Institutional independence vs political influence: Greece’s exclusion from ECB quantitative easing and its consequences (2015–2018)

Ferretti, Julien Olivier (A.A. 2024/2025) Institutional independence vs political influence: Greece’s exclusion from ECB quantitative easing and its consequences (2015–2018). Tesi di Laurea in European political economy in times of crises, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Marco Simoni, pp. 67. [Master's Degree Thesis]

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Abstract/Index

Research puzzle & question over the exclusion. Background and context. Problem significance and rationale. Research question and argumentative stance. Research design & methodology. Theoretical framework. Literature review. Background: the QE programme and crisis governance. QE architecture: legal basis, rules and conditions. Greece under bailout: economic and political landscape. Portugal’s inclusion: conditions met or politics aligned? Timeline of ECB decisions on Greek bond purchases. Analysis: discretion behind the rules. Formal criteria vs. Discretionary enforcement. German and French roles in shaping the ECB's boundaries. Decision-making inside the ECB: technocratic language, political outcomes. Why Portugal, not Greece? A comparative reading. Consequences and contestation. Sovereignty and structural subordination. Public welfare and the cost of exclusion. Democratic erosion and euroscepticism. Rethinking ECB neutrality in a political union.

References

Bibliografia: pp. 54-67.

Thesis Type: Master's Degree Thesis
Institution: Luiss Guido Carli
Degree Program: Master's Degree Programs > Master's Degree Program in International Relations (LM-52)
Chair: European political economy in times of crises
Thesis Supervisor: Simoni, Marco
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Magnani, Marco
Academic Year: 2024/2025
Session: Autumn
Deposited by: Alessandro Perfetti
Date Deposited: 10 Feb 2026 08:46
Last Modified: 10 Feb 2026 08:46
URI: https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/44730

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