Rethinking the non-delegation doctrine in the EU: the case of the Anti-money laundering authority (AMLA)
Armini, Ludovica (A.A. 2024/2025) Rethinking the non-delegation doctrine in the EU: the case of the Anti-money laundering authority (AMLA). Tesi di Laurea in Regulation by independent agencies, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Marta Simoncini, pp. 129. [Master's Degree Thesis]
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Abstract/Index
“Agencification” and the evolution of EU financial supervision. EU agencies through a theoretical lens. The rise of EU agencies. The 2008 financial crisis as catalyst for institutional reform. From coordination to integration: the European system of financial supervision. Blurring the lines: soft law and quasi-regulation. Framing the non-delegation principle in EU law. The Meroni doctrine. Revisiting the non-delegation principle. Rethinking Meroni: shaping the next chapter of EU governance. The Meroni doctrine and the case of the Anti-money laundering authority (AMLA). Responding to systemic deficiencies: why the EU needed AMLA. Regulation (EU) 2024/1620: AMLA’s regulatory framework and institutional design. AMLA’s supervisory and enforcement powers. AMLA through the lens of the Meroni doctrine: compliance or departure? Rethinking delegation and oversight: strengthening AMLA’s accountability.
References
Bibliografia: pp. 112-128.
| Thesis Type: | Master's Degree Thesis |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Luiss Guido Carli |
| Degree Program: | Master's Degree Programs > Corso di Laurea magistrale in Policies and Governance in Europe, lingua inglese (LM-62) |
| Chair: | Regulation by independent agencies |
| Thesis Supervisor: | Simoncini, Marta |
| Thesis Co-Supervisor: | Thatcher, Mark |
| Academic Year: | 2024/2025 |
| Session: | Autumn |
| Deposited by: | Alessandro Perfetti |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Apr 2026 12:48 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Apr 2026 12:48 |
| URI: | https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/45363 |
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