Institutional independence vs political influence: Greece’s exclusion from ECB quantitative easing and its consequences (2015–2018)
Ferretti, Julien Olivier (A.A. 2024/2025) Institutional independence vs political influence: Greece’s exclusion from ECB quantitative easing and its consequences (2015–2018). Tesi di Laurea in European political economy in times of crises, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Marco Simoni, pp. 67. [Master's Degree Thesis]
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Abstract/Index
Research puzzle & question over the exclusion. Background and context. Problem significance and rationale. Research question and argumentative stance. Research design & methodology. Theoretical framework. Literature review. Background: the QE programme and crisis governance. QE architecture: legal basis, rules and conditions. Greece under bailout: economic and political landscape. Portugal’s inclusion: conditions met or politics aligned? Timeline of ECB decisions on Greek bond purchases. Analysis: discretion behind the rules. Formal criteria vs. Discretionary enforcement. German and French roles in shaping the ECB's boundaries. Decision-making inside the ECB: technocratic language, political outcomes. Why Portugal, not Greece? A comparative reading. Consequences and contestation. Sovereignty and structural subordination. Public welfare and the cost of exclusion. Democratic erosion and euroscepticism. Rethinking ECB neutrality in a political union.
References
Bibliografia: pp. 54-67.
| Thesis Type: | Master's Degree Thesis |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Luiss Guido Carli |
| Degree Program: | Master's Degree Programs > Master's Degree Program in International Relations (LM-52) |
| Chair: | European political economy in times of crises |
| Thesis Supervisor: | Simoni, Marco |
| Thesis Co-Supervisor: | Magnani, Marco |
| Academic Year: | 2024/2025 |
| Session: | Autumn |
| Deposited by: | Alessandro Perfetti |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Feb 2026 08:46 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Feb 2026 08:46 |
| URI: | https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/44730 |
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