



**Department of Political Science - Contemporary History
Course**

**Maastricht and Unified Germany: Creation of
a European Germany or a German Europe?**

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INTRODUCTION

How did Germany manage to carry out a difficult unification process while leading the deepening of European integration at the beginning of the 1990s? In what way were the challenges brought by unification challenged by the new German state and how were they influenced by European integration? Following the above-mentioned questions, and based on an in-depth assessment of the core secondary literature on this issue, as well as contemporary press publications in Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, I will proceed by analysing first the political unification process from within the two German States, followed by a reconsideration of the problem of including East Germany into the European framework while also assessing the international reactions to a newly reunified Germany in regards to the position it was going to take in a further integrated Europe, ultimately determining if the monetary union of Europe was a necessary measure to bring the continent closer together. Consequently, the findings of the first chapters will be fundamental for a wider exploration of the European Integration Process from the late 1980's to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Finally, the question of the German impact on these developments will be further explored in a wider context of foreign policy and an increased German autonomy in decision-making processes on the international theatre, assessing how Germany was able to maintain its post-war military abstinence while accommodating the needs of its allies in military operations abroad, leading to final considerations about the concept of European Citizenship and its impact on the Member States of the European Union. Government publications have also been useful in determining the impact of treaties and developments at the international level on the political spectrum, giving a more complex yet substantial perspective on the events analysed on my work. I will ultimately attempt to find an answer to the ongoing debate on the position assumed by Germany in the European framework and, with the help of scholars such as Gert-Joachim Glaebner, Jeffrey Anderson, Sebastian Harnisch and Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, whose work have closely analysed the forces that brought Germany together as well as the legacy of 50 years

of military abstinence in a new context of common European foreign policy, I will assess the extent to which Germany can be considered Europe's hegemon or its reluctant yet worthy leader.

CHAPTER 1: THE FORCES THAT BROUGHT GERMANY TOGETHER

Helmut Kohl and the 10-point programme for German reunification

On November 9 1989, the 155km concrete wall that separated West Berlin from the German Democratic Republic fell, due to pressure from East German citizens who gathered at the wall gates following a TV broadcast, reporting that the country's borders were open to everyone.

It soon became clear that German politics entered a new phase, characterised by new challenges and opportunities. The path towards German reunification was arguably started and carried out by FDR chancellor Helmut Kohl, who - In defiance of the reserved rights that the Allies held over the German reunification - announced on 28 November 1989 a 10-point programme expressing a closer West-East German cooperation, eventually leading to a future reunification. The ten points ranged from dealing with the immediate situation first-hand (such as prompt assistance to refugees from the East to the West) to more intricate issues such as the legal and constitutional framework of the new state that was about to form¹.

One of the main objectives of the 10-point programme was to get all GDR officials on board with the reform of the country, including a constitutional change and a new election law. The monopoly on power held by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was one of the first changes to be applied in order to ensure free, fair and secret elections in the country, allowing for non-socialist parties to participate too. Along with the monopoly, the GDR had to give up its laws on political crimes too, forcing the immediate release of all political prisoners. The programme set out by Kohl also stressed the need for

¹ Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and European union. pp. 27-28 New York: Cambridge University Press

reforms in the economic system of the GDR, which were fundamental to ensure the absorbing of the nation into a greater unified Germany. Understanding the challenges that such drastic change might pose to the country, Kohl drew examples from Poland and Hungary, which, as COMECON members, showed propensity for a market economy to enable private economic activity. Kohl also called for the development of a confederative structure for the new state, looking back at the history of the country, which showed (and shows) that Germany has almost always meant a federation. The second half of the points on the other hand, dealt with the integration of the new German state into the international framework, from the European Community to the NATO Alliance, of which West Germany had been a full member since their founding².

The Chancellor expressed the importance of maintaining the development of inter-German relations within the Pan-European process, highlighting how the future architecture of Germany must fit into the future architecture of Europe as a whole. In doing so, Kohl kept his stance towards the Pan-European development, stressing the significance of a strengthening of the European Community to boost further cooperation between the European nations, as well as reaching for Central and Eastern European countries which pushed for economic reforms³.

Maintaining this outlook on the expansion of the European Community was considered unequivocal by Kohl, as to him German Unity was of European concern as well. The whole process was to be considered therefore, as an important connection with European

² *ibid.*

³ Helmut Kohl, "Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europas" ["Ten Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe"] (November 28, 1989), in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* [*Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government*], November 29, 1989; reprinted in Volker Gransow and Konrad Jarausch, eds., *Die Deutsche Vereinigung: Dokumente zu Bürgerbewegung, Annäherung und Beitritt* [*German Reunification: Documents on the Citizens' Movement, Rapprochement, and Accession*]. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik,

integration. This integration was, in his words, the only way through which the identity of all Europeans was to be maintained, asserted and developed. Such identity was to be not only based on the cultural diversity of the continent, but also on the basic rights of freedom, democracy, human rights and self-determination⁴.

The final points of the programme called for far-reaching and speedy steps towards disarmament and arms control, which were in Kohl's view crucial to overcome the divisions that Europe and Germany were facing. Such process was to be conducted along with political developments, to be carried out towards a condition of peace in the continent in which the German people could regain their unity in self-determination⁵

“Linking the German Question to the development of Europe as a whole and to West-East relations – as I have explained in these ten points – makes possible an organic development that takes into account the interests of everyone involved and – this is our goal – paves the way for a peaceful and free development in Europe. Only together and in a climate of mutual trust can we peacefully overcome the division of Europe, which has also always been the division of Germany.”⁶

-Helmut Kohl

⁴ ibid.

⁵ ibid.

⁶ ibid.

The first free elections in the GDR and Lothar de Maiziere's coalition presiding over unification

The political structure of the GDR resembled very closely the one of its Warsaw Pact neighbours such as Poland or Czechoslovakia. The country was, up until 1989, governed by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the economy was centrally planned, with prices for goods and basic services set by central government planners. The system in which the state was organised stood at the polar opposites of those of West Germany, making the reunification an even more challenging process than it would have otherwise been. As set out in Helmut Kohl's 10 points for reunification, a constitutional change in the GDR was indisputable, with the SED letting go of its monopoly over politics and the opening of its economy to the free-market system.

Following the social pressures caused by the fall of the Wall in November, and in the fear of an even more unstable environment between the two German states, GDR's prime minister Hans Modrow proposed that both the opposition parties and civil rights alliances should participate in the government. This openness towards the opposition led to the very first free and fair elections in East Germany since 1932, with the East German's CDU firmly supported by Helmut Kohl. Newly founded political organisations close to the traditional West German parties, the SPD, CDU and FDP, had an advantage in the election campaign. The West gave them organisational and financial support and sent helpers.⁷

The elections were characterised by phenomena considered unusual in the East, such as election posters that were covering every free spot in the cities of the nation. The right-wing coalition led by

⁷ Revolution89.de. (2018). The first free elections in the GDR - Revolution und Mauerfall. [online] Available at: <http://revolution89.de/en/unity/no-experiments/the-first-free-elections-in-the-gdr/> [Accessed 14 December 2017]

the CDU campaigned all over the country pushing for reunification. The agenda included a proposed strengthening of the European Community as a process to be followed once the reunification would be completed. The reunification implied therefore the consolidation of a greater Europe, with a unified Germany as its main supporter for further integration.

The turnout at the election stood at 93.4%, with a decisive victory for the Alliance for Germany coalition, led by Lothar de Maiziere. The election program of the coalition called for private property, full freedom of trade, the abolition of all trade barriers for Western investors, the creation of a social safety net and the unification of the law with the Federal Republic of Germany. Fundamental to the coalition was the abolition of political criminal law, which was a distinctive feature of the political system of the East. For the first time in the history of the GDR, the country wasn't led by the Socialist Unity Party.

The Alliance for Germany coalition was led by Lothar de Maiziere, who at the time became the first democratically elected prime minister of the GDR, as well as its last one. His victory at the election, supported directly by the West, was also due to the East Germans' expectations for a unified Germany.⁸ Issues regarding concrete politics were secondary concerns compared to the transition to shape the future political order.⁹ Fundamental to the transition process was also the restoration of the former soviet bloc nations' independence, shrinking Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe in order to expand the European Community beyond the infamous Iron Curtain.

Once elected, it became clear to de Maiziere that a broad coalition including the SPD was necessary to speed up the reunification

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Glaebner, G. (2005). German democracy. p. 156 New York: Berg.

process. De Maiziere's agenda included the abandonment of the GDR's statehood in favour of unity, the restoration of the state and municipal self-government, the return of the rule of law and free-market structures, the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the signing of the '*Zwei-Plus-Vier-Vertrag*', in which the Four Powers renounced to all of the rights they held in Germany, enabling the soon-to-be-formed reunified Germany to become fully sovereign.¹⁰

In many former socialist countries, the old constitutions remained in force to fit the new circumstances, only to be replaced by provisional constitutions until the first free election took place. This wasn't the case for East Germany, as an accession to the Federal Republic of Germany was clear not even three months after the fall of the Wall. However, the 1974 East German constitution was used as a basic framework, with notions such as the SED supremacy immediately removed for the sake of the basic democratic rights.¹¹

Along with the basic democratic rights, the fundamental objectives to be achieved by de Maiziere's coalition included rapid economic, monetary and social union. Such objectives were obtained through the implementation of 96 laws, three major treaties and an imprecise number of cabinet submissions, which made the accession of the GDR to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany possible in both domestic and foreign policy.¹²

¹⁰ Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. (2018). Lothar de Maizière, Geschichte der CDU, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. [online] Available at: <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/37.8236/> [In German] [Accessed 15 December 2017]

¹¹ Glaeßner, G. (2005). German democracy. p. 158 New York: Berg.

¹² Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. (2018). Lothar de Maizière, Geschichte der CDU, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. [online] Available at: <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/37.8236/> [In German] [Accessed 16 December 2017]

**The *Einigungsvertrag*, the *Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag* and the
*Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und
Sozialunion***

The three main treaties that effectively secured German unification were the *Einigungsvertrag* (Unification Treaty), the *Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag* (the treaty between the Four Allied Powers and the Two German republics over the rights reserved by the formers on German reunification) and the *Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion* (the treaty on German economic, monetary and social union).

The *Einigungsvertrag* was finally signed on 31 August 1990, and effectively replaced the GDR system with the West German one, with very few exceptions.¹³ The first chapter of the treaty tackled territory issues such as the formation of 5 new *Länder* from the ashes of the GDR and the choosing of the capital of the newly formed republic as well as the institution of the Day of German Unity. The 5 new *Länder* instituted in the former GDR are Mecklenburg Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen Anhalt, Thüringen and Sachsen, as well as the city-state of Berlin which would become the capital of the new state. The entry into force of West German Basic Law within the the GDR's former territory was established in the second chapter of the treaty, while the fourth resolved matters in the international aspects of the unification. As established in the treaty, the future of the new German state within the international organisations that West Germany was a part of was to be discussed with the representatives of the former GDR. Nonetheless, the former GDR territories were immediately part of the European Community, yet matters related to Soviet troops on GDR soil and NATO membership of the former West Germany were still on the debate.

¹³ Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and European union. p. 31 New York: Cambridge University Press.

The *Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag* was the treaty that sealed the foreign policy aspects of reunification, with respect to the rights that the Four Allied Powers reserved over the reunification of the country. It was effectively signed on 12 September 1990, despite some questions on the matters at hand still uncertain to the signatory parties. Such questions were aimed at Soviet troops still stationed in East Germany and whether the new German state should be a part of NATO. After months of negotiations, it was resolved that Soviet troops would have until 1994 to leave German soil and that the new German state was to be a part of NATO. Germany also acknowledged the inviolability of its existing borders, fundamental to its existence within the European continent and the European Community, with Article 1 stating:

*“Its external borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force. The confirmation of the definitive nature of the borders of the united Germany is an essential element of the peaceful order in Europe.”*¹⁴

The *Vertrag über die Schaffung einer Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion* was signed on 18 May 1990 by the finance ministers of the two German republics and entered into force on the first of July of the same year. It effectively merged the economic system of the GDR with the one of West Germany, replacing the East German Mark with the Western one, and introducing the privatisation of enterprises as well as the end of the planned GDR economy.

¹⁴ Germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org. (2018). GHDI - Document - Page. [online] Available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=106 - Source of English translation: Bundesgesetzblatt, 1990, Part II, pp. 1318-24. © Bundesgesetzblatt [Accessed 23 December 2017]

CHAPTER 2: EAST GERMAN INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST AND THE EEC

The *Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung-Ost* and The *Solidaritätzuschlag* - instruments of reconstruction or integration?

By the end of the 1980s, the East German economy was significantly lagging behind the Western European economies, with a nominal GDP of about \$159 billion compared to the \$945 billion West German one.¹⁵ The considerable gap in per capita GDP between the people of the two German republics was also one of the main issues that German statesmen had to face. It soon became clear to government officials that some sort of instrument to stimulate the East German economy to catch up with the West was inevitable, not only to help the country to get back on its feet but also to ensure that the integration process with the rest of the European Community was not to be an additional burden to the reconstruction plan.

Following a decisive federal election victory two months after unification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl devised an economic plan that consisted in a series of programs to boost the eastern *Länder* economy, i.e., the *Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung-Ost*. The plan consisted in a mix of tax incentives, investment credits and infrastructure grants, emphasising on small and medium-sized firms.¹⁶ Incentives for Western companies to invest reached maximum levels in the five new *Länder*, although with varying degrees of commitment and success.

¹⁵ United States. Central Intelligence Agency. (1991). The 1990 CIA World Factbook. Project Gutenberg.

¹⁶ Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and European union. p. 38 New York: Cambridge University Press.

The performance of Western companies in the eastern *Länder* was also affected by the economic downturn that was enshrouding Europe at the time, with companies such as Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz and Deutsche Airbus closing their plants and investment in the East, leaving the unemployment rate unchanged and worsening the economic forecast for the region. Figures for the year 1992 showed that the eastern *Länder* accounted for 6.9% of the national GDP, despite having a fourth of the total population.¹⁷ The plan can arguably be seen as a guarantee for both reconstruction and integration, as investment from both the rest of the EC and Western Germany was seen as an opportunity for the eastern *Länder* to rebuild their economy, while adapting to the economic regulations set out by the Community.

Concurrently with the plan devised, calls for new taxes to finance restructuring and to restrict the overall public debt from the SPD and eastern German representatives were initially rejected by the coalition government, as well as demands for the creation of new institutions that were to implement the government's policies.¹⁸ As per what the economic figures showed in 1992, it became clear that investment from the West was not enough to solve unemployment in the East, which was well over 10% in some regions.¹⁹ The unification process was therefore showing signs of overall deterioration of the German economy as a whole: not only it accelerated the economic crisis in the East, but it also took its toll on the western German economy, with the inflation rate jumping from 3% in 1990 to 4.8% in 1992.²⁰ The reunification process was beginning to show signs of social repercussion, as Eastern Germans

¹⁷ Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and European union. p. 40 New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.38.

¹⁹ Deutschlandfunk. (2018). Vor 25 Jahren - "Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung Ost" wird beschlossen. [online] Available at: http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/vor-25-jahren-gemeinschaftswerk-aufschwung-ost-wird.871.de.html?dram:article_id=347378 [In German] [Accessed 13 January 2018]

²⁰ Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and European union. p. 39 New York: Cambridge University Press.

believed that Westerners were unwilling to make sacrifices for the sake of unity and the Westerners thought that the East was ungrateful towards them.

The already-in-place *Solidaritätszuschlag* became an additional levy to finance German Unity. The *Solidaritätszuschlag* is a supplement to income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax introduced by Helmut Kohl in 1991, to tackle to the cost of the Second Gulf War which amounted to 22 billion German Marks.²¹ The supplements were collected until 1994 only to be reintroduced the following year when economical figures showed that more money was needed for reunification.²² To this day, many Germans, especially in the former West, believe that the *Solidaritätszuschlag* flows completely into rebuilding the East, fuelling the growing discontent of the population towards reunification.

Yet, the tax itself was devised specifically as a way to pay off the Second Gulf War debts²³, and it only became a tool to finance unity once investment wasn't considered enough to boost the eastern German economy. Therefore, it can arguably be considered as a move to deal with the issue internally, rather than a plan to push for further integration within the Community.

²¹ Kuwait.diplo.de. (2018). Deutsche Botschaft Kuwait - In freundschaftlicher Verbundenheit - Deutschlands Beitrag zur Befreiung Kuwaits. [online] Available at: http://www.kuwait.diplo.de/Vertretung/kuwait/de/03/Bilaterale__Beziehungen/seite__Befreiung__Kuwait.html [In German] [Accessed 15 January 2018]

²² Vlh.de. (2018). Was ist der Solidaritätszuschlag? [online] Available at: <https://www.vlh.de/wissen-service/steuer-abc/was-ist-der-solidaritaetszuschlag.html> [In German] [Accessed 15 January 2018]

²³ Kuwait.diplo.de. (2018). Deutsche Botschaft Kuwait - In freundschaftlicher Verbundenheit - Deutschlands Beitrag zur Befreiung Kuwaits. [online] Available at: http://www.kuwait.diplo.de/Vertretung/kuwait/de/03/Bilaterale__Beziehungen/seite__Befreiung__Kuwait.html [In German] [Accessed 15 January 2018]

Reorganisation of ownership and the solidification of private property within a former socialist system – opportunity for economic turnover or bad omen for reunification?

In addition to the evident divergences between the economic performances of the two German states, the structures of the nation's themselves was posing an even bigger obstacle to the reunification process. Problems were starting to arise following the implementation of the GEMSU, including the devaluation of the *Ostmark* (East German Mark) by over 400%, which virtually initiated the collapse of trade within the eastern *Länder*, as the former GDR products were priced out of their markets.²⁴

The privatisation process was entrusted in the hand of a new agency, the *Treuhandanstalt* (THA), which virtually took control of 95% of the enterprise sector and 40% of the total land area. The main tasks of the agency included the privatisation of the enterprises under its control, while enforcing budgetary discipline and fostering the creation of a competitive economic system, thus allowing for the stimulation of capital inflows.²⁵ In parallel with what happened with the implementation of the *Solidaritätszuschlag*, the newly-established government of reunified Germany chose to deal with the privatisation process internally, regulating the transition through a purposely-founded agency that enjoyed almost-complete authority over the enterprises administered.

The problems the agency had to deal with were considerably challenging: of the many state-owned enterprises, very few of them could cope with the consequences of the GEMSU. The introduction of the D-Mark in the eastern *Länder* led to a dramatic rise in wages which left the eastern companies with their weaknesses exposed,

²⁴ Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and European union. p. 41 New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁵ Dornbusch, R. and Wolf, H. (1994). East German Economic Reconstruction. P.13 In: O. Blanchard, K. Froot and J. Sachs, ed., The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 1. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, pp.155 - 190.

given that, at the time of reunification, were not even half as productive as their Western counterparts.²⁶

The agency achieved some very rapid process at the beginning of its operations, allocating job opportunities for about one-third of the employees of the companies administered, while obtaining about DM 114 billion in investment guarantees.²⁷ However, as the privatisation process proceeded, the agency drew some criticism from both political camps and the public. In the privatisation and sale process of companies, the THA was thought to be following regulatory mechanisms, when in fact, the selection and operation was carried out in worrying randomness.²⁸

It can be said that the THA never acted with transparency in the privatisation process, given the time in which it carried out its operations: although at the time of its implementation there was no official time constraint that could have put pressure on its work, the THA was working in a period in which the reunification fever was at its maximum height. Criticism towards the agency culminated with the assassination of its chairman Detlev Karsten Rohwedder on 1 April 1991 by the West German left-wing terrorist organisation *Rote Armee Fraktion*.

²⁶ Neubauer, R. (2014). Treuhandanstalt - Das unzählbare Ungeheuer. Die Zeit, [online] pp.1-2. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-10/treuhandanstalt-privatisierung-ostdeutsche-wirtschaft> [In German] [Accessed 17 January 2018]

²⁷ Dornbusch, R. and Wolf, H. (1994). East German Economic Reconstruction. P.15 In: O. Blanchard, K. Froot and J. Sachs, ed., The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 1. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, pp.155 - 190.

²⁸ Neubauer, R. (2014). Treuhandanstalt - Das unzählbare Ungeheuer. Die Zeit, [online] pp.1-2. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-10/treuhandanstalt-privatisierung-ostdeutsche-wirtschaft> [In German] [Accessed 17 January 2018]

CHAPTER 3: FROM THE EEC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

West Germany within The Single European Act: path towards European security?

The Single European Act of 1986 was the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome which established the European Communities. The main concepts enshrined in the revision included the codifying of European Political Cooperation, the establishment of a Single European Market by 31 December 1992 and the premises for a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The negotiations leading to the signing of the Single European Act were the result of a compromise involving the national interests of the main economies of the EC. Given Germany's position as Europe's leading exporter, and with half of its exports directly going towards the rest of the EC, the nation profits directly from economic integration²⁹. It is clear that in the interests of their people, German politicians maintained a clear positive attitude to further integration, believing it would also benefit to the *Ostpolitik*. In addition to that, a possible greater role for the European Parliament was widely considered as a further step toward political union³⁰. Aligning themselves with Germany, the French turned to the European cause, effectively changing their policy toward the EC under president Mitterrand, who chose to keep France in the EMS in 1983³¹.

Aside from the establishment of a Single Market, the Act set out provisions for European cooperation on foreign affairs, which included mutual briefings and consultations on foreign issues,

²⁹ Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community. *International Organization*, 45(01), p.11.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid, p.12.

political dialogues with third countries and regional groups and ensuring a gradual development for the setting of common principles. This precursor to a common European foreign policy conflicted with the agenda of many EC countries: For West Germany, continued membership in NATO was the cornerstone of the new European security order to be constructed along with unification³². Countries such as Ireland were not participating in the North Atlantic Alliance, and the possible inclusion of countries such as Sweden and Austria into the EC could have been seen as a further departure from the military alliance with the United States by Germany. Although talks for a common foreign policy were initiated with the 1986 SEA, the European Communities were not ready to take such a huge step within the integration progress: conflicting national interests and differing alliances within the bloc prevented this from happening, fuelled especially by doubts coming from Germany, which despite its support for wider economic integration, wasn't ready to completely back a shared foreign agenda.

International reactions to a unified Germany: opportunity for greater peace and stability in the continent or source for further divergences between the main powers?

Following the events of 1989 and the fall of the Berlin wall, the reunification fever was running high in Germany, igniting the spark for unity after decades of domestic policy focused on shutting down every debate that could have possibly led to a united country. It soon became clear that reunification was turning into an unavoidable issue that both the German nations and Europe had to deal with. Leaders from France, the United Kingdom and Italy voiced their thoughts on the matter, each giving their perspectives in relation to the effects of a reunited Germany within an ever-expanding European Community.

³² Arnold, E. (1991). German foreign policy and unification. *International Affairs*, 67(3), pp.453-471.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the staunchest opponent to a reunified Germany, believing it would destabilise Europe: “We beat the Germans twice, and now they’re back!” she allegedly remarked at a Prime Ministers dinner in 1989, according to Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s memoir³³. The Prime Minister’s hostilities towards reunification ran so deep it caused repercussions all the way to Washington, with President Bush fearing Thatcher would want to seek an “*entente cordiale*” with the Soviet Union as a way to counter-balance a unified Germany³⁴. Above everything else, Margaret Thatcher distrusted Germany for its alleged ‘thirst for power’: in a 1990 interview with German Newspaper *Der Spiegel*, Ms. Thatcher asserted that Chancellor Kohl did not recognise the Oder-Neisse border with Poland (a frontier drawn up after World War II), causing the latter to furiously deny he ever made such statement³⁵. When it became clear that the reunification process could not be halted, the British foreign policy turned to a potential deceleration of the reunification process: Thatcher backed a five-year transitional period with two German states, in order to implement all the political and economic reforms needed to such a delicate process³⁶. Thus, it can be said the United Kingdom was not ready to back German reunification, maintaining a cautious position towards such a perilous development that, according to them, could’ve been a source for destabilisation in Europe.

³³ Volkery, C. (2009). The Iron Lady's Views on German Reunification: 'The Germans Are Back!'. *Der Spiegel*. [online] Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-iron-lady-s-views-on-german-reunification-the-germans-are-back-a-648364.html> [Accessed 18 January 2018]

³⁴ Cordon, G. (2016). Margaret Thatcher's fears over domination of unified Germany. *The Independent*. [online] Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/margaret-thatcher-national-archives-files-fears-unified-germany-a7501331.html> [Accessed 19 January 2018]

³⁵ Volkery, C. (2009). The Iron Lady's Views on German Reunification: 'The Germans Are Back!'. *Der Spiegel*. [online] Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-iron-lady-s-views-on-german-reunification-the-germans-are-back-a-648364.html> [Accessed 19 January 2018]

³⁶ *Ibid.*

The French on the other hand, adopted a more generous approach towards German reunification, while maintaining a certain level of scepticism. At an EC summit in Strasbourg on December 1989, French President François Mitterrand raised some criticism towards Chancellor Kohl, accusing him of exploiting German “national” feeling without taking into account other nations’ sensitivities, even going onto saying that a possible reunification would see the re-emergence of the “bad” Germans who had once dominated Europe³⁷. However, Mitterrand had come to terms with the pending reunification by mid-January 1990³⁸, while thinking it would have been prudent for Ms. Thatcher to maintain her opposition to it, possibly in attempt to marginalise Britain in the coming talks that were to be held at future EC summits on the German question³⁹. In the years following formal reunification, it can be said that French policy had been rather successful in linking the German reunification process to EC deepening, adding the former GDR into it being one of the main developments towards this theory⁴⁰. Mr. Mitterrand’s real ambition was therefore steering a wider Germany into the project of the European Monetary Union and a united Europe⁴¹, believing such integration would render the EC able to “tame” the Germans, going against Thatcher’s belief that in doing so, the Communities would’ve been destabilised. France’s position therefore went from from initial divergences between its leader and Germany’s Kohl, to seeing the development as a chance to take

³⁷ Blitz, J. (2009). Mitterrand feared emergence of ‘bad’ Germans. *The Financial Times*. [online] Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/886192ba-9d7d-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0> [Accessed 19 January 2018]

³⁸ Volkery, C. (2009). The Iron Lady's Views on German Reunification: 'The Germans Are Back!'. *Der Spiegel*. [online] Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-iron-lady-s-views-on-german-reunification-the-germans-are-back-a-648364.html> [Accessed 19 January 2018]

³⁹ Blitz, J. (2009). Mitterrand feared emergence of ‘bad’ Germans. *The Financial Times*. [online] Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/886192ba-9d7d-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0> [Accessed 19 January 2018]

⁴⁰ Arnold, E. (1991). German foreign policy and unification. *International Affairs*, 67(3), pp.453-471.

⁴¹ Blitz, J. (2009). Mitterrand feared emergence of ‘bad’ Germans. *The Financial Times*. [online] Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/886192ba-9d7d-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0> [Accessed 19 January 2018]

advantage of the EC in order to maintain peace in the continent, allowing for reunification to happen.

Italy's response to German reunification was filled with concerns, coming especially from the Italian public opinion, which stemmed from an underlying anti-German sentiment fuelled by the reigniting of the anthropological-cultural stereotypes between the two people⁴². Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was famously quoted as having said "I love Germany so much that I preferred when there were two.", aligning his beliefs with the ones of Thatcher and (albeit initially) Mitterrand. Despite German beliefs that Andreotti's opposition to reunification stemmed from his aversion to the self-determination of the German people, the Italian Prime Minister was aware of the international significance of the event, as well as its possible repercussions on Europe⁴³. Thus, an international awareness-founded belief pushed Italy's cautious approach towards reunification, supporting the theory of the other main EC countries such as the UK and France.

The reunification was producing its early effects on the decision-making process within European integration and inter-governmental relations, at a time in which the European Communities were ready to take the next step to bring the continent even closer together, first with the SEA and then with the Maastricht Treaty. Concurrently, it can be said that the main EC powers weren't ready to see the reunification as a positive event to European integration, but rather as a bad omen for the fates of it, in a future in which German domination was seen as an inevitable consequence.

⁴² Trocini, F. (2012). Italian reactions to German reunification - Prejudice and reciprocal misunderstandings. *Mémoire(s), identité(s), marginalité(s) dans le monde occidental contemporain*, (8).

⁴³ Ibid.

Maastricht and the EU monetary union – new tools to contain Germany or gradual steps to further integration?

European integration came to a decisive turning point on 7 February 1992, when the 12 members of the European Economic Community signed the Treaty on European Union (or Maastricht Treaty), which came into force on 1 November 1993 creating the three fundamental pillars that are now at the basis of the Union as well as the single European currency, the Euro. While the treaty definitely arises from economic and institutional developments that took place before 1989, one of the theories discussed by scholars such as Michael J. Baun when dealing with Maastricht is that the treaty itself was a not so veiled response to German unification given by the EC countries.⁴⁴

The treaty revolved around the concept of monetary union, that was to be achieved by the end of the decade, effectively bringing European economic and political unity to a whole different level of integration. Despite the positive mood that rose from the negotiations, the treaty started facing growing popular opposition to ratification in several countries, fuelled by the economic stagnation and crisis that was afflicting the continent in that period.

The main concerns surrounding the monetary union came from every country within the Community, especially the richest ones such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Concerns coming from Germany were mainly centred around the loss of their currency, the D-Mark, which was considered among the strongest, most stable and reliable currencies in the world. Additional doubts were also focused around a monetary union with countries which at the time of ratification were struggling with the Euro convergence criteria, such as Italy and Greece. Aides from Helmut Kohl's cabinet

⁴⁴ Braun, M. (1995). The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration. *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(4), p.605.

warned him about Italy's austerity measures taken at the time, which were merely seen as 'window dressing' to meet the criteria for the adoption of the Euro.⁴⁵ Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the other hand, took a strong stance in supporting Maastricht, stressing how the treaty had "German handwriting on all decisive points"⁴⁶. Several political economists over the years argued that Germany preferred institutional arrangements such as the EMU to operate economically in an environment that provides stable exchange rates to increase competitiveness, given how its economy has always been export-oriented and running with low inflation.⁴⁷ The government, however, needed the support, by a 2/3 majority, of the *Länder*, which proved to be problematic as the CDU was the minority in the Bundesrat. Rather than a struggle between the government and opposition, differences over Maastricht initiated a struggle between the federal government and the *Länder*, which began once the Federal government introduced a bill modifying the *Grundgesetz*: in exchange for Treaty ratification, the *Länder* demanded greater powers in European decision making, extracting as much leverage as possible from the federal government⁴⁸. Under the *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany), the Treaty needed consent or participation of the bodies competent for such federal legislation, including both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat⁴⁹. In order to apply the treaty at a

⁴⁵ Hall, A. (2013). I acted like a dictator to bring in the euro': Former German chancellor Helmut Kohl admits power-trip forced continent to accept single currency. The Daily Mail. [online] Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2306388/I-acted-like-dictator-bring-euro-Former-German-chancellor-Helmut-Kohl-admits-power-trip-forced-rest-continent-accept-single-currency.html> [Accessed 20 Jan 2018]

⁴⁶ Parteien begrüßen im Bundestag die Ergebnisse von Maastricht," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14. Dezember 1991, 1. A detailed account of the Chancellor's remarks and the debate in the Bundestag is presented in Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 68. Sitzung. Bonn, Freitag, den 13. Dezember 1991, pp. 5797–5833. [In German]

⁴⁷ Van Esch, F. (2012). Why Germany Wanted EMU: The Role of Helmut Kohl's Belief System and the Fall of the Berlin Wall. *German Politics*, 21(1), pp.34-52.

⁴⁸ Mazzucelli, C. (2009). *France and Germany at Maastricht*. p.245 New York: Routledge.

⁴⁹ Deutscher Bundestag. (2018). Deutscher Bundestag - V. Der Bundespräsident. [online] Available at: https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_05/245132 [In German] [Accessed 21 January 2018]

national level, a change in the Constitution was required, as the provisions contained in the treaty needed a modifying of the *Grundgesetz*⁵⁰. Support for monetary union in Germany was relatively low, with 36% backing the EU single currency⁵¹. The Single EC Market established by the SEA also had wavering support in the country, with lower figures in the former East Germany especially after formal unification: in 1992, only 32% of Germans from the eastern *Länder* thought that the Single Market was a good thing for them⁵². Further integration with the EC was therefore seen as Germany's main priority by the government – especially by Kohl, who declared that integration became at that point irreversible⁵³ – even though the public expressed faltering support for the concepts enshrined in both the Maastricht Treaty and the SEA.

The United Kingdom also adopted a sceptical view towards EC deepening, prioritising the widening of the Community to incorporate new members such as Sweden, Austria and the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.⁵⁴ British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed her views on the soon to be established European Single Currency and the European Central Bank at a House of Commons debate in 1990, stressing how such an institution would be undemocratic, taking powers away such as the monetary policy and interest rates from every single parliament, and effectively opening the back door for a Federal Europe.⁵⁵ Scepticism came from the British public itself, founded on traditional reluctance to surrender further aspects of national sovereignty to supranational

⁵⁰ Mazzucelli, C. (2009). *France and Germany at Maastricht*. pp. 245-246 New York: Routledge.

⁵¹ *Public Opinion in the European Community*. (1992). [Research study] European Commission, Brussels.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Anderson, J. (1999). *German unification and European union*. p. 45 New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁴ Braun, M. (1995). *The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration*. *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(4), p.605.

⁵⁵ In 1990 Thatcher warned that the Euro would end European democracy. (1990). [video] House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, UK. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TPpuIslzG4> [Accessed 23 January 2018]

institutions mixed with fear of German power, as according to Thatcher, deeper EC integration would be easier to dominate for Germany rather than a broader group of sovereign states.⁵⁶

Other countries, such as France, saw the Euro as an opportunity to prevent a potential German hegemony in Europe, thus establishing control over German monetary policy through the creation of supranational monetary institutions.⁵⁷ Not even 24 hours after formal unification, on 4 October 1990, French President Mitterrand's aide Jacques Attali was talking about dissolving the newly-reunited Germany within a common European political framework.⁵⁸ However, the treaty sparked a debate over its effects on French national sovereignty. The Constitutional court of France came to the conclusion that in order to sign and ratify the treaty, a revision of the Constitution was necessary⁵⁹. While French President Mitterrand highlighted the fact that the nation benefitted from both EC citizenship and French citizenship, he voiced his doubts surrounding EC foreigners to exercise voting rights in municipal election⁶⁰. However, the Mitterrand administration aligned itself with the "Yes" vote on the French referendum to ratify the Maastricht treaty, despite initial doubts surrounding the potential waiver of French national sovereignty on some matters. The French public nearly rejected the treaty: the "Yes" vote won by a narrow 51%, shocking the European public after polls showed overwhelming support for Maastricht⁶¹. In face of a growing integration of the EC and a possible path to federalism, French politicians reinforced the preservation of the

⁵⁶ Thatcher, M. (1993) *The Downing Street Years*. New York: Harper- Collins, 759-763, 789-815.

⁵⁷ Braun, M. (1995). *The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration*. *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(4), p.605.

⁵⁸ Giacché, V. (2013). *Anschluss. L'annessione. L'unificazione della Germania e il futuro dell'Europa*. Reggio Emilia: Imprimatur, pp.253-263. [In Italian]

⁵⁹ Luchaire, F. (1992). *L'Union Européenne et la Constitution - Revue du Droit Public P.* 589-616. Paris: Economica [In French]

⁶⁰ Mazzucelli, C. (2009). *France and Germany at Maastricht*. p.209 New York: Routledge.

⁶¹ Lewis-Beck, M. and Morey, D. (2007). *The French "Petit Oui": The Maastricht Treaty and the French Voting Agenda*. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 38(1), pp.65-87.

language and culture in the constitution, while also giving a status determined in a special framework law to the French overseas territories.⁶²

Italy, on the other hand, had different responses from different positions within the political spectrum. Despite an overwhelming majority in the Lower House of the Italian Parliament voting in favour of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the concepts enclosed in it were subject to criticism coming from politicians such as Mirko Tremaglia of the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement), who defined the treaty as “*a legal and constitutional monster that does not safeguard national interests*”⁶³. Upon the signing of the treaty, Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and the Finance Minister Guido Carli were thought to have said that no one in Italy had any idea of the consequences that Maastricht would have had on the country.⁶⁴ Eurosceptic parties like *Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Refoundation Party) also voiced their opposition to Maastricht, hailing the treaty as the beginning of an era in which “*an authoritarian Europe is born, governed by the central banks and the military structures*”⁶⁵. Arguably, Italy could possibly have seen Maastricht as an opportunity to restructure its finances and align itself with the other European powers, fixing the government budget deficit and inflation rate by doing so. However, such deeper integration, as feared by Germany, could mean mutual difficulties in the likelihood of a financial crisis, fuelling Eurosceptic views in the future.

⁶² Mazzucelli, C. (2009). *France and Germany at Maastricht*. p.212 New York: Routledge.

⁶³ Fabiani, L. (1992). *L'Italia approva Maastricht*. *La Repubblica*. [online] Available at: <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1992/10/30/italia-approva-maastricht.html> [In Italian] [Accessed 23 January 2018]

⁶⁴ Pisu, M. (2016). *L'Europa di Maastricht nasceva 25 anni fa, un momento decisivo per la nostra storia recente*. *Il Sole 24 Ore*. [online] Available at: http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/commenti-e-idee/2016-01-22/l-europa-maastricht-nasceva-25-anni-fa-momento-decisivo-la-nostra-storia-recente-145406.shtml?uuid=ACHrxQFC&refresh_ce=1 (In Italian) [Accessed 23 January 2018]

⁶⁵ Fabiani, L. (1992). *L'Italia approva Maastricht*. *La Repubblica*. [online] Available at: <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1992/10/30/italia-approva-maastricht.html> (In Italian) [Accessed 23 January 2018]

We thus see national interests shaping the EC countries' views on further consolidation of the European project, with some viewing the Maastricht Treaty as an opportunity to contain Germany while others concerned over the political-economic effect of the project on their countries.

CHAPTER 4: THE EU COMMON FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PATH TOWARDS EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

Germany and the EU foreign policy: independent decision-making or reluctant compliance with the Maastricht Treaty?

One of the objectives as set out in Article B of the Maastricht Treaty calls for the European Union to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence⁶⁶. This provision effectively called for the 12 EC members to align their foreign policy towards a common one, at a time in which the major power blocs were collapsing as a result of the end of the Cold War. Of the 12 signatories EC members to the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland was the only sovereign state not participating in the NATO alliance with the United States, and the former East Germany – which from the Warsaw Pact was being integrated in a reunified German nation – was the first territory effectively switching alliances concurrently to the structure of the nation itself.

The countries of the EC were faced with three major international developments at the beginning of the 1990s: The Gulf War of 1990-1991, the 1992-1993 US-led United Nations intervention in the Somali Civil War and the Yugoslav Wars which lasted from 1991 until 2001, during which the geopolitical setting of the Balkans was completely changed. The response of the German government to these crisis was a substantial departure from the positions taken by its main European allies such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The policy of principled military abstinence taken by the German government was seen by centre-right politicians as way to send the country down a new *Sonderweg* ('separate path'),

⁶⁶ European Union (1992). *Treaty on European Union*. Maastricht, Netherlands, p. 8

distancing it from the other major Western democracies⁶⁷. What were the reasons behind such a distant policy from the one other Western democracies stood behind?

The positions assumed by Germany could be seen as a direct result of the end of the Cold War, after which the even remote possibility that the *Bundeswehr* (German Armed Forces) could be used for purposes other than national defence was inconceivable across the political spectrum⁶⁸. In addition to that, a historical perspective from which to see a possible military intervention abroad would inevitably bring back the ghost of World War II: over subsequent years, the renunciation of military power politics, that had been imposed by the Allies on Germany following its defeat, became a feature of the nation's foreign policy in the decades following the end of the war, which also brought economic advantages to the country, as it enjoyed military protection from other NATO allies while becoming a 'rich trading state'⁶⁹. Furthermore, fear of military escalation and the misjudgement of the allies' expectations of Germany influenced the choice of military abstinence: German politicians pushed the country's peacefulness and anti-militarism at every opportunity over the course of the Cold War⁷⁰.

The first major international escalation a united Germany had to face was the Gulf War of 1990-1991, ensued after the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq caused the US to form a coalition of 35 states in response to the aggression. Under Chancellor Kohl, Germany participated by providing financial aid, as the German Constitution effectively banned the dispatch of German troops to

⁶⁷ Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2003) Gulf War: The German Resistance, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 45:1, 99-116, p. 5. DOI: 10.1093/survival/45.1.99

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 4.

⁶⁹ Harnisch, S. and Maull, H. (2001). *Germany as a civilian power? The foreign policy of the Berlin republic*. p. 50. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 51.

combat zones outside the NATO theatre⁷¹. Again, possibly under the pressure to bring the country together on the impending unification, Germany limited participation to the military intervention, however providing assistance logistically and financially. This decision was also arguably taken while considering what impact would a military intervention from a newly unified Germany have on its European allies' views, effectively pushing the country even further away from the likeliness of a common foreign policy.

How was the country to follow the goal of common foreign policy as set out in the Maastricht Treaty? How would Germany perform under the situation of a joint EU military operation?

The case presented itself with the Yugoslav Wars, during which the Socialist State of Yugoslavia broke up after an economic and political crisis in the 1980s and the rise of nationalism. At first, the EU tried to deal with the crisis with a series of ceasefires, imposing sanctions while trying to solve the situation diplomatically. Both NATO and the EU were unable to provide effective preventive action, which was heavily due to their lack of coordination⁷².

German diplomacy during the crisis shifted from compliance with the EC's diplomatic attitude towards the conflict to becoming almost invisible when the war in Bosnia showed that in some conflicts, ways to solve them diplomatically can be useless against a policy of massacres and genocide⁷³: a moral debate in the country ensued, drawing historical parallels which argued that soldiers liberated the Nazi concentration camps⁷⁴. The developments in Bosnia were

⁷¹ Kinzer, S. (1991). WAR IN THE GULF: GERMANY; GERMANS ARE TOLD OF GULF-WAR ROLE. The New York Times. [online] Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/31/world/war-in-the-gulf-germany-germans-are-told-of-gulf-war-role.html> [Accessed 29 January 2018].

⁷² Falanga, S. (2015). EU/NATO intervention in Yugoslavia: Lessons learned?. [online] [futureforeignpolicy.com](http://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/eunato-intervention-yugoslavia-lessons-learned). Available at: <http://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/eunato-intervention-yugoslavia-lessons-learned> [Accessed 29 January 2018]

⁷³ Harnisch, S. and Maull, H. (2001). Germany as a civilian power? The foreign policy of the Berlin republic. p. 55. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

arguably a consequence of German recognition of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia: the recognition was advocated by German politicians in order to stop ongoing violence in Serb-inhabited areas, urging the other European leaders to follow suit by recognising the republics in January 1992, on the conditions that the newly independent countries would bring adequate measures to protect the political and civic rights of minorities⁷⁵. However, as ethnic violence escalated in the conflict following the recognition, Germany was the subject of fierce criticism from its European partners, who accused the nation of undermining the credibility of EU diplomacy, with some suspecting that the German government was pursuing hegemonic ambitions in the Balkan area⁷⁶. Nevertheless, once it became clear that diplomacy won't solve the conflict, the military abstinence policy supported by the Kohl government came to an end, as Germany agreed to participate in IFOR⁷⁷, the NATO-led multinational peace enforcement force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

German participation in the US-led United Nations "Unified Task Force" was the source of another national debate in Germany. Once again, Germany was torn between standing behind the constitutional prerogatives of military abstinence and compliance with the newly established EU principle of common foreign policy, as well as commitment to its allies like the United States. UN secretary general Ghali urged Germans to get rid of their restrictions in order to take part in the full range of UN military missions, including peace enforcement, leading to a debate in the *Bundestag* in which German Defence Minister Volker R  he remarked that Germany must "take on the same responsibility as its neighbours in a new and altered international system"⁷⁸. Ultimately, Germany's cabinet approved Chancellor Kohl's decision to send 1,640 troops to join the

⁷⁵ Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2006). *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement*. Manchester University Press.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Harnisch, S. and Maull, H. (2001). *Germany as a civilian power? The foreign policy of the Berlin republic*. p. 56. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

⁷⁸ (1993). *German Peacekeeping Plans Face Opposition*. p. 16. *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

peacekeeping operations in Somalia, however maintaining a low profile as they had a mandate to conduct humanitarian operations in secure areas of the country⁷⁹.

We thus see Germany reluctantly participating in peacekeeping operations, leaving German politicians in a difficult position in regards to the principles of peace enshrined in the 1949 constitution. The solutions found at the time could be seen as a compromise in maintaining a line of conduct based on peacefulness while trying to appease its European allies by participating marginally in the peace-enforcement operations. We initially see a pattern of independent decision-making within the international framework by German politicians, gradually shifting towards partial contribution to joint task forces. All decisions taken while skating on thin ice, as an even remotely aggressive stance towards these missions could have caused its allies to question the integrity of yet another military-enhanced Germany.

European citizenship: ultimate step to integration?

Another principle enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty brings about the concept of EU Citizenship. Citizenship of the European Union is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty:

“Every person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Portzman, F. (1993). Germany's Troops to go to Somalia. New York Times.

⁸⁰ European Union (1992). *Treaty on European Union*. Maastricht, Netherlands, p. 15

Being an EU citizen means that you have the right to travel, work and live anywhere in the European Union. The concept of EU citizenship was further amended with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, specifying that citizens have the right to vote and stand for election in the European Parliament and in the municipal elections in the member state in which the citizens reside⁸¹. However, before ratification by the Member States, the Lisbon Treaty required extra legitimacy provided by popular votes, as it went beyond the realm of “normal” politics.⁸² Germany, which at the time was holding presidency of the EU, welcomed this decision taken by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. This policy of accommodation adopted by the German government was taken in order to favour as much as they could the needs of governments who were expected to find it most difficult to resist domestic pressures towards a referendum, and who would have been most in danger of losing such a vote.⁸³

Once again, ratification of the Treaty faced suspension following German President Koehler’s claim that its text was incompatible with the German constitution, plunging the European Union in a constitutional crisis aggravated by the initial Irish rejection of the Treaty following a referendum⁸⁴. The main concerns coming from President Koehler were in regards to the significance of the Lisbon Treaty, fearing it would create a European federal state, therefore resulting with noncompliance with the *Grundgesetz* and triggering a potential referendum. The Constitutional Court ruled that the structural democratic deficit of the EU institutions could not be

⁸¹ Guild, E. (2010). The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon Fundamental Rights and EU Citizenship. Centre For European Policy Studies.

⁸² Oppermann, K. (2013) The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon, *Journal of European Integration*, 35:1, 73-89, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2012.671309

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Dw-world.de. (2008). German President Suspends Ratification of EU Lisbon Treaty. [online] Available at: <http://p.dw.com/p/ETH3> [Accessed 3 February 2018].

resolved in an association of sovereign national states, and that the authority of the German state was protected.⁸⁵

The Lisbon Treaty is a crucial example of Germany's commitment to the European Project, as it was supported by all Germany's main political parties and was a priority for Chancellor Merkel⁸⁶; yet, it arguably shows how this German vocation towards the project was exhausted for the future: the challenge posed by the German President towards the legality of the new Treaty goes to show how politicians in the country are slowly turning to question the real consequences of deeper integration between European countries.

⁸⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) (2009). Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon compatible with the Basic Law; accompanying law unconstitutional to the extent that legislative bodies have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20091001215432/http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressmitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html> [Accessed 4 February 2018]

⁸⁶ Paterson, W. (2010). Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation? *German Politics*, 19(1), pp.41-52.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has researched and debated the stance and position taken by Germany following reunification in the European framework, given theories, assumptions and hypothesis developed by both German and Western scholars in more than twenty-five years of deeper European integration. We saw how Germany carried out its difficult yet long-awaited process of reunification under the inquisitive eye of its European partners and allies, while completely restructuring and integrating a former communist country into a new German state in line with the European context of political and economic union based on common values of free-trade and circulation between the people of the continent. The concept of monetary union was a challenge for both the people and the government of Germany, as most Germans were not ready to give up the stability of their internationally-respected currency despite their politicians pushing for it in order to further integrate the continent. This was further questioned when other European nations started challenging the legality and the advantages of a Single European Currency: France saw it as an opportunity to control Germany through a deeper economic integration despite its citizens almost rejecting the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum; the United Kingdom rejected the idea of Single Currency under Thatcher's government, who acted upon the belief that a monetary union would surrender Parliamentary Sovereignty to a supranational authority; Italy on the other hand approved of Maastricht by a large majority in Parliament despite some Eurosceptic politicians sharing some of Thatcher's concerns over the danger of a Single Currency. We ultimately discussed two more important notions introduced by the Treaty on European Union: Common Foreign Policy and European Citizenship, with both receiving mixed signals by Germany over the years following reunification and restructuring of the European Project. Despite concerns that rose from its European partners in regards to a newly militarily-active Germany, we argued how

Germany maintained its military abstinence under international pressure, initially resorting to diplomatic ways to solve crises. A more aggressive stance in the context of peace-enforcement missions could have established the hegemonic nature of Germany in the European continent, combining the economic prowess of the country with its military. However, its military abstinence could also be seen as a way to enjoy military protection from its NATO allies while extending its economic power by saving on the budget defence. Nonetheless, we have seen how German commitment to Europe has always been a priority by its politicians, pushing for greater integration in the interests of the people of the Union. Ultimately, it can be said that the reunification process has effectively pushed pro-European sentiment in the German political elite, seeing it as an opportunity to establish a completely renovated concept of a peaceful Germany in the integrated European framework, while recognising the potential risks of a deeper Union for the foreseeable future, for the sake of its own people as well as Europeans. Despite its reluctant attitude towards participation in peace-enforcement missions - which would establish the country's military might in the continent -, and a more cautious approach to the developments in European integration, Germany is deservedly accredited as Europe's leader rather than a hegemon, as a consequence of 25 years of Europhile policies which dominated the German political spectrum.

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RIASSUNTO ELABORATO FINALE

Il focus di questo elaborato si concentra sull'impatto della riunificazione tedesca nel processo di una più profonda integrazione europea, consolidatosi nel 1992 con la firma del Trattato di Maastricht e su come le principali potenze Europee abbiano reagito ed agito di conseguenza, per difendere i propri interessi nazionali assumendo diverse posizioni nei confronti di una Germania unita nel contesto Europeo. L'elaborato si basa su una valutazione approfondita della letteratura secondaria di base inerente al tema, così come sulle pubblicazioni governative e di stampa in Germania, Francia, Italia e Regno Unito. La tesi procede partendo da un'analisi del processo di unificazione politica tra i due Stati tedeschi, seguita da una riconsiderazione del problema di inclusione della Germania orientale nel quadro europeo, valutando al tempo stesso le reazioni internazionali a una Germania appena riunificata per quanto riguarda la posizione che avrebbe assunto in un'Europa ulteriormente integrata e determinando infine se l'unione monetaria dell'Europa fosse una misura necessaria per avvicinare gli Stati Membri. Infine, l'impatto che la Germania avrà su questi sviluppi a livello europeo viene ulteriormente esplorato in un più ampio contesto di politica estera, prendendo in considerazione una maggiore autonomia tedesca nei processi decisionali per quanto riguarda il teatro internazionale, valutando come la Germania sia stata in grado di mantenere un'astensione militare post-bellica pur accogliendo le esigenze dei suoi alleati nelle operazioni militari all'estero. Il concetto di cittadinanza europea e il suo impatto sugli Stati membri dell'Unione europea vengono discussi nell'ultima sezione dell'elaborato. Con il supporto di studiosi come Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, Jeffrey Anderson, Sebastian Harnisch e Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, i cui lavori hanno analizzato da vicino le forze che hanno unito la Germania e l'eredità di 50 anni di astinenza militare in un nuovo contesto di politica estera comune europea, viene valutato

fino a che punto la Germania possa essere considerata la potenza egemone dell'Europa o il suo degno, ma riluttante, leader.

Si è a lungo discusso su chi fosse effettivamente l'artefice del percorso verso la riunificazione tedesca e, nonostante alcuni accademici ritengano che il processo sia stato portato avanti dai suoi predecessori, il cancelliere della Germania dell'Ovest Helmut Kohl viene spesso accreditato come il principale artefice di questo progetto impegnativo. Il suo programma in 10 punti sulla riunificazione tedesca esprimeva una decisiva cooperazione tra Est e Ovest, nel diretto interesse del popolo tedesco e per facilitare l'integrazione di un paese comunista in un sistema basato sul capitalismo e la proprietà privata. In questo programma, il Cancelliere Kohl evidenziava l'importanza del mantenere lo sviluppo tra le due nazioni all'interno del progetto Pan-Europeo, sottolineando come la struttura di una nuova Germania dovesse entrare in perfetta sintonia con il progetto Europeo. Questa posizione assunta da Kohl sottolinea l'importanza che il Cancelliere dava al rafforzamento della Comunità Europea, per incentivare la cooperazione tra le nazioni Europee e spingerle verso l'inclusione dei paesi dell'Est in fase di riforme economiche. Il mantenimento di questa prospettiva sull'espansione della Comunità europea era considerato inequivocabile da Kohl, poiché anche l'unità tedesca era di interesse europeo. Pertanto, l'intero processo doveva essere considerato un importante collegamento con l'integrazione europea. Questa integrazione era, nelle parole del Cancelliere, l'unica via attraverso la quale l'identità di tutti gli europei doveva essere mantenuta, affermata e sviluppata. Tale identità doveva essere basata non solo sulla diversità culturale del continente, ma anche sui diritti fondamentali di libertà, democrazia, diritti umani e autodeterminazione.

Il programma si concentrava sull'affrontare i problemi provenienti dalla struttura politica della Germania Orientale, la quale ricordava

molto da vicino quella dei suoi alleati nel Patto di Varsavia, come la Polonia o la Cecoslovacchia. A seguito delle pressioni sociali provocate dalla caduta del Muro a novembre e nel timore di un ambiente ancora più instabile tra i due stati tedeschi, il primo ministro della Germania Orientale, Hans Modrow, propose che sia i partiti dell'opposizione che le alleanze per i diritti civili dovessero partecipare al governo. Questa apertura all'opposizione portò alle primissime elezioni libere ed eque nella Germania dell'Est dal 1932, con il CDU della Germania Orientale sostenuto con fermezza da Helmut Kohl. L'agenda politica del CDU prevedeva un proposto rafforzamento della Comunità Europea da portare a termine una volta completata la riunificazione. La riunificazione implicava quindi il consolidamento di un'Europa più ampia, con una Germania unificata come principale sostenitrice di un'ulteriore integrazione. Fondamentale per il processo di transizione fu anche il ripristino dell'indipendenza delle nazioni del blocco sovietico, riducendo l'egemonia sovietica nell'Europa centrale e orientale al fine di espandere la Comunità Europea oltre la famigerata cortina di ferro. Le prime elezioni libere nella Germania Orientale portarono Lothar de Maiziere alla vittoria, i quali obiettivi includevano una rapida unione economica, monetaria e sociale. Tali obiettivi furono raggiunti attraverso l'attuazione di 96 leggi, tre trattati principali e un numero impreciso di proposte di gabinetto, che hanno reso possibile l'adesione della Germania Orientale alla Legge fondamentale per la Repubblica Federale Tedesca, sia per quanto riguarda la politica interna che quella estera.

La riunificazione formale delle due Germanie ebbe luogo il 3 ottobre 1990 e, a seguito di una una decisiva vittoria elettorale federale, il cancelliere Helmut Kohl elaborò un piano economico che consisteva in una serie di programmi per rilanciare l'economia dei stati orientali, ovvero la Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung-Ost. Il piano prevedeva un insieme di incentivi fiscali, crediti di investimento e sovvenzioni infrastrutturali, ponendo enfasi sulle piccole e medie imprese. Gli

incentivi per le imprese occidentali a investire raggiunsero massimi livelli nei cinque nuovi stati, sebbene con diversi gradi di successo. In concomitanza con il piano proposto, le richieste portate avanti dall'SPD e dalle autorità rappresentanti degli stati orientali riguardanti nuove tasse per finanziare la ristrutturazione e limitare il debito pubblico complessivo furono inizialmente respinte dal governo di coalizione, così come le richieste per la creazione di nuove istituzioni che avrebbero dovuto implementare le politiche del governo. Quando divenne chiaro che il piano non sarebbe stato sufficiente a rialzare l'economia tedesca orientale, l'imposta supplementare sul reddito conosciuta come 'Solidaritätszuschlag' divenne un ulteriore strumento per finanziare l'unità tedesca (sebbene fosse inizialmente imposto per ripagare i debiti causati dagli aiuti finanziari forniti dalla Germania nella Guerra del Golfo). Il processo di privatizzazione delle società dell'ex Germania Orientale fu affidato alla Treuhandanstalt, la quale dovette affrontare i problemi posti dall'impatto dell'unione monetaria ed economica sulle piccole e medie imprese. L'agenzia governativa venne in seguito accusata di aver agito con poca trasparenza, in parte dovuta alla pressione sociale causata dalla febbre della riunificazione.

Contemporaneamente al processo di riunificazione, in Europa si cominciava a parlare di una politica estera comune. Sebbene i negoziati per una politica estera comune fossero stati avviati con l'Atto unico europeo del 1986, la Comunità Europea non era pronta a compiere un passo così grande nel processo di integrazione: conflitti di interessi e alleanze diverse all'interno del blocco hanno impedito che ciò accadesse, alimentati soprattutto dai dubbi provenienti dalla Germania che, nonostante il suo sostegno a una più ampia integrazione economica, non era pronta a sostenere completamente un programma politico internazionale condiviso. I negoziati furono influenzati dalle reazioni dei politici europei nei confronti di una Germania unita. I leader di Francia, Regno Unito e Italia espressero le proprie opinioni in merito, ciascuno con le

proprie prospettive in relazione agli effetti di una Germania unita all'interno di una Comunità europea in continua espansione, producendo i suoi primi effetti sul processo decisionale nell'ambito dell'integrazione europea e delle relazioni intergovernative, in un momento in cui la Comunità Europea era pronta a compiere il passo successivo per avvicinare ancora di più gli Stati Membri, prima con l'Atto unico e poi con il Trattato di Maastricht. Le potenze europee non erano quindi pronte a considerare la riunificazione tedesca un evento positivo per l'integrazione europea, ma piuttosto un cattivo auspicio per i loro futuro, poiché il dominio tedesco era visto come una conseguenza inevitabile.

L'integrazione europea prese una svolta decisiva il 7 febbraio 1992, quando i 12 membri della Comunità Europea firmarono il trattato sull'Unione Europea (o il trattato di Maastricht), entrato in vigore il primo novembre 1993 creando i tre pilastri fondamentali che sono ora alla base dell'Unione e della moneta unica europea, l'Euro. Nonostante sia quasi universalmente riconosciuto che il trattato derivi dagli sviluppi economici e istituzionali che ebbero luogo prima del 1989, una delle teorie discusse su Maastricht da studiosi come Michael J. Baun afferma che il trattato stesso sia una risposta non molto velata data dai Paesi della Comunità all'unificazione tedesca. Il trattato ruotava intorno al concetto di unione monetaria, che doveva essere raggiunto entro la fine del decennio, portando effettivamente l'unità economica e politica europea a un livello di integrazione completamente diverso. Nonostante l'umore positivo che scaturì dai negoziati, il trattato iniziò a far fronte alla crescente opposizione popolare alla ratifica nei diversi paesi della Comunità, alimentata dalla stagnazione economica e dalla crisi che stava affliggendo il continente in quel periodo. L'analisi delle risposte politiche e pubbliche nei paesi della Comunità nei confronti del consolidamento del progetto europeo sottolinea quanta influenza gli interessi nazionali abbiano avuto nel modellarle, con alcuni paesi come la Francia che consideravano il trattato di Maastricht

un'opportunità per contenere la Germania mentre altri come l'Italia e il Regno Unito che si preoccupavano dell'effetto politico-economico del progetto sui propri paesi.

Il trattato di Maastricht esortava inoltre l'Unione europea a far valere la sua identità sulla scena internazionale, in particolare attraverso l'attuazione di una politica estera e di sicurezza comune, comprendendo la successiva definizione di una politica di difesa comune, che avrebbe potuto in futuro portare a una difesa comune. Questo approvvigionamento incluso nel trattato poneva la Germania davanti a un dilemma: seguire i propri alleati nelle missioni di peace-enforcement o mantenersi nella loro politica di astensione militare meglio conosciuta come Sonderweg? Tutto ciò viene discusso nell'analisi della risposta tedesca nei confronti di tre grandi escalation internazionali: la Guerra del Golfo del 1990-1991, l'intervento militare delle Nazioni Unite in Somalia del 1993 e le guerre Jugoslave del 1991-2001. Osserviamo quindi la Germania partecipare a malincuore alle operazioni di peace-enforcement, lasciando i politici tedeschi in una posizione difficile per quanto riguarda i principi di pace sanciti nella costituzione del 1949. Le soluzioni trovate dalla Germania all'epoca potevano essere viste come un compromesso nel mantenere una linea di condotta basata sulla pace mentre si cercava di placare i propri alleati europei partecipando marginalmente alle operazioni di peace-enforcement. Inizialmente vediamo un modello di processo decisionale indipendente all'interno del quadro internazionale da parte dei politici tedeschi, spostandosi successivamente verso un contributo parziale alle task force congiunte. Tutte queste decisioni vennero prese dai politici tedeschi in un'atmosfera di alta tensione, in quanto un approccio anche lontanamente aggressivo nei confronti di queste missioni avrebbe potuto far sì che gli alleati della Germania mettessero in discussione l'integrità di una Germania ancora una volta rafforzata dal potere militare.

Un altro principio sancito dal Trattato di Maastricht porta al concetto di cittadinanza europea, il quale stabilisce che ogni cittadino degli Stati Membri abbia il diritto di viaggiare, lavorare e vivere ovunque nell'Unione Europea. Il concetto di cittadinanza europea è stato ulteriormente modificato con la firma del trattato di Lisbona nel 2007, il quale specifica che i cittadini abbiano il diritto di votare e candidarsi al Parlamento Europeo e alle elezioni municipali nello stato membro in cui risiedono. Tuttavia, prima della ratifica da parte degli Stati membri, il trattato di Lisbona richiedeva un'ulteriore legittimità fornita dai voti popolari, accolta con entusiasmo dalla Germania la quale all'epoca stava alla presidenza dell'UE. Inoltre, la ratifica del Trattato venne sospesa dalla stessa Germania, in seguito all'affermazione del presidente tedesco Koehler che il testo di Lisbona fosse incompatibile con la Costituzione tedesca, facendo precipitare l'Unione europea in una crisi costituzionale aggravata dall'iniziale rifiuto irlandese del Trattato a seguito di un referendum. Il trattato di Lisbona è un esempio cruciale dell'impegno della Germania verso il progetto europeo, in quanto venne sostenuto da tutti i principali partiti politici della Germania e fu una priorità per la Cancelliera Merkel; tuttavia, si nota come tale vocazione tedesca verso il progetto sia stata esaurita per il futuro: la sfida posta dal Presidente tedesco verso la legalità del nuovo Trattato dimostra come i politici del paese si stiano lentamente spostando verso un approccio più critico del progetto europeo, valutando le conseguenze concrete di una più profonda integrazione tra i paesi europei.

Questo elaborato ha portato alla conclusione che afferma il processo di riunificazione come la spinta decisiva per il sentimento filoeuropeo nell'élite politica tedesca, considerata come un'opportunità per stabilire un concetto rinnovato di una Germania pacifica all'interno del quadro europeo integrato, pur riconoscendo i potenziali rischi di un'Unione più profonda per il futuro, per il bene comune dei tedeschi e degli europei. Nonostante il suo atteggiamento riluttante verso la partecipazione alle missioni di

peace-enforcement - che affermerebbero la potenza militare del paese nel continente - e un approccio più cauto agli sviluppi dell'integrazione europea, la Germania è a buon diritto accreditata come il leader europeo piuttosto che il suo egemone, in seguito a decenni di politiche filo-europee che hanno dominato lo spettro politico tedesco.