Signaling and matching through luxury goods: the microeconomics of the Veblen effects and fashion cycles

Gallo, Ludovica (A.A. 2016/2017) Signaling and matching through luxury goods: the microeconomics of the Veblen effects and fashion cycles. Tesi di Laurea in Io & competition theory, LUISS Guido Carli, relatore Gian Luigi Albano, pp. 45. [Bachelor's Degree Thesis]

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Abstract/Index

Content overview. Rationalizing conspicuous consumption and Veblen effects. Feasibility and reasons behind markup pricing in the luxury industry. The quiet signaling strategy: adding noisy information to standard signaling. Fashion immediacy: a game theory perspective. Conciliating the models with reality.

References

Bibliografia: pp. 40-41. Sitografia: pp. 42-44.

Thesis Type: Bachelor's Degree Thesis
Institution: LUISS Guido Carli
Degree Program: Bachelor's Degree Programs > Bachelor's Degree Program in Economics and Business, english language (L-33)
Chair: Io & competition theory
Thesis Supervisor: Albano, Gian Luigi
Academic Year: 2016/2017
Session: Summer
Deposited by: Alessandro Perfetti
Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2017 13:53
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2017 13:53
URI: https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/19713

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