such as sociology and histology.

Before we start to disentangle the puzzle, however, the very nature of the research problem requires a methodological concern. Naturally when we refer to power issues in IR theory, we cannot just concentrate on the power condition of a single state without making comparison. This is to say, a structural or systemic perspective should be nonetheless adopted so we can understand the big picture well. Apart from this structuralism path, on the contrary, providing that we are going to talk about balance of power as a diplomacy, it is necessary to look down into the particularities. That is we also have to put our attention to the specific context in which balance of power is introduced. If such reductionism path is excluded, the understanding of the balance of power as a diplomacy would lose its social roots.

1.3 Research questions and hypotheses

As the key question is under what conditions is the balance of power a true diplomacy? To meet the research objectives, I will deal with the following research questions:

Question 1: Under the path of structuralism, what are the key factors that would result in a successful diplomacy of balance of power? (Chapter 3)

Question 2: Under the path of reductionism, what are the key factors that would contribute to a successful diplomacy of balance of power? (Chapter 4)

Question 3: Between structuralism and reductionism, which path has superior explanatory power in terms of a true diplomacy of the balance of power? And by what means can we expect a better diplomacy of the balance of power? (Chapter 5)

And to answer these questions, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Under the path of structuralism, factors as dynamics and elasticity of the system should be taken into consideration in order to successfully implement balance of power.

Hypothesis 2: Under the path of reductionism, the specific socioculture and national psychology of a state are key factors if policy makers expect a successful diplomacy of balance of power.

Hypothesis 3: Between structuralism and reductionism, in terms of a true diplomacy of the balance of power, the factors given by reductionism has superior explanatory power. And by integrating the reductionism variable “attributes of units” into structuralism approach, can we expect a preferable framework to realize better diplomacy of balance of power.

In order to tackle these questions well, I will apply structuralism and reductionism separately to examine the case and then seek possible explanations. In the appeasement case, by reinterpreting history and analyzing the causality, I will come about two explanations to answer why appeasement failed. (Question 1 and Question 2) Since the two causes are deduced through two distinct paradigmatic paths, it is necessary to distinguish which argument could better explain the case, that is to say, which path enjoys favorable explanatory power in the instant case. And this is also the uttermost theoretical ambition of the dissertation, which tries to make comparison between structuralism and reductionism by practicing them on the same prototypical case. The comparison is expected to find a better framework to answer the research Question 3, thus anticipating a better diplomacy of balance of power.

In order to test those three hypotheses, I will examine the interwar history of appeasement during 1919-1938.

Why appeasement during 1919-1938?

I choose the appeasement during 1919-1938 as the case study for two reasons. First,

the case of interwar appeasement is the most different case when we start over examining the conditions for an effective balance of power diplomacy. As we know, in the history of international relations, the implementation of balance of power seldom failed into major wars, let alone a global one. Therefore the case of interwar appeasement is very unique compared to other successful practices of power balancing. It is much more convenient for us to find underlying factors that could contribute to the research in a different case. Second, the appeasement case provided in this dissertation is also a prototypical case. Here the case presents us with a prototypical failed application of balance of power, and moreover the case in 1919-1938 has been somehow acknowledged as the most notorious appeasement attempt in the history. To this extent, both the failure of power balancing and the proverbial appeasement in the period are of symbolic significances.

It should be noted that in the research, while analyzing the appeasement diplomacy during 1919-1938, I proposed Britain and United States as the main leading actors without considering France as equally important. The reason are twofold.⁴ On the one hand, during 1919-1929 before the economic crisis broke out, the French diplomatic goal was to develop the European continental hegemony out of its own favor. Thereby acting as an opposition to the peaceful balance system led by United States and Britain, France in this period contributed little to appeasement. On the other hand, after the economic crisis broke out in 1929, the domestic economic situation deteriorated in France together with severe political instability. This made France unable to seek Europe's leading position, and the enthusiasm of foreign policy has declined as well. Thus France's attitudes to constructing a balance system shifted, and not so long became an important follower to Britain. But even though France was still not capable to dominate the direction of the appeasement policy. Taking into account the behavior and influence of France in 1919-1938, I would argue it is appropriate to propose only Britain and United States as the subjects to analyze appeasement during interwar period. And also given that France indeed made an impact on the appeasement to Germany, the

⁴ For more information about France during interwar period, see S. A. Schuker, *The End of French Predominance in Europe*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976.

dissertation will also be accompanied by a discussion of France.⁵

1.4 Methodology

This dissertation will mainly adopt two methodologies in order to uphold the case analysis. The first is *Process Tracing in case analysis*. Besides, in chapter 3, when analyzing the appeasement case, I will intensively focus on the overall process of Locarno system. In order to investigate its embryo, birth, anomie and death chronically, I will adopt Process Tracing to study the casualty effects. Also in chapter 4, I will selectively go through German modern history, probe to examine the logic chain from history tradition to socioculture and then to national psychology and accordingly the national behaviors. This hermeneutics narrative is also proceeded by means of Process Tracing. Just as Bennett and Elman pointed out “if this explanation is accurate in this case, what else must be true about the processes through which the hypothesized causal mechanisms unfolded in this case.”⁶

The second is *Counterfactual Interference*. In chapter 5, in order to compare the explanatory power of different theories on the same case, I will adopt counterfactual interference as the approach to compliment the case study. The counterfactual inference is to set the contrary-to-fact conditionals which we take them simply as the thought experiments exploring the causal relationship.⁷ In chapter 5 counterfactual interference will be used as the approach to verify the explanatory power of both explanations given by structuralism and reductionism paths and then argue the superiority and limitation.

1.5 Structure of the dissertation

The research is composed of 5 chapters along with a conclusion chapter, and each

⁵ As for other researches supporting my point of view, believing that France held a detached attitude between world wars and pursued its foreign policy following Britain, see Edward Carr, *International Relations Between The Two World Wars, 1919–1939*, London, 1955. Translated in Chinese by L. Xu, Beijing: Commercial Press, 2010.

⁶ Bennett, A and Elman, C (2008), ‘Case Study Methods’, in in Reus-Smit, C and Snidal, D (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford, pp. 499-517.

⁷ Joseph Nye: *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed, London: Longman, 2008, P.68.

chapter is divided into several subchapters. The chapter 1 is introduction part, clarifying the research background and research designs. The chapter 2 is literature reviews related to the dissertation, and it is divided into two parts. The literature review separately focus on structuralism, reductionism and appeasement foreign policy in 1919-1938.

The chapter 3 analyzes the history between two world wars under structuralism path, more specifically the Waltzian approach, which focuses on the balance of power diplomacy and its corresponding envisaged system from its embryo to death. The first part stresses the theoretical background of appeasement as a diplomacy and structuralism as a methodological analyzing path. Unlike the salient explanation that appeasement is a synonym of timidity and surrender, I will regard it as a method of diplomacy in realism spectrum. Moreover, I will analyze the rationalities as well as the deficiencies of the choice of appeasement in the context of historic events between two world wars. The second part explains the motivation of appeasement and the birth of Locarno system, in which four important variables are argued. They are *the distribution of power among units, attributes of units, dynamics of structure* and *elasticity of structure*. The third and the fourth parts address the anomie and collapse of the Locarno system by focusing on the evaluation of the four variables mentioned above. In this chapter, I will give an explanation under the structuralism path, clarifying only when we take the dynamics and elasticity of a given power structure into consideration, shall we qualify the balance of balance of power a true diplomacy.

The chapter 4 provides a sociocultural narration of German history probing the cultural and societal origin of German militarism behaviors before World War II. The first part explains the selection of reductionism and its theoretical background, stating the validity of this approach and how it is going to be introduced in following analysis. The second part examines the cultural origin of militarism of Germany and the third part continued to examine the social process pertaining to Germany's unique socioculture. The fourth part then proceeds to argue how the defined socioculture affected the interactions between Germany and other countries in the interwar period.

At the end of this chapter, I will present an explanation, compared to chapter 3, under the path of reductionism, arguing the importance of socioculture and national psychology in qualifying the balance of power as a true diplomacy.

Meanwhile, both chapter 3 and chapter 4 conclude with an explanation about the failure of appeasement and the outbreak of World War II based on its own path. This is to respond to the appeasement case in this dissertation. The chapter 5 compares the two paths applied in chapter 3 and chapter 4 by practicing counterfactual interference to each path. The first part verify the conclusion of structuralism and the reductionism of the second part. In third part, it argues that structuralism is of less explanatory power than reductionism while explaining the instant case and advocates to revise Waltzian structuralism with the variable “attributes of unit” of reductionism. The last chapter draws out conclusion taking into account the content of the research question concerning both historical and theoretical issues.

Chapter2: Literature review

Considered that it is the appeasement case between two world wars that will be analyzed under structuralism and reductionism paths, previous researches about history and theory should be both taken into account.

2.1 Literature review on structuralism and reductionism

With the development of the fifth *Great Debate* of international relations theory since 1990s, researches and arguments about the battle between rationalism/positivism and reflectivism/post-structuralism is now in the ascendant. And amongst the debates, structuralism and reductionism are under heated discussion while they each is perceived as the main methodology in rationalism and reflectivism.⁸

vailing researches have paid their attentions on the attributes of structure from

⁸ Z. Hu, “Five debates in western international relations theory and its inspiration”, *Contemporary International Relations*, 2009, Vol. 9.

ontological perspective. For example, Kenneth Waltz starts from nation-state, assigning structure with substantial/material attributes; Robert Keohane starts from institution and regime, assigning structure with institutional attributes; Samuel Huntington and Peter Katzenstein start with civilization and relate structure with cultural attributes; Barry Buzan starts with more subordinate society bases, assigning structure with social/societal attributes; Immanuel Wallerstein yet assigns structure with economic and class attributes. In terms of Chinese scholars, Constructivist Qin Yaqing starts from relational (Guanxi) ontology and assigns structure with relational attributes; Confucian Zhao Tingyang inspired by traditional Chinese tributary system (Hua-Yi or Tianxia), assigns structure with geopolitical attributes.⁹ However, apart from the differences among ontological selection, there are not so many distinguishing reflections on structuralism in methodological aspect in academia. Prevailing structuralism researches mainly focus on and are somewhat interested in a narrow tropism of logic, which is the *agent-structure* methodology. Besides, when comes to foreign policy analysis, Waltzian and Keohanian paradigms are more than popular in practices, where there are few convincing modifications to them, let alone straightforwardly open a new path in the broad sense of structuralism. This leads to the methodological ossification in a way.

As for reductionism, with the assimilation of reflectivism and constructivism, reductionism attracts more and more attention in the notion of critical constructivism, the Frankfurt school as a prominent example. Scholars like Robert Cox and Mark Hoffman argue that “world politics and realistic existence are not a matter of course,

⁹ For related references, see Kenneth Waltz, *International Political Theory*, translated by X. Qiang and C. Su, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2003; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, translated by Q. Zhou, F. Liu, L. Zhang, Y. Wang, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2010; Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, Chinese translation by T. Liu, W. Song, Beijing: Peking University Press: 2009; Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni *The Modern World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York/London: Academic Press, 1974; Immanuel Wallerstein, Arrighi and Terence K. Hopkins, *Antisystemic Movements*, London: Verso, 1989; Y. Qin: *Relation and Process: Chinese International Relations Theory and Cultural Constructivism*. (《关系与过程：中国国际关系理论的文化建构》), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2012; T. Zhao, *The Tianxia System: An Introduction of The Philosophy Of A World Institution*, (《天下体系：世界制度哲学导论》), Jiangsu: Jiangsu Education Press, 2005.

but a sort of social construction, a product of human faith and behavioral choice”.¹⁰ They proclaim to expound the changes in international relations through sociology and history. Another intriguing example is Alexander Wendt’s new monograph *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, among his groundbreaking and lurid sentences he believes that social facts are the result of quantum mechanical construction. But in any case he himself abandons the systematic approach in his break book but embraces the reductionist path instead to “challenging the agent-structure problem more directly”.¹¹ Nevertheless, there is one point we cannot deny that the logic chain of reductionism is multifarious and jumbled, even disorderly in some cases. And also it lacks the universality when dealing with different issues. It is partially because reductionism lays excessive emphasis on the differences among units, thus in the meantime lacks the systematic abstraction of regularity and causality, the practical value of which has been accordingly jeopardized. In addition, comparative researches about structuralism and reductionism are often discussed on metaphysically theoretical level, and focus on their incommensurable divergences, where there are not many empirical case studies utilizing their commensurability.

2.2 Literature review on appeasement foreign policy in 1919-1938

Although generally scholars hold the negative attitudes to the appeasement foreign policy in interwar period, arguing that appeasing Germany has done nothing beneficial to maintain peace, if we classify the existing researches in detail, we may find out that there possibly are four arguments from different angles. First are researches from disciplinary of international relations history. These are mostly interpretable explanations of historical events without or with little value judgment, aiming to reconstruct the historical process with fragmented social facts.¹² Second are researches

¹⁰ Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, PP. 126-155, 1981; Mark Hoffman, “Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate”, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 16, PP. 231-250, 1987.

¹¹ Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, P.45.

¹² Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from*

tending to equate appeasement with surrender. Taking Henry Kissinger as an example, he claimed that “Munich has special meaning in our vocabulary...it represents the punishment as bow to extortion.” These researches totally deny the design philosophy of appeasement.¹³ Third, scholars in this realm do not deny the design philosophy and its intention. As Joseph Nye mentioned, “appeasement itself is not a bad thing, rather one traditional diplomacy.” They believe the reason of the failure of appeasement lies in the deviation of implementation.¹⁴ Forth, researches from this angle argue that existing review on this issue did not accurately reveal the diplomatic goal of the appeasement policy in the temporal international environment. It states that the ultimate aim of the interwar appeasement is to buy the time to prepare war on Germany, not to seek peace with it, and in this sense appeasement was successful then.¹⁵ However, the least of perfection is, existing researches tend to continue using the path of structuralism. And the review on appeasement foreign policy are largely based on Waltzian paradigm of distribution of power. They are lacking in the references to subordinate variables such as socioculture, national psychology and so forth, which left the researches concentrating more on the simplicity of theory and absent from social background.

Chapter 3: The path of structuralism: dynamics and elasticity of the system

Structuralism argues that given the historical traditions and consistency of foreign policy, the essential goal of appeasement in interwar period is “supporting Germany and containing France”. Judging no matter from the reconstruction of balance of power in Europe, or from the peaceful wishes among European people, appeasement foreign policy enjoys both rationality in design and feasibility in practice. However, due to that the policy makers from Britain and United States overemphasized the role of the power redistribution in structural level in the peace process, they underestimated the dynamics

1500 to 2000, London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.,1987.

¹³ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, P.283.

¹⁴ Joseph Nye: *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed, London: Longman, 2008, P. 158.

¹⁵ Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s”, *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall, 2008), pp. 148-181.

and elasticity as equally important variables in the system. Henceforth the envisaged appeasement eventually did not prevent the war from happening, leading pacific policy design aborted. In this chapter, I will first make concise explanations to the background of the birth of appeasement and the structuralism path I will be using. Then I will take advantage of empirical analysis, taking diplomatic history in 1919-1938 into account, setting *the distribution of power among units, attributes of units, dynamics of structure* and *elasticity of structure* as variables. With the four variables, I will analyze three phases of Locarno system from its embryo to anomie and then to collapse separately. In the end, by summing up the features and influences of each variables in different phase, I will conclude with an explanation for the failure of appeasement under structuralism path.

3.1 Background of appeasement and structuralism

After World War I, the balance of power in Europe has experienced great changes, mainly for the imbalance between North and South in the continent, which is the power decline of Germany and the rise of France. The punishments on Germany in Treaty of Versailles were extremely strict, which embodied almost every aspects. After the territorial changes, Germany lost its 1/8 territory and 1/10 population.¹⁶ At the same time, Germany lost all its oversea colonies, and was demanded to compensate 20 billion Goldmark as war indemnity. Moreover, Germany was under harsh limitation to keep its standing army and meanwhile was forbidden to enter Rhineland area. Germany's military capability was absolutely constrained with this method. The sanctions against Germany listed in Treaty of Versailles drastically pushed Germany to the bottom in the sequence of power, and the war indemnity and the pressure of debt further diminished the possibility for Germany to reemerge. In contrast, in the postwar period French achieved a huge power growth, and for the time being other European countries were relatively weak, making Europe such a graphic situation: the European balancing

¹⁶ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.55.

system established after Paris Peace Conference has already become a potential hegemonic system of France, where almost any obstacles that would hinder French from dominating the Europe seemed to be excluded.

In view of the traditional balance of power arrangement in Europe, the rise of French would firstly bring panic and dissatisfaction for Britain, who constantly pursued European balancing strategy. Moreover, outside the European system, United States as a higher level of “offshore hand” also paid highly attention to the power distribution in Europe. In order to maintain the advantage and diversification of trade and prevent Europe from hegemonic control which would lead to monopolies and blockade hence endanger its trade, the foreign policy of United States at this time has gradually become more consistent in logic with Britain, namely “supporting Germany and containing France”, only to prevent any potential hegemony in the continent.¹⁷ Based on the purpose of maintaining balance of power in Europe, realizing the vested interests and opportunistically not jeopardizing the relationship with France, thus, Britain and United States sought to revise the Versailles system. In 1925, major European countries held another international conference in Locarno, a Swiss city. And in this conference Britain and United States put forward a principle termed “the consensus of anti-Soviet in Europe”. Britain and United States attempted to channel the conflicts among western European countries to Russia in the name of anti-communism and furthermore enabled Germany to normalize as a competitive player in European traditional balancing system. This, so called “*Locarno system*” expected to fix the Versailles Treaty by removing the items of containing Germany and by constructing Russia as Europe’s major threat instead of Germany. The essence of the revised system was to deregulate the actual constrains on Germany. Since then, the focus of diplomacy of Britain and United States has quietly shifted from defending Germany to defending France from hegemony, and Russia became their guise.¹⁸

¹⁷For more details about the foreign policy of the United Kingdom, the United States and France then, see Patrick O. Cohrs, “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925”, *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 1-31. And L. Feng, “The Origin of Locarno Conference”, *Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences)*, No. 3, (1994), pp.140-147.

¹⁸For more details about the concept of “Locarno system”, see “The Significance of Locarno”, *Bulletin*

From structuralism point of view to see the pacific arrangement, the structural reconstruction and the stabilizing rules in the Locarno system appeared to be successful, but it in reality opened Pandora's Box. The subsequent developments have diverged further and further away from the original intention Britain and United States expected. Under the anti-Soviet consensus, Germany restored its economic and military power in support of Britain and the United States. And the balance of power in Europe looked to be working well and steering towards the traditional, also desired, direction. Along with Nazi's successful suppression on German communist movements, both Britain and the United State seemed to be convinced that the Locarno system has already been in good function. Coincidentally, the only opposition voice to the new system, say the France, has faded away due to the pressure of United States and its domestic turmoil, so the fact was that France had to acquiesce with Britain and the United States on the revised pact. In 1929, the Great Recession swept across the Europe and the United States. France itself was in deep crisis and lost its hegemonic ambition as well as the necessary economic foundation for it. In diplomatic aspect, France's continental aggressiveness and animosity to Germany have all in a degree crippled. Under such circumstances, France turned to pursue a more defensive and low-pitched foreign policy, acting as a follower behind Britain and United States in terms of German policy. Until then, Europe was filled with pacifist atmosphere in every corner.

It was under such an insidious peaceful atmosphere, Nazi Germany became legalized and was acquiesced by Britain and United States. Moreover the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Hitler's Germany was also regarded as an inevitable step to reconstructing the new balance of power. Although during the implementation of appeasement, there had been some historic opportunities that could have reversed the illusion in Locarno system, such as "*Stresa front*" and "*Eastern Locarno Convention*", which might have increased the elasticity the system. But those opportunities were eventually vanished, to be more specific, such endeavors were offset by the anti-

of International News, Vol. 1, No. 24 (Dec. 14, 1925), pp. 5-6; H. Wilson Harris, "Locarno: A European View", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 126, The United States in Relation to the European Situation (Jul., 1926), pp. 160-163; George A. Grun, "Locarno. Idea and Reality", *International Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1955), pp. 477-485.

communism goal and the wishful thinking of a balanced system. In 1939 when Germany asked further partitions of Poland, it was until then that Britain and United States eventually acknowledged that Germany couldn't be satisfied simply through such tiny compensation and Germany would undoubtedly break their bottom line. In other words, the reality of imbalanced power distribution resulted from the "supporting Germany and containing France" notion smashed the fantasy of balancing design. Even though Britain and United States embarked on a substantive military defense preparations, it was too late. Nothing could stop the war then. However, when we review the interwar history, we can't help but to ask whether it is the appeasement that should be responsible for the failure of peace under the balance of power design? Or, is it meaningful from the very beginning that they strive for peace by adopting the method of balance of power? I will adopt the path of structuralism to analyze the issue and try to answer the questions above.

Structuralism refers to that when examine international relations, it seek the explanatory variables from systemic level rather than individual level, that is to say, it focuses on analyzing systemic influences on units behaviors, where the system is composed of different units. Structuralism argues that only when the influences from systemic level are nonexistent or so weak that can be ignored, shall the reductionism approach be sufficient. In the meantime, whether a theory belongs to reductionism or structuralism does not depend on its interpretive objects, but on how it organizes materials.¹⁹ When analyzing international issues under structuralism path, what should be taken into account are the organizational form of units and the distribution of capacity inside the structure or system, and what should not be taken into account are the attributes of units. For example, Richard Rosecrance's international consequences pattern analysis, Stanley Hoffmann's unit force analysis and Morton A. Kaplan's international structure analysis all pertain to the path of structuralism.²⁰ In a sense, structuralism is not only an analyzing approach, but also a design philosophy of public

¹⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *International Political Theory*, translated by X. Qiang and C. Su, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2003, P.53.

²⁰ Ewan Harrison, "Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 143-162.

policy.

In this regard, appeasement is one of structuralism's practical applications in foreign policy domain. And it is a common and frequently-used diplomacy to achieve specific national strategy. It has been repeatedly practiced and utilized amongst the interactions between states, even long before the emergency of modern nation-state and international system. Joseph Nye pointed out that appeasement is a diplomatic policy aimed at avoiding war by making concessions to an aggressor.²¹ And this statement also coincided with Paul Kennedy's widely cited argument as "appeasement is the policy of setting international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and possibly dangerous."²² In this way, there are a great many prominent and supportive examples to verify this argument. For example, British leaders once attempted to appease Benito Mussolini after Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in the hope of keeping Italy out of the German orbit, hence avoiding military confrontation with Italy in North Africa. Another example is the appeasement to Stalin's agitation for Mongolia and Tuva's independence from China, with the anticipation that Soviet Union would declare war on Japan. In addition to these modern cases, there are also some successful appeasement practices in ancient China. For example, in the beginning of West Han dynasty (B.C.200 – B.C. 33), the dynasty promoted the noted "marriage and tribute diplomacy" to minority rulers. Chinese emperor made concessions to Huns by giving tributes and beauties to show humbleness and peace wish. It was exactly with the help of appeasement that the peace was ensured in a considerable long period under bipolar structure in East Asia.²³ Thus it can be seen,

²¹ Joseph Nye: *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed, London: Longman, 2008, P.404.

²² Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, London: Unwin Hyman Ltd.,1987.

²³ From BC 200 to BC 33, there in total were 8 times "Heqin" as political marriages for making peace between Han dynasty and Huns. And each Heqin without exception explicitly proved the appeasing inclination of Han dynasty's diplomacy. The political result of these appeasements was that Han and Huns maintained the bipolar power structure and Han has not been encroached in large scale by stronger Huns, thereby the peace has been kept for more than 70 years. For more references about the relations between Han and Huns, see Nicola Di Cosmo, "Han Frontiers: Toward an Integrated View", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 129, No. 2 (April-June 2009), pp. 199-214.

the word appeasement is not always the synonym to compromise, concession, weakness or incompetence in diplomatic practices, but sometimes it represents such a diplomacy with the consideration of taking advantages of strategic hedge and temporal endurance. The essence of appeasement is striving for breathing space and time to reshape the balance of power by making moderate concessions to other aggressors, and it embodies the diplomatic wise out of either compelled predicament or deep consideration. After all it possesses both rationality and validity.²⁴ Hence, how do we interpret appeasement in the path of structuralism?

In brief, appeasement is the loyal practice to the principle “power shall be matched with capability” in structural and realistic perspective. By conveying a portion of power from oneself to the adversary, appeasement compensates for adversary with such power in order to enable its capability to be just matched. And by doing so, one can also avoid its adversary realizing such equilibrium forcibly, such as provoking a war. From a logical point of view, the application of appeasement is of realistic meaning, at least sensible in policy domain. Therefore, the failed appeasement diplomacy pursued by Britain and United States to Germany should not be reproached blindly. Instead we should assess it with some much sounder criterion, such as rationality in practice and fidelity in implementation.²⁵

3.2 Reshape the system: the construction of Locarno system

The envisaged Locarno system under the concept balance of power is another historical continuation when European countries commit to seeking peace. To reshape the power structure is the same version as organizing an international relational network including major powers with their interests and conflicts. Thereby, how to weave this

²⁴ For more references about the rationality of the practices of appeasement foreign policy, see Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s”, *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall, 2008), pp. 148-181; Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement”, *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), pp. 345-373; James Pettifer, “The Price of Appeasement”, *The World Today*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 10-12.

²⁵ For more references about the fidelity of the practices of appeasement foreign policy, see Patrick O. Cohrs, “The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925”, *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 1-31; Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement”, *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), pp. 345-373.

network after the World War I? How do those countries with fundamentally different interests appealing manage to realize their peaceful coexistence? And by meeting what conditions is such a peace-leading network able to last?

A great deal of existing researches argued that the appeasement to Germany deprived from and motivated by three following factors. They are the weakness and incompetence of Chamberlain's government, the stubborn ideological trends of isolationism in United States and the parochial pacifism centered in national self-interest in Europe.²⁶ However, from the perspective of structuralism, the real reason that Britain and United States pursued appeasement to Germany lies in that the imbalance of the Versailles system. After World War I, Treaty of Versailles inflicted rigor sanctions on Germany, which precisely hindered the power structure in Europe from revitalizing and developing the balance of power. On the one hand, after World War I France became a dominant power compared with a confined Germany, which makes it possible for France to establish hegemony in Europe; on the other hand, due to the lack of other powerful nation-states in the postwar European system, for most European countries, there was no effective counterbalance against French expansion.²⁷ Originally, the establishment of the League of Nations was intended to break the traditional myth of the balance of power in Europe, instead to reshape the European peace by collective security. But the Senate of United States vetoed to accede with huge reluctance, furtherance, after that, Britain and France took League of Nations under their control as a convenient tool to manipulate small countries and their colonies. This made the League of Nations become an appendage of the traditional European political logic, and also, as obstacles, impede United States from involving in European affairs.

²⁶ Raymond J. Sontag, "Appeasement, 1937", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jan., 1953), pp. 385-396; Paul M. Kennedy, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865-1939", *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Oct., 1976), pp. 195-215; 以及 Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall, 1989), pp. 161-191.

²⁷ For more details about the relations between US and the League of Nations, see Patrick O. Cohrs, "The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 1-31

Nevertheless, on the other side of Atlantic Ocean, by enacting and implementing the projects of war indemnity, United States achieved the growth of its capability in a sudden and this led to the mismatch with the power it shared in world structure. Hence United States began to hold more and more dissatisfaction to the European arrangement of world order in the name of Versailles Treaty. Consequently before the ink was dry, the appealing to revise the current system has in no time gained the prevalence among major powers. But what should be noted is that, it was based on quite different considerations that Britain and United States attempted to modify the postwar system. On the British side, the direct target of British revisionists was to maintain its traditional authority and superiority as *mediator* above the continent, trying to retain the role as offshore-hands as well as the advantageous dominance through the construction of a new system. On the United States side, what American revisionists hungered for was to obtain as much interests as possible in order to match its desired proportional strength and power, and for that purpose, United States thus just advocated the return of balance of power in Europe. The ultimate goal was to avoid any un-interventional power lumps, which would jeopardize its own trade interests.²⁹

Therefore, Britain and United States simultaneously took up to modify the system, with the strategy termed as “supporting the weak and restraining the strong”, namely “supporting Germany and containing France”. In 1925, the Locarno conference was held and the goal of the conference was to bring Germany back into the new European system through financial assistance and public support by Britain and United States. And by virtue of the pressure from Britain and United States on French, they forced French to accept the reality that the construction of the new system would be led by them and would function in their desirable way. In 1926, Germany acceded the League of Nations, thereby accomplished the first step of revising the Versailles system. Beside,

²⁸ For more references about the United States policy towards the League of Nation, see Patrick O. Cohrs, “The First ‘Real’ Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925”, *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 1-31

²⁹ For more details about the US foreign policy then, see H.B.wang, “Reflect the US European Security Policy in 1920s through Locarno Treaty”, *World History*, No. 6, (2002), pp. 74-83.

in order to compensate the losses of France and to alleviate the contradictions inside Europe, Britain and United States took advantages of the fear and hatred of communism of western countries, leading the ambivalence towards the east, that is, Soviet Russia and later Soviet Union. They tried to find a solution outside the structure to ease the crisis among Western Europe and meanwhile push the system back to the traditional balance arrangement.³⁰ The illustration of Locarno system shows as following figure:




Figure 1. The Illustration of Locarno System

According to the logic of structuralism, the reasonable part of Locarno system was to accept Germany as a great power as well as an inevitable unit in European system, and the traditional method, say, balance of power, was employed to restore the peace, and to prevent the victorious nations from being hegemon or growing into a dominant power. The principle of the Locarno system is similar with what anti-French Alliance arranged for France in Vienna conference in 1814 after Napoleon War, in which

³⁰ For more details about Locarno treaty, see “THE LOCARNO TREATIES”, *Advocate of Peace through Justice*, Vol. 87, No. 12 (DECEMBER, 1925), pp. 685-692.

conference they carried out sanctions and constraint approaches against France and later then brought France into the newly established Quintuple Alliance. At the same time, Locarno system also seized the opportunity to demonized, if they really thought that way, Soviet Union (Soviet Russia before 1922) as the common external threat. By preinstalling a clear contradiction release channel, the system made it unlikely that the rapidly accumulated conflicts inside the system, or to say, in Western Europe especially between Germany and France, would destroy the system itself in the constructing process. Furthermore, it is still worth noting that as an important unit of the structure, the containment and intervention upon Soviet Union was never the ultimate goal of Locarno system. Instead, it was just a calculative maneuver or intervening variables for the realization of reconstructing the balance of power.

When we observe the strategic options that major powers made in constructing the system, it is not hard to find out that Britain focused mostly on the operation of “supporting Germany and containing France”, say the balance of power diplomacy. And it did not perceive the urgent threat when Russia revoluted and became a communistic nation. On the contrary, in 1921, based on realistic benefits Britain and Soviet Russia signed the *Soviet-Anglo trade agreement*. As for France, its strategies aimed positively at getting rid of the constraint of the balance of power arrangement. And when France found it of less prospect to resist the new system led by Britain and United States, it shifted to approach United States, trying to seek coalition to disperse the threats from both Germany and Britain. With this method, the promulgation of *treaty for the renunciation of war*, also termed as *Kellogg-Briand Pact* in 1928 could be recognized as France’s fierce struggle against the tension stemming from the new system.³¹ On the Germany side, its diplomacy catered to the anti-communism and anti-Soviet propaganda preached by United States from the beginning to the end, and acted a temporizer among Britain, United States and Soviet Union, thus benefiting from each side.

³¹ For more references about the essential goal of French foreign policy at that time, see Raymond J. Sontag, “Appeasement, 1937”, *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jan., 1953), pp. 385-396.

Apparently, at this very moment, the vision of the European powers remained inside Europe, and has not reached anti-Soviet consensus that Americans expected. Such a deviation between aspiration and reality left the construction of Locarno system great hidden troubles: will the Locarno system remain its peaceful consensus in Europe if the crucial unit, United States, also a supportive pillar, is excluded? And will the dynamics from outside Europe be able to maintain the anti-Soviet agreement among Britain, France and Germany, or be able to offset the conflicts inside the system, due to that all units in Europe merely focused on the disadvantages of themselves when constructing the balancing system? These problems are not only unresolved, but also become increasingly prominent with the evolution of the situation.

Therefore, in such a newly constructed system where Germany might once again become the trouble maker, the realization of security is highly dependent on following requirements. (1) The redistribution of power among units should be ordered and controllable. That is to say, the relative change of power of Germany, France, Britain, United States and Soviet Union should be organized and predictable. (2) The attributes of unit should be stable. That is to say, the units should not undergo any unpredictably dramatic intrinsic change or suddenly secede international interactions. For example, it would be unstable for the structure if a country is toppled down or suffers either political or Economic collapse. (3) The structural dynamics should be consistent and stabilized. It requires both the *intrinsic dynamics* which means the consensus to pursue balance of power among countries and the *extrinsic dynamics* which means pressure from United States and explicit anti-Soviet motivation. (4) The structure should possess the fault-tolerant ability, or *elasticity* to some degree. It means that inside the structure there should exist some relatively complicated or intertwined collaboration or alliance in order to absorb the impacts from endogens conflicts.

However, with the “natural selection” in political development, those requirements mentioned above experienced such a historical course from sufficiency to gradual devastation, and finally led the pacific arrangement under structuralism path to a total failure. This is mainly reflected in that at the beginning of the construction of system, the redistribution of power has drastically proceeded but progressively undertook out

of orderly control. Firstly, United States as an extrinsic power endeavored to put Dawes Plan and Young Plan into practice, which have *de facto* reduced German's war debt and indemnity, providing the possibilities for Germany to recover its economy.³² Secondly, although the conference on disarmament closed in 1934 didn't acknowledge Germany's military recovery plan *de jure*, German unilaterally declared that "Since Germany has disarmed all its forces, other signatory states of Versailles Treaty undoubtedly ought to disarm themselves as well. Otherwise Germany shall arm itself just as other states did."³³ Given that Germany emphasized its equal rights in armament, Germany's allegation of increasing armaments occupied the moral high ground in the successive disarmament movements. And the balance of armament in Europe has gradually given way to systematic armament race. Until then, the regularity and controllability of power distribution formally diverged out of the structural preset track. But it also deserves the note that at this moment, the attribute of unit has not changed, the weakness of Soviet Russia and the European military interferences to Soviet Russia showed the communist ideology little attractive to the West.³⁴

Thirdly, from the structural perspective, both intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics for the operation of system were sufficient. On the one hand, in this moment United States has not peaked its isolationism. The failure to accede the League of Nations forced United States to resort to other approaches to exert its influence on European affairs. This can be observed in the attitudes when United States actively promoted its dollar diplomacy to Europe. On the other hand, each country was ever highly motivated by striving for its own interests through revising the Versailles Treaty. Given this, the international interactions were quite booming in the postwar period. In addition, the

³² For more references about the issues of Germany war indemnity and the rise of Germany, see Hans-Joachim Braun, "The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German Reich and the Federal Republic", *German Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 431-433; Hans Ernest Fried, "German Militarism: Substitute for Revolution", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1943), pp. 481-513.

³³ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.163.

³⁴ For more references about Soviet Russia/ Union issues, see Y. Shi, "The Recession of Old Europe: On the Diplomacy and International Politics of Britain and France in the Interwar Period", *Fudan Journal (Social Science)*, No. 6, PP. 8-16; George A. Grun, "Locarno. Idea and Reality", *International Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4(Oct., 1955), pp. 477-485.

signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact decorated the Locarno system with non-war peaceful atmosphere. Thereby the structural elasticity has been perceptibly guaranteed.

³⁵ Coincidentally, the non-hegemonic and cooperative units, namely Britain and United States, as the leading force meditated and reconciled between France and Germany. By virtue of their superiority in capability, they fought to lead the continental diplomacy to the post-Napoleon-war pattern, which is the concert of powers. Provided that France scrupled the capability and power of Britain and United States, and also due to the incompetence of the imaginary Soviet enemy, continental countries cannot make an impact on the power structure bypassing Britain and United States. Together with that Britain and United States engrossingly rendered the Franco-German conciliation and non-war atmosphere, we may conclude that under such circumstance the construction of Locarno system by means of appeasement was very optimistic, where the requirements from both unit and structural level were complete with rationality and feasibility all ensured. However, the subsequent interactions among units and the construction of system unfortunately did not undertake along the promising blueprint that Britain and United States envisaged.

3.3 The anomie of the system: the alienation of Locarno system

Confined to the consistency of policy, even if there emerged many interfering variables, Britain and United States still implemented the diplomacy of balance of power while the conditions were no longer suitable. And more seriously, they even didn't notice that until the situation became a total disaster. Therefore the wishful appeasement has become the shield for Germany's rise, resulting in Germany's vicious expansion and their strategic miscalculation. Henceforth, what on earth happened made it no longer appropriate to pursue the balance of power policy for Britain and United States? And what are the reasons giving rise to the unsuccessful amendments to such arrangement?

³⁵ For detailed information about the peaceful aspiration of the construction of Locarno system, see the temporal news and editorials, "The Significance of Locarno", *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. 1, No. 24 (Dec. 14, 1925), pp. 5-6; "LOCARNO", *Advocate of Peace through Justice*, Vol. 87, No. 10/11 (OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1925), pp. 578-580.

At the unit level, the most influential interference variable was the economic crisis during 1929-1933, resulting in the power decline of each unit to different degrees. The changes of power caused the changes of the power ranking in the structure. The sequence of power has started to shuffle according to the comparative capability of each state. Among them, the change of economic strength is mainly divided into two stages: the first stage is the period before Hitler came into power (from 1926 to 1933). In order to cope with the economic crisis, the victorious countries adopted the infamous strategy by refusing to repay the wartime debt. In the meantime, the cancellation of Germany's indemnity to Britain and France, along with that United States repudiated the wartime debt enabled Germany once again to reduce its economic burden.³⁶ "The debt dishonor was a strategic mistake,, Americans would believe that the European common front which influenced themselves a lot has cracked."³⁷ The second stage was after Hitler came into power (from 1933 to 1938), in which period Hitler's wartime economic policy quickly restored the national economy of Germany. And it was indeed a sharp contrast to Britain, France and United States who were still trapped in and struggling with their slow recoveries. Furthermore, the change of military power in the system has also become clear. In the Geneva disarmament conference, Germany proposed the "equal armament principle", and continued to seek moral support for itself in terms of its military increase. Besides, ironically, the "MacDonald Plan" proposed by Britain even acquiesced Germany's military expansion, which "actually benefited Germany" in Geneva conference.³⁸ In short, Britain, United States and France were too much occupied by their own domestic economic affairs during the economic crisis. And with the method of shifting burdens, they ignored the reality that Germany has benefited from the chaos, which swept the obstacles for Germany's rise. Meanwhile coupled with that Germany introduced effective economic policies, the power distribution among units has gradually changed, with the gravity of power structure leaning to Germany.

³⁶ Hans-Joachim Braun, "The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German Reich and the Federal Republic", *German Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 431-433.

³⁷ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.177.

³⁸ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.189.

Beforehand, due to the outbreak of the economic crisis, the German domestic “common front movement” exacerbated, and Germany was then faced with the spread of communism. The fragile Weimar Germany had to cope with both economic crisis and the red threat. In contrast, due to the implementation of planned economic system with state involved in the economic operational process, the economic crisis did not cause undue impact on Soviet Union. So it’s more appealing for European countries to approach communism at that time.³⁹ Under such circumstances, Germany was faced with the risk of being a communist state. It is exactly based on the communist threat and the need to maintain the stable existence of unit in a balance system that Britain, France and United States accepted the establishment of Hitler’s Nazi regime and encouraged the oppression on German communist movements.⁴⁰ On June 1st 1936 the New York Times commented undisguisedly as “It would be much more satisfactory in Washington if they appoint Adolf Hitler to succeed.”⁴¹ And with the final establishment of the Nazi regime, Germany attributed its weakness to the contemporary international order, and further more at the end of 1933 Germany successively seceded the League of Nations and disarmament conference, breaking down with the Versailles system. So far, Germany retreated from the international system, and established Nazi regime under red threats. The attribute stability of the unit inside structure confronted great challenges.

At the structural level, the dynamics of the structure has been greatly reduced after the economic crisis. This is mainly manifested by the following facts: in terms of the intrinsic dynamics, the will for seeking balance of power by major European countries was gradually replaced by the will of revitalizing economy. Thereby the focus of international affairs turned to trade and international financial issues rather than power politics; in terms of extrinsic dynamics, isolationism became the mainstream public

³⁹ For more details about the power distribution then in Europe, see Y.H. Shi, “The Collapse of Old Europe: On the Foreign Policy and Internal Relations between United States and France”, *Journal of Fudan University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences)*, No. 6 (1999), pp.8-16.

⁴⁰ For more references about the British and American specific supports to German, see Raymond J. Sontag: “Appeasement, 1937”, *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Jan., 1953), pp. 385-396.

⁴¹ Wiener Loch, *History of Germany*, Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Press, 1959, P.465.

ideology in United States due to the catastrophic destruction caused by economic crisis. “There is one argument, believing that the great recession is the sequelae of World War I that Americans poured tons of dollars to Europe but they repudiated to pay them back. This not only resulted in economic predicament, but also aggravated Americans’ sense of deceit”.⁴² Therefore, “in the first two years of the New Deal, Roosevelt’s government indeed had no time to take care of foreign affairs, but to concentrate on solving the domestic problem of economic recovery.”⁴³ American isolationism has fermented as a direct result of the disappearance of the promoter of the Locarno system outside Europe. On the one hand, this led to the loss of extrinsic dynamics which would compel Britain, France and Germany to act under the principle of balance of power. On the other hand, this largely led to the fading of hostility to Soviet Union. However unfortunately, it was in such a condition where all the four requirements for constructing a new system all vanished that Britain and France disturbed by economic crisis insisted in carrying out appeasement. Apparently, it was no longer possible to maintain the myth of balance of power in Locarno system.

Nevertheless, even if the system lost its extrinsic dynamics, it would survive as well if it was able to absorb in a certain degree of impacts, that is, the system had enough flexibility or elasticity. As France sensed the threat from rising Germany, it offered to conduct a new Locarno pact with European countries, namely, the *Eastern Locarno Pact*, also termed as *Eastern Pact*. This new pact aimed to unite United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain and other several small countries in Eastern Europe and Balkan area by virtue of collective obligations to achieve collective security.⁴⁴ As an expanded vision of the League of Nations, however, the improvised system was eventually aborted because of the strong opposition from Germany. And later on France did not continue to propose any other substantial multilateral treaties with rest major

⁴² X. Jian, S. Wang, *History of International Relations: Volume V (1929-1939)*, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1995, P.267.

⁴³ X. Jian, S. Wang, *History of International Relations: Volume V (1929-1939)*, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1995, P.269.

⁴⁴ For more details about the “Eastern Pact”, see Lisanne Radice, “The Eastern Pact, 1933-1935: A Last Attempt at European Co-operation”, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Jan., 1977), pp. 45-64; Also see S. A. H., “A Security Pact in Eastern Europe”, *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jul. 19, 1934), pp. 3-11.

powers, except for signing some frivolous mutual assistant treaties and memorandums with Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In this sense, the efforts to enhance the flexibility and elasticity in Locarno system also proved to be a failure.

In summary, according to the analysis above, the prerequisites for successfully establishing Locarno system have changed both in unit and structural level, and also the international situation at that time was no more suitable for appeasement diplomacy based on the principle of balance of power in Europe. Britain and United States were then deficient in controlling the extent and progress in power redistribution process. It would only induce Germany to behave out of control rather than back to normal track if they still bonded Europe's fate to the old myth of balance of power. While confined by economic crisis and misled by Germany's successful suppression on domestic communist movements, Britain and United States spontaneously continued the original appeasement. Thus, the Locarno system ascended to the abyss irreversibly, and with the appeasement still functioning, the alienation of the system would inarguable aggravate. The final result must be an extreme mismatch between unit power and unit capability, and the unbalancing situation would pave the way for its ultimate collapse.

3.4 The collapse of the system: the end of the Locarno reverie

The collapse of Locarno system was no surprise in that Britain and United States kept pursuing the policy of balance of power under the unstable structural premise. In the previous phases, along with the establishment of the Nazi regime, weakened threat of communism and less international interactions in Europe, Germany has completed the transformation from a stable unit to a labile unit in Locarno system. And other factors in relation to the system stability continued to ferment: the capability of units increased unequally under the cover of wishful balancing system, the loss of external dynamics, and the attenuation of system elasticity eventually ended in the complete collapse of the system. And the breaking point in this phase is that the establishing system has been unable to match the imbalance of unit capability, and also the system itself cannot afford to absorb in any impacts caused by the imbalance.

In terms of the distribution of unit power, the imbalance mainly reflects in that Germany achieved excessive power growth, especially in military aspect. The irreversible imbalance offset the material basis for the balance of power expectation in Europe, that is, no feasibility for appeasement. A typical example was the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which in the long run granted Germany with the opportunities and legitimacy to develop its own military force. And later on the treaty became a cheap excuse for Germany to brazenly tear up the provisions in Versailles Treaty in terms of the codified restrictions upon naval armaments manufacturing.⁴⁵ For the vantage that Britain continued to believe in the myth of Locarno system, aiming to limit the strength of French navy in order to defend its own maritime interests. Not surprisingly, Britain overestimated its own strength and underestimated Germany's potential, or to say, misjudged the balance of power between Britain and Germany. At the same time, Hitler issued the National Defense Law that “may make personal decisions on domestic issues such as martial law, general mobilization and declaration of war.” And he set up the “Authorized Wartime Economy Agency” in order to focus on the development of war economy.⁴⁶ Moreover, he “announced the four-year plan for the expansion of armaments at the National Convention of the Nazi Party in Nuremberg.”⁴⁷ Yet amazingly, Chamberlain's government acquiesced Hitler's bold behavior, considering that “the rise of Germany is more appropriate for the containment to France with 100 army divisions”.⁴⁸ At last, the promulgation of Germany's “National Defense Law” revealed Germany's intention of war and its preparation to break the balance of power, hence to dominate the entire Europe. The Locarno system, which was originally designed to take advantage of controllable rise of Germany to

⁴⁵ For more details about Anglo-German Naval Agreement, see D. C. Watt, “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1956), pp. 155-175; Hines H. Hall III, “The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Britain, 1934-1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 477-499.

⁴⁶ See L.Q. Fang, B.Y. Wang, J. Z. Liu, *History of International Relations*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, p.222.

⁴⁷L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.222.

⁴⁸ For more details about British attitudes towards German naval expansion, see the joint declaration by Hitler and Chamberlain in 1938, “Joint Declaration by Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler, September 30, 1938”, *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. 15, No. 21 (Oct. 22, 1938), pp. 30-31.

achieve balancing stability in Europe, has been blatantly abandoned by Germany. The theme of international interactions under Locarno system has shifted from the good wish to remodel the peaceful balance of power to the fierce confrontation between hegemony and anti-hegemony. Not in so long, the peaceful reverie of Locarno system would be eventually and thoroughly crushed by German tanks.

At last, in terms of the structural level, the intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics to maintain Locarno system have all vanished. United States and Soviet Union established diplomatic relations in 1933, Soviet Union acceded the League of Nations in 1934, linked with that United States promulgated “Neutrality Act” in 1935. These facts made United States no longer legitimate to publically demonize Soviet Union in the name of pursuing Locarno system. At the same time, isolationism of United States reached its peak, the extrinsic dynamics to maintain Locarno system has completely disappeared. As for the intrinsic dynamics, the French economy was in a huge recession, the domestic class contradictions and partisan struggle were very sharp compounded with political revolts, besides the military spending has also been repeatedly cut.⁴⁹ At this moment, France began to absolutely follow the foreign policy of Britain. However, the British appeasement to German and deception to French exacerbated the contradictions among Britain, France and Germany, thereby lowering the willingness of cooperation among them.⁵⁰ The intrinsic dynamics for the balance of power has been constantly decreased.

In this case, Britain became the last possible dynamics to maintain the system sloping to collapse. However, precisely due to that Britain bore the responsibility for balancing the system and mediating between France and Germany, Germany deliberately asserted aggressive claims and took great advantages of Britain’s fantasy of being the offshore hand by provoking conflicts with France.⁵¹ More ironically, this situation happened to satisfy Britain’s vanity of playing as a continental mediator.

⁴⁹ X. Jian, S. Wang, *History of International Relations: Volume V (1929-1939)*, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1995, P.269.

⁵⁰ In order to contain France, Britain constantly fostered Germany’s military expansion, but at the same time it didn’t exchange the information with France.

⁵¹ For more details about Germany’s behaviors, see George A. Grun, “Locarno. Idea and Reality”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4(Oct., 1955), pp. 477-485.

Therefore Britain held somewhat indifferent attitude towards Germany's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In 1936, the Times reported in one appalling editorial “An opportunity for reestablishment” by persuading people into distinguishing two different situation, as “the advance detachment of German forces was to occupy the undisputed territory of German sovereignty, or to burn the war to neighboring territories?”⁵² The struggling Britain was blindly optimistic about the situation in Europe where the strength and power of Germany and France seemed even. And it concluded affirmatively from its self-interests that the Locarno system has successfully constructed and it might keep out of the affairs until the next imbalance occurred.⁵³ So far, the intrinsic dynamics required has been completely vanished given that Britain fulfilled to withdraw from the Locarno system.

At this time, the Locarno system had no elasticity, no ability to absorb in impacts, which implies that the last stabilizer of the structure did not exist. When French sensed the increasing threats from Germany, it once proposed to establish a common defense against Germany among major European countries termed “Stresa Front”, but eventually the communique was of no actual contents, but just lightly criticized the Germany’s breaching behavior.⁵⁴ After the failure of diplomatic efforts, France tried to cooperate with Britain and Soviet Union, but this time the cooperation was sabotaged by the ambiguous relationship between Britain and Germany. In order to enhance the flexibility of the system, the final efforts were some “weak” treaties, like “Anglo-German Declaration”, “Anglo-French Declaration” and “Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact” signed under peaceful smokescreen. But those bilateral peace treaties was not binding, Germany could tear up any treaty with any excuses at any time.⁵⁵ Eventually, in 1938,

⁵² Anthony Eden, *The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators*. London: Casell, 1962. This memoir covers early career and first period as Foreign Secretary to 1938, Chinese translation published in 1977, Beijing: Commercial Press, P.346.

⁵³ For more references about British interests in Locarno system, see Wickham Steed, “Locarno and British Interests”, *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (Nov., 1925), pp. 286-303; John Hiden, *Germany and Europe (1919-1939)*, New York: Longman Publishing, 1993.

⁵⁴ See L.Q. Fang, B.Y. Wang, J. Z. Liu, *History of International Relations*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, p.224. For more details about the Stresa Front, see H. L., “The Stresa Conference”, *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. 11, No. 21 (Apr. 18, 1935), pp. 3-6.

⁵⁵ For more details about the treaty, see S. A. H., “The Berlin Conversations and Russo-German Relations”, *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. 11, No. 20 (Apr. 4, 1935), pp. 3-8.; S. A. H., “Repercussions of the Franco-Soviet Pact”, *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. 12, No. 16 (Feb. 22,

when Germany attempted to replicate the Munich scheme in Poland, Britain and France finally realized the structural imbalance has exceeded the range of control, and the structure did not have sufficient elasticity or flexibility required to correct or accommodate the accumulating contradictions among units. Until this time, Britain and France rushed to confer the substantive military cooperation against Germany, but it was too late, because the war has already begun. Moreover, the only positive factor that could have saved the system by exerting pressure on Germany, that is United States, was still outside the Europe and was dominated by isolationism, feeling indifferent about the situation in Europe.

Table 1. The development history of Locarno system

	Construction	Anomie	Collapse
The distribution of power among units	Orderly	Disorderly	More disorderly
	Dawes Plan; Young Plan	Economic crisis; MacDonald Plan; Repudiation	Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Germany's National Defense Law
Attributes of units	Stable	Emerging unstable factors	Unstable
		Communism; Nazi regime emerging	The foundation of Soviet Union; The establishment of Nazi regime
Dynamics of structure	Sufficient	Receding	More receding
	Pacific atmosphere; Dollar diplomacy	Declining enthusiasm; Isolationism	US established diplomatic relation with Soviet Union; Neutrality Act
Elasticity of structure	Sufficient	Receding	More receding
	Kellogg-Briand pact	The failure of Eastern Pact	Anglo-German Declaration; Anglo-French Declaration; Molotov– Ribbentrop Pact

In summary, the path of structuralism argues that the reason why Britain, United States and France failed to keep Germany at bay by appeasement lies in that: it makes sense to acknowledge that to a unit the change of capability is inevitably accompanied with the change of power and status. The essence of foreign policy is not to prevent changes, but how to deal with these specific changes. When Britain and United States perceived the ineluctable power growth of Germany, in order to minimize the threats and eliminate the discontents, it is reasonable for them to build up a new system by acknowledging the changes and assimilating them with a new complementary structure. However, when the dynamics of the system began to vanish, the power redistribution of unit has gone beyond the control of the rest units, and the elasticity of the system was simultaneously effortless. Coincidentally and unfortunately, owing to the distraction of economic crisis, Britain and United States were not able to correct their foreign policy to abandon appeasement timely, let alone to reshape the structural elasticity, thus ultimately leading to the outbreak of war. This is to say, reasons for the failure of appeasement mainly lies in the neglect of the loss of dynamics and elasticity in structural level by Britain and United States. And furthermore, the reason why they would neglect those vital factors results from the myopic insight confined by economic crisis.

Charter 4: The path of reductionism: socioculture and national psychology

According to the path of reductionism, after the World War I, Britain and the United States failed to bind Germany by the restrictive measures and the follow-up Policy of appeasement, let alone saved Europe from the nightmare of war. This was because the British and American diplomatic policies towards Germany focused only on the re-balancing the structural strength comparison on the material level, lacking of cognition to the socioculture and national psychology that dominated Germany's act of war. On the occasion that the seed of war was not extinguished, the assumption of Britain and the United States to achieve peace by strength adjustment was nothing than

building a castle in the air. Everything would be burnt down once the conditions ripened, regardless the exquisite reshaped new system. In this chapter, I firstly make a brief introduction to the path of reductionism and deconstructs the social and historical cultures that dominated Germany's war behaviors, and then argue how the national psychology brought up Germany's war logic under the influences of specified social and historical cultures in a way of *hermeneutics*, finally I analyze the reasons for the failure of Britain and the United States in Policy of Appeasement towards Germany from the reductionist perspective.

4.1 Reductionism and the selection of paradigms

As another analysis path of international relations corresponding to structuralism, reductionism is always used to explain the reasons for state. The application of reductionism in researches on the international relations is originated in the migration of research methods in natural science. The natural science always decompose the complex matters into different independent subordinate individuals and abstract the theories applicable to explain the entirety by researching the subordinate individuals. Force analysis process in physical mechanics and analysis on the course of reaction of related substances in chemistry are all applications of the reductionism.⁵⁶ In the realm of international relations, the research path of explaining the international relations by researching the state or even subordinate actor is adopted by some scholars for the strong logical connection between the domestic policies and external behaviors of a state. So, what on earth is the reductionism?

According to Kenneth Waltz, reductionism is “the method of making research on its members to explain the behaviors of a certain group; so is the research on the state bureaucrats and bureaucracies.”⁵⁷ Alexander Wendt, the reductionism is to research

⁵⁶ For more references about the applications and reflections on reductionism, see Ullica Segerstråle, “Reductionism, Bad Science, and Politics: A Critique of Anti-Reductionist Reasoning”, *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Aug., 1992), pp. 199-214; 以及 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), pp. 335-370.

⁵⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *International Political Theory*, translated by X. Qiang and C. Su, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2003, P.24.

“factors on the unit levels i.e. mental state of the decision maker and domestic politics etc”.⁵⁸ In the academia, the reductionism in the more broad sense refers to all research methods under the structural level, which is the controlled experiment to reduce the entirety to the separated individuals and inspect the nature of each part as well as the relationship between each other.⁵⁹ Theory of Marxism that the domestic class movement leads to changes in the international relations, Lenin’s theory that the imbalance of national economic development results in the imperial expansion, the “Democratic Peace Theory” of the Western scholars that the democratic states could live together in peace and the “research paradigms of political psychology” based on the researches of the leaders’ personalities all belong to the reductionist category. For this reason, in this article, I adopt the psychological research paradigm of the group members for the application of the path of reductionism and focuses on investigating how the national psychology based on the state culture causes the changes in international relations.

4.2 Cultural origin of militarism: from historical traditions to socioculture

Making a longitudinal survey on the development process and historical culture of Germany we can see no chanciness of Germany’s embarking on the militaristic road for external expansion. The unique culture bred in history had provided hotbed for Germany’s militarism and seduced Germany into choosing the road of war inevitably. Considering the profound historical and cultural background for Germany’s expansionist behaviors, we shall start with its socioculture to trace the reasons for its behaviors first of all if we want to explain the reason why Germany had provoked another war after failed in the first World War instead of accepting the peace efforts of Britain and the United States in appeasement policy. According to this article, the militarist characteristics in Germany’s socioculture is composed of three core elements,

⁵⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Translated in Chinese version by Y. Qin, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2000, P.13.

⁵⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *International Political Theory*, translated by X. Qiang and C. Su, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2003, P.25.

namely the *romantic nationalism* originated from the Prussian culture, *xenophobia and martial culture* originated from historical experience and *cosmopolitanism* originated from the German philosophy. The above three elements mirrored and influenced each other during the historical process of Germany, laid the cultural and social foundations for Germany's taking the militarist expansion path and had become the important cultural origin for Germany's continuous expansion.

Firstly, the romantic nationalism originated from the Prussian culture floods the German society with a host of religious frenetic traditions while pursuing the extreme conservatism in political life. Like a powerful stimulant, such traditions could rapidly instigate the nationalist sentiment of the public anytime and effectively conduct the national political mobilization to provide the outpouring appeal and cohesiveness for the expansion behaviors of the state. As Germany's predecessor, the birth process of Prussia has both the two characteristics of religious culture and knight spirit; Germany's development has always accompanied with force and discipline.⁶⁰ As the vanguard army organized by church for religious colonization, Prussia was marked by religion since its very birth, "happily poor, abstinence-only and obedience" become the oath of each Prussian.⁶¹ In addition, baptism of war turns force into the main choice to solve the problems, "I am here to deliver sword but not peace" became the motto of the knights.⁶² In the meanwhile, knight traditions cultivated in wars also write discipline and dedication into Germany's culture, "only in such horrible discipline as the chivalric order, in a world where the chivalric order is always glorious and lofty while individual is always insignificant and pathetic can we cultivate such selfless dedications."⁶³ After the founding of Prussia, such ascetic religious culture and knight spirit became the glorious traditions the whole nation was proud of. In the time of Friedrich (1740-1786), romantic nationalism based on language, culture, race, religion and history rose, when the original religion was replaced by the national identity, the knight spirit started being

⁶⁰ Hans Ernest Fried, "German Militarism: Substitute for Revolution", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1943), pp. 481-513

⁶¹ Q. Bian, *Rationality and insanity*, (《理性与狂迷》), Beijing: Oriental Press, 1999, P.33.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilization, What?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, No.5. (Nov. - Dec., 1993), pp. 186-194

widely applied in army construction and educational propaganda; “state model is a family with the monarch is the head”, “the supreme end is to build the soldiers into the will-less and mindless tools”.⁶⁴ The final result of which is the autocratic rule and military power policy bred nationalism had firmly realized the prosperity of “Golden Age” in the history of Prussia.

Secondly, the early humiliated history leads to a morbid request for territory and military force in the German society and promotes the martial culture and exclusionism in the German culture. Germany had always been a geographical noun before being reunified in the year 1871. The Holy Roman Empire riven by the internal feuds was only a loose federation and called the “ragged political quit” while the political ecology of the entire Germany was completely in the fragmented state.⁶⁵ More gravely, with great powers stand around in great numbers, Germany’s geographical environment was extremely adverse. As Germany was located in the border zone between the Latin nation and Slavonic nation, it was not only the entrance door of France to the Eastern Europe but also the only passage of Poland, Sweden and Russia rose later to enter the core area of Europe. In addition, the terrain in Germany was flat and lack of natural cover for defense such as high mountains and great rivers, it had always been the casualty of political wrestling of great powers in the history. For example, during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), Germany was ravaged by Sweden, Denmark and France one after another. In this war, Germany lost 1/3 population and more than 300 cities, “everywhere is deserted, when peace comes along, Germany has fallen to the ground hopelessly, being torn into pieces, bleeding.”⁶⁶ However, the Napoleonic Wars had brought forth heavier losses for Germany: in addition to more than half of the territory, the population also plummeted to 4.93 million from 10 million not mention the huge indemnity it had to pay to France. Military power turned to be its last resort if it wanted to survive in the competition dominated by the jungle principle in the hostile

⁶⁴ Wiener Loch, *History of Germany*, Shanghai: Shanghai Joint Publishing Press, 1959, P.58.

⁶⁵ J. Ding, X. Li, *The Spirit and Culture of Prussia*, (《普鲁士的精神和文化》), Zhejiang: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1993, P.4.

⁶⁶ Koppel S.Pinson, *Modern Germany: its history and civilization*, New York: Macmillan, 1966, translated in Chinese by D. Fan, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1987, P.14.

environment of powerful enemies looking around and waiting for opportunities in addition to the internal divisions. Bismarck once said “Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided, but by blood and iron.”⁶⁷ It was the historical experience that had contributed to the martial culture in German society; people believed that the state could only be strengthened by developing the military might and generated profound worships for the military might. For example, there was an atmosphere called “Middle-class militarization” in the German society, people “are not only respectful to the army but also participate in the military imitation for the civilian organizations and activities; teachers regard themselves military officers on the training ground while the mid-life merchants are proudly showing their certificates of officers for reserve duty.”⁶⁸

In addition to the martial culture, the history of being invaded and ravaged time and again also rooted the exclusion and hatred for other nationalities deep into Germany’s culture and became the an important source of Germany’s militarism traditions. Xenophobia refers to the attitude of being fear and hateful for anything coming from the foreign countries, which would always play a unique role in the propaganda and mobilization.⁶⁹ Different from the traditional mode of mobilization preaching historical honors, the Xenophobia or exclusivism had always exaggerated or emphasized threats from other countries to prove the legitimacy and necessity of the decision-making of the public. Such behaviors were no nothing new in the German history. In the year 1900, Kaiser Wilhelm II von Deutschland once declared that “Britain blocked our necessary source of wealth while their navy is the evil tentacle”, then started with the expansion of naval arms.⁷⁰ The other example was Hitler’s advocacy of threats from foreigners especially the Jews; he declared that the Jews was responsible for the poverty of post-war Germany and waged the brutal pogroms. The other influence of exclusivism was the strong desire for territory. Germany’s culture

⁶⁷ J. Ding, X. Li, *The Spirit and Culture of Prussia*, (《普鲁士的精神和文化》), Zhejiang: Zhejiang People’s Press, 1993, P.17.

⁶⁸ B. Li, *The Cultural History of Germany*, Beijing: University of International Business and Economics Press, 2002, P.103.

⁶⁹ Carr William, *A history of German, 1815-1985*, London: Edward Arnold, 1987.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p.45.

had accompanied with the discussion of “*irrendentism*” and “*Lebensraum*” due to the fear memory that its territory was ravaged and carved up time and again. After Deutsches Kaiserreich led the unification war in 1862, its diplomatic goal got developed on the basis of demand for territory by swallowing up Schleswig-Holstein, occupying Alsace-Lorraine, annexing Austria, invading Czechoslovakia after the World War I and finally expanding all-around towards the European countries. Fear of Lebensraum had been haunting Germany’s culture; when Hitler declared war on the United States and the Soviet Union at the same time, the word Lebensraum had lost its original meaning. This was because Germany’s expansion was not the demand for territory in nature but the collective spiritual needs originated from the socioculture to remedy the psychological fear after setbacks.

At last, the cosmopolitanism of German philosophy constructed a set of guides of action, which legitimized Germany’s *sonderweg* (i.e. special way) to become a powerful nation. The German scientist Kant mentioned in *ius cosmopolitanicum* in 1795 that “all human beings are entitled to live on the earth, which finally will enable them to form the cosmopolitan constitution”.⁷¹ Being continuously deduced by the initiation thinkers, cosmopolitanism started playing a role in German society, joined in the mainstream values of German society and became “the topic interested by the upstream society” as Germany’s unification war ran smoothly.⁷² Cosmopolitanism means that human beings of all races shall and finally will be united to a social community under the shared values. Although Kant described this process as an extremely long “long-period social movement” that only can be realized spontaneously, Germany’s reunification had inspired the misinterpretation of the German society on this concept. Germany had defeated Denmark, Austria and France one after another within ten years while the nationalism was instigated greatly. Under the beautiful vision of the cosmopolitanism imagination, Germany started glorifying itself as the elite country,

⁷¹ Immanuel Kant, “*Toward Perpetual Peace*” in *Practical Philosophy – Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.329.

⁷² Kuno Francke, “Cosmopolitanism in German Romantic Thought”, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 66, The Record of the Celebration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the Founding of the American Philosophical Society (1927), pp. 183-190.

praising itself to build the world community responsibly and no longer satisfying with the cautious diplomatic goals in Prussian Era. In the year 1888, the 28-year Wilhelm II ascended the throne, soon after which abandoned Germany's previous conservative continental strategy. He claimed that: "huge waves are lashing against the gate of our country and hastening us to maintain our position in the world as in abiding by one world policy." In the meanwhile, Billow, the German Chancellor after Bismarck also declared on the imperial council that "let other nationalities split up the continent and sea, that time has passed that we Germans are only satisfied with the blue skies."⁷³

In conclusion, Germany's socioculture has the characteristics of typical romantic nationalism, martial traditions, xenophobia/exclusiveness and cosmopolitanism idea. In this sense, sociocultural traditions are to blame as the origin of its acts for the external expansions and wars launched time and again by Germany under the guidance of militarism. Although the above characteristics of German culture cannot be simply equated to the expansion by arms, these cultural factors in the historical evolution have always featured and penetrated throughout German's social life, bred the national psychology with the militarist tendencies and finally derived the specific economic and political systems and national value orientation with the through the public participation militaristic color. In the meantime, these cultural elements have always been sued by different political forces to serve their political goals, while the original cultural values are altered or distorted and finally built into the extreme thinking of militarism and even fascism to support various state acts.

4.3 Social process of militarism: from national psychology to state act

Development of militarism in German society was not accomplished at one stroke but went through a complex process from recessivity to dominance: the above-mentioned compound socioculture was the recessive gene for Germany's choosing the militarist road while the specific national psychology shaped by culture resulting in the

⁷³ Friedrich Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen*, 1946, translated in Chinese by Z. He, Beijing: Joint Publishing Press, 1991, P.131.

dominant expression of this gene and become the important driving force for Germany to conduct system design, mass mobilization and external expansion. Therefore, to explain Germany's acts during the year 1919-1938 with the path of reductionism as national psychology, the national psychology of Germany and its effects shall be summarized: Germany's national psychology was closely linked to its militarist expansion hence the important logical clue for the development of its militarism. First of all, the birth of Germany was militarist while the early national memory gave Germany's state-building the militarist qualities. Secondly, the militarist policy had always winded through the development history of Germany, while Germany's economic structure and administrative system were all structured on the core of militarism; the guiding effect of system had been continuously strengthening the public identity of militarism in making the domestic policies so as to consolidate and continue the system. Thirdly, Germany rode into the European powers successfully by pursuing the militarism, so that the logic of "pursuing the militarism to make Germany strong" had been taken for granted by the German people and kept fermenting as Germany got strong continuously and finally melt into heat of the German people, becoming the driving force inciting the Germany people to follow the militarist expansion spontaneously.⁷⁴

Historically, as a European power, Germany's origin has the militarist traditions, which is completely different from other European states. The earliest origin of Germany is the Teutonic Order born in Jerusalem that came to Prussia to suppress the pagan rebellion at the call of Holy Roman Empire. After the rebellion was suppressed, Prussia was zoned as the territory of the chivalric order's leader by the emperor, hence the original embryo of Germany. Different from the commercial traditions or agricultural traditions of France or Britain's state-building, Germany's state-building had strong military traditional features, which after the establishment of Kingdom of Prussia were more prominent.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ In this thesis I adopt the definition from Hans Ernest Fried to illustrate German national psychology and its militarism elements, see more in Hans Ernest Fried, "German Militarism: Substitute for Revolution", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1943), pp. 481-513.

⁷⁵ For more references about the rise of Germany in history, see Stephen Brockmann, "The Politics of

In Prussia, the relationship between army and state was pretty special, so that Prussia was called “an army with a state”. In general case, army was the extension of state power to serve the state goals while situations were just the opposite in Prussia: army was core of the state, and various functions of state were developed around military affairs.⁷⁶ This special situation can be proved by exploring the development of system of civil servants in Prussia or Germany later. Prussia’s army came into being before its government bureaucracies. In the year 1657 when Prussia was fighting against Poland, the system of civil servants was attached to the military bodies and the state had no specific organizations of civil servants. As the size of army expanded and the management got complex, the state had to focus on the development of industries and optimization of tax system while the system of civil servants was established upon such military requirements. At the same time, the proportion between the scale of army and the resources on which it was established was ill-matched. Before the Seven Years' War symbolizing the rise of Prussia, Prussia had a population of one million while the regular armed forces were up to 200 thousand. During the reunification of Germany, its capital city Berlin developed into a city with a population of 100 thousand in which 20 thousand were soldiers and this proportion was larger than that of any other European city at that time.⁷⁷

The state militarization not only gave the militarist characteristics to Germany on the material level but also shaped the strong militarist complex of the public. Such shaping was mainly realized in two approaches: first of all, the militarized economic structure had made people attached to the economic logic of “developing by means of expansion” while blurred the boundary of army and state; secondly, the successful militarist practice had deepened people’s identity of this policy, the expansion behaviors rooted the national honors deep into the popular feelings while people were apt to

German History”, *History and Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 179-189; 以及 Richard Bessel, “The German History Society”, *Central European History*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), p. 229.

⁷⁶ John Mears, “A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism, an Anthropological Approach by Emilio Willems”, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 746-747.

⁷⁷ Fritz Stern, “Lessons from German History”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2005), pp. 14-18.

seeking an end-result in the state's expansion behaviors. However once such behaviors were restricted, the national psychology would suffer from setbacks and hinder the state's ordered operation.

To maintain the massive regular army, the vast majority of Germany's tax had been invested to solve the demands of the army, which made the most of Germany's financial allocation been consumed by the expense of public goods but not the competitive civil expense. Meanwhile, it became an inexorable demand to expand the financial revenue to sustain the large-scale military development with the result that Germany's national wealth mainly flew into the government but not individual while the economic development was dominated by government but not market.⁷⁸ Economically, the result of economic development led by government with over-valuated military industry is the state's exclusion of market and the shrinking petty and medium-sized bourgeoisie. While politically, this kind of economic arrangement had restricted the development based on the fairness and freedom of market economy at the same time of denying the development and growth of the advanced bourgeoisie.⁷⁹ After the pattern had been solidified, Germany's economic development turned to be completely dependent on the military demand hence no possibilities for the economic transition and intervention of the emerging forces.

However from the public perspective, people were helpless to rely on this military economic system spontaneously as the products were provided to the army in great quantity with pretty small space left for them for the market competition in addition that they could obtain considerable guarantee out of this wartime economic system.⁸⁰ This kind of economic arrangement had led the development of the public thinking and the market competition-based principle of freedom and fairness went increasingly weak,

⁷⁸ For more references about the economic policy during war time, see Alzada Comstock, "German Financial Policies, 1932-1939 by Kenyon E. Poole", *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Part 1 (Mar., 1940), pp. 193-194; R. J. Overy, "Hitler's War and the German Economy: A Reinterpretation", *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 272-291.

⁷⁹ For more references about the influences and assessments of German economic policies, see H. W. Singer, "The German War Economy in the Light of Economic Periodicals", *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 204 (Dec., 1941), pp. 400-421.

⁸⁰ For more references about the relationship between citizens and German war economy, see Frederick Strauss, "The Food Problem in the German War Economy", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (May, 1941), pp. 364-412

while the extension logic on the basis of strengthening the state through war was universally identified. To be simple, Germany's state-building principle had decided its economic system and such economic system had decided the contact way between people and the state. This kind of contact way, however, promoted the public identification to the state's standard of conduct that had formed the unique national psychology--the expansion behavior-based militarist traditions as a result of the inter-generational inheritance of such stand of conduct.

Looking far and wide into the history, the development of German nation did not always go on smoothly while the militarism had provide it the possibility of making it powerful and prosperous. Despite the huge potential provided by Germany's economic structure for its development, Germany was in a mature European power system with an extremely unfavorable development environment. Especially during the Thirty Years War during 1618-1648, when the impact on the Holy Roman Empire by Spain and France made "the Germans artificially fixed on a medieval level of confusion and weakness".⁸¹ Its urgency of integrating itself into the European system and the abnormal development path left no time for Germany to consider the democratic thought while the backwardness in politics, industry and colorization civilization had made it develop farther on the path of militarism with strong practicability. After Germany (Prussia) had benefited from War of the Spanish Succession, War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, people turned to be confiding with the effects of militarism. Looking through the wars Germany had participated in before the World War I, with an exception of Napoleon's being defeated in the anti-French war, Germany had almost suffered no setback in implementing the militarism. People had found sense of belongings and identity from the state act due to the fact of aggressive policy and the increasingly powerful Germany; therefore the national psychology and the state act were highly identified while the militarism was deeply rooted in the public.

⁸¹ J. Zhang, *Why is it Germany?*, (《为什么偏偏是德国》), Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1995, P.44.

⁸² 3100 German professors all over the country made a statement on October 23, 1914 to support the war policies of the German government, in which they said that “the Prussian army is wealth of the country, it exists not only in the German army but the civilians because they are integrated at the first place.”⁸³

Therefore, according to reductionism, the German national psychology born out of Germany’s socioculture was based on militarism dominated by the military priority and expansion; what’s more, during the long-term practice, this kind of national psychology had been actively interacting with the state-building, system design and policy making to strengthen each other so that Germany’s state act was highly identified with its national psychology. In Germany, the economic system, administrative system, public opinion propaganda and even the national education had been steeped in the militarism-featured national psychology. As a result, the national psychology would definitely influence Germany’s foreign policies and even become the starting point to consider the state interest of Germany; the foreign policies of all states towards Germany would inevitably result in failure if they failed to take this point into consideration.

4.4 Invalid counterbalance of international society: from punishment to appeasement

After defining Germany’s national psychology and its significance, the analysis on the diplomatic debacles of Britain and the United States with Germany can be approximately regarded as answers to the following question, namely whether Britain and the United States had taken its national psychology of militarism into consideration when making the postwar policies towards Germany, if they had, so whether the design of foreign policies was to disintegrate and eliminate the influences of this national

⁸² For more references about militarism in German history, see John Mears, “A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism, an Anthropological Approach by Emilio Willems”, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 746-747; Martin Kitchen, “A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism, An Anthropological Approach by Emilio Willems”, *The International History Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (May, 1987), pp. 318-319.

⁸³ H.v.Treitsche, *Das Deutsche Ordensland Preußen*, Leipzig: History, political essays (Vol. 2), 1886, PP.34-35.

psychology in the system structure?

After the first World War, the main tune of British and American foreign policies towards Germany was mainly reflected in the Germany Treaty signed on Paris Peace Conference in 1919, based on which, sanctions against Germany by of Britain, France and the United States were mainly composed of four parts, namely “determining the new postwar borders of Germany”, “carving Germany’s colonies up”, “limiting Germany’s arms” and “Germany’s reimbursement issues and other economic clauses”.

⁸⁴ Both borders and colonies were territorial punishments while this kind of punishment was right the direct confrontation and denial to the desire for territory expansion chased by the German nation over centuries. Despite Germany had been forced to accept this treaty, such handling method went extremely against the national psychology, and remained the obstacle for Germany to take the road of peaceful development after all. On the other hand, punishment of limiting the arms went even more against Germany’s foundation to build the country; the arms limitation referred to the limitation of Germany’s practice of militarism as well as the denial of German government’s administrative mode and economic structure. Therefore, it was not only out of consideration for security that Germany had kept requiring for arms equality but even more based on the reflection of the national psychology. Analyzing it through the path of reductionism, the issues of war indemnity were less important in comparison with cession of territory and arms limitation

Germany’s militarist traditions had been completely exposed during the World War I. Aware of the destructive effect of such national psychology, both Britain and the United States had formulated a series of targeted measures in designing the Germany Treaty: cession of territory was to correct the consequences caused by Germany’s long-term national psychology while the arms limitation and huge indemnity were to limit the material dynamics of militarist national psychology. The treaty had deprived Germany of its prosperity brought forth by the militarism at the same time of denying the possibility for the militarism to return. The foreign policies of Britain and the United

⁸⁴ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, PP.54-56.

States seemed successfully eliminated Germany's dynamics of re-expansion on the national level, yet proved a failure by history. This was because Britain and the United States didn't thoroughly limit or reform Germany's national psychology; the expansion factors remained on the psychological level regardless the expansion motivation being dispelled on the material level. In addition, the Versailles System only stayed on the national level in terms of limitation on Germany while not touching the socioculture that caused the source of national expansion.⁸⁵ As a result, the halfway liquidation of structural design for Germany's national psychology had resulted in the blind optimism of Britain and the United States in policies toward Germany and left behind the seed of war.

To prevent Germany from rising again, Britain and the United States had limited Germany's military force by means of treaty and required Germany to dismiss its regular army and de-militarise Rheinland and 20 kilometer eastward, in the meanwhile, Germany was forbidden to develop navy and the air force with the research and development of related weapons were restricted too. At the same time, the economic chain imposed on Germany's economy has made Germany's economic growth long been trapped in downturn, hence unable to re-militarize. But the key to the question is, the policy of restricting German military power and economic strength did not weaken the cultural and psychological traditions of German militarism from its roots. Expansion and war were still the general logic of postwar Germany development.

After the end of World War I, Germany fell into a dead and exhausted state in economic development, socioculture and political civilization; the failure of the Republic of Weimar's rule and people's dissatisfaction for the current situation bred the revolutionary requirement in Germany's society for the current situation. Different from the logic of strengthening the state with industry and commerce after the Napoleonic Wars and Franco-Prussian War, Germany's rejuvenation relayed more upon the development of warfare. Hitler's top priority after coming into power was to satisfy the

⁸⁵ For more references about the reflections on Germany foreign policy, see Fritz Stern, "Lessons from German History", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2005), pp. 14-18; Stephen Brockmann, "The Politics of German History", *History and Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 179-189.

German people's revolutionary demands or demands to strengthen the state; Hitler had always been connecting revolution with violence to select the method. First of all, he emphasized the historical development track of Germany in the public speeches without exception to enhance the public identity to Germany's glorious history of "developing by expansion, strengthening the state with war". He once said in his speech on May 18, 1933 that "according to the glorious history brought forth by Germany's military force in the past, now as a young states with young regime, we shall learn from this, the way to stopping the neighbor countries from outmatching us is to learn from the past and use of weapons".⁸⁶ Secondly, Hitler listed the development history of other countries to prove violence as the only way of revolution and supported that raising in violent ways was generally recognized all over the world. He said to the German people that "Marseille was held in esteem by the French thanks to the revolutionary violence movement in France" "The American patriotism was completely generated from the wars with the British" "The British development originated in the blood after Glorious Revolution" and "Garibaldi's military rebellion has widely spread in countrysides of Italy".⁸⁷ The historical achievements and practice of all countries made people believe that violence was the feasible way of revolution while the Nazi Germany's mainstream literature further exaggerated war, development and revolution to be the synonyms of militarism so as to preach at people that war guided by militarism was the only way to reform.⁸⁸

By means of the Nazi party's various ideological propaganda, the German public's demand for revolution was gradually directed to the war logic agreeing with the militarist culture and they inveterately believed that "liberation can only be realized through militarism while the political development can only be realized through the warfare or preparations for war".⁸⁹ Therefore driven by the vengeful mentality,

⁸⁶ *Herr Hitler's Speech*, World Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 2 (JUNE, 1933), pp. 74-75

⁸⁷ Hans Ernest Fried, "German Militarism: Substitute for Revolution", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1943), pp. 481-513.

⁸⁸ As for the temporal typical literature works about instilling people the notion "change is war", see *The Flag of the Persecuted* by Baldur von Schirach, Supreme Youth Leader; *The Drum and The Fanfare* by Heinrich Anacker; *Bloody Songs* by Herbert Boehm; *In the Marching Rhythm of the S. A.* by Herbert Menzel; *Of Courageous Living and Brave Dying* by Kurt Eggers.

⁸⁹ Hans Ernest Fried, "German Militarism: Substitute for Revolution", *Political Science Quarterly*,

Germany was capable of making use of the contradictory relations of all European countries and the abrupt changes in the current political situation (for instance the economic crisis) to find out the loopholes in the policies of Britain and the United States and realize the goal of contending for hegemony by means of militarism. For example, taking the advantage of fears of Britain and the United States for communism, the German Nazi Party organized the militarized Schutzstaffel troops, expanded the arms under the anti-communist name and started once again with the militarist road in nature under the acquiescence of the European powers. The World War I was like a fire disaster ignited by the Germany's militarism as the seed. The seed was saved in the ruins although the Paris Peace Conference had extinguished the open fire of militarism; no matter to what extent the open fire had been extinguished and how successful the post-disaster reconstruction was, the seed would be re-kindled any time possible to burn down everything reconstructed once the conditions were met.⁹⁰ The re-construction process here refers to a series of diplomatic mechanisms and structures including Locarno system constructed by Britain and the United States after the war. Before the seed was extinguished, any effort dedicated in reconstructing the stable structure was fruitless, just as Hitler once said: "They cannot fight against the Europe-shaken whirlwind seeking to restore the balance of powers by regulations with small scale."⁹¹

In conclusion, although Britain and the United States had been clearly aware of the hazards of the militarist traditions in Germany's national psychology, they only stayed on the material level instead of taking any effective drastic measure in diplomacy. They only took measures on the practical levels i.e. economy and military to consider the effectiveness of the limitation policies towards Germany on the basis of realizing their own interests while not making effort on how to disintegrate the root and transform Germany's national psychology and finally tolerated the development of Germany's militarism. In a word, according to the reductionist analysis, the root of Britain and the

Vol. 58, No. 4 (Dec., 1943), pp. 481-513.

⁹⁰ Also see Catherine Lu, "Justice and Moral Regeneration: Lessons from the Treaty of Versailles", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 3-25; Frederick Brown, "Reflections on Versailles", *The Hudson Review*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 335-349.

⁹¹ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.238.

United States spoiled their appeasement foreign policy was lack of profound understanding to Germany's national psychology so that the design about the subsequent system structures was of no avail no matter how exquisite it was.

Chapter 5. Counterfactual interference: explanatory power comparison between structuralism and reductionism

Different from the natural science research, the research in the field of international relations cannot conduct the controlled experiments because we are not able to stop other things from happening while observing a changing matter.⁹² However we can adopt a mental experiment called "counterfactuals" to help us screen the effectiveness and rationality explaining the reasons. Therefore, in this chapter the related concepts and operating requirements of counterfactuals shall be described before making the counterfactual interferences respectively on structuralism and reductionism to verify the explanatory power of them in explaining the reasons for failure of appeasement policy; in the end, I would take the limitations and advantages of the explanatory power for the two paths into comprehensive consideration, trying to integrate the two of them from a compromising perspective to obtain the optimal path of explanatory power based on the case in this article.

The counterfactual inference is to set the contrary-to-fact conditionals which we take them simply as the thought experiments exploring the causal relationship.⁹³ In the concrete practice, we regard the various reasons of a certain event as the independent variables and the event results as the dependent variables. Take a certain independent variable as the starting point and determine the completely opposite situation as the new independent variable and substitute it into the event while maintaining other independent variables unchanged. The reasoning finishing point is the investigation of the variety degree of the dependent variables, whether it has changed oppositely along

⁹² Joseph Nye: *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed, London: Longman, 2008, P.68.

⁹³ Ibid.

with the variety of the independent variables and how such opposition is. If the degree is high, it means this independent variable is closely connected with the dependent variable, the explanatory power is strong or otherwise.⁹⁴

The counterfactual inference can be valid upon meeting four standards: rationality, proximity, theoretical property and facticity.⁹⁵ To be specific, it means that the assumption on the opposite situation of independent variable shall meet the historical conditions (rationality), the time-span between the independent variable and dependent variable shall be as small as possible (proximity), the reasoning between the new independent variable and the new dependent variable shall be theoretically supported (theoretical property) and the changes of independent variable shall be simplex (facticity). If the process or result of counterfactual inference fails to meet the four standards at the same time, the counterfactual inference shall be unauthentic or the independent variable assumed for the counterfactual inference will be of no explanatory power.⁹⁶

5.1 Limitation of structuralism under counterfactual interference

According to the analysis path of structuralism, the reasons for the diplomatic failure of British and the United States towards Germany are that Britain and the United States ignored the lack of structural dynamics and the deficiency state of the structural elasticity in building the Locarno system; the limitation of visual field under the economic crisis was the main reason for such ignorance. Considering the facticity principle of counterfactual inference, in this article I would conduct the counterfactual

⁹⁴ For more references about the principle about counterfactual interference, see Ana Arregui, "On similarity in counterfactuals", *Linguistics and Philosophy*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 245-278; As for its mathematical principle, see Igal Kvat, "Counterfactuals", *Erkenntnis* (1975-), Vol. 36, No. 2 (Mar., 1992), pp. 139-179.

⁹⁵ Joseph Nye: *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 7th ed, London: Longman, 2008, P.86.

⁹⁶ For more references about the 4 applying principles about counterfactual interference, see Stephen Barker, "Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation", *Mind*, New Series, Vol. 108, No. 431 (Jul., 1999), pp. 427-469; As for the adequacy of explanatory power of counterfactual interference, see Tomasz Placek and Thomas Müller, "Counterfactuals and Historical Possibility", *Synthese*, Vol. 154, No. 2 (Jan., 2007), pp. 173-197; As for the errors of explanatory power of counterfactual interference, see Boris Kment, "Counterfactuals and Explanation", *Mind*, Vol. 115, No. 458 (Apr., 2006), pp. 261-309.

interference from the three independent variables including the system dynamics, structural elasticity and economic crisis to verify the explanatory power of the path of structuralism.

First of all, in this article I assume that the dynamics of Britain and the United States in building the Locarno system to maintain the system always exist. The dynamics required by the system development are divided into the intrinsic dynamics seeking the balance of power and the extrinsic dynamics of the United States interfering the construction of European balance of power. As the role existence of the United States in the system is the key point lead Britain, France and Germany to fight against the Soviet Union and balance the strength, in addition that Europe didn't have the unanimous identity to construct the balance of power at that time, so that the core of Locarno system dynamics can be regarded as coming from the influence of the American extrinsic dynamics. Would Germany break the constraint of balance of power if the United States had strongly interfered in the European affairs and even replaced Britain's position as the "off-shore hands" instead of pursuing a stricter isolationism after the economic crisis? The United States would never sit idle and appease Germany as the operator of a higher balance of power for the diplomatic vision of the United States was not limited within the Europe but took Europe as a component of its diplomatic strategies. The ultimate aim of the United States was to establish its dominant force in Europe or at least prevent the European hegemony from coming into being to protect its trade safety from being threatened while the construction of European balance of power was just a step in its strategies.⁹⁷ The United States adopted the dollar diplomacy policy to advocate this policy with the specific acts of Dawes Plan and Young Plan processing the war debts in the hope of influencing the state act to maintain the European balance of power by outputting capital to intervene in finance of other countries. Therefore the United States would definitely take measures to intervene facing the controllable sudden rise of Germany.

However the intervention means of the United States were pretty limited as the

⁹⁷ For more references about this hypothetical, see H. Wang, "The European Security Policy of the United States in the 1920s from the Locarno Convention", *World History*, 2002, No.6, PP. 74-93.

United States was far away from the European Continent and it was of remote possibility to adopt the military deterrence means to intervene in Germany. The measures could be adopted by the United States were dominated by economic sanction, for instance restraint of trade, urging the debt and frozen credit etc. On the other hand, based on the European trade analysis at that time, Germany's major trade partners were the Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Britain while the sensitivity and vulnerability of Germany's dependency on the United States were at the low state, so that it would possibly become a mere formality to limit Germany by the economic means.⁹⁸ If the United States could join hands with Britain, France and the Soviet Union to apply the economic sanctions on Germany, it might collapse out of the economic predicament and Europe should have the opportunity to conduct state-rebuilding on Germany. However such situation could only be realized upon the highly consistent point of view of the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union on the issues of Germany, the possibility of which didn't exist at all in reality. So Germany's unbalanced development in Europe still could not be limited effectively and the construction of Locarno system remained a failure.

Secondly, assume from the structural elasticity, would Germany resort to war if Britain, the United States, France and even the Soviet Union had established a certain alliance or treaty that was helpful to limited Germany's expansion or related to the collective safety? During the May Crisis of Czechoslovakia, Germany's two armed provocations in Sudetenland suffered failure as a result of the collective military threat of Britain, France and the Soviet Union, thus the collective safety was still possible at the beginning of Locarno system's alienation.⁹⁹ Yet the construction of collective

⁹⁸ For more references about temporal German trade overview, see Hjalmar Schacht, "German Trade and German Debts", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Oct., 1934), pp. 1-5; see also Arthur Schweitzer, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Nazi War Economy", *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Aug., 1943), pp. 322-337; references about trade overview between Germany and eastern European countries, see Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage", *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer, 1991), pp. 343-368.

⁹⁹ May Crisis: in May 1938, Germany deployed its troops on the border of Czechoslovakia. With the excuse that the Germanic autonomy in Sudetenland was not satisfied, Germany forcefully deterred Czechoslovakia. However under the conditions that the government of Czechoslovakia resolutely refused to grant autonomy and the international society unanimously condemned the deterrence, Germany was compelled to cease the military operation. For more information about May Crisis, see

safety reacted slowly and passively to Germany's expansion while the core issue of Locarno system was how to accept a rising Germany and the construction of system elasticity was to prevent Germany's overexpansion as it rose. The original intention to design Locarno system was to accept Germany, however the actual situation was that due to the Germany's overexpansion, the entire system had played a role in resisting Germany in nature. The original peaceful construction system of balance of power turned into the horrible competitive system, so once all countries realized Germany's raising uncontrollable, it would threaten themselves to continue constructing the Locarno system while a new system containing Germany would become where the interests of all countries lie when peace or not would be greatly related. Though the existence of system elasticity had explanatory power to stop Germany from sliding into war, it would be difficult to be implemented. The unit behavior of state but not the structural elasticity had become the dependent variables to peace while the rationality assumption of counterfactual interference had been challenged.

Thirdly, assuming from the disturbance variables, whether the diplomatic vision of Britain and the United States still stay on the issues of balance of power but not the domestic economy so as to prevent Germany's opportunistic practice? Under this assumption, the answer was yes. If the world economy and politics went down along the tendency before the economic crisis, the strength of Britain, the United States and France would definitely outclass that of Germany and the scheduled payment of war debt would not cause a temporary clamor to the isolationism of the United States. Under the world structure determined according to the distribution of material capability, the elimination of economic crisis interference would make changes in the national strength more consecutive and stable, the power distribution pattern in the structure would not change violently so that Germany would remain the position of being subject to Britain and the United States, which means, the German opportunism would turn to be unpromising as a result of the wide gap of the capability of Britain, the United States and France even it found the market.

Gerhard L. Weinberg, "The May Crisis, 1938", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1957), pp. 213-225.

To sum up, it can be obtained by analyzing the path of structuralism that despite the certain explanatory power in the reason for the diplomatic failure towards Germany, the explanatory power was obviously insufficient. According to the results of counterfactual interference, although the Locarno system constructed by Britain and the United States to build the balance of power had no lack of sustaining dynamics and the internal elasticity, this system still failed to limit Germany's expansion successfully. This was because the influences of disturbance variable shall be eliminated to realize the effect after the system had been successfully constructed, which means the economic crisis could not be the reasons for the limited visions of all countries to display the functions of Locarno system, otherwise the system would become invalid. The results were that the appearance of disturbance variable would cause the causal relationship between the system construction and Germany's success in expansion had nothing to do with whether the system had been successfully constructed or not and the conclusions obtained from the path of structuralism were not persuasive.

5.2 Superiority of reductionism under counterfactual interference

By conducting the counterfactual interference on the reasons explained by the reductionism, the path of reductionism is rather persuasive in explaining the diplomatic failures towards Germany, in addition, comparing with the structuralism, the reductionism is also superior in the explanatory power in terms of logic and degree.

According to the reductionism, the diplomatic failures of Britain and the United States towards Germany was that after the World War I, Britain and the United States had never disintegrated from the root and reformed the militarist traditions in Germany's national psychology in terms of design policies towards Germany so that Germany had speculated successfully in between the situations changes and great power contradictions. Conducting the counterfactual interference on the reason explanation, it is assumed in this thesis that: will the war break out if Britain and the United States had succeeded in limiting Germany's national psychology and successfully reformed it.

The situations pretty similar to the assumption in this thesis are the restriction measures taken by the anti-fascist alliance to Germany after the World War II; we have reason to believe that at that time Britain and the United States had drawn a lesson from the failed limitations of Germany on the Paris Peace Conference. The measures confirmed on the Potsdam Conference related to the disintegration and reformation of Germany's national psychology mainly included: the political and economic principles of occupying Germany by districts, Germany's compensations, distribution of Germany's mercantile marine fleet and warship as well as the ownership of Königsberg.¹⁰⁰ The historical facts proved that the measures taken by Britain and the United States this time especially the policy of occupying Germany by districts were pretty successful. By means of occupation by districts, Britain and the United States had successfully dispersed the identity of the German public for the state and nationality while the state's mobilization capacity and the propaganda effect were absolutely limited. "the sovereign power within Germany was respectively implemented by the commander in chief of the occupation troops of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and France within their occupied territories according to the instructions of their home governments in addition to jointly handle the matters about the entire Germany as 'member of the control committee'."¹⁰¹

Besides the political occupation, the economic occupation had played a more important role in forming Germany's national psychology. Germany's economy before the World War II was attached to war while the material connection of the public and state were also based on the economic belt of war. After the war, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and France reformed Germany's economy according to their own experience and terminated the soil on which the militarism depended.¹⁰² After the World War II, the Anti-fascist Alliance eliminated the social foundation for the

¹⁰⁰ L. Fang, B. Wang and J. Liu, *History of International Relations: Modern Volume*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001, P.513.

¹⁰¹ Shanghai People's Press, *Meeting Minutes of Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1974.

¹⁰² William W. Hagen, "The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German Reich and the Federal Republic by Hans-Joachim Braun", *German Studies Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 431-433.

restoration of Germany's militarism basically in the way of state-building; by means of being supervised by different countries, the German people had lived under the different administrative systems and economic structures, the sense of national identity started changing and the national psychology was reformed therefrom.

After the occupation ended, the spirit of occupying by districts was also implemented in Germany's regime design, namely Germany's federal system. In comparison with the United States or Canada, there was no necessity for Germany to implement the federal system, while its establishment "is more about that it could bring the principles dispersing and limiting the political powers into effect by means of regional right of assignment or internal administrative control".¹⁰³ And also in Germany's constitutional Grundgesetz, say the Basic Law, it designed exquisitely about the power distribution among *Bundesrat* (representing states/land and composed of Land ministers) and *Bundestag* (representing people and directly elected), along with a powerful constitutional court implementing the power of juridical review. The effectiveness of such measure has been proved by history. Germany presents no trend of a comeback for the militarist force or case dominating any war until now.¹⁰⁴ Therefore it is inferred in this thesis that there was a chance to prevent the World War II if Britain and the United States had taken the measures to reform Germany's national psychology similar to the Potsdam Conference after the World War I.

However considering the facticity of the counterfactual interference, in the course from hypothesized independent variable to expected dependent variable, the function caused by the mediating variables cannot be ignored. The limitation effects on Germany after the World War II were greatly reflected as the result of the bipolar structure of the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S.-Soviet confrontation and cold war placed Germany's national psychology of expansionism at the subordinate status of the U.S.-

¹⁰³ J. Zhang, *Why is it Germany?*, (《为什么偏偏是德国》), Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1995, P.60.

¹⁰⁴ Abigail Green, "The Federal Alternative? A New View of Modern German History", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 2003), pp. 187-202; Wolfgang Renzsch, "German Federalism in Historical Perspective: Federalism as a Substitute for a National State", *Publius*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in West Germany: A Fortieth Year Appraisal (Autumn, 1989), pp. 17-33.

Soviet contradiction; after World War II, the absolute weakness of Britain and France made Germany the forefront of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and the “broken zone” in geopolitics while the expansionism in Germany’s national psychology was rapidly replaced by the vision of reunifying the state. However, such conditions were not sufficient after the World War I. Britain and France still had the capability to reject the longing for hegemony of the United States in Europe, while the Soviet Union was not strong enough to fight against the United States. Therefore although Britain and the United States had successfully taken measures to reform and disintegrate Germany’s national psychology while Germany might not provoke the war once again, the situation in Europe would still be eased up, contradictions between British and France would inevitably become the source of the second turbulence in Europe. However considering the balance of power traditions and pacifist thoughts reflecting the World War I dominated by Britain and the United States at that time, there was a very low chance that war might break out in Europe. Therefore, the counterfactual interference of reductionism was pretty persuasive and the explanation of the diplomatic failures of Britain and the United States towards Germany obtained through the reductionism was of strong explanatory power.

After conducting the counterfactual interference on the structuralism and reductionism, the reductionism has advantages of explanatory power in explaining the diplomatic failures of Britain and the United States towards Germany.

First of all, the reductionism has more advantages after comparing the logical rationality. The independent variable assumed by the reductionism in verifying the counterfactual interference of the explanatory power is simplex and emphasizes only “if the postwar policies reforming and disintegrating the Germany’s national psychology” in addition that the assumption content is specific and realizable, which has avoided the situation of several potential independent variables might appear during the logical process of interference. On the other hand, the analysis conclusion of the path of structuralism is composed of three parts while the explanatory power of each part along is insufficient; the counterfactual interference can achieve the optimal state when and only when the three parts are integrated and considered as the unified reason.

However, as there are three variables at the same time, both the proximity and facticity required by the interference cannot be guaranteed, therefore the explanatory power obtained by interference is to be discussed.

Secondly, the path of reductionism is superior to the path of structuralism after comparing the degrees of how the new dependent variables are presented. The conclusion obtained by the counterfactual interference conducted by the reductionism is definite that the dependent variables have perfectly changed. However there is logical paradox for the interference conducted through the path of structuralism; the new dependent variables are lack of practical significance of discussion and fail to be presented during the reasoning process as a result of the defects of the variables. The related contradiction between “the elastic system construction is to limit Germany” and “the original intention of system constriction is to support and accept Germany” has made the assumed result “Germany would never resort to war” become insignificant to discuss. The reason for this paradox is the reverse assumption for the independent variables is conflicting with other realist conditions, while this contraction is originated from the self-conflict of the realist system design but not the logic errors in the counterfactual interference.

Thirdly, the reductionism is better in terms of the logic capacity of resisting disturbance after comparing the counterfactual interference. Although the conclusions obtained by the counterfactual interference might be influenced by the disturbance variables, the disturbed result will not influence the facticity of the conclusions, which means, with or without the disturbance, the obtained conclusions are similar. For instance, in this thesis, there appears the disturbance variable “World Structure” in the counterfactual interference of reductionism, but the differences between “realistic multi-polar system” and “ideal bipolar system” will not influence the conclusion that “the reformation of Germany’s national psychology will bring forth peace in Europe”. On the other hand, the success of the counterfactual interference in structuralism rely greatly on the disturbance variable “economic crisis”, which means reductionism is of stronger logicity and more sufficient explanatory power in this analysis.

5.3 Reflection on the attributes of units: revising structuralism with reductionism

The reductionism believes that the reason for the diplomatic failures of Britain and the United States towards Germany is the ignorance of reforming Germany's national psychology. However the popular path of structuralism fails to perfectly explain the causes. The reason why there are limitations for the explanatory power of structuralism is that the attribute of units have been ignored during the application of structuralism while it is not enough to take only the power distribution of units in the structure into consideration; therefore the applications of the structuralism shall be revised.¹⁰⁵

According to Waltz's three principles of Structuralism, in international relations, the ordering principle, attribute of units and distribution of power are the decisive factors of unit behaviors.¹⁰⁶ The anarchic state of the international society makes the ordering principle no affecting variable while all countries are the equal sovereign states. The attribute of units is the factor on the secondary level, although it will influence the state act, under the power of structure, the socialization of units and the competitions in between them enable all countries to act consciously under the structural arrangement: "once the momentum of the system limits the freedom of units, the behaviors of units and the results of behaviors are predicable."¹⁰⁷ As a series of constraint conditions, structure has limited the influences of the attribute of units in the international interaction by means of reward and punishment so that the attribute of units composes no attracting factor. After excluding the first two factors, only the distribution of power can be the variable influencing the structure while the changes in power will bring forth the changes in structure. So, why could Germany be able to conduct the changes in strength under the Versailles System that went against it? Why did this change go

¹⁰⁵ It needs to be explained that the amendments of structuralism are based on the structural realism theories of Kenneth Waltz while the discussions about the theoretical amendments in this thesis are not limited to the balance of power theory. In this thesis, the theory of balance of power is discussed as a concrete foreign policy or the state of power distribution in structure. Hence here balance of power shall be interpreted as a connotative application of structural realism paradigm, and the revision of structural realism would definitely affect the practical application of balance of power theory.

¹⁰⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *International Political Theory*, translated by X. Qiang and C. Su, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2003, PP.106-134..

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, P.96.

completely out of line with the structural requirements not at all suitable for Germany?
 And also why did other countries fail to limit it by means of structural socialization?

According to this thesis, the problem lies in the assumption for the second principle of Waltz's structuralism. The attribute of units is ignored on conditionally, when the attribute of units serve as the affecting variables, its impact on the structure remains considerable. In the appeasement cases of British and American toward Germany, the comparison of the legitimate structuralist analysis and the actual situation is as shown in the table below:

Table 2. Ideal and Actual Situations of Structuralist Path Analysis

	Structure	Power Distribution	Balance of Power
Ideal Situation	Sufficient intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics	Orderly	Balance
	Balance of power expectation in Europe and interference by United States	Balanced power distribution among Britain, Germany and France	
Actual Situation	Insufficient intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics	Disorderly	Imbalance
	Hegemonic competition in Europe and Isolationism in United States	Excessive power of Germany	

In reality, the limitations of structure on the attribute of units fail to develop as the ideal situation; confined to the dynamic problems of the structure, the limitation effects of the structure also known as the socialization process fail to work on the units. This is because of the competitive relation between the socialization process of structure and the attribute of units in which the structure is not always having the upper hand.




Figure.2 Relationship of unit attributes and structure

This competitive relation is divided into two cases, which can be presented with Situation A and Situation B as in the following table:

Table 3. Competitive relationship between structure and unit

	Socialization behavior	Attribute behavior	Competition result	Dominant power in structure	performance characteristics
Situation A	Strong	Weak	Socialization behavior in dominance	Structure	Structure decides units; the attribute of units can be ignored
Situation B	Weak	Strong	Attribute behavior in dominance	Unit	Structure cannot decides units; the attribute of units cannot be ignored

Notes:

1. **Socialization behavior:** during the socialization process, the structure shall limit and direct the behavior of the units by means of the reward and punishment mechanism for the target of regulating the behaviors of units within the structural restricts and to embody the structural requirements.

2. **Attribute behavior:** the behavior of making rational choice according to its own attributes, this behavior is not limited by the structure while the target of its functions is to fight against the regulating rule of the structure to realize the unit characteristics.

In conclusion, prerequisite for the valid second principle of Waltzian structuralist assumption is that the effect of the socialization behaviors must be stronger than that of the attribute behaviors; otherwise the structure is not able to determine the attributes of

units that cannot be ignored in the structural analysis. As the attribute effects are of deeper significance, such effects could influence the pattern of behaviors; however the effects influencing the behaviors are not equipped with the effects influencing the attributes for instance the structural factors.¹⁰⁸ The attribute behaviors reflected in units could make the rational choice without considering the structure according to its own interest and characteristics, for instance, Germany had ignored or disregarded the limitation structure of the Versailles System on itself after the World War I according to its militarism and national psychology to engage in rearming to provoke another war. Such attribute behavior is undoubtedly the impact on the structural integrity, if the structure wants to continue its limitation on the units, it has to enhance its socialization behavior ability during the competition with units or to become the dominant power in the interactive system.

The structural socialization ability is originated from the pressured imposed by the structure on the units and the fault-tolerant ability of the structure. The structure is capable of imposing pressure on the units by means of rewarding and punishing the unit behaviors to realize the socialization ability. When Germany was breaking into Austria and Sudetenland occupying the Rhineland by force, the Locarno system didn't made any positive react accordingly, while the appeasement policies of Britain and the United States had acquiesced in Germany's behaviors. Germany had taken this tacit permission a reward to its own behaviors (at least not punishment). Britain and the United States gave up using the structure to implement the socialization ability on Germany while the pressure of structure on units got lost and the structural socialization ability was greatly weakened.

The fault-tolerant ability of the structure is also known as the structure elasticity referring to the ability to accommodate the impact from unit behaviors on structure when the structure is losing its dominance ability to the unit behaviors. Once the structure has eased up the impact on structure, the unit behaviors will lose the ability to change the structure and the structure will be conditioned to re-socialize the units. The

¹⁰⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Translated in Chinese version by Y. Qin, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2000, P.31.

evaluation of the structural elasticity ability is quite complicated, and the structural elasticity is generated from the complex unit relations in the structure while the units shall effectively reduce the hazards of a certain unit behavior by means of the relational network knitted in a diplomatic way. For example, from the reunification of Germany in the year 1871 to the breakout of the World War I in the year 1914, powers were distributed extremely imbalanced in Europe with Germany and Britain becoming the source of war in Europe. However, there were a series of “continental alliance systems” such as *Triple alliance*, *Three Emperors League*, *Austro - German Alliance*, *Reinsurance Treaty* and *Mediterranean Agreements* including countries like Britain, Germany, Austria and Russia; Germany’s expansion was buffered with the balance of power structure, and the Vienna System was not impacted either.¹⁰⁹ However after the World War I, the abortion of Stresa Front and Oriental Pact one after another left the Locarno system no condition to buffer while the structural relations were rigid and the system was pretty fractious. In the competition between structure and unit, structure had lost the dominant position completely and attribute of units became the decisive factor.

Therefore, when making use of the path of Structuralism to analyze problems, Waltz should refer to part of the reductionist thinking. The second principle of the structuralist assumption should be revised as **the attribute of units can be ignored when and only when the structural socialization ability is higher than the unit attribute ability, which means when the structure has the pressure and elasticity to the absolute advantages of the unit.**

Take the development process of the U.S-Soviet-dominated international relation in Europe as an example, the applicability of this revision would be proved. After the World War II, the bipolar structure dominated by United States and Soviet Union was established, Europe in the American camp achieved compromise and by now there are few military conflicts among the countries in the EU countries.¹¹⁰ Investigating in terms

¹⁰⁹ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Bismarck's Imperialism 1862-1890”, *Past & Present*, No. 48 (Aug., 1970), pp. 119-155;

¹¹⁰ The expression “Europe in American camp” is for distinguishing the European countries under Soviet control in Cold War. Due to that traditional major European countries are located in western

of the system, the reason for the peace in Europe after the World War II lie in the external dynamics of the bipolar structure to maintain the European balance of power as well as the balanced development of all European countries and the internal desire to seek alliance and self-improvement. However, according to the experience from the appeasement failures of Britain and the United States towards Germany, the system balance of power is not the origin of European peace, for any pure system design ignoring the attribute of units cannot guarantee the realization of peace. On condition of the rational structural design, how to reduce the impact of attribute of units on the structure has become a key point for the postwar peace in Europe.

After the end of the World War II, the British Prime Minister Churchill once proposed to establish the “United States of Europe”; the European coal & steel community established in the year 1952 had opened up the integration process of Europe. Afterwards, the establishment of European Atomic Energy Community and European investment bank laid foundation for the European Community. The EU was established upon the Maastricht Treaty coming into effect in the year 1993. During the Europe becoming continuously uniformed, the national identities of people in countries all over Europe also changed. The Schengen Agreement coming into effect in the year 1993 had canceled the level limitations among the EU countries for good with the boundaries becoming symbolic only. The formation of the European common market had made Europe more coordinate in the economic activities and more unanimous outwardly. The previous loyalty to the country and identity to the nationality were gradually replaced by the identity to Europe; under the background of the continuously homogeneous national psychologies of the European countries, the unique characteristics of each country as the unit had been weakened while the national identity and state identity giving place to the European identity and the disturbance of the attribute of units on the socialization effect was minimized.¹¹¹ In the policy making

European, the European peace mentioned below are mainly among developed western European countries.

¹¹¹ For more references about European identity, see Tzvetan Todorov and Nathan Bracher, “European Identity”, *South Central Review*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Intellectuals, Nationalisms, and European Identity (Fall, 2008), pp. 3-15; Percy B. Lehning, “European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity?”, *Law and Philosophy*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Union Citizenship (May, 2001), pp. 239-282; Hans-Georg Betz,

after the World War II, all countries not only constructed the system to maintain the European peace on the structural level and even took the effect of the attribute of units into consideration to limit it by means of system design to replace the national identity with the European identity. This had reduced the impact of the attribute of units on the structural effects and finally realized the system transformation from conflict to the lasting peace.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I analyzed the reason why the appeasement policy of Britain and United States during 1919-1938 failed to achieve the expected balance of power effects based on the two different paths of structuralism and reductionism while reasoning and comparing the explanatory powers of the two analysis paths, the result of which turns out to be that reductionism is of superior explanatory power in analyzing the foreign policies of a state.

In response to Hypothesis 1, in chapter 3, my proposition is that under the path of structuralism, when we seek to purchase a successful diplomacy of the balance of power, factors as dynamics and elasticity of the system should not be ruled out from consideration. When we adopt the Waltzian approach of structuralist analysis to case study, what we usually put weight on is the distribution of power among units. As we can see from the case of appeasement, both the design and implementation of the balancing system were based on the thought of how to manipulate the power reallocating and hence to realize a balanced power structure. The factors that policy maker at that time valued most were the military equilibrium between each single state, rather the structural design to regulate the changing process. Therefore, it is the lacking of the consideration of systemic level factors that led to the peace arrangement failed

“Mitteleuropa and Post-Modern European Identity”, *New German Critique*, No. 50 (Spring - Summer, 1990), pp. 173-192; for more references in discussing national identity, ethnic identity and European identity, see Richard J. Golsan, “Introduction: Intellectuals, Nationalisms, and European Identity”, *South Central Review*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Intellectuals, Nationalisms, and European Identity (Fall, 2008), pp. 1-2.

and proved appeasement a false diplomacy in terms of the balance of power. However, by virtue of the counterfactual interference, we have found that the balance of power can be carried out successfully to some extent if we take systemic factors into serious consideration. In this dissertation, I proposed the dynamics and elasticity of the system as sticking points.

When we attempt to successfully implement the diplomacy of balance of power, in order to maintain and invigorate the consensus of the balancing peace arrangement, both intrinsic dynamics and extrinsic dynamics should be in place. And the intrinsic dynamics derive from the constructed common knowledge inside the system. It could be guaranteed by multiple international interactions, codified agreements or memorandum of understandings, and embedded acknowledgement of anti-hegemony consensus. On the contrary, extrinsic dynamics demand the interference from outside system which will grant certain pressure on an envisaged peace arrangement. Though an external pushing hand is not always required, an imposing power indeed will help the power balancing process undergo within the track. As for the elasticity of system, playing as a fuse wire, the fault-tolerance ability is crucial to the survival of a frail system. If we try to pursue a true diplomacy of balance of power, what nonetheless shall count is that how the diplomatic design can, and to what extent, correct the deviation in case of the disorganized and unexpected power distribution disturbing the peace progress.

In response to Hypothesis 2, in chapter 4 I concluded that under the path of reductionism, the specific socioculture and national psychology of a state are cruxes as for a successful diplomacy of balance of power. What structuralism approach highly contested are the influential factors subject to secondary analytical framework. However, in this dissertation I proposed that a reductionist paradigm can also well explain the causality of a structuralized puzzle. Returning to the case of appeasement, the failure of the balance of power resulted from the neglecting of the variables in societal level. That is to say, the true diplomacy of balance of power is owing to specific societal conditions.

The first is that the particularity of socioculture of a state should be investigated,

which means the state is no more a black box but with its specific domestic attributes. These secondary attributes will largely give an account to the potential attitudes towards a certain diplomacy. The socioculture embodies how the philosophical traditions and various degree of nationalism will apply to domestic institutions, such as economic structure, administrative system and diplomatic strategy. And all of these will affect the national behaviors when, in the stated puzzle, responding to or initiating a diplomacy of balance of power. More than that, what is compounded with socioculture is the national psychology, the second reductionist factor for a true diplomatic consideration. Rooted in particular socioculture, national psychology should be regarded as one indicator of whether an ongoing diplomacy will come to the end as it depicted. To put it into another way, in the instant puzzle, if the diplomacy of balance of power fulfils the national psychological needs, or at least not jeopardize them, the diplomacy will be welcomed and achieved, otherwise it will doom to fail. At this point, national interests are not the unaltered criteria anymore to assess if a diplomacy will be accepted or gain legitimacy in domestic. Some reductionist variables also deserve to be included for a successful diplomacy.

In response to Hypothesis 3, the path of structuralism is of huge flaws for the traditional path of structuralism focuses only on factors on the structural level and ignores the influences of attribute of units in the system. Integrating the respect advantages of explanatory powers of structuralism and reductionism, this dissertation spares no effort to introduce the concept of attributes of units into the analysis paradigm of structuralism to revise it. And besides the theoretical ambition, the revised approach will as well as provide with a better explanation that under what conditions the diplomacy of balance of power shall function better. The revised structuralism will take the structural factors and unit attributes factors into comprehensive consideration in analyzing problems at the same time; and also the revised structuralism will emphasize the system dynamics and elasticity, and investigated the impact of changes in unit attribute in the system, so as to prevent the deficiency of structuralism caused by the excessive simplification. That is to say, for the sake of a better implication of balance of power, both structuralist and reductionist variables are of distinctive importance, and

by integrating the reductionism variable “attributes of units” into structuralism approach, can we expect a preferable framework to realize better diplomacy of balance of power.

Of course, in this dissertation, the analysis will definitely produce the issue of shrunken extension at the same time of expanding the theoretical connotation, and this will inevitably result in the theoretical faults in universality while trying to revise the traditional theories by selecting the single historical case. Apart from the theoretical immature, this dissertation dedicates to disentangle the puzzle of a concrete diplomatic issue, which may nonetheless give inspirations to future foreign policy analysis. As the North Korea nuclear issue and Ukrainian crisis are still heated, could there be any new shapes of balance of power as their final solution? Stepping into a big picture, with the Brexit and a more isolated United States, are we now entering into a new age of balance of power astride the English Channel? Furthermore, I believe the most potential balancing peace arrangement might emerge between China and United States in the decade, and there must be of great needs for us to revise the contemporary global system with due regard to systematic dynamics and elasticity; meanwhile we are also required to investigate urgently what kind of socioculture and national psychology are veiled behind the name “China”, especially when these still remain ambiguous to many now.

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Appendix

THE LOCARNO TREATIES

(The documents agreed to at Locarno may be divided into three categories: (1) the final protocol; (2) the six annexes, namely, the security pact between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy; the arbitration convention between Germany and Belgium, between Germany and France, between Germany and Poland, between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the Allied note to Germany in regard to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations ; (3) the two French treaties, one with Poland and the other with Czechoslovakia. The text of the final protocol of the Locarno Conference, which was signed by the delegates on October 16, follows. The text of the treaty of mutual guarantee (now familiarly known as the Security Pact), together with the note addressed to Germany in regard to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, appeared in the last number of this magazine. Following the protocol, we publish here the arbitration treaty between Germany and Belgium, the treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the treaty between France and Poland. Thus all of the essential facts of the Locarno treaties are available to the readers of this magazine.)

The Final Protocol

The following is the text of the Final Protocol:

The representatives of the German, Belgian, British, French, Italian, Polish, and Czechoslovak governments, who have met at Locarno from October 5 to 16, 1925, in order to seek by common agreement means for preserving their respective nations from the scourge of war and for providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might eventually arise between them, have given their approval to the draft treaties and conventions which respectively affect them and which, framed in the course of the present conference, are mutually interdependent:

Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy (Annex A).
Arbitration convention between Germany and Belgium (Annex B).

Arbitration convention between Germany and France (Annex C). Arbitration treaty

between Germany and Poland (Annex D).

Arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia (Annex E).

These instruments, hereby initialed "nevarietur," will bear today's date, the representatives of the interested parties agreeing to meet in London on December 1 next, to proceed during the course of a single meeting to the formality of the signature of the instruments which affect them.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France states that as a result of the draft arbitration treaties mentioned above, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have also concluded at Locarno draft agreements in order reciprocally to assure to themselves the benefit of the said treaties. These agreements will be duly deposited at the League of Nations, but M. Briand holds copies forthwith at the disposal of the powers represented here.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain proposes that, in reply to certain requests for explanations concerning Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations presented by the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, a letter, of which the draft is similarly attached (Annex F), should be addressed to them at the same time as the formality of signature of the above-mentioned instruments takes place. This proposal is agreed to.

The representatives of the governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that in strengthening peace and security in Europe it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

They undertake to give their sincere cooperation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realization thereof in a general agreement.

Done at Locarno, October 16, 1925.

(Signed)

LUTHER. STRESEMANN.

EMILE VANDERVELDE.

ARISTIE BRIAND.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

BENITO MUSSOLINI.

AL. SKRZYNSKI.

EDUARD BENES.

German-Belgian Treaty

(The following is the text of the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium :)

The undersigned, duly authorized, charged by their respective governments to determine the methods by which, as provided in Article 3 of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, a peaceful solution shall be attained of all questions which cannot be settled amicably between Germany and France, have agreed as follows:

PART I

Article 1. All disputes of every kind between Germany and Belgium with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present convention and belonging to the past.

Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between Germany and Belgium shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those conventions.

Article 2. Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure or to procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the parties, be submitted with a view to amicable settlement to a permanent international

commission styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present convention.

Article 3. In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according to the municipal law of one of the parties, falls within the competence of the national courts of such party, the matter in dispute shall not be submitted to the procedure laid down in the present convention until a judgment with final effect has been pronounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent national judicial authority.

Article 4. The Permanent Conciliation Commission mentioned in Article 2 shall be composed of five members, who shall be appointed as follows, that is to say: the German Government and the Belgian Government shall each nominate a commissioner chosen from among their respective nationals and shall appoint, by common agreement, the three other commissioners from among the nationals of their powers: these three commissioners must be of different nationalities and the German and Belgian governments shall appoint the president of the commission from among them.

The commissioners are appointed for three years, and their mandate is renewable. Their appointment shall continue until their replacement, and in any case until the termination of the work in hand at the moment of the expiry of their mandate. Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation, or any other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the manner fixed for the nominations.

Article 5. The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be constituted within three months from the entry into force of the present convention. If the nomination of the commissioners to be appointed by common agreement should not have taken place within the said period, or, in the case of the filling of a vacancy, within three months from the time when the seat falls vacant, the President of the Swiss Confederation shall, in the absence of other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointments.

Article 6. The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be informed by means of a request addressed to the President by the two parties acting in agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, by one or other of the parties. The request, after having given a summary account of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the Commission to take all necessary measures with a view to arrive at an amicable

settlement. If the request emanates from only one of the parties, notification thereof shall be made without delay to the other party.

Article 7. Within 15 days from the date when the German Government or the Belgian Government shall have brought a dispute before the Permanent Conciliation Commission, either party may, for the examination of the particular dispute, replace its commissioner by a person possessing special competence in the matter. The party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other party; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within 15 days from the date when the notification reaches it.

Article 8. The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of inquiry or otherwise, and to endeavor to bring the parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it and lay down a period within which they are to make their decision. At the close of its labors the Commission shall draw up a report stating, as the case may be, either that the parties have come to an agreement and, if need arises, terms of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement. The labors of the Commission must, unless the parties otherwise agree, be terminated within six months from the day on which the committee shall have been notified of the dispute.

Article 9. Failing any special provision to the contrary, the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall lay down its own procedure, which in any case must provide for both parties being heard. In regard to inquiries the Commission, unless it decides unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance with the provisions of chapter 3 (International Commissions of Inquiry) of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Article 10. The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall meet, in the absence of agreement by the parties to the contrary, at a place selected by its president.

Article 11. The labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission are not public except when a decision to that effect has been taken by the Commission with the consent of the parties.

Article 12. The parties shall be represented before the Permanent Conciliation Commission by agents, whose duty it shall be to act as intermediary between them and the Commission; they may, moreover, be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for that purpose, and request that all persons whose evidence appears to them useful should be heard. The Commission on its side shall be entitled to request oral explanations from the agents, counsel, and experts of the two parties, as well as from all persons it may think useful to summon with the consent of their government.

Article 13. Unless otherwise provided in the present convention, the decisions of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be taken by a majority. Article 14.

The German and Belgian governments undertake to facilitate the labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission, and particularly to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their territory and in accordance with their law to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or experts and to visit the localities in question.

Article 15. During the labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission each commissioner shall receive salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the German and Belgian governments, each of which shall contribute an equal share.

Article 16. In the event of no amicable agreement being reached before the Permanent Conciliation Commission, the dispute shall be submitted by means of a special agreement either to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by its statute or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes. If the parties cannot agree on the terms of the special agreement after a month's notice, one or other of them may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application.

PART II

Article 17.

All questions on which the German and Belgian governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision, as provided in Article 1 of the present convention, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conventions in force between the parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty it shall be to propose to the parties an acceptable solution and in any case to present a report.

The procedure laid down in Articles 6-15 of the present convention shall be applicable.

Article 18. If the two parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

General Provisions

Article 19. In any case, and particularly if the question on which the parties differ arises out of acts already committed or on the point of commission, the Conciliation Commission, or, if the latter has not been notified thereof, the arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its statute, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. It shall similarly be the duty of the Council of the League of Nations, if the question is brought before it, to insure that suitable provisional measures are taken. The German and Belgian governments undertake respectively to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial to the execution of the decision or to the arrangements proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and in general to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute.

Article 20. The present convention continues applicable as between Germany and Belgium, even when other powers are also interested in the dispute.

Article 21. The present convention shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited

at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratifications of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy. It shall enter into and remain in force under the same conditions as the said treaty.

The present convention, done in a single copy, shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, the Secretary General of which shall be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the two contracting Governments.

Locarno, October 16, 1925.

Germany and France

The Arbitration Convention between Germany and France (Annex C of the Final Protocol) is identical, mutatis mutandis, with the arbitration between Germany and Belgium.

German-Czech Treaty

(Following is the text of the treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia :)

The President of the German Empire and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries, declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals, agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent, and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving without recourse to force questions which may become the cause of division between States, have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect and have named as their plenipotentiaries the following [the plenipotentiaries are named here], who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, are agreed upon the following articles :

PART I

ARTICLE I. All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may

not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article XIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past. Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between the high contracting parties shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those conventions.

ARTICLE II. Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure or to procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present treaty.

ARTICLE III. In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according to the municipal law of one of the parties, falls within the competence of the national courts of such party, the matter in dispute shall not be submitted to the procedure laid down in the present treaty until a judgment with final effect has been pronounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent national judicial authority.

ARTICLE IV. The Permanent Conciliation Commission mentioned in Article II shall be composed of five members, who shall be appointed as follows, that is to say : The high contracting parties shall each nominate a commissioner chosen from among their respective nationals and shall appoint, by common agreement, the three other commissioners from among the nationals of third powers ; those three commissioners must be of different nationalities, and the high contracting parties shall appoint the president of the commission from among them. The commissioners are appointed for three years and their mandate is renewable. Their appointment shall continue until their replacement, and in any case until the termination of the work in hand at the moment of the expiry of their mandate. Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation, or any other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the

manner fixed for the nominations.

ARTICLE V. The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be constituted within three months from the entry into force of the present conventions. If the nomination of the Commissioners to be appointed by common agreement should not have taken place within the said period, or, in the case of the filling of a vacancy, within three months from the time when the seat falls vacant, the President of the Swiss Confederation shall, in the absence of other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointments.

ARTICLE VI. The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be informed by means of a request addressed to the president by the two parties acting in agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, by one or other of the parties. The request, after having given a summary account of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the commission to take all necessary measures with a view to arrive at an amicable settlement. If the request emanates from only one of the parties, notification thereof shall be made without delay to the other party.

ARTICLE VII. Within fifteen days from the date when one of the high contracting parties shall have brought a dispute before the Permanent Conciliation Commission either party may, for the examination of the particular dispute, replace its commissioner by a person possessing special competence in the matter. The party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other party; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within fifteen days from the date when the notification reaches it.

ARTICLE VIII. The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of inquiry or otherwise, and to endeavor to bring the parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it and lay down a period within which they are to make their decision. At the close of its labors the commission shall draw up a report stating, as the case may be, either that the parties have come to an agreement, and, if need arises, terms of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement. The labors of the commission must, unless the parties otherwise agree, be terminated within six months from the day on which the committee shall have been notified of the dispute.

ARTICLE IX. Failing any special provision to the contrary, the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall lay down its own procedure, which in any case must provide for both parties being heard. In regard to inquiries, the commission, unless it decides unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance with the provisions of chapter 3 (International Commissions of Inquiry) of The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes.

ARTICLE X. The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall meet, in the absence of agreement, by the parties to the contrary, at a place selected by its President.

ARTICLE XI. The labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission are not public except when a decision to that effect has been taken by the commission with the consent of the parties.

ARTICLE XII. The parties shall be represented before the Permanent Conciliation Commission by agents, whose duty it shall be to act as intermediary between them and the commission. They may, moreover, be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for that purpose, and request that all persons whose evidence appears to them useful should be heard. The commission on its side shall be entitled to request oral explanations from their agents, counsel and experts of the two parties, as well as from all persons it may think useful to summon with the consent of their government.

ARTICLE XIII. Unless otherwise provided in the present treaty, the decisions of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be taken by a majority.

ARTICLE XIV. The high contracting parties undertake to facilitate the labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission, and particularly to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their territory and in accordance with their law, to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or experts, and to visit the localities in question.

ARTICLE XV. During the labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission each commissioner shall receive salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the high contracting parties, each of which shall contribute an equal share.

ARTICLE XVI. In the event of no amicable agreement being reached before the

Permanent Conciliation Commission, the dispute shall be submitted, by means of a special agreement, either to the Permanent Court of International Justice, under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by its statute, or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, for the pacific settlement of international disputes. If the parties cannot agree on the terms of the special agreement after a month's notice, one or other of them may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application.

PART II

ARTICLE XVII. All questions on which the German and Czechoslovak governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy, the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision as provided in Article I of the present treaty, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conventions in force between the parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty it shall be to propose to the parties an acceptable solution, and in any case to present a report. The procedure laid down in Articles VI-XV of the present treaty shall be applicable.

ARTICLE XVIII. If the two parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labors of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with Article XV of the covenant of the League.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XIX. In any case, and particularly if the question on which the parties differ arises out of acts already committed, or on the point of commission, the Conciliation Commission, or, if the latter has not been notified thereof, the arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in accordance with Article XLI of its statute, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. It shall similarly be the duty of the Council of the

League of Nations, if the question is brought before it, to ensure that suitable provisional measures are taken. The high contracting parties undertake respectively to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial to the execution of the decision or to the arrangements proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and in general to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute.

ARTICLE XX. The present treaty continues applicable as between the high contracting parties even when other powers are also interested in the dispute.

ARTICLE XXI. The present treaty, which is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not in any way affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties as members of the League of Nations, and shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

ARTICLE XXII. The present treaty shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratifications of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy. It shall enter into and remain in force under the same conditions as the said treaty. The present treaty, done in a single copy, shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, the Secretary General of which shall be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the high contracting parties.

LOCARNO, October 16, 1925.

(The text of the arbitration convention between Germany and Poland is identical with the above. The conventions between Germany and - France and between Germany and Belgium omit Article XXI.)

French Treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia

The text of the treaty between France and Poland follows:

The President of the French Republic and the President of the Republic of Poland, equally desirous to see Europe spared from war by a sincere observance of the undertakings arrived at this day with a view to the maintenance of general peace, have

resolved to guarantee their benefits to each other reciprocally by a treaty concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the treaties existing between them, and have to this effect nominated for their plenipotentiaries . . . who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article I. In the event of Poland or France suffering from a failure to observe the undertakings arrived at this day between them and Germany with a view to the maintenance of general peace, France, and reciprocally Poland, acting in application of Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, undertake to lend each other immediately aid and assistance, if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms.

In the event of the Council of the League of Nations, when dealing with a question brought before it in accordance with the said undertakings, being unable to succeed in making its report accepted by all its members other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, and in the event of Poland or France being attacked without provocation, France, or reciprocally Poland, acting in application of Article XV, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, will immediately lend aid and assistance.

Article II. Nothing in the present treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of the high contracting parties as members of the League of Nations, or shall be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article III. The present treaty shall be registered with the League of Nations, in accordance with the Covenant.

Article IV. The present treaty shall be ratified. The ratifications will be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratification of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, and the ratification of the treaty concluded at the same time between Germany and Poland.

It will enter into force and remain in force under the same conditions as the said treaties.

The present treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary General of the League will be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the high contracting parties.

Done at Locarno the 16th October, 1925.

(The treaty between France and Czechoslovakia is identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the treaty between France and Poland.

Summary

1. Research background

In the field of international relations, the theory of balance of power has always been an important tool to analyze concrete case and give explanations in global affairs. Especially in the school of realism, balance of power enjoys prominent statue for long due to its simple and neat logic chain, as well as its strong explanatory power. Before the modern international relations theory was introduced, balance of power has already been mentioned in many other disciplines, such as histology. The earliest record in western history about the using of balance of power can be traced back to Thucydides' History of Peloponnesian War. The balance of power, both as a descriptive power structure and a diplomatic strategy, was discussed and praised by Thucydides. Also in the East, the theory of balance of power are abundant in history records. Dating back to 2 BC, the famous Chinese national style history recordation Zhan Guo Ce, translated as Intrigues of the Warring States, clearly cited the applications of balance of power amongst small states to survive. Though as a centuried diplomacy, cases about balance of power never shriveled. From ancient Greek city states to duchies of Holy Roman Empire, from Bismarck's continental alliances to the confronted blocs in Cold War, balance of power from time to time occupied the center stage of international arena. And this makes the balance of power an inexhaustible resources to unveil the truth, if any, of international relations.

There have been innumerable researches on the topic of balance of power, some are concerning about the pure theoretical evaluation, some focus on the fluctuation of the applications of this specific diplomacy, and some put the balance of power under the context of realism spectrum to assess its universality. With so many previous research achievements and theory findings, this dissertation will particularly focus on a tiny spot of the history of international relations between two world wars. Taking the history of appeasement during 1919-1938 as the background, look closely at the elaborative attempts that European countries sought to maintain the balanced power structure

shaped in Paris Peace Conference after World War I. Hence, what is the historical background in that period?

In June 28th 1919, the signing of Versailles Treaty marks the formation of a new European system. As the core of the “Versailles-Washington System”, the essence of the peace treaty reflected the consistent demands for the balance of power among postwar European countries. The powers were trying to make the system run by a series of diplomatic adjustments, interest compromises and even intriguing local conflicts, henceforth devoted to form a balanced and flexible system. Although the reconstruction of the balance of power was bound to hurt some actors with vested interests, Europe enjoyed a long history of pursuing balance of power as guiding diplomacy.

Since Metternich established the principle of balance of power and territorial compensation in Vienna Conference in 1815, seeking the balance of power has always been the important rule in European foreign policy practices. Due to the great changes of balance of power after World War I and together with that Versailles peace treaty failed to achieve its balancing goal, there rose a great deal of diplomatic actions aiming to reshape the balance of power after the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Amongst those endeavors, the Locarno conference held in 1925 was of node significance: after this conference “the consensus of anti-Soviet Union in Europe” began to replace the “containment policy towards Germany” as European diplomatic consensus. From then on, the new consensus had become the criterion in dealing with postwar international relations. And afterwards, along with the gradual ease of containing Germany, appeasement was eventually introduced and fermented as the catalyst of World War II.

2. Research problem statement: A puzzle of balance of power

The history of the interwar period showed obviously that the pursuit of balance of power for peace with the method of appeasement had proved a total failure. As a highly contested diplomacy, appeasement, in a way, can be regarded as a special way to pursue a specific power structure. Either this is out of cowardly concession or sensible strategic compromise. Nevertheless, the debates about whether appeasement is a true diplomacy

seem not to end right away.

When scholars talk about appeasement, few of them would not knit their brows. In the modern context, appeasement has long been infamously and unjustly labeled as a futureless foreign policy. This is largely due to the deceptive Munich scheme and its war-leading consequences. However, in the practice, appeasement was adopted as an effective means of foreign policy in order to shape the balance of power before World War II, and even continued to militate after the war. Contrast to the detestable attitude among academia, there is no obvious moral prejudice in the decision-making level. The prevailing misunderstanding of appeasement requires a more objective evaluation, which should in a way exclude the overwhelming despite, but go with rational assessment by recalling the historic moment before the conspiracy of Munich incubated.

In a sense, the appeasement policy pursued by Britain and United States after World War I towards Germany is, by some means, the continuation of the historic principle in foreign policy acquiesced by major nations in Europe, namely the balance of power. In view that under the guidance of such principle, the Westphalia and Vienna peace conferences had sequentially and successfully realized peace after Thirty-year War and Napoleon's hegemonic war. Therefore the envisaged balancing system provided in Locarno conference at that time were of high expectations among European countries. However, not only did the construction of the wishful system fail to ensure the peace of Europe, but also unable to prevent Germany from embarking on a vicious expansion. Until up to the Germany's invasion of Poland, the efforts for peace under balance of power principle completely bankrupted, and consequently resulted in the outbreak of World War II.

Appeasement is far away from the essence of balance of power, but it is indeed a subtle lens to closely observe the feature of this diplomacy. Traditionally, the notion of balance of power means major powers in a certain international structure seek to achieve peace via terrible but solid balance of capability, especially the balance of military forces. We can recall the night before World War I, when Britain and Germany accelerated the military competition in navy, and Germany attempted to counterbalance British dominance on maritime power. Also it's not difficult for us to remember the

Cold War era, while United States and Soviet Union competitively increased their long range nuclear missiles for fear that any bloc would gain relative advantages henceforth broke the balance of terror. In any case, however, when talk about balance of power, we all agree that the ultimate goal for such diplomacy is to reach an equilibrium between or amongst states, which will automatically result in peace, regardless of how horrible it might be.

But our stereotype to balance of power remains strong. Since the diplomatic objective is to achieve peace under the arrangement of a balanced power structure, we took it for granted that only by gaining power would the balance of power be implemented appropriately. However, we have to admit that appeasement also fall into the claim of the goal of a balanced peace. Though the mechanism of how power shifts in the structure differs from what we presume, it is undeniable that by giving power to others can also lead to equilibrium, of course it will only function when the power offering state owns favorable power. In a way we can say appeasement aims at the same end the balance of power has long been pursuing, but only in a different, maybe opposite, approach. Just as what Joseph Nye argued “appeasement itself is not a bad thing, rather one traditional diplomacy”.

Moreover, before the appeasement diplomacy was stigmatized by Munich scheme, there are many cases that proved the effectiveness of offering power to realize peace. As mentioned previously the consensus made in Vienna Peace Conference, the attitude towards vanquished France was a good example to understand the relations between balance of power and appeasement. Also we can resort to the experience in the East, have a look at what happened in China during the bipolar system between Han Dynasty and the Huns. This also presents us with a different example to go deep into how balance of power could function. By all means, the balance of power can be implemented in many ways, at least we have to say military competition is not the only annotation. And appeasement in theory should be listed in our remarks, just as Paul Kennedy argued “appeasement is the policy of setting international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody and

possibly dangerous.”

Considered that what United States and Britain did to Germany during interwar period can be regarded as an attempt of power balancing, so unlike what happened after the conferences in Munster and Vienna, why was the new balancing arrangement unable to maintain the peace and even bolstered another crucial war? Was it the flawed design of the balancing system *per se* or the faults in the practical operation that should be to blame? To be more specific, was the appeasement policy, at bottom, motivating Germany to provoke the war? If that is the truth, to what extent should we put blame on appeasement? And essentially, what kind of perspective should we adopt to explain the false promise of appeasement in this time under the notion of balance of power?

With so many doubts to the failed diplomacy, here comes the puzzle that the balance of power does not always work as envisaged. The theoretical gap between normative descriptions and empirical cases is huge. We have to detangle the puzzle by focusing on the diplomacy of balance of power itself. Again, go back to the instant case of appeasement in 1919-1938, if appeasement is a false promise for peace and never a just approach to pursue the balance of power, so, what would be the right approach to implement the diplomacy of balance of power? To put it in other words, and also the research problem this dissertation would like to solve:

Under what conditions is the balance of power a true diplomacy?

Based on the background we discussed, the conditions for a true diplomacy can be various. Given the multiple approaches to implementing balance of power, some conditions might lie in a certain mechanism that power should be shifted accordingly. And also we may think beyond the power logic, and try to find some inspiring factors that are hidden behind the veil of power. Furthermore, we could just jump out of the field of IR, where there might be some helpful enlightenments that contribute to our work, such as sociology and histology.

Before we start to disentangle the puzzle, however, the very nature of the research problem requires a methodological concern. Naturally when we refer to power issues in IR theory, we cannot just concentrate on the power condition of a single state without making comparison. This is to say, a structural or systemic perspective should be

nonetheless adopted so we can understand the big picture well. Apart from this structuralism path, on the contrary, providing that we are going to talk about balance of power as a diplomacy, it is necessary to look down into the particularities. That is we also have to put our attention to the specific context in which balance of power is introduced. If such reductionism path is excluded, the understanding of the balance of power as a diplomacy would lose its social roots.

3. Research questions and hypotheses

As the key question is under what conditions is the balance of power a true diplomacy? To meet the research objectives, I will deal with the following research questions:

Question 1: Under the path of structuralism, what are the key factors that would result in a successful diplomacy of balance of power? (Chapter 3)

Question 2: Under the path of reductionism, what are the key factors that would contribute to a successful diplomacy of balance of power? (Chapter 4)

Question 3: Between structuralism and reductionism, which path has superior explanatory power in terms of a true diplomacy of the balance of power? And by what means can we expect a better diplomacy of the balance of power? (Chapter 5)

And to answer these questions, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Under the path of structuralism, factors as dynamics and elasticity of the system should be taken into consideration in order to successfully implement balance of power.

Hypothesis 2: Under the path of reductionism, the specific socioculture and national psychology of a state are key factors if policy makers expect a successful

diplomacy of balance of power.

Hypothesis 3: Between structuralism and reductionism, in terms of a true diplomacy of the balance of power, the factors given by reductionism has superior explanatory power. And by integrating the reductionism variable “attributes of units” into structuralism approach, can we expect a preferable framework to realize better diplomacy of balance of power.

In order to tackle these questions well, I will apply structuralism and reductionism separately to examine the case and then seek possible explanations. In the appeasement case, by reinterpreting history and analyzing the causality, I will come about two explanations to answer why appeasement failed. (Question 1 and Question 2) Since the two causes are deduced through two distinct paradigmatic paths, it is necessary to distinguish which argument could better explain the case, that is to say, which path enjoys favorable explanatory power in the instant case. And this is also the uttermost theoretical ambition of the dissertation, which tries to make comparison between structuralism and reductionism by practicing them on the same prototypical case. The comparison is expected to find a better framework to answer the research Question 3, thus anticipating a better diplomacy of balance of power.

In order to test those three hypotheses, I will examine the interwar history of appeasement during 1919-1938.

Why appeasement during 1919-1938?

I choose the appeasement during 1919-1938 as the case study for two reasons. First, the case of interwar appeasement is the most different case when we start over examining the conditions for an effective balance of power diplomacy. As we know, in the history of international relations, the implementation of balance of power seldom failed into major wars, let alone a global one. Therefore the case of interwar appeasement is very unique compared to other successful practices of power balancing. It is much more convenient for us to find underlying factors that could contribute to the research in a different case. Second, the appeasement case provided in this dissertation

is also a prototypical case. Here the case presents us with a prototypical failed application of balance of power, and moreover the case in 1919-1938 has been somehow acknowledged as the most notorious appeasement attempt in the history. To this extent, both the failure of power balancing and the proverbial appeasement in the period are of symbolic significances.

It should be noted that in the research, while analyzing the appeasement diplomacy during 1919-1938, I proposed Britain and United States as the main leading actors without considering France as equally important. The reason are twofold. On the one hand, during 1919-1929 before the economic crisis broke out, the French diplomatic goal was to develop the European continental hegemony out of its own favor. Thereby acting as an opposition to the peaceful balance system led by United States and Britain, France in this period contributed little to appeasement. On the other hand, after the economic crisis broke out in 1929, the domestic economic situation deteriorated in France together with severe political instability. This made France unable to seek Europe's leading position, and the enthusiasm of foreign policy has declined as well. Thus France's attitudes to constructing a balance system shifted, and not so long became an important follower to Britain. But even though France was still not capable to dominate the direction of the appeasement policy. Taking into account the behavior and influence of France in 1919-1938, I would argue it is appropriate to propose only Britain and United States as the subjects to analyze appeasement during interwar period. And also given that France indeed made an impact on the appeasement to Germany, the dissertation will also be accompanied by a discussion of France.

4. Methodology

This dissertation will mainly adopt two methodologies in order to uphold the case analysis. The first is *Process Tracing in case analysis*. Besides, in chapter 3, when analyzing the appeasement case, I will intensively focus on the overall process of Locarno system. In order to investigate its embryo, birth, anomie and death chronically, I will adopt Process Tracing to study the casualty effects. Also in chapter 4, I will

selectively go through German modern history, probe to examine the logic chain from history tradition to socioculture and then to national psychology and accordingly the national behaviors. This hermeneutics narrative is also proceeded by means of Process Tracing. Just as Bennett and Elman pointed out “if this explanation is accurate in this case, what else must be true about the processes through which the hypothesized causal mechanisms unfolded in this case.”

The second is *Counterfactual Interference*. In chapter 5, in order to compare the explanatory power of different theories on the same case, I will adopt counterfactual interference as the approach to compliment the case study. The counterfactual inference is to set the contrary-to-fact conditionals which we take them simply as the thought experiments exploring the causal relationship. In chapter 5 counterfactual interference will be used as the approach to verify the explanatory power of both explanations given by structuralism and reductionism paths and then argue the superiority and limitation.

5. Structure and main idea of each chapter

The research is composed of 5 chapters along with a conclusion chapter, and each chapter is divided into several subchapters. The chapter 1 is introduction part, clarifying the research background and research designs. The chapter 2 is literature reviews related to the dissertation, and it is divided into two parts. The literature review separately focus on structuralism, reductionism and appeasement foreign policy in 1919-1938.

The chapter 3 analyzes the history between two world wars under structuralism path, more specifically the Waltzian approach, which focuses on the balance of power diplomacy and its corresponding envisaged system from its embryo to death. The first part stresses the theoretical background of appeasement as a diplomacy and structuralism as a methodological analyzing path. Unlike the salient explanation that appeasement is a synonym of timidity and surrender, I will regard it as a method of diplomacy in realism spectrum. Moreover, I will analyze the rationalities as well as the deficiencies of the choice of appeasement in the context of historic events between two

world wars. The second part explains the motivation of appeasement and the birth of Locarno system, in which four important variables are argued. They are *the distribution of power among units, attributes of units, dynamics of structure and elasticity of structure*. The third and the fourth parts address the anomie and collapse of the Locarno system by focusing on the evaluation of the four variables mentioned above. In this chapter, I will give an explanation under the structuralism path, clarifying only when we take the dynamics and elasticity of a given power structure into consideration, shall we qualify the balance of balance of power a true diplomacy.

Table 1. The development history of Locarno system

	Construction	Anomie	Collapse
The distribution of power among units	Orderly	Disorderly	More disorderly
	Dawes Plan; Young Plan	Economic crisis; MacDonald Plan; Repudiation	Anglo-German Naval Agreement; Germany's National Defense Law
Attributes of units	Stable	Emerging unstable factors	Unstable
		Communism; Nazi regime emerging	The foundation of Soviet Union; The establishment of Nazi regime
Dynamics of structure	Sufficient	Receding	More receding
	Pacific atmosphere; Dollar diplomacy	Declining enthusiasm; Isolationism	US established diplomatic relation with Soviet Union; Neutrality Act
Elasticity of structure	Sufficient	Receding	More receding
	Kellogg-Briand pact	The failure of Eastern Pact	Anglo-German Declaration; Anglo-French Declaration; Molotov– Ribbentrop Pact

The chapter 4 provides a sociocultural narration of German history probing the cultural and societal origin of German militarism behaviors before World War II. The first part explains the selection of reductionism and its theoretical background, stating the validity of this approach and how it is going to be introduced in following analysis.

The second part examines the cultural origin of militarism of Germany and the third part continued to examine the social process pertaining to Germany's unique socioculture. The fourth part then proceeds to argue how the defined socioculture affected the interactions between Germany and other countries in the interwar period. At the end of this chapter, I will present an explanation, compared to chapter 3, under the path of reductionism, arguing the importance of socioculture and national psychology in qualifying the balance of power as a true diplomacy.

Meanwhile, both chapter 3 and chapter 4 conclude with an explanation about the failure of appeasement and the outbreak of World War II based on its own path. This is to respond to the appeasement case in this dissertation. The chapter 5 compares the two paths applied in chapter 3 and chapter 4 by practicing counterfactual interference to each path. The first part verify the conclusion of structuralism and the reductionism of the second part. In third part, it argues that structuralism is of less explanatory power than reductionism while explaining the instant case and advocates to revise Waltzian structuralism with the variable "attributes of unit" of reductionism. The last chapter draws out conclusion taking into account the content of the research question concerning both historical and theoretical issues.

Table 2. Ideal and Actual Situations of Structuralist Path Analysis

	Structure	Power Distribution	Balance of Power
Ideal Situation	Sufficient intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics	Orderly	Balance
	Balance of power expectation in Europe and interference by United States	Balanced power distribution among Britain, Germany and France	
Actual Situation	Insufficient intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics	Disorderly	Imbalance
	Hegemonic competition in Europe and Isolationism in United States	Excessive power of Germany	




Figure.1 Relationship of unit attributes and structure

Table 3. Competitive relationship between structure and unit

	Socialization behavior	Attribute behavior	Competition result	Dominant power in structure	performance characteristics
Situation A	Strong	Weak	Socialization behavior in dominance	Structure	Structure decides units; the attribute of units can be ignored
Situation B	Weak	Strong	Attribute behavior in dominance	Unit	Structure cannot decides units; the attribute of units cannot be ignored

Structuralist assumption should be revised as the attribute of units can be ignored when and only when the structural socialization ability is higher than the unit attribute ability, which means when the structure has the pressure and elasticity to the absolute advantages of the unit.

6. Conclusion

In this dissertation, I analyzed the reason why the appeasement policy of Britain and United States during 1919-1938 failed to achieve the expected balance of power effects based on the two different paths of structuralism and reductionism while reasoning and comparing the explanatory powers of the two analysis paths, the result of which turns out to be that reductionism is of superior explanatory power in analyzing the foreign policies of a state.

In response to Hypothesis 1, in chapter 3, my proposition is that under the path of structuralism, when we seek to purchase a successful diplomacy of the balance of power, factors as dynamics and elasticity of the system should not be ruled out from consideration. When we adopt the Waltzian approach of structuralist analysis to case study, what we usually put weight on is the distribution of power among units. As we

can see from the case of appeasement, both the design and implementation of the balancing system were based on the thought of how to manipulate the power reallocating and hence to realize a balanced power structure. The factors that policy maker at that time valued most were the military equilibrium between each single state, rather the structural design to regulate the changing process. Therefore, it is the lacking of the consideration of systemic level factors that led to the peace arrangement failed and proved appeasement a false diplomacy in terms of the balance of power. However, by virtue of the counterfactual interference, we have found that the balance of power can be carried out successfully to some extent if we take systemic factors into serious consideration. In this dissertation, I proposed the dynamics and elasticity of the system as sticking points.

When we attempt to successfully implement the diplomacy of balance of power, in order to maintain and invigorate the consensus of the balancing peace arrangement, both intrinsic dynamics and extrinsic dynamics should be in place. And the intrinsic dynamics derive from the constructed common knowledge inside the system. It could be guaranteed by multiple international interactions, codified agreements or memorandum of understandings, and embedded acknowledgement of anti-hegemony consensus. On the contrary, extrinsic dynamics demand the interference from outside system which will grant certain pressure on an envisaged peace arrangement. Though an external pushing hand is not always required, an imposing power indeed will help the power balancing process undergo within the track. As for the elasticity of system, playing as a fuse wire, the fault-tolerance ability is crucial to the survival of a frail system. If we try to pursue a true diplomacy of balance of power, what nonetheless shall count is that how the diplomatic design can, and to what extent, correct the deviation in case of the disorganized and unexpected power distribution disturbing the peace progress.

In response to Hypothesis 2, in chapter 4 I concluded that under the path of reductionism, the specific socioculture and national psychology of a state are cruxes as for a successful diplomacy of balance of power. What structuralism approach highly contested are the influential factors subject to secondary analytical framework.

However, in this dissertation I proposed that a reductionist paradigm can also well explain the causality of a structuralized puzzle. Returning to the case of appeasement, the failure of the balance of power resulted from the neglecting of the variables in societal level. That is to say, the true diplomacy of balance of power is owing to specific societal conditions.

The first is that the particularity of socioculture of a state should be investigated, which means the state is no more a black box but with its specific domestic attributes. These secondary attributes will largely give an account to the potential attitudes towards a certain diplomacy. The socioculture embodies how the philosophical traditions and various degree of nationalism will apply to domestic institutions, such as economic structure, administrative system and diplomatic strategy. And all of these will affect the national behaviors when, in the stated puzzle, responding to or initiating a diplomacy of balance of power. More than that, what is compounded with socioculture is the national psychology, the second reductionist factor for a true diplomatic consideration. Rooted in particular socioculture, national psychology should be regarded as one indicator of whether an ongoing diplomacy will come to the end as it depicted. To put it into another way, in the instant puzzle, if the diplomacy of balance of power fulfils the national psychological needs, or at least not jeopardize them, the diplomacy will be welcomed and achieved, otherwise it will doom to fail. At this point, national interests are not the unaltered criteria anymore to assess if a diplomacy will be accepted or gain legitimacy in domestic. Some reductionist variables also deserve to be included for a successful diplomacy.

In response to Hypothesis 3, the path of structuralism is of huge flaws for the traditional path of structuralism focuses only on factors on the structural level and ignores the influences of attribute of units in the system. Integrating the respect advantages of explanatory powers of structuralism and reductionism, this dissertation spares no effort to introduce the concept of attributes of units into the analysis paradigm of structuralism to revise it. And besides the theoretical ambition, the revised approach will as well as provide with a better explanation that under what conditions the diplomacy of balance of power shall function better. The revised structuralism will take

the structural factors and unit attributes factors into comprehensive consideration in analyzing problems at the same time; and also the revised structuralism will emphasize the system dynamics and elasticity, and investigated the impact of changes in unit attribute in the system, so as to prevent the deficiency of structuralism caused by the excessive simplification. That is to say, for the sake of a better implication of balance of power, both structuralist and reductionist variables are of distinctive importance, and by integrating the reductionism variable “attributes of units” into structuralism approach, can we expect a preferable framework to realize better diplomacy of balance of power.

Of course, in this dissertation, the analysis will definitely produce the issue of shrunken extension at the same time of expanding the theoretical connotation, and this will inevitably result in the theoretical faults in universality while trying to revise the traditional theories by selecting the single historical case. Apart from the theoretical immature, this dissertation dedicates to disentangle the puzzle of a concrete diplomatic issue, which may nonetheless give inspirations to future foreign policy analysis. As the North Korea nuclear issue and Ukrainian crisis are still heated, could there be any new shapes of balance of power as their final solution? Stepping into a big picture, with the Brexit and a more isolated United States, are we now entering into a new age of balance of power astride the English Channel? Furthermore, I believe the most potential balancing peace arrangement might emerge between China and United States in the decade, and there must be of great needs for us to revise the contemporary global system with due regard to systematic dynamics and elasticity; meanwhile we are also required to investigate urgently what kind of socioculture and national psychology are veiled behind the name “China”, especially when these still remain ambiguous to many now.