Bayesian persuasion under a value of information constraint
Gan, Xingwei (A.A. 2022/2023) Bayesian persuasion under a value of information constraint. Tesi di Laurea in Advanced corporate finance, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Matteo Escude, pp. 16. [Master's Degree Thesis]
![[img]](http://tesi.luiss.it/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF (Full text)
Restricted to Registered users only Download (537kB) | Request a copy |
Abstract/Index
Literature review. The persuasion model with a value of information constraint. Relationships between the informativeness of optimal signal structures and the VOI requirements. Informativeness may be non-monotone in C. As C increases, informativeness cannot strictly decrease. Sufficient condition for (strictly) increasing case.
References
Bibliografia: p. 15.
| Thesis Type: | Master's Degree Thesis |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Luiss Guido Carli |
| Degree Program: | Master's Degree Programs > Master's Degree Program in Economics and Finance (LM-56) |
| Chair: | Advanced corporate finance |
| Thesis Supervisor: | Escude, Matteo |
| Thesis Co-Supervisor: | Michelacci, Claudio |
| Academic Year: | 2022/2023 |
| Session: | Summer |
| Deposited by: | Alessandro Perfetti |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jan 2024 14:47 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Jan 2024 14:47 |
| URI: | https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/37438 |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
Repository Staff Only
 |
View Item |
