When regulation fosters financial conglomerates: a Danish compromise simulation

Clarelli, Daniele (A.A. 2024/2025) When regulation fosters financial conglomerates: a Danish compromise simulation. Tesi di Laurea in Advanced corporate finance, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Pierluigi Murro, pp. 136. [Master's Degree Thesis]

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Abstract/Index

Banks regulatory framework. Banking regulation context: Basel I, Basel II. Risk evaluation in banking regulation: RWAs. Basel III: capital adequacy and tier structures. Basel IV: EU banking regulation. Equity exposures, from Basel III to IV: a spotlight on insurance stakes. The Danish compromise. A favorable moment to reshape Europe’s financial landscape. Article 49: the Danish compromise. The rise of financial conglomerates in European Bancassurance. EU powerful tool to foster competitiveness. A regulatory controversy: the double gearing of capital. Article 49: an “unique gift” form EU regulator. Future outlooks: economic rationale over regulatory arbitrage. The Bancassurance model. The bancassurance business model in Italy and Europe. The typology of Bancassurance models. Benefits and risks of the Bancassurance model. An in-depth analysis of the joint venture model. Form a joint venture model to full control. Does the full integration create value? The accounting of insurance stakes: a DC illustrative simulation. A Danish compromise simulation.

References

Bibliografia: pp. 129-136.

Thesis Type: Master's Degree Thesis
Institution: Luiss Guido Carli
Degree Program: Master's Degree Programs > Master's Degree program in Corporate Finance, English language (LM-77)
Chair: Advanced corporate finance
Thesis Supervisor: Murro, Pierluigi
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Altieri, Michela
Academic Year: 2024/2025
Session: Autumn
Deposited by: Alessandro Perfetti
Date Deposited: 29 Jan 2026 13:49
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2026 13:49
URI: https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/44709

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