Aligning executive compensation with long-term value: the role of ESG-linked incentives in modern corporate governance
Perillo, Melania (A.A. 2024/2025) Aligning executive compensation with long-term value: the role of ESG-linked incentives in modern corporate governance. Tesi di Laurea in Corporate governance, Luiss Guido Carli, relatore Alessandro Zattoni, pp. 46. [Master's Degree Thesis]
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Abstract/Index
Agency theory. Shareholder value vs. stakeholder value. Corporate social responsibility and ESG principles. Executive compensation as a governance mechanism. ESG-linked pay: emerging practices and debates. Theoretical rationale and academic debate. Evolution of executive remuneration regulation in Europe. Guidelines on pay-for-performance and sustainability. ESG disclosure, transparency and performance measurement. International best practices in ESG-linked compensation design. Research design and analytical framework. Analytical expectations for ESG-Linked executive compensation in banking. UniCredit: Design and implementation of ESG-linked executive compensation. Intesa Sanpaolo: design and implementation of ESG-linked executive compensation. Comparative analysis: UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo. Theoretical assessment of ESG-linked compensation architectures. Theoretical implications, practical implications and limitations.
References
Bibliografia: pp. 43-45.
| Thesis Type: | Master's Degree Thesis |
|---|---|
| Institution: | Luiss Guido Carli |
| Degree Program: | Master's Degree Programs > Master's Degree program in Corporate Finance, English language (LM-77) |
| Chair: | Corporate governance |
| Thesis Supervisor: | Zattoni, Alessandro |
| Thesis Co-Supervisor: | Fiori, Giovanni |
| Academic Year: | 2024/2025 |
| Session: | Extraordinary |
| Deposited by: | Alessandro Perfetti |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2026 14:55 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Jun 2026 14:55 |
| URI: | https://tesi.luiss.it/id/eprint/46228 |
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