Capacity remuneration mechanisms in the EU energy market: the Italian experience as a case study
Marini, Benedetta (A.A. 2021/2022) Capacity remuneration mechanisms in the EU energy market: the Italian experience as a case study. Tesi di Laurea in Regulation by independent agencies, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Marta Simoncini, pp. 100. [Master's Degree Thesis]
Full text for this thesis not available from the repository.
Abstract/Index
The sustainability of the energy–only market design. The introduction of Capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs). Typologies of capacity remuneration mechanisms. The impact of capacity remuneration mechanisms on the construction of the single European energy market. Capacity remuneration mechanisms and the energy transition. Existing barriers to the design of capacity remuneration mechanisms and strategies to secure generation adequacy. New challenges in remunerating capacity market. The functional system of energy-only markets and the importance of CRMs. Aspects and alternatives for the market design and status of implementation all over the world. Market power: potential, effects, uncertainty, and risks. CRM: its efficiency and market welfare. Policy implications and concluding remarks. The liberalisation of the Italian electricity market. The regulatory path towards the implementation of Capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs).
References
Bibliografia: p. 24, pp. 53-60, p. 80, pp. 83-91.
Thesis Type: | Master's Degree Thesis |
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Institution: | Luiss Guido Carli |
Degree Program: | Master's Degree Programs > Corso di Laurea magistrale in Policies and Governance in Europe, lingua inglese (LM-62) |
Chair: | Regulation by independent agencies |
Thesis Supervisor: | Simoncini, Marta |
Thesis Co-Supervisor: | Salerno, Francesco Maria |
Academic Year: | 2021/2022 |
Session: | Summer |
Deposited by: | Alessandro Perfetti |
Date Deposited: | 13 Dec 2022 13:27 |
Last Modified: | 13 Dec 2022 13:27 |
URI: | https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/34342 |
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