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Yugoslavia: the process of integration and its failure

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Academic Year 2019/2020

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Introduction

Yugoslavia was one of the most interesting political experiments of the twentieth century, its beauty is to be found in the fact that its conception is much older than its creation: if in fact the birth of the first Yugoslav state dates back to 1918, with the foundation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the idea of a state that encompasses all the Southern Slavic populations dates back to at least a century earlier, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, at the same time as the birth of liberalist and nationalist ideologies in the continent European, whose uprisings in '48, also known as the spring of the peoples, will constitute the apex of their diffusion and manifestation.

It is therefore very important, before talking about Yugoslavia, to fully understand the complicated historical process that led to its formation, and this is the goal of the first chapter of this thesis: to try to describe and assimilate the various events that have taken place in the Balkans from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, also giving a quick glance at the most important events that occurred previously, so as to have a complete idea of the development of the nationalistic phenomenon. We will therefore begin first with a brief description of the various Slavic peoples who live in Europe and we will proceed with a quick historical overview of the main events in the Balkans before the nineteenth century, we will then move on to analyze in detail the birth and development of nationalist ideologies in the regions of the Balkans inhabited by Slavic populations, paying particular attention to the relationship between them and the empires to which they were subjugated, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

We will then continue by describing the line of thought and political strategy pursued by the Great Western Powers in the Balkans, which are then at the basis of the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and the First World War: it is in fact impossible to separate the two, as the latter are directed consequences of the first; we will see above all how the interest of the Great Powers in the Balkans was due to the sudden power vacuum left in the area by the Ottoman Empire, which had dominated the region for centuries, and we will see the different reasons that led them, each in their own way, to care so much. The First World War had the consequence, among many other things, that of the

creation of the first sovereign state, independent of foreign domination, which brought together all the southern Slavic peoples, the Kingdom of the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, which should have represented model of coexistence between different ethnic groups, but which unfortunately will have a very difficult life, despite its short duration (about ten years), due to strong nationalistic pressures and the different opinions of the constituent ethnic groups on how the Kingdom should have been organized. Following a coup d'état at the hands of King Alexander I, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was born, which established a personal dictatorship that aimed at the cultural and administrative centralization of the state, thus trying to eliminate the differences of the various Slavic peoples who inhabited it, thus to avoid pressure of anything.

Unfortunately, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was also short-lived, with the outbreak of the Second World War the invasion by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany also arrived: at first the Kingdom tried to maintain a neutral position hoping that, as Switzerland could have avoided being the object of expansionist aims by the Axis forces, but this was not the case. The country was invaded and the Independent State of Croatia was created, a puppet state of Germany and Italy controlled by the Ustaša, the Croatian fascists, who committed the worst crimes such as genocide against the Serbian population, as well as the Jewish one, and the establishment of numerous concentration camps. It was only thanks to the help of the Partisans, led by the communist Josip Broz (later known as Tito), that Yugoslavia was liberated from foreign domination. It is important to keep in mind that the Soviet Red Army helped the Partisans little or nothing, and this will be of great importance for the development of future relations between the two countries.

In the second chapter we will try to describe the main ideology of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Titoism, which tried to smooth out the differences between the peoples who inhabited the Republic by creating a new national identity, that of Yugoslavia. But before doing this, it is important to understand what is meant by nation and nationalism, for this reason the first pages of the second chapter are dedicated to the deepening of these two concepts and you will learn how, although they may seem simple to describe and analyze, not even the scholars have an unanimous

opinion on the subject: if some consider the phenomenon purely European, and that all nationalisms outside Europe are nothing more than a revival of those concepts in a local key, there are others who, especially in the recent years, they see this vision as too Eurocentric, therefore anachronistic and disconnected from reality. Similarly, other scholars try instead to link the phenomenon of nationalism to that of industrialization, noting a certain correlation between the birth of nationalist movements with that of industrialized society, even if some consider this view too functional and does not take into account other factors that may have led to the birth of these movements.

Once this difficulty of the academic world in defining the origins of the phenomenon in a definitive way has been described, we move on to the description of Titoism, putting it in particular in contrast with the other great communist ideology in force at that time in Europe, Stalinism. This contrast is important because it reflects the historical events of when Titoism was developed, in the 50s, when there was the split between Tito and Stalin, which occurred following the refusal of the first to blindly obey the orders and will of the second, this it happened because Yugoslavia was the only large communist state that managed to free itself without the help of the Red Army, and was not subject to that regime of surveillance and control to which all the countries of the communist bloc were forced, therefore he was able to carry out his policies independently from Moscow.

Taken as a whole, the analysis of the Titoist ideology can be summarized in three main points: first of all that each country must carry out its project of transformation of society from bourgeois to communist following its own needs, and that therefore the existence of a single leading state (the USSR) is inconceivable. The second point concerns the use of violent and revolutionary methods to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, considered by the Stalinists as the only way to carry out the communist project, while the Titoists believed that this was not always necessary, and that sometimes the Communist revolution could also take hold in capitalist political systems, taking the Scandinavian countries as an example. The last point, instead, concerns the fact that Titoism did have as its objective the realization of the communist state, but that this should have been achieved

in a long-term perspective, without therefore trying to speed up the process, respecting precisely the needs and needs of the single state.

After addressing this topic, the thesis returns to the historical analysis of the main historical events in Yugoslavia, such as the fact that Stalin's death in 1953 led to a relaxation of relations between the two countries, and that Yugoslavia was in the meanwhile one of the founding states of the Non-Aligned Movement, which brought together all the states that were not part of either the Western or the Eastern blocs; one of Tito's goals was to make this movement the "third bloc" in international relations, but without succeeding.

Continuing, we analyze the economic situation of Yugoslavia from the 50s to the 70s, the introduction of the self-management system of workers, and how the first substantial regional differences that would later have an important role in the dissolution of the country were already glimpsed. . It is important to note, however, that in the 1981 census there was the highest number ever recorded of citizens declared Yugoslavs, equal to 5.4% of the population, a sharp increase compared to ten years earlier, when it reached 1.3%, highlighting how Tito's unifying policy had begun to yield the desired results. Unfortunately, however, as we all know, Yugoslavia dissolved, and this due to a series of different but closely related factors, some of these factors include: the death of Tito, considered the political and social glue of the country, the rise of the Serbian nationalism, an increasingly difficult economic situation and the weakening of communist regimes globally. In this section, the thesis tries to explore these and other causes that may have contributed to a greater or lesser extent to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The third chapter, on the other hand, briefly describes the current situation of the former Socialist Republics, one by one, highlighting how even today the already existing regional differences have not smoothed out, but have even increased. We will therefore try to understand what are the challenges that these countries are still facing today, and which ones they could face in the future

Chapter 1: Chrono-history of the Balkans until the formation of Yugoslavia

1. The origin of the conflict

1.1. Before the 19th century

The Slavs constitute an important ethno-linguistic branch of the Indo-European family: they mainly reside in Europe, where they make up about a third of the population. Starting in the 6th century, they emigrated from their original territories in Eastern Europe to Central Europe and the Balkans. Subsequently, many of them also settled in North Asia or moved, in more contemporary times, to other areas of the world.

The Slavs are divided into three ethno-linguistic subgroups: Western, Eastern, and Southern Slavs.

These are in turn differed by the language they belong to, and therefore we have:

- Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians (Eastern Slavs)
- Polish, Czech, Slovak (Western Slavs)
- Slovenians, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and Macedonians (Southern Slavs). Even if listed separate, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrins, and Bosnian are the same language, commonly called Serbo-Croatian, in this case the distinction is not based on an ethno-linguistic basis, but rather a political one[1].

The southern Slavs occupy a significant portion of the Balkan peninsula, they are in fact the majority ethnic component of 7 of the 9 Balkan states (10 if we consider Kosovo as an independent country).

The southern Slavs emigrated to the Balkan peninsula, including Greece, and a portion of Asia minor, starting from the 6th century, supplanting the pre-existing Illyrian and neo-Latin populations. They moved from their original territory at the same time of the Germanic tribes' westward expansion in the Roman Empire.

Around the end of the 7th century, the Slavs settled in much of central and south-eastern Europe. Bulgarians were the first to create a political South Slavic entity, a state founded in 681 as a union between Slavic and the Bulgars tribes, these one being Turkic people from the Volga river (hence the name Bulgarians), led by Khan Asparuh.

The people of Slavic settlements in Peloponnese and in Asia minor were soon assimilated to the local cultures, while the Romance people lived in Dalmatia, inside fortified city-states, and in the

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[1] SNJEŽANA KORDIĆ, (2010) *Jezik i nacionalizam (Language and Nationalism),* Zagreb: Durieux (Rotulus Universitas), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/

Walachia region of modern-day Romania. According to popular historiography, the influx of Serbs and Croats into the Balkans was part of a second Slavic invasion.

During much of the Medieval period, the Slavic peoples were *foederati* of the Byzantine Empire, meaning that they were "barbarian" mercenaries who were allowed to settle within the Empire. At the same time, the Christianization process of most of the tribes began, leading to a first internal split following the East-West schism, with the Slovenians and Croatians converting to Roman Catholicism, while Bulgarians, Serbs, and Macedonians to Eastern Orthodoxy.

From the 14th to the beginning of the 20th century, a large part of the Balkans was under Ottoman rule, leading, among other things, to the process of Islamization of many of the Balkan peoples, notably Bosnians, Pomaks, Gorani, Torbeši (Slavs) and Albanians (non-Slavs).

This great plurality of ethnicities and religions that coexisted together for centuries led to a relative degree of tolerance and coexistence with each other.

The situation changed radically during the 19th century.

1.2. Rise of nationalism in the Slavic Balkans during the 19th century

During the 19th century, nationalist theories arose in Europe following the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Most of the Balkan were under Ottoman rule at the beginning of the 19th century; for four centuries the Christian peoples, first Serbs and Greeks, then Montenegrins and Bulgarians, had been under Ottoman rule. The Balkan people managed to gain independence or even just more autonomy and self-rule through bloody riots, revolts, and armed revolutions.

Going in detail country by country:

1.2.1. Bosnia[2]

Bosnia was one of the Ottoman Empire's least developed provinces, as well as one of the most autonomous. The Sultan Mahmud II tried to implement various economic reforms, and to extend the centrally controlled army into the Balkans, abolishing the local Janissary corps. The conservative Bosnian Muslim elite opposed the Sultan's reformist efforts. Disputes persisted during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, as no one was willing to sacrifice their rights and agree to the changes aimed at centralizing the government.

Because of this, along with unhappiness at the political concessions given to emerging eastern Christian states, in 1831 Husein Gradaščević's, a military commander of the Ottoman Empire, brought about a popular rebellion. With the aid of his Albanian allies, he and the rebels were

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[2] MITJA VELIKONJA, Religious separation and political intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 84, available at: https://books.google.com/

eventually able to take control of the city of Travnik. The rebels requested a special autonomous status for Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Ottoman Empire. They promised to remain faithful to the sultan only if these demands were met. Ultimately, the grand vizier managed to separate the Herzegovinian armies, led by Ali-paša Rizvanbegović, from Gradaščević 's powers.

The rebellion was eventually quelled, and in 1833 the new province of Herzegovina was established by taking land from the southern part of Bosnia and given to Ali-paša Rizvanbegović as a reward for his contribution[3]. This new province only existed for a few years: it was returned to the Bosnians after Rizvanbegović's death. Gradaščević is considered the national hero of Bosnia for his actions and he is known as "Dragon of Bosnia" (*Zmaj od Bosne*)

By 1850 similar rebellions had been repressed. In the 1860s, a renewed attempt at Ottoman reform took place when the provincial printing press was created in 1866, written in both Ottoman and Bosnian languages. In 1875, agrarian unrest gradually sparked the Herzegovinian revolution, a major peasant rebellion. The war quickly spread and included many Balkan states and the Great Powers as well, which ultimately forced the Ottomans to hand over the country's administration to Austria-Hungary after the signing of the Berlin Treaty of 1878[4].

1.2.2. Bulgaria[5]

In the 19th century, the growing discontent of Bulgaria led to a national revival movement that restored Bulgarian national consciousness and paved the way for independence.

Many Bulgarian merchant houses were founded, and local craftsmen began to form guild organizations that played an important role in sponsoring schools and providing scholarships for young Bulgarians to study abroad. The spread of education was, in fact, the centerpiece of Bulgaria's national revival.

Initially, the rise of Bulgarian national consciousness was a cultural rather than a political movement, for example, the desire to restore an independent Bulgarian church was one of the main goals of the national "Awakeners." Their efforts were rewarded in 1870 when the Ottoman Government issued a decree establishing an autocephalous (autonomous) Bulgarian church.

Although the Greek Patriarch refused to recognize the Church and excommunicated its adherents, it became a leading force in Bulgarian life, representing Bulgarian interests to the Ottoman author and sponsoring the further expansion of Bulgarian churches and schools.

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[3] GÁBOR ÁGOSTON, BRUCE ALAN MASTERS, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, p. 93, at https://books.google.com/
[4] MALCOLM, NOEL (2002). Bosnia: A Short History. Pan Books, available at: https://books.google.com/
[5] PHILIP DIMITROV, FRANCIS WILLIAM CARTER, Bulgaria, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Bulgaria/The-national-revival

In 1866, Lyuben Karavelov and Vasil Levski created the Bulgarian Secret Central Committee in Bucharest, Romania, to prepare for a national uprising. In the following year the Internal Revolutionary Organization (in Bulgarian: Вътрешна Революционна Организация, Vatreschna Revoljuzionna Organizacija) and the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (in Bulgarian: Български Революционен Централен Комитет, Bălgarski Revoljucionen Centralen Komitet), were created, with Vasil Levski taking actively part in both organizations.

The so-called "April uprising" (in Bulgarian: Априлско въстание, Aprilsko văstanie) erupted on the 20th of April 1876. The brutal repression of the uprising and the massacres perpetrated against the civilian population, the atrocities committed against the civilian population by irregular Turkish forces, including the massacre of 15,000 Bulgarians near Plovdiv, had the sole effect of strengthening the demand for independence in Bulgaria.

Following the defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed. The boundaries set out in the treaty, signed on February 19, 1878, represented the fulfillment of the territorial ambitions of Bulgaria, since a new Bulgarian state would be created. The creation of an independent Bulgaria, viewed as an outpost of Russian control in the Balkans, was intolerable to Austria-Hungary and Britain, which forced a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano at the Berlin Congress a few months later. The Treaty of Berlin, signed on 1 July 1878, established two Bulgarian states, one that was autonomous but under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, the other, known as Eastern Rumelia, was independent.

1.2.3. Croatia[6]

Croatian resistance emerged when Hungarian was adopted as the official language in Hungary and Croatia, with the development of the Illyrian movement in the 1830s. The Illyrians were mainly scholars, academics, and clergymen led by Ljudevit Gaj, a linguist. They fought to protect the interests of Croatia by calling for unification of all the South Slavs, which could be encouraged by adopting a common literary language.

Threatened by Hungarian nationalism in the 1848 Revolution, and hoping for national unity and autonomy within the Austrian Empire, the Croats sided with the Austrian monarchy against the Hungarians, but got, instead of a reward, the same central rule and Germanization as the Hungarians were handled as punishment.

The continuous contrast with the Habsburgs and Hungarians, and the need to depend on the other South Slavs held alive the Illyrian idea, revived in the 1860s under the name Yugoslavism. The

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[6] LIZ DAVID-BARRETT, JOHN R. LAMPE, et al, Croatia available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Croatia/Croatian-national-revival

Yugoslavists proposed South Slav unification as the basis for an autonomous Balkan state within a federated Habsburg regime.

When in 1867 the Habsburg monarchy was reorganized as the Austria-Hungary dual monarchy, Croatia was put under Hungarian rule, and its statehood was officially recognized under an 1868 agreement with Hungary, known as the Nagodba, but in reality Croatia had no real influence over its affairs.

The Sabor (Parliament) demanded that Bosnia and Herzegovina (under Habsburg occupation from 1878) be integrated into Croatia on the basis that those territories were part of Croatia's medieval monarchy, but the demand was denied.

In the following decades, the Hungarian dominance of Croatian politics was retained by a Hungarian magnate, Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry, and was supported by those in Croatia who favored collaboration with Budapest. The Government also gained support by making concessions to the Serbs, who had become a greater proportion of the population of Croatia when the Military Frontier was integrated into the local population. These reforms increased antagonism between Croatia and the Serbs, as well as the demands for greater Croatian autonomy.

1.2.4. North Macedonia

The origins of the idea of the ethnic Slav Macedonian identity emerged from the compositions of Georgi Pulevski in the 1870s and 1880s, who differentiated the emergence of a particular advanced "Slav Macedonian" dialect, which he defined as distinct from other dialects because it had (according to his theory) etymological components from Serbian, Bulgarian, Slavonic and Albanian[7].

Pulevski spent his time studying traditional folk stories of the Macedonian people and reached the conclusion that the Slavic Macedonians were ethnically related to the people of Alexander the Great of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia. He based his claims on the (linguistically wrong[8]) suggestion that the ancient Macedonian Greek dialect had Slavic features in it, thus making the ancient Macedonian people Slavic.

In either case, during the late 19th century, Slavic Macedonians remained ambiguous regarding self-identification and nationalist loyalties, as Pulevski himself failed in giving a precise answer regarding his own, once calling himself a "Serbian nationalist", another time a "Bulgarian from the village of Galicnik[9]", revealing the absence of clear ethnic identification in the Macedonian people.

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[7] FRIEDMAN VICTOR A (1975). *Macedonian language and nationalism during the 19th and early 20th centuries*
[8] Macedonian belongs to the eastern group of the South Slavic branch of the Slavic languages, while Ancient Macedonian is an extinct language, it is still debated whether it was a dialect of Ancient Greek or a separate Hellenic language
[9] PETER LANG (2010). *Contested Ethnic Identity: The Case of Macedonian Immigrants in Toronto*, 1900–1996. p. 67.

In 1893 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Movement (IMRO, Macedonian: Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација, Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija) was created, and emerged as the largest Macedonian nationalist organization, demanding Macedonia's independence from the Ottoman Empire. The IMRO originally opposed the idea of a Macedonian nation being subjected to any of its neighboring countries, like Greece and Serbia. However, in the following years, the IMRO built a solid relationship with Bulgaria, so much that some members of the movement wanted Macedonia to merge into Bulgaria because they believed that Bulgarians and Macedonians were the same people. The international community itself considered Macedonians to be Bulgarians, in fact, at the end of the First World War, very few ethnographers accepted the idea that a distinct Macedonian nation existed.

After the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 and the subsequent division of Ottoman Macedonia between three neighboring Christian states, the "Macedonian question" became particularly important, followed by tensions between these states for its possession. Each of these countries tried to "persuade" the population to loyalty in order to legitimize their arguments. Macedonian nationalistic ideas grew in importance after the First World War and were supported by the Comintern (the Communist International).

1.2.5. Serbia[10]

The fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church remained autonomous and free to operate throughout the period of Ottoman rule was one of the reasons for the rise of Serbian nationalism. The church, in fact, acted as the maintainer of the Serbian national identity, keeping the memory of the medieval past, when the nation was independent.

The Serbian linguist Vuk Stefanović Karadžić is considered the father of Serbian nationalism because he created a linguistic definition of the Serbs that included all speakers of the Štokavian dialect. This definition is especially significant since Štokavian is the most common dialect of the Serbo-Croatian language, and therefore it also includes most Croatians and Bosniaks speakers. Other prominent figures of Serbian nationalism include Ilija Garašanin: he advocated for the creation of a Greater Serbia, a country that would consist of all the Serbs in the Balkan region.

The Serbian Revolution lasted from 1804 to 1835, it is particularly remarkable since it was among the first major oppositions to the Ottoman rule in the Balkans that led to tangible results. The Revolution is usually divided into two phases: the first, from 1804 to 1817, was the most violent, with recurrent armed insurrections, the second, from 1817 to 1835, is instead characterized by the consolidation of power in the hands of the Serbian nationalists, and eventually the formation of the

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[10] MOTYL, ALEXANDER J. (2001). *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, Volume II, pp 470

Principality of Serbia an autonomous region inside the Ottoman Empire ruled by the leader of the second Bosnian Uprising Miloš Obrenović.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, the Principality was recognized as an independent state in 1878. Serbian nationalists' desire for independence merged with that of those who proposed the creation of a united south Slavic nation, Yugoslavia. Doing so, Serbia sought to emulate the role that the Kingdom of Sardinia had in the reunification process of Italy.

1.2.6. Slovenia

Napoleon conquered and incorporated the Slovenian territory into the wider Illyrian provinces in 1809, an autonomous area of the French Napoleonic Empire. Although French domination was short-lived, it led to greater and the widespread recognition of individual freedoms in the local population. The French did not succeed in dismantling the traditional feudal order, but the occupation showed the Slovenian people the innovations of the French Revolution. They were successful in modernizing the country[11]. Gradually a distinct Slovene national conscience emerged.

A group of Slovenian activists joined the wider Illyrian movement in neighboring Croatia, which advocated for the unification of all the South Slavs in one nation. Nevertheless, an academic circle that revolved around the philologist Matija Čop and the romantic poet France Prešeren reaffirmed that the Slovenian people and their language constituted a separate branch of the south Slavic people, thus they could not be fully incorporated into a wider Slavic nation.

In 1848, a political and cultural movement for unified Slovenia (*Zedinjena Slovenija*) was created within the Austrian Empire as part of the "Spring of Nations" movement[12]. Slovene activists called for the unification of all Slovene-speaking territories within the Austrian Empire into a separate and independent Slovene kingdom. Despite the failing of the project, its relevance held a significant position in Slovenian political discussions.

In 1860 the Austrian Empire introduced a constitution that guaranteed civil and political liberties within the Empire, this allowed the Slovenian national movement to gain strength.

1.3. Policies of the Great Powers[13]

Besides Turkey, there were six Great Powers during the late nineteenth century: Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany. These Powers expressed interest in the Balkan region, mainly if that interest could satisfy their own national needs. The foreign policies of

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[11] "Development of the state", available at: www.croatia.eu
[12] AKHAVAN, PAYAM; ROBERT HOWSE (1995). *Yugoslavia, the Former and Future.* Brookings Institution Press. p. 20
[13] STEVEN W. SOWARDS, *Twenty-five lectures on modern Balkan history (the Balkans in the age of nationalism), "The Great Powers and the "Eastern Question",* available at: https://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/

these countries cannot be considered individually, excluding them from the broader context in which they were carried out.

Each of these Powers crafted their foreign policies in the Balkan region with little or no regard to the actual needs and demands of the local populations.

Going in detail country by country:

1.3.1. Austria-Hungary

The Austro-Hungarian Empire originally was not interested in the Balkan cause and was actually committed to maintaining the status quo for two main reasons: Russia and its own ethnic minorities' potential demands.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Russian Empire was the major threat to the Ottoman domination and one of the main goal of the Empire was to reach the Mediterranean Sea, using its ethno-religious ties with the local population (especially Serbians and Bulgarians). Austria feared the potential fall of the region under another Great Power, and therefore posing a threat to its rule[14].

The other reason was linked to the fact that one of the main causes of the fall of the Ottoman Empire were the claims of independence of the numerous ethnic minorities living inside it. Being the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself multi-ethnic, it could not allow the collapse of a nation similar to its own, as this could have awakened nationalistic and independence feelings in the local population, feelings that had already been bloody repressed in 1848.

The most prominent figure in the Empire's foreign policy in those years was the Foreign Minister Gyula Andrássy, a Hungarian statesman that also served as Prime Minister of Hungary. His political decisions resulted as a mixture of protecting both the Empire and the Magyars' interests[15]. One of its main objectives was to preserve South Eastern Europe, the only region in Europe where Vienna could exert influence.

As pointed out by Charles K. Burns Jr. *"Specifically in terms of a Balkan policy, Andrassy's objective of protecting the Magyars' privileged status translated into an attempt to preserve the territorial and political status quo in southeastern Europe. […]. Any change in the existing territorial and political arrangement in the Balkans could jeopardize that process by providing an alternative example to Magyarization and a real and power full source of attraction for Austria-Hungary's minorities. This was particularly true in regard to the South Slavs. A strong and dynamic Slavic state in the Balkans*

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[14] BURNS, CHARLES KELLAR JR. *The Balkan Policy of Count Gyula Andrássy* (PhD dissertation, Rice U. 1980), p.460
[15] ANDRASSY THE YOUNGER, *Bismarck, Andrassy and their successor*, 1927, p.42, available at:
https://archive.org/details/bismarckandrassy00andr/page/42/mode/2up

could prove so attractive to the Slavs of Austria-Hungary that it would pose a serious threat [..] even to the continued existence of the Habsburg empire. To Andrássy the best method of preventing any danger like that seemed to be to forestall further development by Serbia and Montenegro as focal points of South Slavic nationalism."[16]

1.3.2. France

France's interests were, both economic and political. During the Napoleon rule the country posed a major threat to the Ottoman Empire, with the Mediterranean campaign of 1798 (and especially the invasion of Egypt) being its culmination.

Later on, with the establishment of the July Monarchy, the bourgeoisie wished to stimulate the economic growth of the nation, which was favored, among other things, with the particular commercial relations established by the Treaty of Balta Liman in 1838. Under the treaty, duties were set at 3% on imports; 3% on exports; 9% on transiting exported goods; and 2% on transiting imported goods.[17]

This mean that Marseilles, France's busiest port, relied heavily on trade with the Ottoman-ruled Eastern Mediterranean.

The country's interest to expand its trade inside the Ottoman Empire's territories is clear when reading the French weekly *La Semaine Financière: "Syria is a country with great future, and bound to remunerate amply in ten years from now all the men willing to exploit her"*[18]

Under Napoleon III, France also supported nationalists' claims of independence.

Furthermore, French investors too played a role in the policy of the Balkans. When the Turkish state went bankrupt during the crisis and war of 1875-78, French bondholders were the greatest possible losers in the case of default, and the French state followed cautious economic strategies in Turkey. Once the Ottoman Debt Administration (ODPA) was set up to track Turkish state finances, French administrators played a major role.

1.3.3. Germany

Germany did not exist until 1871, and therefore we cannot speak of a cohesive German foreign policy in the Balkan before this date. However, even after unification, Chancellor Bismarck was never concerned about the Balkans per se (he famously referred to the region and its people as *"not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier"*)[19] but only because his two great

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[16] BURNS, CHARLES KELLAR JR. *The Balkan Policy of Count Gyula Andrássy* (PhD dissertation, Rice U. 1980), p.459

[17] Convention of Commerce and Navigation, etc. in Parliamentary Papers, 1838, pp. 289-295

[18] La Semaine Financière, Nov. 8 1856, p.11

[19] LUDWIG, EMIL, *Bismarck: The Story of a Fighter*, Little, Brown (1927b) p.511

neighbors and possible enemies to the East, the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had an interest in the region. He was therefore determined to reconcile their positions so as to avoid having to choose which of the two empires to support, and therefore risk that the other could ally with another Great Power to the West, such as France or the United Kingdom. In 1873 he negotiated the *Dreikaiserbund* (Three Emperors' League) with Russia and Austria-Hungary. When the Austrians and British threatened war over a peace imposed on Turkey by Russia at the end of the Russo-Turkish War, Bismarck called for a peace congress in Berlin. Here he negotiated a defensive alliance with Austria- Hungary, which remained in effect through World War I. He feared that the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy would lead to Russian expansion into central Europe. He consistently used the alliance to prevent a war in the Balkans, also, he did not want seven million Austro-German Catholics seeking admission to the Empire.[20]

1.3.4. Italy

Before 1861, the Kingdom of Italy did not exist, like Germany, and we cannot speak of a foreign policy in the Balkan before this date, again like Germany. The political difficulties of the newborn Kingdom of Italy in carving out its own space in the European scenario, its struggle to find powerful allies, and its efforts to satisfy its interests in Balkans (like annexing the Istrian and the Dalmatian regions) are described with accuracy and in great detail by Burns: *"The primary goals of the Italian government in the 1870's were to create a cohesive state and to guard zealously Italy's status as a Great Power.[…] Any understanding with Austria-Hungary was out of the question because of the Italian remembrance of long years of Habsburg Intervention and rule in the Apennine peninsula, the constant anti-Habsburg agitation of the Italian irredentists, and the fact that Italian and Austro-Hungarian interests clashed in the Balkans. […] From the Italian point of view, Germany was a possible ally, but, as previously stated, Germany would be likely to prefer an alliance with Austria-Hungary to one with Italy. […]The Italian government could view Russia as a possible ally especially in the Balkans, but in the 1870's Russia and Great Britain were scarcely on the best of terms, and as an ally of Russia, Italy would be subject to attack by the British navy."[21]*

1.3.5. Russia

Russia's interest in the Balkan regions can be drawn from its peculiar geopolitics. Despite being Europe and the World's largest contiguous land empire, just like today is the largest country, Russia has always had numerous political issues related to its geography, one of these problems is

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[20] THOMAS HENRY ELKINS, LAWRENCE G. DUGGAN, et al., *Germany Foreign Policy 1870-90,* available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Foreign-policy-1870-90

[21] BURNS, CHARLES KELLAR JR. *The Balkan Policy of Count Gyula Andrássy* (PhD dissertation, Rice U. 1980), p.7

access to warm seawaters[22]. The Empire's main seaport was in Saint Petersburg (which had been annexed only in 1721), but water here freeze during winter, making the port unpracticable, the other main seaport was in Rostov-on-Don, a city at the mouth of the Don river annexed in 1733, which lies by Taganrog Bay, at the northeastern arm of the Sea of Azov, which also occasionally freeze during winter.

The Empire managed to gradually gain substantial land around the Black Sea between 1783 and 1878, but one of its main objectives had always been direct access to the Mediterranean Sea, and the control of the Balkan region (either directly or indirectly) was crucial to do so. One type of indirect control was to take on the role of protector of the Orthodox Christian in the region, even though this policy turned out to be much more complex than one could imagine in terms of alliances. For example, when Serbia fell under Austrian influence, the Russians would switch their support to a regional rival, such as Bulgaria.

The Russian policy in the Balkans also aimed to maintain safe entry to the Mediterranean Sea via the Black Sea. To do so, they tried to obtain absolute rights for their traders to trade and their warships to pass across the Straits. They tried to do that while denying the freedom of other States to send ships to the Black Sea, but ultimately, they had to adhere to an agreement that authorized free trade for all merchant ships and no warships.

Russia then plotted to enter the First World War with the intention of destroying Turkey and capturing the Ottoman capital of Istanbul (Constantinople), and returning Constantinople to its former glory as the holy city of Orthodox Christianity[23].

In the words of Sean McMeekin *"Russian imperialists were dead serious about dismembering Turkey"[24]*.

1.3.6. The United Kingdom

Unlike Russia, the UK's interests in the Balkans were motivated not by geopolitical, but by economic reasons.[25] The UK, in fact, needed to secure its shipping lanes to India, which passed through the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal (later conquered by the British following the invasion of Egypt in 1882), in Ottoman territory. Since the Turks were too weak to pose any

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[22] ANIRBAN PAUL, *Russia and the 'Geo' of its Geopolitics*, ORF Occasional Paper No. 202, July 2019, Observer Research Foundation.

[23] Frantzman, S. (2012*). The Russian Origins of the First World War* - By Sean McMeekin. Digest of Middle East Studies, 21(1), 261–263.

[24] MCMEEKIN, S. (2011). *The Russian Origins of the First World War*. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, p.21, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbwt2

[25] "The new Turkish Six per cent Loan" The Bankers Magazine, 18 (Oct. 1858), p.724

threat, the UK's foreign policy was thus aimed at opposing France, Russia, and Germany's ambition over Turkey.

Furthermore, the UK tried to maintain a balance of power in Europe so to prevent any nation, particularly Russia and France, to dominate over the continent[26].

Lastly, the UK's political liberalism possibly led to a humanitarian interest and interventionism in the region to support the Balkan cause.[27]

In conclusion, economic and social change, international rivalry, and unsolved problems combined to unsettle the Balkans. Neither local states nor Great Powers could control the situation. The result was a succession of Balkan crises, some of which had serious consequences for Europe as a whole.

1.4. The Balkan Wars[28]

The Balkan Wars were a series of conflict fought between 1912 and 1913, whose outcome was crucial not only for the various nations that took part in the conflict, but because it also set the stage for the Balkan crisis of 1914 and thus served as a "prelude to the First World War"[29].

The 1912-1913 Balkan Wars initiated a period of conflict which devastated southeastern Europe. Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia sought to replicate German and Italian nationalist successes in the 19th century but competing territorial claims had prevented them from cooperating against the Ottomans. The Russians, for their part, planned to form a pro-Russian Balkan alliance to avoid further Austro-Hungarian development in the area following the events of the Bosnian crisis. After the 1908 coup, when the Young Turks threatened to revitalize the Ottoman Empire, the states' leaders pursued ways to resolve rivalries. Consequently, an alliance named Balkan League was established by September 1912.

On 8 October 1912, Montenegro began the First Balkan War. The Ottomans declared war on the Balkan League on 17 October before the other allies could join in. The Turkish army continually retreated, up to the city of Çatalca, whose fortifications formed the so-called "Çatalca line", which became the armistice line of December 3, 1912[30]. On 28 November 1912 Albania, backed by Italy and Austria, declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman coup d'état dated 23 January 1913 restored to power a Young Turk government in Constantinople, determined to

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[26] NORMAN LOWE, Mastering Modern British History Macmillan, 1998, p. 111.
[27] PERKINS, JAMES ANDREW (2014) British liberalism and the Balkans, c. 1875- 1925. PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London.

[28] R. C. HALL, *Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, in U. DANIEL et al. (eds.), *1914-1918-online, in International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, Berlin, 2014
[29] *Ibidem*
[30] *Ibidem,* page 69

continue the war. The conflict lasted until the fall, in March 1913, of Adrianople and Janina to the Bulgarians and the Greeks, respectively. At the end of the war the Ottoman Empire had been reduced to a weakened state. The Austrians also requested that the city of Scutari, whose siege came to be of international relevance, join the new Albanian regime. Serbian supporting forces withdrawn from the siege. The Montenegrins succeeded in the siege and were able to capture the town on April 23 but were forced to withdraw just two weeks later because of the presence of a fleet of Great Power off the Adriatic coast. At the Albanian Congress in Trieste, on 1 May 1913, further diplomatic efforts were displaced, where 119 delegates from newborn Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Italy, Romania, Turkey and the United States acknowledged Ismail Qemal's provisional government in Albania and negotiated the country's borders. The provisional Treaty of London, concluded on 30 May 1913, culminated in peace negotiations. By the terms of the treaty, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its remaining European territory, which had been reduced to a straight line drawn from the Black Sea port of Midya to the Aegean port of Enos[31]. Albanian independence was insisted upon by the European great powers, and Macedonia was to be divided among the Balkan allies. As observed by Jansz Bugajski, the Albanians were unfavorable to the term of the Treaty since *"roughly half of the predominantly Albanian territories and 40% of the population were left outside the new country's borders"* [32], these territories had been in fact given to Serbia and Greece, among these: the region of Chameria and Kosovo.

The Second Balkan War took place a few months later, because of Bulgaria's discontent with the partition of the territories. During the first conflict, Serbia had occupied large areas of Macedonia and, following Austria's prohibition, strengthened its control as a compensation for its loss of the North Adriatic coast. During the spring of 1913, hostilities over Macedonia escalated rapidly, despite Russia's attempts to mediate among the States. On 29-30 June 1913, the Bulgarians attacked Greek and Serbian armies and the war officially broke out, but Bulgaria was rapidly defeated and pushed back to pre-war frontiers. To make things even worse, the Romanian and the Ottoman army invaded Bulgaria, taking advantage of its weakened status.

The Romanians attempted to annex southern Dobrudzha to expand their coastline on the Black Sea to stop the Bulgarian advances elsewhere in the Balkans, while the Ottomans attempted to reconquer Adrianople. The Bulgarian army, already heavily engaged against the Greeks and Serbs, was unable to withstand the Romanian and Ottoman armies, and so called for peace. Bulgaria lost much of Macedonia to Greece and Serbia, and southern Dobrudzha to Romania via the subsequent

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[31] Peace Treaty between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey of 30 May 1913, on the territorial regulation after the conclusion of the First Balkan War, Art. 2.

[32] JANUSZ BUGAJSKI (2002). *Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era*. M.E. Sharpe. p. 675

Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913. The brief occupation of Adrianople by Bulgaria ended with the Constantinople Treaty.

The Balkan Wars were devastating in terms of human losses. Bulgaria lost 65,000 men[33], the Greeks 9,500[34], the Montenegrins 3,000[35], the Serbs 36,000[36], the Ottomans lost more than 125,000.[37]

The estrangement of Bulgaria from Russia was one of the most significant consequences of the two Balkan Wars: Bulgaria was in fact a strategic country for Russia's international relations and putting pressure on the Ottoman Empire. Due to the failure of Russia's ambassadorial capacity during the conflicts, Bulgaria sought a potential future ally in the Western countries, especially in the Triple Alliance. Russia was left with Serbia alone as a possible ally in the Balkans and, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire invaded Serbia in July 1914, Russia had to protect it so as not to lose its last Balkan stronghold. Another major outcome of the wars was the realization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the aspirations of Serbians and Montenegrins for enlargement in Albania: eager to block further growth of the two Slavic powers, the Viennese Government initiated a series of hostilities over Albania against Serbia and Montenegro in three different episodes (December 1912, April 1913 and October 1913). The state of constant conflict on behalf of Serbia led to the decision of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to fight against the Serbs at the beginning of the First World War.

1.5. WWI and the foundation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia

After the Balkan Wars, Serbia and Montenegro were the only sufficiently important and independent countries in the Balkans, while all the other Slavic countries were still under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia acquired a predominant status in the eyes of everyone in the region.

Following the assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip, World War I broke out, leading, among other things, to the invasion and occupation of Serbia. During this period of military occupation, nationalist sentiments among the local population began to escalate, with people advocating for the creation of a single united South Slav nation, so to bring them together under the same political authority.

In 1916, the Yugoslav Committee, a political group whose member represented the Slavic people living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, started negotiations with the Serbian Government in exile to decide the nature of the future South Slavic state. The Croats supported a federal system, so to

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[33] *Bulgarian troops losses during the Balkan Wars*, available at http://www.bulgarianartillery.it

[34] Hellenic Army General staff*: A concise history of the Balkan Wars*, page 287, 1998

[35] Radule Simov Brajičić: MOJI MEMOARI, available at www.montenegrina.net

[36] HALL, RICHARD C. (2000). *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 Prelude to the First World War*. London: Routledge, p.135

[37] JUSTIN MCCARTHY. 1912-1913 *Balkan Wars, Death and Forced Exile of Ottoman Muslims, An Annotated Map*, available at https://www.tc-america.org

preserve the plurality of cultures, while the Serbs favored a unitary state that would unite its people in one nation.

In 1917, the Corfu Declaration was signed by Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and Croatian politician Ante Trumbić, establishing the creation of a single State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, also known as Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1929. The constitution of 1921 established a highly centralized state under the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty, under which the monarchy and the Skupština (assembly) jointly exercised legislative power.

The principle of self-determination, first defined by the US President Woodrow Wilson in a speech named "The Fourteen Points", gave additional legal protection for the independent cause of the Slavs; the speech was used as a general framework for peace talks and includes radical views on foreign policy. In point 11, Wilson stated that: *"Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into"*[38]. This claim is especially important for the Balkan cause, as it specifically refers to the Balkan people's right to self-determine their autonomy and their foreign status without intervention from other governments.

Nevertheless, not everyone was satisfied, the Croatians in particular felt that they only changed their ruler from Austria to Serbia, and that the original purpose of the Illyrian Movement had been betrayed[39]. Numerous discontents also came from the Kosovar, since they were not Slavs, but rather Albanian speaking; their territory was divided in three districts of the new kingdom.

The new Kingdom's economic and integration problems were, to some extent, to be attributed to the different levels of development of its regions. Economic growth was largely limited to the North, where Slovenia and Croatia had more developed intelligentsia, more efficient and honest bureaucracies, an emerging economic infrastructure, and extensive trade ties with other parts of the Austrian Empire, whereas those who escaped Ottoman domination were less developed and poor, therefore leading to major regional variations in productivity and standard of living[40]. Birth rates were among the highest in Europe and analphabetism rates were 60 per cent in most rural areas. In addition, the centralized government has had its own economic impact, as seen in heavy military

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[38] Speech of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of 8 January 1918, on the principles for a durable and solid peacetime in Europe.
[39] T. JUDAH, *Yugoslavia: 1918 – 2003*, 2 February 2011, available at:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/yugoslavia_01.shtml
[40] JOHN B. ALLCOCK, RICHARD J. CRAMPTON et al., *Balkans*, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Balkans

spending, the development of a bloated civil service, and direct involvement in the productive industries and in the marketing of agricultural goods[41].

1.6. WWII and the creation of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia

The Great Depression was one of the most severe worldwide economic crises. It started in the US in 1929 and then spread across the world, lasting until the late '30s. It had an enormous effect on many people's life, and its consequences deeply impacted governments around the world.

The economic crisis was one of the key causes for Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany was, which led the Balkan countries to seek measures to maintain their stability and freedom, such as the Balkan Entente of 1934, the treaty signed by Yugoslavia, Turkey, Romania and Greece. The pact was intended to unite the region's governments so they could resist and protect themselves against any foreign-power attack or pressure.

On the eve of World War II, Serbian Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović sought a neutral position for his country by signing a non-aggression pact with Italy and strengthening relationships with Nazi-Germany: he hoped that maintaining a neutral stance, like Switzerland, could guarantee a sustainable future to the Kingdom.

By supporting the fascist and Croatian ultra-nationalistic movement Ustaša, Mussolini sought to annex Dalmatia, part of the so-called "unredeemed lands". The Ustaša had the primary aim of obtaining independence from Belgrade and stressed the concept of a "pure race" free of Serbs, Roma, and the Jewish people[42].

The Axis forces occupied Yugoslavia in 1941, dismembering it: Germany occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia was divided between Italy and Germany, parts of Dalmatia went to Italy, as well as most of Kosovo, and Montenegro became an Italian protectorate. On 25th May 1941 Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy, leading to the establishment of the Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (NDH - Independent State of Croatia), a puppet-state of Nazi Germany.

The NDH was one of the most lethal regimes of the 20th century[43], it advocated for mass genocide of Serbs, Jews, and Roma. The terrifying words of the Education Minister Mile Budak show how resolute the regime was in pursuing this political line of annihilation of the Serbs "1/3 of Serbs we

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[41] JOHN B. ALLCOCK AND JOHN R. LAMPE, *Yugoslavia*, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003

[42] M. F. LEVY, *The Last Bullet for the Last Serb: The Ustaša Genocide against Serbs: 1941–1945*, in The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 37 no. 6, 2010, p. 807-837

[43] CHARNY, ISRAEL (1999*). Encyclopedia of Genocide: A-H*. ABC-CLIO, pp. 27-28

shall kill, another we shall deport, and the last we shall force to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and thus meld them into Croats"[44].

The Serbian Chetnik forces, led by the General Draža Mihailović and loyal to the old Serbian government, and the Communist partisans, led by Marshall Josip Broz (later known as Tito) were the two main armed resistance forces.

The Partisans founded the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, known as the AVNOJ, on 26 November 1942 as the coordinating organization of the liberation forces against the occupation of the Axis. The international community recognized the AVNOJ providing it with international legitimacy.

Yugoslavia was founded on 29 November 1943 in Jajce, Bosnia: AVNOJ declared itself as provisional parliament and established the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, headed by Tito. Yugoslavia was eventually freed, with little help of the Soviet Red Army.

Chapter 2: The rise and fall of Yugoslav society

1. The concept of nationalism

Talking about nationalism and nation is a rather complicated task. In fact, although on the surface it might seem simple to describe the phenomenon, its origin, its development, and its consequences on society, a deeper look will reveal to us that there is no unanimous consensus on the subject.

The Encyclopedia Britannica defines nationalism as *"an ideology that emphasizes loyalty, devotion, or allegiance to a nation or nation-state and holds that such obligations outweigh other individual or group interests"*, and nation as *"a group of people with a common language, history, culture, and (usually) geographic territory"*[45].

But while these definitions can give us an idea of what nationalism can be, not all scholars think the same about how nationalism was born and spread around the world.

Hans Kohn, for example, believed that while the modern forms of nationalism can be attributed to the French and the American revolutions, its roots are deep in the past of countries' political, economic, and intellectual development[46]. Moreover, he was of the opinion that nationalism arose in two different ways, depending on the power that the third estate held in a society: if it was powerful

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[44] M. F. LEVY, *The Last Bullet for the Last Serb: The Ustaša Genocide against Serbs: 1941–1945*, in The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 37 no. 6, 2010, p. 809

[45] HANS KOHN, *Nationalism*, available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/nationalism

[46] HANS KOHN, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, p.3, available at https://books.google.it

-as in the UK, the US, and France in the 18th century- nationalism sought its manifestation primarily in political and economic reforms; on the other side, where the third estate was still in its early form by the eve of the 19th century -as in Germany or Italy- nationalism found its way predominantly in the cultural elite[47].

Kohn was among those scholars who firmly believe that nationalism is a pure European phenomenon born in the 19th century, and that nationalism in the rest of the world was merely an adaptation of the original concept to the local society and culture. Nationalism, according to this interpretation, is a product of modernization, specifically European modernization, and its roots can be found in the Kantian principle of self-determination in his *"Perpetual Peace"*[48], and in the principle of Westphalian sovereignty.

Kedourie is another scholar who has supported the European origin of nationalism, and he also argued that one of the African and Asian countries is nothing more than the result of the resentment of the colonial past that these countries have had to endure, and that therefore their nationalism was born out of a desire for revenge rather than a process of modernization. He also discussed the relation between nationalism and religion.

Gellner is another academic who sees nationalism as a fundamental component of modernity, the outcome of the transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial society, and the unavoidable consequence of the industrial state's need for ethnocultural homogeneity. He argues that it is the uneven spread of industrialization that causes nationalism, as differences between established groups intensify if their members in a new industrial state are unable to function as homogenized units.

Gellner does not dispute the existence of states in pre-modern times that acted like modern nation-states, as exemplified by ancient Israel, nor does he deny the fact that certain ethnic groups might have expressed similar feelings in the past to what we identify as nationalism; however, what he is trying to understand is why many of those groups who had existed under multi-ethnic empires suddenly considered it intolerable.

In his own words *"What is being claimed is that nationalism is a very distinctive species of patriotism, and one which becomes pervasive only under certain social conditions, which in fact prevail in the*

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[47] *Ibidem,* p. 4

[48] 2. "No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation".
A state is not, like the ground which it occupies, a piece of property (patrimonium). It is a society of men whom no one else has any right to command or to dispose except the state itself. It is a trunk with its own roots. But to incorporate it into another state, like a graft, is to destroy its existence as a moral person, reducing it to a thing; such incorporation thus contradicts the idea of the original contract without which no right over a people can be conceived"

modern world, and nowhere else. Nationalism is a species of patriotism distinguished by a few very important features […] Homogeneity, literacy, and anonymity are the key traits."[49]

Despite having had a great influence on nationalism studies, Gellner's work has been heavily criticized, particularly for being too functionalist, in that according to his vision, an industrialized society could not function adequately without the phenomenon of nationalism. In the words of Damian Tambini *"Gellner's theory, however, fails to explain all forms of nationalism, is overly materialist, and at times relies on dubious functionalist explanations. A more satisfactory theory would take into account the cultural content of nationalism—not only myths, but political culture—as well as phenomena of identity and collective action"*[50].

This Euro-centric, enlightenment-inspired approach to history, modernization, and ultimately nationalism, has been questioned in the last decades. Some scholars, such as Duara, Eisenstadt and Ichijo, argue that traditional theories of modernization neglect the historical and cultural history of other parts of the world, suggesting instead that there might be "multiple modernities" and historical identities in continuous evolution and contrast with each other, different from those encountered in the West. In order to truly understand nationalism, we need to look beyond Europe and take other viewpoints into account.

In particular, Duara offers pre-modern China as an example of a unified political community long before the Western ideas of nation reached the country in the 19th century, even though he acknowledge that *"they were not accompanied by the goal of creating an unmediated relationship between state and individual (the citizenship model) and, perhaps most importantly, they were not underpinned by the ideological complex which included notions of popular sovereignty, historical progress and economic competition"*[51], and therefore prevent these movements from being considered nationalists.

2. Slavic nationalism

Now that we have discussed, even if only superficially, how difficult it is to even describe the concept of nationalism, we can now speak more deeply about the different nationalisms found in the Slavic countries, examine in depth the peculiar nationalism that has formed in Yugoslavia, and why it has ultimately failed.

2.1. Pan-Slavism and Slavic Irredentism

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[49] GELLNER E. (1983), *Nations and nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

[50] TAMBINI, DAMIAN (March 1996). "Explaining monoculturalism: Beyond Gellner's theory of nationalism". Critical Review. 10 (2): 251–270

[51] DUARA P. (2006), *Nationalism in East Asia.* History Compass.;4(3):407–427

Each Slavic country developed its own version of nationalism, although it is worth noting that at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century a specific type of pan-nationalist ideology, namely pan-Slavism, became especially widespread in Slavic countries and prevalent in the political debate.

The goal of Pan-Slavism was to unite all the Slavic populations, freeing them from foreign domination. This last point is of particular relevance because Russia was the only Slavic state that had never been conquered by foreign powers, and at the same time one of the great world powers, and for this reason some of the Slavic peoples of Central Europe and the Balkans viewed Russia as a potential promoter of the pan-Slavic ideology.

One of the most famous authors of the time who strongly supported this pan-ethnic idea was Ľudovít Štúr, the man who codified the Slovak language: he wrote in his book "Slavdom and the World of the Future" that *"Every nation has its time under the sun of God, and the linden tree blooms until the oak tree has long since blossomed"[52]*. Poland, which was just under Russian domination, was the only country that did not allow itself to be influenced by this ideology, and instead developed a distinct identity from the rest of the Slavs; as Joseph Conrad put it *"between Polonism and Slavonism there is not so much hatred as a complete and ineradicable incompatibility"[53]*.

Let us now move on to examine the key characteristics of the nationalisms that have formed in the Balkans.

One distinct feature that we can notice by looking at the region is that each of the states in it have an irredentist component, each Balkan country has a form of nationalism that advocate for the creation of "greater" version of that state.

The idea of a "Greater Croatia" (Croatian: *Velika Hrvatska*), for example, dates back to the Illyrian Movement, when Croatian sought for a greater autonomy from the Hungarian Kingdom, with whom they were in a personal union, since they feared a possible Magyarization process. The *Banovina* (province) of Croatia, an autonomous region in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, represented the first realization of the Croatian irredentist requests.

The actual concretization of the Greater Croatia was the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), after the occupation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers in 1941. Slavko Kvaternik, deputy leader of the ultra-nationalist Ustaša, declared the creation of the NDH, which

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[52] ĽUDOVÍT ŠTÚR (1993), *Slovanstvo a svet budúcnosti (Slavdom and the World of the Future)*, , p. 59, note that the linden is the tree of Slavic nations, the oak is the tree of Germanic nations, to signify the liberation from the Austrian Empire
[53] JOSEPH CONRAD (1921)*, Notes on Life and Letters*

encompassed modern-day Croatia (except the Istria region), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and portions of Serbia.

Following the fall of Yugoslavia, Croatian irredentist sentiments resumed, with the former Croatian president Franjo Tuđman trying to annex territories of Bosnia with a Croatian majority[54].

Macedonian irredentist, similarly, wished for a greater Macedonian state (Macedonian: Обединета Македонија, *Obedineta Makedonija)* that would cover all those regions in the area considered to be part of the geographical region of Macedonia, which today stretches mostly to northern Macedonia, northern Greece, part of south-eastern Bulgaria and other small regions in the surrounding countries.

In more recent times the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), a right-wing North Macedonian party, the second biggest in the country, was criticized for carrying out a policy named "antiquization", whose goal is to demonstrate a direct link between contemporary Macedonians and Ancient Macedonians. In the words of Anastas Vangeli, antiquization *"is manifested as a belated invention and mass-production of tradition, carried out through the creation of new ceremonies, interventions in the public space and dissemination of mythological and metaphysical narratives on the origin of the nation"* and also *"attempts to scientifically rationalize claims to ancient nationhood"[55]*.

The same goes for Slovenia, where the project for a United Slovenia (Slovene: *Zedinjena Slovenija*) tried to unify all the so-called Slovenian Lands in one single state. These lands were scattered among several regions of the Austrian Empire, like Carinthia, Goriza and Gradisca, and Styria, with the bulk of the Slovenian nation being in the region of Carniola. Despite the project's failure after the Spring of Nations in 1848, the nationalist drive for the creation of a single Slovenian state persisted until the end of World War II, and ceased to exist once the Free Territory of Trieste was divided between Yugoslavia and Italy in 1954, annexing the territories now known as Slovenian coast.

But the idea of a Greater Serbia was perhaps the most impactful of the irredentist ideologies in the Slavic Balkans. In fact, Serbia played a fundamental role in the unification process of the Slavic peoples, being the only Slavic country in the Balkans to oppose the Triple Alliance during the First World War, and that the royal family of the kingdom of Yugoslavia was precisely of Serbian ethnicity.

Moreover, Vuk Karadžić, the most influential Serbian linguist of the 19th century, claimed that all those who spoke the Stokavian dialect should be considered Serbs[56], and this is especially important

[54] Trial Judgement Summary for Prlić et al., ICTY. 29 November 2017. p. 10., available at:
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acjug/en/171129-judgement-summary.pdf
[55] ANASTAS VANGELI (2011) *Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: the origins and the effects of the so-called antiquization in Macedonia*, Nationalities Papers, 39:1, 13-32
[56] Danijela Nadj. "*Vuk Karadzic, Serbs All and Everywhere (1849)*", available at:
http://www.hic.hr/books/greatserbia/karadzic.htm

because the afore mentioned dialect is the most common of the Serbo-Croatian language. Greater Serbia was then meant to have annexed much of those territories now belonging partly to Croatia, and the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Starting from the '80s, nationalist sentiments among the Serbs were also one of the main causes of the dissolution of the Republic of Yugoslavia, with the infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of 1986 being its culmination. The document included several false claims about the supposed discrimination (if not real genocides) perpetrated by the Croats and the Albanians in Kosovo to the detriment of the Serbs, and also stated that Croatia and Slovenia had in effect taken charge of the Serbian economy. It also reported an (alleged) increasing anti-Serbian sentiment and the fact that Serbs have been the most vulnerable to persecution and assimilation efforts by other ethnic groups in the previous 50 years[57]. The Memorandum and its contents became part of the popular political discourse, and the election of Slobodan Milošević only aggravated the already delicate state of affairs and, above all, the skillful exploitation and manipulation of the media in Serbia by him and his collaborators, for example through the spread of "*ethnically inflammatory speeches at public events and in the media and such propaganda helped to unleash violence against the Croat population and other non-Serbs*".[58]

Today the project of a Greater Serbia is supported and carried out above all by the Serbian Radical Party, a party founded by Vojislav Šešelj, a paramilitary leader among the most strenuous nationalists, found guilty in 2018 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for instigating persecution (forcible displacement), deportation, and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity and for committing persecution (violation of the right to security) as a crime against humanity in Hrtkovci, Vojvodina[59].

Now that we have discussed the key aspects of the different Slavic nationalisms, in particular the irredentist component, let us discuss the political philosophy that has formed in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Titoism, named after President Tito, who contrastingly considered nationalisms dangerous for the integrity of the state.

2.2. Titoism and the development of Yugoslav identity

Tito, whose real name was Josip Broz, was a revolutionary military leader who commanded the Partisans, a communist-inspired armed resistance group, and led the liberation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from the occupation of Axis. It is worth noting that the Soviet Red Army was almost

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[57] Memorandum 1986 (the Greater Serbian Ideology) by Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
[58] "Milan Babić Verdict - Case Information Sheet". The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. March 2006. Retrieved 11 September 2011
[59] UNITED NATIONS Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, Appeal Judgement Summary for Vojislav Šešelj, The Hague, 11 April 2018, p. 9

not involved in the process of liberation, so much so that the Yugoslav Communists managed to liberate the country on their own, and this is of special significance as it will affect Yugoslavia's future diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and, subsequently, with the communist world as a whole.

Tito 's military and tactical abilities to free Yugoslavia gave him immense popular support, so much so that in November 1945 the Yugoslav Communist Party, headed by Tito himself, was able to gain an overwhelming majority in the elections, leading to the appointment of Tito as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, which was still nominally a Monarchy, the country was then renamed Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the King, Peter II, formally deposed.

2.2.1. The Tito–Stalin split

Immediately after the Second World War, relations with the Soviet Union were made complicated by the specific situation that had led Yugoslavia to become independent: as mentioned above, the Soviet Union was basically not involved in the process of liberation, and this granted Tito substantial political autonomy from the USSR when compared to the rest of the Eastern bloc countries.

The differences between Titoism and Soviet Communism show most clearly In the field of international relations and foreign policy: Tito rejected the use of the Communist national parties as instruments of Soviet policy, he did not accept the principle that the various Communist parties' duty was to function solely as subordinate of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and only secondly as domestic political movements.

The frictions between the two leaders were already sparking in 1945, as one can easily understand from the speech of Tito in Ljubljana after the USSR refused to back the pretensions of Yugoslavia in Carinthia and Venezia Giulia *"We are not going to pay the balance on others' accounts, we are not going to serve as pocket money in anyone's currency exchange, we are not going to allow ourselves to become entangled in political spheres of interest. Why should it be held against our peoples that they want to be completely independent? And why should autonomy be restricted, or the subject of dispute? We will not be dependent on anyone ever again!"*[60]

Tito, for example, planned to employ troops in Albania to avoid the spread of civil war in Greece to Yugoslavia, and did so without consultation or approval from the Soviet Union.

The purpose of the Soviet strategy at the time was to establish regimes exclusively controlled by the respective Communist parties in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, special measures in this direction were unnecessary because the government had been controlled solely by the Communist Party

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[60] RAMET, SABRINA P. (2006). *The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005*, p.176, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press

since the end of the Second World War. By 1948, the Communist Parties of the various East European satellite states had consolidated their control over their respective countries: they were now able to enter a new process of integration involving Soviet dominance and cooperation over the satellite states' economic and political structures.

This new step forced the Eastern European satellite Communist Parties to accept the CPSU's leading position more than ever. This principle, as Stalin interpreted, mandated those who accepted its validity to submit willingly and entirely to Moscow's guidance of their internal growth, and to shape their methods closely according to the Soviet model. This change in Soviet policy ignited some controversy in the Communist satellite parties, where some leaders responded "nationalistically" to Soviet rule, such as Kostov in Bulgaria, Xoxe in Albania, Gomulka in Poland, and Rajk in Hungary; apart from Gomulka, the others were all sentenced to death in1949 for supporting the Yugoslav cause[61].

Among the Communist satellite groups, the Yugoslav Communist Party was therefore the most likely to resist Soviet intervention in its internal affairs and demand for absolute subordination, since it had enjoyed a long time of loose cooperation with Moscow, had been used to solve their difficulties autonomously, and had achieved independence and power on their own initiative.

The situation was further complicated when Tito embarked on a negotiating process with Bulgarian President Georgi Dimitrov which would ideally lead to the unification of their respective states. This proposal was part of a broader initiative called the Balkan Federation, which should have brought together all the Balkan countries in a single superstate.

Stalin was strongly opposed to this project because it would mean the independence, or at least significant autonomy, of a communist state from Soviet control.

In 1948, the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) exchanged a series of letters outlining their complaints. The Yugoslav people were accused by the CPSU, in the first letter, of denigrating Soviet democracy[62], while the PCY was blamed for not being adequately democratic and for not working in order to bring the country to socialism. Stalin was quoted saying "We cannot consider this kind of organization of the Communist Party as truly Marxist-Leninist or Bolshevik. One does not feel any policy of class struggle in the Yugoslav Party"[63]

The CPY response of 13 April was a strong denial of the Soviet accusations, both in defense of the party 's revolutionary nature and in reaffirming its high view of the Soviet Union. However, the CPY

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[61] GEORGE H. HODOS (1987). *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954*, Greenwood Publishing Group

[62] STEPHEN CLISSOLD, ED. (1975), *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973: A Documentary Survey* p 172

[63] EDVARD KARDELJ, (1982), *Reminiscences--the Struggle for Recognition and Independence: The New Yugoslavia, 1944-1957,* p. 217

also noted that "no matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his own country less", de facto declaring that the national interests of Yugoslavia were more important and more deserving of attention than those of the Soviet Union and the socialist ideology in general . The Soviet response on May 4 admonished the CPY for not admitting and correcting its mistakes and went on to accuse the CPY of being too proud of their successes against the Germans, claiming that the Red Army had "saved them from destruction. "The response of the CPY on May 17 reacted sharply to Soviet attempts to devalue the success of the Yugoslav resistance movement and suggested that the matter be dealt during the Cominform meeting in June, but that never happened since Yugoslavia didn't even attended it. This led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. This is considered the ultimate split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

2.2.2 The "Informbiro period" and the development of Titoism[64]

The period between 1948 and 1955 is commonly referred to as *Informbiro* (the Yugoslav name for Cominform) and is characterized by the erosion of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as the development and codification of the communist ideology of Yugoslavia, later called Titoism.

This form of communism was seen by the Soviet Union as a treacherous and was therefore prohibited. In the years that followed, many politicians in the Eastern Bloc countries suspected of being Titoist were sentenced to death.

The CIA wrote a report in 1957 that analyzes the features of the Titoist ideology in depth, and places special emphasis on its differences with Stalinism. Given that the two ideologies are often simply branded as authoritarian forms of communism, this differentiation is particularly important. In truth, these two forms of authoritarianism have well-defined characteristics which it is important to discern, since Titoism meant that Yugoslavia, despite being a communist country, was able to establish and even maintain profitable relations with the Occidental Powers: just think that Yugoslavia was the only Communist country benefiting from substantial economic aid from the US[65].

The report identifies 10 ideological macro-areas that characterize the Titoist ideology

The first identified discrepancy between Titoism and Stalinism is that concerning the "World Revolution". According to Marx and Engels, the proletarian revolution would have a global resonance, and that capitalism would eventually be defeated.

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[64] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report (1957)*: TITOISM AND SOVIET COMMUNISM: An Analysis And Comparison Of Theory And Practice, ,* available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A073800530001-4.pdf
[65] JOHN R. LAMPE; et al. (1990). *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II*. Duke University Press. pp. 28–37

On this point both the USSR and Yugoslavia agreed, what they differed on was the role of leading nation.

The Soviet Union had in fact set itself as the global leading nation for the achievement of the communist ideal, and therefore all other countries that wished to achieve the same goal would have had to blindly and uncritically follow its lead.

However, Yugoslavia was of a different opinion, if on the one hand it recognized the need for the communist states to collaborate to achieve the goal, it did not believe that there should be any nation to act as a guide, be it spiritual or factual, and that it would indeed be counterproductive if a state had imposed its methods and its solutions on other states: each state would have to pursue the communist ideal in its own way, according to its own times and needs.

What mattered for Yugoslavia was not the world revolution, but the development of socialism, which could also be achieved by countries that were not necessarily socialist, if, however, the various workers' movements had cooperated in its development, and that the only way to do this was to make them freely associate. Therefore, an imposition from above was unthinkable.

In 1955, when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union reconnected their relations, the two countries adopted a policy of mutual respect and collaboration in pursuit of their objectives without interference from each other, de facto acknowledging (even if only partially) this Titoist principle.

The second divergence between the two countries revolved around "Violent Seizure of Power", meaning the way the proletariat was supposed to gain power in a society and how to install a socialist regime.

Stalin was certain that a violent proletarian revolution was inevitable, and that peaceful progress was possible, but only in the far future, after the proletariat had overthrown the most important capitalist states and subjugated them to communist ideology. Hence, he refused the reformist approach.

On the other hand, the Titoist solution to the issue is nothing more than taking Marxism's basic teachings and adapting them to the local socioeconomic conditions of the country. This solution was in direct tension, to a certain degree, with the Stalinist approach to the problem.

According to the Titoists, the rise to power of the working classes and the advancement of the socialist forces are not necessarily identical in all countries. The Socialists must use tactics which correspond to the actual situation in which they are fighting. Even without resorting to armed and violent revolution, if the conditions were favorable, the proletarian revolution and the establishment of a communist regime could be achieved by parliamentary methods. However, Titoism did not reject violent forms of revolution, for example, where the ruling classes would not grant concessions to the workers, the latter might have resorted to violent means to secure their rights.

The Scandinavian countries were taken by Vice President Kardelj as an example of countries where the working class managed to gain power through the application of this principle.

Since Stalinism and Titoism differed in the method by which the socialist forces acquired power, it is unsurprising to observe that its direct consequence, the question of proletarian dictatorship, is equally divisive.

Lenin was of the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the only form of government capable of allowing socialism to develop; this principle was true for Stalin too. Titoism, on the other hand, while accepting this principle in general, also acknowledged that, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat, certain countries could have still achieved the development of socialism

The multi-party bourgeois-democratic system is therefore a method of advancement contemplated by Titoism, considered suitable for those countries with deep-rooted democratic traditions and in which internal conflicts have not developed to extremes.

Still, countries with a backward social and economic structure, such as Yugoslavia, may recourse to different forms of revolutionary dictatorship.

As stated by Yugoslav Vice President E. Kardelj *"Yugoslavia belongs to a considerable extent to the latter group of countries. In our country internal conflicts used to be very acute, and no other way than the revolutionary one was open to the working class and the progressive democratic forces"*[66]

Similarly, the next point of divergence concerns the Bourgeois State: according to Stalinism, just like the dictatorship of the proletariat was to be imposed only through violent means of revolution, the Bourgeois State could not simply be overthrown and replaced, instead, it had to be "smashed" by the workers. While acknowledging that some bourgeois states had some civil liberties, one could not take this as an excuse to renounce the violent revolution as a mean to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Titoist view on this issue is almost identical to that of the dictatorship of the proletariat: it acknowledges that, where the working class has a certain amount of power in countries with deep-rooted democratic traditions, progress towards the goal of socialism can be made even under the bourgeois multi-party system. According to Titoism, the violent destruction of the bourgeois state is not a foregone conclusion. However, this does not imply the renunciation of the need to resort to violence when necessary: rather, it challenge the Stalinist view of always recurring to violence to pursue the goal.

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[66] Socialist International Information, London, 20 December 1955

Once the Bourgeoise state is overthrown and the dictatorship of the proletariat established, the traditional Marxist ideology dictate that the state has to "disappear" (the expression used by Engels is "withers away"), since its society would be able to govern itself, thus making the State apparatus obsolete.

On this point, both Stalinism and Titoism agreed, but Tito's view was that Stalin did not put this concept into practice, and that he altered Engel's teachings.

On June 25th, 1950, Tito gave a speech to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly, stating that: *"First of all, he* [Stalin] *added two conditions to Engels formulation on the withering away of the State, saying: "Is this proposition of Engels correct? Yes, it is correct but only on one of two conditions: (1) if we study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country or, (2) if we assume that socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the Army and the State....".*"

Tito then continues his speech asserting that: "*In 1939, it could really be said that the Soviet Union was entirely surrounded by capitalist countries. But after the Second World War, when a whole series of new Socialist states emerged in the proximity of the Soviet Union, there could no longer be any question of the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union. […] What is the tremendous bureaucratic, centralized apparatus doing? Are its functions directed outward? What are the NKVD and the militia doing? Are their functions directed outward? Who deports millions of citizens of various nationalities to Siberia and the Far North? Can anyone claim that these are measures against the class enemy?"[67]*

Tito was therefore accusing Stalin and the Soviet Union of becoming the very thing they swore to destroy, a "tremendous bureaucratic, centralized apparatus" when in reality the State, he claims, should begin to wither away immediately after the basic means of production and distribution have been nationalized. Nevertheless, as the CIA report highlights *"it should be pointed out that Tito has not drawn any substantial practical consequences from this position"*.

Closely related to the role of the state is that of the party. Tito criticizes Stalin's management of the Party, claiming that it had become progressively more bureaucratic, that it had lost all contact with the people and with those things which should be occupying it. Tito was of the idea that the Party's duty was to be the organizer and most active participant in all political, cultural and economic actions to increase the enthusiasm of the masses by its own example.

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[67] Speech delivered on June 26th, 1950 by Marshal Tito to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly pointing out the character of the Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Workers' Collectives that was just passed, and the aim of developing Socialism in Yugoslavia. Available at: https://www.marxists.org

According to the Titoist understanding, the role of the Party is defined by Marxism-Leninism only up to the point where it seizes political power in a country, what to do next is described vaguely. Therefore, Titoists came to the conclusion that after the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly established, the military power of the party is to be transferred gradually to the state, and that only the "ideological" power is to be retained by the Party indefinitely (or until the country is fully communized), but this ideological monopoly is still a considerable coercive instrument.

The next three points identified by the CIA report, namely nationalization, collectivization, and socialization, are closely related to each other.

With regard to nationalism, Titoism, which considered it to be the lowest form of socialization, argues that when the proletariat seizes power, the first thing the proletariat should do is nationalize the basic means of production and distribution and then proceed to enable the real producers (the workers) to control and manage them in order to turn nationalized property into socialized property. If the state fails to bring workers into the administration of the properties on which they are engaged in, this results in a system called by Tito of state capitalism, which he believed existed in the USSR.

As for collectivization, Tito agreed with orthodox Marxism-Leninism that in order for socialism to develop in the countryside it was an absolute necessity for farms, but that Yugoslav industry was not capable at the time of producing farm implements that would have made collective farming profitable.

Regardless, Tito was determined to collectivize farming, but, unlike Stalin, he wanted to implement it gradually, rather than impose it coercively, and only when the Yugoslav industry would have been able to support it.

Since Tito needed the widest possible support from the population, of which the peasantry was the largest part, he did not push for collectivization during the difficult Informbiro period also to avoid resistance from the people.

As stated earlier, when private means of production are turned into socialized property, socialization is achieved, and both Stalinism and Titoism agreed to this principle. What they disagreed on concerned the role of state ownership, considered by the Soviets as the highest form of social ownership, while Titoists argued that it only creates state capitalism, rather than socialism, and that only when workers are involved in the management of the means of production we can speak of common property.

The last point discussed by the CIA regards the so-called democratic centralism, Titoists agree with the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, demanding "iron discipline bordering on military discipline", but they also believe that the State should disappear one the conditions for the victory of

socialism, like secure itself from both internal and external threats, are achieved. One way to do it is to decentralize the state powers, passing it down to the six Yugoslav republics, which will have to do the same, passing it to lower-level administrations, like the Regional People's Committees, the Communal People's Committees and the two bodies of the workers' self-administration: the Workers' Councils and the Management Boards; the only powers that are to be held in the hands of the federal government are foreign affairs, national defense, internal affairs (police), federal budget administration, and general national economic planning.

As the CIA reports "The decentralization of administration, the establishment of the Communes and the creation of the Workers' Councils are the three things which the Titoists claim to be their singular contribution to Communist doctrine on the methods of building Socialism after power is seized by the Party. These methods are hailed as superior to what the Yugoslavs used to call the "State Capitalist Stalinist system"."

The main objectives of Titoism are to prevent the dictatorship of proletariat from degenerate as it did in the USSR, prevent the rise of bureaucratic class, and bring true socialism to society.

The CIA report asserts that Titoism is ideologically close to Marxist Social Democracy, and that some Western liberals might even believe that it is tolerable, compared to Stalinism, since it lacks all those features considered to be too unappealing.

In an article on "The Yugoslav Experiment" the following statement appeared:

"To put it, perhaps, in somewhat over Simplified fashion, one may say that they (the Yugoslav) adopt the opposite stand on bureaucracy, labor and socialist relations to that taken by Russia.... While doggedly maintaining the Socialist positions--and in this they are perfectly right, for it would be foolish of them to abandon what they have attained at such great cost--they reject neither the contacts nor the exchange of information, nor even collaboration with those who follow a different course and attempt to move towards progress in different ways....

Having definitely broken with the bureaucratic centralism of Russian Communism, and placing confidence in the working mans, having dismantled the whole structural edifice, they have transferred to the collectives' (work councils) the management of the enterprises. Thus, they have carried out a considerable evolution of responsibility. From a few isolated officials of the State, re responsibility has been shifted to broad masses throughout the country. Within the framework of a Socialist economy, competition between various nationalized industries plays an important role.... An economic organization of this kind is bound to have political repercussions and the most evident is a return to democracy."[68]

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[68] Socialist International Information, 6 December 1952

The report concludes by stating that Titoism, both in theory and in practice, aims more at achieving its objectives in the long run.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, tensions started to relax between the two communist countries, and diplomatic relations were resumed, but despite this, Yugoslavia remained an autonomous state from Soviet influence, but without taking the side of the Westerners as well, remaining neutral.

During these years, Yugoslavia became one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, a forum of developing nations that were not part of the two blocs during the Cold War. One of the objectives in Yugoslavia in terms of foreign policy was to make this Movement the third bloc in the international scenario.

2.2.3. The economy of Yugoslavia from the 50s to the 70s

Tito introduced the "worker self-management" system during the 1950s, which enabled employees to run companies on their own, thanks to the workers' councils made up of all employees who supervised the work of the managers of the companies. The Communist Party was rooted in all companies, and the most influential employees were likely to be party members.

In the timeframe of the Informbiro period, the moving of the Serbian industry to western Yugoslav republics took place. What happened was that fearing a possible Soviet invasion from the East, Tito moved most of the industrial plants in Eastern Yugoslavia to the West, primarily Croatia and Slovenia. The consequence of this was that the industries in Croatia and Slovenia were further strengthened, making the two republics the most advanced and productive in Yugoslavia.

One of the main advantages derived from Yugoslavia's neutral status was that it could trade with countries both from the Eastern and the Western bloc, as well as Non-Aligned countries, as well as foreign aid, mainly from the US. Yugoslav companies carried out construction of numerous major infrastructural and industrial projects. The Energoprojekt was founded in 1951 to rebuild the country's war devastated infrastructure. By the early 1980s, the company was the world's 16th largest engineering and construction company, employing 7,000[69]. Many infrastructure projects in Africa and Asia were political deals, done for prestige reasons.

Nevertheless, during its existence, Yugoslavia had one of Europe's highest unemployment rates, with great regional differences. For example, in the early 1960s the unemployment rate in the whole country reached 7 per cent and continued to grow, doubling by the mid-1970s, but the Slovenian rate never exceeded 5%, while Macedonia and Kosovo had rates persistently above 20%[70].

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[69] JOHN TAGLIABUE (1983), "How A Yugoslav Company Built An International Market", *New York Times*, March 28, , Section D, Page 3

[70] SUSAN L. WOODWARD: *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia*, 1945-1990, p. 383

To make things worse, Yugoslavia lifted its emigration restrictions in the mid-1960s and the number of emigrants rapidly increased. By the early 1970s, 20% of the country's labor force was employed abroad, or 1.1 million workers, including high-skilled workers. Emigration was caused primarily by the deagrarization of force, deruralization, and overpopulation of larger cities[71].

The oil crisis of the 1970s exacerbated even more the economic problems of the country. Foreign debt grew at an annual rate of 20%, reaching more than US$ 20 billion in the early 1980s[72], forcing the government to renegotiate the foreign debt at the cost of implementing a policy of severe austerity measures.

Although the economic situation was not the most optimistic, and indeed continued to deteriorate, in 1981, when Yugoslav citizens took part in that year's census, a surprising number of people defined themselves as Yugoslav when asked to identify their nationality. To be precise, 5.4% of the population, a huge increase compared to the modest 1.3% of just 10 years earlier.

In an article published in the American Political Science Review in 1989, Burg and Berbaum show how their findings indicate that the support expressed in the declaration of Yugoslav identity for the multinational community was mainly attributable to broad social processes, like increasing ethnic interaction and socializing influence of already declared "Yugoslavs" on others, and that the declaration of Yugoslav identity can be seen as evidence of the "sense of community" associated with a widespread support for the regime, despite things not going well[73].

Nonetheless, they also claimed that this support was already fading away in some fringes of the population, saying that *"among intellectuals, students, and others, criticism of the regime's present incumbents and their policies and demands for democratization of the political order are increasing.*

Thus, the regime is already experiencing an erosion of specific support. While short-term negative performance may not affect the level of diffuse support, sustained negative performance is likely to do so. If the Yugoslav leadership is to insulate diffuse support for the regime from such an erosion, it must first resolve the social, economic, and political problems that underlie the decline in economic performance and contribute to the erosion of specific support.

Furthermore, they also added that "*the findings reported here imply that in order to increase the level of diffuse support, the leadership must also revise its strategy for controlling ethnic conflict and devise solutions to break down ethnic isolation and permit increased levels of interethnic contact*

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[71] DRAŽEN ŽIVIĆ, NENAD POKOS, IVO TURK (2005), *Basic Demographic Processes in Croatia, in Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik* 67/1, 27 – 44.
[72] MIECZYSLAW P. BODUSZYNSKI: *Regime Change in the Yugoslav Successor States: Divergent Paths toward a New Europe*, p. 64
[73] BURG, S., & BERBAUM, M. (1989). Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia, in *The American Political Science Review, 83*(2), 535-554

and to renew the formal socialization of regional populations to the Yugoslav idea. In the absence of such changes, it may be very difficult indeed to sustain diffuse support for a multinational political community in Yugoslavia"[74]

These last paragraphs were unwittingly premonitory of what would have been a couple of years later the main causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent wars that will be fought from 1991 to 2001 that will be characterized by genocide (like the Bosnian Genocide, the first to occur in Europe since WWII), war crimes, mass rape, and crimes against humanity.

The Yugoslav Wars led to the independence of almost all Yugoslav Socialist Republics, except Montenegro (which separated following a referendum in 2006) and the partially recognized Kosovo, as well as the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by the UN to prosecute those who committed crimes during the conflicts.

2.3. The causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia

When we talk about the breakup of Yugoslavia, we have to keep in mind that there is not a single solitary cause for it, nor a single solitary moment in history that determined the failure of the South Slavic federation project: rather, it is a set of concatenated events more or less distant in time from each other, but all of them closely linked, and whose effect have been seen in the course of decades. The problems that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia are both social and political in nature, as well as economic, and to speak of one of these as the single cause that triggered it all would be reductive, as well as wrong.

Several authors, like Dejan Jovic, identify as many as seven major types of arguments that can help explain the fall of Yugoslavia, the economic argument, the "ancient ethnic hatred" argument, the "nationalism" argument, the cultural argument, the "international politics" argument, the "role of personality" argument, and the "fall of empires" argument[75].

So, let us start by describing the structural causes, describing the institutional system of the federation, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a federation of eight Socialist Republic: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, plus two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina, both located within Serbia, at the head of the country was the President of the Federation, who was replaced in 1974, once the new Constitution was approved, by the Yugoslavs Presidency, a collective of eight members from the federal Socialist Republic.

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[74] Ibidem
[75] JOVIC, D., (2001). The disintegration of Yugoslavia: a critical review of explanatory approaches. *European Journal of Social Theory* 4 (1), 101–120.

This institutional set-up in itself was already problematic. The motivation behind this federalist choice was to provide an entity that represented each of the nations that made up the state, in order to avoid the ethnic clashes that had devastated the region in the previous centuries, until the Second World War. The problem, however, was that the two autonomous provinces had one seat, and therefore one vote each, in the Yugoslav presidency, despite being nominally under Serbia's dominion, and their vote was not always in favor of Serbia. Serbian public opinion has begun to see Yugoslavia as a threat to its republic (the infamous concept of "a weak Serbia for a strong Yugoslavia"). In addition, the 1974 Constitution introduced annual presidencies, meaning that each member of the presidency would assume the role of president for a year, so as to ensure that all ethnic components could govern. This strategy proved to be ineffective, however, as one year only for the presidency undermined the presidents' ability to run the country.

Another cause was the death of Tito, who until then had been the political and social glue of Yugoslavia. His death, which occurred in 1980, coincided precisely with the decade that characterized the weakening of Communism and Communist regimes in the Eastern European countries.

In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts published a controversial SANU memorandum describing (false) claims of growing anti-Serbian sentiment and urging the Serbian Government to do something to control the situation. The situation was also aggravated by the demands of the Autonomous Region of Kosovo to become a constituent republic in all respects, thus separating itself from Serbia. Likewise, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia pushed for greater and more consistent decentralization of the state[76].

In a paper published on Science Direct, Viachaslau Yarashevich and Yuliya Karneyeva claim that the cause of the collapse of Yugoslavia is at it's a core an economic issue, asserting that: *"There are numerous theories to explain why Yugoslavia eventually broke up, some of them focusing on nationalism and other political issues, others – on cultural and historical aspects. Undoubtedly, they can help in understanding the modern history of this in many respects' unique political entity in Europe, but it is plausible to assert that it was economic difficulties which were at the core of Yugoslavia's break-up. Based on the analysis of the economic situation in Yugoslavia before its break-up it can be argued that it was the economic drama which triggered other disintegrating factors. Indeed, when the Yugoslav economy was growing fast in the 1950s, 1960s and even in the 1970s, delivering welfare to wide masses of working people, nationalist sentiments were put down and separatist aspirations simply did not stand a chance to win popularity. As Yugoslav postwar economic success was largely attributable to self-management and export-led industrialization*

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[76] HENRY KAMM. (1985), "Yugoslav republic jealously guards its gains", *The New York Times,* December 8, , Section 1, Page 24

strategy, it is not surprising that when these two economic drivers stopped working properly in the 1980s, Yugoslavia went into freefall.

Caught in the circle of hyperinflation and economic stagnation, the peoples of Yugoslavia channeled their discontent along nationalist and separatist lines that ended up in one of the most gruesome conflicts in the postwar European history, which continues to resonate until the present day"[77].

Milos Bokic too believes that the economic crisis was, if not the trigger for the dissolution of the country, at least one of the most significant, that gave the opportunity to alternative ideas like nationalism to rise, in his words: *"The economic crisis of the eighties and the attenuation of influence of the Federal Communist party were giving a new life to political ideas which were based on the nationalism.[…] Failure of the system produced not only distrust between people of different nationalities, but also created such political situation in which nationalistic motivated individuals succeeded to link the existing dissatisfaction of the people with national differences and historical resentments. […] In the absence of the other forms of the political linking, nationalistic ideas became the most suitable means for winning a significant political support.[…] Constant tension between federal authorities and republic authorities on Yugoslav political scene at the end of the eighties produced a situation where every trivial issue in functioning of the state got ethnic or national connotation.[…] Yugoslav political elite was guilty because it allowed that nationalist sentiments become substitute for political arguments."[78]*

In conclusion, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was the result of a process whose roots are very old, particularly from a political and sociological point of view, but whose development has taken place over a period of approximately ten years, from the death of Tito to the beginning of the 1990s, and also, above all, because of the serious economic conditions in which it has found itself in the last years of its existence.

Chapter 3: The current situation in the former Yugoslav countries

Now that we have talked about the history of Yugoslavia, and above all of the nations that compose it, let us move on to analyze what their situation is today, especially in the context of the European Union.

Nowadays there are six countries that are fully recognized by the international community that were once part of Yugoslavia, plus Kosovo, which is only partially recognized: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia,

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[77] VIACHASLAU YARASHEVICH, YULIYA KARNEYEVA (2013), Economic reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Volume 46, Issue 2, Pages 263-273,

[78] BOKIC, MILOS, *The Main Reasons that Led to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia and Short Explanation of Failed Project of the Yugoslav Nation* (April 15, 2013), available at https://www.ssrn.com.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, all of which had a different development.

Among the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia are the one that has had the greatest development, from every point of view, be it social, economic or political.

Slovenia in itself is in a hybrid position: depending on the case, it is ascribed to the countries of South-Eastern Europe or those of Central Europe, even if the latter is the most often indicated[79]. Sometimes Croatia too is sometimes included, although much more rarely than Slovenia.

From the nineteenth century to the present day, the countries benefited from a series of fortunate coincidences that enabled them to grow continuously: a massive industrialization started already during the Habsburg rule that led it to be linked by train with the major cities of the Empire, also because Trieste (then under Austrian rule) was its main port.

The First World War hit the Slovenian and Croatian economy hard, but they became the country's key manufacturing centers already during the interwar period, when they were within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Slovenia and Croatia benefited from the rivalry between Tito and Stalin during the first years of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: fearing an armed invasion by the latter, Tito transferred much of the industry to the lands of the two western Republics. Because of its neutral stand, Yugoslavia could trade with both the East and the West, and this allowed the already strong economy to mitigate the negative effects of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in their respective country.

Together with Croatia, during the last years of Yugoslavia's existence, Slovenia was the republic that most pressed the federal government for greater decentralization and democracy within the republic, even passing constitutional amendments in the attempt to introduce parliamentary democracy[80].

When independence was declared in 1990, Slovenia had just 10 days of armed conflict with the Yugoslav army, and only North Macedonia, which had no armed conflict at all, had more luck. Croatia, on the other hand, was one of the countries that was hit the most by the war, which lasted from 1991 to 1995, approximately.

Today Slovenia is the most advanced among the former Yugoslav republics, and we only need to look at some data to realize it. For example, since 2010 Slovenia is the only former Yugoslav republics that is considered to be a developed economy by OECD, IMF, and World Bank, and that

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[79] Both the Encyclopedia Britannica and the CIA "The World Factbook" list Slovenia among the Central European countries
[80] DRAGO ZAJC, (2004). *Razvoj parlamentarizma: funkcije sodobnih parlamentov [The Development of Parliamentarism: The Functions of Modern Parliaments]*. Publishing House of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. p. 109.

meet the criteria to be considered as such in terms of HDI and per capita PPP[81]. Croatia is the only other country that accomplished something similar to Slovenia, but it does not meet the OECD and IMF parameters yet.

It is worth noting that Slovenian HDI, which is equal to 0.902 as of 2018[82], is the 24th highest in the world, and even taking into account the inequality-adjusted HDI (equals to 0.858)[83], it is still higher than Croatia (equals to 0.837)[84], the second highest among former Yugoslav Republic.

Today Slovenia is one of the most integrated countries in Europe: it is part of the EU, the EEA, the EU customs Union, NATO, and the Eurozone. Croatia is not part of the EEA nor the Eurozone yet, but is planning to do so in the not-so-distant future.

Serbia embarked on a tumultuous path of reforms following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the deposition of Milošević in 2000, which ultimately led to the complete democratization of its state apparatus in recent years. The early 2000s were not easy: until 2003, Serbia was part of a second state known as Yugoslavia, which also includes today's Kosovo and Montenegro, and which then changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro until 2006, the year of its dissolution.

The assassination of Zoran Đinđić, Prime Minister of Serbia and staunch opponent of Milošević, created enormous turmoil in the country, given that Đinđić was carrying out with his government big reform plans for Serbia, and also because he was elected after that for three times in the Serbian presidential elections no party had achieved an absolute majority of votes. In the presidential elections of 2004 Boris Tadić, the pro-West candidate of the Democratic Party, managed to win over Tomislav Nikolić, candidate of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party. In both the 2007 legislative elections and the 2008 presidential elections, the Democratic Party managed to win, confirming and continuing Serbia's desire for ever greater integration with Western countries, and in particular with the European Union.

But not everything went the right way. In 2006 Montenegro, which for many years had been pursuing a decidedly autonomous political line from the central government (just think that the current currency in the country was since 1999 the German mark and not the Yugoslav dinar), held a referendum in which citizens were asked to choose whether to remain in the federation together with Serbia, or whether to become an independent state, and the latter option was chosen by 55.4% of the voters.

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[81] It did not meet all the criteria in 2010, that is the year it met the OECD parameters, thus completing all the parameters to be defined as a developed country, the others were met in 2007, 1997, 1998, and 2004, respectively

[82] Human Development Report 2019 – "Human Development Indices and Indicators". HDRO (Human Development Report Office) United Nations Development Programme. pp. 22–25. Retrieved 9 December 2019.

[83] Ibidem

[84] Ibidem

In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia, since the negotiations begun in 2006 concerning the adoption of the so-called Ahtisaari Plan had led to nothing. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo's independence, and to this day it continues to list it in the Autonomous Regions of Serbia, alongside Vojvodina. To date, 98 countries have recognized Kosovo as an independent state, the last of which was Israel on 4 September 2020[85].

Both Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro have applied to join the European Union. Of the three, Kosovo is a potential candidate, given that five EU member states still do not recognize its independence, while Serbia and Montenegro are considered candidates negotiating. Among the three, Montenegro is the one that has brought the negotiations for accession further forward, closing three of the thirty-three chapters of the so-called Community AQUIS[86] (defined as *"the body of common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU countries, as EU Members"[87]*), Serbia closed two instead[88]. Both Kosovo and Montenegro have unilaterally adopted the Euro as their currency

Bosnia was the country that most of all suffered the horrors of war. Since more than 30% of the population was ethnic Serbs, and more than 17% ethnic Croats[89], Serbia and Croatia tried to take possession of those territories where their nationalities constituted the majority. The result was that Bosnia was the scene of some of the bloodiest events that Europe has witnessed since the Second World War, such as the infamous Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, where more than eight thousand Bosniak men and children found death at the hands of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under the command of Ratko Mladić.

Today Bosnia is a federal republic composed of two entities, the Srpska Republic, inhabited for the most part by Serbs, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited mainly by Bosniak with a substantial Croatian component. It is an applicant for EU membership and part of the NATO's Membership Action Plan, the only country to participate in it.

North Macedonia was the only former Socialist Republic that did not have to face an armed conflict with the Yugoslav army, but was involved in the 1999 Kosovo war, when hundreds of thousands of Kosovars crossed the border to seek refuge in the northern part of the country, with an Albanian

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[85] @IsraeliPM (PM of Israel). "US President @realDonaldTrump telephoned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu yesterday during the former's meeting with Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and congratulated the two leaders on their decision to establish full diplomatic relations between the two countries." *Twitter,* 5 set 2020, 8:30 p.m. https://twitter.com/IsraeliPM/status/1302313140802252808

[86] European Commission, Neighborhood Enlargement, Check current status, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/negotiations-status-montenegro.pdf

[87] EUR-Lex, Glossary of Summaries, "AQUIS", available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/acquis.html

[88] European Commission, Neighborhood Enlargement, Check current status, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-state-of-play.pdf

[89] "Stanovništvo prema nacionalnoj pripadnosti i površina naselja, popis 1991. za Bosnu i Hercegovinu", p. 1., available at: https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G1991/Pdf/G19914013.pdf

majority [90]. The situation became complicated in 2001, when an armed clash broke out between the Macedonian government and the Albanian insurgents (led mostly by the National Liberation Army, NLA), which fortunately was resolved within a few months with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which guaranteed greater political autonomy to the Albanian minority in North Macedonia on the condition that the NLA would be disarmed.

In more recent times, North Macedonia has had to deal with the rise of antiquization, a nationalist political ideology that seeks to find links between the contemporary Macedonian population (of Slavic ethnicity) with the ancient one (of Hellenic ethnicity). This has led to various diplomatic clashes especially with Greece: the dispute over the name of the country was one of the most heated and heartfelt by public opinion, to the point that Greece would have hindered North Macedonia's access to NATO and the European Union, if the question of the had not been resolved[91]. On 12 June 2018, after years of negotiations, with the so-called Prespa agreement the governments of the two countries managed to overcome the issue, and the name of Republic of North Macedonia was adopted. This made it possible for the country to apply and became part of NATO in March 2020 and is now looking forward to join the European Union, with which negotiations have begun in March 2020 as well[92].

[90] THOMAS, NIGEL (2006). The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo And Macedonia 1992–2001. Osprey Publishing
[91] "Karamanlis: No accession without a solution for the name". *Eleútheros Týpos*. 19 October 2007
[92] ENLARGEMENT AND STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS - the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania - Council conclusions. Council of the European Union. 25 March 2020. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7002-2020-INIT/en/pdf

Conclusion

The analysis concluded within this final dissertation is that if more attention had been paid to the more divisive phenomena within the country, the integration process in Yugoslavia could have been better, and perhaps lead to the results hoped for by Tito. As we have seen, the 1980s were the turning point in the integration process, both for good and for bad, with as many as 5.4% of the population identifying themselves as Yugoslavs at the 1981 census, as well as the rise of Serbian nationalism. However, this is only the point of arrival of a much longer process, which began even before the creation of Yugoslavia, with Slovenia and Croatia which have maintained levels of growth well above the average of the country thanks also and above all to the solid industry. and to the infrastructures built already during the Habsburg rule, which allowed them a greater and better development. If Yugoslav politics had therefore concentrated on trying to bring the levels of modernization of the other Republics to levels similar to those of Croatia and Slovenia, there would certainly have been one less problem, considering also that one of the reasons why the latter pushed for a greater decentralization of the state was due precisely to the fact that they felt exploited by the other Republics. Tito's move to transfer industries from the east of the country to the west, fearing a Soviet attack, might have been a good military strategy, but it only exacerbated the already serious situation of inequality.

The figure of Tito, then, was in itself both a benefit and a cause of problems: if it is true that he created a political and social glue that lasted until his death, it is also true that after his death no other politician he was able to create the same conditions, making the glue created by the persona of Tito fail. Obviously, he had no intention of leaving Yugoslavia in the hands of one person, and this can be seen because it was he who introduced the system of rotating presidencies, but perhaps he should first have tried to cautiously distance himself from the public stage so as to allow the presidency of Yugoslavia to take the baton of unifying entity of the nation and to make people get used to perceive it as such.

Another problem was the limbo in which the country found itself after the split between Tito and Stalin: Yugoslavia in fact was in dialogue with both the Western and the Eastern blocs, but not being part of either of the two, it should have sought with more perseverance to create that third bloc formed by non-aligned countries, or in any case try to forge better alliances with international partners, so as to avoid being isolated.

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Riassunto in lingua italiana

La Yugoslavia è stata uno degli esperimenti politici più interessanti del ventesimo secolo. La sua bellezza sta nel fatto che la concezione di un tale organismo politico è molto più antica della sua creazione. Se, infatti, la nascita del primo stato jugoslavo risale al 1929, con la fondazione del Regno di Jugoslavia, l'idea di uno stato che racchiudesse al suo interno tutte le popolazioni slave meridionali risale invece ad almeno un secolo prima, agli inizi dell'Ottocento, in contemporanea con la nascita delle ideologie liberaliste e nazionaliste nel continente Europeo. I moti che hanno attraversato l'Europa nel '48, noti anche come primavera dei popoli, costituiranno, appunto, l'apice della diffusione di tali ideologie. È quindi molto importante, prima di parlare della Jugoslavia, capire a fondo il complicato processo storico che ha portato alla sua formazione, ed è questo l'obiettivo del primo capitolo di questa tesi: descrivere e discutere i vari avvenimenti che si sono succeduti nei Balcani dall'Ottocento al Novecento, dando anche un veloce sguardo ai fatti più importanti avvenuti precedentemente, così da avere un'idea completa dello sviluppo del fenomeno nazionalistico. Si inizierà, quindi, prima con un breve descrizione dei vari popoli slavi che abitano in Europa e si procederà con un rapido excursus storico sui principali avvenimenti nei Balcani prima dell'Ottocento. Si passerà, poi, ad analizzare nel dettaglio la nascita e lo sviluppo delle ideologie nazionaliste nelle regioni dei Balcani abitate da popolazioni slave, ponendo particolare attenzione al rapporto fra queste e gli imperi ai quali erano sottomesse, l'Impero Austro-Ungarico e l'Impero Ottomano. Si proseguirà, poi, descrivendo la linea di pensiero e di strategia politica perseguita dalle Grandi Potenze Occidentali nei Balcani, che sono poi alla base dello scoppio delle Guerre Balcaniche e della Prima Guerra Mondiale: è, infatti, impossibile separare le due cose, in quanto queste ultime sono dirette conseguenze della prima. Si vedrà soprattutto come l'interesse delle Grandi Potenze nei Balcani fu dovuto all'improvviso vuoto di potere lasciato in quell'area da parte dell'Impero Ottomano, che aveva dominato la regione per secoli; vedremo, inoltre, le diverse ragioni che hanno portato ognuna di quelle potenze, a suo modo, a interessarsi così tanto di quel territorio. La Prima Guerra Mondiale ha avuto come conseguenza, fra le tante, quella della creazione del primo stato sovrano, indipendente da dominio straniero, che riunisse tutti i popoli slavi meridionali, il Regno dei Croati, Serbi e Sloveni, che avrebbe dovuto rappresentare un modello di convivenza fra diverse etnie. Purtroppo, però, tale organismo politico avrà una vita molto difficile, nonostante la sua breve durata (circa dieci anni), per via delle forti spinte nazionalistiche e delle diverse opinioni delle stesse etnie costituenti su come avrebbe dovuto essere organizzato. A seguito di un colpo di stato, per mano del re Alessandro I, nacque il Regno di Jugoslavia. Il monarca instaurò una dittatura personale che mirava alla centralizzazione culturale ed amministrativa dello Stato, cercando quindi di eliminare le differenze fra i vari popoli slavi che lo abitavano, così da evitare qualsivoglia pressione politica.

Purtroppo, anche il Regno di Jugoslavia ebbe breve durata. Con lo scoppio della Seconda Guerra Mondiale arrivò anche l'invasione da parte dell'Italia Fascista e della Germania Nazista. In un primo momento, il Regno cercò di mantenere una posizione neutrale sperando che, come la Svizzera, avrebbe potuto evitare di essere oggetto di mire espansionistiche da parte delle forze dell'Asse: ma così non fu. Il paese fu invaso e fu creato lo stato Indipendente di Croazia, un organismo fantoccio sotto il controllo della Germania e dell'Italia, retto dagli Ustaša, i fascisti croati, che si macchiarono di indicibili crimini quali il genocidio della popolazione serba, oltre che ebraica, e l'istituzione di numerosi campi di concentramento. Sarà solo grazie all'aiuto dei Partigiani, guidati dal comunista Josip Broz (successivamente noto come Tito), che la Jugoslavia sarebbe stata liberata dal dominio straniero. È importante tenere a mente che l'Armata Rossa dei Sovietici aiutò poco o nulla i Partigiani, e questo sarà di grande importanza per lo sviluppo delle future relazioni fra i due paesi.

Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sull'ideologia identitaria della Repubblica Socialista di Jugoslavia, il Titoismo, che cercò di appianare le differenze fra i popoli che abitavano la Repubblica creando una nuova identità nazionale, appunto quella jugoslava. Si partirà da un'importante pressa: capire cosa si intende con nazione e nazionalismo. Le prime pagine del secondo capitolo sono, quindi, dedicate all'approfondimento di questi due concetti, peraltro complessi persino in una loro definizione univoca, che non manca di essere oggetto di dibattito nella critica. Alcuni studiosi, infatti, ritengono il fenomeno puramente europeo; conseguentemente, tutti i nazionalismi al di fuori dell'Europa non sarebbero altro che una riproposizione di concetti europei in chiave locale. Altri, invece, soprattutto negli ultimi anni, ritengono questa visione troppo eurocentrica, quindi anacronistica e slegata dalla realtà. Allo stesso modo, altri studiosi cercano di connettere il fenomeno del nazionalismo a quello dell'industrializzazione, notando una certa correlazione fra la nascita dei movimenti nazionalisti e la società industrializzata; tale tesi, comunque, è oggetto di critica da parte di coloro che ritengono questa visione troppo funzionalista per il fatto di non tenere in considerazione altri fattori che possono aver portato alla nascita di questi movimenti. Dopo una disamina di queste differenti posizioni, si passa alla descrizione del Titoismo, ponendo particolarmente l'accento sulle differenze con l'altra grande ideologia comunista vigente in quel momento in Europa: lo Stalinismo. Il Titoismo, infatti, nacque negli anni 50, quando ci fu una profonda scissione fra Tito e Stalin, che avvenne a seguito del rifiuto del primo di ubbidire ciecamente agli ordini e alla volontà del secondo. Ciò fu possibile perché la Jugoslavia fu l'unico grande stato comunista che riuscì a liberarsi dall'oppressione nazi-fascista senza l'aiuto dell'Armata Rossa. Quindi, non era sottoposta a quel regime di sorveglianza e di controllo al quale erano invece erano costretti tutti i paesi del blocco comunista. Ne conseguì che la Jugoslavia poté portare avanti le sue politiche in maniera autonoma da Mosca. Nel suo complesso, l'analisi dell'ideologia titoista si può riassumere in tre punti principali.

Innanzitutto, ogni paese deve portare avanti il suo progetto di trasformazione della società da borghese a comunista seguendo le proprie esigenze; perciò, l'esistenza di un singolo stato guida (l'URSS) è inconcepibile. Il secondo punto riguarda, invece, il ricorso ai metodi violenti e rivoluzionari per instaurare la dittatura del proletariato. Considerato dagli Stalinisti come l'unico modo per portare avanti il progetto comunista, al contrario i Titoisti ritenevano che tale azione non fosse sempre necessaria e che a volte la rivoluzione comunista poteva prendere piede anche nei sistemi politici capitalistici (come, per esempio, nei paesi scandinavi). Infine, il Titoismo aveva sì come obbiettivo la realizzazione dello stato comunista, ma tale obiettivo si sarebbe dovuto raggiungere in un lungo periodo, senza quindi cercare di accelerare il processo, rispettando, appunto, i bisogni e le necessità del singolo stato. Dopo aver discusso di questi temi, la tesi ritorna sull'analisi dei principali eventi storici avvenuti in Jugoslavia. In particolare, si soffermerà sul rilassamento delle relazioni internazionali fra i due paesi (Jugoslavia e URSS) a séguito della morte di Stalin nel 1953. Nel frattempo, la Jugoslavia era diventata uno degli stati fondatori del Movimento dei Non-Allineati, che raggruppava tutti gli stati non facenti parte né del blocco Occidentale, né di quello Orientale. Uno degli obbiettivi di Tito, che comunque non riuscì a portare a compimento, era di riuscire a rendere questo movimento il "terzo blocco" nelle relazioni internazionali. Successivamente, si analizza la situazione economica della Yugoslavia dagli anni 50 agli anni 70: in particolare, l'introduzione del sistema dell'autogestione dei lavoratori e le prime sostanziali differenze regionali che avrebbero poi avuto un ruolo importante nella dissoluzione del paese. È importante, però, notare come nel censimento del 1981 si documentò il più alto numero mai registrato di cittadini dichiaratisi Jugoslavi, pari al 5,4% della popolazione, in forte aumento rispetto a dieci anni prima, quando aveva raggiunto l'1,3%, evidenziando come la politica unificatrice di Tito avesse cominciato a dare i risultati sperati. Alla fine del secondo capitolo si tratterà della dissoluzione della Jugoslavia. Le cause furono diverse, ma tutte strettamente collegate: la morte di Tito, considerato il collante politico e sociale del paese, l'ascesa del nazionalismo serbo, una sempre più difficile situazione economica e l'indebolimento dei regimi comunisti a livello globale. In questa sezione, la tesi cerca di esplorare queste ed altre cause che hanno contribuito in maniera più o meno risolutiva alla dissoluzione della Jugoslavia. Il terzo capitolo, invece, descrive brevemente la situazione attuale di tutte le ex-Repubbliche Socialiste, evidenziando come ancora oggi le già esistenti differenze regionali non si siano appianate, ma che anzi siano persino aumentate. Si cercherà, quindi, di capire quali sono le sfide che stanno oggi affrontando questi paesi e quali potrebbero essere quelle da affrontarsi in futuro.